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GS Paper: GS2

  • Draft SIR poll roll: names flagged for 11 ‘logical’ discrepancies in Delhi

    Why in the News

    Over a third of the electorate included in Delhi’s newly published draft electoral roll is being served notices to verify documents and attend hearings. The drive is part of the ongoing Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of the roll. The Election Commission’s software flagged 19.33 lakh electors under 11 different “logical discrepancies”, and they form the bulk of the 33.1 lakh voters now facing scrutiny. A software flag is an inference drawn from a mismatch between two databases, not a finding that an entry is false. The elector nonetheless carries the burden of answering it within a fixed calendar.

    What is a Special Intensive Revision?

    1. What it revises: It is a full re enumeration of the electoral roll, in which every existing elector is covered afresh rather than only additions, deletions and corrections being processed.
    2. How it differs from the routine exercise: A summary revision updates an existing roll on the basis of applications received from citizens. An intensive revision rebuilds the roll through house to house enumeration.
    3. What it produces: A draft roll is published first, a period for claims and objections follows, and a final roll is published at the end.

    What do the 11 discrepancies actually test?

    1. The first category, relationships inside a household: Flags arise where more than six children are linked to one parent, where the age gap between a child and a parent is under 15 or over 50 years, where the gap between a child and a grandparent is under 40 years, or where two children are less than nine months apart.
    2. The first category also covers changed relative details: Flags arise on mismatched parent names, on a change of relative type from father to mother, and on a shift from “father” to “husband” between the current and the previous SIR rolls.
    3. The second category, age inconsistency: Electors were flagged where the age difference between the current and the last SIR does not reconcile.
    4. The third category, name mismatch: Flags arise from a discrepancy in either the elector’s own name or the father’s name between the two rolls.

    How large is the verification load, and where does it fall?

    1. The base: Delhi has a total electorate of 1.45 crore registered voters.
    2. What the draft actually carries: The draft roll published on 31 August holds around 97.5 lakh voters whose enumeration forms were successfully digitised.
    3. A second and larger category of notices: Over 13.79 lakh electors remain “unmapped” on the draft roll and face notices for lacking mapping details from previous rolls.
    4. Concentration by district: North East district will see the highest volume of action, with over 3 lakh voters set to receive notices.

    What does the calendar allow at each stage?

    1. For those left out of the draft: Claims and objections can be filed until 30 September.
    2. For those included in the draft: All notices must be served, and all claims and objections disposed of, by 29 October.
    3. The end point: The final electoral roll is scheduled for publication on 4 November.

    Why is the flagged elector at a disadvantage?

    1. The list is not public: The full list of flagged electors has not been uploaded publicly. Booth Level Officers, the field staff who maintain a polling station’s roll, can see the names through their own application.
    2. The documentary standard is discretionary: Where none of the 11 prescribed documents is available, the matter rests on the satisfaction of the Electoral Registration Officer, the officer who decides inclusion for an assembly constituency, and varies with the anomaly involved.
    3. Flexibility cuts both ways: A standard looser than the one applied to unmapped electors is also a standard that is not written down, so two electors with the same gap in records can be treated differently.

    Challenges to the Special Intensive Revision

    1. Field capacity decides accuracy: A house to house exercise rests on a single Booth Level Officer covering an entire polling station inside a fixed calendar. Eg. In the revision carried out in Bihar in 2025, officers were reported completing enumeration forms themselves where households were not found at home.
      The Fix: Publish the workload per officer, cap it, and sanction temporary staff wherever a polling station exceeds the cap.
    2. Mobile and migrant electors are the likeliest to be dropped: A person absent from the registered address during enumeration has no way to be counted in place. Eg. Tenants and daily wage migrants in urban constituencies routinely hold a roll entry at one address and live at another.
      The Fix: Allow a flagged elector to complete verification at any electoral office in the State, and through a documented online submission.
    3. A software flag carries no reasoning the elector can rebut: A person told that an entry is inconsistent is not told which record produced the inconsistency. Eg. Transliteration of one name across two scripts generates mismatches between rolls without anything about the person having changed.
      The Fix: Serve the specific field and the two conflicting values with every notice, so the reply can address the actual mismatch.
    4. The remedy is slower than the roll: Appeals against exclusion run to the District Magistrate and then to the Chief Electoral Officer, on a timeline unconnected to the election calendar. Eg. An elector wrongly excluded shortly before a poll regains the entry only after that poll is over.
      The Fix: Fix outer time limits for the first and second appeal that close before the final roll is published, not after it.

    Conclusion

    The revision has quietly reversed the default. An entry on the roll is now provisional until the elector re establishes it, and what triggers that is a mismatch between two databases rather than an objection raised by a person. A cleaner roll may well result, and it does so by moving the cost of administrative error onto the individual least equipped to absorb it. What to watch is the disposal record, specifically how many flagged electors were restored and on what proof, because that ratio is the only measure of whether the drive corrected the roll or shrank it.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026, GS2, 10 marks] Is the right to vote a fundamental right? Discuss the position of the Election Commission of India while undertaking the revision of electoral rolls. Can it also examine the question of citizenship of voters?”

  • SC seeks clarity on FSSAI’s warning label norms

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court has questioned the Food Safety and Standards Authority of India (FSSAI), the statutory food regulator, on how it proposes to determine whether a packaged food is “high” in sugar, salt or fat for the purpose of front of pack warning labels. The regulator had proposed such labels a month earlier, after the Court questioned its reluctance to introduce them. Its affidavit sets the thresholds by reference to the Dietary Guidelines for Indians, 2024 issued by the ICMR National Institute of Nutrition, without stating the triggering level itself. The Court described food safety as a cause of “national interest” and said it would pass a detailed order seeking further information from stakeholders. A warning label operates entirely through the number that switches it on, and that number is the one part of the proposal not yet on record.

    What is a front of pack warning label?

    1. Where it sits, and why that matters: It is a mark printed on the front of a package rather than inside the nutrition panel on the back, so a purchaser sees the risk before choosing to read anything.
    2. The form proposed: A red hexagonal warning would appear on the front of the pack.
    3. The trigger proposed: It would apply where a product is found to be high in two or more of the specified nutrients of concern, namely added fat, added sugar and salt.

    What did the Court ask that the affidavit does not answer?

