GS Paper: GS2-13.Issues relating to development and management of Social Sector/Services relating to Health, Education, Human Resources.

Why in the News

The most revealing number in India’s healthcare record is government health expenditure at 1.43 per cent of GDP in 2022 to 2023, against the 2.5 per cent target set by the National Health Policy 2017. Almost every visible measure of healthcare has expanded, with medical colleges and seats multiplied, the footprint of the All India Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS) network widened, and Ayushman Bharat established as one of the world’s largest publicly funded health insurance programmes. The latest report of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Health and Family Welfare finds a system still struggling with basic capacity, affordability and regulation. The tension is that expansion has been measured in inputs the state can count, while the outcome that decides the result, whether a family is less exposed when illness strikes, is set by financing the state has not provided.

What does government health expenditure as a share of GDP measure?

1. What the ratio counts: It measures spending on health by the Centre, the states and local bodies, set against the size of the economy, so it rises only when health spending grows faster than output does.
2. Why the share and not the amount: An absolute figure grows every year with prices and with the economy, so only the share shows whether health is gaining or losing ground against competing claims on public money.
3. The benchmark it is read against: The National Health Policy 2017 fixed 2.5 per cent of GDP as the target, and the distance between that and the actual figure is what the public system’s shortfall is measured by.

Why has expanding medical education not fixed the distribution of care?

1. The expansion is real: The number of medical colleges has risen to 818, and undergraduate medical seats have reached 1,28,875.
2. The problem was never the count of doctors: It was where they practise, who can afford them, and whether the system has the infrastructure to use them.
3. Specialists are missing where they are most needed: The Committee finds specialist shortages at rural community health centres of roughly 70 to 80 per cent.
4. Facilities without a building: There are 17,788 sub centres with no building of their own.
5. Education as a commercial sector: Medical education has itself become a major commercial sector, with private and public private partnership models playing an important role, and once medical seats become valuable commercial assets the integrity of the regulator becomes the live question.

What does the private sector’s share of care cost a patient?

1. Where care actually happens: Citing the National Sample Survey Office (NSSO) 80th round of 2025, more than 60 per cent of hospitalisations and around 70 per cent of outpatient care are serviced by the private sector.
2. The price difference: Average hospitalisation expenditure is approximately Rs 6,631 in government hospitals, against Rs 50,508 in private hospitals.
3. How the state imposes a cost without charging one: The state does not have to bill a patient to place the cost of private treatment on them, and only has to fail to provide a realistic public alternative.

Why does insurance leave both prices and the missing middle unaddressed?

1. What insurance has delivered: Ayushman Bharat has helped millions of families obtain hospital care they might otherwise have been unable to afford.
2. Insurance pays the bill without controlling the price: If treatment costs Rs 5 lakh and insurance pays that amount, the patient is protected from immediate financial ruin while the healthcare system has still consumed the same sum.
3. Someone eventually pays: If prices continue rising, the cost falls somewhere, on the government, the insurer, the employer or the patient.
4. The missing middle: More than 40 crore Indians remain outside comprehensive financial protection, being too well off for the scheme and too poor for private cover.
5. Out of pocket spending stays high: Such spending has fallen substantially and still accounted for 43.4 per cent of total health expenditure in 2022 to 2023.

What is private capital buying, and what should the test of it be?

1. Where the capital is going: Major transactions involving Manipal Health Enterprises, CARE Hospitals, KIMS, Rainbow Children’s Hospital and several diagnostic chains illustrate the growing appetite for healthcare assets.
2. What attracts investors: Recurring demand, consolidation opportunities and the ability to build scalable chains.
3. Capital is not the problem: India needs enormous investment, and the open question is what that investment actually produces.
4. The tests to apply: Whether it creates capacity in under served districts, makes treatment cheaper and strengthens primary care, or instead acquires existing businesses, consolidates markets and pursues the most profitable segments.
5. The standard proposed: The 2026 Lancet Commission Report on a Citizen-Centred Health System for India argues for a stronger publicly financed and publicly provided health system as the foundation of universal healthcare.

