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GS Paper: GS2

  • [21st July 2026] The Hindu OpED: Canada-India Defence Collaboration for a secure future 

    PYQ Relevance[UPSC 2015] What is the significance of Indo-US defence deals over Indo-Russian defence deals? Discuss with reference to stability in the Indo-Pacific region.
    Linkage: It examines India balancing defence partnerships amid strategic diversification. It has the same underlying theme of India diversifying defence-partner dependence, now with Canada as the partner in question.

    Mentor’s Comment

    Canada has committed to raising defence spending to 5% of GDP by 2035 and has since taken concrete steps to deepen defence cooperation with India, including a bilateral Defence Dialogue and a Critical Minerals Value Chain MoU signed in early 2026. The push is framed as a natural convergence of interests, but the stated driver is Canada’s own need to end reliance on a single supply-chain partner, raising the question of whether India is being positioned as a diversification option rather than an equal strategic partner.

    Why is Canada scaling up defence engagement with India at this specific moment?

    1. Rearmament trigger: Prime Minister Carney announced an ambitious plan to rebuild, rearm, and reinvest in the Canadian Armed Forces six weeks after his government was formed. He cited the rapidly evolving nature of war driven by drones, autonomous systems, and orbital weapons.
    2. Spending trajectory: Canada committed in 2025 to spend 5% of GDP on defence by 2035, and had already surpassed 2% of GDP by March 2026.This placed it among the ten largest economies in the world by defence spend.
    3. Rupture narrative: Prime Minister Mark Carney invoked his own January 2026 Davos speech describing a “rupture in the world order,” paired with Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s description of the present period as a “decade of crisis,” to frame urgency for new partnerships.
    4. Supply-chain motive stated directly: Canada launched a Defence Industrial Strategy explicitly so that it “does not rely on just one country” for defence supply chains, identifying the structural reason India is being courted now.

    What concrete institutional mechanisms anchor the bilateral defence relationship?

    1. Defence Advisers: Canada and India have accredited Defence Advisers in both Ottawa and Delhi.
    2. Defence Dialogue: Prime Ministers of both the countries have agreed to establish a Defence Dialogue to prioritise cooperation on shared interests and align capacities.
    3. Joint military exercises: Canadian and Indian navies have participated together in the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercises and Talisman Sabre exercises.
    4. Institutional exchange: A delegation from India’s National Defence College visited Canada in June 2026, opening direct exchanges between Indian officers and Canadian military colleges and bases.
    5. Procurement reform: Canada established a national Defence Investment Agency to streamline military procurement and called on India to participate in co-development, subsystem manufacturing, and sustainment.
    6. Innovation investment: Canada is investing over half a billion dollars in next-generation aerospace technologies, including a drone innovation hub.

    What specific technology complementarities does Canada claim with India?

    1. Aerospace scale-matching: Canada is one of only a few countries with a full-spectrum aerospace sector; India’s domestic aviation industry is the third largest domestic market in the world.
    2. R&D versus manufacturing framing: Canada is positioned as a research and development powerhouse, while India is framed as focused on advancing innovation capacity and high-end manufacturing.
    3. Space capability convergence: Canada and India are described as part of a small group of countries with advanced space capabilities, with civilian space cooperation highlighted in a joint statement between the two Prime Ministers.
    4. Satellite and robotics complementarity: Canada’s strengths in advanced components for satellite technology and space robotics are claimed to complement India’s strengths in low-cost platforms.
    5. RADARSAT-naval link: Canada’s RADARSAT satellite constellation is presented as having application in advancing India’s naval capacity in the region, tying space technology directly to maritime security goals.

    Why have critical minerals become central to this defence partnership?

    1. Strategic framing: Critical minerals are described as the building block of defence technologies, positioned as a distinct area for partnership expansion beyond conventional defence hardware.
    2. West Asia linkage: The crisis in West Asia is cited as evidence that national security and economic security are now inextricably linked, used to justify treating minerals supply as a security issue.
    3. Canada’s reserve base: Canada holds geological reserves of 31 critical minerals ranging from cobalt to helium, the tenth largest reserves of rare earth elements, the third largest recoverable uranium resources, and 5% of the world’s tungsten reserves.
    4. Uranium production position: Canada is the second largest producer and exporter of uranium globally, accounting for 24% of global production in 2024.
    5. MoU as delivery mechanism: A Canada-India memorandum of understanding on the Critical Minerals Value Chain, signed during Carney’s February-March 2026 visit to India, is presented as the groundwork for integrating stable, resilient supply chains between the two countries.

    Does this reflect mutual strategic need, or Canada’s own diversification imperative framed as partnership?