    1. The threshold question: A two judge Bench asked how the regulator would fix the level beyond which a packaged food is classified as high in sugar, salt or fat.
    2. Whether any standard exists at all: The Bench asked directly whether guidelines had been laid down for making that determination.
    3. The answer on record: The Additional Solicitor General, appearing for the Centre and the regulator, said the regulator was adhering to the guidelines issued by the ICMR National Institute of Nutrition.
    4. A dietary guideline is not a labelling standard: Those guidelines advise individuals on what to eat. A labelling rule needs a numeric limit stated per unit of food, which a manufacturer can apply and an inspector can test.

    How did the case reach this point?

    1. The petition behind it: The proceeding is a public interest litigation filed by non profit organisations seeking warning labels that indicate high levels of salt, sugar and saturated fats.
    2. The regulator moved only under scrutiny: The proposal for prominent red warnings marked a regulatory pivot, and it arrived after judicial questioning rather than from the regulator’s own standard setting cycle.
    3. The Court’s stated ground: The Bench said it had undertaken its own study, asked the regulator to treat its directions seriously, and grounded its concern in the health of the population and of growing children in particular.

    Challenges to front of pack warning labels

    1. The threshold decides the policy, and it is the contested part: Industry attention concentrates on the cut off rather than on the label, because a lenient limit leaves most products unmarked. Eg. An earlier Indian proposal offered an Indian Nutrition Rating awarding stars, which public health bodies criticised for rewarding marginal reformulation instead of warning about risk.
      The Fix: Notify numeric limits per 100 g for solids and per 100 ml for liquids, separately for each nutrient, so the standard is testable rather than advisory.
    2. A two nutrient trigger lets single nutrient products pass: A food extremely high in one nutrient alone would carry no mark at all. Eg. A sugar sweetened beverage low in fat and salt escapes a label that requires two breaches.
      The Fix: Apply one warning mark for each nutrient breached, so the label scales with the risk rather than with the count of risks.
    3. Enforcement reaches only the packaged segment: Loose and unbranded food sold without a package falls outside any labelling rule. Eg. Fried snacks and sweets sold by weight carry no nutrition declaration whatsoever.
      The Fix: Pair the label with mandatory menu and point of sale declarations for chain food outlets, where the product is standardised and traceable.
    4. A label changes purchase only if it is understood: Nutrient information fails where the reader cannot convert a figure into a judgement. Eg. Chile adopted a black octagonal mark carrying the words “high in” in 2016 precisely because numeric panels were going unread.
      The Fix: Test the mark for comprehension among low literacy consumers before notification, and pair it with restrictions on marketing such products to children.

    Conclusion

    The regulator has conceded the principle and left the operative part open. A warning is a binary statement, so it cannot be issued out of advice about balanced diets, it needs a limit written per unit of food. What follows is that the useful output of this litigation is not a further affidavit accepting labels but a notified numeric standard, with a compliance date and a named enforcement authority behind it. Until that exists, the label is a design and not a rule.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2016] With reference to pre-packaged items in India, it is mandatory to the manufacturer to put which of the following information on the main label, as per the Food Safety and Standards (Packaging and Labelling) Regulations, 2011? 1. List of ingredients including additives 2. Nutrition information 3. Recommendation, if any, made by the medical profession about the possibility of any allergic reactions 4. Vegetarian/non-vegetarian Select the correct answer using the code given below. (a) 1, 2 and 3 (b) 2, 3 and 4 (c) 1, 2 and 4 (d) 1 and 4 only ANSWER: (c)”

  • Manipur’s demand for a 1951 baseline for NRC: Why the date is contentious

    Why in the News

    The State’s Home Minister has told the Manipur Assembly that 1951 will be the base year for updating the National Register of Citizens (NRC) in the State, a register of residents against which claims to belonging are tested. The State cannot implement an NRC without the Centre’s approval, and officials are tracing the records of the register prepared in 1951. The choice of year is not an administrative detail. Manipur’s own permit system controlling entry from outside lapsed in 1950, which is why valley based organisations treat 1951 as the point from which outsiders must be identified. The Kuki Zo Council has challenged the reliability of that baseline, since the hill districts were barely enumerated in that year. A baseline that one set of claimants treats as the earliest honest record is the same baseline another treats as a record of its own absence.

    Why does 1951 have a claim as Manipur’s baseline?

    1. The permit system lapsed just before it: The erstwhile princely State ran a permit system regulating the entry of people from outside, and that system was abolished in 1950.
    2. 1951 produced both a count and a register: The first Census of independent India was conducted in 1951, and an NRC was prepared alongside it carrying names, parentage and residence.
    3. The earliest available demographic baseline: The Joint Committee on Inner Line Permit System (JCILPS), the umbrella body that led the agitation for an Inner Line Permit, argues that 1951 is the earliest point against which later migration and population change can be measured.
    4. The growth figure it relies on: The same body cites recorded decadal population growth rising from 12.80% in 1951 to 35.04% in 1961. A rise of that size does not by itself establish illegal immigration as its cause.

    What earlier settlements already named 1951?

    1. The 1980 understanding: The “Proceedings of Understanding” between the State government and student organisations named 1951 as the baseline.
    2. The 1994 agreement: A further agreement between the Lieutenant Governor and student organisations, concluded under President’s Rule in the State, carried the same year.
    3. The 2018 Bill: The Manipur People’s Protection Bill, 2018 named 1951 and classified as “non Manipuris” those who were not Meitei, not Meitei Pangal, not members of the Scheduled Tribes, and not resident in Manipur before 1951.
    4. Passed but never law: The Assembly passed that Bill unanimously and it did not become law.

    Why did Assam settle on a 1971 cut off instead?

    1. A longer agitation produced it: Assam had a far longer and more intense history of agitation over illegal immigration, culminating in the Assam Movement of 1979 to 1985.
    2. The Accord fixed a base date: Under the Assam Accord, 1 January 1966 was fixed as the base date. Those who entered before it were to be regularised.
    3. Two further brackets followed: Entrants between 1 January 1966 and 24 March 1971 were to be detected and registered under the law. Those entering on or after 25 March 1971 were to be detected and expelled.
    4. The date came from a settlement, not a survey: The 1971 date emerged from that specific political settlement, shaped by migration from East Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh.
    5. Manipur’s proponents distinguish their case: They argue their problem arises from the abolition of the permit system and later demographic change rather than from partition era migration.

    Why has the demand gained urgency now?

