Opinion argues India lacks a West Asia strategy as a Saudi Arabia, Turkiye and Pakistan collective defence pact signed in Mecca reshapes the region’s security architecture

Why in the News

A collective defence pact signed in Mecca between Saudi Arabia, Turkiye and Pakistan has altered the security architecture of West Asia. The pact pools Saudi capital, Pakistani military strength and Turkish defence technology, and is aimed at deterring Israel rather than Iran. India built a decade of gains in the region and now has no declared strategy to answer this realignment.

What is the Mecca collective defence pact?

1. Parties: Saudi Arabia, Turkiye and Pakistan signed the pact in Mecca, the latest of the region’s realignments.
2. What collective defence means: An armed attack on one signatory is treated as an attack on all, triggering a commitment to respond jointly.
3. Pooled capabilities: The three pool Saudi capital, Pakistan’s military strength and Turkiye’s technological advances.
4. Its actual target: The pact is aimed less at Iran and more at deterring Israel, since all three see themselves as Israel’s next target after Iran.
5. Limited effect on the Iran war: None of the three signatories is likely to take on Iran directly alongside the United States.

What is the I2U2 grouping?

1. About: I2U2 binds India, Israel, the United States and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), agreed in 2021.
2. Focus: It channels joint investment into water, energy, transport, space, health and food security.

What is the Gulf Cooperation Council?

1. About: The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is a regional grouping of six Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf.
2. Function: It coordinates defence, economic and security policy among its members.

What is the UN Interim Force in Lebanon?

1. About: The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) is a peacekeeping force deployed in southern Lebanon since 1978.
2. Mandate: It monitors the cessation of hostilities along the Blue Line and supports the Lebanese army’s deployment to the south.

What is the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait?

1. About: It is the strait linking the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, lying between Yemen on one side and Djibouti and Eritrea on the other.
2. Why it matters: Every vessel using the Suez Canal route between Europe and Asia must pass through it.

What did India build in West Asia over the past decade?

1. 2016, Saudi recognition: Saudi Arabia awarded India’s Prime Minister its highest civilian honour, marking a shift in the political relationship.
2. 2021, I2U2: The I2U2 agreement was signed, tying India into a grouping with Israel, the United States and the UAE.
3. 2024, Chabahar: Iran leased Chabahar port to India, giving overland access towards Afghanistan and Central Asia that bypasses Pakistan.
4. The UAE relationship: India cultivated a special relationship with the UAE built on remittances from Indian expatriate workers, investments by Indian business in the UAE, and UAE strategic investments in India.
5. Where they stand now: These are gains from the past, and India’s footprint is contracting one country at a time.

Why is the region’s security order breaking down now?

1. A war that spread: In the last four months the United States and Israel war with Iran escalated into a regional conflict.
2. Iran against the Gulf: Iran attacked GCC countries, ending the assumption that the Gulf monarchies sit outside the fighting.
3. Saudi strikes in Iraq: Saudi Arabia hit Iraqi militias.
4. Attacks at sea: The Houthis attacked Saudi ships.
5. Israeli strikes: Israel carried out strikes in multiple countries.
6. The American umbrella in doubt: Gulf states are rethinking the efficacy of the United States security umbrella and now see a threat from both Iran and Israel.
7. A schism over method: The Gulf is split between handling that threat through engagement, the UAE approach, and through deterrence, which Saudi Arabia is contemplating.

How has Pakistan converted the regional crisis into diplomatic capital?

1. The mediator role: Pakistan’s role as mediator in the United States and Iran conflict is earning it reputational benefits across the region.
2. The timing: It entered when no one else could bring the United States President and the Iranians to the table.
3. Who had failed first: Turkiye, Qatar and Egypt had all attempted mediation without success.
4. The pact as the payoff: The Mecca collective defence pact follows directly from that diplomatic moment.
5. The Israel risk for India: A future Israel and Pakistan war would draw India in, given the close India Israel partnership.
6. The Turkiye risk for India: Greater Turkish support for Pakistan in a future India Pakistan conflict cannot be ruled out.

