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Type: States

Many questions regarding developments in specific states are asked in both prelims and mains. These Newscards correspond to such developments.

  • BLOs shared details for ‘verification’; hundreds of voters in Odisha nearly struck out of rolls

    Why in the News

    Booth Level Officer (BLO) logins meant to certify voter checks were used, without the BLOs’ knowledge, to file bulk deletion applications against voters they had verified. In Odisha’s Dhamnagar Assembly seat, the Election Commission of India (ECI) has approved the suspension of the Assistant Electoral Registration Officer (AERO) accused of misusing BLOs’ one-time passwords (OTPs) during the Special Intensive Revision (SIR).

    How were BLO credentials turned against voters?

    1. What Form 7 is: Form 7 is the application to object to, or seek deletion of, a name on the roll. BLOs process it on an app under their own login, confirmed by an OTP.
    2. How the misuse worked: The AERO and his staff sought OTPs from BLOs on the pretext of verification. The OTPs were then used to process Form 7s removing genuine voters.
    3. Spread across BLOs: Several BLOs in the Dhamnagar Notified Area Council (an urban local body) found such uploads. One found at least 227 in her name, another 130.
    4. Pressure on BLOs: Their police complaint says the AERO pressed them through a supervisor and threatened a show-cause notice.
    5. The takeaway: A check built on each BLO’s login became a way to strike voters off without any BLO deciding it.

    Who was targeted, and why did it raise suspicion?

    1. One community: Over 90% of the applications concerned Muslim voters. Dhamnagar, in northeast Odisha, is among the State’s few seats with a sizeable Muslim population.
    2. Already verified voters: BLOs say almost all flagged voters had been cleared in the enumeration round and traced to the 2002 SIR roll.
    3. Outlier volume: Dhamnagar alone produced over 3,000 Form 7s, against a statewide average of 141 Form 7-based deletions per seat.
    4. Narrow political margins: The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) won the seat twice by narrow margins over the Biju Janata Dal (BJD). The BJD now seeks a thorough probe.

    How did the election machinery respond?

    1. Complaint and memorandum: 10 BLOs filed a police complaint on 4 September and approached the Bhadrak District Collector. The BJD then petitioned the State Chief Electoral Officer (CEO).
    2. Preliminary inquiry: The Electoral Registration Officer (ERO), Bhadrak’s Additional Sub-Collector, found prima facie, on a first look, that the forms were processed in an unauthorised manner.
    3. Suspension: On 21 September, the ECI approved, via the CEO, suspension and disciplinary proceedings against the AERO, also the council’s Executive Officer. Odisha’s Housing and Urban Development Department issued the order.
    4. Further action: The Collector must forward a full “draft charge” (the formal allegations), and a detailed inquiry has been ordered.
    5. Names restored: The applications were withdrawn, and most targeted voters appear in the final roll released the same day.

    Challenges

    1. Shared credentials: OTPs handed to superiors mean a login no longer proves who decided.
    2. Detection by chance: The misuse surfaced through a BLO checking her app, not a system alert.
    3. Religious targeting: Deletions aimed at one community strike at Article 325, which bars exclusion from the roll on grounds of religion.
    4. Cheap objections: Bulk Form 7s cost filers little, while flagged voters must prove eligibility again.

    Way Forward

    1. Bulk filing alerts: Flag logins processing Form 7s far above the seat average.
    2. Non-transferable login: BLO approvals should use biometric or device-bound authentication in place of shareable OTPs.
    3. Penal action: Prosecute guilty officials under Section 32 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950, which punishes breach of official duty in roll work.
    4. Protected reporting: Shield BLOs who report misuse from threats by superiors.

    Conclusion

    The SIR’s safeguards hold only if officials cannot borrow the credentials of those below them. Whether the inquiry ends in formal charges against the suspended officer is the next marker.

    Key numbers

    1. Odisha’s Form 7 deletions: 20,707 names across 147 Assembly seats.
    2. Odisha’s electorate: 3.33 crore before the SIR, 3.16 crore in the final roll.
    3. Dhamnagar’s electorate: 2.49 lakh at the start of the SIR, 2.31 lakh in the final roll.
    4. Dhamnagar enumeration deletions: 17,956 voters; the seat had 20,000 Muslim voters at the start.
    5. BJP’s winning margins: over 4,000 (2019) and 8,000-plus (2024).

    Back2Basics: Electoral Registration Officer

    1. Statutory hierarchy: Sections 13A to 13CC of the 1950 Act set up the roll machinery: a CEO per State, District Election Officers and EROs.
    2. Role of the ERO: The ERO prepares and revises the electoral roll for an Assembly constituency.
    3. Role of the AERO: AEROs assist the ERO and may perform the ERO’s functions, subject to the ERO’s control.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026, GS2, 10 marks] Is the right to vote a fundamental right? Discuss the position of the Election Commission of India while undertaking the revision of electoral rolls. Can it also examine the question of citizenship of voters?”

  • Form 7 objections in Karnataka SIR mostly against Muslim voters

    Why in the News

    In Karnataka’s Special Intensive Revision (SIR), the objection process meant for checking individual entries has become a route to bulk deletions, largely against Muslim voters. The statutory Form 10 report shows Form 7 applications seeking more than 4,000 deletions, most filed by a handful of electors a day before the claims and objections deadline, raising fears of targeted disenfranchisement.

    What is a Form 7 objection, and what changed at the deadline?

    1. What it is: Form 7 lets an elector object to a name on the roll or seek its deletion. It works like a neighbourhood check on the voter list.
    2. Public record: Form 10 consolidates every Form 7 filed, so anyone can see who objected to whom.
    3. Normal pattern: Earlier in the revision, deletions sought on the ground of shifting ran at about two or three per polling station, mostly electors removing their own names.
    4. What changed: From 22 September, bulk filings appeared against other people’s names, all citing “Absent/Permanently Shifted”.
    5. The takeaway: A tool built for self-correction was used by a few individuals to challenge thousands of voters, largely from one community.

    How concentrated were the bulk filings?

    1. Babaleshwar: Just 10 people filed 1,363 of the Form 7s received there on a single day, largely against Muslim voters outside their own polling stations.
    2. Single-filer volumes: One Babaleshwar elector filed 493 applications across 30 polling stations, far beyond his own booth.
    3. Bhalki (Bidar district): At least 30 people sought to delete more than 1,700 names on the deadline day.
    4. Single-booth targeting: In Basavakalyan and Belthangady, single electors filed 32 and 21 objections, all against Muslim voters in one polling station each.
    5. Across party lines: Congress Ministers represent Babaleshwar and Bhalki, and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) holds the other two seats.

