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Subject: Geography

  • Centre notifies two offshore mineral blocks near Great Nicobar

    Why in the News

    The Ministry of Mines has notified two offshore mineral blocks near Great Nicobar Island in the Andaman Sea, covering 1,632 square kilometres between them, for the grant of composite licences. The same metals in the same waters found no bidder in the country’s first ever auction of offshore mineral blocks.

    What is on the seabed, and what does a composite licence allow?

    1. What is down there: Polymetallic nodules and crusts are mineral deposits lying on the ocean floor, nodules scattered like potatoes on sand and crusts formed as a coating on rock.
    2. Why India wants them: They hold nickel, cobalt, manganese, copper and rare earth elements, the inputs to batteries, magnets and electronics that India largely imports.
    3. What the licence obliges: A composite licence under the Offshore Areas Mineral (Development and Regulation) Act, 2002 is not a mining permit. The winner must first explore the block and establish its mineral potential.
    4. The takeaway: The Centre is auctioning the right to prove a deposit rather than a proven deposit, so the bidder carries the exploration cost and the geological uncertainty.

    What exactly has been notified?

    1. West Sewell Ridge 01: The larger block lies off Great Nicobar Island and covers 1,000 square kilometres.
    2. Sewell Rise 01: The second block sits in the southern part of Sewell Rise near the same island and covers 632 square kilometres.
    3. What is being sold: The ministry offers both as composite licences over polymetallic nodules and crusts, the same deposit type in the same stretch of sea.
    4. Where the blocks lie: Both sit inside India’s exclusive economic zone, the sea belt extending 200 nautical miles from the coastal baseline.

    Why did the first offshore auction find no takers?

    1. Blocks put to auction: The ministry put 13 offshore mineral blocks to auction in November 2024.
    2. Where the failure was: The seven blocks near Great Nicobar Island carrying these minerals drew no bid, so the same ground is back on offer.
    3. Auction is the only route: The 2023 amendment to the 2002 Act made competitive bidding the only way to obtain an offshore licence, so a risky block has no negotiated alternative.
    4. No rules, no price: The International Seabed Authority, which licenses seabed mining beyond national waters, has issued no exploitation rules, so a bidder cannot price the work.

    Where does this sit in India’s critical minerals push?

    1. National Critical Mineral Mission: The Ministry of Mines runs a mission launched in 2025 to secure supply of the minerals it has classed as critical, several of which these blocks carry.
    2. Deep Ocean Mission: The Ministry of Earth Sciences runs a parallel mission approved in 2021. Its Matsya 6000 submersible is built to carry a crew to the deep seabed.
    3. India already holds seabed contracts: The International Seabed Authority has granted India exploration rights for nodules in the Central Indian Ocean Basin and for sulphides on the Central Indian Ridge.

    Challenges

    1. No technology at depth: Lifting nodules from the deep seabed at commercial scale has not been demonstrated by any country.
    2. Ecological objection: The waters adjoin protected ground. Eg. Galathea National Park and leatherback turtle nesting beaches.
    3. No refining chain: India lacks the nickel and cobalt refining capacity to turn seabed ore into battery grade metal at home.

    Way Forward

    1. Publish the resource data: The Geological Survey of India and the National Centre for Polar and Ocean Research should release block level estimates before bids close.
    2. Share the exploration risk: Fund a government survey tranche first, so bidders compete over a proven block instead of over a guess.
    3. Build the downstream: Tie any offshore nickel and cobalt to refining capacity created under the critical minerals mission.
    4. Assess the sea before the lease: Require a cumulative environmental assessment for the Andaman Sea before any production lease is granted.

    Conclusion

    Two more blocks are on offer on the same terms that drew no bid, so the notification tests whether the obstacle was the terms or the geology. Watch whether a bidder appears at all, since nothing has changed about what is known to lie on that seabed.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025] Consider the following statements: Statement I: In India, State Governments have no power for making rules for grant of concessions in respect of extraction of minor minerals even though such minerals are located in their territories. Statement II: In India, the Central Government has the power to notify minor minerals under the relevant law. Which one of the following is correct in respect of the above statements? (a) Both Statement I and Statement II are correct and Statement II explains Statement I (b) Both Statement I and Statement II are correct but Statement II does not explain Statement I (c) Statement I is correct but Statement II is not correct (d) Statement I is not correct but Statement II is correct Answer: (d)”

  • [23rd September 2026] The Hindu OpED: Water wealth

    [23rd September 2026] The Hindu OpED: Water wealth

    Question (2025, GS3 – 15 Marks):Examine the factors responsible for depleting groundwater in India. What are the steps taken by the government to mitigate such depletion of groundwater?”
    Linkage: Directly targets the root causes of aquifer depletion in intensive agrarian states—such as flood irrigation, crop-choice mismatch (paddy in semi-arid zones), and unrestricted deep tube-well extraction—while demanding policy interventions to reverse the trend.

    Mentor Comment

    Punjab’s groundwater extraction rate stands at 152 per cent, meaning the State draws half again as much each year as is annually replenished. Depletion has now begun to redistribute wealth among farmers. Those who can afford deeper tube wells continue to reach the falling water table. Those who cannot are forced to buy water from them, which hands larger landowners a claim on smaller cultivators. The conflict is between an electricity and procurement structure that makes extraction the safe choice and a conservation goal that requires additional extraction to become expensive.

    How far has Punjab’s groundwater been drawn down?

    1. Extraction rate: The 2025-26 Dynamic Groundwater Assessment records the State’s groundwater extraction rate at 152 per cent.
    2. Blocks in the red zone: 72 per cent of Punjab’s 153 blocks sit in the red zone, the highest share among States.
    3. Marginal improvement: Interventions reduced the number of over-exploited blocks by five across the last two assessments.
    4. Deepening wells: The fraction of observation wells with water below 40 metres in the post-monsoon period grew by two percentage points between 2022 and 2025.
    5. Principal consumer: Irrigation for rice and wheat accounts for nearly 25 billion cubic metres a year in the latest estimate.

    Why has the rice-wheat system held against its water cost?

    1. Origin in food security: The pattern began as a strategy to improve food security and settled into a concentrated rice-wheat cropping system.
    2. Three supports that removed risk: Assured procurement, subsidised electricity and access to groundwater made high-yield varieties, intensive irrigation, fertilizer use and mechanisation less risky than alternative modes of cultivation.
    3. Unaddressed barriers to switching: Farmers’ reluctance to take up other crops rests on uncertainties in storage options, prices, processing infrastructure and supply chains, and that reluctance has gone relatively unaddressed.

    How does groundwater depletion widen the gap between farmers?

    1. Efficiency against capacity: A study in the Economic and Political Weekly found that farmers with marginal landholdings use water more efficiently. The same study found wealthier farmers better equipped to access lower water tables and to draw higher volumes.
    2. Forced water purchase: Farmers unable to afford the requisite tube wells buy water from those who own them. The purchase transfers wealth to larger landowners and creates unregulated dependencies.
    3. Returns against productivity: A study in Discover Sustainability reported that in Sangrur and Barnala larger farms earned higher returns and recorded lower groundwater productivity for paddy than smaller farms.
    4. Capital as the gate: Depletion raises the capital required for irrigation, which systematically privileges farmers with better access to finance.

    What would make conservation pay the cultivator?

    1. Pani Bachao, Paisa Kamao: The scheme entitles a farmer to cash for every unused kilowatt-hour of pumping electricity below a threshold.
    2. Redirecting the electricity subsidy: Part of the electricity subsidy bill can instead directly support smallholder farmers.
    3. Collective irrigation assets: Irrigation infrastructure can be collectivised, so that access to water stops depending on owning a tube well.
    4. Benefit tied to the cultivator: Where benefits follow the cultivator, including tenants, rather than the owner of the land or the pump, welfare subsidises access to water rather than groundwater extraction.

