💥Join UPSC 2027,2028 Mentorship (July Batch) + XFactor Notes & Microthemes PDF
Talk to Mentor

Civilsdaily

Login

GS Paper: GS2

  • [13th July 2026] The Hindu OpED: Five crore Indians wait when the courts take a break

    Mentor’s Comment

    The Supreme Court’s six-week summer break (June 1 to July 12) coincides with a record 5.39 crore pending cases across Indian courts, the Supreme Court’s heaviest load in over 30 years. This has sharpened the debate on whether collective, en masse judicial recess is defensible when nearly three in four prisoners in India are undertrials awaiting the completion of their own trials.

    What does the coexistence of a record case backlog and a mass judicial vacation reveal about court functioning in India?

    1. Scale of pendency: More than 5.39 crore cases were pending in Indian courts as of the last day of 2025.
    2. Distribution of the backlog: District courts held over 4.76 crore cases, High Courts held 63.6 lakh cases, and the Supreme Court held more than 92,000 cases, its heaviest load in over 30 years.
    3. Undertrial burden: Roughly three in four prisoners in India are undertrials. They are unconvicted and presumed innocent, yet some serve longer in custody than the sentence they would have received had they pleaded guilty.
    4. Institutional asymmetry: Hospitals, police stations, markets, and government offices continue functioning through individual staff leave. The Supreme Court and High Courts instead shut down collectively for six weeks.
    5. Clearance timeline: A government study calculated that clearing the existing backlog at the present pace would take three centuries.

    Why does an individual judge’s right to rest not justify the institution’s collective closure?

    1. Workload reality: Indian judges are among the most overworked in the world. The recess period is when reserved judgments finally get written.
    2. Continuity is achievable: Last year the Chief Justice of India and the four senior-most judges worked through the first week of the break.
    3. The actual design flaw: The problem is not that judges rest. It is that almost all of them rest together, so the institution goes quiet for six-plus weeks every year.
    4. Colonial origin: The current calendar traces to a practice built for English judges. They withdrew to cooler climates during the Indian summer and took long Christmas holidays in winter.

    Why did the 2024 renaming of the summer vacation fail to reduce the backlog?

    1. Rebranding without substance: In 2024, the Supreme Court renamed the “summer vacation” as “partial court working days.”
    2. No change in working days: The actual number of sitting days remained at approximately 190 days a year.
    3. Litigant impact unaddressed: A litigant whose case is stalled is unaffected by the label given to the recess. What matters is whether the matter is heard and disposed of.

    What administrative reform has been repeatedly recommended to keep courts continuously functional, and why has it not been adopted?

    1. Staggering as the core proposal: The judiciary’s own watchdogs have long recommended not abolishing judicial rest but staggering it, rotating leave so Benches remain full.
    2. Parliamentary recommendation: A 2023 parliamentary standing committee objected to “the entire court going on vacation en masse” and proposed rotating leave to keep courts running continuously.
    3. Earlier precedent: The Law Commission of India and the Justice Malimath Committee made the same recommendation earlier. They were not opposing the courts; they were trying to protect them from themselves.
    4. Institutional analogy: A hospital does not empty its wards because doctors are owed time off. It builds a roster instead.
    5. Status: Despite three separate recommending bodies, this reform remains unimplemented.

    Is the crisis in India’s courts one of vacations or of vacancies? 

    1. The standard objection: Critics argue that vacations are a sideshow and the real disease is judicial vacancies, not recess.
    2. Vacancy scale: Up to a third of High Court seats lie vacant.
    3. The rebuttal: A Bench already running at half strength is thinned further for six weeks every summer. This makes the recess a stronger case against itself, not a defence of it.
    4. Distinct accountability: Filling vacancies depends on the government and the collegium, and will take years to resolve.
    5. Distinct reform lever: The vacation calendar is the judiciary’s own to fix. It needs only institutional will, not external permission.

    Beyond staggering leave, how can India reduce the flow of disputes into its courts?

    1. Symptom versus deeper fix: Staggering leave treats only the symptom. Courts were never meant to be the first stop for every dispute, only the last.
    2. Lok Adalat performance: Lok Adalats settled more than 2.59 crore cases in a single national sitting last December, and over 23.5 crore cases in three years.
    3. Mediation Act, 2023: This Act nudges parties to attempt settlement before approaching a court.
    4. Arbitration: Arbitration can remove commercial disputes entirely from judges’ hands. This route remains badly underused.
    5. Retired judges as an untapped resource: India has a reservoir of retired judges who step down at 62 or 65, still in full command of their expertise. Many already head quasi-judicial bodies and tribunals.
    6. Proposed use: A dedicated corps of former judges, freed from daily dockets, could identify where cases pile up, set public disposal targets, and report progress openly.

    Conclusion

    Collective judicial recess, an inherited colonial practice, is defensible for individual judges but indefensible as an institutional design when 5.39 crore cases and undertrial prisoners are held hostage to it. Cosmetic fixes such as renaming the vacation do not alter the actual working calendar. Staggering leave to keep Benches continuously functional is a reform within the judiciary’s own control, unlike the filling of vacancies, which depends on the executive and the collegium. The unresolved question is whether the judiciary will exercise this available reform, or continue mistaking cosmetic change for structural correction.

  • HC Halts Byelections in 5 Tamil Nadu Constituencies

    Why in the News?

    The Madras High Court restrained the Election Commission from notifying byelections to five Tamil Nadu Assembly constituencies whose sitting members resigned after the 2026 Assembly election, since election petitions challenging their victories remain pending. The interim order raises the question of whether a resignation-created vacancy is legally “clear” enough to trigger fresh polls when the same seat’s original result is still under judicial challenge.