    1. It predates the current conflict: The demand existed before the ethnic violence that began in May 2023.
    2. A cross border influx added a security dimension: The movement of people from Myanmar after the 2021 military coup gave the demand a security framing it did not previously carry.
    3. Representation is the new stake: The 2027 Census and the prospect of delimitation have made the sequence of the two exercises politically significant.
    4. Valley organisations want the register first: Meitei and Naga organisations want the NRC completed before the Census, arguing that population figures should not influence future political representation until illegal immigration has been addressed.

    Why do the hill based organisations reject a 1951 baseline?

    1. The 1951 enumeration was incomplete in the hills: The Kuki Zo Council says most hill areas of Manipur had virtually no road connectivity in 1951, which made comprehensive population enumeration difficult.
    2. An incomplete record excludes rather than verifies: On that reading, a 1951 benchmark could exclude indigenous communities who were never fully counted in the first place.
    3. A community older than the boundary: Kuki, Zomi and Chin communities have historically lived on both sides of the India Myanmar border, so organisations representing them fear that a 75 year old baseline would fall hardest on them.

    Challenges to a 1951 baseline for the Manipur NRC

    1. The State has already reversed itself on the year: A shift in the proposed base year from 1971 to 1951 in 2018 triggered protests. Eg. In Jiribam, people from communities with longstanding links to neighbouring Assam feared exclusion, and the Bill was never brought into force.
      The Fix: Settle the base year through a published inquiry into record availability district by district before it is announced as policy.
    2. Its own operational choice was a different year: When the government had to operationalise the Inner Line Permit system, the Cabinet chose 1961 as the base year in 2022. Eg. The then Chief Minister said the choice followed consideration of the interests of the State’s 34 recognised tribes, and the 2024 recommendation of an NRC to the Centre also proposed 1961.
      The Fix: Align the NRC base year with the year already in force for the permit system, so one State does not operate two definitions of residence.
    3. Proof falls on those least able to furnish it: A baseline that old cannot distinguish a recent migrant from a long settled resident who simply cannot produce records. Eg. Assam’s own exercise left over 19 lakh applicants out of the final register published in 2019, largely on documentary grounds.
      The Fix: Accept a defined ladder of alternative proof, including school, land and ration records and village level certification, rather than a single documentary standard.
    4. The legal consequence of exclusion is undefined: The Centre would have to prescribe the evidentiary and appeals framework and clarify what exclusion means in law. Eg. Applicants excluded in Assam were left to Foreigners Tribunals, a forum whose orders have been criticised for inconsistent standards.
      The Fix: Publish the appeal forum, the time limit and the legal status of an excluded person before any enumeration begins.
    5. Displacement compounds verification: In a State where conflict has displaced thousands, documentary verification becomes harder still. Eg. Households moved into relief camps after the violence left property and identity records behind.
      The Fix: Treat a State certified displacement record as admissible proof of prior residence.

    Conclusion

    A base year is a political settlement presented as a date. Manipur’s valley and hill organisations both accept a register in principle and cannot agree on the year that defines belonging, because each candidate year redistributes the burden of proof. What to watch is the order of steps. If a base year is announced before the rules of evidence and appeal are written, the exercise will start producing exclusions before it has defined what exclusion means.

    Back2Basics: Inner Line Permit

    1. What it is: A travel document that an Indian citizen from another State must obtain to enter a protected State, valid for a limited period and purpose.
    2. Its legal source: It operates under the Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulation, 1873, which empowered the authorities to restrict entry into designated frontier areas.
    3. Where it applies: Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland and Mizoram have long required it, and Manipur was brought under the regime in 2019.
    4. What it does not decide: It regulates entry and stay by citizens of other States and does not by itself determine citizenship or residence for any other purpose.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2021] With reference to India, consider the following statements: 1.There is only one citizenship and one domicile. 2.A citizen by birth only can become the Head of State. 3.A foreigner, once granted citizenship, cannot be deprived of it under any circumstances. Which of the statements given above is/are correct? (a) 1 only (b) 2 only (c) 1 and 3 (d) 2 and 3 ANSWER: (a)”

  • Court protects space for protest, it needs to

    Why in the News

    The Chief Justice of India has rebuked a Greater Noida executive magistrate for issuing a notice to a student over his alleged participation in the Cockroach Janta Party led protests over examination paper leaks. The notice went out after the Supreme Court had already quashed cases against student protesters, other than those carrying a criminal history. It was revoked afterwards, and the Court has demanded accountability for its having been issued at all. Days earlier the Allahabad High Court quashed charges under the National Security Act, 1980 against another student arising from workers’ protests in Noida. Both orders grant relief to students and both uphold the right to protest. The space for protest is being preserved case by case through judicial relief, rather than by the state defining the limits on protest narrowly in the first place.

    What did the two court interventions actually decide?

    1. The earlier Supreme Court order: An order of 1 September quashed cases against student protesters, with an exception carved out for those carrying a criminal history.
    2. Accountability for a notice already withdrawn: Withdrawal of the magistrate’s notice was not treated as closing the matter, and an explanation for its issue was sought.
    3. The High Court’s characterisation: Invocation of the National Security Act, 1980 was described as “arbitrary and vague”, and the decision to invoke it as “worthy of derision”.
    4. Officials named in a chain: Responsibility was fixed on officials from the District Magistrate down to the Station House Officer.
    5. Compensation as the remedy: The student was ordered to be paid compensation for the “casual and cavalier exercise of authority by the state”.
    6. Why the wording matters: The order locates the failure in the application of an extraordinary law to ordinary protest, not in any dispute about the facts.

    Why does the right to protest need active protection?

    1. Protest is the channel for those outside institutions: In a democracy with a young population, the ability to speak and to talk back to power has to be protected and widened rather than merely tolerated.
    2. The protests produced a response: Student agitations at Jantar Mantar and beyond forced those in authority to listen, which is the function protest performs.
    3. Amplification changes the stakes on both sides: A young population with a voice and a phone to carry it makes suppression both more visible and more tempting.
    4. The record the courts are drawing on: Judicial review has been used to widen the constitutional promise of civil liberties, including the scope of the freedom of speech and expression.

    Where should the limits on protest be drawn?

    1. Limits exist and are not in dispute: Protest cannot extend to violence, vandalism or incitement to violence.
    2. The burden of definition sits with the state: Those restrictions must be framed reasonably, precisely and narrowly rather than at large.
    3. Overbreadth is the mechanism of abuse: Loose and wide definitions allow ordinary protest to be recast as an offence, which the use of a preventive detention law against a student illustrates.
    4. The stated risk: Abuse of power on that scale risks reducing a state to an “Orwellian dystopia”, a landscape denuded of freedom and marked by severe government control.