    1. Diversification motive named only for Canada: The Defence Industrial Strategy’s stated purpose is that Canada does not rely on just one country. No equivalent single-partner dependence is named on India’s side.
    2. Asymmetric evidentiary weight: Canada’s motivations are backed by specific figures on GDP spend, mineral reserves, and production shares. India’s strategic rationale for the partnership is asserted through general phrases such as “reliable partners” and “national security goals,” without matching specificity.
    3. Complementarity asserted, not demonstrated: Claims that Canadian R&D strength complements Indian manufacturing scale, or that Canadian satellite components complement Indian low-cost platforms, are stated as fact without supporting data or named joint projects beyond the MoU and joint statement references.

    Conclusion

    Canada and India are natural defence partners bound by complementary strengths in technology, space, and critical minerals. But this points to a narrower reality: Canada’s own rearmament plan and its explicit strategy to end reliance on a single supply-chain partner are the primary drivers, with India positioned as a diversification option. What remains unaddressed is any comparably specific account of India’s independent strategic calculus in deepening this relationship, beyond general references to reliability and national security goals.

  • WTO Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies (AFS)

    Why in News?

    India has deposited its Instrument of Acceptance for the WTO Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies (AFS), becoming the 123rd WTO Member to join the Agreement.

    Key Highlights

    • Adopted: At the 12th WTO Ministerial Conference (MC12), Geneva, June 2022.
    • Entered into Force: 15 September 2025, after acceptance by two-thirds of WTO Members.
    • Nature: First WTO multilateral agreement with an environmental sustainability objective.
    • Objective: Promote sustainable use and conservation of marine fisheries resources while ensuring fair global trade.

    Major Provisions

    • Prohibits subsidies for:
      • Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing.
      • Fishing of overfished stocks.
      • Harmful fishing practices leading to overexploitation of marine resources.
    • Provides special and differential treatment (S&DT) for developing and least-developed countries.

    What is Outside its Scope?

    • Aquaculture (fish farming).
    • Inland fisheries (rivers, lakes, reservoirs).

    Significance for India

    • Protects the interests of traditional and small-scale fishers.
    • Disciplines subsidies provided to large industrial distant-water fishing fleets, creating a more level playing field.
    • Enhances India’s image as a responsible and sustainable seafood exporter.
    • India’s aquaculture-based shrimp exports, which form a major share of seafood exports, remain outside the Agreement’s scope.

    India’s Fisheries Management Framework

    • Sustainable Harnessing of Fisheries in the EEZ Rules, 2025.
    • Guidelines for Sustainable Harnessing of Fisheries in the High Seas by Indian-Flagged Fishing Vessels, 2025.
    • Pradhan Mantri Matsya Sampada Yojana (PMMSY) for fisheries infrastructure, conservation and capacity building.

    About the WTO Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies

    • Negotiated under Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 14.6, which calls for eliminating harmful fisheries subsidies.
    • Applies mainly to marine wild capture fisheries and fishing-related activities at sea.
    • Seeks to balance marine conservation, livelihood protection, and rules-based international trade.

    [2017] Consider the following statements:

    1. India has ratified the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) of WTO.
    2. TFA is a part of WTO’s Bali Ministerial Package of 2013.
    3. TFA came into force in January 2016.

    Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

    [A] 1 and 2 only

    [B] 1 and 3 only

    [C] 2 and 3 only

    [D] 1, 2 and 3

  • Exercise Pitch Black 2026

    Why in News?

    The Indian Air Force (IAF) is participating in Exercise Pitch Black 2026, hosted by the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) at Darwin, Australia, from 20 July to 7 August 2026.

    Key Highlights

    • Host: Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF), Australia.
    • Venue: RAAF Base Darwin, Northern Australia.
    • Frequency: Biennial (held every two years).
    • Theme: Multinational air combat exercise with a strong emphasis on night flying over sparsely populated regions of northern Australia.
    • History: Conducted for 45 years; one of the largest editions in terms of participating air forces.

    Indian Air Force Participation

    • Aircraft Deployed:
      • Rafale multirole fighter aircraft.
      • C-17 Globemaster III strategic airlift aircraft.
      • IL-78 Air-to-Air Refuelling aircraft.
    • Personnel: Pilots, engineers, technicians, controllers, and other operational experts.
    • Previous Participation: 2018, 2022, 2024, and 2026.

    Objectives

    • Enhance multinational interoperability among participating air forces.
    • Validate expeditionary air operations over long distances.
    • Improve Large Force Employment (LFE) capabilities.
    • Strengthen defence cooperation and operational partnerships across the Indo-Pacific.
    • Exchange operational best practices in realistic combat scenarios.

    [2025] With reference to India’s defense, consider the following pairs:
    Aircraft type Description
    1. Dornier-228 Maritime patrol aircraft
    2. IL-76 Supersonic combat aircraft
    3. C-17 Globe Master IIIMilitary transport aircraft
    How many of the pairs given above are correctly matched?

    [A] Only one

    [B] Only two

    [C] All the three

    [D] None

  • The Case for Updating the Indus Waters Treaty

    Why in the News?