    What is the factual and procedural backdrop of the Madras High Court’s interim order?

    1. Interim restraint: The Madras High Court restrained the Election Commission from notifying byelections to Tiruchi East, Perundurai, Ambasamudram, Viralimalai, and Karur Assembly constituencies until July 31.
    2. Trigger for vacancy: All five sitting MLAs resigned after winning the 2026 Assembly election.
    3. Core contention: The petitioner argued that byelections before disposal of pending election petitions could create an anomalous situation of dual representation for a single constituency.
    4. Deadline set: The court granted the respondents time till July 31 to file counter-affidavits.

    On what legal doctrine did the petitioner challenge the Election Commission’s power to notify byelections?

    1. Statutory basis challenged: The petitioner argued the Election Commission cannot treat these vacancies as a “clear vacancy” under Section 151A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Section 151A: provision requiring the Election Commission to fill a vacancy in a House through byelection within six months of its occurrence.
    2. Precedent cited: Sanjeevayya vs Election Commission of India (1967) held that byelections cannot proceed while an election petition relating to that constituency remains pending.
    3. Precedent cited: Election Commission of India vs Telangana Rashtra Samithi (2011) reinforced the same bar on byelections during pending adjudication.
    4. Precedent cited: Pramod Laxman Gudadhe vs Election Commission of India (2018) extended the same principle.
    5. Consequential prayer argument: All five election petitions sought not only to invalidate the winning candidates’ victory but also to declare the petitioners themselves as winners.
    6. Risk of dual mandate: A byelection conducted before these petitions are decided could produce a second declared winner for a seat where a court may later declare a different winner from the original contest.

    Does the timing of an MLA’s resignation relative to the election petition alter the vacancy’s legal status?

    1. Distinguishing principle raised: The Advocate-General argued that a distinction must be drawn between MLAs who resigned before an election petition was filed and those who resigned after.
    2. Chief Minister’s case: The Chief Minister resigned from Tiruchi East on May 10, before his rival candidate filed the election petition.
    3. Other MLAs’ case: Several other MLAs resigned before the election petitions challenging their victory were filed.
    4. Implication for vacancy classification: A resignation preceding the petition may create a genuinely clear vacancy. A resignation following the petition may not.
    5. Unresolved legal question: The Bench agreed that this timing distinction required deeper examination before final orders could be passed.

    What procedural objections did the respondents raise against the maintainability of the PIL?

    1. Locus standi challenge: Senior counsel representing the Chief Minister, questioned the PIL petitioner’s standing to direct the Election Commission’s conduct. Locus standi: the legal right of a party to bring a case before a court.
    2. Prematurity argument: The petition was argued to be premature since the Election Commission had not yet taken any decision on conducting byelections in the five constituencies.
    3. No notification issued: No notification on byelections had been issued at the time the PIL was heard.
    4. Distinct roles of respondents: The Advocate-General represented the Legislative Assembly Secretary. Separate counsel represented the Election Commission and the Chief Minister.

    How did the Bench reconcile the competing claims in its interim order?

    1. Rejection of narrow standing objection: The Bench held that a narrow and pedantic interpretation of locus standi cannot be applied in matters touching the purity of the democratic process.
    2. Acceptance of AG’s nuance: The Bench agreed that the Advocate-General’s argument on the timing of resignations relative to petition filing required deeper examination.
    3. Deferred decision: The court decided to pass final orders only after notice was issued to all respondents and counter-affidavits were filed.
    4. Interim balance struck: The Bench restrained byelection notification without ruling on the merits of either side’s substantive claim.

    Conclusion

    The order establishes that a resignation-created vacancy is not automatically a “clear vacancy” under Section 151A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, when the underlying election result is under judicial challenge. The unresolved question is whether the timing of resignation relative to the filing of an election petition changes this classification. Until the High Court examines the Advocate-General’s distinction between pre-petition and post-petition resignations, five Tamil Nadu constituencies remain without elected representation. The case will determine whether electoral finality doctrine can override the Election Commission’s statutory duty to fill vacancies promptly.

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2022] Discuss the procedures to decide the disputes arising out of the election of a Member of the Parliament or State Legislature under The Representation of the People Act, 1951. What are the grounds on which the election of any returned candidate may be declared void? What remedy is available to the aggrieved party against the decision? Refer to the case laws.

    Linkage: The PYQ asks directly about election petition procedure and remedies under the RP Act. The article’s central dispute is precisely about how pending election petitions interact with byelection notification under this Act.

  • AI Use by the Judiciary: SC’s Draft AI Regulations, 2026

    Why in the News?

    The Supreme Court released the Draft Regulations for Use of Artificial Intelligence in Courts, 2026 last month, inviting public comments till July 15. The draft permits AI for administrative and research functions in courts but places an absolute, non-derogable bar on any AI role in decisions affecting bail, recidivism (a critical metric used to measure the effectiveness of the justice and rehabilitation systems.), witness credibility, or personal liberty.

    What does the Draft Regulations permit AI to do in courts?

    1. Administrative and assistive functions: AI use is permitted for case management, transcription, translation, legal research, document summarisation, accessibility, and court administration.
    2. Approval requirement: Every permitted use requires prior written approval from the Apex Body for the Supreme Court, or the AI Committee of the concerned High Court or tribunal.
    3. Human supervision: Officers nominated by the court must supervise and verify AI-assisted outputs before use.
    4. Scope boundary: Permission covers efficiency-enhancing functions only. It does not extend to any function that produces or contributes to a judicial outcome.

