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GS Paper: Executive & Judiciary

  • Madras HC judge picks: 88% not from general category

    Why in the News?

    During the tenure of Chief Justices D.Y. Chandrachud and Sanjiv Khanna, authorities appointed 15 out of 17 judges to the Madras High Court from BC, OBC, MBC, SC, or ST communities.

    Why is BC/OBC/SC/ST representation highest in Madras High Court?

    • Strong Social Justice Framework in Tamil Nadu: Tamil Nadu has a long history of affirmative action and reservation policies aimed at uplifting Backward Classes (BC), Other Backward Classes (OBC), Most Backward Classes (MBC), Scheduled Castes (SC), and Scheduled Tribes (ST), which creates a larger pool of eligible candidates from these communities.
    • Better Educational Access and Mobility: The state contributes disproportionately to the OBC population in higher education—while Tamil Nadu has about 10% of India’s OBC population, it accounts for 13% of OBCs enrolled in higher education nationally. This leads to higher qualifications among BC/OBC candidates, increasing their chances of judicial appointments.
    • Collegium Appointments Reflect State Demographics: The Supreme Court Collegium, while selecting judges, considers inputs from the state, and the Madras High Court appointments reflect this social reality, with 88.2% of recent appointees belonging to BC/OBC/MBC/SC/ST groups, the highest among all High Courts.

    Why do Southern High Courts have more non-general category judges?

    • Higher Social Mobility and Educational Access: Southern States like Tamil Nadu have better upward social mobility for BC/OBC groups, reflected in higher enrollment rates in higher education. Eg, Tamil Nadu has about 10% of India’s OBC population but accounts for 13% of OBCs in higher education nationally, which leads to greater representation in judicial appointments.
    • Regional Political and Social Dynamics: Southern States often have political environments and social policies that encourage inclusion of non-general categories in key positions. Eg, Madras High Court had 88.2% of appointees from BC/OBC/SC/ST groups, the highest share among all High Courts.

    What role do Chief Ministers and State Intelligence play in appointments?

    • Chief Ministers’ Opinions Are Considered: The Supreme Court Collegium takes into account the views of Chief Ministers during the appointment process, which can subtly influence the selection of judges. Eg, this influence might explain variations in representation across States, though the exact extent of their impact is unclear.
    • State Intelligence Inputs Are Used: The Collegium also reviews inputs from the State Intelligence Branch to assess candidates’ suitability and background. Eg, such inputs could affect appointments in States like Rajasthan, where political and security considerations might play a role.

    How does BC social mobility affect judicial representation?

    • Women from Non-General Categories Are Represented but in Small Numbers: Out of 34 women appointed, several belonged to BC, OBC, MBC, SC, or ST communities, showing some diversity in gender and social groups. Eg, at the Madras High Court, 5 women were appointed, including one from BC, one from MBC, and three from OBC categories.
    • Other High Courts Also Appoint Women from Non-General Categories: States like Telangana, Kerala, Andhra Pradesh, Rajasthan, Guwahati, and Manipur have women appointees from various non-general groups, reflecting broader inclusivity. Eg, Telangana appointed women from BC and OBC categories, while Manipur had a woman appointee from the ST category.

    Way forward: 

    • Institutionalize Diversity Criteria in Appointments: Formal guidelines should be introduced to ensure fair representation of BC/OBC/SC/ST and women in judicial appointments across all High Courts.
    • Strengthen Educational and Legal Training Access: Expand scholarships, coaching, and mentorship programs for underrepresented communities to build a larger pool of eligible candidates for the judiciary.

    Mains PYQ:

    [UPSC 2021]  Discuss the desirability of greater representation to women in the higher judiciary to ensure diversity, equity and inclusiveness.

    Linkage: While the article focuses on social categories (caste/class), the underlying theme of ensuring diversity and representation in the judiciary is common. The article also provides data on women appointees, including their social categories in Madras HC.

  • Permanent Lok Adalats 

    Why in the News?

    Permanent Lok Adalats in as many as 16 districts of Rajasthan have ceased functioning owing to the non-extension of tenure of their presiding officers and members.

    About Permanent Lok Adalats (PLAs) 

    • Legal Basis: PLAs are statutory bodies established under Section 22-B of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987.
    • Establishment: They were introduced in 2002 to offer speedy and affordable dispute resolution for public utility services.
    • Disputes Handled: PLAs resolve issues related to transport (air, road, water), postal, telecom, electricity, water supply, sanitation, healthcare, and insurance.
    • Composition: Each PLA has a Chairman (a current or retired District Judge or higher) and 2 members with experience in the relevant public utility sectors.
    • Functioning: Unlike regular Lok Adalats, PLAs operate on a continuous basis and are always available for dispute resolution.
    • Jurisdiction Limit: They can hear cases involving claims up to ₹1 crore but cannot take up non-compoundable criminal cases.
    • Unique Power: If conciliation fails, the PLA has the authority to adjudicate the dispute and issue a final and BINDING award, just like a civil court.