Challenges to a publicly financed health system

1. Spending is stuck below the policy’s own target: The share of public money reaching health has not moved to the level the policy set, so every other reform runs into a financing ceiling. Eg. Only around 40 per cent of public health funds go to primary care, against the National Health Policy 2017 target of two thirds.
   The Fix: Ring fence a rising share of the health budget for primary and preventive care, with an annual reporting requirement against the two thirds target.
2. Health is a State subject and capacity varies sharply: Delivery depends on the state, so a single national design lands on very different administrative systems. Eg. Kerala’s decentralised public health system and Tamil Nadu’s doorstep care programme for the elderly and for patients with non communicable diseases have no counterpart in many states.
   The Fix: Tie central health transfers to state level outcome indicators rather than to expenditure alone, so building capacity is what gets rewarded.
3. Public beds sit where the patients are not: Public capacity is concentrated in cities while most of the population is rural, so proximity rather than price decides who reaches care. Eg. 73 per cent of public hospital beds are in urban areas.
   The Fix: Make rural service a condition of subsidised medical education, with the posting tied to the district that lacks that specialty.
4. Money collected for health does not reach health: A cess raised for a stated purpose does not arrive in the fund built for it, so the shortfall persists even where the revenue exists. Eg. The Comptroller and Auditor General has reported a gap of over Rs 43,000 crore in the transfer of health cess to the Pradhan Mantri Swasthya Suraksha Nidhi.
   The Fix: Make the transfer of the health cess to that fund automatic, and report the closing balance in the annual budget documents.
5. Regulation of a commercialised sector is weak: Where private providers deliver most of the care, the state’s only lever over price and quality is a regulatory capacity it has not built. Eg. There is no national mechanism that caps the cost of high cost private procedures.
   The Fix: Enforce the Clinical Establishments (Registration and Regulation) Act, 2010 across states, with published standard treatment guidelines and rate ranges.

Conclusion

The expansion is real and it is being measured against the wrong thing. Counting colleges, seats, cards and institutions records what the state has built, and records nothing about whether a household can reach care it can pay for. The unresolved tension is that the public system is being asked to carry a universal promise on a share of national income that has not risen to meet it, while the private system it defers to sets the price. What to watch is whether that financing share moves, because every other reform in this area sits downstream of it.

Public Healthcare System in India

1. Constitutional placement: Public health and hospitals are a State subject in the Seventh Schedule, with the Centre acting through centrally sponsored schemes and coordination rather than direct delivery.
2. How delivery is organised: Rural care runs in three tiers, the sub centre, the primary health centre and the community health centre, with district hospitals and medical college hospitals above them.
3. Where the disease burden now sits: Non communicable diseases account for around 66 per cent of total deaths, with cardiovascular disease and chronic respiratory disease the leading causes.
4. Scale of the primary care network: More than 1,85,000 Ayushman Arogya Mandirs, formerly health and wellness centres, are operational.

Government Initiatives for Public Healthcare

1. National Health Mission: It is the umbrella programme funding rural and urban public health delivery through the states, and it created the Accredited Social Health Activist (ASHA) cadre in 2005.
2. Pradhan Mantri Swasthya Suraksha Yojana: It addresses regional imbalance in tertiary care by setting up new AIIMS institutions and upgrading existing government medical colleges.
3. Ayushman Bharat Digital Mission: It builds the digital health record layer, with Ayushman Bharat Health Accounts giving each person a portable health identifier.
4. eSanjeevani: The national telemedicine service links primary health facilities to specialists on a hub and spoke model, extending specialist advice to remote and tribal areas.
5. Pradhan Mantri Bhartiya Janaushadhi Pariyojana: Its Janaushadhi Kendras supply quality generic medicines at low prices, reducing the medicines share of household health spending.

Back2Basics

1. What it is: The Committee on Health and Family Welfare is one of the 24 department related standing committees of Parliament.
2. Composition: Each such committee has 31 members, 21 from the Lok Sabha and 10 from the Rajya Sabha, all nominated rather than elected, for a tenure of one year.
3. Origin: The system of 17 such committees was constituted with effect from 8 April 1993, and was restructured in July 2004 to the present 24.
4. Weight of its reports: It examines the ministry’s demands for grants, bills and policy, and its recommendations are advisory rather than binding on the government.

Matching Previous Year Question

“[2024, GS2, 15 marks] In a crucial domain like the public healthcare system, the Indian State should play a vital role to contain the adverse impact of marketisation of the system. Suggest some measures through which the State can enhance the reach of public healthcare at the grassroots level.”