    India has continued to hold on to the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) in abeyance, following the terrorist strikes in Pahalgam. This has drawn war threats from Pakistan and revived attention to India’s separate, pending request to renegotiate the 65-year-old treaty. Pakistan has publicly treated the abeyance and the renegotiation notices as a single hostile act. This is despite  India’s actual 2023 and 2024 notices for treaty revision unanswered.

    Why is India’s push to renegotiate the IWT not an unusual or hostile move?

    1. Global norm of treaty revision: At least 250 separate transboundary river-water treaties exist worldwide, covering 113 river systems, as per a 2013 study. Supplementary protocols, amendments and data-sharing arrangements had already taken the total number of agreements to 688 by then.
    2. Continuing growth in revisions: The International Freshwater Treaties database (Oregon State University) now records over 800 such agreements, showing that transboundary treaties are routinely reviewed and updated.
    3. India’s own precedent: India’s 1996 Ganga water-sharing treaty with Bangladesh carries a 30-year validity and is due for renewal this year, showing India itself treats such treaties as time-bound instruments needing renewal.
    4. IWT already permits revision: Article VII allows the Permanent Indus Commissions of both countries to agree on new drainage or engineering works, though this has never been invoked. Article XII allows treaty modification “from time to time” through a fresh government-level treaty: the provision India invoked to serve its 2023 and 2024 notices.
    5. Not a new demand: Pakistani experts and scholars themselves called for review of the IWT well before the present standoff. India’s notices are the first official move by either side, not the first such call.

    What modern water-management elements does the IWT’s design fail to address?

    1. No groundwater provision: The treaty does not mention groundwater resources at all, despite groundwater being connected across borders in the same way as surface water.
    2. No water-quality standards: The treaty sets no requirements for water quality in the shared rivers.
    3. No environmental-flow provision: There is no mechanism to maintain minimum ecological flows in the rivers.
    4. Pakistan’s own grievance illustrates the gap: Pakistan has repeatedly complained that India releases municipal and sewage waste into the eastern rivers, over which India has full control under the treaty, affecting Pakistan’s soil and water health, a complaint the treaty’s silence on water quality leaves unresolved.
    5. Climate change was structurally excluded: No treaty negotiated before the 1990s could have factored in climate change; the IWT (1960) is no exception.
    6. Partition rather than sharing: Most water-sharing treaties guarantee a fixed volume or percentage of flow to each party. The IWT instead allocates entire rivers to one party or the other, making it more a partition agreement than a sharing arrangement, a design that has reduced incentive for joint river-basin management.

    How does the Mekong River Commission show the institutional flexibility the IWT’s commission lacks?

    1. Mekong River Commission (Southeast Asia, established 1995): Functions as a joint river water-management system, not merely a treaty-implementation body.
    2. Power to revise strategies: While it cannot alter the original treaty’s provisions, it is empowered to develop and revise joint basin-management strategies, data-sharing protocols, and water-quality rules.
    3. Contrast with the Permanent Indus Commission (PIC): The PIC, set up under the IWT, functions merely as the treaty’s implementing agency and has so far focused largely on ensuring the treaty’s existing provisions are not violated. It has no comparable mandate to revise or adapt joint management practices.

    Is India’s renegotiation push a technical necessity or an extension of the security standoff?

    1. Pakistan’s conflation: Pakistan organised an “international” conference on the treaty, with ministers and leaders threatening war over any disruption to the Indus basin’s rivers. They treat the abeyance and the renegotiation request as one hostile package.
    2. Selective response: Despite this rhetoric, Pakistan has still not responded to India’s actual 2023 and 2024 notices seeking treaty modification.
    3. Independent climate evidence: A study by researchers Vimal Mishra and Urmin Vegad of IIT Gandhinagar found climate change is affecting the two basins differently.
    4. Divergent basin trends: The eastern river basins have seen a 20% decline in annual rainfall over the last 70 years, while precipitation in the western river basins has remained largely unchanged.
    5. The delinking argument: India’s request to renegotiate the treaty must be seen as separate from its decision to hold it in abeyance. Agreeing to renegotiate, rather than continued brinkmanship, is presented as Pakistan’s most reliable route to ending the abeyance.

    Conclusion

    The Indus Waters Treaty was designed for a 1960 hydrological and political reality. It partitions entire rivers rather than sharing flows, omits groundwater, water-quality and environmental-flow provisions, and gives its joint commission no mandate to revise the treaty. These are the gaps that comparable transboundary arrangements, including the Mekong River Commission, address through built-in review mechanisms. This creates an independent, technical case for updating the IWT. India’s renegotiation request must be evaluated on this basis, delinked from its abeyance decision; Pakistan’s willingness to renegotiate, not further confrontation, is what would end the abeyance.

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2026] Present an account of the Indus Water Treaty and examine its ecological, economic and bilateral relation.

    Linkage: The PYQ directly asks for an account of the IWT and its bilateral implications. This article supplies the treaty’s institutional design flaws and the current bilateral context directly answering such a question today.