    Back2Basics: Lok Adalats vs Permanent Lok Adalats

    Lok Adalats Permanent Lok Adalats 
    Nature Ad hoc, held occasionally Permanent, functional continuously
    Jurisdiction Broad (civil, compoundable criminal, family, etc.) Limited to public utility service disputes
    Dispute Stage Usually post-litigation Pre-litigation stage only
    Panel Composition Judicial officers, lawyers, social workers Chairman (Judge) + 2 experts in utility services
    Conciliation Role Only conciliatory; no decision if no settlement Can adjudicate if no settlement is reached
    Decision Binding only if parties agree Award is final and binding, with no appeal
    Legal Status Decree of a civil court Also a civil court decree, but with adjudication power
    Appeal Provision No appeal, but fresh suit possible No appeal, but constitutional remedies may apply

     

    [UPSC 2009] With reference to Lok Adalats, consider the following statements:

    1. An award made by a Lok Adalat is deemed to be a degree of a civil court and no appeal lies against thereto before any court.

    2. Matrimonial/Family disputes are not covered under Lok Adalat.

    Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

    Options: (a) 1 only * (b) 2 only (c) Both 1 and 2 (d) Neither 1 nor 2

     

  • Article 143 of the Indian Constitution

    Why in the News?

    The Tamil Nadu CM has criticised the Presidential Reference under Article 143 as a “desperate attempt” to weaken State powers, following a Supreme Court ruling that set timelines for Governors and the President to act on State Bills.

    Article 143 of the Indian Constitution

    Recent Invocation:

    • The Presidential Reference asked whether the Supreme Court could impose timelines on:
      • Governors under Article 200 (assent to State Bills)
      • The President under Article 201 (Bills reserved for Presidential assent)

    What is Article 143 of the Indian Constitution?

    • Article 143 empowers the President of India to seek the advisory opinion of the Supreme Court on any question of law or fact that is-
      • of public importance
      • Likely to arise or has already arisen
    • This provision defines the Supreme Court’s advisory jurisdiction, exclusive to the President.
    • Sub-clauses and Legal Operation:
      • Article 143(1): The President may refer any matter to the Supreme Court for its opinion. In the first case, the Supreme Court may tender or may refuse to tender its opinion to the president.
      • Article 143(2): Allows the President to refer disputes arising from pre-Constitution agreements, including state-related matters, for the Supreme Court’s opinion. The Supreme Court must tender its opinion to the President.
    • Nature of the Reference: The Supreme Court’s opinion is advisory and NOT legally binding since it is NOT a judicial pronouncement.
    • President’s Response: It is NOT binding on the President; he/she may follow or may not follow the opinion. However, it facilitates the government to have an authoritative legal opinion.
    • Types of Questions Referred: Article 143(1) allows the President to refer questions of law or fact.
      1. Legal questions: Constitutional interpretation, rights, and executive powers.
      2. Factual questions: The 1993 Ram Janmabhoomi-Babri Masjid reference asked whether a temple existed at the disputed site.
    • Judicial Interpretation: The Supreme Court has clarified that Article 143 is broad in scope and not limited to questions that have arisen; potential or likely questions can also be referred.

    Executive’s Control of Presidential Reference: 

    • Although Article 143 vests the power in the President, the real decision to refer is taken by the Union Council of Ministers under Article 74(1). 
    • Article 74(2) bars the Court from inquiring whether such advice was given.

     

    [UPSC 2010] Consider the following statements:

    The Supreme Court of India tenders’ advice to the President of India on matters of law or fact

    1. on its own initiative (on any matter of larger public interest).

    2. if he seeks such an advice.

    3. only if the matters relate to the Fundamental Rights of the citizens.

    Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

    Options: (a) 1 only (b) 2 only * (c) 3 only (d) 1 and 2 only

     

  • Justice B.R. Gavai takes charge as 52nd CJI

    Why in the News?

    Justice B.R. Gavai has been sworn in as the 52nd Chief Justice of India (CJI).

    About the Chief Justice of India:

    • The CJI is the head of the Supreme Court and the highest-ranking judicial officer in the country.
    • As the “Master of the Roster,” the CJI has the exclusive authority to:
      • Constitute benches
      • Allocate cases among judges
      • Decide the schedule of hearings
    • The CJI leads the judicial and administrative functions of the Supreme Court.
      • Holds administrative control as recognised in State of Rajasthan v. Prakash Chand (1997).
    • The CJI is referred to as “first among equals” among Supreme Court judges.