Why in the News

The Food Safety and Standards Authority of India (FSSAI), the statutory food regulator, has proposed that packaged foods high in fat, salt or sugar carry a bold red warning on the front of the pack rather than in fine print on the back. The proposal follows prodding by the Supreme Court. It arrives against a childhood disease load that the World Obesity Atlas 2026 puts at 41 million overweight or obese Indians aged 5 to 19. The tension is that a warning label works on disclosure. The demand it targets is set by price, and India’s tax design currently charges a sugared drink and its zero sugar counterpart the same rate.

What is the proposed front-of-pack warning label?

1. What it marks: A bold red warning is placed on the front of a pack that is high in fat, salt or sugar, so the classification is visible at the point of choosing.
2. What it replaces: The same information currently sits in the back of pack nutrition declaration, which is read after purchase rather than before it.
3. What it is for: A person picking up instant noodles, a breakfast cereal or a health drink is told at a glance that the product is not as wholesome as its advertising claims.

How large is the childhood problem?

1. The headline count: 41 million Indian children and adolescents aged 5 to 19 are now overweight or obese.
2. The clinical trend: The number of children presenting with morbid obesity and diabetes has climbed sharply within a few years.
3. The driver is composition, not appetite: The rise is not only a matter of children eating more, it is a matter of what they are being sold.

How is the market shaping what children eat?

1. Products are sold as filling a dietary gap: Breakfast cereals, sweetened yoghurts and health drinks are marketed to parents as making up shortfalls in a child’s diet, emphasising energy and vitamins while saying little about sugar content.
2. The same product is formulated differently by market: In 2024 a leading multinational was found adding sugar to infant food sold in India and other lower income countries, with sugar left out of the same product in Europe.
3. Correction came from publicity, not regulation: A health drink popular in Indian homes turned out to be flavoured sugar syrup, and it took a social media storm rather than a regulator to force a 15 per cent cut in its added sugar.
4. Unhealthy calories are priced to pocket money: An energy drink popular among teenagers is priced at Rs 20 and packs close to 17 grams of sugar, caffeine and artificial colour into a single bottle, and its label saying it is not meant for children stops nobody from buying it.
5. Proximity to schools compounds it: Studies show that around schools and colleges the cheapest and most easily available snacks are also the least healthy.

Where does the label stop short?

1. School canteen norms are advisory: The FSSAI and the Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSE) have long recommended what schools should not sell, optional rules get treated as optional, and canteens stock whatever sells cheapest.
2. The rule ends at organised retail: Most of India’s sugar, salt and trans fat is eaten unbranded from street stalls, dhabas and sweet shops, none of which is required to declare anything.
3. The unregulated half of the plate is untouched: A red label on a biscuit packet does nothing about the jalebi sold loose beside it.
4. Enforcement, not knowledge, is the missing input: A red warning label works only if it is actually enforced, and none of the underlying evidence about these products was ever secret.

What does the United Kingdom’s levy show that India’s Goods and Services Tax slab does not?

1. The United Kingdom taxed in tiers by sugar content: The soft drinks industry levy set thresholds by sugar concentration, so a manufacturer could lower its tax bill by changing the product.
2. The response was reformulation, not repricing: Manufacturers reformulated their drinks to slip below the tax threshold rather than raise prices, and sugar consumption fell among both children and adults.
3. India taxes the category, not the sugar: Since September 2025 aerated and sweetened beverages, sugar free versions included, have been folded into one 40 per cent Goods and Services Tax (GST) slab.
4. The design removes the incentive it should create: A normal cola and its zero sugar counterpart pay the same tax, so a manufacturer has no reason to cut sugar.

Does the objection that a sugar tax hits the poor hardest hold?

1. The objection is not wrong: A consumption tax on a cheap product takes a larger share of a poorer household’s spending, and that is the standard case against it.
2. It is only half the argument: Unregulated cheap sugar already extracts a heavy price from the poor, who bear the brunt of the diabetes, hypertension and childhood obesity that sugar heavy diets drive, with the least means to treat it.
3. Inaction is itself a charge: Doing nothing is not neutral, it is a slower and costlier tax paid in ill health rather than in rupees at the till.
4. The design answers the objection: A tax calibrated to sugar content nudges reformulation, and part of the revenue set aside to make healthy food cheaper offsets the burden on the households least able to absorb it.