    Why is relief in individual cases not a sufficient answer?

    1. Relief arrives after the cost has been imposed: A notice or a detention order does its work in the interval before a court reaches it, through legal expense, interrupted study and the deterrent it sets for others.
    2. The incentive facing the official is unchanged: Where an overbroad order is set aside without consequence for the officer who signed it, the calculation that produced it survives intact.
    3. The guarantee has to travel downward: A constitutional promise is worth what it is worth at the police station and in the office of the local politician, not only in a constitutional court.
    4. Judicial capacity is finite: Intervention one case at a time cannot match the volume of orders a wide statute permits, so the remedy has to sit in the definition of the offence.

    Challenges to protecting the freedom to protest

    1. Preventive detention is constitutionally permitted: Detention without trial for a limited period is contemplated by the Constitution itself, so its use is a question of proportionality rather than of legality. Eg. Article 22 expressly provides for preventive detention laws and regulates only the procedure around them.
      The Fix: Require a written and reasoned satisfaction naming the specific apprehended act before a detention order takes effect, and make that record reviewable.
    2. Prohibitory orders substitute for a ban on protest: Standing orders against assembly convert a gathering into an offence without any judgment on what it is about. Eg. Orders under Section 163 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, which replaced Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, are renewed for long stretches in parts of the capital.
      The Fix: Cap the duration and the geographic extent of such orders and require publication of the reasons for every renewal.
    3. The process itself is the punishment: Bail applications, hearings and travel impose a cost that does not depend on any conviction. Eg. Undertrials make up the large majority of India’s prison population.
      The Fix: Provide for compensatory costs against the state as the default where a case against a protester is quashed for overbreadth.
    4. Space to assemble is shrinking: Where a city permits assembly at a single notified site, the state controls the audience a protest can reach. Eg. Ramlila Maidan and the Boat Club lawns in Delhi have progressively been closed to routine demonstrations.
      The Fix: Notify several protest sites in every city with a transparent and time bound permission process.
    5. Communication restrictions accompany protest policing: Suspension of mobile data around a protest site limits coordination and documentation together. Eg. India has recorded among the highest numbers of internet shutdowns of any country over the past decade.
      The Fix: Require every suspension order to be published with its duration and reasons, and to lapse automatically unless a review committee renews it.

    Conclusion

    The pattern in both orders is the same. An extraordinary power was turned on an ordinary protest, and a court had to say so. That is a working check and a poor system, because it places the burden of defending a constitutional guarantee on the person who was first denied it. The durable answer is a narrower statutory definition of what the state may prohibit, so that the question stops arriving in court at all.

    Back2Basics: National Security Act, 1980

    1. What it allows: It permits preventive detention of a person in order to stop an anticipated act, without charge or trial.
    2. Who may order it: The Central Government, a State Government, and a District Magistrate or Commissioner of Police so empowered may issue a detention order.
    3. Grounds: Detention may be ordered on grounds including the security of the State, the maintenance of public order, and the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community.
    4. Duration and review: Detention may extend up to twelve months, and an advisory board must examine the order within a fixed period for it to continue.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025, GS2, 15 marks] “Constitutional morality is the fulcrum which acts as an essential check upon the high functionaries and citizens alike…” In view of the above observation of the Supreme Court, explain the concept of constitutional morality and its application to ensure balance between judicial independence and judicial accountability in India.”

  • How should RUPPs be regulated?

    Why in the News

    Six Registered Unrecognised Political Parties (RUPP) based in Gujarat received donations of about Rs 1,700 crore in the 2023 to 2024 financial year. A RUPP is a party registered with the Election Commission of India (EC) that has not met the vote and seat tests for recognition as a State or a national party. That single figure exceeds the Rs 1,480 crore received in the same period by five nationally recognised parties other than the Bharatiya Janata Party. The six remain on the list of active parties because they fielded candidates in the last general election. Registration brings tax exemption and a common symbol, and the law gives the Election Commission almost no power to remove a party that does nothing else.

    What is a Registered Unrecognised Political Party?

    1. The registering provision: Section 29A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (RP Act) sets out the requirements for registering a political party with the Election Commission.
    2. How registration happens: The Commission registers a party as a RUPP after satisfactory scrutiny of the documents submitted to it.
    3. Tax exemption on donations: Donations received are exempt under Section 12 of the Income Tax Act, 2025.
    4. Electoral privileges: A RUPP gets a common symbol for contesting general elections to the Lok Sabha and the State Assemblies, and is allowed 20 star campaigners during a campaign.

    What must a RUPP disclose, and what follows if it does not?

    1. Donor records above a threshold: Details of individual donors giving more than twenty thousand rupees in a financial year must be maintained and submitted to the Election Commission every year.
    2. The penalty for non disclosure: Under Section 29C of the RP Act, failure to furnish those details results in loss of income tax exemption.
    3. A cap on cash: Donations above two thousand rupees may be accepted only by cheque or bank transfer under the Income Tax Act, 2025.

    Why do parties that never seriously contest stay on the register?

    1. The gap between registration and contest: India had more than 2,800 RUPPs as of July, and only around 750 contested the 2024 general elections.
    2. The label that followed: The remainder are described as “letter pad parties”, since registration is all they maintain.
    3. No power to deregister: The RP Act confers no explicit power on the Election Commission to remove a party from the register for failing to contest elections, hold internal elections or lodge required returns.
    4. The position in law: In Indian National Congress v. Institute of Social Welfare and Others (2002) the Supreme Court held that the Commission has no power to deregister a political party under the RP Act.
    5. The narrow exceptions: Removal is available only where registration was obtained by fraud, where the party ceases to have allegiance to the Constitution, or where it is declared unlawful by the government.
    6. Delisting is not removal from the register: The Commission periodically publishes a list of delisted RUPPs, and its notification of October 2025 carried over 800 such parties.
    7. A minimal contest keeps a party active: The six Gujarat based parties stayed on the active list by fielding a total of 15 candidates in the 2024 Lok Sabha elections. Eg. They are the Aam Janmat Party, Bharatiya National Janata Dal, Garib Kalyan Party, New India United Party, Satyawadi Rakshak Party and Swatantrata Abhivyakti Party.

    What does the compliance record show?