    Powers and functions of the CJI:

    • Judicial Functions:
      • Assigns judges to the Constitution Benches. (Article 145)
      • Handles interpretation of important legal and constitutional matters. (Article 145)
      • Exercises judicial leadership by steering jurisprudential direction. (Article 145)
      • Exercises judicial authority in matters of national significance. (Article 136)
      • Protects fundamental rights through the Supreme Court’s original and appellate jurisdiction. (Article 32)
    • Administrative Functions:
      • Maintains court roster and case listing. (Derived from judicial precedent and administrative conventions)
      • Supervises court staff and administration. (Based on administrative authority of the CJI)
      • Ensures smooth functioning of the Supreme Court. (Supreme Court Rules, 2013)
      • Holds disciplinary authority over subordinate judicial officers. (Administrative powers acknowledged in precedents)
      • Engages in administration of justice at the highest level. (Overarching responsibility under Article 145)
    • Advisory Function:
      • Provides advisory input when consulted by the President. (Article 143)

    Appointment and Terms:

    • Article 124 of the Constitution empowers the President of India to appoint the CJI.
    • Traditionally, the senior-most judge of the Supreme Court is appointed.
    • Exceptions to this practice:
      • 1973: Justice A.N. Ray appointed over 3 senior judges.
      • 1977: Justice M.H. Beg appointed over Justice H.R. Khanna.
    • Qualifications as outlined in Article 124(3):
      • Must be a citizen of India, and:
      • Served at least five years as a High Court judge, or
      • Practised at least ten years as a High Court advocate, or
      • Deemed a distinguished jurist by the President.

    Selection Procedure:

    • Governed by the Memorandum of Procedure for Appointment of Supreme Court Judges.
    • The Union Law Minister seeks the outgoing CJI’s recommendation.
    • The recommendation is processed as follows:
      • Sent to the Prime Minister by the Law Ministry.
      • Prime Minister advises the President.
      • President of India appoints the new CJI.
    • No specific timeline is defined — the recommendation must be made at the “appropriate time”.

    Tenure and Removal:

    • CJI serves until the age of 65 years.
    • Can only be removed through removal under Article 124(4):
      • Requires approval by both Houses of Parliament.
      • Must be supported by:
        • A majority of total membership, and
        • A two-thirds majority of members present and voting.
      • Grounds for removal: Proven misbehavior or incapacity.
    [UPSC 2021] With reference to the Indian judiciary, consider the following statements:

    1. Any retired judge of the Supreme Court of India can be called back to sit and act as a Supreme Court judge by the Chief Justice of India with the prior permission of the President of India.
    2. A High Court in India has the power to review its own judgment as the Supreme Court does

    Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

    Options:  (a) 1 only  (b) 2 only (c) Both 1 and 2 * (d) Neither I nor 2

     

  • How the judiciary maintains accountability

    Why in the News?

    The recent remarks made by the Vice-President of India about the role of judges have raised serious concerns and need to be carefully examined.

    What concerns arise from the Vice-President’s comments on judges’ roles in India?

    • Undermines Judicial Authority: Calling judges a “super parliament” questions the legitimacy of judicial review — a core function to uphold the Constitution. Eg: Criticism of court directions to Governors on bill assent.
    • Erosion of Constitutional Balance: His comments disrupt the delicate balance among the legislature, executive, and judiciary by implying judicial overreach without constitutional basis. Eg: In cases like Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973), the Supreme Court protected constitutional principles through its basic structure doctrine—critical for maintaining checks and balances.
    • Erodes Public Trust: Statements from high offices may weaken public faith in judicial impartiality and independence. Eg: Comments implying judges are unaccountable raise doubts on rule of law.

    Why is the term “super parliament” problematic in India’s parliamentary system?

    • Contradicts the Principle of Popular Sovereignty: Parliament derives its authority from the people; no organ, including the judiciary, can override it. Calling the judiciary a “super parliament” distorts this hierarchy. Eg: In Rojer Mathew v. South Indian Bank Ltd. (2019), the Supreme Court clarified that judicial review strengthens—not replaces—parliamentary supremacy.
    • Misrepresents the Role of Judicial Review: Judicial review is a constitutional mechanism to check the validity of laws—not an attempt to legislate. Calling it a “super parliament” falsely equates judicial scrutiny with lawmaking. Eg: In Minerva Mills v. Union of India (1980), the Court struck down amendments violating the Constitution’s basic structure without encroaching on the legislative domain.
    • Undermines Separation of Powers: The term falsely suggests that the judiciary exceeds its mandate, eroding the balance between the three organs of government enshrined in the Constitution. Eg: The L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997) judgment upheld judicial review as part of the basic structure, emphasizing that courts act within their defined constitutional limits.

    How does the Constitution ensure judicial independence and separation of powers?

    • Fixed Tenure and Security of Judges: Judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts enjoy security of tenure and can only be removed through a rigorous impeachment process, ensuring they are free from executive or legislative pressure. Eg: The impeachment process under Article 124(4) was invoked in the case of Justice V. Ramaswami (1993), though it did not lead to removal, demonstrating the difficulty of arbitrary dismissal.
    • Financial Independence of the Judiciary: The salaries, allowances, and pensions of judges are charged on the Consolidated Fund of India and are not subject to parliamentary vote, protecting them from financial manipulation. Eg: This provision, under Article 112 and Article 125, ensures that the executive cannot curtail judicial functioning by reducing funds.
    • Constitutional Authority of Judicial Review: The Constitution explicitly empowers courts to review laws and executive actions for constitutional validity, preserving checks and balances between organs of government. Eg: In Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973), the Supreme Court asserted its authority to strike down amendments violating the Constitution’s basic structure.

    What justifies the judiciary setting deadlines for the President to clear Bills in line with popular sovereignty?