    Why has the SC opted for a staggered, court-wise implementation instead of a uniform rollout?

    1. SC-specific notification: Provisions apply to the Supreme Court only from a date notified by the Chief Justice of India.
    2. High Court autonomy: Provisions for High Courts and the courts and tribunals under their jurisdiction come into force separately, on dates notified by the respective High Court Chief Justice.
    3. Provision-wise phasing: Different provisions can be brought into force on different dates within the same court.
    4. Rationale: Phasing allows each court to adopt AI at a pace suited to its own infrastructure, caseload, and readiness.

    Why is human judicial authority made non-negotiable in adjudicative outcomes?

    1. Categorical bar on algorithmic outcomes: No judicial outcome can be reached through algorithmic decision-making alone, or solely on the basis of AI-generated information.
    2. Determinative human authority: Human judicial authority is determinative in all adjudicative decisions, regardless of AI input.
    3. Advisory-only role: Where AI is used anywhere in a decision-making process, its role is only advisory.
    4. Independent evaluation mandate: Any AI-assisted input is subject to independent human judicial evaluation before use.

    What functions has the SC placed beyond regulatory reach altogether, and why?

    1. Risk scoring barred: AI cannot be used for ‘risk scoring’ to assess flight risk.
    2. Recidivism prediction barred: AI cannot be used to predict recidivism.
    3. Bail eligibility barred: AI cannot be used to evaluate bail eligibility.
    4. Witness credibility barred: AI cannot be used to determine the credibility of witnesses.
    5. Profiling barred: AI cannot be used to predict, profile, or infer the future conduct or behaviour of parties, accused persons, witnesses, or legal representatives.
    6. Undisclosed AI evidence barred: AI-generated output cannot be submitted as independent evidence without full disclosure of its AI-generated character.
    7. Blackbox AI barred in liberty matters: Unexplainable AI systems cannot be used in matters affecting personal liberty.
    8. Non-derogable status: These prohibitions are absolute. No authority can permit them later under the Regulations.

    Does the disclosure mechanism for litigants adequately safeguard their right to know?

    1. Material assistance trigger: Litigants must be informed only when an AI tool “materially assists” case management, document analysis, or judicial administration.
    2. Timely and accessible disclosure: Disclosure to litigants and their counsel must be made in a timely and accessible manner.
    3. Threshold-based, not blanket disclosure: Litigants are not informed of every instance of AI use in their case, only instances that meet the material assistance standard.
    4. Undefined threshold: The Regulations do not define what constitutes “material assistance,” leaving the disclosure trigger to case-by-case determination by courts.

    What institutional architecture will govern AI use in courts?

    1. Apex Body: An Apex Body at the Supreme Court will set minimum mandatory standards for AI systems and issue implementation guidelines.
    2. Composition: The Apex Body comprises sitting Supreme Court and High Court judges, an official of the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, and experts in finance and cybersecurity.
    3. Specialised committees: The Apex Body will function through five specialised committees.
    4. Court-level AI Committees: The Supreme Court and each High Court will constitute their own AI Committees, backed by an AI Secretariat.
    5. Dedicated research body: The Centre of Research and Excellence on Artificial Intelligence (CoRE-AI) will evaluate AI tools and track technological developments to support the Apex Body.

    How are private AI vendors regulated to prevent capture of judicial data and infrastructure?

    1. Prior written approval: Private companies can supply AI tools only with written approval from the relevant court authority.
    2. Mandatory contract terms: Vendor agreements must include a mandatory list of contract terms set out by the Regulations.
    3. Data ownership and access: Contracts must specify ownership of, and access rights to, court data and AI outputs.
    4. Bar on sensitive data use: Vendors are barred from using sensitive judicial data.
    5. No unauthorised model training: Vendors cannot retain or fine-tune models using court data without the AI Committee’s written approval.
    6. IP restriction: Vendors cannot claim exclusive intellectual property rights over tools built substantially using public resources.

    Conclusion

    The Draft Regulations construct a two-tier framework for judicial AI: broad permission for administrative efficiency, and an absolute prohibition on AI’s role in outcome-determinative and liberty-affecting functions. This boundary, not the list of permitted uses, is the framework’s operative safeguard against algorithmic opacity compromising due process. The undefined “material assistance” threshold for litigant disclosure remains its weakest link, leaving courts significant discretion over what litigants get to know. Effective implementation will depend on how the Apex Body and CoRE-AI operationalise this boundary as AI adoption scales across courts.

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2024] Explain the reasons for the growth of public interest litigation in India. As a result of it, has the Indian Supreme Court emerged as the world’s most powerful judiciary?”

    Linkage: The PYQ discusses expansion of judicial power through institutional self-assertion. The Draft AI Regulations are another instance of the SC using its institutional authority to self-regulate its own processes.

  • National Institute of Science Education and Research (NISER)

    Why in News?

    The Vice President of India recently addressed the 15th Graduation Ceremony of the National Institute of Science Education and Research (NISER), Bhubaneswar.

    About NISER

    • Established in 2006.
    • An Autonomous Institute under the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), Government of India.
    • Located about 20 km south of Bhubaneswar, Odisha.
    • Equipped with advanced laboratories, computational facilities, library, and residential hostels.
    • Affiliated with the Homi Bhabha National Institute (HBNI), Mumbai, a deemed-to-be university under the DAE.

