Why in the News
Russia has moved from promoting a “strategic triangle” with India and China in the 1990s to backing a Russia-China-US trilateral summit in Shenzhen. The idea first surfaced at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in September. For India, the shift calls for a better reading of Moscow’s strategic traditions and compulsions.
What is the “table for three”, and how does it differ from RIC?
- The G3 proposal: A “G3” would seat Russia beside the US and China in the joint management of global challenges, much like a three-member board of the world’s strongest states.
- The older triangle: Moscow helped create the Russia-India-China (RIC) forum, BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa and newer members) and the SCO. These platforms push back against American primacy in Eurasia, the landmass joining Europe and Asia.
- Path of the proposal: The Russian President discussed the idea with the Chinese President, then took it to the US President.
- The takeaway: Russia can oppose American dominance in Eurasia and still seek accommodation with American power, because both serve one strategy.
Why does Moscow want a seat with Washington and Beijing?
- Great-power status: Russia’s economy cannot back a claim to equal America and China. Its nuclear arsenal, military, resources and geography still give it weight, and a G3 would turn that weight into status.
- Ukraine settlement: A favourable settlement in Ukraine is difficult without Washington’s support or acquiescence. Moscow also sees an opening in US-Europe differences over transatlantic security.
- Unequal partnership with China: Beijing helped Russia withstand Western sanctions, but the partnership has grown increasingly unequal. Triangulation, keeping options open with both powers, stops Moscow swapping American domination for Chinese domination.
- Economic gains: Moscow has floated cooperation with American companies in energy and the Arctic. Sanctions relief, investment and technology would ease Russia’s economic strain, and such deals suit the US President’s transactional, deal-by-deal style.
Why does Russia keep looking West?
- Westernisers and Slavophiles: Peter the Great tried to make Russia European, and the Slavophiles pushed back for a distinct Russian path. In 1881, Fyodor Dostoevsky wrote that Russians were “followers” in Europe but would go to Asia “as masters”.
- Eurasianism: Émigré intellectuals argued that Russia was neither European nor Asian but a separate civilisation. Russia’s 2023 foreign policy concept calls it a “unique country-civilisation” and a Eurasian power.
- Wartime and Cold War ties: Moscow allied with America and Britain against Nazi Germany. In the 1970s it pursued détente, an easing of tensions with the West.
- Post-Cold War offers: Mikhail Gorbachev imagined a “common European home”. In 2001 the Russian President offered Europe a free trade pact and visa-free travel.
- Collapse of that vision: North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) expansion and Western neglect of Moscow’s security concerns ended it, marked by the Munich speech of 2007. The invasion of Ukraine and Western sanctions then shattered Russia’s economic ties with Europe.
What should India read into Moscow’s move?
- A narrow Indian lens: Delhi treats Russia as a sum of bilateral items: oil, weapons, nuclear energy and propulsion, and past vetoes at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).
- Taking Russia for granted: Seeing Russia as a “best friend forever” leaves Delhi little empathy for Moscow’s structural challenges.
- Reading Russia’s rhetoric: India should “take note, not offence”, because Moscow’s anti-Western rhetoric does not mean permanent confrontation with Washington. Warm Cold War memories should not hide Russia’s natural focus on America, Europe and China.
- India’s interest: A Russia with more room for manoeuvre in Asia, and at peace with Europe and America, would serve Indian interests.
Challenges
- Weaker RIC: A G3 could make RIC, where India sits as an equal, matter less to Moscow.
- Arms dependence: India relies heavily on Russian-origin weapons, so shifts in Moscow’s priorities affect spares and deliveries.
- Russia’s tilt to China: Sanctions have deepened Russia’s economic reliance on China, which limits how far Moscow can back India in a dispute with Beijing.
Way Forward
- Broader Russia agenda: The Ministry of External Affairs should widen engagement with Moscow beyond oil and arms, to Arctic and Eurasian cooperation.
- Diversified defence supply: Continue indigenisation and diversified sourcing to protect military readiness.
- Active RIC and SCO channels: Use these forums to keep India inside the conversations Russia holds with China.
Conclusion
Russia’s pursuit of a seat with Washington and Beijing is an old westward pull, not a turn against India. The question is whether Delhi treats a Russia with more options as an asset or as a lost certainty.
Matching Previous Year Question
“[2024, GS2, 10 marks] The West is fostering India as an alternative to reduce dependence on China’s supply chain and as a strategic ally to counter China’s political and economic dominance.’ Explain this statement with examples.”