    • Fixed Tenure and Security of Judges: Judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts enjoy security of tenure and can only be removed through a rigorous impeachment process, ensuring they are free from executive or legislative pressure. Eg: The impeachment process under Article 124(4) was invoked in the case of Justice V. Ramaswami (1993), though it did not lead to removal, demonstrating the difficulty of arbitrary dismissal.
    • Financial Independence of the Judiciary
       The salaries, allowances, and pensions of judges are charged on the Consolidated Fund of India and are not subject to parliamentary vote, protecting them from financial manipulation. Eg: This provision, under Article 112 and Article 125, ensures that the executive cannot curtail judicial functioning by reducing funds.

    Why is the claim that judges are above the law considered irrational?

    • Judges are bound by the Constitution and Rule of Law: Judges operate strictly within the constitutional framework and are accountable to it. Any violation of constitutional provisions by a judge amounts to “proved misbehaviour” and can lead to removal. Eg: Article 124(4) allows Parliament to impeach a Supreme Court judge for proven misbehaviour or incapacity, showing they are not immune from the law.
    • Parliament can override judicial decisions by making new laws: If the judiciary overreaches or issues controversial verdicts, Parliament can counter it through legislative action, reinforcing democratic accountability. Eg: After the Shah Bano case (1985), Parliament passed the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, effectively reversing the Court’s judgment.

    Way forward: 

    • Respect Constitutional Boundaries: All constitutional authorities should uphold the principle of separation of powers and avoid statements that may undermine public trust in institutions.
    • Promote Constructive Dialogue: Encourage open, respectful discussions between the judiciary and executive to resolve differences while maintaining democratic values.

    Mains PYQ:

    [UPSC 2020] Judicial Legislation is antithetical to the doctrine of separation of powers as envisaged in the Indian Constitution. In this context justify the filing of large number of public interest petitions praying for issuing guidelines to executive authorities.

    Linkage:  Judicial action (issuing guidelines to the executive) to the separation of powers doctrine. It discusses judicial legislation, which is when courts effectively create law, blurring the lines between the judiciary and legislature. This raises concerns about accountability – to whom is the judiciary accountable when it is perceived to be legislating?

  • Power and freedom: On the Senthilbalaji case

    Why in the News?

    On April 23, the Supreme Court told Tamil Nadu Minister V. Senthilbalaji, who has been out on bail since September 2024 in a money laundering case, to choose between keeping his position or his freedom. This was an expected statement.

    Why did the Supreme Court question V. Senthilbalaji’s continuation in office while on bail?

    • Conflict of Interest Between Bail and Office: The Supreme Court questioned V. Senthilbalaji’s continuation in office while on bail in a money laundering case, suggesting that he should choose between his ministerial position and his freedom. Eg: The Court pointed out the issue of a person facing serious criminal charges holding a high office of responsibility.
    • Concerns About Potential Witness Tampering: The Court expressed concerns that Senthilbalaji might tamper with evidence or influence witnesses due to his position of power. Eg: Justice Oka’s remark that Senthilbalaji might prevent witnesses from testifying indicated the gravity of the situation.
    • Premature Re-induction Into the Cabinet: The Supreme Court had previously granted bail to Senthilbalaji not on merits, but because he had already served one year in detention. His return to the Cabinet shortly after this raised doubts, as the Court had not cleared him of the charges. Eg: This was exemplified by the Court’s remark that it had made a “mistake” in granting him bail.

    What concerns did the Supreme Court raise about Senthilbalaji’s conduct?

    • Dishonest Conduct and Risk of Evidence Tampering: The Supreme Court raised concerns about Senthilbalaji’s dishonest conduct and the potential risk of him tampering with evidence or influencing witnesses in the case. Eg: Justice Oka’s remark about Senthilbalaji ensuring no witnesses come to the box reflected this concern.
    • Inappropriate Return to the Cabinet While Facing Serious Charges: The Court questioned the propriety of Senthilbalaji being re-inducted into the Cabinet while facing serious criminal charges. Eg: The Court had previously stated that granting bail was not based on merits, but on the time already served, which raised doubts about his fitness for office.

    Why is Senthilbalaji’s re-induction into the Cabinet legally scrutinized?

    • Bail Conditions Not Fully Met: Senthilbalaji’s re-induction into the Cabinet is legally scrutinized because he was granted bail not on merits but on the ground that he had already spent one year in incarceration as an undertrial. Eg: The Court had questioned his return to the Cabinet just after granting him bail, highlighting concerns over his ongoing legal situation.
    • Impact on Fair Trial and Public Perception: His re-induction raises questions about the fairness of his trial and the potential to undermine justice. Eg: The Supreme Court had earlier expressed its objection to his return to the Cabinet, stating that it could negatively affect the victims of the job scandal and the integrity of the trial process.

    Why should Senthilbalaji avoid staying in the Cabinet?

