💥Join UPSC 2027,2028 Mentorship (August Batch) + XFactor Notes & Microthemes PDF
Talk to Mentor

Civilsdaily

Login

Subject: Geography

  • Why a flat map fails to accurately depict Earth

    Why a flat map fails to accurately depict Earth

    Why in the News

    • The UN General Assembly has adopted a resolution encouraging a shift from the Mercator projection towards the Equal Earth projection.
    • 164 countries, including India, supported the resolution.
    • The United States voted against, while six countries abstained.
    • The resolution is non-binding.
    • The debate centres on how world maps represent the relative size of different regions, particularly Africa.

    What is a Map Projection?

    • A map projection converts the three-dimensional Earth into a two-dimensional map.
    • Every projection involves some form of distortion.
    • Four major properties are: Area, Shape, Distance, Direction
    • Major types include:
      • Conformal: Preserves local angles and shapes.
      • Equal-area: Preserves relative areas.
      • Equidistant: Preserves selected distances.
      • Compromise: Balances different types of distortion.

    Mercator Projection

    • Developed by Gerardus Mercator in 1569.
    • Designed mainly for navigation.
    • Meridians and parallels are represented as straight lines.
    • A constant compass bearing can be represented as a straight line.
    • It is a conformal projection.

    Major Limitation

    • Areas become increasingly exaggerated towards the poles.
    • Greenland and Antarctica therefore appear much larger than their actual relative size.
    • This can visually distort perceptions of the geographical size of regions.

    Equal Earth Projection

    • Developed in 2018.
    • It is an equal-area projection.
    • Preserves the relative area of landmasses.
    • Particularly useful for:
      • Population distribution
      • Climate data
      • Land-use mapping
      • Resource distribution
    • It sacrifices some accuracy in shape and distance.

    Which Projection for Which Purpose?

    • Navigation → Mercator or other conformal projections.
    • Statistical/thematic maps → Equal-area projections such as Equal Earth.
    • General world maps → Robinson or Winkel Tripel.
    • Polar regions → Azimuthal projections.

    Challenges

    • UN resolutions are not legally binding.
    • Digital mapping systems continue to rely heavily on Mercator-derived projections.
    • Changing a projection does not eliminate distortion; it only changes which property is prioritised.
    • Therefore, maps should clearly mention the projection and its principal purpose.

    Way Forward

    • Use projection according to purpose, rather than adopting one universal map.
    • Provide equal-area options in government statistical and mapping platforms.
    • Clearly mention the projection used on published maps.
    • Improve geographical literacy by teaching the limitations of different projections.

    Prelims Pointers

    • Compromise projections → Balance multiple distortions.
    • Mercator → Conformal projection.
    • Mercator → Developed in 1569.
    • Mercator’s major use → Navigation.
    • Equal Earth → Equal-area projection.
    • Equal-area projection → Preserves relative areas.
    • Geostationary ≠ Geosynchronous is a separate orbital concept, not a map projection.
    • No flat map → Can simultaneously preserve area, shape, distance and direction perfectly.
  • Two countries and a shared river: Mistrust is not inevitable

    Two countries and a shared river: Mistrust is not inevitable

    Why in the News

    India’s most important rivers rise in a region it cannot see into, controlled by China, which treats the data about them as an asset to switch on and off. The Brahmaputra rises as the Yarlung Tsangpo in Tibet and enters Arunachal Pradesh as the Siang, and the Sutlej and the Indus rise there too. The arrangement that governs what India learns about them, a pair of flood-season memorandums, lapsed in June 2025. China broke ground in July 2025 on the Medog project at the Great Bend of the Yarlung Tsangpo, immediately upstream of the point where the river turns towards Arunachal Pradesh. The tension is that hydrological data on rivers India depends on is a discretionary favour rather than a treaty right, and India practises the same discretion on the rivers where it sits upstream.

    What is the India-China hydrological data arrangement?

    1. No water treaty exists between the two countries: The relationship rests on two flood-season memorandums, one on the Brahmaputra signed in 2002 and one on the Sutlej signed in 2005.
    2. India pays for the data it receives: India pays roughly Rs 1 crore a year for the flood-season information supplied under those memorandums.
    3. A consultative body that convenes at China’s convenience: An expert-level consultative mechanism sits alongside the memorandums and meets when relations allow.
    4. The instrument is seasonal by design: The memorandums cover the flood season, so hazards arising outside that window carry no notification obligation at all.