    1. Most annual reports never reach the public: A July 2025 report of the Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR), analysing annual reports for 2022 to 2023, found reports of only 26% of RUPPs available in the public domain.
    2. What weak compliance enables: Poor compliance with statutory requirements together with low transparency lets these parties serve as an opaque channel for tax evasion and money laundering.
    3. The scale problem: A register of thousands of entities, most of which never contest, cannot be policed through annual return scrutiny alone.

    What reforms have been proposed?

    1. The Law Commission’s recommendation: The 255th report of the Law Commission recommended amendments allowing removal from the register of a party that fails to contest elections for ten consecutive years.
    2. The Election Commission’s own proposal: Its memorandum on electoral reforms of 2016 sought an amendment to the RP Act empowering it to deregister a party.
    3. Enforcement rather than registration alone: Transaction level monitoring by the Income Tax Department and other enforcement agencies is feasible with digital records and would act as a deterrent against misuse of exemptions.
    4. Linking exemption to electoral success: The Election Commission has suggested that tax exemption be confined to parties that win seats in the Lok Sabha or a Legislative Assembly.
    5. Why that proposal is contested: Confining exemption to winners is open to the objection that it is undemocratic and extreme, since parties contest consistently without electoral success.
    6. A vote share threshold instead: A vote percentage threshold fixed by law could govern eligibility for tax exemption, on the model of the 1% vote threshold already used for allotting common symbols to RUPPs.

    Challenges to regulating Registered Unrecognised Political Parties

    1. Entry is easy and exit is absent: The statute sets a documentary threshold for entry and provides almost no route out, so the register only grows. Eg. The number of registered parties has risen steadily across successive general elections.
      The Fix: Provide for statutory lapse of registration where a party files no return and contests no election within a fixed period.
    2. Token candidature defeats a contest based test: A party that fields a handful of candidates satisfies any rule keyed to mere participation while doing nothing else. Eg. A large share of candidates in a general election forfeit their security deposit for polling below one sixth of valid votes.
      The Fix: Key the test to a minimum vote share rather than to the act of contesting.
    3. Tax exemption is the actual prize: Exemption on donations makes registration valuable to entities with no electoral purpose at all. Eg. Tax investigations into registered unrecognised parties have found arrangements in which most of a donation was returned to the donor in cash against a commission.
      The Fix: Make exemption conditional on an audited annual return filed on time, rather than automatic on registration.
    4. Disclosure thresholds leave most money invisible: Only contributions above the reporting threshold must be itemised, so funds can be split into smaller amounts. Eg. Parties routinely report large sums under the head of voluntary contributions from unnamed donors.
      The Fix: Require itemised reporting of every contribution above the cash limit, aligning the disclosure threshold with the banking channel threshold.
    5. Enforcement is split across agencies with different mandates: The Election Commission holds the register and the Income Tax Department holds the financial trail, and neither can act on the other’s finding. Eg. Delisting by the Commission does not by itself withdraw an exemption already claimed.
      The Fix: Provide for automatic reference from the Commission to the tax authority on default, with a statutory timeline for action.

    Conclusion

    Regulation here has been treated as a records problem when it is a design problem. The register was built to be easy to enter, because a democracy should not gate the formation of parties, and nothing was built to remove an entity that stops behaving like one. Every measure repeatedly proposed shifts the test from whether a party exists on paper to whether it seeks votes. Whether Parliament is willing to give the Election Commission that power, having left the position untouched since the Court described the gap, is what decides the outcome.

    Back2Basics: Recognition of political parties in India

    1. Who decides: The Election Commission recognises a party as a State party or a national party under the Election Symbols (Reservation and Allotment) Order, 1968.
    2. State party test: Recognition in a State requires a fixed share of valid votes together with seats in the Assembly or the Lok Sabha from that State, or a minimum number of Lok Sabha seats from it.
    3. National party test: Recognition as a national party requires recognition as a State party in at least four States, or a fixed vote share along with Lok Sabha seats from several States.
    4. What recognition brings: A recognised party gets a reserved symbol, free broadcast time on public service media, a larger number of star campaigners and copies of the electoral roll.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2024, GS2, 10 marks] Examine the need for electoral reforms as suggested by various committees with particular reference to “one nation-one election” principle.”

  • No Statehood, Ladakh to get unique elected body, says Chief Secretary

    Why in the News

    The Ladakh Chief Secretary has stated that neither Statehood nor a Union Territory with a legislature is on offer for Ladakh. What is being offered instead is a *sui generis* body under the Constitution, carrying legislative, executive and financial powers. The proposal follows the reorganisation that made Ladakh a Union Territory without a legislature, and the sustained agitation since then for an elected tier with real powers. The Union Home Ministry has discussed the structure of the proposed Union Territory level body under Article 371 of the Constitution with the Leh Apex Body (LAB) and the Kargil Democratic Alliance (KDA). Both called the discussion disappointing and said the Union Territory administration and the Home Ministry are not on the same page. The nomenclature of the new body has not been settled, which is the immediate reason the talks remain open.

    What is the body being offered to Ladakh?

    1. Not Statehood: Ladakh was never a State, having been part of Jammu and Kashmir before becoming a Union Territory, so the proposal is not framed as a restoration.
    2. Not a Union Territory with a legislature: The model is stated to be neither Statehood nor the Union Territory with legislature form that already exists elsewhere in the country.
    3. What it is to carry: The body is to hold legislative, executive and financial powers, which the Centre describes as the aspiration it is answering.
    4. Direct election through constituencies: Members of the two Ladakh bodies recorded their consensus that the Union Territory level body should be filled by direct election through constituencies.

    Why is Article 371 the route being used?

    1. Special provisions as the vehicle: Article 371 carries special provisions for particular States and regions, and the proposed structure is being discussed under it.
    2. A constitutional amendment is required: Constitutional safeguards of this kind require a detailed and established legal and parliamentary process rather than an executive order.
    3. The stated preconditions: Any such amendment needs broad political consensus, consultation and parliamentary consideration.
    4. No imposition: The Centre’s stated position is that no framework will be imposed on Ladakh without due consultation with stakeholders.

    What is still unresolved between the new body and the existing councils?

    1. A list of questions to answer: The Ladakh representatives have been handed eight to nine questions to examine.
    2. The substance of those questions: They cover the structural relationship and the distribution of powers between the existing hill councils and the proposed Union Territory level body.
    3. The designation is undecided: Whether the head of the elected body will be called a Chief Minister has not been settled, and discussions continue for that reason.
    4. The next step: The next round of discussions is expected in October.