    Why are the forms themselves under question?

    1. Pre-printed forms: In some Bhalki forms, the targeted voters’ details were already printed, with only the objector’s details handwritten.
    2. Disowned objector: Several forms named an elector at Booth 129 as objector. The person contacted gave a different name, yet the Electors Photo Identity Card (EPIC) details on the forms matched that elector.
    3. Repeat pattern: Another objector’s forms, over 170 of them, showed the same pre-printed pattern.
    4. Data mismatch: The disowned objector is missing from the downloadable Form 10 data. Officials said many offline forms were still to be digitised.

    How are officials and parties responding?

    1. Scrutiny promised: Officials in Bidar and Vijayapura said objections would be scrutinised so that no eligible voter is deleted. Bulk filers were warned that groundless claims, if proved, could invite punishment.
    2. Congress demand: The Karnataka Pradesh Congress Committee president asked the State Chief Electoral Officer (CEO) for “suo motu action” against “large-scale fraudulent” misuse of Form 7.
    3. Civil society demand: The SIR Virodhi Okkuta sought an inquiry and criminal cases over forms found fraudulent.

    Challenges

    1. Cheap to object: Filing a Form 7 costs the objector little, but defending a name costs the voter time and documents.
    2. Deadline-eve surges: Last-day bulk filings leave Electoral Registration Officers (EROs) little time to verify each case.
    3. Community targeting: Objections aimed at one community strain Article 325, which bars exclusion from the roll on grounds of religion.

    Way Forward

    1. Mandatory field check: EROs should order a Booth Level Officer (BLO) visit for every “shifted” objection before issuing notice.
    2. Bulk flagging: The Election Commission of India (ECI) should auto-flag filers objecting beyond their own polling station.
    3. Action on false filers: The CEO should file complaints under Section 31 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950 where forms prove fraudulent.
    4. Real-time digitisation: Offline Form 7s should be uploaded within a day.

    Conclusion

    The SIR’s claims process can be turned against one community when filing is cheap and verification comes later. The test now is whether ERO scrutiny keeps every eligible voter on the final roll, and whether false filers face action.

    Key numbers

    1. Babaleshwar, one day: 1,373 Form 7s received.
    2. Second Babaleshwar filer: 413 applications across 33 polling stations in one day.
    3. Bhalki repeat filer: 54 applications on 22 September, 120 on 23 September.

    Back2Basics: Section 31, Representation of the People Act, 1950

    1. What it penalises: A written false statement or declaration, known or believed to be false, made in connection with preparing or revising an electoral roll.
    2. Punishment: Imprisonment up to one year, or a fine, or both.
    3. Link to Form 7: The claim and objection forms carry a declaration that a false statement is punishable under this Section.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026, GS2, 10 marks] Is the right to vote a fundamental right? Discuss the position of the Election Commission of India while undertaking the revision of electoral rolls. Can it also examine the question of citizenship of voters?”

  • Towards a gender-just Uniform Civil Code

    Why in the News

    The Union Home Minister has said a Uniform Civil Code (UCC) will be implemented in all 21 States ruled by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) before the 2029 Lok Sabha elections. The UCC is justified as serving equality and gender justice, but the Uttarakhand code “confuses uniformity with equality” and “conflates regulation with protection”.

    Where does the UCC push stand?

    1. What it is: A UCC replaces religion-based personal laws on marriage, divorce, maintenance and inheritance with one civil law for all citizens. It is like one rulebook replacing community rulebooks.
    2. Origin of the push: The UCC became an important BJP goal after the Shah Bano judgment (1985), but no draft existed to debate.
    3. Enacted and pending: Uttarakhand’s UCC applies from January 2025. Gujarat, Assam and Madhya Pradesh await Presidential assent, needed where a State law on a Concurrent List subject clashes with Union law.
    4. Drafting and dissent: Maharashtra, Rajasthan, West Bengal and Chhattisgarh have drafting committees. Justice R.C. Chavan quit Maharashtra’s committee, headed by Justice Ranjana Desai, over its consultative process.
    5. The takeaway: States are drafting codes on the Uttarakhand model, so its flaws will spread unless corrected.

    Why does the Uttarakhand code confuse uniformity with equality?

    1. Live-in registration: Compulsory registration of live-in relationships, with notice to police and parents, is “surveillance masquerading as protection”.
    2. Criminal penalties in civil law: Ending a marriage outside court carries three years’ punishment and a fine. Unregistered marriages, divorces or live-in relationships risk fines or jail, hurting the poor and marginalised most.
    3. Court-only divorce: Sending every divorce to a civil court will clog family courts already holding lakhs of pending cases. Customary divorces are quicker and cheaper for weaker sections.
    4. Silence on HUF: The code ignores tax benefits available only to Hindus through the Hindu Undivided Family (HUF), a joint family taxed as a separate unit.
    5. Copy of the Hindu Code Bill: It reads like a “copy-paste” of the Hindu Code Bill, ignoring progressive reforms in personal laws and family codes worldwide.

    What should a gender-just UCC guarantee women?

    1. Support for deserted women: Desertion leaves women and children highly vulnerable. A UCC should provide automatic maintenance orders and bar disposal of assets.
    2. Gender-specific maintenance: Only women can claim maintenance under the Special Marriage Act, 1954 and other personal laws, unlike the gender-neutral Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. A UCC should keep this, given unequal power in marriage.
    3. Non-willable share: The Hindu Code Bill let Hindu men will away all property, causing the silent disinheritance of women. Like Muslim law’s protected share, a UCC should reserve wives and children a minimum share.
    4. Marital property: Women should get an equitable share of assets built during marriage, recognising unpaid care and domestic work.
    5. Second wives: Courts grant maintenance to women deceived into a void second marriage, and a UCC should codify this.

    Challenges

    1. Patchwork of State codes: Each State enacting its own code produces different rules, which defeats uniformity itself.
    2. Minority apprehension: Communities fear a code modelled on Hindu law imposes majority practice. Eg. Meghalaya and Mizoram district councils opposing it.
    3. Religious freedom claims: Reform faces challenges under Article 25 (freedom of religion).
    4. Thin consultation: Hurried drafting loses legitimacy with affected groups.