    Why is there no legal floor under the arrangement?

    1. Both states sit outside the governing convention: The 1997 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses would oblige an upstream state to give prior notice of works and not to cause significant harm to those below. China voted against it and India abstained.
    2. A non-binding memorandum can be suspended without breach: Withholding data under such an arrangement carries no legal consequence, so there is nothing for India to invoke when supply stops.

    Why does shared data function as a lever rather than a right?

    1. Supply tracks the state of the boundary dispute: China stopped sharing Brahmaputra data during the Doklam standoff of 2017, blaming damaged collection sites, even as that summer’s floods killed scores in Assam.
    2. The pattern repeated and then ended the arrangement: Sharing resumed once relations thawed, dried up after the Galwan clash of 2020, and the memorandum lapsed in June 2025.
    3. Flood prediction data is not a neutral public good: It is released when ties are warm and withdrawn when they are not, which makes it a bargaining instrument rather than a technical input.
    4. Reassurances cannot be checked: Beijing attributes the stoppages to technical faults, calls the dam “fully within China’s sovereignty” and promises it will “prevent and mitigate disasters”. Those meant to be reassured cannot verify any of it, because the region is sealed and India, which hosts the Dalai Lama and the largest Tibetan exile community, is viewed with particular suspicion.

    What does the Medog project add to India’s exposure?

    1. The largest hydropower project in the world, at the worst possible point: The Medog project at the Great Bend will run to 60 GW, sited just before the Yarlung Tsangpo turns towards Arunachal Pradesh.
    2. It sits on the seam that generates the hazard: The site lies in one of the planet’s most seismically violent zones, the same tectonic seam that produces the outburst floods now hitting the border.
    3. Downstream states have been told nothing: Arunachal Pradesh’s Chief Minister has called the project an “existential threat” to the Siang valley. Bangladesh, at the river’s end, sought details in early 2026 and received none.

    Where does India’s own record cut against its demand?

    1. India settled for paid data instead of pressing for a right: Successive governments accepted the paid-data memorandum and did not push for the binding, basin-wide architecture that would make information an entitlement rather than a favour.
    2. India is an upstream withholder on its own rivers: It shares thinly with Bangladesh, and it has placed the Indus Waters Treaty, 1960 in abeyance following the Pahalgam terror attack.
    3. The same logic runs in both directions: The reasoning India faces on the Brahmaputra is the reasoning it practises on the Indus, which removes the ground from which it could demand a rule of general application.

    What do the Senegal and Mekong models show is possible?

    1. Poverty is not the constraint: On the Senegal River, four of the world’s poorest African countries jointly own their dams as “common and indivisible property”.
    2. Nor is conflict: That joint ownership was sustained even through a war between two of the member states, so mistrust between riparian governments does not by itself prevent pooled sovereignty over a river.
    3. China’s absence is a choice, not a limitation: Its neighbours built the Mekong River Commission and China stayed outside it, which shows the refusal to enter a basin institution is political rather than structural.

    Challenges to a binding India-China river arrangement

    1. Forecasting depends on a single unverifiable supplier: Flood forecasting for the Brahmaputra rests on upstream gauge readings that no Indian agency can independently audit, so a stoppage removes the input rather than degrading it. Eg. Central Water Commission forecasts for the Assam valley are built on flows measured at stations India cannot access.
      The Fix: Fund independent satellite-based flow and precipitation estimation for the upper basin, so a data cut-off reduces accuracy instead of ending the forecast.
    2. The hazards that kill fall outside the covered season: Glacial lake outburst floods and landslide-dam breaches occur without regard to the monsoon calendar the arrangement is built around. Eg. The South Lhonak glacial lake outburst flood of October 2023 destroyed the Teesta-III dam in Sikkim and killed dozens, outside any flood-season notification window.
      The Fix: Negotiate a year-round hazard-notification obligation covering lake formation, landslide damming and reservoir release, separately from seasonal flow data.
    3. Water has no forum of its own: The boundary question runs through the Special Representatives channel, and water sits in a separate expert mechanism with no power to compel a meeting or an answer. Eg. An interruption in data supply has no body before which it can be formally raised as a breach.
      The Fix: Give the expert mechanism a fixed annual calendar and a standing agenda item on notification failures, so a stoppage produces a documented exchange.
    4. The lower riparians negotiate separately on the same river: India, Bangladesh and China each deal bilaterally, so the basin’s downstream users never present a common position. Eg. India and Bangladesh’s Joint Rivers Commission covers 54 shared rivers and has produced only two water-sharing treaties in five decades.
      The Fix: Raise the Yarlung Tsangpo-Brahmaputra as a joint India-Bangladesh agenda item so notification is sought by the whole downstream reach at once.
    5. India’s own counter-project is contested at home: Storage proposed on the Siang as a strategic answer to Medog is opposed by the communities it would displace, which weakens the case India makes about consultation. Eg. Survey work for the Siang Upper Multipurpose Project has faced sustained local protest in Arunachal Pradesh.
      The Fix: Settle consent and compensation on the Indian side of the border before advancing a counter-dam as a security argument.