    Objectives

    • Develop high quality human resources in basic sciences.
    • Promote excellence in scientific research and innovation.
    • Contribute to India’s knowledge economy through education and research.

    Major Activities

    • Science Education: Centre of excellence for undergraduate and postgraduate education in basic sciences.
      • Offers: Five year Integrated M.Sc. Ph.D. programmes in pure and applied sciences.
    • Scientific Research: Conducts theoretical and experimental research in frontier areas of science. Has seven Schools specializing in different scientific disciplines.
    • Science Outreach and Policy: Promotes scientific temper through outreach programmes for students and the public. Faculty members contribute to national science policy formulation through various government committees.

    About Homi Bhabha National Institute (HBNI)

    • Established in 2005.
    • A Deemed to be University under the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE).
    • Headquartered in Mumbai.
    • Integrates academic programmes of premier DAE institutions to promote advanced education and research in science, engineering, and technology.

    [2015] Indira Gandhi Peace Prize for Peace, Disarmament and Development for 2014 was given to which of the following?

    [A] Bhabha Atomic Research Centre

    [B] Indian Institute of Science

    [C] Indian Space Research Organization

    [D] Tata Institute of Fundamental Research

  • Government Tightens Regulation of High Alcohol Containing Drug Formulations

    Why in News?

    The Central Government has amended the Drugs Rules, 1945 to tighten regulation of high alcohol containing medicinal formulations, removing their exemption under Schedule K and bringing them under Schedule H1.

    Key Highlights

    • Schedule K exemption removed for medicinal formulations containing:
      • More than 12% v/v ethyl alcohol, and
      • Pack size exceeding 30 mL.
    • Such products must now obtain manufacturing and sale licenses under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940.
    • Shifted to Schedule H1, making them:
      • Available only on the prescription of a Registered Medical Practitioner (RMP).
      • Subject to strict sale records and monitoring.
    • Targets misuse of formulations such as cardamom tincture, ginger tincture, and other aromatic preparations, some containing 80 to 90% v/v ethyl alcohol.
    • Ensures availability for genuine therapeutic use while preventing diversion for intoxication.

    Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940

    • Regulates the import, manufacture, distribution and sale of drugs and cosmetics in India.
    • Administered by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare.
    • Implemented through the Central Drugs Standard Control Organisation (CDSCO) and State Drug Controllers.
    • Supported by the Drugs Rules, 1945, which prescribe standards, licensing, labeling and schedules.

    Schedule K

    • Lists specified drugs exempted from certain licensing provisions under defined conditions.
    • Intended mainly for low risk preparations or specified categories of sale.
    • The amendment removes exemption for high alcohol formulations exceeding the prescribed threshold.

    Schedule H1

    • Introduced to regulate drugs prone to misuse and antimicrobial resistance.
    • Drugs can be sold only on a registered medical practitioner’s prescription.
    • Pharmacists must:
      • Maintain a separate register recording patient and prescriber details.
      • Preserve records for at least three years.
    • Originally covered certain antibiotics, anti TB medicines and other critical drugs; now also includes specified high alcohol medicinal formulations.

    [2018] Consider the following statements:

    1. The Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 replaced the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.
    2. The Food Safety and Standard Authority of India (FSSAI) is under the charge of Director General of Health Services in the Union Ministry of Health and Family Welfare.
    Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

    (a) 1 only

    (b) 2 only

    (c) Both 1 and 2

    (d) Neither 1 nor 2

  • [10th July 2026] The Hindu OpED: Building a durable India-Australia partnership

    PYQ Relevance[UPSC 2024] The West is fostering India as an alternative to reduce dependence on China’s supply chain and as a strategic ally to counter China’s political and economic dominance. Explain this statement with examples
    Linkage: The article shows India and Australia strengthening cooperation in critical technologies, resilient supply chains and maritime security to reduce dependence on China and manage its strategic influence in the Indo-Pacific.

    Mentor’s Comment

    Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Australia produced a cluster of institutional deliverables, a defence MoU, a maritime security roadmap, an operationalised uranium supply deal, and a new critical-technology partnership. The visit has sharpened the question of whether India and Australia have moved from independently arriving at similar strategic conclusions (convergence) to building genuinely interlocked capabilities and institutions (alignment).

    Why Is Strategic Convergence Between India and Australia Deepening?

    1. Shared hedging instinct: Both countries face structural risk from single-point dependence, Australia economically on China and militarily on the United States, India across its energy suppliers, defence platforms and critical minerals sourcing.
    2. Eroding trust in Washington: This year’s Lowy Institute Poll recorded Australian trust in the United States at a record low of 31%, with a narrow majority of Australians favouring distance from Washington under President Trump.
    3. Conflict-driven lesson on dependency: The Iran and Ukraine conflicts demonstrated that long-standing single-point dependencies, however historically stable, have become strategic liabilities.
    4. India’s parallel diversification: New Delhi is diversifying energy suppliers, defence platforms and critical minerals processing for the same underlying reason as Australia.
    5. Limits of unilateral hedging: No single country can balance China or hedge against American unpredictability alone, which makes partners such as India, Australia and Japan mutually reinforcing.

    What Institutional Steps Toward Alignment Did This Visit Deliver?

