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GS Paper: GS3

  • Assam’s Floods: A 200-Year Man-Made Crisis?

    Why in the News

    In the third week of July, several south bank rivers of Upper Assam rose with extreme speed, swallowed paddy fields and grazing lands, and swept through villages and towns in districts that had not previously faced catastrophic floods. The event exposes a conflict between two explanations of the disaster, one that treats the flood as a hydrological event to be excluded by engineering, and one that treats it as the outcome of a landscape whose capacity to absorb rain has been dismantled over two centuries.

    What is embankment based flood control?

    1. About: An embankment is an earthen barrier raised along a river to confine its flow within the channel and shield the settled floodplain from inundation.
    2. When it was adopted in Assam: A techno bureaucratic campaign in the mid 20th century set out to shield settled floodplains from floods that had until then been treated as predictable and nourishing for agriculture.
    3. The design assumption: The approach treats the flood as an external event to be kept out, rather than as the process that builds the plain it inundates.
    4. The sediment consequence: These barriers interrupted the flow of sediment onto the floodplain, confining silt to the channel instead of spreading it across the fields.
    5. The coverage limit: By 1988, even after thousands of kilometres of embankments had been built, two thirds of the valley still lay open to flooding.

    What are the south bank tributaries of Upper Assam?

    1. About: The south bank tributaries are the rivers that rise in the hills south and east of the Brahmaputra valley and join the main river from its right bank, including the Buridihing, Disang, Dikhow, Jhanji and Dhansiri.
    2. Why they matter here: They are fed by rainfall over the Naga Hills and eastern Arunachal Pradesh, so their flood peaks are set by rain falling outside Assam’s own boundaries.

    What is riverbed aggradation?

    1. About: Aggradation is the raising of a riverbed by deposition of sediment that the river can no longer carry downstream.
    2. Why it worsens flooding: A raised bed reduces the channel’s carrying capacity, so the same discharge overtops the banks at a lower volume than before.

    What is a flash flood?

    1. About: A flash flood is a rapid rise in water level within hours of intense rainfall, typical of steep catchments where runoff reaches the channel before it can infiltrate the soil.
    2. The determining factor: The severity depends on how quickly the catchment sheds water, which is a function of forest cover and soil condition rather than rainfall volume alone.

    What made the July flood different from a routine Brahmaputra flood?

    1. Damage before the main river peaked: Upper Assam felt the brunt of the disaster before the Brahmaputra swelled to its highest, which rules out the main channel as the primary cause.
    2. Rain fell outside Assam: Relentless rain pounded the Naga Hills and Arunachal Pradesh, soaked the slopes and unleashed sudden torrents into the southern tributaries.
    3. New districts affected: Several districts once strangers to such catastrophic floods found themselves engulfed.
    4. Extraction accelerated the runoff: Stone and boulder extraction from riverbeds and hillsides, common in both highlands and lowlands, was identified as a factor that hastened the rainfall’s journey downstream.
    5. The regional setting: Assam is cushioned between the Eastern Himalaya to the north, the Patkai and Barail ranges to the east and the Bay of Bengal to the south, so the southwest monsoon links highlands, floodplains, billions of tonnes of sediment and the shifting channels of hundreds of rivers into a single interdependent system.

    What has changed in the highland catchments that feed Upper Assam?

    1. Shorter cultivation cycles: Growing populations in the highlands of Nagaland and eastern Arunachal Pradesh have made cultivation cycles shorter and more intense, cutting the fallow period that allowed soil to recover.
    2. Small scale coal mining: Mining woven into local economies now competes with the highland agrarian economy and operates through complex networks of speculators.
    3. Relentless logging: Continued removal of tree cover strips the canopy and root systems that slow rainfall reaching the ground.
    4. Expanding infrastructure: New construction seals and compacts surfaces, adding to runoff.
    5. The combined effect: This pressure on the uplands erodes the land’s ability to absorb rainfall, so a given storm now delivers more water, faster, to the tributaries below.

    How did the south bank lose its historic resilience?

    1. The earlier condition: The south bank districts of Upper Assam were once among the Brahmaputra valley’s most resilient regions, defined by thick forests, scattered settlements and a safe distance from the Brahmaputra’s main channel.
    2. The colonial turn: The calm began to unravel in the mid 19th century, when these areas drew the attention of colonial tea planters.
    3. The land use conversion: Land where rain once vanished quietly into the forest floor was transformed into plantations, sites of mineral extraction and farms.
    4. The hydrological result: The converted land could no longer hold back the water, which shifted the flood response of the whole south bank.

    What did the embankment campaign change?

    1. The reversal of the flood’s meaning: Floods that had been seen as predictable and nourishing for agriculture were reclassified as a hazard to be excluded.
    2. The sediment interruption: The barriers cut off the annual deposition of silt that had renewed floodplain fertility.
    3. The incomplete shield: By 1988, thousands of kilometres of embankments still left two thirds of the valley exposed.
    4. The failure mode in July: Embankments along the southern tributaries gave way before the main river crested, producing sudden breaches.
    5. Why a breach is worse than a flood: The breach released a fall of water onto an unembanked plain, concentrating the discharge instead of spreading it.

    How is the monsoon itself changing?

    1. Greater unpredictability: India’s rainy season has become more unpredictable, marked by sudden downpours separated by long dry spells rather than simply more rain overall.
    2. Corroboration for the Northeast: Studies focused on Northeast India echo these findings.
    3. The explanatory shift: The gap between intense rainfall and a weakened landscape explains the flash floods more fully than the quantity of rain alone.
    4. Why the distinction matters: A landscape that once absorbed a heavy monsoon now converts the same rainfall into a peak discharge, so historical rainfall thresholds no longer predict damage.

    Do embankments protect the floodplain or deepen its exposure?

    1. The protection is real but partial: Embankments shielded settled floodplains and made permanent cultivation and settlement possible on land that had flooded annually.
    2. The cost is the sediment: The same barriers interrupted sediment flow, denying the plain the silt that renewed it and confining deposition to the channel bed.
    3. Protection invites exposure: A shielded plain attracts denser settlement, which raises the population and assets at risk when a breach occurs.
    4. Failure is concentrated, not gradual: An unembanked plain floods slowly and predictably, while an embanked one stays dry until the barrier gives way and then receives the full discharge at once.
    5. The measure of the approach: After thousands of kilometres of construction, two thirds of the valley remained open to flooding, which shows the strategy could not be completed at the scale it assumed.
    6. The deeper limitation: The state’s ecology has been treated as a puzzle for engineers, with each crisis examined in isolation, so the cumulative loss of catchment capacity is never entered into the calculation.

    Challenges to flood management in Assam

    1. Ageing embankments past their design life: Most of Assam’s embankment network was built decades ago and now fails at multiple points each season. e.g. the breach of the Bethukandi embankment on the Barak in June 2022, which submerged Silchar town for days.
    2. Bank erosion and permanent land loss: The braided Brahmaputra shifts its channels and consumes cultivated land and villages every year. e.g. Majuli, the large river island in Assam, which has lost a substantial part of its area to erosion since the 1950s.
    3. A catchment that lies outside the State’s jurisdiction: The rainfall that determines Assam’s flood peak falls in Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland and beyond the international border. e.g. the July flood peak on the south bank tributaries generated by rain over the Naga Hills.
    4. Sudden releases from upstream hydropower projects: Reservoir operation upstream can add a flood wave to an already rising river. e.g. water released from the Ranganadi project in Arunachal Pradesh flooding parts of Lakhimpur district.
    5. Loss of wetlands that once absorbed flood water: The valley’s beels have been filled for construction and encroached upon. e.g. shrinkage of Deepor Beel, the Ramsar site adjoining Guwahati, which has intensified urban flooding in the city.
    6. Relief centred rather than mitigation centred spending: Public expenditure concentrates on camps, compensation and post flood repair rather than catchment restoration. e.g. annual embankment repair works sanctioned after each season’s breaches rather than a basin wide restoration programme.
    7. Riverbed and hillside extraction: Removal of stone, boulders and sand strips the roughness that slows runoff and destabilises slopes. e.g. boulder extraction from riverbeds in the foothills feeding the south bank tributaries.

    Conclusion

    The July flooding in Upper Assam is the outcome of vulnerabilities built over two centuries, not a seasonal misfortune produced by a river’s behaviour. Plantation conversion from the mid 19th century, embankment construction from the mid 20th century and current highland extraction have each reduced the landscape’s capacity to absorb rain, while the monsoon has shifted towards sudden concentrated downpours. Assam’s environment is approaching a tipping point and is not yet beyond repair. What remains unresolved is the framing itself, since the connections between highland and lowland, water and land, and forests and floodplains cannot be rebuilt by engineering alone.