    Challenges to groundwater regulation in Punjab

    1. Efficiency gains overwhelmed by scale: State efforts to manage demand continue, and the volume of extraction outruns the gains those efforts produce. Eg. The count of over-exploited blocks fell by five and most of the State’s blocks stayed in the red zone.
      The Fix: Set a declining annual extraction ceiling for each red zone block, so efficiency measures are judged against a volume target rather than against a block count.
    2. Incentives measured in electricity, not water: Conservation payments are calculated on unused pumping units, which is a proxy for water and not a measure of it. Eg. Pani Bachao, Paisa Kamao pays for kilowatt-hours left unused below a threshold.
      The Fix: Meter pumped volume at the connection, so payment tracks abstraction directly.
    3. Voluntary enrolment: A scheme a farmer must opt into reaches those already confident about their water access, and not those most exposed to a falling table. Eg. Enrolment in Pani Bachao, Paisa Kamao remains low.
      The Fix: Enrol every metered connection by default and allow farmers to opt out.

    Conclusion

    Punjab’s groundwater question has stopped being only a question about the aquifer. Depletion now decides which farmers can irrigate at all, and it converts water access into a form of wealth that moves from the smaller cultivator to the larger one. Conservation has to be paid for in a form that reaches the person farming the land, including the tenant, rather than the person who owns the pump. The thing to watch is whether the State converts part of its electricity subsidy into direct support tied to the cultivator.

  • Building trust is key in warnings on melting glaciers

    Why in the News

    The disaster that unfolded in Nepal and Tibet began with a rock-ice avalanche that transformed into a devastating debris flow. First reports read the event as an earthquake and possibly a glacial lake outburst flood (GLOF), a flood released when a lake held back by glacial ice or debris gives way. The shaking was in fact the force of the rock-ice avalanche hitting the valley floor. There was no glacial lake in the valley at all. The same sequence produced the Chamoli disaster in 2021, from a rock-ice avalanche off Ronti Peak, and the Dharali disaster in 2025. Himalayan warning systems are organised around glacial lakes whose location is known. The hazard that killed at Rasuwa can begin on any of hundreds of thousands of thawing slopes.

    What is a rock-ice avalanche hazard cascade?

    1. Rock-ice avalanche: A mass of rock and ice detaches from a steep, deglaciating slope and falls to the valley floor.
    2. Transformation into a debris flow: The impact converts the avalanche into a debris flow, which then travels down the valley and destroys what stands in its path.
    3. Hazard cascade: One process sets off the next, so the damaging flood has no single identifiable source waiting to be watched.
    4. Disaster rather than natural event: Many rock avalanches and thousands of debris flows occur every year, and they become disasters only where they strike lives and surroundings.

    Why is a hazard cascade harder to plan for than a glacial lake flood?

    1. Known water source in a GLOF: For a glacial lake outburst flood, the origin of the water is the glacial lake itself.
    2. Three interventions available at a lake: A lake can be modelled to forecast flood behaviour, drained where it is judged dangerous, or fitted with real-time monitoring.
    3. No lake at Rasuwa: There was no large lake in that valley, so none of those three options was available and the event was as difficult to plan for as Chamoli.
    4. Number of possible sources: Rock-ice avalanches could originate from many hundreds of thousands of steep, rapidly deglaciating slopes with thawing permafrost in the Himalaya.
    5. Limits of failure prediction: Detecting slopes that are already moving is perhaps possible, and working out which of them will fail catastrophically is not yet reliable.

    Who is exposed to these hazards, and where did the deaths occur?

    1. Global GLOF exposure: 15 million people worldwide live with glacial lake outburst flood danger.
    2. Concentration in High Mountain Asia: Over 9 million of those people are in High Mountain Asia, and nearly 3 million are in India alone.
    3. Hydropower workers among the dead: In both Chamoli and Rasuwa, a significant number of the dead and missing were workers at hydropower infrastructure standing in the path of the flows.
    4. Decisions downstream: The open questions are where people can and cannot live below such slopes, and what the benefits and risks of hydropower development in these environments are.

    What would a denser seismic station network deliver?

    1. Detection of landslide-generated earthquakes: Seismic stations can detect and locate the earthquake that a landslide itself generates.
    2. Seismic signature of the flood: Extreme flood events produce continuous seismic noise as they move down a valley, in the same way glacial lake outburst floods do.
    3. Technically possible, not yet built: The denser network is achievable with existing science and has not been done.
    4. Cost and cross-border requirement: It would need co-operation across the Himalaya’s international borders and tens of millions of dollars.

    Challenges to early warning for Himalayan hazard cascades

    1. Instrumenting every valley is impractical: River gauges or monitoring in every single high mountain valley cannot realistically deliver warning in time. Eg. At Rasuwa the cascade began where there was no lake and no instrumented source to watch.
      The Fix: Concentrate instruments on the valleys that carry settlements or hydropower works below a rapidly deglaciating slope.
    2. No usable lead time near the source: Warning shrinks to nothing for people living close to where the cascade begins. Eg. The system in place during the Rasuwa event gave enough warning for those further downstream and not enough for those upstream.
      The Fix: Pair instrumented warning with pre-agreed evacuation routes for the upstream valley, where no alert will ever arrive early enough.
    3. Warning as a communication problem: Detection has to be followed by the news reaching people, by the speed at which they respond, and by what they actually do. Eg. Workers at hydropower sites in the flow path died in both Chamoli and Rasuwa.
      The Fix: Embed the warning system in the communities expected to act on it, so an alert is trusted and attached to a rehearsed response.
    4. Cost of a wrong call: Naming a slope as dangerous, and failing to name one, both carry high consequences. Eg. Identifying which moving slopes will catastrophically fail is not yet reliable science.
      The Fix: Publish slope hazard assessments with their stated uncertainty, so the confidence attached to a warning travels with the warning.

    Conclusion

    Himalayan risk planning is built around a hazard whose source can be located, and the events now killing people begin on slopes nobody is watching. The science to close that gap exists and the network to carry it does not, because it requires money and agreement between countries that share the range. A warning that communities do not trust, or do not know how to act on, saves nobody, which makes trust part of the engineering rather than an afterthought. Lives can be saved on those terms, and the places cannot, which turns the harder question into where building should be permitted at all.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2020, GS1, 10 marks] How will the melting of Himalayan glaciers have a far-reaching impact on the water resources of India? (हिमालय के हिमनदों के पिघलने का भारत के जल-संसाधनों पर किस प्रकार दूरगामी प्रभाव होगा ?)”

  • Missing measure in India’s magnet mission

    Why in the News

    China’s tight export controls on rare earth magnets and materials, imposed in April 2025, exposed the dependence of global industrial value chains on a single supplier and the limits of what importing countries know about their own exposure. India has responded by strengthening its critical minerals and rare earth strategy through the National Critical Mineral Mission (NCMM), overseas mineral acquisitions, expanded geological exploration and Production Linked Incentive (PLI) schemes. India’s primary vulnerability does not stem from a shortage of critical minerals. It lies in the absence of a comprehensive framework able to pinpoint where strategic technological dependence is cultivated, accumulated and propagated along the permanent magnet value chain. The tension is that the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) puts the domestic permanent magnet market at about Rs 750 crore while international trade statistics record import values several times larger than that entire reported market.

    What is a high performance permanent magnet?

    1. About: A permanent magnet holds its magnetic field without a continuous electric current, which is what allows a motor or a generator to convert energy without an external magnetising supply.
    2. The main types: Ferrite, Alnico and Samarium Cobalt magnets continue to serve important industrial applications, each at a different level of strength and temperature tolerance.
    3. Why NdFeB dominates: Neodymium Iron Boron (NdFeB) magnets have become the backbone of the energy transition and advanced manufacturing, because no other commercially available permanent magnet combines comparable magnetic strength with such a high ratio of power to weight.
    4. Where they sit in the economy: Electric vehicle motors, semiconductor fabrication facilities and precision manufacturing machinery all depend on the high performance permanent magnet as a component.

    Where does India’s magnet economy go statistically missing?

    1. The reported market: The Annual Survey of Industries estimates the domestic permanent magnet market at around Rs 750 crore.
    2. The contradiction in the trade data: International trade statistics indicate import values several times larger than that entire reported domestic market.
    3. Possible explanations: The gap may reflect differences in statistical coverage, differences in industrial classification, or supply chain accounting that records the magnet only inside a finished assembly.
    4. What the gap costs policy: Policymakers cannot confidently explain where these magnets enter the economy or how they move through it, so part of the permanent magnet economy exists without being visible in statistics.
    5. A partial statistical picture overall: India’s statistical system provides only a partial account of what is mined, what is imported and what is manufactured.