    1. Defence and security MoU: A Joint Declaration on Defence and Security Cooperation created a memorandum of understanding between Australia’s Maritime Border Command and the Indian Coast Guard.
    2. Maritime Security Collaboration Roadmap: Both countries adopted a roadmap to address shared threat perceptions across maritime domains.
    3. Uranium deal operationalised: The SHANTI Act, enacted last December, reformed the nuclear liability regime that had deterred foreign suppliers since the 2014 bilateral civil nuclear agreement. 
    4. Technology partnership launched: The summit launched the Australia-India Partnership on Cyber, Critical Technologies and Supply Chains (PACTS), positioned to build resilient technology partnerships through flexible minilateral arrangements. 
    5. Complementary minilateral framing: PACTS was framed as complementary to the Australia-Canada-India Technology and Innovation Partnership, both structured as flexible minilateral arrangements rather than formal alliances.

    Why Does Convergence Still Fall Short of Durable Alignment? 

    1. Indian Ocean overlap is real: India’s Information Fusion Centre-Indian Ocean Region and Australia’s closer attention to its western seaboard show converging maritime domain awareness.
      1. Information Fusion Centre-Indian Ocean Region: India’s hub for monitoring regional shipping movements and maritime threats.
    2. Shared threat assessments: Both navies have converged on assessments of shadow fleets, threats to undersea cables, and coercive activity below the threshold of conflict.
    3. Australia’s force posture points elsewhere: Australia’s most consequential defence decisions, including AUKUS, remain oriented toward the Western Pacific rather than the Indian Ocean.
    4. India’s strategic attention remains divided: India’s planners continue to split focus between continental threats and maritime challenges, limiting dedicated Indian Ocean bandwidth.
    5. Operational overlap is narrower than political rhetoric: The shared strategic ground between the two countries is real but narrower than the convergence visible at the political level.

    Why Has Economic Convergence Not Translated into Broad-Based Alignment?

    1. Trade growth is concentrated: Trade has grown sharply since the Economic Cooperation and Trade Agreement came into force, but gains sit disproportionately with large firms.
    2. SME awareness gap: Smaller exporters on both sides remain unaware of how to use the trade agreement’s provisions.
    3. Operationalisation gap flagged by experts: Track 1.5 dialogues have identified this awareness gap as a structural obstacle to broad-based trade alignment.
      1. Track 1.5 dialogue: a hybrid diplomatic format combining government officials and non-official experts.

    Why Does Australian Public Perception Lag Behind Elite Convergence?

    1. Wide perception gap with China: This year’s Lowy Poll found only 5% of Australians expect India to be the world’s most important power a decade from now, against 54% for China.
    2. High trust, low strategic recognition: Trust in India remains comparatively high among Australians, but this has not translated into recognition of India’s strategic weight.
    3. Elite-public disconnect: Convergence at the political and institutional level has not yet trickled down into wider Australian public awareness of India’s strategic heft.

    Can the Diaspora Bridge the Convergence-Alignment Gap?

    1. Diaspora scale: Indian-origin Australians are now the country’s largest immigrant-born community, surpassing the U.K.-born population for the first time.
    2. Existing recognition is narrow: A Centre for Australia-India Relations study finds Australians broadly recognise the diaspora as skilled migrants, students and workers, but only in that limited sense.
    3. Cultural asset is not alignment: Recognising the diaspora as a cultural or electoral asset differs from using it to build a public economic case for India.
    4. Institutionalisation is missing: Alignment requires institutionalising the diaspora’s role in helping Australian SMEs navigate Indian regulatory and business culture, and vice versa, rather than relying on individual champions.
    5. Migration politics complicate mobility: The mobility of Indian professionals remains entangled with Australia’s increasingly contested migration politics.
    6. Visit as fresh ballast: PM Modi’s remarks on Australian pension funds investing in India, framed as a marker of strategic trust rather than pure capital, provided renewed momentum for these conversations.

    Conclusion

    The India-Australia relationship rests on strong convergence: both countries are independently hedging against overdependence on China and an unpredictable Washington. Alignment, however, remains narrower than the political rhetoric suggests. Defence cooperation stays bounded by Australia’s Western Pacific-oriented force posture, trade gains remain concentrated among large firms, and Australian public perception of India continues to lag behind elite consensus. The partnership will deepen only if institutional steps, the Coast Guard MoU, the uranium deal, and diaspora-linked economic outreach, are sustained incrementally, since convergence alone does not guarantee durable alignment.

  • Why is the centre revising the NFSA 

    Why in the News?

    The Union Food and Public Distribution Department has published a draft amendment to the National Food Security Act (NFSA), 2013 converting the Antyodaya Anna Yojana (AAY) entitlement from a household-based to a per-capita formula. Tamil Nadu and Kerala have objected, arguing the change will cut monthly foodgrain allocations for smaller households even though it is framed as an equity correction. The dispute revives a food-politics fault line between the Centre and these two States that traces back to the NFSA’s 2013 enactment.

    What has the Centre proposed, and what does it claim to fix?

    1. Current rule: Every Antyodaya Anna Yojana (AAY) household receives 35 kg of foodgrains per month, regardless of household size.
    2. Proposed rule: Each person in an AAY household is entitled to 7 kg per month, subject to a ceiling of 35 kg per household.
    3. Legal provision amended: The first provision to Section 3(1) of the NFSA, which governs the right to subsidised foodgrains for eligible households.
    4. Stated rationale: The F&PD Department says the household-based system causes intra-category inequity. Smaller households get a higher per-capita share. Larger households get a lower per-capita share that can fall below what priority households receive.
    5. Stated objective: The amendment aims to make allocation more rational and align entitlements with nutritional norms.
    6. Consultation window: Public comments were invited till July 13, 2026.
    7. Gap in the amendment: The draft does not address inclusion of ineligible persons as beneficiaries. This problem remains a State-level issue.