Challenges to the front-of-pack warning label

1. A binary threshold invites formulation just below the line: A single high in fat, salt or sugar cut off rewards a product that sits marginally under it as much as one that is genuinely reformulated. Eg. The United Kingdom’s tiered levy was designed precisely to reward movement between bands rather than a single pass or fail.
   The Fix: Publish the underlying nutrient values on the front of the pack alongside the warning, so the distance from the threshold is visible rather than collapsed into one mark.
2. Loose and cooked food carries no declaration duty: The disclosure obligation attaches to a package, so the food sold without one falls outside the rule entirely. Eg. Sweet shops, dhabas and street stalls supply a large share of India’s added sugar and declare nothing.
   The Fix: Extend a simplified menu board declaration to registered food service outlets above a turnover threshold, starting with chains that already standardise recipes.
3. Advisory school norms carry no consequence: A recommendation to schools on what not to sell creates no liability for a canteen that ignores it. Eg. FSSAI and CBSE guidance on school canteens has stood for years without changing what canteens stock.
   The Fix: Make the school canteen standards a condition of affiliation, so non compliance is enforced by the board that already inspects the school.
4. Marketing to children is not restricted alongside the label: A warning on the pack competes with advertising that positions the same product as a nutritional supplement for a growing child. Eg. Health drinks and sweetened cereals are advertised to parents on energy and vitamin content.
   The Fix: Set enforceable limits on the promotion of products carrying the warning mark to audiences under eighteen, rather than relying on industry self regulation.

Conclusion

A warning label changes what a buyer knows and leaves untouched what a buyer pays. The regulator is correcting a disclosure failure, and the tax code is holding the composition incentive flat; the two are pulling against each other inside the same policy. What has to change is the tax base: calibrating the levy to sugar content is what turns a consumer nudge into a producer obligation, and the label alone will not do it. The markers to watch are whether the labelling regulation is notified as mandatory rather than advisory, and whether the single beverage slab is broken into sugar linked tiers.

Non-Communicable Diseases in India

1. What they are: Non communicable diseases are long duration conditions such as cardiovascular disease, diabetes, cancer and chronic respiratory illness, driven by diet, tobacco, alcohol and physical inactivity rather than by infection.
2. Their share of mortality: They account for about 66 per cent of total deaths in India, with cardiovascular diseases at 28 per cent and chronic respiratory diseases at 12 per cent.
3. The scale and the age profile: An estimated 6.1 million Indians die of a non communicable disease each year, and roughly one in four Indians faces the risk of dying from one before the age of 70.
4. The economic cost: India is projected to lose 4.58 trillion dollars by 2030 to non communicable diseases and mental health disorders.

Laws and Rules Governing Non-Communicable Disease Prevention

1. Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006: It replaced the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 and created a single regulator for food standards, labelling and safety across the food chain.
2. Food Safety and Standards (Labelling and Display) Regulations, 2020: They set the mandatory nutrition declaration and per serve information that the front of pack proposal is built on top of.
3. Cigarettes and Other Tobacco Products Act, 2003: It bans advertising, restricts sale to minors and mandates pictorial health warnings, and it is the domestic precedent for a graphic warning driving consumption behaviour.

Government Initiatives for Non-Communicable Disease Prevention

1. Eat Right India: An FSSAI campaign to promote safe, healthy and sustainable food, working through certification of workplaces, campuses and eateries.
2. National Programme for Prevention and Control of Non-Communicable Diseases: It funds population level screening for hypertension, diabetes and common cancers through district and community health centres.
3. Fit India Movement and POSHAN Abhiyaan: The first targets physical inactivity through schools and workplaces, the second targets undernutrition and anaemia in children and mothers.

Challenges in Non-Communicable Disease Prevention

1. Surveillance is event based rather than predictive: Data for communicable disease, non communicable disease and animal health is collected in separate vertical silos, so a risk trend is visible only after it becomes a caseload. Eg. Childhood obesity data reaches policy through a periodic survey rather than a continuous registry.
   The Fix: Merge the vertical disease reporting streams into a single district level dashboard with a fixed reporting cycle.
2. Primary care cannot sustain lifelong treatment: A non communicable disease requires uninterrupted medication, and the network closest to the patient is the least reliably supplied. Eg. Only 60 per cent of Ayushman Arogya Mandirs reported a dependable supply of essential non communicable disease drugs.
   The Fix: Tie the facility’s drug budget to its registered patient load rather than to a flat allocation, so supply scales with the panel it serves.
3. Three disease burdens compete for the same budget: India simultaneously carries infectious disease, rising non communicable disease and emerging zoonotic threats, and health spending is allocated against outbreaks first. Eg. Prevention programmes are routinely reprioritised when an epidemic draws staff and funds.
   The Fix: Ring fence a fixed share of the health budget for prevention that cannot be reallocated to outbreak response within the year.
4. Fiscal tools are used on tobacco but not on diet: Higher taxation is accepted as a public health instrument for tobacco and is treated as a revenue question for sugar and salt. Eg. India’s beverage taxation was reorganised in September 2025 without any sugar content differential.
   The Fix: Earmark a defined share of any diet related levy for subsidising fruit, vegetables and pulses, so the instrument is visibly a health measure rather than a revenue measure.