    • Legal and Ethical Concerns: Senthilbalaji’s continued stay in the Cabinet raises legal and ethical issues due to the money laundering case against him. Eg: The Supreme Court’s remarks about the possibility of tampering with evidence and influencing witnesses highlight the risks of him holding a position of power while facing serious charges.
    • Risk of Damage to Reputation and Governance: His re-induction into the Cabinet could harm the government’s reputation and undermine public trust in governance. Eg: The Court had earlier granted him bail on humanitarian grounds, not on merits, and his return to the Cabinet despite ongoing charges could be seen as improper, potentially leading to political fallout.

    Way forward: 

    • Resignation for Upholding Integrity: Senthilbalaji should voluntarily resign from the Cabinet to maintain the integrity of the government and avoid further legal scrutiny.
    • Clear Legal Resolution: A clear and swift legal resolution should be sought, ensuring that the charges are addressed transparently, without political interference, to restore public confidence.

    Mains PYQ:

    [UPSC 2024] The Doctrine of Democratic Governance makes it necessary that the public perception of the integrity and commitment of civil servants becomes absolutely positive. Discuss.

    Linkage: Although focused on civil servants, the underlying principle of integrity and public perception in governance is relevant to the case of a Minister like Mr. Senthilbalaji, especially given the Supreme Court’s observations on his conduct.

  • [11th April 2025] The Hindu Op-ed: Are existing mechanisms effective in combating judicial corruption?

    PYQ Relevance:

    [UPSC 2017] Critically examine the Supreme Court’s judgement on ‘The National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014’ concerning the appointment of judges of higher judiciary in India.

    Linkage: The integrity of the appointment process is a key mechanism to prevent the entry of potentially corrupt individuals into the judiciary. Debates around judicial appointments often touch upon the need for transparency and meritocracy to safeguard against various forms of impropriety, including corruption.

     

    Mentor’s Comment:  The current system to deal with corruption in the judiciary includes in-house inquiries, impeachment, and oversight by the Supreme Court and High Courts. However, it is often slow, and secretive, and rarely results in strict action. Lack of transparency and political influence can weaken its impact, making it less effective in ensuring full accountability of judges.

    Today’s editorial talks about problems in making judges more accountable. It highlights gaps in how judicial misconduct is handled and why better checks are needed. This topic is useful for UPSC GS Paper 2 (governance, transparency) and GS Paper 4 (ethics, integrity in public life).

    _

    Let’s learn!

    Why in the News?

    Last month, a large amount of unaccounted cash was reportedly found at the official home of former Delhi High Court judge Justice Yashwant Varma. In response, Chief Justice of India, Sanjiv Khanna, started an internal inquiry into the matter.

    What are the limitations of the impeachment process in ensuring judicial accountability?

    • High Threshold for Removal: The impeachment process requires a two-thirds majority in both Houses of Parliament and an absolute majority of total membership. This makes it extremely difficult to impeach a judge even in cases of credible misconduct. Eg: No judge of the Supreme Court or High Court has ever been successfully impeached in independent India, despite allegations — such as in the case of Justice V. Ramaswami (1993), whose impeachment failed due to political abstentions.
    • Over-Reliance on Political Consensus: The process is politically driven, requiring broad support across parties, which may not be feasible in a fragmented or polarized Parliament. Political considerations often override judicial integrity in decision-making.
    • Delayed and Ineffective as a Deterrent: The process is slow, opaque, and reactive, initiated only after significant public outcry or media coverage. It fails to act as a timely or effective deterrent, allowing misconduct to go unchecked. Eg: Justice Nirmal Yadav of the Punjab and Haryana High Court was acquitted nearly 15 years after a corruption inquiry, despite early evidence.

    Why is there a demand to institutionalise transparency in judicial inquiries?

    • Prevents Perception of Shielding Judges: Transparency helps counter the belief that the judiciary protects its own members in misconduct cases. Eg: In the Justice Yashwant Varma case, the Supreme Court proactively released CCTV footage showing recovery of unaccounted cash to pre-empt accusations of cover-up.
    • Builds Public Trust and Confidence: In an era of social and mass media scrutiny, opaque proceedings can fuel public suspicion and damage the judiciary’s credibility. Making inquiry reports public can reaffirm accountability and institutional integrity.
    • Reduces Speculation and Misinformation: Lack of official communication can lead to rumours or leaks, which may distort facts and undermine due process. Eg: Experts have suggested appointing dedicated communications personnel in the judiciary to clarify facts and handle sensitive disclosures responsibly.

    Who informally influences judicial appointments, and how does it impact the collegium?

    • Executive’s Role in Informal Consultations: Even before formal recommendations, the executive is consulted informally, allowing it to influence selections. Eg: The Union Government often shares IB (Intelligence Bureau) inputs that can sway or stall decisions by the collegium.
    • De Facto Executive Veto: The government can withhold or delay approval of names without giving reasons, effectively creating a veto power. Eg: Several appointments have been indefinitely delayed by the executive sitting on the collegium’s recommendations.
    • Impact on Transparency and Candidate Morale: This opaque and selective process discourages deserving candidates from participating in judicial selection. Eg: Many lawyers and judges avoid the process due to its lack of transparency and potential for humiliation.

    How can peer review within the judiciary be strengthened to prevent judicial misconduct?