    Way Forward

    1. Optional registration: Make registration optional and confidential, with tangible benefits such as maintenance, legitimacy of children and inheritance rights.
    2. Administrative divorce: Create an administrative mechanism for mutual-consent divorces, reserving courts for contested or complex cases.
    3. Inclusive consultation: Consult groups working for women, Adivasis, queer and transgender people and persons with disabilities.
    4. Civil, not criminal, compliance: Replace penalties with awareness drives and user-friendly procedures.

    Conclusion

    The UCC is moving from slogan to statute State by State, but the first enacted model regulates relationships more than it secures women’s economic rights. Whether pending State bills are revised toward maintenance and marital property rights before assent will show if uniformity serves gender justice.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2021] Under the Indian Constitution, concentration of wealth violates (a) the Right to Equality (b) the Directive Principles of State Policy (c) the Right to Freedom (d) the Concept of Welfare Answer: (b)”

  • Waves of rain: Odisha must prepare for repeated bouts of intense downpour

    Why in the News

    Odisha is going through one of its most intense monsoons, with 1,453 mm of rain between June and 25 September, a 29% excess. The rain arrived in repeated bouts that left no time to recover, exposing a gap between the State’s celebrated evacuation system and its drains, roads and towns.

    Why was this monsoon so intense?

    1. Many weather systems: An unusually large number of low-pressure systems (rain-bearing areas of low air pressure) formed, 11 over the Bay of Bengal. The latest made landfall near Kalingapatnam on 23 September.
    2. Forecast missed: The India Meteorological Department (IMD) had forecast 90% of the long-period average (LPA) for India, the multi-decade mean used as the benchmark for a normal monsoon.
    3. El Niño expectation: That forecast rested partly on an expected El Niño, a warming of the central Pacific that usually weakens the Indian monsoon.
    4. From deficit to excess: The State finished June with a 47% deficit, after which the weather systems came to dominate its rainfall.
    5. The takeaway: Regional weather systems overrode a national forecast built on a global driver, so Odisha got repeated deluges instead of a weak season.

    Why do repeated bouts cause more damage?

    1. Saturated ground: When an earlier bout has soaked the soil and filled local storage, the next bout turns almost at once into runoff, so floods come faster.
    2. Extreme days: At least 60 locations have received more than 100 mm of rain in a single day.
    3. Floods and landslides: Swelling rivers threaten floods downstream in Bhadrak and Jajpur, and landslides in hilly areas.
    4. Two kinds of terrain: The hilly south faces slope failure, meaning landslides. The coast is a flat depositional plain built by several deltas, so water drains slowly into the sea.
    5. People affected: By the State’s estimates, 5.2 lakh people were affected by the end of July and another 13.5 lakh by late August.

    What does the long-term record show?

    1. Rainfall bursts: A May study by the Odisha University of Agriculture and Technology, using data from 1901 to 2020, found maximum one-day and five-day rainfall bursts becoming more common.
    2. Fewer heavy-rain days: The same study found the frequency of heavy-rain days dipping, so rain is concentrating into fewer, more intense spells.
    3. Climate link: Climate change is increasingly correlated with a more protracted monsoon withdrawal and more intense rain events.

    Do Odisha’s evacuation protocols match its civic engineering?

    1. Zero-casualty policy: Odisha is renowned for its long-standing goal of zero casualties, built on early warning and mass evacuation. Its efficacy this season remains untested.
    2. Drain deficiencies: The Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) flagged deficiencies in drain design and maintenance in 2024, and this season will stress them.
    3. Urban waterlogging: Recurrent waterlogging in towns such as Berhampur shows the State is better at evacuating people than at draining its towns.
    4. Transport disruption: Floods repeatedly cut inter-State highways and rail lines, so roads, trade and livelihoods cannot absorb back-to-back shocks.
    5. Assessments pending: Crop and infrastructure damage assessments, and peak levels of the Baitarani, Budhabalanga, Jalaka and Rushikulya rivers after the 11th system fades, will show the season’s full cost.

    Challenges

    1. Design for single events: Drains and embankments are sized for isolated storms, not for back-to-back bursts on saturated ground.
    2. Building on floodplains: Towns expand into low-lying land and fill natural drainage channels, which raises flood exposure.
    3. Forecast blind spots: Seasonal forecasts built on global drivers miss regional extremes, so preparation keyed to them falls short.
    4. Losses beyond lives: Evacuation saves lives but not crops, homes and roads, which drive the cost of recovery.

    Way Forward

    1. Redesign drains: Odisha’s urban local bodies should redesign drains for repeated intense bursts and correct the defects the audit found.
    2. Plan for multiple events: The Odisha State Disaster Management Authority should plan for several extreme spells in one season, using burst trends in rainfall records.
    3. Flood-proof transport: Raise and cross-drain vulnerable highway and rail stretches, working with the national highway and railway authorities.
    4. Impact forecasting: Pair IMD warnings with district-level forecasts of runoff and waterlogging.

    Conclusion

    Odisha’s disaster system is built to move people out of harm’s way before a single storm, not to keep towns and roads working through a season of repeated deluges. It needs to pivot from anticipating isolated seasonal anomalies to preparing for repeated intense downpours, and the pending damage assessments will show how wide that gap is.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026, GS3, 10 marks] Discuss how the contradiction between ‘rapid infrastructure development’ and ‘disaster-risk reduction’ in ecologically-sensitive areas of India can be managed, with suitable examples.”

  • Delhi announces vehicle curbs, construction bans, 50% WFH to tackle winter pollution

    Why in the News

    Delhi’s winter pollution response has moved from curbs imposed after the air turns severe to a permanent, pre-announced action plan for the whole season. A meeting chaired by the Union Environment Minister with the Delhi Chief Minister and the Commission for Air Quality Management (CAQM) fixed curbs on vehicles, offices, construction and industry in advance of the annual winter spike.

    What is the winter action plan?

    1. What it is: A fixed, season-long set of pollution curbs announced before winter, like a timetable rather than an alarm sounded only after the air turns toxic.
    2. Why it is needed: As the southwest monsoon withdraws, cooler and stiller air traps dust and exhaust near the ground, so the National Capital Region (NCR) sees a sharp rise in pollution.
    3. Implementing bodies: The Union Environment Ministry, the Delhi Government and CAQM, the NCR’s statutory air quality body, run the plan together.
    4. Airshed approach: Delhi will coordinate action with NCR cities as one airshed, meaning the shared body of air a region breathes, because pollution crosses city limits.
    5. The takeaway: Pollution control becomes a standing seasonal routine, not a scramble after air quality turns severe.