  • Can Courts Restrain a Film Cleared by the CBFC?

    Why in the News?

    The Supreme Court declined to permit the release of the CBFC-certified animated film Mahaprabhu Jagannath on its scheduled date, directing the producer to postpone release until after the Rath Yatra in Puri concludes, following an Orissa High Court stay over the film’s depiction of Lord Jagannath. The episode brings into focus the tension between the settled judicial position that certification by an expert statutory body carries a strong presumption of validity immune from apprehensions of public disorder, and the recurring judicial practice of restraining certified films precisely on such grounds.

    What triggered the dispute, and what exactly did the Supreme Court decide?

    1. Origin of the restraint: The Orissa High Court, on July 15, stayed the film’s release over concerns about its depiction of Lord Jagannath and the possible impact of screening it during the Rath Yatra.
    2. Nature of the Supreme Court’s order: The Court did not permit release on the original date. It also did not uphold an indefinite restraint. It directed postponement until after July 27, when the Rath Yatra concludes.
    3. Scope of challenge: The producer contested the High Court’s power to restrain a certified film, and the extent to which such restraint can rest on apprehensions of public disorder rather than an actual legal violation.
    4. High Court’s stated reasoning: The film’s depiction of Lord Jagannath’s childhood and adventures was held “not in tune with the religious texts,” and its release during the Rath Yatra was called “counterproductive.”
    5. Certification status of the film: The film held three separate ‘U’ (universal) certificates from the CBFC for its Hindi, Telugu, and Odia versions, dated May, June, and July respectively.
    6. Territorial overreach in the stay: The restraint stalled the certified Hindi and Telugu versions even in states “where no cause of action existed and no relief was ever sought.

    Why does CBFC certification carry a strong presumption of validity against restraint by apprehension of disorder?

    1. Petitioner’s core argument: Once an expert statutory body certifies a film for unrestricted public exhibition, there is a strong legal presumption of validity. Courts should not substitute their own view for the CBFC’s expert judgment based on unverified apprehensions.
    2. Union of India v K M Shankarappa (2000): The Supreme Court struck down a provision letting the government revise a tribunal’s decision on a certified film. It held that once an expert statutory body certifies a film, that decision cannot be revisited by the executive on the grounds of objections or apprehensions about public reaction.
    3. Allocation of responsibility for law and order: The Court in Shankarappa held that once an expert body clears a film, apprehension of a law-and-order situation is no excuse to restrain it. Maintaining law and order is the concerned state government’s responsibility, not a ground to withhold the certified film.
    4. S Rangarajan v P Jagjivan Ram (1989): The Supreme Court held that if a film is otherwise unobjectionable under Article 19(2), freedom of expression cannot be suppressed on account of threatened demonstrations, processions, or violence.
    5. The anti-heckler’s-veto principle: Yielding to such threats amounts to a “negation of the rule of law.” The state cannot plead inability to handle a hostile audience; it has an obligatory duty to prevent disruption and protect the freedom of expression. Heckler’s veto, suppression of lawful expression to avoid a violent or disruptive reaction from its opponents, rather than because the expression itself is unlawful.

    Does the outcome in this case match the doctrine it invokes, or does it concede ground to the apprehension the doctrine forbids?

    1. Re-adjudication of content already cleared: The High Court’s finding that the depiction was “not in tune with the religious texts” evaluates content on the same grounds the CBFC had already cleared, which the Shankarappa doctrine holds courts should not revisit.
    2. A calibrated restraint, not a vacated one: The Supreme Court did not fully restore the certified release. It replaced an indefinite block with a postponement timed to the Rath Yatra, a decision still shaped by public-sensitivity considerations rather than a finding of unlawful certification.
    3. Restraint exceeding the specific dispute: The stay affected certified versions in states where no cause of action existed and no relief was sought, extending the restraint beyond what the underlying grievance covered.
    4. Net effect on the doctrine: The anti-heckler’s-veto principle is reaffirmed in language but diluted in practice. This is because the timing of a certified film’s release is still being shaped by apprehension of disruption during a religious event.

    Is certification actually beyond interference, or does the law retain other levers over a cleared film?

    1. Certification is not immune from judicial scrutiny: Courts retain the power to examine whether certification was granted in accordance with law, including whether the CBFC relied on statutory grounds, issued reasons, or followed fair procedure.
    2. Deference is conditional: Where the CBFC acts within the framework of the Cinematograph Act, courts usually defer to it. This deference is tied to lawful process, not to certification as such.
    3. Executive power to suspend or revoke: Under the Cinematograph Act, the government may suspend or revoke a certification even after approval.
    4. Power to restrict without prior hearing: The government may, in some cases, temporarily restrict a certified film’s screening without a prior hearing.
    5. Enforcement mechanisms beyond certification: The Act allows criminal liability for violations, and authorities are empowered to enter theatres and seize materials.