    Why does the stage structure of the value chain matter?

    1. The upstream sequence: Geological exploration leads to mining, mining feeds mineral processing, and processing enables chemical separation.
    2. The downstream sequence: Separation produces oxides, which are refined into metals, transformed into alloys, engineered into magnetic materials and finally manufactured into finished magnets.
    3. Each stage is a different capability: Every stage demands different scientific knowledge, different industrial capability and a different level of technological maturity.
    4. Where the real question sits: The strategic question is not whether India possesses rare earth resources or whether imports from China can be reduced, it is what happens in between.
    5. Capability without a map of it: India has built capabilities across several stages of magnet manufacturing, and it still lacks a systematic way of identifying where those capabilities are globally competitive, where critical gaps persist, and how dependence accumulates across production stages.

    Can a techno economic map close the dependence gap?

    1. What the framework is: An Integrated Techno Economic Mapping (ITEM) framework brings engineering measurement together with economic measurement to show how a permanent magnet is built, from minerals in the ground to the finished products that use them.
    2. The missing toolkit: Such a framework is at present a missing piece in India’s industrial policy toolkit.
    3. What it would identify: It would show where industrial capability should be built, where technological partnerships become essential, and where domestic investment would yield the greatest strategic return.
    4. Why resources alone are not security: A country may secure mineral resources and still remain dependent if it lacks processing and manufacturing capability, which makes closing the measurement gap an industrial imperative rather than an academic exercise.

    Challenges to India’s rare earth magnet push

    1. Separation and refining is the bottleneck, not ore: Rare earth oxides have to be separated into individual elements before they can be alloyed, and that is the stage at which India has almost no commercial capacity. Eg. China processes over 90% of the world’s rare earths, which is what gives an export control its effect regardless of where the ore was mined.
      The Fix: Tie incentives under the rare earth permanent magnet scheme to certified output at the separation and alloying stages rather than to installed magnet capacity.
    2. Monazite is locked into atomic energy regulation: India’s principal rare earth bearing sand carries thorium, so its processing sits under atomic energy control rather than under ordinary mining law. Eg. Monazite is a prescribed substance under the Atomic Energy Act, 1962, and Indian Rare Earths Limited handles its processing.
      The Fix: Create a licensed private participation route for the non thorium fraction of monazite with a defined custody protocol for the thorium residue.
    3. Heavy rare earths decide magnet grade and India holds few: Dysprosium and terbium are what let an NdFeB magnet hold its field at motor operating temperatures, and India’s deposits are weighted toward the light rare earths. Eg. Indian monazite is rich in cerium, lanthanum and neodymium rather than in dysprosium.
      The Fix: Secure heavy rare earth offtake through overseas acquisition and make a share of every contract conditional on processing inside India.
    4. Recycling has no separated feedstock stream: A magnet recovered from an end of life motor or wind turbine is the one domestic source needing no mining, and no collection channel separates it out. Eg. The E-Waste (Management) Rules, 2022 set extended producer responsibility targets by weight rather than by recovered critical material.
      The Fix: Add a material specific recovery target for rare earth magnets, reported separately from bulk electronic waste tonnage.
    5. Exploration data is too shallow to auction on: A block offered without G1 or G2 level exploration cannot be priced by a bidder, so auctions clear thinly or not at all. Eg. Only about 48% of the mineral blocks auctioned between 2020 and 2023 were sold.
      The Fix: Fund state exploration to G2 level before a critical mineral block is offered, so an auction transfers a defined resource rather than a prospect.

    Conclusion

    India’s rare earth problem is being treated as a supply problem when it is in the first instance a visibility problem. Securing ore, acquiring assets abroad and incentivising magnet capacity all assume the state already knows which stage of the chain its dependence sits at, and no existing statistical instrument tells it. What to watch is whether the next revision of the mission’s monitoring framework records capability stage by stage from ore to finished magnet, because until it does, spending is allocated against a chain the state can describe at both ends and not in the middle.

    Critical Minerals in India

    1. Definition: Critical minerals are minerals essential to a country’s economic development and national security, whose limited availability or concentrated extraction and processing in a few locations can disrupt critical industries.
    2. India’s list: India has identified 30 critical minerals through a three stage assessment, including lithium, cobalt, nickel, rare earth elements, titanium, molybdenum and vanadium.
    3. Selection parameters: The list was drawn on resource availability, import dependency and significance for future technologies, clean energy and agriculture.
    4. Where the demand originates: Solar photovoltaic cells rely on silicon, tellurium, indium and gallium, wind turbines use neodymium and dysprosium, and electric vehicle batteries depend on lithium, nickel and cobalt.

    Government Initiatives for Critical Minerals

    1. Rare Earth Permanent Magnet Manufacturing Scheme, 2025: A scheme with an outlay of Rs 7,280 crore to establish 6,000 tonnes per annum of integrated rare earth permanent magnet capacity for electric vehicles, renewables, aerospace and defence.
    2. Auction of critical mineral blocks: By May 2025, 34 critical and strategic mineral blocks had been auctioned across five tranches, including India’s first potash block.
    3. Royalty rationalisation: Royalty rates for lithium, niobium and rare earth elements were approved in 2023 under the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957, and rates for twelve further critical minerals were specified in 2024, completing rationalisation for all twenty four strategic minerals.
    4. Khanij Bidesh India Limited (KABIL): This joint venture of three public sector undertakings acquires critical mineral assets abroad, with lithium and cobalt as its stated priorities.

    Back2Basics: National Critical Mineral Mission (NCMM)

    1. Ministry and launch: The mission is run by the Ministry of Mines, was announced in the Union Budget for 2024 to 2025 and was launched in 2025 with an outlay of about Rs 16,300 crore.
    2. Scope: It covers the entire value chain, from mineral exploration and mining through beneficiation and processing to recovery from end of life products.
    3. Instruments: It offers financial incentives for exploration, creates a fast track regulatory approval route for critical mineral mining projects, and supports the setting up of mineral processing parks.
    4. Strategic reserve: It provides for building a national stockpile of critical minerals as a buffer against an export restriction by a dominant supplier.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “Which of the following statements about Rare Earth Elements (REEs) and Critical Minerals is/are correct? 1. Modern technological innovations including Artificial Intelligence, robotics and space exploration extensively utilise Rare Earth Elements (REEs). 2. China has the highest share in mining of REEs followed by India. 3. The Government of India launched the National Critical Mineral Mission (NCMM) in 2025 to establish a robust framework for self-reliance in the critical mineral sector. 4. Rare Earth Elements are a set of 13 metallic elements. Select the answer using the code given below: (a) 1 and 3 only (b) 3 only (c) 1, 3 and 4 (d) 1, 2 and 4”

  • How melting glaciers could ‘put 20% of GDP at risk’

    Why in the News

    A new assessment of the Himalayas has put a monetary value on India’s dependence on the mountain range, estimating that Rs 64.8 lakh crore, or 21.5% of India’s FY24 GDP, rests on Himalayan water and Himalayan economies. The report, ‘A resilient Himalaya: protecting a region at risk and securing future prosperity’, follows the Nepal floods that placed the warming Himalayas under public attention. It converts glacier retreat from an environmental concern into a measurable macroeconomic exposure. The tension it exposes is one of timing. Meltwater flows are rising now and are expected to peak around the middle of this century before declining, while the one driver India can act on quickly, black carbon, is being tackled unevenly across States.

    What is the ‘A resilient Himalaya’ report?

    1. Compiling body: The report was compiled by the consultancy Systemiq, in partnership with the Integrated Mountain Initiative.
    2. Supporting institutions: It was supported by the International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD), Nepal, and the GB Pant National Institute of Himalayan Environment, Uttarakhand.
    3. Core estimate: It places Rs 64.8 lakh crore, equal to 21.5% of India’s FY24 GDP, as dependent on the Himalayas.

    How was the 20% of GDP figure arrived at?