    How will vehicles be curbed?

    1. Entry restriction: From 1 November to 31 January, vehicles registered outside Delhi that do not meet BS-VI (Bharat Stage VI, the strictest national emission standard) will be kept out.
    2. No PUCC, No Fuel: Vehicles without a valid Pollution Under Control Certificate (PUCC) will be denied fuel at all 500 fuel stations. Automatic Number Plate Recognition cameras will check each vehicle.
    3. End-of-life vehicles: Petrol vehicles older than 15 years and diesel vehicles older than 10 years will not be given fuel.
    4. Early campaign: A special awareness and enforcement drive at petrol pumps begins on 1 October.
    5. Parking charges: Charges at authorised parking sites will double, except at facilities of the Delhi Metro Rail Corporation.

    What changes for offices and construction?

    1. Work from home: Government and private offices must keep 50% of their staff working from home during the season.
    2. Staggered timings: Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Delhi Government offices will keep different hours, spreading rush hour traffic.
    3. Full construction ban: All construction and demolition stops from 10 December to 20 January, the peak smog window.
    4. Season-long dust curbs: Dust-generating demolition and outdoor civil construction are prohibited for the whole restriction period.
    5. Deadlines for works: Cement-concrete works are to finish by 31 October and bitumen (road tarring) works by 15 November.

    How will enforcement and monitoring work?

    1. Industrial crackdown: An artificial intelligence (AI) enabled command-and-control centre will drive enforcement against polluting industries. Of 11,271 units surveyed, 2,283 have already been closed or sealed.
    2. Monitoring network: Continuous air quality monitoring stations will rise from 47 to 60, mapping pollution sources more finely.
    3. Field enforcement: 334 enforcement teams will act on local sources, backed by weekly inspections of pollution hotspots.
    4. Citizen participation: Residents can report pollution and use a new citizen suggestions portal. Daily evening Air Quality Index (AQI) bulletins will inform the public.

    Challenges

    1. Pollution from outside: Delhi’s rules cannot reach farm fires and industry in neighbouring States. Eg. Stubble burning in Punjab and Haryana.
    2. Fuel-ban leakage: Vehicles refused fuel in Delhi can refill at pumps in NCR towns just across the border.
    3. Workers’ livelihoods: A six-week halt on building work cuts off daily wages for construction labourers.

    Way Forward

    1. Airshed-wide rules: CAQM should extend the same vehicle and fuel rules to NCR towns in Haryana, Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan.
    2. Wage support: The Delhi Government should pay registered construction workers during the ban from the construction workers’ welfare cess fund, a levy collected on building work for workers’ welfare.
    3. Shared plate data: Link number plate recognition data across NCR fuel stations, so a refused vehicle cannot refuel next door.

    Conclusion

    Delhi has turned its winter response into a pre-announced, season-long regime rather than a reaction to smog. Its real test is whether NCR neighbours adopt matching rules, since the airshed does not stop at Delhi’s border.

    Back2Basics: Commission for Air Quality Management (CAQM)

    1. Legal basis: A statutory body under the Commission for Air Quality Management in National Capital Region and Adjoining Areas Act, 2021, first set up by ordinance in 2020.
    2. Replaced EPCA: It replaced the Supreme Court-mandated Environment Pollution (Prevention and Control) Authority (EPCA), set up in 1998.
    3. Jurisdiction: The NCR and adjoining areas of Punjab, Haryana, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh.
    4. Powers: It issues binding directions on air pollution and enforces the Graded Response Action Plan (GRAP), the stage-wise curbs tied to AQI levels.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025, GS3, 10 marks] What is Carbon Capture, Utilization and Storage (CCUS)? What is the potential role of CCUS in tackling climate change?”

  • As J&K House passes resolution on statehood, CM Omar asks, ‘what does uchit samay mean?’

    Why in the News

    The Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly has turned the Centre’s open ended promise of statehood at an “uchit samay” (opportune moment) into a formal legislative demand that the Union Territory (UT) be made a State again. The resolution passed by voice vote as Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) members walked out, and the Chief Minister asked what that timeline means when the Supreme Court had sought restoration “at the earliest”.

    What is J&K’s present status, and what did the Supreme Court say?

    1. What it is: The Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019 split the State into two UTs: Jammu and Kashmir, with a legislature, and Ladakh, without one.
    2. How a UT works: Like Delhi or Puducherry, an elected government works alongside a Lieutenant Governor (LG) representing the Centre.
    3. Court’s position: In In Re: Article 370 of the Constitution (2023), a five judge Constitution Bench upheld ending J&K’s special status. It recorded the Centre’s assurance of restored statehood.
    4. The takeaway: Until statehood returns, the elected government lacks powers a State holds, so the timing is contested.

    What did the Chief Minister argue?

    1. Long wait: Chief Minister Omar Abdullah said J&K has waited two years for the Centre to keep its word, with no clarity on when statehood will return.
    2. Link to militancy: He asked whether the Centre’s promise is linked to militancy, meaning statehood would wait until “guns fall silent”.
    3. Decision left to Pakistan: The Centre says militancy is instigated from Pakistan. Linking statehood to it, he argued, leaves the decision to Islamabad rather than New Delhi.

    How does the UT set-up limit the elected government?

    1. Sub judice opinion: The Law Department told the Speaker the debate was sub judice (pending in court). The Chief Minister, also Law Minister, said he never saw that opinion.
    2. Chief Secretary’s letter: He said the Chief Secretary had also written to the Speaker, and asked on whose directions this was done.
    3. Limited domain of the LG: The Act reserves only security and law and order for the LG, he said, yet the revenue department sits outside the elected government.
    4. Universities and reservation: Control of the Islamic University of Science and Technology and Baba Ghulam Shah Badshah University, and rationalisation of reservation, are other areas where UT status “affects us daily”.

    Where do the parties differ on the resolution?