    Conclusion

    The doctrine from Shankarappa and Rangarajan holds that CBFC certification is final, and that neither the executive nor the courts may let apprehension of public disorder override a cleared film’s freedom of expression. In practice, both the Orissa High Court’s stay and the Supreme Court’s own decision to postpone release until after the Rath Yatra show that religious and public-order sensitivities continue to shape when and how a certified film is actually screened. Certification functions as a strong but not absolute shield: courts retain review over the legality of the certification process. Also, the executive retains statutory power to suspend, revoke, or temporarily restrict a cleared film. The unresolved question is where deference to apprehension, which the doctrine forbids, ends and legitimate statutory or procedural oversight, which the doctrine permits, begins.

  • Lakhpati Didi Mission: Roadmap for 6 Crore Lakhpati Didis

    Why in News?

    The Ministry of Rural Development, in collaboration with BRLPS-JEEVIKA, organised a two-day Regional Workshop to prepare a strategy and roadmap for achieving the national target of 6 Crore Lakhpati Didis.

    Key Highlights

    • Objective: Formulate a Strategy, Roadmap, and Annual Action Plan (FY 2026–27) for creating 6 Crore Lakhpati Didis.
    • Organised by: Ministry of Rural Development with BRLPS-JEEVIKA at BIPARD, Gaya (Bihar).
    • Key Focus Areas:
      • Farm and non-farm livelihoods.
      • Enterprise promotion and value addition.
      • Digital Management Information System (MIS).
      • Market linkages and convergence.
      • Climate-resilient livelihoods.
    • Major Outcomes:
      • Strategy for sustainable income enhancement.
      • Greater use of digital platforms and data-driven planning.
      • Strengthening community institutions and SHGs.
      • MoU signed between BRLPS-JEEVIKA and Arunachal State Rural Livelihood Mission (ArSRLM) for knowledge sharing.
    • Milestone Achieved: 3 Crore Lakhpati Didis; next target is 6 Crore.

    About Lakhpati Didi Initiative

    • Launched under Deendayal Antyodaya Yojana – National Rural Livelihoods Mission (DAY-NRLM).
    • Aims to enable women Self-Help Group (SHG) members to earn a sustainable annual household income of at least ₹1 lakh through diversified livelihood activities.
    • Focuses on financial inclusion, entrepreneurship, skill development, and market access.

    [2023] Consider the following statements:
    1. The Self-Help Group (SHG) programme was originally initiated by the State Bank of India by providing microcredit to the financially deprived.
    2. In an SHG, all members of a group take responsibility for a loan that an individual member takes.
    3. The Regional Rural Banks and Scheduled Commercial Banks support SHGs.
    How many of the above statements are correct?

    [A] Only one

    [B] Only two

    [C] All three

    [D] None

  • CCPA Penalises SpiceJet for Use of Dark Patterns

    Why in News?

    The Central Consumer Protection Authority (CCPA) imposed a ₹1 lakh penalty on SpiceJet for using dark patterns on its flight booking platform, violating consumer protection laws.

    Key Highlights

    • Violation: Use of dark patterns that manipulated consumer choices.
    • Dark Patterns Identified:
      • Forced Action: Automatic enrolment into SpiceClub via pre-ticked checkbox.
      • Interface Interference: Default selection of the company’s preferred options.
      • Trick Question: Confusing and negatively worded consent language.
    • Legal Violations:
      • Consumer Protection Act, 2019.
      • Rule 4(9) of the Consumer Protection (E-Commerce) Rules, 2020.
      • Guidelines for Prevention and Regulation of Dark Patterns, 2023.
    • CCPA’s Observation: Consumer consent must be explicit, informed, and voluntary; consent obtained through pre-ticked checkboxes or deceptive interfaces is invalid.

    Prelims Facts

    • Central Consumer Protection Authority (CCPA):
      • Established under the Consumer Protection Act, 2019.
      • Functions under the Department of Consumer Affairs.
      • Protects consumer rights and regulates unfair trade practices, misleading advertisements, and unfair contracts.
    • Dark Patterns: User interface designs that deceive or manipulate consumers into making unintended choices.

  • [17th July 2026] The Hindu OpED: It is not all bad between India and Pakistan 

    PYQ Relevance[UPSC 2015] Terrorist activities and mutual distrust have clouded India-Pakistan relations. To what extent the use of soft power like sports and cultural exchanges could help generate goodwill between the two countries? Discuss with suitable examples.
    Linkage: The PYQ directly engages the same tension the article raises, that terrorism-driven distrust coexists with underused avenues of cooperation between India and Pakistan.

    Mentor’s Comment

    A letter signed by 117 prominent Indians and Pakistanis has revived the debate on whether India should resume dialogue with Pakistan after the 2025 Pahalgam terror attack. While relations are often seen only through the lens of conflict, history shows that both countries have also exercised restraint during wars and cooperated on several issues. However, these efforts have repeatedly been undermined by terrorism.