    “[2017, GS1, 15 marks] In what way can floods be converted into a sustainable source of irrigation and all-weather inland navigation in India?”

  • RBI’s Dollar Inflows Keep India’s Bond Yields Under Control

    Why in News?

    India’s 10-year government bond yield rose only 8 basis points in six months, compared with much larger increases in major advanced and emerging economies. The RBI relied more on foreign exchange and liquidity management than policy-rate hikes.

    Key Concepts

    1. FCNR(B) Deposits

    • FCNR(B) = Foreign Currency Non-Resident (Bank) deposits.
    • Term deposits held by NRIs in permitted foreign currencies.
    • Principal and interest are repaid in the same foreign currency, protecting depositors from exchange-rate risk.
    • Banks can bring these foreign currency funds into India and swap them with the RBI.
    • This increases forex reserves and rupee liquidity.
    • It is a borrowed inflow with fixed maturity, not permanent capital.

    2. 10-Year Benchmark Bond Yield

    • Return earned on the most actively traded 10-year government security.
    • Bond price and yield move inversely:
      • Bond price ↓ → Yield ↑
      • Bond price ↑ → Yield ↓
    • It influences pricing of corporate bonds and long-term loans.
    • 1 basis point = 0.01 percentage point.

    3. RBI’s Policy Corridor

    The overnight money-market rate operates within a corridor around the repo rate.

    • MSF → Upper ceiling; banks borrow from RBI.
    • SDF → Lower floor; banks park surplus funds with RBI.
    • The corridor is 25 basis points on either side of the repo rate.

    4. Certificate of Deposit

    • A short-tenor negotiable money-market instrument issued by banks to raise funds.
    • Rising CD issuance can indicate credit growth exceeding deposit growth.
    • Falling issuance suggests deposits are sufficient to finance lending.

    5. Bloomberg Global Aggregate Index

    • A global benchmark bond index tracked by passive funds.
    • Inclusion of Indian government bonds would lead index-tracking funds to purchase Indian bonds.
    • India’s inclusion was deferred, postponing potential index-driven inflows.

    What Did the RBI Do?

    • Instead of aggressively raising the policy rate, the RBI used targeted measures to attract foreign currency:
      • FCNR(B) deposits
      • External Commercial Borrowings
      • Overseas foreign-currency borrowings
    • These measures attracted about $56.8 billion between 8 June and 13 August, with $52.3 billion through FCNR(B).

    Impact on Banking Liquidity

    • Overnight rates moved below the repo rate towards the SDF floor.
    • Deposits increased.
    • Banks relied less on market borrowing.
    • Certificate of Deposit issuance declined.
    • Banking-system surplus liquidity increased.

    “[2022] With reference to the Indian economy, consider the following statements:
    1. If the inflation is too high, Reserve Bank of India (RBI) is likely to buy government securities.
    2. If the rupee is rapidly depreciating, RBI is likely to sell dollars in the market.
    3. If interest rates in the USA or European Union were to fall, that is likely to induce RBI to buy dollars.
    Which of the statements given above are correct?
    (a) 1 and 2 only
    (b) 2 and 3 only
    (c) 1 and 3 only
    (d) 1, 2 and 3

  • Ethanol Debate: Should India Bring Back E10 Alongside E20?

    Why in the News

    A public campaign claiming that E20 petrol wrecks engines and empties fuel tanks faster has been answered with test evidence showing no increased engine wear. The rebuttal has exposed the question the blending debate has avoided, which is whether pushing the blend beyond 20 percent moves land and water from food to fuel.

    What is the Ethanol Blended Petrol Programme?

    1. About: The programme mandates the blending of ethanol, an alcohol produced from crops, into petrol sold by oil marketing companies. E20 denotes a fuel that is 20 percent ethanol by volume and 80 percent petrol.
    2. Origin: It was rolled out nationally from 2003 and expanded through the National Policy on Biofuels, 2018.
    3. Feedstock routes: Ethanol is produced from sugarcane juice, B heavy and C heavy molasses, maize, damaged food grains and surplus rice.
    4. Stated objectives: It aims to cut the crude oil import bill, reduce tailpipe emissions and give cane and grain growers an assured market.
    5. Price setting: Oil marketing companies buy ethanol at administered prices that differ by feedstock route rather than at a single market price.

    What is the distinction between green water and blue water?

    1. Green water: This is rainfall held in the soil and taken up by the crop, water the field would have received in any case.
    2. Blue water: This is water drawn from rivers, canals, groundwater pumps and wells. It is the scarce component, because withdrawing it denies the same unit to another user.

    What are Distillers Dried Grains with Solubles?

    1. About: These are the residual grain solids left over after ethanol is distilled from maize or rice.
    2. Where they go: They are sold as protein rich animal feed and compete directly with soybean meal in the same market.

    Why does the charge that E20 damages engines not hold up?

    1. Lower energy density is real: Ethanol carries about two thirds the energy of petrol. A litre of E20 therefore takes a vehicle slightly less far.
    2. The size of the penalty is small: Ethanol is only a fifth of the blend, so the energy loss is around 6 to 7 percent. The 30 percent figure circulating online is wrong.
    3. Emissions improve: Carbon monoxide and unburnt hydrocarbons fall on E20, which is an environmental gain.
    4. Domestic durability testing agrees: Testing by the Automotive Research Association of India (ARAI), the petroleum institute and Indian Oil found no increased wear attributable to the blend.
    5. The fear is misplaced, the concern is not: Loss of range is not a malfunction. The genuine problem lies elsewhere in the fleet.

    Which vehicles are the genuine exception to that record?

    1. Scale of the exposed fleet: India has roughly 75 million to 80 million two wheelers built before the BS4 norms that run on carburettors.
    2. Why a carburettor cannot adjust: A carburettor cannot sense the extra oxygen the blend carries. The engine then draws too little fuel for the air it takes in and runs hot.
    3. Seal degradation is a separate defect: Older rubber seals not rated for ethanol degrade on contact with the fuel. This happens irrespective of engine temperature.
    4. Retrofitting is cheap but slow: Replacing seals with ethanol compatible ones costs little. Covering 75 million to 80 million two wheelers happens one vehicle at a time and will take years.
    5. The protection fuel went missing: The original roadmap asked that a lower blend stay on sale for these vehicles. That fuel quietly vanished from the pumps.
    6. What restoring E10 would achieve: Selling E10 alongside E20 would protect the legacy fleet while the retrofit programme catches up. It would also lower total ethanol use rather than raise it.

    Why is the edible oil import gap a better target than the crude oil bill?

    1. Scale of the crude bill: India’s crude oil import bill runs at around Rs 11 lakh crore to Rs 12 lakh crore a year.
    2. Scale of the edible oil bill: The edible oil import bill is far smaller, at roughly Rs 1.6 lakh crore to Rs 1.75 lakh crore.
    3. What E20 actually saves: Ethanol at E20 trims only 3 to 4 percent of the crude bill.
    4. The edible oil gap is closeable: India already produces about 40 percent of its cooking oil and aims to reach 72 percent by financial year 2031.
    5. The test of a good target: A gap the government can close fully and then stop subsidising is worth more than one it can only reduce at the margin forever.

    How has the shift in feedstock turned a distant trade off into a direct one?

    1. Grain now dominates the feedstock mix: Maize supplies about half of India’s ethanol. Grains together supply nearly 67 percent.
    2. Direct competition for the same fields: Maize competes with soybean, groundnut and mustard for identical acreage.
    3. First pull, the administered price: Ethanol from maize is procured at a fixed price well above the sugarcane route. That keeps maize attractive whatever the open market pays.
    4. Second pull, the feed by product: The leftover grain from distillation is sold as animal feed and undercuts soybean meal.
    5. The oilseed farmer loses twice: Weaker meal prices drag down soybean prices. The grower loses on acreage and then again on price.

    Why do the water and climate claims not settle the case for a higher blend?

    1. The headline figure mixes two things: Quoted totals of thousands of litres of water per litre of ethanol combine green water and blue water into one alarming number.
    2. Only the blue component is scarce: Rain the crop would have received anyway does not represent a withdrawal from a contested source.
    3. Where the pressure actually falls: Cane in Maharashtra and Karnataka draws heavily on already stressed rivers, canals and groundwater.
    4. What the rule should measure: A water norm for ethanol should target blue water use, not the frightening aggregate.
    5. The climate evidence is unsettled: Indian life cycle studies do not agree on whether grain ethanol is cleaner than the alternatives once cultivation and processing are counted.
    6. Consequence for the green case: The environmental argument for going beyond E20 does not survive close scientific scrutiny.