    1. BJP’s stand: The Leader of the Opposition said the BJP favours restoring statehood but called the resolution’s language unacceptable.
    2. “Pre-1953 position”: He called the resolution’s reference to J&K’s pre-1953 position unconstitutional.
    3. Demands from allies and rivals: At least eight Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs), including from the ruling National Conference, the Congress and the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), sought amendments naming Articles 370 and 35A.
    4. Condemnation sought: The same members wanted the resolution to condemn “the events of August 5, 2019”, the day J&K’s special status was ended.

    Challenges

    1. No timeline: The Centre’s promise names no date, leaving restoration to its discretion without any enforceable deadline.
    2. Dual power centres: Split control between the LG and the elected government blurs accountability for administration.
    3. Security linkage: Tying statehood to the end of militancy makes a constitutional decision depend on events outside India’s control.
    4. Parliamentary route: Restoration needs Parliament to amend the Reorganisation Act under Articles 3 and 4, and the Assembly’s resolution carries no binding force.

    Way Forward

    1. Dated roadmap: The Union Ministry of Home Affairs should publish a time-bound roadmap for statehood.
    2. Interim transfer: The Centre should move departments such as revenue to the elected government under the Act’s business rules before full statehood.
    3. Legislative step: The Centre should introduce a Bill in Parliament amending the Reorganisation Act.
    4. Separate tracks: J&K’s parties should keep statehood distinct from the Article 370 dispute to build consensus.

    Conclusion

    The resolution shows that an elected government in a UT answers to voters without holding the powers they expect it to use. What to watch is whether the Centre turns its promise into a dated plan or a Bill in Parliament.

    Back2Basics: Articles 370 and 35A

    1. Article 370: A “temporary provision” that gave J&K special status. Most Union laws applied there only with the State government’s concurrence.
    2. Article 35A: Added by a 1954 Presidential Order, it let J&K’s legislature define permanent residents and reserve rights such as land ownership and State jobs for them.
    3. Pre-1953 arrangement: Until 1953, J&K had its own Prime Minister and a Sadr-i-Riyasat (head of state), and the Union’s role centred on defence, external affairs and communications.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2021] Which one of the following in Indian polity is an essential feature that indicates that it is federal in character? (a) The independence of the judiciary is safeguarded. (b) The Union Legislature has elected representatives from constituent units. (c) The Union Cabinet can have elected representatives from regional parties. (d) The Fundamental Rights are enforceable by Courts of Law. Answer: A”

  • Naga leaders agree to open key Manipur highway after talks with Centre in Assam

    Why in the News

    The United Naga Council has agreed to lift its economic blockade of Manipur’s national highways temporarily, after tripartite talks with the Centre and the State government in Assam. The lifting rests only on a promise that its demands will be addressed, after more than three months of cut supplies.

    What is an economic blockade, and why does it bite in Manipur?

    1. What it is: An economic blockade is an obstruction of road traffic by a community body, not the State, so there is no order to revoke.
    2. Why Manipur is exposed: The State is landlocked and almost everything it consumes arrives by road, mainly National Highway 2 from Imphal to Dimapur.
    3. Which roads were closed: Goods traffic stopped on National Highways 2, 37, 202 and 102A.
    4. How it escalated: The blockade began on 11 June and the Council made it indefinite on 9 September.
    5. The takeaway: A blockade on a State with one supply corridor pressures the government by cutting off the population first, the protesters’ neighbours included.

    What is the United Naga Council demanding?

    1. Killing of six civilians: Six Naga civilians from Leilon Vaiphei village were abducted and killed in May, which set off the blockade.
    2. Revoke the ceasefire: The Council wants the Suspension of Operations ceasefire with Kuki armed groups revoked. That arrangement has held through the ethnic conflict since May 2023.
    3. Removal of a minister and prosecution: The Council also wants Deputy Chief Minister Nemcha Kipgen removed and justice for the six men killed, with every demand met first.
    4. Kamjong killings raised: The Council raised the recent killing of four Naga civilians in Kamjong district. The government promised to maintain law and order.

    What did the blockade do to the State?

    1. Shortages in the Imphal Valley: The Imphal Valley ran short of medicines, baby food, fresh produce and fuel as consignments stopped moving.
    2. Black market prices: Petrol sold for as much as Rs 250 a litre in the black market and a cooking gas cylinder for up to Rs 5,000.
    3. Hill districts also cut off: Kuki Zo districts depend on routes through Naga areas, so Kangpokpi, Churachandpur, Tengnoupal and Pherzawl ran short of goods and medical supplies.

    Why did the talks move now?

    1. Tripartite talks in Assam: The Council met the Union Ministry of Home Affairs and the State government at the Border Security Force frontier headquarters in Garbhanga, Assam.
    2. Earlier rounds had failed: Talks with the Chief Minister at Senapati broke down on 8 July. A round on 10 August produced only an agreement to keep talking.
    3. Concession in the parallel talks: The Centre agreed to Union Minister level participation in the Naga Peace Process, the separate Naga settlement talks long sought by the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak Muivah).
    4. No official word yet: Neither the Centre nor the State government has confirmed what was agreed.

    Challenges

    1. No enforceable end: The lifting is temporary and rests only on a promise, so goods traffic can be stopped again at any time.
    2. Revocation would remove a restraint: Ending the Suspension of Operations would free Kuki armed groups from camp confinement.
    3. Justice remains a demand: The killings that triggered the blockade have produced no announced outcome.

    Way Forward

    1. Put the demands on dates: The Union Ministry of Home Affairs should record each demand against a named authority and a response date.
    2. Prosecute the killings: Hand the May abductions to a court monitored investigation with a deadline for filing charges.
    3. Protect the supply line: Notify the highways feeding Manipur as essential supply routes, with a State plan to escort convoys.
    4. Widen the table: Bring Kuki Zo and Meitei bodies into the same format, since settling with one community shifts the blockade.

    Conclusion

    Trucks will move again, but every demand that stopped them stays open, so the State has bought supplies with a promise. Watch whether those demands are recorded against dates, because nothing else stands between Manipur and the next blockade.

    Back2Basics: Suspension of Operations agreement

    1. What it is: A tripartite ceasefire signed by the Centre, the State government and an armed group that gives up violence and accepts the Constitution.
    2. What it obliges: Cadres stay in designated camps, weapons are held in monitored storage, and the agreement runs for fixed terms.
    3. When it began in Manipur: The arrangement with Kuki Zo armed groups was first signed in 2008 and has been extended since.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025, GS3, 15 marks] What are the major challenges to internal security and peace process in the North-Eastern States? Map the various peace accords and agreements initiated by the government in the past decade.”