    1. Direct layer: The Gross State Domestic Product of the Himalayan States is counted in full as Himalaya dependent output.
    2. Indirect layer: Downstream agriculture, manufacturing, hydropower and services reliant on Himalayan fed rivers and on groundwater recharge are added. Rain fed production is expressly excluded from this layer.
    3. Induced layer: Supply chain and wage spending effects are counted, such as tractors sold from southern States into the Indo Gangetic Plains, and wages spent on food and services.

    Why does glacier retreat translate into economic risk?

    1. Three river systems: The Himalayas feed the Indus, Ganga and Brahmaputra systems, which support agriculture, cities and industry downstream.
    2. Named dependent economies: The report ties these flows to wheat and rice across the Indo Gangetic plain, tea in Assam and Bengal, hydropower in the Northeast, and pilgrimage economies in downstream towns.
    3. Disaster concentration: The Himalayas account for 18% of India’s land but roughly 35% of its disasters, making them a standing disaster hotspot rather than an occasional one.
    4. The reconstruction trap: Disasters create food and water insecurity, disrupt supply chains, displace people and raise macroeconomic and sovereign debt pressure. Reconstruction spending then leaves less money available for building future resilience.

    Why do meltwater flows rise before they fall?

    1. Glaciers as storage: Glaciers hold water as ice and release meltwater into rivers, particularly during the dry season when rainfall contributes least.
    2. Peak Water: Himalayan river basins are expected to reach ‘Peak Water’ around the middle of this century, the point at which glacier meltwater reaches its maximum.
    3. The decline after the peak: Flows begin to fall after that point as the ice reserve shrinks, so today’s higher flows are not a durable supply.

    Why is black carbon the driver India can act on fastest?

    1. What black carbon is: Black carbon is soot produced by incomplete combustion, and unlike global warming as a whole it is a pollutant India can act on quickly on its own.
    2. The snow darkening effect: When black carbon lands on snow it darkens the surface, so the snow absorbs more sunlight instead of reflecting it. Modelling shows this adds about 40 watts per square metre of surface heating in the spring season across the Himalaya.
    3. Zigzag kiln technology: Converting brick kilns to zigzag firing, a method that burns fuel more efficiently, cuts black carbon and particulate emissions by roughly 70% and fuel use by 20% to 30%.
    4. Uneven adoption: Punjab and Haryana have completed the switch to zigzag kilns. Uttar Pradesh, India’s largest brick producer, is at only 56%, and the rest of India runs on traditional technology.
    5. Kilns are not the whole story: Real progress requires kilns, cookstoves, transport and crop residue burning to be tackled together rather than one source at a time.

    Challenges to securing the Himalayan economy

    1. Transboundary river dependence: The three river systems the estimate rests on originate outside India in whole or in part, so flow security is not a purely domestic policy variable. Eg. The Indus system is governed by a treaty arrangement with Pakistan, and the Brahmaputra rises in Tibet where upstream storage decisions are not disclosed to India.
      The Fix: Build hydrological data sharing into existing basin level dialogues so flow changes are detected upstream rather than inferred from downstream damage.
    2. Gaps in glacier monitoring: India monitors only a small fraction of its glaciers on the ground, so mass balance estimates rest heavily on modelling. Eg. Glacier and lake monitoring shortfalls were flagged after the February 2021 Chamoli disaster in Uttarakhand.
      The Fix: Expand automated weather station and mass balance networks across benchmark glaciers in each Himalayan basin.
    3. Glacial lake outburst risk: Warming creates and expands moraine dammed lakes whose failure sends a flood wave downstream with little warning time. Eg. The October 2023 South Lhonak lake outburst in Sikkim destroyed the Teesta III hydropower project at Chungthang.
      The Fix: Attach early warning instrumentation and drawdown works to every high risk lake identified in the national expansion inventory.
    4. Construction in a fragile zone: Hydropower, highway and tunnel projects add load and cut slopes in terrain that is already seismically active and steep. Eg. Land subsidence in Joshimath, Uttarakhand, in January 2023 forced the evacuation of hundreds of households.
      The Fix: Make cumulative basin level impact assessment, rather than project by project clearance, the condition for approving new infrastructure in the Himalayan States.
    5. Fiscal asymmetry between hill and plain States: Himalayan States carry the cost of protecting catchments while the economic benefit accrues largely downstream. Eg. Forest cover in the Himalayan States supports irrigation and power generation in the plains without a matching transfer for that service.
      The Fix: Widen ecological and forest cover weightage in Finance Commission devolution so catchment protection is financed rather than assumed.

    Conclusion

    The estimate changes the category of the problem rather than the facts of it. A mountain range treated as an environmental subject now carries a fifth of national output as a stated exposure, which places it inside fiscal and investment planning rather than only inside climate policy. Two things cannot both hold: flows rising toward a mid century peak are being planned against as though they were permanent, while the ice reserve that produces them is shrinking. The near term marker is whether brick kiln conversion moves beyond the two States that have completed it.

    Back2Basics: International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD)

    1. Nature: An intergovernmental knowledge and learning centre for the Hindu Kush Himalaya region.
    2. Establishment and headquarters: Founded in 1983, with its headquarters at Kathmandu, Nepal.
    3. Membership: Its eight regional member countries are Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, India, Myanmar, Nepal and Pakistan.
    4. Mandate: It supports mountain research, cryosphere monitoring and transboundary cooperation across the Hindu Kush Himalaya.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2020, GS1, 10] How will the melting of Himalayan glaciers have a far-reaching impact on the water resources of India? (हिमालय के हिमनदों के पिघलने का भारत के जल-संसाधनों पर किस प्रकार दूरगामी प्रभाव होगा ?)”

  • Pressure on food prices: El Nino effect, geopolitical tensions / Dip in fertiliser sales warning signal

    Pressure on food prices: El Nino effect, geopolitical tensions / Dip in fertiliser sales warning signal

    Why in the News

    The southwest monsoon has finished 14.7 per cent below the long period average (LPA) as on 14 September, with 24 of India’s 36 meteorological subdivisions more than 10 per cent deficient. The shortfall tracks a strengthening El Nino, which weakened the easterly trade winds in August and cut the transport of moisture laden air towards the subcontinent. Kharif sowing has held up at 1,096.5 lakh hectares, only 1.4 per cent below the same point last year. Fertiliser sales and wholesale mandi prices point the other way. The tension is between a sowing figure that reads as normal and the input and price data that point to lower yields, arriving at the same moment as a turn upward in world food prices.

    What is El Nino?

    1. El Nino: It is an abnormal warming of sea surface temperatures in the equatorial Pacific Ocean off the coasts of Ecuador and Peru, which shifts global atmospheric circulation for several seasons at a time.
    2. Effect on the Indian monsoon: It weakens the easterly trade winds that carry moisture laden air from east to west towards the subcontinent, so rainfall systems that do form deliver less rain than their number suggests.
    3. Temperature effect: El Nino suppresses rainfall over India and also raises temperatures, which is why its consequences run past the monsoon into the winter crop season.
    4. Low pressure system (LPS): It is the rain bearing system of the monsoon, formed when warm moist air near the ground rises, cools and condenses into cloud.

    How did the monsoon actually behave month by month?

    1. June: Not a single low pressure system formed, against a monthly average of three systems covering about 11 days. All India rainfall was 38 per cent below the LPA for the month.
    2. July: Four systems formed, close to the climatological average, and each persisted longer than usual. Total LPS days reached 24 against an average of 13.56, and rainfall came in 1 per cent above the LPA.
    3. August: Six systems formed against a normal of 5.38, and LPS days reached 26 against a normal of 16.3. Rainfall still recorded a 16.3 per cent deficit, because weakened easterly trade winds cut moisture transport.
    4. Season and spatial spread: Cumulative rainfall to 14 September was 14.7 per cent below the LPA, with 24 of 36 subdivisions over 10 per cent deficient. The southern States, along with Marathwada and Vidarbha in Maharashtra, were worst affected.

    Why does sowing acreage understate the damage?