    What does experience abroad show about the limits of high ethanol blends?

    1. United States, Oak Ridge National Laboratory: The laboratory ran 86 vehicles for a cumulative 10 million kilometres on blends up to E20 and found no increased wear in cars not rated for E20.
    2. United States, multiple blends at the pump: American pumps sell E10 and E15 side by side, so owners of older vehicles retain a compatible option. This is the design India’s roadmap intended and then lost.
    3. United States, Renewable Fuel Standard: The mandate fixes volumes of renewable fuel in transport fuel. Its corn ethanol component drew sustained criticism for raising feed and food grain prices.
    4. Brazil, the Proalcool programme: Brazil built blending on sugarcane and on flex fuel vehicles able to run on any blend up to pure ethanol. The fleet, rather than the fuel specification, absorbs changes in the blend.

    Why is holding at E20 not a costless option either?

    1. Cane arrears were cleared: Ethanol demand gave sugar mills the cash flow to settle sugarcane dues owed to farmers.
    2. Rural incomes rose: The programme lifted incomes and built an assured market for cane and grain growers.
    3. Distillery capacity was built for more: Capacity now in place was created on the expectation of blends above E20.
    4. Loans were taken against expected demand: Those investments carry debt to be serviced against demand a freeze would not deliver.
    5. The sugar surplus needs an outlet: Ethanol absorbs a structural sugar surplus that would otherwise depress domestic prices.
    6. Both sides belong in the reckoning: The honest course weighs the cost of holding against the cost of advancing, rather than assuming either away.

    Why should reversibility decide the sequence of policy moves?

    1. Instruments that can change within a season: The ethanol procurement price, the protection fuel at the pump, the water rules and the import duty on edible oil can all be altered and reversed if evidence turns.
    2. The one instrument that cannot: The blend level is not reversible on the same timescale.
    3. Why the blend locks in: Once land and water are committed to fuel, cropping patterns and distillery investment are built around that commitment.
    4. The sequencing principle: Prudence says to move the reversible instruments first and hold off on the irreversible one until a thorough cost benefit analysis is complete.
    5. What the recommendation amounts to: Restore E10 for the older fleet, correct the price and water distortions favouring maize, revisit the edible oil import duty, and hold at E20.

    Challenges to the Ethanol Blended Petrol Programme

    1. Feedstock concentration in water intensive crops: Cane and maize both carry heavy irrigation demand in already stressed basins. e.g. Latur in Maharashtra received drinking water by train during the 2016 Marathwada drought while cane crushing continued in the region.
    2. Diversion of food grain to fuel: Grain routed to distilleries competes with the public distribution and feed markets. e.g. the release of surplus rice by the Food Corporation of India to distilleries was repeatedly started and stopped between 2023 and 2024 as open market rice prices rose.
    3. Material compatibility in the legacy fleet: Older engines and fuel lines were never certified for a 20 percent blend. e.g. two wheelers manufactured before the BS4 norms of 2017 use carburettors and non compliant elastomer seals.
    4. Blending logistics and evacuation: Ethanol absorbs water and cannot move through existing multiproduct petroleum pipelines. e.g. supply moves by road tanker from distillery clusters in Uttar Pradesh and Maharashtra to deficit states in the south and the east.
    5. Second generation ethanol has not scaled: Cellulosic ethanol from crop residue remains commercially fragile. e.g. the Panipat second generation bioethanol refinery based on paddy straw has struggled with feedstock aggregation since its commissioning in 2022.
    6. Administered price distortion across routes: A fixed price above the cane route pulls acreage towards maize regardless of demand. e.g. maize acreage has expanded in Bihar and Madhya Pradesh at the expense of oilseeds.
    7. Consumer trust and labelling: Buyers cannot easily tell which blend they are purchasing or whether their vehicle is rated for it. e.g. the 2026 online campaign over E20 mileage produced public demands for a lower blend option at pumps.

    Conclusion

    The engine controversy was never the real argument. The decision that matters is the blend level itself, because procurement prices, water rules, the protection fuel and import duties can be reversed within a season while committed land, cropping patterns and distillery capacity cannot. Restoring E10 for the older fleet and holding at E20 until the food versus fuel trade off is properly costed keeps every reversible option open. The unresolved question is what India chooses to grow, and what it will not be able to take back.

    Biofuels and Ethanol Blending in India

    1. About: Biofuels are liquid or gaseous fuels produced from biomass and used to substitute petroleum products in transport.
    2. Categories: They run from first generation fuels made from food crops, to second generation fuels from agricultural residue, third generation fuels from algae and fourth generation fuels using carbon capture.
    3. Blending record: Average ethanol blending rose from 1.53 percent in financial year 2014 to 20 percent in 2025, achieved five years ahead of the 2030 target.
    4. Global standing: India is among the largest ethanol producers and consumers in the world, after the United States and Brazil.
    5. Scale of the fuel base: India consumes roughly 40 million tonnes of petrol a year, which sets the size of the ethanol requirement at any given blend.
    6. Claimed gains: Official statements place foreign exchange savings from ethanol blending at over Rs 1 lakh crore since 2014.
    7. Structural feature: Ethanol is the only large scale biofuel India has commercialised, while biodiesel and compressed biogas remain far below their targets.

    Laws and Rules Governing Biofuels in India

    1. National Policy on Biofuels, 2018: Categorises biofuels, widens the permitted feedstock list and sets indicative blending targets.
    2. 2022 amendment: Advanced the 20 percent ethanol blending target to the 2025 26 ethanol supply year and permitted additional feedstocks.
    3. Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951: Provides the regulatory basis for distilleries and for the Centre’s control over industrial and denatured alcohol.
    4. Judicial position: A nine judge Bench of the Supreme Court held in October 2024 that “intoxicating liquor” under Entry 8 of the State List covers industrial alcohol, preserving State regulatory power.
    5. Essential Commodities Act, 1955: Enables control over the movement, storage and pricing of molasses and ethanol.
    6. Environment (Protection) Act, 1986: Governs distillery effluent standards, including zero liquid discharge norms for molasses based units.
    7. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989: Set emission norms and material compatibility requirements for vehicles rated to run on E20.
    8. Bureau of Indian Standards specifications: IS 2796 governs motor gasoline and IS 15464 governs anhydrous ethanol, with a separate notified specification for E20 fuel.

    Back2Basics: National Policy on Biofuels, 2018

    1. Nodal ministry: Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas.
    2. Approval and revision: Approved by the Union Cabinet in 2018 and amended in 2022.
    3. Categorisation: Divides biofuels into Basic Biofuels, meaning first generation bioethanol and biodiesel, and Advanced Biofuels, meaning second generation ethanol, municipal solid waste to drop in fuels, third generation biofuels and bio compressed natural gas.
    4. Permitted raw materials for ethanol: Sugarcane juice, sugar beet, sweet sorghum, corn, cassava, damaged food grains such as wheat and broken rice, and rotten potatoes unfit for human consumption.
    5. Blending targets: 20 percent ethanol in petrol and 5 percent biodiesel in diesel by 2030, with the ethanol target later advanced to the 2025 26 supply year.
    6. Surplus grain clause: Allows use of surplus food grains for ethanol production with the approval of the National Biofuel Coordination Committee, chaired by the Minister of Petroleum and Natural Gas.
    7. Financial support: Provides viability gap funding for second generation ethanol refineries and additional incentives for advanced biofuels.

    Government Initiatives for Biofuels and Ethanol

    1. Ethanol Blended Petrol Programme, 2003: Mandates blending of ethanol in petrol supplied by oil marketing companies across notified states and Union Territories.
    2. Pradhan Mantri JI-VAN Yojana, 2019: Provides viability gap funding to commercial and demonstration second generation bioethanol projects using lignocellulosic biomass.
    3. SATAT initiative, 2018: Sustainable Alternative Towards Affordable Transportation invites entrepreneurs to set up compressed biogas plants and sell the output to oil marketing companies.
    4. GOBARdhan scheme: Converts cattle dung and agricultural waste into biogas and organic manure, targeted at rural households and dairy clusters.
    5. Ethanol Interest Subvention Scheme: Subsidises interest on loans taken by sugar mills and standalone distilleries to expand ethanol capacity.
    6. Global Biofuels Alliance: Launched at the G20 New Delhi Summit in September 2023 with India, the United States and Brazil as founding members, to accelerate global biofuel trade and technology transfer.
    7. National Mission on Edible Oils, Oil Palm, 2021, and the Oilseeds Mission: Target domestic self sufficiency in cooking oil, which is the competing claim on the same land the ethanol programme draws from.