Matching Previous Year Question

“[2018] Consider the following statements: 1. The Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 replaced the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. 2. The Food Safety and Standard Authority of India (FSSAI) is under the charge of Director General of Health Services in the Union Ministry of Health and Family Welfare. Which of the statements given above is/are correct? (a) 1 only (b) 2 only (c) Both 1 and 2 (d) Neither 1 nor 2 ANSWER: (a)”

Why in the News

Different parts of India have reported 2 to 10 times more influenza cases this year than last year. The official position is that the circulating strain has not changed, and public advisories ask people to remain vigilant without becoming alarmed. That instruction states no action a reader can take. The detection layer built after Covid-19 is working, and the layer that must convert a detection into a decision is not. A surge of this size is the period in which that gap can be closed, since a pandemic is the worst time to learn.

Pillars of outbreak management

1. Surveillance: The ability to detect an outbreak early and to initiate action on that detection. For influenza it also covers genomic surveillance to identify the strain or variant behind the rise, which is what allows its virulence and the population’s susceptibility to be gauged.
2. Prevention: Issuing advisories to high-risk individuals to avoid crowded places, promoting mask use, and vaccinating high-risk individuals and health workers.
3. Control: Ensuring that those already infected receive proper medical care.

What does the current surge actually show?

1. The size of the rise: Reported influenza cases across different parts of the country are 2 to 10 times last year’s level.
2. Hospital positivity has risen: Among patients admitted with severe acute respiratory infection (an acute respiratory illness severe enough to require hospitalisation), the positivity rate in selected hospitals was 16 per cent this year against 12 per cent last year.
3. An unchanged strain is not by itself the answer: A well-established virus does not warrant serious concern on virological grounds alone. The scale of transmission still decides how many avoidable deaths occur.

Why does surveillance not convert into action?

1. No alert threshold is defined: A rise in influenza positivity past a defined threshold should trigger an alert. No such thresholds exist.
2. The data is not public: There is no publicly available dashboard on which positivity trends can be seen, so no one outside the system can tell when a threshold would have been crossed.
3. Responsibility is split three ways: Laboratory surveillance sits with the Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR), response coordination with the National Centre for Disease Control (NCDC), and implementation with State health systems.
4. No one holds authority to act on the signal: No integrated command structure exists with clear authority to coordinate and implement a response during a disease upsurge. This was the specific lesson Covid-19 offered and it was not learnt.

Where is the line between an appropriate response and one that causes panic?

1. The stated fear is panic: Governments hesitate to issue advisories on the ground that a public warning will itself cause alarm.
2. The line is genuinely thin: Governments across the world struggle to place it, and the WHO has itself been accused of overreacting.
3. The asymmetry decides it: Where the primary concern is to save lives, overreaction is the better error of the two.
4. The current position sits on the wrong side: The response is too cautious and too bureaucratic for the scale of the surge.
5. This is a professional capability, not a temperament: Situations of this kind require trained risk communication and named experts speaking, rather than a general advisory.

Why does influenza vaccine use stay low even among high-risk groups?

1. Poorly perceived threat: Influenza is treated as an ordinary seasonal illness, so the risk it carries for the elderly and the immunocompromised is discounted.
2. Non-affordability: The vaccine is largely an out-of-pocket purchase for those outside institutional programmes.
3. Doubtful effectiveness: Protection varies by season and by strain match, which weakens the case a physician can make for it.
4. The annual injection requirement: Immunity does not carry over, so the decision has to be taken and paid for again every year.

What should the response to this surge prioritise?