    1. Kharif acreage: Area sown under kharif crops was 1,096.5 lakh hectares as of 11 September, against 1,112.5 lakh hectares for the same period of 2025, a gap of only 1.4 per cent.
    2. Fertiliser sales: Sales in April to July 2026 fell across di ammonium phosphate (25.6 to 24.4 lakh tonnes), muriate of potash (7 to 5.9 lakh tonnes) and complex fertilisers (50 to 43 lakh tonnes) against the same months of 2025. Only single super phosphate rose, from 20 to 20.2 lakh tonnes.
    3. Urea: Sales fell 6.6 per cent despite policy interventions to secure natural gas for domestic production and to secure imports through the West Asia supply shocks.
    4. Mandi prices: Maize at Chhindwara in Madhya Pradesh is around Rs 2,625 a quintal against Rs 2,165 a year ago. Arhar at Akola is Rs 8,650 against Rs 6,200 and soyabean at Dewas Rs 6,150 against Rs 4,300.
    5. Output forecasts: The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) has forecast India’s rice output falling to 147 million tonnes from an all time high of 154 million tonnes, and maize to 50 million tonnes from 55.1 million tonnes.
    6. The temporal and spatial pattern: Extended dry spells interspersed with heavy downpours, with rain largely confined to Odisha, Chhattisgarh, eastern Madhya Pradesh, Gangetic West Bengal, Jharkhand and Uttar Pradesh, translates into lower yields rather than into unsown land.

    What does the El Nino outlook mean for the rabi season?

    1. Current state: El Nino is in a strong state, with average sea surface temperatures in the equatorial Pacific roughly 1.8 degrees Celsius above normal.
    2. Projection: The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) projects a 90 per cent plus chance of a very strong event, meaning sea surface temperatures more than 2 degrees Celsius above normal, running from September through January.
    3. Decay path: The event is projected to stay strong, above 1.5 degrees Celsius, until March, and weak to moderate, 0.5 to 1.5 degrees Celsius, until May.
    4. Crops at risk: A short and warm winter would hit the rabi crop, from wheat, rapeseed mustard, chana, masoor and matar to potato, onion, garlic, jeera, saunf and dhaniya.

    Why are world food prices turning up now?

    1. The buffer that held: The West Asia conflict produced no dramatic spike in world food prices, unlike Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, because back to back bumper crops in 2024 to 2025 and 2025 to 2026 left ample stocks of wheat, rice, maize, sugar, soyabean, rapeseed and palm oil.
    2. The index: The Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) food price index, a weighted average of world prices of a basket of food commodities against a 2014 to 2016 base value of 100, stood at 133.3 points in August, the highest since November 2022 and below the all time high of 160.2 points in March 2022.
    3. Where the pressure sits: The vegetable oil index was the highest since June 2022 and the cereal index edged to a 27 month high.
    4. Vegetable oils: Landed Mumbai prices of imported crude palm, soyabean and sunflower oil are $1,285, $1,300 and $1,450 per tonne, against September 2025 averages of $1,164, $1,182 and $1,293.
    5. Cereals: Wheat export prices firmed over the past year from $228 to $262 per tonne for Argentina, $226 to $290 for the European Union, $251 to $319 for Australia and $235 to $354 for the United States. Corn from Argentina and Brazil is exported at $219 and $238 against $200 and $210 a year ago.
    6. The direction of travel: A running down of stocks, disrupted trade logistics from escalating tensions in West Asia and Russia Ukraine, and a strengthening El Nino all push world prices the same way.

    Challenges to India’s food price management under El Nino

    1. Import dependence in edible oils: India imports the bulk of its vegetable oil, so a world price move passes into domestic retail prices within weeks regardless of the domestic harvest. Eg. Landed Mumbai prices of crude palm, soyabean and sunflower oil are all above their September 2025 averages.
      The Fix: Tie import duty changes to a stated trigger price rather than announcing them after the retail price has already moved.
    2. Procurement concentrated in two crops: Assured purchase at the support price operates at scale for wheat and rice, so a pulse or oilseed grower carries the full price risk of a bad season. Eg. Pulse and oilseed prices at Akola and Dewas moved sharply this year with no procurement floor doing the work.
      The Fix: Extend physical procurement capacity to pulses and oilseeds in the deficit districts rather than relying on an announced floor alone.
    3. Input withdrawal is invisible in acreage data: A farmer who sows but cuts fertiliser use produces a yield shortfall that no sowing statistic records until harvest. Eg. Kharif area was 1.4 per cent below last year while fertiliser sales fell across every major category except single super phosphate.
      The Fix: Publish district level fertiliser offtake alongside the weekly sowing bulletin so the yield signal arrives before the harvest does.
    4. Irrigation cover decides the rabi outcome: The winter crop depends on stored soil moisture and reservoir levels built during the monsoon, which a deficient season does not deliver. Eg. The southern States, Marathwada and Vidarbha carried deficits above 10 per cent this season.
      The Fix: Sequence reservoir releases for the rabi sowing window in the deficient subdivisions rather than for the standing kharif crop alone.
    5. Buffer stocks cannot absorb a domestic and a world shock together: Releasing stock cools the domestic market only where the commodity is one the state actually holds. Eg. Duty free imports of up to 10 lakh tonnes of raw sugar were allowed until 31 October after inventory fell to multi year lows.
      The Fix: Hold a standing calibrated import window for commodities with no domestic buffer, so the decision is not taken at the festival season peak.

    Conclusion

    Food price pressure this year is not a single monsoon question. A rainfall deficit, a pullback in purchased inputs and a turn in world prices are three separate pressures that have arrived together, and only the first of them ends with the season. The winter crop is where the remaining two will be counted, since the same ocean warming that suppressed the rains is projected to persist into the sowing window. The rabi sowing period is the next decision point, and input availability and reservoir cover in the deficient subdivisions are the markers to watch.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2014, GS1, 10 marks] Most of the unusual climatic happenings are explained as an outcome of the El-Nino effect. Do you agree?”

  • There is no such thing as a ‘UN map with borders’: UN Secretary-General

    Why in the News

    The United Nations Secretary General has stated that the United Nations has not published any map with borders and that it is not for the United Nations to define borders. The statement answers India’s objection to “anomalies” in a “Map of the World” published by UN Geospatial on 1 July and used during the consultation process for the “Correct the Map” resolution. That map showed the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir as a dotted line with an explanatory note attached, and omitted the Indian and Chinese “claim lines” in Arunachal Pradesh and Aksai Chin that previous United Nations maps carried, with no note explaining the omission. India voted in favour of the resolution, which the United Nations General Assembly passed on 3 September to replace the Mercator map with maps following the “equal area” principle. The contest is that a map disowned as unofficial has stayed on the United Nations website and circulated as the artefact accompanying a resolution India supported.

    What is the “Correct the Map” resolution?

    1. Replacement of the Mercator map: The resolution, passed by the United Nations General Assembly on 3 September, seeks to replace the Mercator map with maps that follow the “equal area” principle.
    2. Distortion of landmass sizes: The Secretary General’s stated position is that there are distortions in the landmasses relative to their real sizes, that these come from power relations of the past, and that those distortions should be corrected.
    3. Scope of the resolution: The resolution is not a map, and the approval of a resolution in the General Assembly does not amount to the adoption of any cartographic depiction.

    What did the disputed map actually show?

    1. “Map of the World”, published 1 July: The artefact is titled the “Map of the World”, was published by UN Geospatial on 1 July, and was later taken up for discussion at the General Assembly.
    2. The Line of Control was marked and explained: The map showed the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir as a dotted line, with a note stating that the dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control agreed upon by India and Pakistan and that the final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.
    3. The claim lines were dropped without explanation: It depicted Arunachal Pradesh and Aksai Chin without the Indian and Chinese “claim lines” that previous United Nations maps used, and carried no note explaining that omission.
    4. Continued hosting on the United Nations website: The map published by UN Geospatial has remained on the United Nations website.

    What is the United Nations position on maps and borders?

    1. No map with borders exists: The Secretary General’s position is that there is no such thing as a United Nations map with borders and that it is not for the United Nations to define borders.
    2. The artefact is attributed elsewhere: The map on the website is described as not an official United Nations map and as the contribution of a non governmental organisation.
    3. Indicative status of the depiction: The map is treated as indicative, with no definition by the United Nations of what borders should be.

    What position has India taken?