    Key Facts about Ethanol Blending

    1. World Biofuel Day is observed on 10 August, marking the day in 1893 an engine was run on peanut oil by Rudolf Diesel.
    2. The Ethanol Supply Year runs from 1 November to 31 October, not the financial year.
    3. E20 is 20 percent ethanol by volume, E85 is 85 percent, and E100 denotes ethanol used as a standalone fuel.
    4. India achieved 20 percent average blending in 2025, five years ahead of the 2030 target set in the 2018 policy.
    5. Flex fuel vehicles are engineered to run on any blend up to E85 or E100 without modification.
    6. Ethanol procurement uses differential administered prices by feedstock route, with the sugarcane juice route priced highest among cane routes.
    7. The National Biofuel Coordination Committee clears the use of surplus food grains for ethanol.

    Challenges in the Biofuel Sector

    1. Biodiesel blending has barely moved: Against a 5 percent target, biodiesel blending has remained close to negligible. e.g. used cooking oil collection under the Repurpose Used Cooking Oil initiative covers only a fraction of India’s restaurant and hotel supply chain.
    2. Sugar cycle volatility disrupts contracts: Ethanol supply from cane is hostage to sugar availability decisions taken mid season. e.g. the 2023 restriction on diverting cane juice to ethanol was imposed to protect domestic sugar supply and stranded distillery offtake plans.
    3. Centre and State conflict over alcohol regulation: Regulatory authority over industrial alcohol is contested and affects distillery licensing. e.g. the Supreme Court’s nine judge ruling of October 2024 held that States retain power over industrial alcohol under Entry 8 of the State List.
    4. Compressed biogas offtake and evacuation: Plant commissioning lags the announced targets because feedstock aggregation and gas evacuation are unresolved. e.g. SATAT set a target of 5,000 compressed biogas plants and actual commissioning has run far behind.
    5. Water footprint of the feedstock base: Blending demand is concentrated in crops grown in drought prone tracts. e.g. Maharashtra’s cane belt draws on stressed groundwater in districts that carry recurring drought declarations.
    6. Vehicle fleet compatibility lag: Only recent vehicles are certified for the mandated blend. e.g. only vehicles manufactured from April 2023 are E20 material compliant, leaving the older fleet dependent on a lower blend that is no longer sold.
    7. Absence of a settled national life cycle assessment: Without an agreed carbon accounting method, the climate benefit claimed for each blend level cannot be verified. e.g. Indian studies differ on whether maize ethanol lowers emissions once fertiliser and processing energy are counted.

    Way Forward

    1. Restore a lower blend at the pump: Sell E10 alongside E20 nationally until the retrofit of pre BS4 two wheelers is substantially complete.
    2. Correct the administered price: Reprice ethanol by feedstock so that maize does not carry an artificial advantage over oilseeds.
    3. Regulate blue water, not aggregate water: Set distillery and feedstock water norms on measured groundwater and canal withdrawal, with metering at the distillery gate.
    4. Fund oilseed self sufficiency: Direct the incentive structure towards closing the edible oil import gap, which is smaller and fully closeable.
    5. Scale second generation ethanol: Build residue aggregation networks so that paddy straw and bagasse substitute for grain feedstock.
    6. Mandate flex fuel capability: Require new vehicles to be flex fuel rated so that future blend changes are absorbed by the fleet rather than by the fuel specification.
    7. Publish a national cost benefit study: Complete a transparent food versus fuel accounting, covering land, blue water and life cycle emissions, before any move to E27 or E30.

    “[2020] According to India’s National Policy on Biofuels, which of the following can be used as raw materials for the production of biofuels?
    1. Cassava
    2. Damaged wheat grains
    3. Groundnut seeds
    4. Horse gram
    5. Rotten potatoes
    6. Sugar beet
    Select the correct answer using the code given below:
    (a) 1, 2, 5 and 6 only
    (b) 1, 3, 4 and 6 only
    (c) 2, 3, 4 and 5 only
    (d) 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6

  • Gaganyaan vs ISS: India’s Mission Is About Proving Indigenous Technology

    Why in the News

    The Indian astronaut who flew on Axiom Mission 4 has described Gaganyaan as a prototype mission built to prove technology, test systems and communicate with the ground, unlike the International Space Station flight, which was an established mission of experiments and return. The distinction separates having flown from owning the capability to fly. Axiom Space owned no hardware, while the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) is building the capsule and the spacecraft in house.

    What is the Gaganyaan mission?

    1. About: It is India’s first human spaceflight programme, designed to carry a crew to low Earth orbit in an indigenously built crew module and return them safely.
    2. Nature of the mission: It is a prototype mission, focused on proving the technology, testing out systems and communicating with the ground, not on a defined experiment schedule.
    3. In house hardware: ISRO is building the capsule and the spacecraft in which the astronauts will travel, and launching Indian astronauts on an Indian vehicle.
    4. Engineering intensity: The work is described as heavy engineering, with robust processes and review mechanisms being set up around it.
    5. Status: The programme is scheduled over the next year or two, and preparation is currently ground based.

    What was Axiom Mission 4?

    1. About: It was a commercial crewed mission to the International Space Station, on which an Indian became only the second Indian in space and the first in over four decades.
    2. Duration: The Indian crew member spent 20 days at the International Space Station after a launch on 25 June.

    What is microgravity?

    1. About: It is the condition of near weightlessness experienced in orbit, where objects and fluids behave differently from how they behave on the ground.
    2. Why it matters for training: Microgravity cannot be simulated on the ground, so the environment is encountered fully only in flight.

    Why is the Axiom model not comparable to the Gaganyaan model?

    1. Axiom owned no hardware: Axiom Space is a private company coordinating missions to space and did not own any of the hardware used.
    2. Station ownership: The International Space Station is owned by NASA and its international partners, not by the mission coordinator.
    3. Vehicle ownership: The crew flew in SpaceX’s Crew Dragon vehicle, launched by the Falcon 9 rocket, both owned by SpaceX.
    4. ISRO’s position: India is attempting to make the hardware in house and launch its own astronauts in its own capsule, which is a different nature of work.
    5. Consequence: The two programmes cannot be compared, because one buys access to space and the other builds the means of access.

    What did India actually gain from the Axiom flight?

    1. Stated objective: The primary objective of the mission was to learn as much as possible and use that experience to enable India’s own mission.
    2. Observation team: An ISRO team was present alongside the astronaut to observe how operations were run.
    3. End to end exposure: The team witnessed the end to end execution of an entire crewed mission, from preparation to recovery.
    4. Ecosystem lesson: ISRO has launched many successful missions, but human spaceflight requires a different ecosystem, and the scale of operations was the biggest learning.
    5. Disciplines identified: The flight showed the range of disciplines India must address before sending people to space and bringing them back.

    Back2Basics: International Space Station

    1. What it is: The largest crewed structure in low Earth orbit, operated as a multinational research laboratory.
    2. First module: The Zarya module was launched in 1998, with continuous human occupation since November 2000.
    3. Partners: Five participating space agencies, NASA, Roscosmos, the European Space Agency, the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency and the Canadian Space Agency.
    4. Orbit: It orbits at roughly 400 km altitude, completing an orbit in about 90 minutes and around 16 orbits a day.
    5. Function: It hosts microgravity research in biology, human physiology, materials science and Earth observation.
    6. Retirement: The station is planned for controlled deorbit around 2030 to 2031, which is driving commercial station projects.

    Government Initiatives

    1. Indian Space Policy, 2023: Opens the space sector to non government entities across the value chain and redefines the roles of ISRO, IN-SPACe and NSIL.
    2. IN-SPACe: The Indian National Space Promotion and Authorisation Centre, a single window autonomous body that authorises and promotes private space activity.
    3. NewSpace India Limited (NSIL): The commercial arm of the Department of Space, handling technology transfer and demand driven satellite and launch missions.
    4. Gaganyaan Programme: Sanctioned in 2018 and later expanded in scope and outlay to include the first module of the Bharatiya Antariksh Station.
    5. Foreign Direct Investment reform, 2024: Liberalised FDI limits for satellite manufacturing, launch vehicles and ground segment components.
    6. SpaDeX: The Space Docking Experiment, which demonstrated autonomous docking of two Indian satellites, a prerequisite technology for a space station and crewed missions.

    Key Facts about India in Space

    1. First Indian in space: Flew aboard the Soviet Soyuz T-11 mission in 1984, spending about eight days aboard the Salyut 7 station.
    2. Second Indian in space: Flew on Axiom Mission 4 in 2025, over four decades after the first flight, spending 20 days at the International Space Station.
    3. ISRO: Established in 1969, headquartered in Bengaluru, functioning under the Department of Space.
    4. Chandrayaan 3: Made India the first country to soft land near the lunar south pole, in August 2023, with National Space Day observed on 23 August.
    5. Aditya L1: India’s first solar observatory, placed in a halo orbit around the Sun Earth Lagrange point L1.
    6. Private launch: India’s first privately built rocket flew a suborbital mission in November 2022, marking the entry of startups into launch services.