    • Institutionalising Informal FeedbackRegularise the informal feedback already exchanged within legal circles into a formal review system. Eg: Concerns shared among judges and lawyers about a colleague’s integrity can be compiled and assessed systematically.
    • Involving Bar Associations: Inputs from bar associations can serve as early warnings of problematic judicial behaviour. Eg: If advocates repeatedly report bias or misconduct by a judge, it could trigger a formal internal review.
    • Mandatory Periodic Evaluations: Judges could undergo peer-reviewed performance evaluations at regular intervals. Eg: Evaluation of case disposal rates, conduct in court, and legal soundness of judgments by a panel of peers.
    • Disclosure of Conflicts of Interest: Enforce mandatory disclosures of family members practicing in the same court or other potential conflicts. Eg: If a judge’s relative practices in the same court, either the judge is transferred or the relative is barred from appearing.
    • Protection of Whistleblowers Within Judiciary: Create a safe mechanism for judges or staff to report unethical conduct without fear of retaliation. Eg: A junior judge or clerk reporting bribe attempts or unusual case assignments should be protected and heard confidentially.

    When can contempt laws allow public scrutiny without undermining judicial dignity?

    • When Criticism is in Good Faith and Based on Facts: Legitimate concerns or constructive criticism aimed at reform, not defamation, should be allowed. Eg: A lawyer or journalist pointing out procedural delays or lack of transparency in judicial appointments based on verified data.
    • When the Speech is Not Intended to Scandalise the Court: Public discourse that respects the institution but critiques specific actions or decisions helps improve accountability. Eg: Civil society groups questioning a controversial verdict or delay in inquiry, without using derogatory language.
    • When It Promotes Institutional Integrity: Scrutiny that leads to reform and helps maintain the credibility of the judiciary should not be penalised. Eg: Media coverage exposing corruption in the judiciary, like the Justice Yashwant Varma case, can lead to necessary reforms if done responsibly.

    Way forward:

    • Establish an Independent Judicial Oversight Body: A permanent and independent authority comprising retired judges, legal scholars, and public representatives can investigate complaints, oversee peer reviews, and recommend disciplinary action.
    • Codify Transparent Guidelines and Communication Protocols: Formulate clear, time-bound procedures for judicial appointments, disclosures, and inquiry mechanisms with mandatory public reporting (where appropriate). Eg: Publish annual integrity audits, conflict-of-interest registers, and inquiry outcomes (with due protection for sensitive data) to uphold public trust.

  • An IJS is an idea whose time has come

    Why in the News?

    Social media has been flooded with memes, and one of the most popular ones says, “For the first time, a fire brigade has started more fires than it put out.” The truth is, the fire is still burning. This perfectly reflects the ongoing controversy surrounding the Delhi High Court judge and the half-burnt currency notes case.

    What key issues arise from the Delhi High Court Judge controversy over half-burnt currency notes?

    • Allegations of Corruption in the Judiciary: The discovery of half-burnt currency notes at a judge’s residence raises suspicions of financial misconduct and corruption within the judiciary. Example: The Justice P.D. Dinakaran case, where allegations of land grabbing and corruption led to his resignation before impeachment proceedings.
    • Lack of Immediate Legal Action and Accountability: Unlike other public officials who face direct investigations, the judge in question was merely repatriated to his parent High Court, reflecting a selective approach to judicial accountability. Example: Justice Soumitra Sen of Calcutta High Court was impeached for financial misconduct, but only after prolonged proceedings, highlighting delays in judicial accountability.
    • Opacity in Internal Inquiry Mechanisms: The judiciary relies on internal probes rather than independent investigations, raising concerns about transparency and impartiality in handling misconduct. Example: The former CJI Ranjan Gogoi sexual harassment case, where an internal Supreme Court panel cleared him without an external review, leading to public outcry.

    Why has the Collegium system of judicial appointments in India faced criticism over the years?

    • Lack of Transparency and Accountability: The Collegium functions through closed-door deliberations without publicly disclosing selection criteria or reasons for appointments and rejections. Example: In 2019, Justice Akil Kureshi’s elevation was delayed without a clear explanation, raising concerns over executive influence and opaque decision-making.
    • Nepotism and Judicial Dynasties: The system has been criticized for favoring judges’ relatives and individuals with strong connections rather than selecting candidates purely on merit. Example: The presence of multiple second-generation judges in the Supreme Court, such as Justice D.Y. Chandrachud (son of former CJI Y.V. Chandrachud), has fueled debates over judicial nepotism.
    • Lack of Diversity and Inclusivity: The Collegium system has led to an underrepresentation of marginalized communities, women, and candidates from diverse backgrounds in the higher judiciary. Example: As of 2024, the percentage of women judges in the Supreme Court remains significantly low, with only three out of 34 judges being women.

    How can the establishment of an Indian Judicial Service help address concerns regarding judicial accountability and transparency?