    Why do the Ladakh bodies call the process unsatisfactory?

    1. Two arms of government reading it differently: Both bodies said the Union Territory administration under the Lieutenant Governor and the Union Home Ministry were not on the same page.
    2. No agenda circulated in advance: A Leh Apex Body representative said the questions involve legal issues and cannot be answered on the spot, and that the agenda should have been shared beforehand.
    3. No concrete progress on core demands: A member of the delegation that met Ministry officials said no concrete progress has been made on the key demands.
    4. A threat to resume agitation: The same delegation cautioned that protests would resume if assurances were not provided within a week.
    5. A charge of divide and rule: The delegation also said efforts have been made to drive wedges between communities and regions and to tire the leadership out.

    Challenges to the proposed Ladakh elected body

    1. A body with no precedent has no settled template: A structure that exists nowhere else must define its relationship with Parliament, the Lieutenant Governor and the courts from the beginning. Eg. The Union Territory of Delhi has spent decades litigating the division of executive power between its elected government and the Centre.
      The Fix: Write the division of legislative and executive subjects into the enabling amendment itself rather than leaving it to rules framed later.
    2. Three tiers competing for the same functions: An elected Union Territory level body layered above the existing hill councils risks duplicating their subjects and their budgets. Eg. The councils already administer land allotment, local development planning and village level works in Leh and Kargil.
      The Fix: Fix a clear subject list for each tier, with the councils retaining village level administration and the new body taking Union Territory wide legislation.
    3. Financial powers without an assured revenue base: A legislature that cannot raise its own revenue depends on central allocation for every decision it takes. Eg. Ladakh has a small population, a short working season and almost no industrial tax base.
      The Fix: Attach a formula linked share of central transfers to the new body, so its budget is not an annual negotiation.
    4. Leh and Kargil press different core demands: A single settlement has to satisfy two regions that differ on representation and on the weight given to religious and ethnic composition. Eg. The two have separately pressed for reserved seats and for safeguards on land and employment.
      The Fix: Provide for guaranteed regional representation inside the new body rather than leaving the balance to constituency delimitation alone.
    5. An elected tier is not a land and jobs safeguard: Representation does not by itself restrict outside purchase of land or reserve employment for residents. Eg. Sixth Schedule status, which the Ladakh bodies have demanded, carries land and forest protections that an ordinary legislature does not.
      The Fix: Pair the new body with a statutory domicile rule and a restriction on land transfer, so representation and protection arrive together.

    Conclusion

    The offer settles one question and leaves the harder one open. The Centre has accepted that Ladakh will get an elected tier with real powers, and has ruled out both of the forms that already exist in the constitutional scheme. What has not been agreed is how much power that tier holds against the administration currently exercising it, and how it sits alongside the councils already in place. Those are the questions the next round has to answer, and the Ladakh leadership has tied its restraint to visible progress on them.

    Back2Basics: Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Councils

    1. Statutory basis: They were created under the Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Council Act, 1995, enacted by the Jammu and Kashmir legislature.
    2. Two councils: One functions for Leh, set up in 1995, and a second for Kargil, set up in 2003.
    3. What they do: Each council handles local development planning, allotment of land and execution of village level works within its district.
    4. Composition: Members are directly elected from territorial constituencies alongside a few nominated members, and the council is headed by a Chief Executive Councillor.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025, GS2, 10 marks] Discuss the nature of Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly after the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganization Act, 2019. Briefly describe the powers and functions of the Assembly of the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir.”

  • Mining, money & federalism: Why a new law is at the centre of a political tussle in Odisha

    Why in the News

    Parliament has passed the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2026. It sets a uniform national tax framework for major minerals and limits the power of States to levy taxes on mining lands. The step overrides the financial effect of Mineral Area Development Authority v. Steel Authority of India (2024). A nine judge Constitution Bench had held there, by a majority of 8 to 1, that States hold the power to tax mineral rights and mineral bearing lands. The contest is over who collects the revenue that mining generates, and Odisha is where it is sharpest. Three States have taken the amendment to the Supreme Court, so a question the largest Bench to hear it had settled is open again.

    What does the 2026 amendment change about who can tax mining?

    1. A bar on State levies: The new Section 9D provides that no tax, cess or other levy shall be imposed by a State on mineral rights or on mineral bearing lands, whether computed on mineral quantity, mineral value, royalty payable or otherwise.
    2. A conditional exception only: A State may levy only in accordance with such conditions or restrictions as the Central Government prescribes.
    3. Wider central reach: Amendments to Section 2 and Section 13 extend the Centre’s control to mineral bearing lands.
    4. Rule making is centralised: The Centre is given sole authority to frame the rules that restrict the taxing power of States over minerals.

    What did the Supreme Court hold in 2024?

    1. Royalty on extraction: States were held competent to levy royalty on the extraction of minerals from land within the State.
    2. Tax on mineral bearing land: The same ruling held that States may tax the lands which comprise mines and quarries.
    3. The central law was read as no bar: The Bench held that the parent mining statute did not take away the taxing competence of the States in this field.
    4. Past dues were opened up: Recovery of dues for earlier years was permitted in staggered instalments, which is the origin of the arrears claims now in dispute.

    Why is Odisha the sharpest site of the dispute?

    1. The stakes as the Opposition states them: The Biju Janata Dal (BJD) puts the cost to Odisha at Rs 12,000 crore a year in foregone revenue and Rs 1 lakh crore in arrears.
    2. The procedural objection: A letter from the former Chief Minister of Odisha to the State’s ruling party Members of Parliament records that the Bill was passed with less than 10 minutes of discussion in the Lok Sabha.
    3. The framing of the contest: The Opposition presents the law as an attack on federalism and on the financial rights of the State rather than as a technical tax measure.
    4. Street level escalation: The Congress and the Left have announced a gherao of the Odisha Assembly on 29 September.
    5. The legal challenge is already under way: Karnataka, Kerala and Telangana have moved the Supreme Court against the amendment, and the Odisha unit of the Congress has said it will do the same.
    6. Why the State is so exposed: The economy and the politics of Odisha are closely tied to mining, so a change in mineral taxation reaches its budget directly.

    What is the case made for a uniform national framework?

