Farakka treaty nearing expiry, JDU revives campaign against barrage

Why in the News

Janata Dal (United), a partner in the ruling coalition in Bihar, has launched a campaign across 12 districts of the state along the Ganga demanding that the Farakka barrage be dismantled, and opposing any renewal of the India-Bangladesh Ganga water sharing treaty. The treaty it is targeting was signed in December 1996 and set a 30 year framework for sharing Ganga waters at the barrage during the dry season. That framework lapses this December, which converts a standing state grievance into a live negotiating question. The state government’s own position is narrower, that Bihar’s interest should be guarded in the treaty, with the Chief Minister stating in Munger that the state receives Ganga water for only four months of the year against a need for year round flow. A bilateral water sharing arrangement is the Union government’s to negotiate, and what is now being pressed is not a better share but the removal of the structure the sharing is measured at.

What does the 1996 Ganga water sharing treaty do?

1. Who it binds and what it covers: It is a bilateral agreement between India and Bangladesh, signed in December 1996, regulating the sharing of Ganga waters at the Farakka barrage in West Bengal.
2. The season it governs: It applies primarily to the dry season, running from 1 January to 31 May, which is when the flow available at the barrage is least able to meet both countries’ requirements.
3. Why a 30 year term was written in: The treaty established a binding framework for 1996 to 2026 to replace the earlier short term stopgap arrangements and give both sides predictable distribution.
4. Where it now stands: That framework lapses this December, so continuation requires a fresh negotiation rather than an automatic rollover.

Why was the barrage built, and what did it change on either side?

1. The purpose it was built for: The barrage was built in 1975 to divert water from the Ganga into the Hooghly river, to flush out silt and keep Kolkata Port navigable.
2. The downstream effect in Bangladesh: The diversion reduced downstream flow into Bangladesh, producing severe water shortages, increased soil salinity and ecological stress in the south of that country.
3. The upstream effect Bihar reports: Heavy silt trapped behind the barrage has raised the Ganga’s riverbed, destroying the river’s natural storage capacity and driving seasonal floods.
4. One structure sits behind both complaints: The diversion that sustains a port channel downstream is the same arrangement that holds sediment upstream, so the barrage is what both sets of grievances point at.

What is Bihar’s stated grievance?

1. A flood and parch cycle upstream: The state government’s position is that the barrage has created a severe flood and parch dynamic upstream of it, alternating inundation with shortage rather than steadying the flow.
2. Four months of water against a year round need: The Chief Minister has stated that Bihar currently receives Ganga water only from July to October, and requires flow throughout the year.
3. What the state asks of the Union government: Its stated demand is that the treaty safeguard Bihar’s interest, which places a riparian state’s claim inside a negotiation it is not a party to.

What is the campaign demanding, and how is it being run?

1. A demand to dismantle, not to renegotiate: The party is demanding that the barrage be dismantled, citing a stance its chief and former Chief Minister has repeatedly taken with the Union government that the structure causes heavy siltation and floods.
2. Outright opposition to renewal: The party’s stated position is that it is completely against renewal, on the ground that the treaty fails to serve the state’s interests and remains a primary cause of flooding.
3. Where it is being taken: The ‘Nitish Samvad’ campaign covers the 12 districts through which the Ganga flows in Bihar, and has so far covered four, Buxar, Bhojpur, Begusarai and Khagaria.
4. How it is being conducted: It is led by the party’s national working president, a Rajya Sabha member, and carries recorded audio messages of the party chief, who is not travelling for it.
5. The timetable it is working to: The party intends to finish the campaign well before the treaty ends in December, which places it ahead of any decision on renewal.

Challenges to renegotiating the Ganga water sharing framework

1. A riparian state has no seat at the table: Water is a State subject, and a treaty with a foreign country is the Union government’s exclusive power, so a state can press a claim and cannot block an agreement. Eg. The India-Bangladesh Teesta water sharing draft has remained unsigned since 2011 over West Bengal’s objections, without the state being a party to it.
   The Fix: Constitute a standing consultative mechanism with the basin states before negotiation opens, with their submissions placed on record as part of the Indian position.
2. The sharing formula rests on historical flows: The arrangement was built on the average dry season availability recorded at the barrage over four earlier decades, and that baseline no longer describes current or projected flows. Eg. Its operation depends on how much water actually arrives at the barrage in each ten day period of the dry season.
   The Fix: Write the next arrangement on a rolling flow record revised at fixed intervals, rather than on a single fixed historical average.
3. Sediment has no institutional owner: The dispute Bihar raises is about silt rather than volume, and no authority holds the power to order desilting or to set a sediment budget for the river. Eg. The approach channel at Farakka itself requires repeated dredging to stay open, which relocates silt rather than reducing the load.
   The Fix: Attach a sediment management protocol to the barrage’s operating rules, naming the responsible authority and the annual dredging and disposal obligation.
4. The flood peaks are set outside India: The Kosi and the Gandak, the rivers that deliver Bihar’s worst flood peaks, rise in Nepal, so peak discharge is governed by catchments and structures beyond this treaty’s scope. Eg. The Kosi and Gandak barrages stand in Nepalese territory and are operated by India under the 1954 Kosi Agreement and the 1959 Gandak Agreement.
   The Fix: Pair the Ganga negotiation with a flow data sharing and release coordination arrangement with Nepal on the Kosi and Gandak.
5. Removing the structure moves the problem rather than ending it: Dismantling the barrage would restore downstream flow and withdraw the diversion that keeps the Bhagirathi-Hooghly channel and the Kolkata port route navigable. Eg. The feeder canal at Farakka exists solely to carry that diverted flow into the Bhagirathi-Hooghly system.
   The Fix: Commission an independent flow and sediment study of the barrage’s upstream and downstream effects, so the dismantling demand is tested against measured alternatives rather than settled politically.

Conclusion

A dry season sharing arrangement is now being contested on grounds it was never written to address, since the demand from Bihar concerns sediment and flood behaviour rather than the volume of water allotted. That mismatch is what makes renewal harder than an extension of terms. The decision to watch is whether the Union government opens the negotiation with a stated position on siltation upstream of the barrage, or confines it to the dry season allocation. Confined to allocation, a new agreement settles the bilateral question and leaves the domestic one exactly where it started.

Back2Basics: Farakka Barrage

1. Where it stands: Across the Ganga in Murshidabad district of West Bengal, a short distance upstream of the point where the river enters Bangladesh.
2. Its scale: The barrage runs about 2,240 metres across the river and carries a road and rail link over it.
3. How the diversion works: A feeder canal roughly 38 km long carries water from above the barrage into the Bhagirathi-Hooghly, the channel the diversion was designed to sustain.
4. Who operates it: The Farakka Barrage Project authority, under the Union Ministry of Jal Shakti, runs the structure and its regulating gates.

Matching Previous Year Question

“[2016, GS1, 12 marks] Present an account of the Indus Water Treaty and examine its ecological, economic and political implications in the context of changing bilateral relations.”