    • Merit-Based and Transparent Selection Process: The IJS would ensure that judges are selected through a competitive examination, reducing nepotism and favoritism in judicial appointments. Example: Similar to the Indian Administrative Service (IAS), where UPSC conducts open and merit-based recruitment, an IJS would create a level playing field for candidates from diverse backgrounds.
    • Greater Diversity and Inclusivity in the Judiciary: A national-level selection system would bring in candidates from different social, economic, and regional backgrounds, making the judiciary more representative. Example: Currently, women and marginalized communities are underrepresented in the higher judiciary, but an IJS could help bridge this gap by ensuring equal opportunities.
    • Stronger Oversight and Accountability Mechanisms: Judges recruited through IJS could be subjected to periodic performance reviews and disciplinary oversight, ensuring accountability and ethical conduct. Example: In Germany, judges are part of a structured civil service system with evaluation and accountability mechanisms, ensuring higher judicial standards.

    Who would be responsible for conducting the recruitment process for the Indian Judicial Service?

    • Union Public Service Commission (UPSC) as the Conducting Authority: The UPSC, which already handles merit-based recruitment for civil services like IAS and IPS, could be entrusted with conducting exams for IJS to ensure transparency and fairness. Example: The Judicial Services Examination at the state level is conducted by State Public Service Commissions; a national-level IJS could follow the same model under UPSC.
    • Supreme Court and High Courts for Selection Criteria and Oversight: The Supreme Court, in consultation with High Courts and legal experts, could frame eligibility criteria, syllabus, and selection methods to maintain judicial independence. Example: The All India Judicial Service (AIJS) proposal, discussed since the 1960s, suggested a recruitment system similar to UPSC but with judicial oversight to ensure fairness.
    • Independent Judicial Commission for Monitoring and Appointments: An autonomous body, comprising retired judges, legal scholars, and judicial officers, could be set up to oversee appointments and address grievances. Example: Judicial Appointments Commissions exist in the UK, where an independent body handles judicial recruitment, preventing executive or political interference.

    Way forward: 

    • Balanced Judicial Appointments with Greater Transparency: Establish a Judicial Appointments Commission (JAC) that includes representatives from the judiciary, executive, and civil society to ensure a more transparent and accountable selection process.
    • Strengthening Judicial Accountability Mechanisms: Implement periodic performance reviews and ethical oversight for judges, with an independent body monitoring judicial conduct and financial integrity.

    Mains PYQ:

    Question: Critically examine the Supreme Court’s judgement on ‘National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014’ with reference to appointment of judges of higher judiciary in India. [UPSC 2017]

    Linkage: Existing mechanism for judicial appointments and the debates surrounding it. The discussion on an IJS often arises as an alternative or complementary approach to the current system, aiming for greater transparency and potentially reducing the scope for concerns raised in the NJAC debate.

     

  • What are the Norms for Disclosure of Judges’ Assets?

    Why in the News?

    The discovery of large sums of cash at Delhi High Court judges’ residence has raised concerns about corruption in India’s judiciary and reignited the debate over the public disclosure of judges’ assets and liabilities.

    Current Stance on Judges’ Asset Disclosure

    • Supreme Court’s Historical Approach:
      • 1997 Resolution: The Supreme Court, under Chief Justice J.S. Verma, resolved that judges should disclose their assets to the Chief Justice of India (CJI), but this did not involve public disclosure.
      • 2009 Resolution: The full Bench of the Supreme Court agreed to publish judges’ asset declarations on the court’s website, though this was done voluntarily. However, the website has not been updated since 2018, and the assets of current judges are not publicly available.
      • 2019 Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that judges’ personal assets and liabilities are not private information, making them subject to the Right to Information (RTI) Act.
    • High Court’s Position:
      • As of March 2024, only 13% of High Court judges have publicly disclosed their assets and liabilities. Many High Courts, including Uttarakhand and Allahabad, have opposed public disclosure and argued that such information is outside the scope of the RTI Act.
    • Resistance to Full Disclosure:
      • The Uttarakhand High Court (2012) passed a resolution opposing the disclosure of judges’ assets under the RTI Act. Similarly, many High Courts have rejected RTI applications seeking information about judges’ assets.

    Parliament’s Role – Proposed Reforms

    • Committee Recommendation (2023):
      • The Parliamentary Committee on Personnel, Public Grievances, and Law and Justice recommended that legislation be introduced to make the disclosure of judges’ assets and liabilities mandatory for Supreme Court and High Court judges.
      • However, there has been no progress on implementing this recommendation as of now.
    • Need for Legislation:
      • Despite the RTI Act requiring public servants to disclose their assets, judges have largely remained exempt from such transparency.
      • Legislative action is seen as essential to ensure accountability and transparency within the judiciary, with several advocating for mandatory public disclosure similar to other public officials.
    [UPSC 2017] With reference to the appointment of the High Court Judges, consider the following statements:

    1. Chief Justice of India is consulted by the President in the appointment.

    2. Governor of the State is consulted by the Chief Justice of India in the appointment.

    Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

    (a) 1 only (b) 2 only (c) Both 1 and 2 (d) Neither 1 nor 2

    [UPSC 2021] An independent and empowered social audit mechanism is an absolute must in every sphere of public service, including judiciary, to ensure performance, accountability and ethical conduct. Elaborate.

     

  • SC stays HC’s ‘inhuman’ remarks on rape bid

    Why in the News?