    1. The vote was on the principle: The Ministry of External Affairs stated on 8 September that India’s vote for the resolution was in support of the underlying principle of “equal area representation”.
    2. The map question was separated from the vote: The Ministry’s stated position is that the United Nations does not endorse any map and does not issue any map, and that maps may exist for reasons of consultation.
    3. The omission has been formally raised: The Ministry stated that India has taken note of the anomaly and is taking it up with the United Nations.

    Challenges in the depiction of disputed boundaries on international maps

    1. An unofficial map acquires official standing by association: A map circulated during a General Assembly process is read as carrying institutional authority whatever its disclaimer says. Eg. The “Map of the World” was used during the consultation process for a resolution and has remained on the United Nations website.
      The Fix: Require any cartographic material circulated in a General Assembly process to carry the producing entity’s name and the standard territorial disclaimer on the artefact itself.
    2. Disclaimers are applied inconsistently across disputes: Explaining one disputed line and silently dropping another creates an asymmetry that reads as a position. Eg. The same map annotated the Line of Control and carried no note on the omitted claim lines in Arunachal Pradesh and Aksai Chin.
      The Fix: Apply a single annotation standard to every disputed boundary on a map, so a line is either shown with its note or its absence is explained.
    3. Correction has no procedural route: A member state that objects to a depiction can raise it bilaterally with the Secretariat, and there is no mechanism that compels a revision or a withdrawal. Eg. India has taken note of the anomaly and is taking it up with the United Nations.
      The Fix: Create a published register of member state objections to circulated maps, with a stated time limit for the producing entity to respond.
    4. Domestic law and international depiction diverge: India’s own legal position on depicting its external boundaries binds publishers within India and has no effect on material produced abroad. Eg. Indian law requires the depiction of Indian territory as claimed, which the circulated map did not follow.
      The Fix: Route the objection through the United Nations Group of Experts on Geographical Names and the regional cartographic conferences, where standards are set rather than only contested after publication.

    Conclusion

    The resolution and the map are two different objects and the Secretary General’s answer rests entirely on that separation. It resolves the legal question, since no cartographic depiction was adopted by anyone, and leaves the practical one open, because the artefact that dropped the claim lines is still hosted where a reader will find it. The status is that India’s vote stands on the equal area principle, the objection has been raised with the United Nations, and the map has not been altered. The marker to watch is whether UN Geospatial reissues the map with the claim line annotation restored or withdraws it from the website.

    Back2Basics: UN Geospatial

    1. UN Geospatial: UN Geospatial, formerly the United Nations Cartographic Section, is the Secretariat unit that produces maps and geospatial products for United Nations use.
    2. Map products supplied: It supplies general reference maps, maps for peace operations and thematic maps requested by United Nations bodies.
    3. The status of its maps: Its maps carry a disclaimer that the designations used and the presentation of material do not imply any official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
    4. Relevance to the disputed artefact: The artefact at issue was produced by this unit yet has been described as not an official United Nations map.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026] Which of the following with reference to Indian States is/are NOT correct? 1. Uttar Pradesh shares its boundary with the highest number of other Indian States. 2. Rajasthan shares the longest international border among all Indian States. 3. Sikkim is the only State that shares its boundary with just one other Indian State. (a) 1 only (b) 1 and 2 (c) 2 and 3 (d) 3 only ANSWER: C”

  • El Nino to peak during Oct-Dec this year, says US climate agency

    Why in the News

    The current El Nino event will enter its peak phase during October to December this year and will prevail through the winter season. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) puts the chance of the event intensifying further into the “very strong” category at greater than 90 per cent. Sea surface temperatures in the key Nino regions continued to rise through August and clocked readings of 1.8 to 3 degrees Celsius. On that trajectory the 2026 El Nino would be a historic event, the strongest ever recorded since 1950. The consequence is that a year of below normal rainfall and above normal temperature is now being forecast with confidence rather than flagged as a possibility.

    What is El Nino?

    1. El Nino: El Nino is a naturally occurring ocean and atmospheric phenomenon in which abnormal warming is recorded along the equatorial and central Pacific Ocean waters.
    2. What drives the warming: The easterly trade winds that normally push warm surface water towards the western Pacific weaken, so warm water spreads back eastward and suppresses the cold upwelling off South America.
    3. Global weather effects: El Nino conditions are linked to extreme weather across the globe, in the form of higher than average temperatures, rainfall or droughts.
    4. El Nino Southern Oscillation cycle: It is the warm phase of the El Nino Southern Oscillation, whose cool phase is La Nina, and the cycle recurs irregularly rather than on a fixed calendar.

    What does the latest assessment actually record?

    1. The temperatures kept climbing: Sea surface temperatures continued to rise in August, and the key Nino regions clocked readings of 1.8 to 3 degrees Celsius.
    2. The index confirms acceleration: The latest Nino index, covering June through August, rose by 0.4 degrees Celsius over the May to July value, confirming a rapidly intensifying event.
    3. The category is expected to move up: NOAA puts the chance of intensification into the “very strong” category at greater than 90 per cent.
    4. The duration is not short: The event is expected to prevail through the winter season, beyond the October to December peak.
    5. Strongest event since 1950: The 2026 event would be the strongest recorded since 1950, which is the start of the comparable record.

    Challenges posed by a very strong El Nino

    1. The Indian monsoon weakens in most El Nino years: A warm eastern Pacific shifts the rising limb of the Walker circulation away from the Indian Ocean, which suppresses monsoon rainfall over India. Eg. The very strong event of 2015 and 2016 followed consecutive deficient monsoons in India in 2014 and 2015.
      The Fix: Trigger the contingency crop plans of the Indian Council of Agricultural Research at the forecast stage rather than after a rainfall deficit is confirmed, so short duration and drought tolerant seed reaches districts before sowing.
    2. Reservoir and groundwater stress follows the deficit by months: A weak monsoon empties storage that the following summer depends on, so the damage peaks long after the event is over. Eg. Southern States drawing on hydropower face the shortfall in the dry season that follows a deficient monsoon.
      The Fix: Set reservoir drawdown limits for the post monsoon season on the forecast rather than on the current storage level, so carryover is protected.
    3. Food price inflation moves with a small production shortfall: A modest fall in output of pulses, oilseeds and vegetables translates into a disproportionate price rise because those crops have thin buffer stocks. Eg. Pulses and edible oils are already import dependent, so a domestic shortfall is met at world prices.
      The Fix: Pre position import contracts for pulses and edible oils in the peak forecast window, so procurement is not made in a market that has already moved.
    4. Marine fisheries are disrupted by the same warming: Suppressed upwelling cuts nutrient supply and moves fish stocks, which hits coastal livelihoods that carry no crop insurance equivalent. Eg. The collapse of the Peruvian anchoveta catch is the classic documented El Nino fishery effect.
      The Fix: Extend forecast linked advisories and lean season support to registered marine fishers on the same basis as agricultural advisories.
    5. A strong event raises the global temperature record itself: El Nino releases ocean heat into the atmosphere, so the warmest years on record cluster in El Nino years and compound the underlying warming trend. Eg. Heat released during a strong event is added on top of the long term rise rather than substituting for it.
      The Fix: Issue heat action plan activation thresholds for the following summer at the time of the peak forecast, so city level preparation runs on the seasonal outlook rather than on the first heatwave.

    Conclusion

    The forecast has moved from probability to expectation, since the agency now attaches a greater than 90 per cent chance to further intensification and expects the event to hold through the winter. That gives India a lead time of several months between the warning and the season in which the consequences land, which is the interval in which seed, storage and import decisions are actually made. The status is that the event is intensifying and unbroken, and the next milestone is the peak window itself, when the category will either be confirmed or fall short of it.