  • Zones of worry

    Why in the News

    The seventh draft notification for an Ecologically Sensitive Area (ESA) in the Kerala stretch of the Western Ghats proposes to bring 9,993.7 sq km across 131 villages under the regime. The Kerala government will reiterate a counter position confining the area to 8,590.69 sq km across 98 villages, excluding human habitations and agricultural land. The first draft, based on the report of the High Level Working Group, covered 123 revenue villages and was never finalised, and six further drafts have followed without settling the dispute. The window for filing objections to the seventh draft closed on 25 September. The disagreement is no longer about whether the Ghats need protection. It is about whether an ecologically sensitive line is drawn around ecology or around land use.

    What does the Ecologically Sensitive Area regime restrict?

    1. Purpose of the designation: Those framing the proposals state that the notification is intended to regulate activities that can damage fragile ecosystems, rather than to remove human presence from the landscape.
    2. What the draft prohibits: Mining, quarrying and sand mining are barred in the notified areas.
    3. What the draft leaves untouched: There are no restrictions on the repair, extension or renovation of existing residential houses, or on changes in ownership of land.
    4. The basis of the classification: The zonation rests on ecological sensitivity, the approach proposed by the Western Ghats Ecology Expert Panel.

    How far apart are the Centre’s draft and Kerala’s counter position?

    1. The area proposed: The seventh draft, issued on 27 July, covers 9,993.7 sq km across 131 villages in Kerala.
    2. The forest and non forest split: Of that area, 9,107 sq km is forest and 886.7 sq km is non forest.
    3. The State’s figure: Kerala will press for 8,590.69 sq km across 98 villages, with the ecologically sensitive areas confined to forests and leased forest plantations.
    4. The principle behind the State’s figure: Kerala argues that inhabited and cultivated landscapes should not be treated in the same manner as forests and other ecologically fragile areas. The demand reflects a position held by successive State governments across the political divide.

    Why do high range residents read the notification as a threat to their land?

    1. Origin of the settlements: The Grow More Food campaign of the erstwhile Travancore administration in the early 1940s encouraged migration into the high ranges. Families moved in to farm, and habitations turned large stretches of the mountains into agricultural landscapes.
    2. Damage done by uncertainty rather than by rules: After 2013 people began cutting down trees for fear they would not be able to use their land later. Farmlands were abandoned and land prices fell.
    3. Effects already visible: The Melukavu panchayat president in Kottayam says the issue has affected access to loans and land transactions, and has told on the marriage prospects of young people in the region.
    4. The ecological rationale questioned: The president of the Rubber Producers’ Society at Edamaruku in Kottayam points out that the nearest forests lie about 30 km to the north and about 50 km to the south of the village proposed for inclusion.
    5. The jurisdictional fear: The chairperson of the Kerala Independent Farmers Association argues that inclusion takes a holding out of the jurisdiction of the State Revenue department and places it with the Central regime, so residents would have to seek Central clearance for almost every activity. The proposal in that reading creates two categories of residents, those inside the ESAs and those outside.

    How did the Gadgil report and the Kasturirangan review set the terms of the dispute?

    1. The original proposal: The Western Ghats Ecology Expert Panel, chaired by Madhav Gadgil, proposed a comprehensive zonation of the Ghats based on ecological sensitivity.
    2. How it was received in the high ranges: The report generated fears that agriculture and development would be restricted, and that existing settlements could eventually face displacement.
    3. The review that followed: The Centre appointed a High Level Working Group chaired by K. Kasturirangan to review the Gadgil recommendations. Environmentalists hold that the group watered down the restrictions.
    4. The first draft and the stalemate after it: The first draft notification, based on the High Level Working Group report, proposed 123 revenue villages in Kerala, mainly in Idukki and Wayanad. Protests prevented a final notification and six more drafts followed.
    5. The State’s own committee: A committee appointed by the State government under Oommen V. Oommen recommended excluding inhabited areas, plantations and agricultural lands through physical verification and field surveys. It also proposed re fixing the ecologically sensitive areas using cadastral maps, which are plot level land records, approved by the Kerala State Biodiversity Board.

    What have conservationists and the panel’s own members said in reply?

    1. The fears called propaganda: The president of the Wayanad Prakruthi Samrakshana Samiti says apprehensions of restrictions on building houses and digging wells are baseless political propaganda pushed by vested interest groups.
    2. Existing law already protects forests: The same view holds that a host of laws, including the Forest Act and the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972, already protect forests, so classifying forest areas as ESAs adds nothing.
    3. What the Gadgil report asked for: A member of the panel states that the report recommended a shift to organic farming and never opposed farming. It opposed the pollution of water resources through chemical pesticides, called for non polluting industries, and placed no restrictions on local infrastructure development.
    4. Who was to decide: The panel’s approach was to give local communities a decisive role in determining how development should proceed in ecologically sensitive landscapes, in place of a blanket ban on local activity.
    5. The latest draft already concedes ground: The chairman of the State appointed committee notes that the current draft has excluded farmlands and plantations from the ESAs, which leaves the objection directed at fragile rocky land the high range communities do not own.

    How has the dispute reshaped mobilisation and politics in the high ranges?

    1. Idukki as the epicentre: Fifty one villages in Idukki figure in the latest draft, and all the grama sabhas there have passed resolutions urging the Union and State governments to exclude their villages from the regime.
    2. An organised church led agitation: The Idukki Diocese of the Syro Malabar Church has been at the forefront of the anti ESA agitation since 2013, and the High Range Samrakshana Samiti under its patronage has organised protests across the high ranges. The Church’s position is that human habitations and farmlands must be fully excluded.
    3. The electoral consequence: In the 2014 Lok Sabha election the Samiti’s legal adviser, standing as an Independent backed by the Left Democratic Front (LDF), won the Idukki seat, long considered a Congress citadel.
    4. The heritage listing drawn in: The State vice president of the All India Kisan Sabha, the farmers’ wing of the Communist Party of India, has demanded that the Western Ghats be removed from UNESCO World Heritage Site status, which requires more stringent conservation. The counter cited is that UNESCO guidelines themselves require exclusion of an area where a project disrupts the livelihood or daily life of the local population.

    Can protection and settlement be mapped on the same hills?