    Why have Tamil Nadu and Kerala historically treated food policy as high-stakes politics?

    1. Kerala’s PDS legacy: Kerala traces informal food distribution mechanisms to the erstwhile princely State of Travancore and launched a formal Public Distribution System (PDS) in 1962, three years before the Food Corporation of India (FCI) was established.
    2. Tamil Nadu’s political precedent: Incumbent governments lost power in 1952 and 1967 over failure to manage rice shortages, making rice policy a lasting political sensitivity.
    3. Kerala’s resistance to the 2013 NFSA: The Congress-led UDF government, despite the Congress-led UPA pushing the law at the Centre, resisted implementation. It argued the law would drop a large number of poor families and impose a heavy financial burden on the State.
    4. Delayed Kerala rollout: Chief Minister Oommen Chandy committed to enforcing the NFSA, but the formal decision was taken only under his successor, Pinarayi Vijayan.
    5. Tamil Nadu’s universal rice policy: Chief Minister Jayalalithaa opposed the NFSA after her government began distributing free rice to all ration cardholders in 2011, regardless of economic status.
    6. Concession extracted in 2013: Tamil Nadu secured a Central guarantee that its then-existing allocation levels would be legally protected under the NFSA.
    7. Delayed adoption: Both southern States joined the rest of the country in implementing the NFSA only in November 2016.

    Why does a per-capita formula built on a household ceiling disadvantage southern States?

    1. Mechanical effect of the formula: A household with fewer than five members receives less than 35 kg under the per-capita rule, since 7 kg multiplied by fewer than five persons falls short of the existing ceiling.
    2. Kerala’s structural exposure: Kerala’s Food Minister has argued that States characterised by nuclear families will lose out, since Kerala took the position in 2013 that AAY cardholders deserved “special consideration,” a stance it maintains.
    3. Tamil Nadu’s quantified loss: The State’s monthly allocation is projected to fall from 65,261 tonnes to 42,040 tonnes under the new formula.
    4. Scale of exposure in Tamil Nadu: Of 18.64 lakh AAY households, 15.75 lakh have fewer than five members, covering 58.51 lakh of the State’s 69.27 lakh AAY beneficiaries.
    5. Non-substitutability argument: Rice is a staple across all three daily meals for AAY cardholders and cannot be replaced with market purchases without significant out-of-pocket cost.
    6. North-South divide argument: Right to Food Campaign functionary Anuradha Talwar has argued that northern States, with larger average family sizes, will receive higher allocations under the new formula while southern States lose out.
    7. South’s collective stake: The five southern States and Puducherry together hold 52.51 lakh of India’s 250 lakh AAY household ceiling, about one-fifth of the national total, making the region’s exposure to the formula change substantial in absolute terms.

    What is the way forward, and does it resolve the underlying tension?

    1. Process concern: A change of this scale should have been subjected to wider public scrutiny before a consensus was sought, according to food policy commentary cited in the report.
    2. Middle-path proposal: Tamil Nadu Progressive Consumer Centre president T. Sadagopan has suggested a flat allocation of 30 kg per household, irrespective of family size, as a compromise.
    3. Fiscal rationale for the middle path: A flat 30 kg allocation would still let the Union government reduce its overall subsidy bill compared to the current 35 kg ceiling.
    4. Implementation context: Current off-take and distribution data for the financial year up to May 2026 show uneven utilisation across southern States relative to their allocations, indicating that formula design alone will not resolve execution gaps in the PDS chain.
    5. Unresolved gap: Neither the Centre’s draft nor the proposed middle path addresses the separate, State-level problem of ineligible persons remaining on beneficiary lists.

    Conclusion

    The NFSA amendment corrects a genuine per-capita inequity within the AAY category, but the household ceiling built into the new formula shifts the burden onto smaller-household southern States, reviving a federal food-politics conflict rooted in each State’s distinct PDS history. The amendment leaves the parallel problem of ineligible beneficiaries at the State level untouched, meaning one inequity is corrected while another persists. A flat per-household allocation remains a proposed middle path, but the Centre has not formally responded to it.

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2013] What are the salient features of the National Food Security Act, 2013? How has the Food Security Bill helped in eliminating hunger and malnutrition in India?

    Linkage: The PYQ examines the provisions and effectiveness of the NFSA as a rights-based framework for ensuring food and nutritional security. The proposed shift from a fixed 35 kg entitlement per AAY household to 7 kg per person, capped at 35 kg, enables a critical assessment of whether rationalising foodgrain allocation may weaken existing NFSA entitlements and affect vulnerable households unevenly.

  • India-Australia Civil Nuclear & Strategic Partnership

    Why in News?

    India and Australia signed 18 agreements, including a landmark Civil Nuclear Energy Agreement enabling commercial uranium exports from Australia to India, along with pacts on defence, maritime security, critical minerals, and trade.

    Civil Nuclear Cooperation

    • Australia will commercially supply uranium for India’s civilian nuclear power plants.
    • Builds on the India-Australia Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (2014).
    • Supports India’s clean energy and non-fossil fuel targets.

    Defence & Maritime Cooperation

    • Signed a Joint Declaration on Defence and Security Cooperation.
    • Launched the India-Australia Maritime Security Collaboration Roadmap.
    • Cooperation in Maritime law enforcement, Maritime domain awareness, Shipbuilding, repair and maintenance, Defence industrial collaboration, Interoperability and information sharing

    Critical Minerals & Technology

    • Launched the Australia-India Partnership on Cyber, Critical Technologies and Supply Chains.
    • Agreed to establish a Critical Minerals Corridor to strengthen resilient supply chains.