    On Wednesday, March 26, 2025, the Supreme Court put a hold on an Allahabad High Court ruling from March 17. The High Court had stated that just grabbing a minor girl’s breasts, breaking the string of her pyjama, and trying to pull down her lower garment were not enough to consider it an attempt to rape.

    What was the basis of the Allahabad High Court’s March 17 order regarding the attempt to rape charge?

    • Reclassification of the Offense to Lesser Charges: Instead of attempt to rape (Section 511 IPC, Section 18 POCSO Act), the High Court downgraded the charges to Section 354(b) IPC (assault with intent to disrobe) and Section 9 POCSO Act (aggravated sexual assault).
    • “Thoughtful Consideration” Despite Clear Trauma: The judgment stated that the case had been reviewed with “thoughtful consideration and meticulous examination of facts”, yet concluded that the offense of attempt to rape was not prima facie made out.

    Why did the Supreme Court find the High Court’s observations “insensitive” and “inhuman”?

    • Contradiction Between Facts and Conclusion: The High Court acknowledged the victim’s trauma—that the accused grabbed her breasts, broke the string of her pyjama, and tried to drag her under a culvert—but still concluded that this did not amount to an attempt to rape.  
      • Example: A case where an accused undresses and assaults a victim but is not charged with an attempt to rape, despite clear intent, shows a failure to apply legal principles correctly.
    • Failure to Recognize the Seriousness of the Crime: The judgment downplayed the gravity of the accused’s actions by modifying the charge from attempt to rape to mere sexual assault, despite the victim being a minor. 
    • Delayed Judgment Despite “Thoughtful Consideration”: The case was reserved for judgment in November 2024 but the order was passed in March 2025, showing deliberate and conscious decision-making. The insensitivity was not a spur-of-the-moment error but a considered opinion.  
    • Misinterpretation of “Determination” to Commit Rape: The High Court ruled that the lack of direct penetration or explicit intent meant there was no determination to commit rape, ignoring legal precedents where actions leading up to rape have been considered an attempt.
      • Example: In State of Maharashtra v. Mohd. Yakub (1980), the Supreme Court ruled that even preparatory acts leading to a crime can constitute an attempt. Here, forcibly undressing and dragging the minor away indicated clear criminal intent.
    • Disregard for Judicial Responsibility and Victim’s Dignity: The Supreme Court highlighted that such remarks from a High Court judge could set a dangerous precedent, potentially discouraging victims from seeking justice.  

    What steps did the Supreme Court take after staying the Allahabad High Court’s order?

    • Declared the High Court’s Observations “Insensitive and Inhuman”: The Supreme Court strongly criticized the Allahabad High Court’s order, stating that it displayed a “complete lack of sensitivity” and was “unknown to the tenets of law”. Example: Justice Gavai remarked that the judgment’s graphic description of the minor’s trauma only to dismiss the charge of attempt to rape was completely unjustified.
    • Issued Notice to the Union Government and the State of Uttar Pradesh: The Court directed the Central and State governments to respond to the matter, ensuring a higher level of scrutiny and legal accountability. Example: By involving government authorities, the Supreme Court ensured that the prosecution and legal framework around sexual offenses against minors were properly examined.
    • Allowed the Victim’s Mother to Join the Case: The Court granted liberty to the minor victim’s mother to implead herself in the case, ensuring that the victim’s family had a direct say in the proceedings. Example: This step allowed the victim’s mother to challenge the High Court’s dilution of charges and advocate for stronger legal action.
    • Directed the Supreme Court Registry to Communicate the Order to the Allahabad High Court: The Court instructed its Registry to forward the stay order to the Allahabad High Court Chief Justice, urging necessary action against the Single Judge’s ruling. Example: This move signaled that the Supreme Court wanted the High Court’s Chief Justice to review and possibly take corrective measures on the judgment.
    • Listed the Case for Further Hearing After Two Weeks: The Supreme Court scheduled the matter for further hearing, ensuring continuous judicial oversight and preventing any further miscarriage of justice. Example: This step kept the case active in the Supreme Court’s docket, preventing delays and allowing for immediate corrective action if required.

    Way forward: 

    • Judicial Sensitization and Training on Gender Justice: Regular sensitization programs for judges, especially in cases involving sexual offenses, should be conducted to ensure judgments are aligned with the spirit of laws protecting women and minors.
    • Strengthening Legal Precedents and Accountability Mechanisms: The Supreme Court should establish clear guidelines on what constitutes attempt to rape to prevent judicial misinterpretation. Review mechanisms should be in place to scrutinize judgments that dilute charges in serious offenses.

    Mains PYQ:

    Question: “Right to privacy is intrinsic to life and personal liberty and is inherently protected under Article 21 of the Constitution. Explain. In this reference discuss the law relating to D.N.A. testing of a child in the womb to establish its paternity.” (UPSC 2024)

    Reason: This question directly relates to the broader theme of gender justice, which includes the protection of women and children from sexual violence. The Supreme Court’s intervention in the High Court’s order demonstrates its commitment to upholding gender justice and ensuring a sensitive interpretation of laws related to crimes against women and children.