[29th July 2026] The Hindu OpED: Iran’s Afghan balancing act amid regional upheaval

Mentor’s Comment

Delegations from both the Taliban and the rival Northern Alliance attended the funeral of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in Tehran. This dual presence exposed Iran’s continued refusal to fully commit to the Taliban government despite deep economic and diplomatic engagement with Kabul. The visit occurred while Iran was fighting a war in the west, raising the stakes of managing its eastern flank.

Why does Iran’s history with the Northern Alliance still shape its Taliban policy today?

1. Pre-2001 alignment: Iran backed the Northern Alliance against the Taliban through the 1990s, alongside India, Russia, and Tajikistan.
2. Post-9/11 recalibration: Iran’s view of the Taliban shifted after the 9/11 attacks brought sustained Western military deployment to its borders.
3. Non-recognition persists: Iran has built the strongest external influence in Kabul since 2021 but still withholds formal recognition of the Taliban government.
4. Dual channel maintained: Iran hosted Taliban Deputy Prime Minister Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar and Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi alongside Northern Alliance leader Ahmed Massoud at the same funeral.

How did the US withdrawal from Afghanistan reshape Iran’s regional calculus?

1. Border threat removed: The August 2021 US withdrawal ended a two-decade military presence on Iran’s eastern border.
2. Competing patronage exposed: Pakistan simultaneously backed the Taliban and the US-led war on terror, producing overlapping and contradictory interests.
3. Contradiction on record: Osama bin Laden was found in Abbottabad in May 2011, in a house and not a cave, pointing to this dual role.
4. A quieter front sought: Iran calculated that reducing conflict on its Afghan front would free up resources for other priorities.
5. Limited patronage offered: Iran could offer the Taliban political legitimacy but only a limited amount of material patronage.

Why does Iran keep hedging despite the Taliban’s declared wartime support?

1. Support pledged: A Taliban spokesman close to emir Hibatullah Akhundzada said the group would support Iran if it came under attack. The extent of this support remains undefined.
2. Access granted: The Taliban gave Iran access to Afghanistan’s civilian airports over the past year.
3. Durability doubted: Iran treats an insurgency-turned-government as carrying a persistent question mark over its long-term stability.
4. Internal fissures noted: Ideological and tribal divisions inside the Taliban require constant micromanagement.
5. Power still consolidating: The Taliban is still solidifying control between Kabul, its political capital, and Kandahar, its ideological one.
6. Institutional memory at play: Quds Force chief Esmail Qaani’s operational history traces back to the 1990s Taliban-Northern Alliance conflict. This history informs his current caution.

Why does Iran engage both the Taliban and its opposition at once?

1. Hedging strategy: Engaging both the recognised Taliban government and the Northern Alliance lets Iran preserve influence regardless of which side gains ground in Afghanistan’s internal balance of power.
2. Border security concern: Iran shares a long border with Afghanistan, and instability on either side directly affects Iranian security, giving Tehran incentive to maintain channels with all major Afghan actors.
3. Pakistan factor: Iran’s Afghanistan policy is shaped in part by its complex relationship with Pakistan, which has its own competing interests in Afghan internal politics.
4. Regional war context: The West Asia war constrains Iran’s bandwidth and resources, making a flexible, multi track Afghan policy more practical than committing exclusively to one Afghan faction.

What does the Iran-Pakistan wartime “brotherhood” reveal about the limits of regional alliances?

1. Mediator role assumed: Pakistan positioned itself as a mediator between Tehran and Washington during the war.
2. Divergent aims surfaced: Pakistan seeks favour with the US and Gulf partners, shown by its troop deployment in Saudi Arabia.
3. Instrumental use by Iran: Iran uses the relationship as a channel to reach the US through a neighbour it knows, though does not fully trust.
4. Bilateralism made incidental: The Iran-Pakistan relationship itself is secondary to each country’s separate external objectives.

Conclusion

Iran’s simultaneous engagement with the Taliban and the Northern Alliance is a hedging strategy shaped by the West Asia war’s demands on its resources and by its complicated relationship with Pakistan. The approach preserves Iranian influence in Afghanistan without requiring Tehran to bet its regional position on one Afghan faction’s success.

Back2Basics

Key Terms

1. IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps): Iran’s ideological military force, separate from its regular armed forces.
2. Quds Force: IRGC’s branch handling external operations and foreign militant networks.
3. Northern Alliance: A coalition of anti-Taliban Afghan factions, historically backed by Iran, India, and Russia.