    “[2025] Consider the following space missions:
    I. Axiom-4
    II. SpaDeX
    III. Gaganyaan
    How many of the space missions given above encourage and support microgravity research?
    (a) Only one
    (b) Only two
    (c) All the three
    (d) None

  • Can a 100-Year-Old Vaccine Train the Brain’s Immune System?

    Why in the News

    A study gave two doses of the Bacillus Calmette Guerin vaccine a month apart to 23 older adults and tracked blood and cerebrospinal fluid for a year, finding monocytes switching on genes for a faster immune response. This is evidence of trained immunity operating within the central nervous system. The tension is between a cheap, decades old vaccine with a large safety record and a study too small to establish clinical benefit.

    Note: Bacillus Calmette-Guérin (BCG) vaccine is more than 100 years old. It was first given to a human on July 18, 1921. Two French scientists, Albert Calmette and Camille Guérin, made the vaccine to stop tuberculosis (TB).

    What is trained immunity?

    1. About: Trained immunity is the capacity of innate immune cells to mount a stronger response to a later, unrelated challenge after an initial exposure, through lasting changes in gene expression.
    2. How it differs from adaptive immunity: Adaptive immunity is pathogen specific and mediated by lymphocytes. Trained immunity is non specific and mediated by innate cells such as monocytes.
    3. Mechanism: The change operates through epigenetic and metabolic reprogramming rather than through antibody memory.
    4. Why BCG: BCG is the best documented inducer of trained immunity, which is why it is used to test the effect.

    What did the study actually find?

    1. Sample and design: 23 older adults were enrolled, roughly half with cerebrospinal fluid biomarkers of Alzheimer’s disease, given two BCG doses a month apart.
    2. Immune change: Monocytes switched on genes associated with a faster immune response.
    3. Functional test: Monocytes responded more strongly to lipopolysaccharide, a standard bacterial stimulus, confirming a functional and not merely transcriptional change.
    4. Amyloid movement: Amyloid fell in cerebrospinal fluid and rose in blood among participants without established Alzheimer’s, and not among those with it.
    5. Location of the effect: The change was detected in the central nervous system compartment, which is the finding’s principal claim.

    What are the study’s stated limits?

    1. Sample size: 23 participants is too small to detect a clinical effect.
    2. No control arm: The study had no placebo group, so observed changes cannot be separated from natural variation.
    3. No cognitive change: Cognitive scores were unchanged over the year.
    4. Directional ambiguity: Amyloid shifting from cerebrospinal fluid to blood is consistent with clearance and is not proof of clearance.

    Why does a cheap vaccine matter for this disease?

    1. Cost comparison: BCG is inexpensive and carries decades of safety data, against anti amyloid drugs that are expensive and require infusion infrastructure.
    2. Existing supply: BCG is already manufactured at scale for tuberculosis immunisation.
    3. Repurposing precedent: A five year BCG cohort in type 1 diabetes established the model of testing the vaccine for a non tuberculosis indication.
    4. Underlying hypothesis: Chronic low grade inflammation with ageing, described as inflammaging, is implicated in neurodegeneration, and trained immunity is one route to modulating it.

    Challenges in translating this finding

    1. Blood brain barrier access: Demonstrating that a peripheral vaccine changes central nervous system immunity requires invasive sampling. e.g. the cerebrospinal fluid collection this study depended on.
    2. Amyloid hypothesis contestation: Amyloid reduction has not reliably produced cognitive benefit. e.g. the modest clinical effect sizes reported for approved anti amyloid antibodies.
    3. Trial duration: Neurodegeneration progresses over years, so trials must run long. e.g. the five year design of the BCG type 1 diabetes cohort.
    4. Vaccine supply competition: Diverting BCG to a new indication competes with tuberculosis immunisation demand. e.g. periodic global BCG supply shortages affecting national immunisation programmes.
    5. Strain variability: BCG substrains differ in immunological potency, complicating replication. e.g. the differing efficacy estimates across BCG trials attributed to substrain variation.
    6. Diagnostic access: Identifying preclinical Alzheimer’s requires biomarker testing unavailable at scale in India. e.g. limited availability of cerebrospinal fluid and amyloid imaging assays outside tertiary centres.

    Conclusion

    The study’s contribution is the demonstration that trained immunity can be detected within the central nervous system, which extends a peripheral immunology concept into neurology. It establishes a mechanism, not a treatment, since 23 participants without a control arm and with unchanged cognition cannot support a clinical claim. The next milestone is a randomised controlled trial with a placebo arm and cognitive endpoints over a multi year horizon.

    Back2Basics: Bacillus Calmette Guerin vaccine

    1. A live attenuated vaccine derived from Mycobacterium bovis, first administered in humans in 1921.
    2. Used primarily against severe childhood forms of tuberculosis, including tuberculous meningitis and miliary tuberculosis.
    3. Included in India’s Universal Immunisation Programme, given at birth or as early as possible thereafter.
    4. Provides limited protection against pulmonary tuberculosis in adults, which is why a new tuberculosis vaccine remains a research priority.
    5. Also used as an intravesical immunotherapy for non muscle invasive bladder cancer.
    6. Manufactured in India at the BCG Vaccine Laboratory, Chennai, among other facilities.

    Government Initiatives

    1. National Tuberculosis Elimination Programme: Targets tuberculosis elimination, covering diagnosis, treatment and nutritional support for patients.
    2. Ni-kshay Poshan Yojana: Provides direct benefit transfer for nutritional support to tuberculosis patients on treatment.
    3. Universal Immunisation Programme: Provides BCG and other vaccines free of cost, targeting infants and pregnant women.
    4. National Programme for Health Care of the Elderly: Provides dedicated geriatric health services including cognitive and mental health care.
    5. Indian Council of Medical Research clinical trial network: Supports multicentre trials, including for tuberculosis vaccine candidates.

    Way Forward

    1. Run a controlled trial: Replicate the finding with a placebo arm and a sample large enough to detect a cognitive effect.
    2. Standardise the substrain: Fix the BCG substrain across trial sites so results are comparable.
    3. Protect immunisation supply: Ensure any repurposing trial does not draw on doses allocated to childhood tuberculosis immunisation.
    4. Expand biomarker capacity: Build cerebrospinal fluid and blood biomarker testing capacity so preclinical cases can be identified for trial enrolment.
    5. Fund domestic replication: Support an Indian cohort, since India carries both the largest BCG immunised population and a rapidly ageing one.

    “[2022, GS3, 15 marks] What is the basic principle behind vaccine development? How do vaccines work? What approaches were adopted by the Indian vaccine manufacturers to produce COVID-19 vaccines?”

  • India’s Next Giant Leap: Building a Base on the Moon

    Why in the News

    NASA invited ISRO at the ninth India United States Civil Space Joint Working Group meeting to join its Moon Base programme under the Artemis Accords, targeting a facility near the lunar south pole around 2030. A rival International Lunar Research Station led by China and Russia targets the same region by 2035. The tension is between the access a partnership offers and the interoperability standards that would extend terrestrial blocs onto the Moon.

    What is the Moon Base programme?

    1. About: Moon Base is the NASA led programme to establish a permanent crewed facility near the lunar south pole, operating under the Artemis Accords framework.
    2. Why the south pole: The region offers longer sunlight for power generation and permanently shadowed craters holding water ice.
    3. Target date: The facility is targeted for around 2030.
    4. Contracting model: Delivery is contracted to commercial providers rather than built entirely in house.

    What are the Artemis Accords?

    1. About: The Artemis Accords are a set of non binding principles for civil space exploration, covering transparency, interoperability, emergency assistance, registration of objects, release of scientific data, preservation of heritage sites, deconfliction of activities and safe disposal of debris.
    2. Legal basis: They build on the Outer Space Treaty, 1967 rather than replacing it.
    3. India’s position: India signed the Accords in 2023.

    What is the International Lunar Research Station?

    1. About: The International Lunar Research Station (ILRS) is the China and Russia led lunar base programme announced in 2021.
    2. Location and timeline: It targets the lunar south pole, with a stated completion horizon of 2035.
    3. Participation: It counts 17 countries and organisations and more than 50 institutions.

    What contracts define the NASA programme’s shape?