    1. Multiple levies deter industry: On the State government’s own argument, arbitrary and multi level levies on mineral bearing land would cause extensive damage to the industrial ecosystem of the State.
    2. Mining revenue has already risen sharply: The State’s Steel and Mines Minister puts earnings from the mining sector at about Rs 50,000 crore, against about Rs 5,000 crore before 2014.
    3. A second channel already reaches States: States continue to receive money for mining affected areas through the District Mineral Foundation (DMF), a non profit trust set up by the State government.
    4. The earlier reform is offered as the cause: That rise in receipts is attributed to the last amendment of the parent Act in 2015, which moved major mineral concessions to competitive auction.

    Challenges to the MMDR Amendment Act, 2026

    1. A statute answering a constitutional finding invites a second round: Where a Bench locates a taxing power in the State List, an ordinary central law restricting its exercise raises the question of legislative competence rather than settling it. Eg. Royalty and cess on minerals has been litigated repeatedly since the India Cement judgment of 1990.
      The Fix: Route the change through a constitutional amendment or a Finance Commission mediated compensation formula rather than through a bar inserted by ordinary law.
    2. Producing districts carry the costs of mining and lose the levy: Land degradation, displacement and water stress sit in the mining district, with the taxing power moving upward. Eg. The iron ore districts of Keonjhar and Sundargarh in Odisha carry heavy overburden dumping and haulage traffic.
      The Fix: Make a fixed share of central mineral receipts a statutory entitlement of the producing district rather than a discretionary allocation.
    3. Revenue predictability for States falls: A levy that can be permitted or withdrawn through prescribed central conditions cannot be budgeted for with confidence. Eg. Mineral rich States had already built projected receipts into their medium term fiscal statements.
      The Fix: Fix the permitted State levy in the Act itself with a floor, so it is not alterable by executive prescription.
    4. Uniformity ignores unequal mineral endowment: A single national framework treats a State with large reserves and a State with none as comparable for taxation purposes. Eg. Odisha, Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh together account for the bulk of India’s iron ore and coal output.
      The Fix: Build an endowment weighted transfer into the framework so producing States are not equalised downward.
    5. Litigation freezes investment decisions: A pending challenge to the taxing framework leaves both States and lessees uncertain about liability for the interim period. Eg. The 2024 ruling itself came at the end of litigation running over three decades on the same question.
      The Fix: Seek an early and time bound hearing along with an interim arrangement on collection, so liability does not accumulate unresolved.

    Conclusion

    The dispute is no longer about the rate at which minerals are taxed. It is about whether a fiscal power the Court located with the States can be narrowed by ordinary central legislation. Until the challenge is decided, mineral rich States must budget for revenue they may not be permitted to collect. The marker to watch is whether the Court treats the new bar as a permissible exercise of the Union’s mining power or as an encroachment on a State legislative field.

    Back2Basics: Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957

    1. What it governs: It is India’s principal law for the development and regulation of mines and minerals.
    2. The Union’s declared control: The Act declares that the Union should take control of mining and mineral development to the extent provided by the Act.
    3. Major and minor minerals: Major minerals are regulated centrally under this Act, and minor minerals such as sand, building stone and ordinary clay are governed by State rules.
    4. The 2015 overhaul: That amendment moved allocation of major mineral concessions to auction, created the District Mineral Foundation and the National Mineral Exploration Trust (NMET), and strengthened penalties for illegal mining.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025] Consider the following statements: I. India has joined the Minerals Security Partnership as a member. II. India is a resource-rich country in all the 30 critical minerals that it has identified. III. The Parliament in 2023 has amended the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 empowering the Central Government to exclusively auction mining lease and composite license for certain critical minerals. Which of the statements given above are correct? (a) I and II only (b) II and III only (c) I and III only (d) I, II and III ANSWER: (c)”

  • Rude lessons

    Why in the News

    Trade relations between the United States (US) and Canada have fallen to a new low despite decades of deep integration. Canada pulled out of negotiations over a new tariff deal, citing last minute insertions by the US side, and the US has made the same allegation in return. Statements by the US President have not been conciliatory. The breakdown raises the question of what a signed trade agreement is actually worth to a partner such as India.

    How deep was the integration that has now broken down?

    1. Automobile trade: Free trade in automobiles and their parts was established between the two countries in 1965.
    2. Free Trade Agreement: A comprehensive free trade agreement followed in 1989.
    3. NAFTA: That agreement was expanded into the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) about five years later.
    4. Mutual benefit: Integration continued steadily and by most accounts served both economies well.
    5. Economies of scale: Canada’s aim was to achieve economies of scale by producing very large volumes of a few products.

    What does Canada’s place in US supply chains show about the stakes?

    1. Crude oil supply: Canada accounts for 70% of the oil refined in the American Midwest, on an estimate by the Nobel laureate economist Paul Krugman.
    2. Aluminium supply: Canada supplies 60% of American aluminium requirements.
    3. Lumber supply: Canada supplies nearly all the types of lumber used in American residential construction.

    How far has the relationship actually been rolled back?

    1. Reciprocal tariffs: Canada levied reciprocal tariffs of up to 50% in answer to the 50% tariffs the US imposed on imports from Canada.
    2. Outright import bans: From 29 September the US will ban certain Canadian alcoholic spirits, some dairy goods and motorcycles.

    What are the three lessons the episode holds for India?

    1. No assured preference: The country being treated this way is a neighbour, an alliance member and a trade partner of long standing, so India has no stronger claim to preferential handling.
    2. Speed of negotiation: Malaysia backed out of an agreement it had already signed with the US, arguing that once the reciprocal tariff system was held illegal, the gains no longer covered the cost of opening its market.
    3. Reversal after signature: A concession is only as durable as the other side’s continuing willingness to honour it.

    Why is an agreed tariff number not the end of the pressure?

    1. The February 2026 agreement: The February 2026 agreement set tariffs of 18% on imports from India, and the US has pressed on with forced labour and excess capacity investigations that could take the effective level past it.
    2. India’s negotiating condition: India’s stated position is that no deal will be struck until its advantage over competing suppliers is clear.
    3. Record of other pacts: India’s recent trade pacts have worked, and the same weighing of gains against costs still has to be applied to this partner.