    Trade & Investment

    • Decided to expedite negotiations on the Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA).
    • Agreed to move forward on a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT).

    Energy Security

    • Joint framework to ensure reliable supplies of Coal, Natural gas, Diesel and other liquid fuels

    Education

    • Approval granted for Victoria University to establish a campus in Gurugram.
    • Flinders University received a Letter of Intent to open a campus in Bengaluru.

    [2020] In India, why are some nuclear reactors kept under “IAEA safeguards” while others are not ?

    a) Some use uranium and others use thorium
    b) Some use imported uranium and others use domestic supplies
    c) Some are operated by foreign enterprises and others are operated by domestic enterprises
    d) Some are State-owned and others are privately-owned

  • [9th July 2026] The Hindu OpED: How India withstood the crisis in West Asia

    PYQ Relevance[UPSC 2017] The question of India’s Energy Security constitutes the most important part of India’s economic progress. Analyse India’s energy policy cooperation with West Asian countries
    Linkage: The PYQ directly examines the linkage between India’s energy security, economic growth and energy cooperation with West Asian countries. The article shows how sustained diplomatic engagement with West Asian partners, diversification of energy suppliers and strategic preparedness enabled India to maintain energy supplies and limit the economic impact of the West Asia crisis.

    Mentor’s Comment

    India’s fuel and LPG prices rose only marginally during the recent West Asia crisis even though the country imports nearly 90% of its crude oil through routes exposed to the Strait of Hormuz. This price resilience concealed a ₹74,781 crore loss absorbed by state-run Oil Marketing Companies, exposing the fiscal cost hidden behind India’s energy security architecture.

    Why did India appear structurally vulnerable to the West Asia energy shock?

    1. Import dependence: India imports almost 90% of its crude oil and is heavily dependent on the Gulf for oil, gas, and fertilizers.
    2. Third-largest oil importer: India ranks as the world’s third-largest oil importer, making it directly exposed to any disruption at the Strait of Hormuz.
    3. Historical precedent of instability: Sharp oil price increases have historically been a major source of macroeconomic instability for India, as seen in the 1973 oil shock and the 1991 balance-of-payments crisis.
    4. Sharp initial price signals: The Indian crude basket crossed $120 per barrel within weeks of the crisis. The import-linked cost of a domestic LPG cylinder rose above ₹1,600. War-risk premiums on shipping escalated sharply.
    5. Compounding risk factors: Rising freight costs and maritime risk combined with crude dependence to create the conditions for a severe external shock.

    How resilient was India’s fuel pricing compared to global peers?

    1. Petrol price comparison: Petrol prices in India rose by only 7.5% during the crisis. Germany saw a rise of nearly 14%, the U.K. 19%, the U.S. 45%, Pakistan and the Philippines over 50%, and Myanmar almost 90%.
    2. Diesel price comparison: India limited diesel price increases to just 8%. The UAE, a crude-producing country, saw diesel prices surge by about 85%.
    3. LPG affordability: A domestic LPG cylinder in India cost ₹942, and ₹642 for Ujjwala beneficiaries, despite India importing nearly 60% of its LPG requirement.
    4. Regional LPG comparison: India’s LPG price remained cheaper than in Pakistan, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, and dramatically lower than in the U.S., Australia, and Canada.

    Did India’s price stability represent genuine resilience or a deferred fiscal cost?

    1. Scale of losses: State-run Oil Marketing Companies incurred ₹74,781 crore in losses on petrol, diesel, and LPG sales up to June 30 as global crude prices surged.
    2. Absorption over pass-through: The government and public-sector OMCs chose to absorb the price shock rather than pass it fully to consumers.
    3. Trade-off exposed: Consumer price stability was protected at the direct cost of OMC balance sheets, converting a market shock into a fiscal one.
    4. Limits of the model: This absorption capacity depends on OMC financial health and government fiscal space. A prolonged or repeated shock would test the sustainability of this approach.

    What structural preparations enabled India to absorb the shock?

    1. Diplomatic relationships as energy security: Decades of engagement with Iran and Gulf partners kept communication channels open during peak tensions. Iran facilitated the movement of Indian ships and Gulf producers continued energy supplies.
    2. Supplier diversification: Energy partnerships with Russia, the U.S., Africa, and Latin America gave India flexibility to withstand disruption that was unavailable in earlier crises.
    3. A decade of energy planning: Higher ethanol blending, an expanding renewable energy base, larger strategic reserves, and stronger refining capacity built layered resilience over time.
    4. Whole-of-government coordination: The Ministries of External Affairs, Petroleum and Natural Gas, and Ports, Shipping and Waterways, along with the Indian Navy and the National Security Council Secretariat, coordinated to monitor risk, manage logistics, and protect supply.

    What does this episode signal for India’s future energy security strategy?

    1. Preparation precedes crisis: Resilience was the product of choices made years before the crisis, not of measures adopted during it.
    2. Foreign policy as an energy security tool: Diplomatic outreach functioned as a substitute for physical reserves during the acute phase of the crisis.
    3. Unresolved fiscal question: The crisis did not resolve the tension between consumer price protection and OMC financial sustainability. It only deferred that cost.
    4. Framing for national strategy: The episode is positioned as a template for future energy resilience under the government’s ‘Viksit Bharat’ framing.