    Back2Basics: The Nino regions and the Nino index

    1. What the regions are: The Nino regions are fixed boxes in the equatorial Pacific, numbered 1+2, 3, 3.4 and 4, running from the South American coast westward.
    2. Nino 3.4 as the standard region: Nino 3.4, in the central equatorial Pacific, is the region used for standard El Nino Southern Oscillation monitoring.
    3. What the index measures: The index tracks the sea surface temperature anomaly, meaning the departure from the long period average for that region, rather than the absolute temperature.
    4. How an event is classified: Sustained positive anomalies of half a degree Celsius or more mark an El Nino, and anomalies of about 2 degrees Celsius and above place it in the “very strong” category.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2017] With reference to ‘Indian Ocean Dipole (IOD)’ sometimes mentioned in the news while forecasting Indian monsoon, which of the following statements is/are correct? 1. IOD phenomenon is characterized by a difference in sea surface temperature between tropical Western Indian Ocean and tropical Eastern Pacific Ocean. 2. An IOD phenomenon can influence an El Nino’s impact on the monsoon. Select the correct answer using the code given below: (a) 1 only (b) 2 only (c) Both 1 and 2 (d) Neither 1 nor 2 ANSWER: (b)”

  • For Bihar flood problem, solution lies beyond

    Why in the News

    Bihar received 27 per cent below normal rainfall between 1 June and the first week of September, and large parts of the state are still under water. Six rivers, the Ganga, Gandak, Kosi, Budhi Gandak, Punpun and Ghaghra, have risen above danger levels in different stretches. The flooding therefore cannot be explained by how much rain fell on the state, which locates the cause in how its rivers and channels are managed. The state’s inherited answer has been containment, holding rivers inside defined channels behind embankments since colonial times. That method separates a river from its floodplain, and with silt raising the bed year on year it reduces the channel’s capacity to carry the discharge it is given. The contested question is whether flood works should keep aiming to hold the river in, or to give it space to spread safely.

    Why did rivers cross danger levels in a deficit monsoon?

    1. The rainfall record for the season: The state recorded 27 per cent below normal rainfall for the period from 1 June to the first week of September.
    2. Two causes acting together: High upstream river flows combined with erratic weather, meaning spells of heavy localised rainfall inside an overall seasonal deficit, pushed rivers over their banks.
    3. A tributary can flood because the main river is high: The unusually high level of the Ganga created a backwater effect in the Gandak and the Punpun, the condition where a high level in the receiving river obstructs the outflow of a river draining into it.
    4. What that effect did: Both tributaries drain into the Ganga, and its high level made their discharge difficult, so water backed up in the tributaries and added to the flooding.
    5. Danger level is a gauge based threshold: It is the level fixed for each gauge site above which a river threatens habitation and property, so six rivers crossing it in different stretches describes localised failures rather than one basin wide event.

    What does containment by embankment do to a river?

    1. It cuts the river off from its floodplain: Embankments separate rivers from the floodplains that would otherwise absorb and spread a high discharge.
    2. The bed rises inside the confined channel: Continuous silt deposition raises the riverbed and reduces the channel’s capacity to carry flow.
    3. A breach concentrates the damage: When an embankment breaches, artificially contained water rushes into homes and fields at a depth and force an unconfined flood would not produce.
    4. Each year of containment narrows the next year’s margin: A rising bed inside fixed embankments means the same discharge sits higher against the same defences, so the safety margin shrinks with no change in rainfall.

    Why will higher embankments not settle the problem?

    1. The premise needs revisiting: The state needs to reconsider the idea that higher or stronger embankments will by themselves contain floods, since the containment is what raises the bed against them.
    2. Maintenance remains an obligation: Existing embankments protect settlements and land that have grown up behind them, so the choice is not between maintaining them and abandoning them.
    3. The stated objective is the opposite of containment: Persistent monsoon floods point to the need to give the river space to spread safely during periods of high discharge, which a confined channel is designed to prevent.
    4. This is an execution problem, not a knowledge problem: The measures required are already identified in policy, and the flooding continues, which places the failure in implementation rather than in diagnosis.

    What must accompany embankment maintenance?

    1. Restoration of drainage channels: The natural and constructed drains that carry water off the land have to be reopened, since water that cannot drain stays on fields after the river level falls.
    2. Protection of floodplains: The land a river needs during high discharge has to be kept free of the construction and occupation that turns a spread into a disaster.
    3. Better land use planning: Where settlement, cropping and infrastructure are permitted has to follow the flood behaviour of the stretch rather than precede it.
    4. Restoration of wetlands: Wetlands in the basin hold and release flood water, and their loss transfers that volume to the channel and to the settlements behind the embankment.
    5. Deployment of early warning systems: Warning converts an unavoidable flood into an evacuated one, and it is the only measure on this list that reduces loss without altering the river.

    Why has an existing basin plan not changed the outcome?

    1. The imperatives are already on record: The Ganga Basin River Management Plan, implemented for more than a decade, acknowledges these requirements.
    2. The outcome has not followed: Persistent monsoon floods in Bihar show how much remains to be done to give the river room to spread during high discharge.
    3. One requirement sits outside the state’s control: Addressing Bihar’s concerns requires greater coordination between the riverine states on reservoir releases, since a downstream state’s peak is partly set by upstream release decisions.

    Where does the Farakka question sit in this argument?

    1. The state’s long standing contention: Bihar has argued that the barrage and the India-Bangladesh Ganga water sharing treaty compounded its river management challenges.
    2. The mechanism it alleges: Its case is that the barrage altered the Ganga’s flow regime, affecting the movement and deposition of the river’s sediment load.
    3. The causal claim is not settled: The extent to which this contributes to flooding in Bihar remains contested, so it cannot carry the whole explanation for the season’s flooding.
    4. The claim still belongs in the negotiation: Renegotiation of the 1996 treaty, which expires in December, should take account of Bihar’s concerns over silt accumulation and the state’s river management needs.
    5. The evidence base has to be current: Any new arrangement needs to be informed by updated data on river flows and climate change projections rather than on historical records alone.
    6. The principle extends past this treaty: In a period of erratic weather, states and countries sharing a river basin have to strengthen coordination to manage flows and reduce flood related distress.

    Challenges to embankment based flood control in Bihar

    1. The network is too long to maintain to standard: Bihar carries roughly 3,800 km of flood embankments, and every weak section of it is tested in the same few weeks each year. Eg. Breaches are recorded each season at several points across different river systems rather than at one predictable location.
      The Fix: Publish a stretch wise condition rating for the full embankment length before each monsoon, with repair funds released against the ratings rather than spread evenly.
    2. Containment creates waterlogging behind the line: An embankment that keeps a river out also keeps rainwater and local drainage in, so land behind it is lost to standing water rather than to flooding. Eg. Large areas in the Kosi and Gandak belts of north Bihar remain waterlogged well after river levels have fallen.
      The Fix: Build and maintain sluice and pump drainage at every point where an embankment crosses a natural drain, and treat the outfall as part of the embankment asset.
    3. People live between the embankments: Villages inside the embanked corridor are flooded every year by design, without the protection the structure was built to provide. Eg. Settlements between the eastern and western Kosi embankments are inundated annually while the land outside them is defended.
      The Fix: Fix a statutory resettlement and compensation entitlement for households inside the embanked corridor, separate from general flood relief.
    4. The decisive failure point can lie outside the state: The Kosi and the Gandak are regulated by structures in Nepalese territory, so a breach beyond Bihar’s jurisdiction can determine its flood year. Eg. The 2008 Kosi flood followed a breach at Kusaha, upstream of the barrage in Nepal, and displaced close to three million people in Bihar.
      The Fix: Establish a joint pre monsoon inspection and certification regime with Nepal for the Kosi and Gandak structures, with agreed repair timelines.
    5. Warning lead time is short because the catchment is foreign: Rainfall and discharge data from the upper catchments decide how much notice a district can be given, and that data is not generated within India. Eg. A peak on the Kosi can reach the Bihar plains within a day of heavy rainfall in its Nepalese catchment.
      The Fix: Extend real time telemetry sharing across the upper catchments and route it directly to district administrations rather than only to state control rooms.
    6. Silt removal has no funded programme: Reversing a raised bed is slow work with no annual budget head behind it, so the only measure reliably funded is raising the embankment. Eg. Dredging in the state is undertaken for navigation on specific stretches rather than for restoring channel capacity across a river.
      The Fix: Create a standing sediment management head in the state’s water resources budget, reporting channel capacity rather than embankment height as its outcome.