What do the positions of individual regional states reveal about the new architecture?

1. Saudi Arabia, deterrence and a new maritime force: Riyadh is moving from engagement to deterrence, supplies the capital leg of the Mecca pact, and is raising a Saudi led maritime force for the Red Sea that India is not part of.
2. Turkiye, technology as leverage: Ankara contributes defence technology to the pact and runs a deepening military relationship with Pakistan that India has no channel to discuss.
3. Pakistan, military manpower as currency: Islamabad supplies the military strength the pact rests on, converting an army into diplomatic capital with Gulf financiers.
4. United Arab Emirates, engagement over deterrence: Abu Dhabi manages the Iran and Israel threat through engagement, and carries mounting differences with Saudi Arabia plus positions against United Nations recognised governments in conflicts as far away as Sudan.
5. Iran, from partner to belligerent: Tehran leased Chabahar to India in 2024 and has since attacked GCC states, putting India’s connectivity asset inside an active war zone.
6. Israel, strikes that created the pact: Israeli operations across multiple countries made three regional states conclude they are next, which is the design logic of the Mecca pact.

Why does India’s current posture carry risk?

1. The Israel bet: India’s approach rests on confidence in Israel’s victory, drawn from Israel’s proximity to the United States.
2. The American consensus is shifting: Both Make America Great Again Republicans and Democratic Socialists now question the once unquestioned United States support for Israel.
3. Israel alone: Whether Israel can prevail without assured American backing is unsettled.
4. The UAE bet: The second pillar of India’s regional position is the UAE relationship, resting on remittances, elite investment and Emirati investment in India.
5. UAE exposure: The UAE’s differences with Saudi Arabia and its Sudan positions place that pillar at risk.

What are the choices before India?

1. Formal alignment: India can sign military alliances with Israel and the UAE.
2. The cost of alignment: That would damage what is left of India’s relationships with Iran and Saudi Arabia.
3. Continued inaction: India can do nothing, which is the current position.
4. Cost of inaction, seafarers: Indian merchant mariners continue to be killed in the Strait of Hormuz.
5. Cost of inaction, shipping: More Indian ships sink in the Bab-el-Mandeb.
6. Reputational cost: A great power in the making appears hobbled in its own immediate maritime neighbourhood.
7. The third way: India can devise an active regional political strategy instead of choosing between alignment and drift.

What would an active Indian regional strategy involve?

1. Renewed engagement with Saudi Arabia: India has no explicit differences with Riyadh, which makes it the cheapest relationship to rebuild.
2. Arab and Iran trust building: India can work to rebuild trust between Arab states and Iran, beginning with the UAE and Iran relationship.
3. Jordan’s security: India can offer defensive technologies to Jordan at a time when United States munitions are running low.
4. Lebanon peacekeeping: India can take a role in the future UN peacekeeping presence in Lebanon, with UNIFIL forecast to end.
5. A back channel with Turkiye: India can share its red lines on Turkiye’s relationship with Pakistan through a quiet channel.
6. Red Sea shipping with Egypt: If India cannot join the Saudi led maritime force, it can work with Egypt on a parallel effort to protect India bound shipping from the Suez Canal to Bab-el-Mandeb.
7. A military presence: India can examine a presence in the Red Sea region, in Somaliland or Socotra.
8. Exercises with the region: Existing military training exchanges can be scaled into joint drills and exercises with a range of regional states.
9. A Special Envoy for West Asia: India can appoint one who draws all the threads together, rather than one confined to the Israel and Palestine peace process.