    Do India and Pakistan’s three wars support a narrative of implacable hostility, or a shared doctrine of restraint?

    1. Restraint as the norm: In all three wars (1947, 1965, 1971), both militaries made deliberate efforts to avoid bombing each other’s cities and civilian spaces.
    2. Exceptions test the rule: The church at Ambala was hit in 1965 while Pakistan targeted the adjoining air base, and the only serious civilian-area attack, at Chheharta, occurred hours after a ceasefire while originally aiming at a radar station in Amritsar.
    3. 1971 target discipline: Both sides restricted attacks to military targets, including oil storage sites, even in the most decisive of the three wars.
    4. Military over civilian toll: India’s official count places military dead across all three wars at 8,211, against Pakistan’s broader estimate of about 15,000; no credible civilian casualty data exists for either side.
    5. Restraint held until terrorism: This battlefield discipline was set aside only once terrorism entered the relationship, marking terrorism as a distinct category from conventional war.

    What do WWII bombing doctrines and the collapse of Russia-U.S. arms control show about the India-Pakistan record, by comparison?

    1. Allied “area bombing” in Germany: Deliberate targeting of civilian areas killed an estimated 3,00,000-6,00,000 German civilians under the Allied doctrine of “area bombing.”
    2. Dresden’s limited military value: The bombing of Dresden alone killed 25,000 civilians despite the city holding hardly any military value.
    3. Tokyo and Operation Starvation: The bombing of Tokyo killed 1,00,000 civilians, while Allied mining of the seas under “Operation Starvation” was designed to deny Japan its fishing.
    4. Contrast with the India-Pakistan battlefield concept: Unlike the Axis and Allied doctrines that treated civilian life as expendable, India and Pakistan’s militaries retained a battlefield concept restricting engagement to military objectives.
    5. Nuclear CBM outlasting Russia-U.S. arms control: The 2005 India-Pakistan nuclear confidence-building agreement remains functional, with its last meeting held in January 2026, even as arms control agreements between Russia and the United States have collapsed in the same period.

    Is terrorism a battlefield failure, or a deliberate departure from the restraint both sides otherwise observed?

    1. Terrorism as the sole disruptor: Once terrorism entered the relationship, the battlefield restraint that governed three conventional wars was set aside entirely.
    2. Tacit cooperation despite terrorism: A third assassination attempt on General Musharraf in 2003 was foiled quietly with Indian intelligence support, tacitly acknowledging strong Pakistani action against terrorist groups even during hostility.
    3. External coercion, not voluntary restraint: This cooperation followed Islamabad being told to cooperate with the U.S. or risk being “bombed back into the Stone Age,” indicating external pressure rather than bilateral goodwill drove the action.
    4. Escalating and shifting targets: Relations deteriorated sharply once terrorism began, moving from military targets initially to civilians more recently, as seen in the Pahalgam attack.
    5. Pakistan as terrorism’s later victim: Groups Pakistan once supported, such as the Taliban, have since turned against it, showing terrorism has become a threat to Pakistan’s own internal security as well.

    Has diplomatic outreach between India and Pakistan failed where military-level restraint has held?

    1. Post-26/11 refusal: President Asif Ali Zardari’s instruction to ISI Chief General Shuja Pasha to visit Delhi and cooperate in the 26/11 investigation was flatly refused by then Army Chief General Kayani.
    2. Civilian leadership’s weak position: A year later, U.S. Vice-President Joe Biden told the British that Zardari feared being “taken out,” and the “Memogate” scandal exposed his appeal for help against the generals.
    3. Repeated outreach, repeated rupture: Nawaz Sharif was first to congratulate Narendra Modi in 2014 and hosted him at a family wedding in December 2015, but the Pathankot attack followed weeks later in January 2016, and Sharif was removed from office within a year on unproven corruption charges.
    4. Political capital spent without result: Vajpayee, Manmohan Singh and Modi all invested significant political capital in outreach to Pakistan, with Manmohan Singh facing particular criticism for his efforts, and all three initiatives ultimately failed.
    5. Military channel outlasting diplomacy: General Bajwa’s restrained response during the Imran Khan years, his advocacy for trade corridors, and the reaffirmation of the ceasefire commitment despite the Galwan incursions and the 2019 abrogation of Article 370 show cooperation persisting through military channels even where diplomacy failed.

    What single precondition would need to be met for India-Pakistan cooperation to resume durably?

    1. Terrorism trend worsening: Terrorism rose by 34% in 2025 amid growing unrest in Occupied Kashmir, the tribal areas and Balochistan.
    2. Weakened state capacity: Years of military rule have weakened Pakistan’s state institutions, complicating any consistent counter-terror commitment.
    3. Existing areas of functional cooperation: Cooperation remains possible in glacial melt, stubble-burning alternatives and narcotics trafficking, areas where both countries have previously worked together.
    4. The singular precondition: The key step is for Rawalpindi to demonstrate a clear and visible end to its support for terrorism.
    5. Potential downstream gain: Meeting this precondition could open the way for a renegotiation of the Indus Waters Treaty to mutual benefit.