    1. The question conservationists are asking: For conservationists the central issue is whether human activity in the Western Ghats can continue without weakening ecological safeguards.
    2. The question residents are asking: For residents the distinction between forest and settlement is critical, because their houses, farms and livelihoods are embedded in the same landscape that conservation policy seeks to protect.
    3. The same hills read two ways: The same slopes are treated as a fragile ecological system requiring protection and as a lived landscape of farms, homes and communities built over generations. The disagreement has simmered through more than a decade of committees, consultations and draft notifications.

    Conclusion

    Seven drafts have narrowed the area and settled nothing. The Centre and the State are not arguing about protection; they are arguing about the unit the line is drawn on, and each successive draft has restated that disagreement rather than resolved it. With the objection window now shut, the decision point is whether the Centre finalises the notification on its own mapping or reopens the plot level verification the State’s committee asked for.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2016] Gadgil Committee Report’ and ‘Kasturirangan Committee Report’, sometimes seen in the news, are related to (a) constitutional reforms (b) Ganga Action Plan (c) linking of rivers (d) protection of Western Ghats Answer: (d)”

  • Union Minister to join Naga peace negotiations; encouraging: NSCN (IM)

    Why in the News

    The Centre has agreed to include a Union Minister or a group of Union level Ministers in the Naga peace talks. The step meets a longstanding demand of the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (Isak Muivah), or NSCN (IM), for political representation in the negotiations. It follows the appointment of Ajit Lal, a former Joint Intelligence Committee chief, as the Centre’s pointsman for the talks seven months ago. The talks have run since 1997 and produced a Framework Agreement in 2015 that was never converted into a settlement. A day after welcoming the new format, the group’s External Publicity Wing described a Nagalim national flag and a Nagalim national constitution as non negotiable, two demands the Centre has said will not be met.

    What is the Naga peace process?

    1. The negotiating track: The Union government has been holding talks with the NSCN (IM) since 1997 to resolve the decades long insurgency in the Naga hills through a peace accord.
    2. The Framework Agreement: A Framework Agreement between the government and the NSCN (IM) was signed on 3 August 2015. Little was achieved after it.
    3. The interlocutor mechanism: The Centre negotiates through an appointed pointsman rather than through a minister. The post has passed from a former Indian Police Service officer to a former Additional Director of the Intelligence Bureau and now to a former Joint Intelligence Committee chief, who holds the post of Adviser (North East) in the Ministry of Home Affairs.
    4. The ceasefire boundary: Participation in the talks runs alongside a ceasefire, and a Naga armed group outside that ceasefire is outside the negotiation as well.

    What does political level representation change in the talks?

    1. The concession on format: The Centre has agreed to bring a Union Minister, or a group of Union level Ministers, into the negotiation framework. The talks so far have been conducted by an appointed official.
    2. The group’s stated expectation: The NSCN (IM) said the decision will “expedite the political process” and create the momentum for “an honourable and enduring political settlement”.
    3. The demand behind it: The security establishment’s reading is that the NSCN (IM) has always wanted the negotiations to be political, with political representatives involved, rather than conducted at the official level.

    Why did the talks stall after the Framework Agreement was signed?

    1. Disagreement over the 2015 text: The parties fell out over the Framework Agreement itself, and the dispute over what it committed either side to hardened the group’s position.
    2. Public accusations on both sides: The NSCN (IM) accused the then interlocutor of “mischief” and of attempts to “segregate Naga society”. The interlocutor called the NSCN an “armed gang” and accused it of running a “parallel government” engaged in extortion.
    3. A stalemate rather than a rupture: The exchanges virtually pushed the talks into a stalemate without ending them, and the public altercations of the early 2020s made a settlement appear more distant.
    4. A change of interlocutor did not help: The post passed to a former Additional Director of the Intelligence Bureau and the talks still failed to make much headway.

    What explains the change in the NSCN (IM)’s tone?

    1. First acceptance of the interlocutor: The group welcomed the current pointsman’s appointment as “interlocutor” for the first time, calling it a “significant and encouraging development that reflects the GoI’s renewed resolve to advance the peace process with seriousness and urgency”. He was appointed Adviser (North East) in February.
    2. Prior standing with the Nagas: He had officiated as interlocutor for five months in 2014, and his relations with the Nagas are cited as one reason the present step became possible.
    3. A State government kept inside the process: The NSCN (IM) thanked the Nagaland government for its “sincere participation and active facilitation”, and said its engagement has been instrumental in sustaining the peace process.

    How does the breakaway Eastern Flank constrain the NSCN (IM)?

    1. A rebel faction outside the ceasefire: The Eastern Flank, based in Myanmar, is a hardline faction that has refused negotiations with the government and is not under any ceasefire agreement.
    2. The defection that gave it standing: In 2024 Ikato, son of NSCN co founder Isak Chishi Swu, joined the faction, accusing the NSCN (IM) leadership of being “corrupt” and of “compromising the (Naga) national interest for their own selfish gain”. He was appointed its chairman in July this year.
    3. The legitimacy problem it creates: The chairmanship confers legitimacy because he is Isak’s son and a Naga from Nagaland. The NSCN (IM) is led by Muivah, a Tangkhul from Manipur.
    4. Popular impatience adds to it: Patience in Nagaland has been wearing thin over the delay in concluding the peace process, which builds further pressure on the NSCN (IM).

    Can a political upgrade survive the demands the Centre has ruled out?

    1. The two non negotiables: The External Publicity Wing of the NSCN (IM) asserted that the ongoing political negotiations rest on “sovereignty” between the government and the NSCN, and described the “Nagalim national flag and Nagalim national constitution” as “non negotiable”.
    2. The Centre’s stated limit: Delhi has said a Naga flag and a separate Naga constitution will not be conceded. The same two items are the group’s core demands.
    3. Hardliners narrow the room to compromise: The Eastern Flank’s position makes it costlier for the NSCN (IM) to soften on either demand, because any concession would be read against a faction that has refused to negotiate at all.

    Conclusion

    The talks have changed their format without changing their content. Ministerial participation answers a question about who sits at the table. It does not touch the two demands the Centre has ruled out, and the group restated both within a day of welcoming the new arrangement. What to watch is whether a ministerial round is actually convened, and whether the faction sitting outside the ceasefire is brought into one.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025, GS3, 15 marks] What are the major challenges to internal security and peace process in the North-Eastern States? Map the various peace accords and agreements initiated by the government in the past decade.”