    1. Terrain vehicles: Astrolab holds a $219 million contract and Lunar Outpost a $220 million contract for lunar terrain vehicles.
    2. Delivery services: Blue Origin holds $188 million in delivery task orders.
    3. Robotic missions: Astrobotic, Firefly Aerospace and Intuitive Machines together hold $600 million for four robotic missions.
    4. Programme restructuring: Under the current NASA leadership, Artemis III becomes a crewed Earth orbit test flight in 2027 and Artemis IV the first landing in 2028.
    5. Policy driver: The restructuring responds to the December 2025 United States space policy on cislunar space.

    Where does the partnership become a constraint?

    1. Exclusion clause: NASA excluded foreign entities with bilateral ties to China from a payload solicitation.
    2. Budget framing: The NASA financial year 2027 budget request frames Moon Base as establishing United States superiority on the Moon.
    3. Consequence for India: Deep integration could let United States objections constrain India’s independent cooperation choices.
    4. Foreclosure risk: Accepting exclusionary terms now would foreclose future cooperation with the ILRS.

    Why do interoperability standards decide the outcome?

    1. What standards fix: Docking interfaces, power connections, communication protocols and navigation references determine which hardware can work with which.
    2. Bloc formation mechanism: A closed standard makes participation conditional on political alignment, which transfers terrestrial blocs into cislunar space.
    3. Open standards alternative: Open international standards preserve sovereign control of hardware and software while permitting cooperation.
    4. India’s strategic interest: Strategic autonomy on the Moon depends on standards being open rather than on which partnership India joins.

    Challenges to India’s lunar ambitions

    1. Human spaceflight readiness: India has not yet flown a crewed mission. e.g. the Gaganyaan programme still in its uncrewed test flight phase.
    2. Heavy lift constraint: Lunar cargo delivery requires launch capacity beyond the current fleet. e.g. GSAT-N2 flown abroad because it exceeded LVM-3 capacity.
    3. Deep space communication: Sustained lunar operations need dedicated deep space network capacity. e.g. the Indian Deep Space Network at Byalalu operating a limited antenna set.
    4. Dual bloc pressure: Partnering with one programme invites exclusion from the other. e.g. the NASA payload solicitation barring entities with bilateral ties to China.
    5. Funding scale: India’s space budget is a fraction of the contracted value of individual NASA lunar task orders. e.g. $600 million contracted for four robotic missions against India’s annual space budget.
    6. Resource law vacuum: The Outer Space Treaty bars national appropriation but does not settle resource extraction rights. e.g. the contested legal status of the Artemis Accords safety zones.

    Conclusion

    The decisive question for India is not which lunar programme to join but whether interoperability standards stay open, since standards rather than treaties will determine who can operate with whom on the Moon. Joining Moon Base delivers access, and it carries the risk of inheriting an exclusion clause aimed at a third country. The next milestone is whether India secures an explicit open standards position in any agreement arising from the Joint Working Group.

    Back2Basics: India’s Decision to Sign the Artemis Accords

    1. India signed the Artemis Accords in June 2023, becoming among the later major spacefaring signatories.
    2. The Accords are a United States led set of non binding principles built on the Outer Space Treaty, 1967.
    3. Core commitments cover peaceful purposes, transparency, interoperability, emergency assistance, registration of space objects, release of scientific data, protection of heritage, deconfliction through safety zones and orbital debris mitigation.
    4. Signing enabled the joint NASA ISRO Synthetic Aperture Radar (NISAR) mission and the training of Indian astronaut candidates in the United States.
    5. The Accords do not create binding treaty obligations and operate alongside, not in place of, the Outer Space Treaty.

    Constitutional and Treaty Framework Governing Outer Space

    1. Outer Space Treaty, 1967: Establishes outer space as the province of all mankind and bars national appropriation by claim of sovereignty.
    2. Rescue Agreement, 1968: Requires assistance to and return of astronauts and space objects.
    3. Liability Convention, 1972: Makes a launching state absolutely liable for damage caused by its space objects on the surface of the Earth.
    4. Registration Convention, 1975: Requires states to register objects launched into outer space with the United Nations.
    5. Moon Agreement, 1979: Declares the Moon and its resources the common heritage of mankind, and has not been ratified by any major spacefaring state.

    Way Forward

    1. Negotiate open standards explicitly: Make interoperability on open international standards a condition of participation rather than an assumption.
    2. Preserve sovereign control of hardware: Retain control over Indian built systems and their software in any joint architecture.
    3. Avoid exclusivity clauses: Decline terms conditioning participation on the exclusion of third country cooperation.
    4. Build deep space capacity: Expand the deep space network and advance the Next Generation Launch Vehicle to support independent lunar operations.
    5. Use multilateral forums: Press the lunar resource question at the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, where a universal rule can be built rather than a bloc rule.

    “[2023, GS3, 15 marks] What is the main task of India’s third moon mission which could not be achieved in its earlier mission? List the countries that have achieved this task. Introduce the subsystems in the spacecraft launched and explain the role of the Virtual Launch Control Centre at the Vikram Sarabhai Space Centre which contributed to the successful launch from Srihari Kota.”

  • Despite reputation, India’s per-unit space launch cost highest

    Why in the News

    A peer-reviewed study estimates India’s 2025 launch cost to Low Earth Orbit (LEO) at $13,302/kg, the highest among major spacefaring nations and far above the global average of $3,868/kg.

    The key distinction is between low mission cost and low cost per kilogram. India is efficient in spacecraft and mission design, but low launch frequency and limited payload capacity raise its per-kg cost.

    Cost per kg to LEO

    1. Meaning: Launch cost divided by payload mass delivered to LEO.
    2. Why important: A low-cost mission can still have a high per-kg cost if it carries a small payload.
    3. What it measures: Launch vehicle efficiency and utilisation, rather than spacecraft-design frugality.

    Experience Curve

    • An experience curve shows declining unit costs as cumulative production or launch volume increases.
    • Since 2010, the study finds a significant experience curve mainly for the US and Europe.
    • Higher launch frequency allows fixed costs to be distributed across more missions.

    Comparative Cost

    • India: $13,302/kg, Europe: $9,897/kg, Russia: $6,682/kg, China: $5,809/kg, Japan: $5,287/kg, USA: $3,225/kg, and Global average: $3,868/kg

    Why is India’s Cost High?

    1. Small vehicle bias: Smaller rockets carry limited payloads, increasing per-kg costs.
    2. Low launch cadence: India recorded only five launches in 2025.
    3. Heavy-lift gap: The 4,700 kg GSAT-N2 was launched by Falcon 9 in 2024 as it was beyond India’s available launch capability.
    4. High fixed costs: Launch infrastructure, range and workforce costs remain even with fewer launches.
    5. Limited demand: Indian satellite operators sometimes depend on foreign rideshare missions.

    Private Space Ecosystem

    • Around 400 startups have registered with IN-SPACe since 2020.
    • Skyroot Aerospace achieved India’s first privately developed orbital launch milestone.
    • Pixxel and Digantara have developed private satellite capabilities.
    • GalaxEye has booked Falcon 9 launch capacity.
    • The emerging pattern is domestic spacecraft development but foreign launch dependence.

    “[2026] Consider the following statements about involvement of private entities in India’s space programme:

    1. IN-SPACe is an autonomous agency formed to facilitate participation of private entities.

    2. Agnikul Cosmos launched the world’s first flight using 3D-printed rocket engine.

    3. Skyroot Aerospace has developed liquid fuel for GSLV.

    (a) 1 only

    (b) 2 and 3 only

    (c) 1 and 2 only

    (d) 1, 2 and 3

  • India’s Green Mission in Trouble? CAG Flags Major Lapses

    Why in the News

    A Comptroller and Auditor General audit of the Green India Mission across 16 states and union territories found a 91.87 per cent shortfall against its forest quality improvement target and a 97.57 per cent shortfall against its forest cover target over ten years. The mission received Rs 1,149.14 crore, or 47.88 per cent, of the budgetary support it was to get. The tension is between a mission carrying India’s forest carbon sink commitment and a funding and convergence design that never materialised.

    What is the Green India Mission?

    1. About: The Green India Mission is one of the eight missions under the National Action Plan on Climate Change, launched in 2014 by the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change.
    2. Twin targets: Increasing forest and tree cover on 5 million hectares, and improving the quality of forest cover on another 5 million hectares.
    3. Design principle: The mission was to work through convergence with existing schemes rather than through a large standalone budget.
    4. Climate function: It carries the forestry component of India’s Nationally Determined Contribution under the Paris Agreement.

    What did the audit find on physical targets?

    1. Quality improvement: Forest cover quality improved on only 0.11384 million hectares against a 1.4 million hectare target, a shortfall of 91.87 per cent.
    2. Cover increase: Forest cover increased on only 0.03409 million hectares against a 1.4 million hectare target, a shortfall of 97.57 per cent.
    3. Audit period: The audit covered 2015-16 to 2024-25 across 16 states and union territories.
    4. Accounting failure: Eight states and union territories did not maintain annual accounts for the mission.