Challenges to India’s West Asia Strategy

1. The alliance trap: Any formal military alignment with one camp forecloses the other, since Iran and Saudi Arabia both read Indian alignment as a choice against them. e.g. India’s Chabahar development slowed each time United States sanctions pressure on Iran tightened.
2. The Turkiye and Pakistan axis: Turkish defence technology transfers to Pakistan directly degrade India’s conventional edge. e.g. Turkish origin Songar armed drones were used against Indian positions during the May 2025 hostilities.
3. Chokepoint exposure: India’s trade and energy routes converge on two narrow straits it cannot secure alone. e.g. Houthi attacks from late 2023 forced Indian bound shipping to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope, raising freight and insurance costs.
4. Attacks on Indian crewed shipping: Indian seafarers crew a large share of global merchant vessels and absorb the human cost of regional escalation. e.g. the drone strike on MV Chem Pluto off Porbandar in December 2023.
5. Evacuation burden: Every escalation converts India’s diaspora presence into a mass evacuation operation. e.g. Operation Kaveri from Sudan in 2023 and Operation Sindhu from Iran and Israel in June 2025.
6. No standing regional mechanism: India has no dedicated envoy or regional platform to convert bilateral goodwill into collective influence. e.g. the piece’s own recommendation for a Special Envoy for West Asia has no existing counterpart in the Indian system.
7. Exclusion from new regional security structures: New arrangements are being built without Indian participation. e.g. the Saudi led Red Sea maritime force, which India is not part of.

Conclusion

West Asia’s security architecture is being rebuilt around a Saudi Arabia, Turkiye and Pakistan pact designed to deter Israel, and India has no strategy that matches the scale of that change. Formal alignment with Israel and the UAE costs India Iran and Saudi Arabia, and inaction costs it seafarers, ships and standing. The workable route is an active regional political strategy built on renewed engagement with Riyadh, trust building between the Arab states and Iran, and a dedicated envoy. India’s capacity to shape the region survives, its window does not.

West Asia in India’s Foreign Policy

1. About: West Asia covers the Gulf monarchies, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Turkiye and the Levant, treated in Indian policy as an extended neighbourhood rather than a distant theatre.
2. Policy label: India’s approach shifted from Look West to Link West, moving beyond oil and labour transactions towards defence, technology and investment partnerships.
3. Energy: West Asia remains a principal source of India’s crude oil imports, and Qatar is India’s largest supplier of liquefied natural gas.
4. Diaspora: About 9 million Indians live and work in the Gulf, the largest concentration of the Indian diaspora anywhere.
5. Remittances: India is the world’s largest recipient of remittances, receiving over 100 billion dollars annually, with the Gulf a major contributor.
6. Trade: The UAE is among India’s top three trading partners, and the India UAE Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement took effect in May 2022.
7. Connectivity: The India Middle East Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) was announced on the margins of the G20 New Delhi Summit in September 2023.

Constitutional Framework Governing India’s Conduct of Foreign Relations

1. Article 51: Directs the State to promote international peace and security and to respect international law and treaty obligations.
2. Article 246 with Union List Entries 10 to 21: Places foreign affairs, diplomatic representation, war and peace, and treaty making exclusively with the Union.
3. Article 73: Extends Union executive power to every matter on which Parliament can legislate, including the making of treaties.
4. Article 253: Empowers Parliament to legislate for the whole or any part of India to implement any international treaty, agreement or convention.

Back2Basics: Gulf Cooperation Council

1. Formation: Established in 1981 at Abu Dhabi.
2. Headquarters: Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
3. Members: Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and Oman.
4. Mandate: Coordination and integration among members in economic, defence, security and cultural affairs.
5. Military arm: The Peninsula Shield Force, a joint military force raised in 1984.
6. Economic instrument: A unified economic agreement and a customs union among the six members.
7. India link: India is not a member, and engages the bloc through bilateral strategic partnerships and an India GCC ministerial mechanism.

