Should the EC take action against those filing forms for mass deletions?

Why in the News

Form 7, meant for an elector to object to a voter’s entry and seek its deletion, is being filed in bulk, with more than 4,000 in Karnataka. The surge has come in Phase 3 of the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls. Similar cases in Rajasthan and Gujarat raise whether the Election Commission (EC) should act against the filers.

What is Form 7, and what safeguards do the Rules provide?

1. What it is: Form 7 lets an elector object to another person’s name on the roll. The Registration of Electors Rules, 1960 set out the steps for registration, deletion and amendment.
2. Public notice: The Electoral Registration Officer (ERO) must display each objection on a notice board, then serve a specific notice on the person objected to.
3. Formal inquiry: If an inquiry is demanded, the ERO must hold one before deciding, and may summon both sides and make the objector testify under oath.
4. Penalty for false claims: Section 31 of the Representation of the People Act (RPA), 1950 punishes false declarations with imprisonment, and objectors are warned of it.
5. The takeaway: The Rules intend that no name is deleted without the voter getting a fair chance to respond.

How are bulk Form 7 filings being misused?

1. Few filers, many objections: In Karnataka’s Babaleshwar, 1,363 objections came from just 10 electors, many reportedly targeting Muslim names.
2. Filings in an official’s name: About 3,500 objections in one Uttarakhand constituency were filed in the ERO’s name near the deadline; the Haridwar Rural ERO says he filed none.
3. Automated appeals: An Election Commissioner flagged that an automated method produced appeals for exclusion before West Bengal’s appellate tribunals.
4. Earlier precedent: In Karnataka last year, the EC found only about 28 of some 2,000 objections correct.

What does the West Bengal data show?

1. Disclosure lapse: Totals for Form 6 (inclusion), Form 7 (deletion) and Form 8 (correction) must be published after each revision. Most States, especially West Bengal, have not.
2. Inclusion claims: Of 34 lakh claims to add names, 7,26,000 were rejected, about one in five.
3. Deletion objections: Of 6,39,000 deletion objections, high for the State’s size, 5,72,000 were accepted.
4. Skewed acceptance: Accepting almost 90% of deletion objections is a glaring anomaly, argues the West Bengal petitioner before the Supreme Court.

Why have existing safeguards failed to deter misuse?

1. Narrow penalty: Section 31 punishes false information; it cannot be invoked merely for filing bulk forms.
2. Penalty unused: The EC has no known prosecution for a false declaration, so the provision has lost its deterrent force.
3. FIRs not pursued: The EC files First Information Reports (FIRs) but leaves follow-up to police, who treat such cases lightly.
4. EC filing caps: EC instructions cap filings at five or six forms per person. Booths with over 2% additions or deletions get greater scrutiny.

Is the system broken, or only poorly enforced?

1. Misuse, not failure: A former Election Commissioner says an ERO cannot file objections, and calls central manipulation unproven. He wants the Chief Electoral Officer and the EC to investigate.
2. Institutional breakdown: The West Bengal petitioner argues that when part of the institution meant to uphold the law violates it, the system breaks down.
3. Outdated law: The RPA and its forms predate online submission, so the petitioner seeks legal reform and judicial intervention.

Challenges

1. Unverified online filing: Objections can be submitted online without proof that the named filer sent them.
2. Opaque data: Without booth-level disclosure, parties and courts cannot detect targeted deletions in time.
3. Burden on the voter: A migrant voter may miss a notice and, once deleted, must reapply.

Way Forward

1. Separate crime data: The National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) should publish a separate dataset on election-related crimes.
2. Digital-era rules: Parliament should amend the RPA and the Rules to authenticate online objections against the filer’s identity.
3. Mandatory disclosure: The EC should publish booth-wise data on all three forms at the end of each revision.

Conclusion

Deletion safeguards exist on paper, but false objections go unpunished, so mass filings cost their authors nothing. Whether the Supreme Court orders full disclosure in the West Bengal case will show if deterrence returns.

What is the Special Intensive Revision?

1. About: SIR is a time-bound house-to-house check of every voter entry by Booth Level Officers (BLOs), unlike the routine annual summary revision.
2. Legal basis: Article 324 gives the EC control of electoral rolls. Section 21 of the RPA allows a special revision for recorded reasons.

Matching Previous Year Question

“[2026, GS2, 10 marks] Is the right to vote a fundamental right? Discuss the position of the Election Commission of India while undertaking the revision of electoral rolls. Can it also examine the question of citizenship of voters?”