    Why did the funding architecture fail?

    1. Proposed requirement: The mission’s proposed funding requirement was Rs 40,600 crore.
    2. What was approved: The Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs approved Rs 2,000 crore for the first four years, alongside Rs 400 crore from Thirteenth Finance Commission grants.
    3. What was received: Only Rs 1,149.14 crore, or 47.88 per cent of even that reduced budgetary support, reached the mission over ten years.
    4. Structural consequence: A mission funded at under 3 per cent of its assessed requirement could not deliver targets set against the full requirement.

    Why did convergence not happen?

    1. Intended partners: Convergence was planned with the Compensatory Afforestation Fund Management and Planning Authority, the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme, the Nagar Van Yojana and the School Nursery Yojana.
    2. What the audit found: These schemes operated in silos, and convergence was not achieved.
    3. Design dependence: The mission’s low budget was justified on the assumption that convergence would supply the resources, so the failure of convergence removed the funding basis entirely.
    4. Accountability gap: No single authority was answerable for delivering convergence across ministries.

    What does this mean for India’s climate commitment?

    1. The commitment: India’s Nationally Determined Contribution includes creating an additional carbon sink of 2.5 to 3 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent by 2030 through additional forest and tree cover.
    2. Delivery vehicle: The Green India Mission is the principal instrument for the forestry component of that commitment.
    3. Arithmetic problem: Cover added on 0.03409 million hectares cannot support a sink target premised on 5 million hectares.
    4. Reporting risk: The gap between the reported forest cover figures and the audited mission achievement raises a measurement question about what counts as forest cover.

    Challenges to India’s afforestation programmes

    1. Plantation survival rates: Trees planted are counted, trees surviving are not. e.g. audits repeatedly finding low survival in compensatory afforestation plantations.
    2. Monoculture plantation: Fast growing single species plantations raise canopy cover without restoring biodiversity. e.g. eucalyptus and acacia plantations counted as forest cover gains.
    3. Definition of forest cover: The forest survey definition counts any land above one hectare with over 10 per cent canopy, including plantations and orchards. e.g. commercial plantations appearing as forest cover increases.
    4. Compensatory afforestation land shortage: States lack non forest land of the required extent to compensate diversion. e.g. the accumulation of unspent Compensatory Afforestation Fund balances before the 2016 Act.
    5. Community rights friction: Plantation on land under claim conflicts with recognised forest rights. e.g. disputes over plantation drives on land claimed under the Forest Rights Act, 2006.
    6. Convergence without an owner: Cross ministry convergence has no accountable authority. e.g. the Green India Mission’s four named partner schemes operating in silos through the audit period.

    Conclusion

    The mission failed because its target was set against an assessed requirement of Rs 40,600 crore while its funding was built on a convergence assumption that no authority was made accountable for delivering. The shortfall is therefore a design failure rather than an implementation lapse. The next milestone is whether the government restructures the mission’s funding or restates the forestry component of the Nationally Determined Contribution.

    Back2Basics: National Action Plan on Climate Change

    1. Launched in 2008 to outline India’s strategy on climate adaptation and mitigation.
    2. Comprises eight national missions: Solar, Enhanced Energy Efficiency, Sustainable Habitat, Water, Sustaining the Himalayan Ecosystem, Green India, Sustainable Agriculture, and Strategic Knowledge for Climate Change.
    3. Coordinated by the Prime Minister’s Council on Climate Change.
    4. States prepare State Action Plans on Climate Change aligned to the national missions.
    5. The Green India Mission was approved by the Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs in 2014 with a mandate covering 10 million hectares in total.

    Government Initiatives

    1. Compensatory Afforestation Fund Act, 2016: Governs the use of funds collected for forest land diversion, with a national authority and state authorities managing the corpus.
    2. Nagar Van Yojana: Supports the creation of urban forests on forest or other land within municipal limits, targeting city residents and local bodies.
    3. National Mission for a Green India: Targets 5 million hectares of new cover and 5 million hectares of quality improvement.
    4. Mission LiFE: Promotes individual and community behaviour change on sustainable consumption.
    5. School Nursery Yojana: Engages schools in raising seedlings to build a nursery base and environmental awareness.

    Way Forward

    1. Fund the mission against its assessed requirement: Close the gap between the Rs 40,600 crore requirement and the Rs 1,149.14 crore released, or restate the targets.
    2. Appoint an accountable convergence authority: Name one authority answerable for delivering convergence across the four partner schemes.
    3. Report survival, not planting: Measure achievement through third party verified survival after three years, not through saplings planted.
    4. Separate plantation from natural forest in reporting: Report plantation area distinctly from natural forest cover so the carbon sink claim is verifiable.
    5. Enforce annual accounts: Make release of the next instalment conditional on maintained annual accounts, since eight states did not maintain them.

    “[2016] Which of the following best describes/ describe the aim of ‘Green India Mission’ of the Government of India?

    1. Incorporating environmental benefits and costs into the Union and State Budgets thereby implementing the ‘green accounting’

    2. Launching the second green revolution to enhance agricultural output so as to ensure food security to one and all in the future

    3. Restoring and enhancing forest cover and responding to climate change by a combination of adaptation and mitigation measures

    Select the correct answer using the code given below.

    (a) 1 only

    (b) 2 and 3 only

    (c) 3 only

    (d) 1, 2 and 3

  • As Govt. mulls MDR on UPI, data shows cash usage quickening

    Why in the News

    The Taxation and Other Laws (Amendment) Act, 2026, passed in the concluded Monsoon Session, enables a Merchant Discount Rate on Unified Payments Interface and RuPay debit card transactions that are currently free. Data over the same period shows digital transaction growth decelerating while cash with the public rose to Rs 41.8 lakh crore. The tension is between making the payments system financially self sustaining and preserving the zero cost design that drove its adoption.

    What is the Merchant Discount Rate?

    1. About: The Merchant Discount Rate (MDR) is the charge a bank levies on a merchant for accepting a customer payment through a card or a digital payment instrument.
    2. How it is split: The charge is shared between the card issuing bank, the acquiring bank and the network operator.
    3. Current position in India: MDR on UPI and RuPay debit card transactions was set at zero in 2020, making the rails free at the point of acceptance.
    4. What the Act changes: The amendment enables the government to permit an MDR on these instruments, reversing the zero charge position.

    What do the payment and cash numbers actually show?

    1. UPI value growth, decelerating: Growth fell from 133 per cent in 2019-20 to 95 per cent in 2020-21, 105 per cent in 2021-22, 20.3 per cent in 2025-26 and 18.7 per cent so far in 2026-27.
    2. Cash growth, accelerating: Growth in cash with the public fell to about 4 per cent in 2023-24, then rose to 6.5 per cent in 2024-25, 12 per cent in 2025-26 and about 13 per cent in 2026-27.
    3. Absolute cash level: Cash with the public stood at Rs 41.8 lakh crore as on 31 July 2026.
    4. The anomaly: Digital payments and cash holdings are growing together, which contradicts the substitution assumption behind the zero MDR policy.

    Why are digital payments and cash rising together?

    1. Under counted inflation: If nominal transactions require more cash than measured inflation implies, the price index is understating actual price growth. Retail inflation was 4.45 per cent in July 2026 while wholesale inflation stood at 9.8 per cent.
    2. Real growth explanation: A rate of real growth above 7 per cent expands nominal transaction demand for both cash and digital instruments at once.
    3. Distress explanation: Rising cash holding is read as precautionary balances accumulating under high youth unemployment.
    4. Measurement gap: The wholesale and retail inflation series have diverged by more than five percentage points, which is itself the evidence the competing explanations turn on.

    What is contested about charging for UPI?

    1. Government position: The charge will not fall on the general public and will apply only to certain high value transactions.
    2. Opposition position: Merchants will pass the charge on to customers, so the incidence reaches the consumer regardless of who is billed.
    3. Underlying fiscal problem: Zero MDR shifted the cost of running the rails onto banks and the exchequer through incentive payments, which is not indefinitely sustainable.
    4. Adoption risk: Small merchants accepted UPI precisely because acceptance was costless, so a charge changes the acceptance calculation at the margin.