    Conclusion

    A flood season inside a rainfall deficit places the cause in the river system rather than in the monsoon, and that changes what a flood programme should be measured against. Protection built on confining rivers cannot hold once the beds inside those confinements keep rising. The question Bihar now faces is whether it makes channel capacity and floodplain space the stated objective of its flood works, or continues to judge success by the height and length of its defences. The water negotiation ahead is where the state’s sediment case will either become an operating rule or remain a grievance.

    Back2Basics: Ganga Basin River Management Plan

    1. What it is: A basin scale plan that treats the Ganga as a single hydrological unit, covering environmental flows and sediment alongside pollution abatement, rather than as a set of separate state level works.
    2. Why a basin frame: The Ganga basin covers about 861,000 sq km in India, close to 26 per cent of the country’s geographical area, spread across 11 states.
    3. Who carries the Ganga programme: The National Mission for Clean Ganga, under the Ministry of Jal Shakti, is the implementing arm of the National Ganga Council and was constituted as an authority under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986.
    4. What a basin plan can and cannot do: It sets requirements across the basin and depends on state departments and inter state coordination to execute them, which is how its imperatives can stand on record for years without changing outcomes on the ground.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2017, GS1, 15 marks] In what way can floods be converted into a sustainable source of irrigation and all – weather inland navigation in India?”

  • Farakka treaty nearing expiry, JDU revives campaign against barrage

    Why in the News

    Janata Dal (United), a partner in the ruling coalition in Bihar, has launched a campaign across 12 districts of the state along the Ganga demanding that the Farakka barrage be dismantled, and opposing any renewal of the India-Bangladesh Ganga water sharing treaty. The treaty it is targeting was signed in December 1996 and set a 30 year framework for sharing Ganga waters at the barrage during the dry season. That framework lapses this December, which converts a standing state grievance into a live negotiating question. The state government’s own position is narrower, that Bihar’s interest should be guarded in the treaty, with the Chief Minister stating in Munger that the state receives Ganga water for only four months of the year against a need for year round flow. A bilateral water sharing arrangement is the Union government’s to negotiate, and what is now being pressed is not a better share but the removal of the structure the sharing is measured at.

    What does the 1996 Ganga water sharing treaty do?

    1. Who it binds and what it covers: It is a bilateral agreement between India and Bangladesh, signed in December 1996, regulating the sharing of Ganga waters at the Farakka barrage in West Bengal.
    2. The season it governs: It applies primarily to the dry season, running from 1 January to 31 May, which is when the flow available at the barrage is least able to meet both countries’ requirements.
    3. Why a 30 year term was written in: The treaty established a binding framework for 1996 to 2026 to replace the earlier short term stopgap arrangements and give both sides predictable distribution.
    4. Where it now stands: That framework lapses this December, so continuation requires a fresh negotiation rather than an automatic rollover.

    Why was the barrage built, and what did it change on either side?

    1. The purpose it was built for: The barrage was built in 1975 to divert water from the Ganga into the Hooghly river, to flush out silt and keep Kolkata Port navigable.
    2. The downstream effect in Bangladesh: The diversion reduced downstream flow into Bangladesh, producing severe water shortages, increased soil salinity and ecological stress in the south of that country.
    3. The upstream effect Bihar reports: Heavy silt trapped behind the barrage has raised the Ganga’s riverbed, destroying the river’s natural storage capacity and driving seasonal floods.
    4. One structure sits behind both complaints: The diversion that sustains a port channel downstream is the same arrangement that holds sediment upstream, so the barrage is what both sets of grievances point at.

    What is Bihar’s stated grievance?

    1. A flood and parch cycle upstream: The state government’s position is that the barrage has created a severe flood and parch dynamic upstream of it, alternating inundation with shortage rather than steadying the flow.
    2. Four months of water against a year round need: The Chief Minister has stated that Bihar currently receives Ganga water only from July to October, and requires flow throughout the year.
    3. What the state asks of the Union government: Its stated demand is that the treaty safeguard Bihar’s interest, which places a riparian state’s claim inside a negotiation it is not a party to.

    What is the campaign demanding, and how is it being run?

    1. A demand to dismantle, not to renegotiate: The party is demanding that the barrage be dismantled, citing a stance its chief and former Chief Minister has repeatedly taken with the Union government that the structure causes heavy siltation and floods.
    2. Outright opposition to renewal: The party’s stated position is that it is completely against renewal, on the ground that the treaty fails to serve the state’s interests and remains a primary cause of flooding.
    3. Where it is being taken: The ‘Nitish Samvad’ campaign covers the 12 districts through which the Ganga flows in Bihar, and has so far covered four, Buxar, Bhojpur, Begusarai and Khagaria.
    4. How it is being conducted: It is led by the party’s national working president, a Rajya Sabha member, and carries recorded audio messages of the party chief, who is not travelling for it.
    5. The timetable it is working to: The party intends to finish the campaign well before the treaty ends in December, which places it ahead of any decision on renewal.

    Challenges to renegotiating the Ganga water sharing framework

    1. A riparian state has no seat at the table: Water is a State subject, and a treaty with a foreign country is the Union government’s exclusive power, so a state can press a claim and cannot block an agreement. Eg. The India-Bangladesh Teesta water sharing draft has remained unsigned since 2011 over West Bengal’s objections, without the state being a party to it.
      The Fix: Constitute a standing consultative mechanism with the basin states before negotiation opens, with their submissions placed on record as part of the Indian position.
    2. The sharing formula rests on historical flows: The arrangement was built on the average dry season availability recorded at the barrage over four earlier decades, and that baseline no longer describes current or projected flows. Eg. Its operation depends on how much water actually arrives at the barrage in each ten day period of the dry season.
      The Fix: Write the next arrangement on a rolling flow record revised at fixed intervals, rather than on a single fixed historical average.
    3. Sediment has no institutional owner: The dispute Bihar raises is about silt rather than volume, and no authority holds the power to order desilting or to set a sediment budget for the river. Eg. The approach channel at Farakka itself requires repeated dredging to stay open, which relocates silt rather than reducing the load.
      The Fix: Attach a sediment management protocol to the barrage’s operating rules, naming the responsible authority and the annual dredging and disposal obligation.
    4. The flood peaks are set outside India: The Kosi and the Gandak, the rivers that deliver Bihar’s worst flood peaks, rise in Nepal, so peak discharge is governed by catchments and structures beyond this treaty’s scope. Eg. The Kosi and Gandak barrages stand in Nepalese territory and are operated by India under the 1954 Kosi Agreement and the 1959 Gandak Agreement.
      The Fix: Pair the Ganga negotiation with a flow data sharing and release coordination arrangement with Nepal on the Kosi and Gandak.
    5. Removing the structure moves the problem rather than ending it: Dismantling the barrage would restore downstream flow and withdraw the diversion that keeps the Bhagirathi-Hooghly channel and the Kolkata port route navigable. Eg. The feeder canal at Farakka exists solely to carry that diverted flow into the Bhagirathi-Hooghly system.
      The Fix: Commission an independent flow and sediment study of the barrage’s upstream and downstream effects, so the dismantling demand is tested against measured alternatives rather than settled politically.

    Conclusion

    A dry season sharing arrangement is now being contested on grounds it was never written to address, since the demand from Bihar concerns sediment and flood behaviour rather than the volume of water allotted. That mismatch is what makes renewal harder than an extension of terms. The decision to watch is whether the Union government opens the negotiation with a stated position on siltation upstream of the barrage, or confines it to the dry season allocation. Confined to allocation, a new agreement settles the bilateral question and leaves the domestic one exactly where it started.

    Back2Basics: Farakka Barrage

    1. Where it stands: Across the Ganga in Murshidabad district of West Bengal, a short distance upstream of the point where the river enters Bangladesh.
    2. Its scale: The barrage runs about 2,240 metres across the river and carries a road and rail link over it.
    3. How the diversion works: A feeder canal roughly 38 km long carries water from above the barrage into the Bhagirathi-Hooghly, the channel the diversion was designed to sustain.
    4. Who operates it: The Farakka Barrage Project authority, under the Union Ministry of Jal Shakti, runs the structure and its regulating gates.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2016, GS1, 12 marks] Present an account of the Indus Water Treaty and examine its ecological, economic and political implications in the context of changing bilateral relations.”