  • MP’s Jal Jeevan probe findings: Collapsed tank and missing taps

    Why in the News

    The Economic Offences Wing (EOW), the Madhya Pradesh police unit that investigates financial crime, has recorded findings of collapsed storage, missing taps, incomplete pipework and halted supply in Jal Jeevan Mission works in four villages of Mauganj district. Rs 3.85 crore had already been paid to the contractor for those works. The agency alleges that the contractor and three then Public Health Engineering (PHE) officials colluded to execute substandard work and secure payment for it. The works were awarded in 2021 under the Har Ghar Nal Jal programme with a nine month completion deadline. The contested point is that the divergence between works recorded as complete and water actually delivered surfaced only on physical verification after a complaint, and not through the scheme’s own reporting.

    What did the investigation cover, and under which laws is it proceeding?

    1. Trigger for the probe: The investigation followed a complaint and a physical verification of the works on the ground.
    2. Villages covered: Verification covered four villages, Judmania Raghunath, Khatkhari, Karah alias Bairagarh and Shivrajpur.
    3. Statutes invoked: The case is being investigated under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 and the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
    4. Departmental response: The Jal Jeevan Mission department declined to comment on the findings, stating only that it had “no issues with the probe”.

    What did the four village projects sanction, and what did the contractor report?

    1. Judmania Raghunath: The project covered 7,600 metres of high density polyethylene (HDPE) pipeline, an underground sump from which water is pumped up, a motor and 440 household tap connections. The contractor and the sub engineer reported the pipeline laid, a motor pump installed, electrical work completed and 400 household connections provided.
    2. Khatkhari: The project covered a 75 kilolitre overhead tank, a sump, 4,400 metres of pipeline, a motor pump, electrical work and 315 household connections. The contractor reported the pipeline, motor, electrical work and sump completed, with 290 domestic connections provided.
    3. Karah alias Bairagarh: The project covered a 250 kilolitre overhead tank, a sump, 11,500 metres of pipeline, five submersible motors and 740 domestic tap connections. The contractor reported the full pipeline length laid, four submersible motors installed and all 740 household connections provided.
    4. Shivrajpur: The project covered a 125 kilolitre overhead tank, a sump, 8,000 metres of pipeline, two motors, electrical work and 700 household connections. The contractor reported the pipeline laid, one motor installed, electrical work completed, the sump constructed and 600 domestic connections provided.

    What did physical verification actually find?

    1. Household connections incomplete: At Judmania Raghunath the household connections had not been completed. Water released into the main pipeline reached the “initial five to 10 distribution lines” and could not move further.
    2. Pipes without fittings: Distribution pipelines had been brought out in front of villagers’ houses with “no fitting of any kind or concrete circular stand post” constructed. The First Information Report records this at Khatkhari and at Karah alias Bairagarh.
    3. Collapsed storage: The Khatkhari overhead tank, built with 15 metre staging during the tenure of the then executive engineer, was of poor quality. It collapsed on 27 March 2026 during test filling.
    4. Half laid pipeline and missing pumps: At Karah alias Bairagarh pipeline work was complete in only about half the area, and one submersible motor was found against the four reported. Supply there has now stopped completely.
    5. Part covered Gram Panchayat: At Shivrajpur pipeline laying was completed in only part of the Gram Panchayat. Supply ran for a few days after construction began and then stopped.

    What does the pattern across the four villages show about how payment was released?

    1. Last mile omission: Pipelines were laid in several places. The infrastructure needed to actually supply water to individual households was missing or incomplete.
    2. Reported count above verified count: In each of the four villages the connection count the contractor reported exceeded what verification could confirm, so payment rested on the report rather than on delivered supply.
    3. Storage as single point of failure: A tank that fails on its first filling leaves a village with pipework and no supply, whatever pipeline length the record carries.
    4. Certification inside the executing department: The officials named belong to the department that executes the works, so the party recording completion was the party answerable for it.

    Challenges to Jal Jeevan Mission delivery

    1. Assets counted instead of water delivered: A scheme measured by works built records success even where nothing arrives at the tap. Eg. The Mission’s own reporting is built on household tap connections provided, which is an asset count rather than a measure of supply.
      The Fix: Make payment tranches conditional on a functionality test at the household tap, verified by the Village Water and Sanitation Committee of the Gram Panchayat.
    2. Thin independent inspection: Works spread across thousands of villages are certified by the same engineering department that builds them, so an outside check arrives only after a complaint. Eg. Mission guidelines provide for third party inspection agencies, whose coverage depends on what each State engages.
      The Fix: Fix a minimum sampling percentage for third party inspection per district and attach the inspection report to every payment file.
    3. Source sustainability: A tap fails where the underlying source dries, so storage and pipework alone do not secure supply. Eg. Groundwater over extraction leaves large parts of Bundelkhand and Marathwada dependent on tanker supply each summer.
      The Fix: Tie every village scheme to a source sustainability plan under the Atal Bhujal Yojana or to a surface water linkage before sanction.
    4. Operation and maintenance after commissioning: A commissioned scheme needs recurring power, chemicals and repair money, which a capital grant does not carry. Eg. Under the National Rural Drinking Water Programme, which the Mission subsumed in 2019, habitations recorded as covered slipped back to partially covered status.
      The Fix: Route operation and maintenance to the Gram Panchayat funded from the tied water and sanitation grant of the Fifteenth Finance Commission.

    Conclusion

    The failure here sits in the last stretch between the pipeline and the tap, and that stretch is what the completion record never tested. The case now rests on a criminal investigation, so the immediate questions are recovery of the amount already released and completion of the unfinished works. The marker to watch is whether certification of such works moves outside the engineering department that executes them.

    Back2Basics: Jal Jeevan Mission

    1. Administering ministry: The Mission is run by the Department of Drinking Water and Sanitation under the Ministry of Jal Shakti.
    2. Objective: Announced in 2019, it aims to provide a functional household tap connection to every rural household, with the target year extended from 2024 to 2028.
    3. Service standard: Its design service level is 55 litres per capita per day of potable water at the household.
    4. Implementation unit: Planning, implementation and management are routed through the Gram Panchayat and its village level water committee, also called the Pani Samiti.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026, GS2, 15 marks] “Transparency and accountability in governance are not about controlling corruption but about creating the trust of stakeholders in the policy process by following the Rule of Law and Participatory Governance.” Comment.”