    Challenges to India’s bilateral trade strategy with the United States

    1. Trade remedy investigations sit outside the deal: A negotiated tariff line does not restrain separate inquiries that can raise the effective duty on the same goods. Eg. Antidumping and countervailing duty cases against Indian steel and shrimp exports have run independently of tariff talks.
      The Fix: Insist on a standstill clause covering fresh investigations for the life of any agreed tariff schedule.
    2. Agriculture and dairy access is the concession India cannot give: Opening those markets touches a very large number of small producers, so what the other side wants most is the hardest thing to offer. Eg. Dairy market access was the sticking point that kept India out of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership in 2019.
      The Fix: Offer tariff rate quotas on a narrow list of products instead of broad access, so the exposure stays bounded and measurable.
    3. No working appellate remedy: A bilateral dispute has nowhere binding to go for as long as the multilateral appeal mechanism stays non functional. Eg. The World Trade Organization’s Appellate Body has been unable to hear appeals since 2019 for want of members.
      The Fix: Write a standing bilateral arbitration panel with fixed timelines into the text of every new agreement.
    4. Concentration in one market magnifies a reversal: A large share of exports going to a single destination turns one tariff decision there into an economy wide shock. Eg. The US is India’s largest single destination for merchandise exports.
      The Fix: Front load market access negotiations with other large blocs, so the export base is not hostage to one partner’s politics.

    Conclusion

    The durability of a trade agreement rests on the other party’s continuing interest in it rather than on its text. For India that argues for negotiating slowly, keeping concessions reversible, and measuring any offer against what a competing supplier is being given. The tension stays unresolved, because a deal is the only route to predictable access and the deal itself has become the least predictable part of the arrangement. The thing to watch is whether the investigations still running against Indian goods close within the tariff level already conceded.

    Back2Basics: North American Free Trade Agreement

    1. Formation: NAFTA came into force in 1994 among the United States, Canada and Mexico.
    2. Mandate: It removed trade barriers and eased the cross border movement of goods and services among the three.
    3. No institutional seat: It is a trade agreement rather than an organisation, so it has no permanent headquarters.
    4. Successor: It was replaced by the United States Mexico Canada Agreement (USMCA) in 2020.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025, GS3, 10 marks] What are the challenges before the Indian economy when the world is moving away from free trade and multilateralism to protectionism and bilateralism? How can these challenges be met?”

  • India and Morocco hold inaugural Joint Defence Committee meeting

    Why in News

    1. First committee meeting: The inaugural Joint Defence Committee (JDC) meeting between India and Morocco was held in New Delhi on 8 September 2026.

    Core facts

    1. Administering body: The Ministry of Defence hosted the meeting.
    2. Co-chairs by position: India’s Joint Secretary in the Ministry of Defence and Morocco’s 2nd Bureau Chief co-chaired the session.
    3. Domains discussed: training and education, peacekeeping operations, military exercises, medical cooperation, cyber defence and defence industries.
    4. Industrial cooperation: Both sides agreed to explore joint production, joint ventures, technology collaboration, and maintenance and sustainment.
    5. Visit dates: The Moroccan delegation visited India from 7 to 10 September 2026.
    6. Institutional origin: The JDC was created by a defence cooperation Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed in September 2025.
    7. Milestone ahead: The two countries mark the 70th anniversary of diplomatic ties in 2027.

    Static Context

    1. Morocco is a North African kingdom on the Atlantic and Mediterranean coasts. It borders the Strait of Gibraltar.
    2. A Joint Defence Committee is a standing bilateral mechanism. It institutionalises regular defence dialogue between two states.
    3. India and Morocco established diplomatic relations in 1957.

    Prelims angle

    1. Location of Morocco: North West Africa, near the Strait of Gibraltar.
    2. Mechanism: The India and Morocco Joint Defence Committee as a bilateral defence institution.

    Mains angle

    1. GS2, international relations: A question can assess India’s deepening defence diplomacy with African states and its strategic value in the western Indian Ocean and Atlantic approaches.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “No direct PYQ traced in the provided files. Closest Microtheme: Bilateral Relations (International Relations).”

  • PM-SETU clears three State Implementation Plans worth ₹735.70 crore

    Why in News

    1. Fifth committee meeting: The fifth National Steering Committee of PM-SETU approved three State Implementation Plans (SIPs) worth ₹735.70 crore on 8 September 2026.

    Core facts

    1. Full name: PM-SETU is the Pradhan Mantri Skilling and Employability Transformation through Upgraded ITIs scheme.
    2. Administering body: The Ministry of Skill Development and Entrepreneurship (MSDE) runs it.
    3. Model: It uses an industry led, cluster based design. A Hub Industrial Training Institute (ITI) supports a network of Spoke ITIs.
    4. Cumulative investment: Approved investment now totals ₹2,171 crore across 9 ITI clusters.
    5. Rajasthan plan: Value ₹241 crore. Industry partner H.G. Infra Engineering Limited. Hub is Government ITI Bhiwadi. Rajasthan is the first state to execute a shareholders agreement.
    6. Telangana plan: Value ₹254.30 crore. Industry partner ZEN Technologies Limited. Hub is Government ITI Medchal.
    7. Uttar Pradesh plan: Value ₹240.40 crore. Partner is the National Skill Development Corporation (NSDC). Hub is Government ITI Saket, Meerut.

    Static Context

    1. Industrial Training Institutes are post school vocational training centres. They fall under the Directorate General of Training.
    2. The National Skill Development Corporation is a public private partnership body that funds and scales skilling.
    3. Demographic dividend refers to growth potential from a rising working age share of the population. Skilling converts this potential into productive employment.

    Prelims angle

    1. Nodal ministry: Ministry of Skill Development and Entrepreneurship.
    2. Structure: Hub and Spoke ITI model, industry led clusters.
    3. Distinguish schemes: PM-SETU against Pradhan Mantri Kaushal Vikas Yojana and the Recognition of Prior Learning scheme.

    Mains angle

    1. GS2 and GS3: A question can assess how industry linked ITI upgrades strengthen the link between education, skilling and employability.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2018] With reference to Pradhan Mantri Kaushal Vikas Yojana, consider the following statements :
    1. It is the flagship scheme of the Ministry of Labour and Employment.
    2. It, among other things, will also impart training in soft skills, entrepreneurship, financial and digital literacy.
    3. It aims to align the competencies of the unregulated workforce of the country to the National Skill Qualification Framework.
    Which of the statements given above is/are correct?
    (a) 1 and 3 only
    (b) 2 only
    (c) 2 and 3 only
    (d) 1, 2 and 3
    Final answer: (c)”

    “[2023, GS2, 15 marks] Skill development programs have succeed in increasing human resources supply to various sectors. In the context of the statement analyze the linkages between education, skill and employment.”