Government Initiatives for India’s West Asia Engagement

1. Link West Policy: Reframes the Gulf and West Asia as a zone of strategic partnership rather than an energy and labour market alone.
2. I2U2: Joint investment platform with Israel, the United States and the UAE across food security, clean energy and health.
3. India Middle East Europe Economic Corridor: Rail and shipping corridor linking India to Europe through the Gulf, announced in September 2023.
4. India UAE Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, 2022: India’s first Gulf trade agreement, cutting tariffs on the bulk of traded goods.
5. Chabahar long term contract, 2024: A ten year agreement for operating the Shahid Beheshti terminal, giving India a port outside the Strait of Hormuz.
6. eMigrate portal and Pravasi Bharatiya Bima Yojana: Registration and mandatory insurance cover for Indian workers emigrating to Gulf destinations.
7. Evacuation operations: Operation Sindhu, Operation Ajay and Operation Kaveri, evacuating Indians from Iran and Israel, Israel and Sudan respectively.
8. Operation Sankalp: Indian Navy deployment in the Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulf to escort Indian flagged merchant shipping.

Key Facts about India and West Asia

1. The Strait of Hormuz carries roughly a fifth of global oil consumption and has no practical bypass for most Gulf exporters.
2. The Bab-el-Mandeb is the southern gate of the Red Sea and the compulsory approach to the Suez Canal.
3. Chabahar is Iran’s only oceanic port, on the Gulf of Oman, and lies outside the Strait of Hormuz.
4. India’s overseas military logistics access includes Duqm in Oman, agreed in 2018.
5. I2U2 was agreed in 2021 and held its first leaders summit in July 2022.
6. India is not a member of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, and was invited as guest of honour to its foreign ministers meeting at Abu Dhabi in 2019.
7. The GCC has six members; the wider Arab League has 22.

Challenges in India’s Engagement with West Asia

1. Energy import concentration: India imports more than 85 percent of its crude oil, and a large share transits a single strait. e.g. any closure of the Strait of Hormuz would hit Indian refiners within weeks.
2. Diaspora vulnerability: Millions of Indian workers sit inside conflict zones with limited legal protection. e.g. the kafala style sponsorship systems that tie a worker’s legal status to a single employer.
3. Balancing Israel and Palestine: India maintains a defence relationship with Israel and a stated commitment to a two state solution. e.g. India’s abstentions and shifting votes at the United Nations General Assembly on Gaza resolutions.
4. The Pakistan factor in Islamic institutions: Pakistan uses Islamic multilateral platforms to block Indian access. e.g. Pakistan’s objection has kept India out of observer status at the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation.
5. Sanctions exposure: Third party sanctions restrict India’s Iran linked projects and payments. e.g. Indian crude imports from Iran fell to zero after United States waivers ended in 2019.
6. Competition from China: Beijing has moved from a purely commercial to a political role in the region. e.g. China brokered the Saudi Arabia and Iran normalisation in March 2023.
7. Maritime capability limits: India lacks basing and sustainment for continuous presence west of the Arabian Sea. e.g. anti piracy and escort deployments depend on port calls rather than permanent facilities.

Way Forward

1. Appoint a Special Envoy for West Asia: A single point of political coordination across the Gulf, Iran, Israel and Turkiye, with a mandate beyond the Israel and Palestine file.
2. Institutionalise the India GCC dialogue: Convert the ministerial mechanism into a standing security and energy consultation with a fixed calendar.
3. Diversify crude and gas sourcing: Expand long term contracts outside the Hormuz route and enlarge strategic petroleum reserve capacity.
4. Secure the shipping lanes with partners: Build a working arrangement with Egypt and Red Sea littoral states for convoy protection of India bound traffic.
5. Offer defence technology rather than alliances: Supply defensive systems to states such as Jordan, which builds influence without foreclosing other relationships.
6. Protect the diaspora contractually: Push labour mobility agreements with enforceable wage, grievance and repatriation clauses.
7. Keep Chabahar operational: Seek durable sanctions carve outs and complete the rail and road links that give the port commercial traffic.

Matching Previous Year Question

“[2025, GS2, 15 marks] “Energy security constitutes the dominant kingpin of India’s foreign policy, and is linked with India’s overarching influence in Middle Eastern countries.” How would you integrate energy security with India’s foreign policy trajectories in the coming years?”