    Conclusion

    India and Pakistan’s history is not one of unbroken hostility but of deliberate mutual restraint in conventional conflict and durable institutional cooperation that has survived wars, political failures and direct provocations such as Galwan and the abrogation of Article 370. Terrorism, not conventional war or political rupture, has been the sole consistent disruptor of this cooperation. Renewed cooperation is possible only if Pakistan visibly ends its support to terror groups, since only this precondition removes the single variable that has repeatedly derailed nuclear confidence-building, backchannel diplomacy and functional cooperation.

  • Operationalizing the Australia–Canada–India Technology and Innovation Partnership

    Why in the News

    Australia, Canada and India are moving to operationalise the Australia–Canada–India Technology and Innovation Partnership (ACITI), announced at the G20 Summit in Johannesburg in November 2025. Expanding bilateral cooperation on AI, critical minerals and clean energy across the three countries has not yet converted into a coordinated trilateral delivery mechanism.

    Why does ACITI need to move beyond bilateral cooperation?

    • Canada–India convergence: Bilateral ties have deepened through CEPA negotiations, the Strategic Energy Partnership, and uranium supply and critical minerals cooperation.
    • Canada–Australia convergence: Carney’s March 2026 visit produced agreements spanning critical minerals, clean energy and emerging technologies.
    • Australia–India institutionalisation: ECTA (in force since December 2022) and the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership have embedded sector-driven cooperation.
    • Parallel tracks, no alignment: Each bilateral relationship has advanced independently without a shared framework linking them.
    • ACITI’s actual mandate: Consolidate existing bilateral progress rather than generate new cooperation from a blank slate.

    What complementary capabilities make trilateral cooperation viable?

    • Canada: AI research strength, clean technology, and CCUS regulatory experience.
    • Australia: Resource base, commercialisation capacity, and grid-scale battery storage operating experience.
    • India: Manufacturing scale, population-scale digital infrastructure, and downstream industrial demand.
    • Sectoral scope: AI governance, digital infrastructure, green hydrogen, battery storage, CCUS and critical minerals form a single interconnected agenda rather than separate silos.
    • Strategic logic: Energy security and industrial competitiveness are treated as mutually reinforcing, not independent, policy goals.

    Is the binding constraint capability or coordination?

    • Minerals: The binding constraint across gallium, germanium, indium, lithium and rare earths is refining and processing capacity, not resource availability.
    • AI governance: None of the three countries has binding AI legislation; all rely on voluntary, principles-based frameworks, producing convergence without harmonisation.
    • Digital infrastructure: Advanced national capability coexists with unresolved rural, remote and regional connectivity gaps in all three countries.
    • Financing: Commercialisation mechanisms to move projects beyond the pilot stage remain undeveloped.
    • Pattern: Capability exists at the national level; the mechanism to convert it into trilateral outcomes does not.

    What do country-specific positions demonstrate about where trilateral value can be added?

    • Gallium: Australia is scaling toward roughly 100 tonnes as a bauxite byproduct, Canada holds pilot-stage refining capacity near 40 tonnes, India targets nearly 10 tonnes with no active production, against China’s approximately 750 tonnes.
    • Lithium: Australia is the world’s largest producer, Canada ranks sixth in reserves and seventh in production while expanding refining, India is scaling demand through Jammu & Kashmir discoveries, but China retains dominant midstream refining capacity.
    • AI safety standards: Canada’s Accessible and Equitable Artificial Intelligence Systems standard, Australia’s Voluntary AI Safety Standard, and India’s evolving guidelines remain non-binding by design, avoiding overregulation at the cost of interoperability.
    • Grid storage: Australia’s Hornsdale Power Reserve demonstrates millisecond-scale grid stabilisation, offering a template for India’s over 90 GWh of storage projects underway and Canada’s hydro-based balancing capacity.
      • Each example shows division of labour by capability stage — extraction, refining, or downstream deployment — rather than uniform national strength.

    Can coordination be institutionalised given administrative and political constraints?

    • Innovation Working Group: Proposed to support financing access, industrial partnerships and cross-border markets for firms across the ecosystem.
    • Biannual dialogues: Proposed to tie meetings to specific deliverables, project pipelines, standards proposals, and regulatory coordination.
    • Standards coordination: Sector-specific dialogues with mutual recognition mechanisms are proposed for green hydrogen certification and mineral traceability.
    • Third-market collaboration: Joint engagement with Taiwan, South Korea and Japan is identified to improve bargaining power in downstream semiconductor markets.
    • Primary risk: Sustained political and industry engagement across three governments, not capability, is the binding implementation constraint.

