Can India and China coexist peacefully?

Why in the News

India and China live in managed coexistence: they are not at war, yet every patrolling deviation is treated as a face off. Peaceful coexistence remains possible because neither side holds a clear edge in the disputed high Himalayan areas and a grave Chinese military threat is a myth.

What is managed coexistence, and why is it fragile?

1. What it is: Managed coexistence means the two countries are not at war but treat every patrolling deviation as a face off, like neighbours who avoid a fight but quarrel at the boundary wall.
2. Why the border is contested: The border in Ladakh’s terrain was never properly drawn on maps. In Arunachal Pradesh the McMahon Line left a border that was improperly marked on the ground.
3. The 1962 war: It is traced to Mao’s hubris after the disastrous Great Leap Forward, his failed economic campaign. India lost territory in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh, and the loss remains a lingering grievance.
4. Galwan clash: The 2020 clash that cost 20 Indian soldiers is often blamed for the tension, but it cannot alone explain the distance between the two civilisations.
5. The takeaway: The hostility is rooted in an unsettled border and old distrust, so each patrol incident can harden into a face off.

What sustains the stalemate, and what has worked before?

1. Quad and suspicion: The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), a US sponsored grouping, has prolonged the stalemate. Chinese strategists see India’s role in US plans as a ploy to contain China, so they see no reason to improve ties. Many initiatives look like a zero sum game, meaning one side’s gain is the other’s loss.
2. Rajiv Gandhi’s visit: His 1988 visit remains a model, because the border question was discussed separately. That sidestepped bureaucratic hurdles and military confidence building measures.
3. 2005 Agreement: It was signed under President Hu Jintao to foster a long term constructive partnership. Article I bars the use or threat of force, and Article VII protects the interests of settled border populations.

Is China a military threat that India should fear?

1. No clear edge: Neither country enjoys an edge in the disputed high Himalayas, so avoiding inadvertent action is essential.
2. Advances, not yet world class: The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and its Navy have advanced, the Navy more so, but are not yet world class. China has refrained from war to reclaim Taiwan.
3. India’s match: Despite China’s long range missiles, submarines and amphibious ability, India is more than a match for it in the high Himalayas.
4. Cost of conflict: A conflict with India would set China back several years and derail its 2049 target of becoming the world’s top power.
5. Reading China right: India should understand China’s intentions better. China, in turn, understands India less, though it produces more research on it.

Challenges

1. Unresolved friction points: Two friction points, the Depsang Plains and Charding Ninglung Nala, remain unresolved.
2. China Pakistan nexus: Chinese infrastructure in Pakistan occupied Kashmir and diplomatic support to Pakistan raise India’s security cost. Eg. Backing Pakistan’s call for an independent Pahalgam probe.
3. Trade imbalance: India’s trade deficit with China hit a record $112.16 billion in March 2026.
4. Water without a treaty: No water sharing treaty exists, and China stopped releasing Brahmaputra data after the Doklam standoff.

Way Forward

1. Messages to field forces: Send clear messages to the military and border guards of both sides ruling out force, so Galwan type incidents do not recur.
2. Separate border track: Revive border talks that run apart from bureaucratic hurdles, as Rajiv Gandhi’s initiative did.
3. Data sharing: Seek an agreement on sharing Brahmaputra hydrological data.

Conclusion

Coexistence holds as long as both sides treat patrol incidents as incidents and not as tests of strength. The marker to watch is whether border talks move onto a separate track insulated from wider rivalries.

About the India and China Boundary

1. Line of Actual Control (LAC): The 3,488 km LAC is undefined, so standoffs are frequent, and China occupies 38,000 sq km of Aksai Chin. The middle sector in Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand is largely undisputed.
2. Western sector: In Ladakh, India follows the Johnson Line of 1865, while China claims a line drawn in 1899.
3. Eastern sector: In Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim, the LAC runs along the McMahon Line drawn at the Simla Convention of 1914. China claims about 90,000 sq km of Arunachal as South Tibet.
4. Agreements: The Panchsheel Agreement of 1954 set five principles of peaceful coexistence. A 1993 agreement committed both sides to maintain peace and tranquility along the LAC.

Matching Previous Year Question

“No direct PYQ traced in the provided files. Thematic PYQ: [2025, GS2, 10 marks] India–Africa digital partnership is achieving mutual respect, co-development and long-term institutional partnerships. Elaborate.”