    Challenges to the digital payments system

    1. Cost recovery without an acceptance charge: Banks carry infrastructure costs with no transaction revenue on UPI. e.g. the annual incentive outlay the government has budgeted to compensate banks for zero MDR.
    2. Concentration risk: Two applications account for the overwhelming majority of UPI volume. e.g. the National Payments Corporation of India repeatedly deferring its 30 per cent market share cap.
    3. Fraud and mule accounts: Instant irreversible settlement makes recovery difficult once a payment is made. e.g. the rise in digital arrest and investment fraud cases routed through UPI collect requests.
    4. Outage exposure: A single operator running the rails concentrates systemic failure risk. e.g. the intermittent UPI outages that halted merchant acceptance across the country in 2025.
    5. Rural acceptance gap: Feature phone and low connectivity users remain outside the mainstream flow. e.g. limited uptake of UPI123Pay against smartphone based volumes.
    6. Cash persistence in the informal economy: Cash remains preferred where transactions are deliberately unrecorded. e.g. cash with the public rising to Rs 41.8 lakh crore alongside record digital volumes.

    Conclusion

    The amendment converts a policy question about who pays for the payments system into an operative legal power, and the answer will determine whether acceptance keeps widening. The simultaneous rise in cash is the more important signal, since it suggests digital adoption has been additive rather than substitutive. The next milestone is the notification specifying which transaction categories will attract the charge and at what rate.

    Back2Basics: National Payments Corporation of India

    1. Set up in 2008 as an umbrella organisation for retail payments and settlement systems in India.
    2. Incorporated as a not for profit company under Section 8 of the Companies Act, 2013, promoted by public and private sector banks.
    3. Operates under the regulatory authority of the Reserve Bank of India, which draws its powers from the Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007.
    4. Runs UPI, RuPay, Immediate Payment Service, National Automated Clearing House, National Electronic Toll Collection and Bharat Bill Payment System.
    5. Established NPCI International Payments Limited in 2020 to take UPI and RuPay to overseas markets.

    Way Forward

    1. Define the threshold in the notification: State the transaction value above which the charge applies, so small merchant acceptance is not affected by ambiguity.
    2. Cap the pass through: Prohibit merchant surcharging on transactions below the threshold, since incidence rather than billing decides the consumer effect.
    3. Reconcile the inflation series: Investigate the divergence between retail and wholesale inflation before treating cash growth as evidence of either strength or distress.
    4. Enforce the market share cap: Implement the volume cap on individual UPI applications to reduce concentration risk.
    5. Fund the rails transparently: Publish the annual cost of running the zero charge system, so the trade off between an explicit charge and a budgetary subsidy is visible.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2018] Which one of the following best describes the term Merchant Discount Rate sometimes seen in news? (a) The incentive given by a bank to a merchant for accepting payments through debit cards pertaining to that bank. (b) The amount paid back by banks to their customers when they use debit cards for financial transactions for purchasing goods or services. (c) The charge to a merchant by a bank for accepting payments from his customers through the bank’s debit cards. (d) The incentive given by the Government to merchants for promoting digital payments by their customers through Point of Sale (PoS) machines and debit cards. Answer: (c)”

  • Govt. brings scheme to disclose foreign assets

    Why in the News

    The Central Board of Direct Taxes notified the Foreign Assets of Small Taxpayers Disclosure Scheme (FAST-DS), open from 16 August to 31 December 2026. The scheme offers immunity from penalty and prosecution under the black money law in exchange for an effective 60 per cent levy. The tension is between clearing a large stock of inadvertent non disclosure by salaried professionals and the moral hazard of repeated amnesty windows.

    What is FAST-DS?

    1. About: FAST-DS is a time bound voluntary disclosure window for undisclosed foreign income and assets held by small taxpayers.
    2. Category one: Previously untaxed foreign assets or income with an aggregate value up to Rs 1 crore, charged at 30 per cent tax plus 30 per cent in lieu of penalty, an effective 60 per cent.
    3. Category two: Foreign assets up to Rs 5 crore that were already offered to tax, or acquired while the holder was non resident, but were not reported in the return schedule, settled through a flat fee of Rs 1 lakh.
    4. Valuation date: Fair market value is determined as of 31 March 2026.
    5. Relief granted: Immunity from penalty and prosecution under the Black Money (Undisclosed Foreign Income and Assets) and Imposition of Tax Act, 2015.
    6. Exclusion: Immunity does not extend to proceedings under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.

    Who is the scheme actually aimed at?

    1. Target group: Students, young technology professionals and returning non resident Indians who hold foreign equity awards.
    2. Typical asset: Restricted stock units and employee stock options vested while working for a foreign parent company.
    3. Nature of default: The default is usually a failure to fill the foreign asset schedule of the return, not concealment of income.
    4. Penalty exposure avoided: The 2015 Act prescribes a flat penalty of Rs 10 lakh for non disclosure of a foreign asset regardless of the asset’s size.

    Why is the government able to detect these assets now?

    1. Common Reporting Standard: Participating jurisdictions automatically exchange financial account information on each other’s residents.
    2. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act: The bilateral arrangement with the United States requires reporting of accounts held by Indian residents.
    3. Effect on enforcement: Automatic exchange converts detection from an investigative exercise into a data matching exercise.
    4. Consequence for taxpayers: Non disclosure that once went unnoticed now surfaces as a mismatch in the department’s records.

    What does the design tell us about the government’s calculation?

    1. Rate choice: An effective 60 per cent rate is punitive against the 30 per cent maximum marginal rate, so the scheme is not priced as a concession.
    2. Threshold choice: The Rs 1 crore and Rs 5 crore ceilings exclude large scale offshore holdings, keeping the window away from serious evaders.
    3. Money laundering carve out: Retaining Prevention of Money Laundering Act exposure signals that the scheme buys relief from reporting failure, not from criminal conduct.
    4. Duration: A four and a half month window forces disclosure decisions inside one assessment cycle.

    Challenges to voluntary disclosure schemes

    1. Moral hazard: Repeated windows teach compliant taxpayers that waiting is rewarded. e.g. the Income Declaration Scheme of 2016 following earlier voluntary disclosure rounds.
    2. Modest collections: Disclosure schemes typically raise far less than projected. e.g. the 2015 black money compliance window collecting about Rs 2,428 crore in tax and penalty.
    3. Valuation disputes: Fair market value of unlisted foreign equity is contestable and invites later litigation. e.g. disputes over the valuation of unlisted shares under earlier disclosure rounds.
    4. Equity objection: Constitutional challenges have been mounted arguing amnesty discriminates against honest taxpayers. e.g. the Supreme Court’s observations in the challenge to the 1997 Voluntary Disclosure of Income Scheme.
    5. Residual exposure: Immunity under one statute does not close exposure under others, which suppresses participation. e.g. the explicit exclusion of Prevention of Money Laundering Act proceedings in this scheme.
    6. Data mismatch errors: Automatic exchange data carries identity and currency conversion errors that generate wrongful notices. e.g. duplicate reporting of joint accounts under the Common Reporting Standard.

    Conclusion

    FAST-DS is priced and capped so that it functions as a clean up of reporting failure by salaried professionals rather than as an amnesty for offshore concealment. Retaining money laundering exposure is what keeps the scheme distinguishable from a general pardon. The next milestone is the disclosure volume reported when the window closes on 31 December 2026.

    Back2Basics: Black Money (Undisclosed Foreign Income and Assets) and Imposition of Tax Act, 2015

    1. Enacted in 2015 to deal specifically with undisclosed foreign income and assets, separately from the Income-tax Act.
    2. Levies a flat tax of 30 per cent on undisclosed foreign income and assets, with no deductions or exemptions permitted.
    3. Prescribes a penalty of three times the tax on undisclosed foreign assets, and a flat penalty of Rs 10 lakh for failure to disclose a foreign asset in the return.
    4. Provides for rigorous imprisonment of three to ten years for wilful attempt to evade tax on foreign income or assets.
    5. Applies to persons resident in India, and covers assets held as a beneficial owner or beneficiary.

    Way Forward

    1. Make the disclosure schedule simpler: Redesign the foreign asset schedule so vested equity awards can be reported without professional assistance.
    2. Pre fill from exchanged data: Populate the return with information already received under automatic exchange, converting disclosure into confirmation.
    3. Separate reporting failure from evasion: Set a lower statutory penalty for a first time reporting lapse below a defined threshold, so an amnesty window is not needed to fix it.
    4. Publish outcome data: Report collections and participant counts after closure, so the case for or against future windows rests on evidence.
    5. Close the window credibly: State that no further disclosure window will follow, since the deterrent value of the 2015 Act depends on that expectation.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2021] Which one of the following effects of the creation of black money in India has been the main cause of worry to the Government of India? (a) Diversion of resources to the purchase of real estate and investment in luxury housing (b) Investment in unproductive activities and purchase of precious stones, jewelry, gold, etc. (c) Large donations to political parties and the growth of regionalism (d) Loss of revenue to the State Exchequer due to tax evasion Answer: (d)”