    Conclusion

    India’s resilience during the West Asia crisis was not accidental. It was the outcome of a decade of supplier diversification, sustained diplomatic engagement with Iran and Gulf producers, strategic reserve-building, and whole-of-government coordination. This resilience, however, was purchased through a ₹74,781 crore fiscal absorption by public-sector Oil Marketing Companies rather than a costless outcome. The crisis therefore validates India’s energy security architecture while leaving open the question of how long consumer price insulation can be sustained through OMC losses if shocks recur or persist.

  • What is the right to be forgotten? 

    Why in the News?

    The Delhi High Court, ruling on 29 May 2026 in Laksh Vir Singh Yadav v. Union of India, laid down India’s first structured proportionality test for the right to be forgotten. The ruling forces a direct reckoning between an individual’s right to informational privacy and the constitutional commitment to open justice and free speech.

    How did the right to be forgotten emerge, and why did Indian courts arrive at it inconsistently?

    1. Origin in EU jurisprudence: The right originated in 2014 when Mario Costeja González complained to the European Court of Justice that Google continued to display an old notice about the auction of his repossessed house even after the debt was settled.
    2. Codification in General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR): The European Court ruled in his favour. This laid the groundwork for the right to erasure, later incorporated into Article 17 of the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation.
    3. Constitutional anchor in India: The Supreme Court’s judgment in K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) held that privacy is a Fundamental Right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. This includes the right to informational privacy.
    4. Divergent High Court practice: High Courts adopted inconsistent approaches after Puttaswamy. Some permitted anonymisation in limited cases, such as the Delhi High Court’s masking of names in certain matrimonial and criminal matters.
    5. The unresolved gap: Other courts rejected similar requests on grounds of open justice. No coherent framework existed to balance these competing interests before the May 2026 judgment.

    What test did the Delhi High Court lay down, and what does it require?

    1. The core issue: The Delhi High Court ruled on a batch of over 30 consolidated petitions. The central question was whether informational privacy could justify de-indexing or masking judicial records in a system committed to open justice.
    2. Constitutional source of the right: The court held that the right to be forgotten flows from Article 21’s guarantee of dignity and informational privacy.
    3. The proportionality test: Any restriction must have a legitimate purpose. The harm to privacy must be balanced against the public interest.
    4. Preference for the least intrusive means: Masking names should be preferred over deleting the entire judgment.
    5. Procedural direction: The court prescribed a two-week deadline for legal databases to comply. It clarified that only the parties’ names should be redacted, not the facts of the case.

    Why does the right to be forgotten sit in tension with open justice and free speech?

    1. Not a stand-alone right: The right to be forgotten frequently conflicts with freedom of speech and press under Article 19(1)(a), the principle of open justice, and the public’s right to know.
    2. A high threshold for privacy: A right to privacy must be sacrificed when the public interest is of a high order, particularly in serious cases of crime.
    3. The limiting principle: The digital presence of a case should not destroy a person’s life long after the trial ends.
    4. Selective, not absolute, restriction: Judgments remain publicly accessible by case number or keyword search. Only name-based searches are restricted.
    5. The unresolved concern: For an acquitted person, a name-based search can still surface the original accusation, described as the “shadow of crime,” as the first result a user sees.

    Why does enforcement remain the weakest link in this framework?

    1. Search engine design defeats masking: Search results are still generated at the search-engine level. Removing a court’s own copy does not remove all traces.
    2. Persistence beyond the primary source: Mirrors, archived copies, and social media sharing keep the original content accessible even after a court orders removal.
    3. No coordination mechanism: Effective technical compliance requires coordination among multiple platforms. No such mechanism currently exists.
    4. Consequence for the right’s value: Without platform-level compliance, the right to be forgotten remains largely symbolic rather than enforceable.

    What is the statutory basis for erasure under the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 (DPDP Act), and why is it inadequate for judicial records?

    1. Limited existing statutory right: The Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 offers a limited right to erasure under Section 12.
    2. Consent-based design: This statutory right is primarily based on consent. It does not explicitly address judicial records.
    3. Scope gap: The Act does not cover public archives, where the need for a right to be forgotten is most acute.
    4. Non-operational status: The Act is deficient because its rules have not been notified.
    5. Missing institution: The data protection board contemplated under the Act has not been established.

    Who should decide erasure requests, and how should that authority be structured?

    1. The efficiency-accountability trade-off: Requiring every request to be decided by a court would create significant bottlenecks. Leaving decisions entirely to technology companies raises concerns about due process and transparency.
    2. A tiered proposal: A more sensible approach would use a tiered system.
    3. First tier: platforms: Straightforward cases could be heard directly by platforms.
    4. Second tier: data protection board: Contested cases would go to the data protection board.
    5. Third tier: courts: Judicial cases, including those with constitutional questions, would be reserved for courts.

    Conclusion

    The Delhi High Court’s ruling gives the right to be forgotten its most structured judicial articulation in India, subordinating deletion to name-masking to protect dignity without eroding open justice. This framework remains judge-made and non-statutory: the DPDP Act does not cover judicial records, the data protection board does not exist, and search engines retain wide discretion over technical compliance. Until the Supreme Court settles the doctrine nationally and a statutory institution is created to adjudicate erasure requests, the right to be forgotten in India will function more as a judicial aspiration than an enforceable entitlement.

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2024] Right to privacy is intrinsic to life and personal liberty and is inherently protected under Article 21 of the constitution. Explain. In this reference, discuss the law relating to D.N.A. testing of a child in the womb to establish its paternity.

    Linkage: The article similarly examines the Right to be Forgotten as an aspect of informational privacy under Article 21 and its balance with freedom of speech, the public’s right to know and the principle of open justice.