    Conclusion

    ACITI’s core challenge is institutional conversion, not capability shortfall. Australia, Canada and India already possess complementary strengths across AI, energy and critical minerals, demonstrated through working bilateral relationships. What remains unresolved is a mechanism to translate fragmented bilateral initiatives into coordinated trilateral delivery. ACITI’s success will depend on moving from strategic alignment to implementation discipline — mobilising capital, securing long-term commercial commitments, and sustaining political support across all three governments.

  • [16th July 2026] The Hindu OpED: The Crisis at the Heart of Non-Proliferation 

    Why in the News?

    Talks in Doha over Iran’s nuclear programme have stalled, with Tehran pressed to fully dismantle its enriched uranium stockpile even as it insists on its sovereign right to enrich. This demand exposes the selective enforcement of the global non-proliferation order, which places no comparable disarmament obligation on existing nuclear weapon states.

    How has the non-proliferation framework institutionalised inequality rather than eliminating nuclear weapons?

    1. Structural hierarchy: The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) divided the world into nuclear “haves” and “have-nots,” binding the latter to restraint while the former continue to modernise their arsenals.
    2. Restraint without reciprocity: Non-nuclear states carry the entire compliance burden; disarmament by existing powers remains indefinitely deferred.
    3. Iran’s legal route: Iran pursued enrichment within a declared legal framework, unlike states that stayed outside the treaty altogether.
    4. Selective demand: Only Iran currently faces an ultimatum to disarm; the five recognised weapons powers and Israel face no equivalent demand.

    What does the differential treatment of India, Pakistan, Israel, and Iran reveal about the double standards in enforcement?

    1. India and Pakistan: Both remain outside the NPT, hold substantial nuclear arsenals, and are treated as strategic partners by the same powers that police the non-proliferation order.
    2. Israel: Its nuclear programme is an open secret; it has never submitted to inspection and is routinely excluded from proliferation-risk discourse.
    3. Iran: Pursued enrichment within a legal framework and submitted to the most intrusive inspection regime in arms-control history under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
    4. Outcome mismatch: Iran’s compliance was met with unilateral American withdrawal, renewed sanctions, and the threat of military destruction, punishment despite compliance.

    On what historical foundation does the current nuclear order’s moral authority rest?

    1. Founding act: The global nuclear order is anchored in the use of nuclear weapons against Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, the only instances of nuclear weapons deployed in conflict.
    2. Precedent of justified use: This act established both the catastrophic potential of nuclear arms and the precedent that their use could be absorbed into the language of strategic necessity.
    3. Designated guardian: The state that used the weapons survived the act morally and emerged as the self-appointed guardian of the nuclear order it now enforces.
    4. Compromised authority: A state that has used nuclear weapons against civilians occupies a singular position when regulating other states’ nuclear ambitions; its authority derives from prior use and the dominance that use consolidated.
    5. Einstein’s warning: Humanity must choose between abolishing war and facing annihilation; that choice remains deferred, most effectively by states holding the largest arsenals.

    What does the collapse of the JCPOA reveal about the reliability of nuclear agreements with existing powers?

    1. Genuine achievement: The JCPOA, negotiated under the Obama administration, represented a genuinely achieved instance of multilateral diplomacy.
    2. Unilateral collapse: The Trump administration unilaterally withdrew from the agreement in 2018, despite Iran’s compliance.
    3. Signal to other states: The withdrawal sent a message extending beyond Tehran, that future arms agreements with the US carry no guarantee of compliance.
    4. Proximate cause: Should the Iran nuclear crisis deepen further, the destruction of the JCPOA will stand as its proximate cause.

    Is the current global order a rules-based system or a structure of selective tolerance?

    1. Reframing the question: The real question is not whether Iran should or should not enrich uranium, but whether the framework posing that question is coherent, consistent, or just and by any honest reckoning, it is none of these.
    2. Not a rules-based order: Punishing Iran for compliance while rewarding other states for defiance, alongside indefinite deferral of the NPT’s disarmament obligation, does not constitute a rules-based order.
    3. A chosen tolerance: This is a system that has knowingly chosen to tolerate the most destructive weapons in history rather than eliminate them.
    4. 1955 answer: Einstein and Bertrand Russell asserted in 1955 that nuclear weapons must be abolished altogether, by all states, without exception, or the logic of deterrence will produce the catastrophe it claims to prevent.
    5. The remaining choice: The only question left is whether this choice is confronted through policy or through catastrophe.

    Conclusion

    The Iran nuclear crisis is not fundamentally a dispute over enrichment rights. It is evidence that the non-proliferation order is a selectively enforced hierarchy, anchored in the founding legitimacy the US drew from Hiroshima and Nagasaki, that rewards defiance in some states while punishing compliance in others. Unless this framework is confronted directly and reformed toward the universal abolition proposed as early as 1955, the logic of deterrence will keep reproducing the very catastrophe it claims to prevent.