1. Preventing avoidable deaths: At the current scale the objective is not to stop transmission but to keep high-risk people out of severe illness.
2. A specific advisory rather than a general one: The advisory should tell high-risk people to avoid crowded places and to wear masks, in those terms.
3. Immunising high-risk groups during the surge: The case for routine immunisation is debatable and the case during a major seasonal surge is not. Skipping it leaves the system unpractised for the next pandemic.
4. Low antiviral use needs examination: Antiviral use stays low even in peak influenza season, which calls for a relook at the influenza management guidelines.
5. The private sector has to be inside the response: Private providers and professional bodies deliver most outpatient care and cannot be reached through public system instructions alone.

Challenges to India’s outbreak surveillance and response system

1. Influenza carries no statutory duty to notify: Reporting rests on administrative instruction rather than legal obligation, so private-sector cases stay outside the national count. Eg. Most States have no public health Act listing notifiable conditions, and the Kerala Public Health Act, 2023 is among the few that do.
   The Fix: Enact a public health law fixing the list of notifiable conditions and placing the reporting duty on private providers as well as public ones.
2. Vaccine composition is set for the wrong season: Supply follows the Northern Hemisphere formulation while influenza in much of India peaks with the monsoon. Eg. The WHO issues separate Northern and Southern Hemisphere composition recommendations each year.
   The Fix: Procure the Southern Hemisphere formulation for monsoon-peak States and fix the public procurement calendar to that cycle.
3. Surveillance is an additional charge, not a post: District surveillance duties are given to serving clinical or programme officers on top of their own work, so analysis is done last. Eg. Rural Community Health Centres run at about an 80 per cent shortfall of specialists, which is the pool such officers are drawn from.
   The Fix: Create a separate public health cadre with dedicated district epidemiologist posts filled on their own recruitment line.
4. Antiviral supply is not pre-positioned: Oseltamivir was moved from Schedule X to Schedule H1 in 2017, and the prescription-record duty that follows keeps retail stocking low outside declared alerts. Eg. Shortages appear at the retail counter in the same weeks that hospital positivity rises.
   The Fix: Stock antivirals at district hospitals ahead of the seasonal peak rather than relying on retail availability during the surge.
5. Sequencing capacity is concentrated in a few laboratories: Sequencing volumes are set by laboratory capacity rather than by case load, so variant detection lags the epidemic curve. Eg. Sequencing effort fell sharply between Covid-19 waves and had to be rebuilt each time activity rose.
   The Fix: Fix a minimum sequencing share of positive samples per State per week as a standing requirement rather than an outbreak-time instruction.

Conclusion

An outbreak response is judged by the interval between a signal and a decision. India has built the layer that produces the signal and has not built the layer that must act on it, which is a governance problem rather than a scientific one. The next seasonal peak will test the same gap. The markers to watch before it arrives are whether a numeric alert threshold has been fixed and whether positivity data is published where the public can see it.

Outbreak Surveillance and Pandemic Preparedness in India

1. About: Disease surveillance is the continuous collection and analysis of health data to detect unusual disease activity early enough to act on it. Preparedness is the standing capacity to respond once that detection is made.
2. The zoonotic load: Over 60 per cent of emerging infectious diseases in India are zoonotic, so animal and human surveillance cannot be run separately. Eg. Nipah virus, avian influenza, rabies and brucellosis.
3. The triple burden: India faces infectious disease, rising non-communicable disease and emerging zoonotic threats at the same time.
4. The standing weakness: Surveillance remains event-based rather than predictive, with communicable disease, non-communicable disease and animal health data held in separate vertical silos.

Government Initiatives for Outbreak Surveillance and Pandemic Preparedness

1. Integrated Disease Surveillance Programme: Collects district-level disease data and has been upgraded to carry animal health indicators for integrated surveillance.
2. National One Health Mission: A cross-ministerial effort involving 13 departments to coordinate pandemic preparedness across human, animal and environmental health.
3. National Institute for One Health, Nagpur: The anchor institution for research, training and policy integration on zoonotic disease.
4. National Joint Outbreak Response Team: A multi-disciplinary team of human, animal and wildlife experts constituted for rapid outbreak investigation.
5. BSL-3 and BSL-4 laboratory network: A national grid of high-security biosafety laboratories, with a new BSL-4 facility in Gujarat foundation-laid in January 2026.
6. One Health Governance Framework: Released in December 2025 as a roadmap for States and Union Territories to set up State One Health Cells.

Matching Previous Year Question

“[2024, GS2, 15 marks] In a crucial domain like the public healthcare system, the Indian State should play a vital role to contain the adverse impact of marketisation of the system. Suggest some measures through which the State can enhance the reach of public healthcare at the grassroots level.”