    Conclusion

    India cannot compel China to open the plateau, and the question is therefore not about leverage but about design. What is missing is an architecture that makes hazard information an obligation owed to everyone downstream rather than a concession granted when relations permit. Building it requires India to accept the same obligation on the rivers where it sits upstream, since a rule it will not apply to itself is not a rule it can ask for. The unresolved point is whether a shared river is treated as a common lifeline or as a weapon held in reserve, and neither government has yet chosen.

    Transboundary River Water Sharing in India

    1. About: A transboundary river crosses an international boundary, and its use is governed by bilateral treaties and memorandums between the riparian states rather than by a single binding global law.
    2. India’s position is both upstream and downstream: India is the lower riparian to China on the Brahmaputra, the Sutlej and the Indus headwaters, and the upper riparian to Pakistan on the Indus system and to Bangladesh on the Ganga and the Teesta.
    3. The dependence is agricultural: Around 45% of irrigation in the Indo-Gangetic plain depends on water from the Himalayan rivers, which is why control of the headwaters translates directly into food security.

    Laws and Agreements Governing Transboundary River Water Sharing

    1. Indus Waters Treaty, 1960 (India-Pakistan): Brokered by the World Bank, it assigns the Eastern Rivers (Ravi, Beas, Sutlej) to India and the Western Rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab) to Pakistan, with run-of-the-river hydropower and limited storage permitted to India on the Western Rivers.
    2. Article XII: Termination is possible only through a ratified treaty between both governments, and the text carries no suspension provision.
    3. Ganga Waters Treaty, 1996 (India-Bangladesh): It fixes the sharing of dry-season flows at the Farakka Barrage and runs for 30 years, expiring in December 2026.
    4. Kushiyara River Treaty, 2022 (India-Bangladesh): It provides for withdrawal of an agreed quantum from the Kushiyara in the dry season, and is only the second water-sharing treaty between the two countries.
    5. Kosi Agreement, 1954 and Gandak Agreement, 1959 (India-Nepal): These provide for flood control, barrage construction and irrigation management on shared rivers, with India funding and operating the structures on Nepali territory.
    6. Mahakali Treaty, 1996 (India-Nepal): It covers the integrated development of the Mahakali river, including the Pancheshwar Multipurpose Project, which remains stalled over disagreement on benefit-sharing.

    Challenges in Transboundary River Water Sharing

    1. The customary principles bind weakly without a forum: Equitable and reasonable utilisation and the obligation not to cause significant harm are widely accepted in principle, and no standing tribunal exists to apply them to a river basin. Eg. The Mekong River Commission can review a member’s dam proposal and cannot stop it.
      The Fix: Build compulsory technical arbitration into each treaty at renewal, so a disputed project has a named forum rather than a bilateral stalemate.
    2. Treaties fix volumes that the climate then moves: Allocations negotiated on decades-old flow records become unworkable as glacier melt, monsoon variability and river morphology change the water actually available. Eg. Negotiations over the Ganga sharing formula are complicated by changing river morphology and by disagreement over water levels at Farakka.
      The Fix: Replace fixed quantum allocations with percentage-of-flow formulas carrying explicit dry-year and surplus-year rules.
    3. Domestic federal politics stalls bilateral agreements: A riparian State’s objection can hold up an agreement the two national governments have already negotiated. Eg. The draft Teesta agreement of 2011, providing for a 50:50 sharing arrangement, has never been implemented.
      The Fix: Include the riparian State in the negotiating delegation from the outset, rather than seeking its concurrence after a text is settled.
    4. Third parties build in the same basin without notice: A neighbour can bring in external financing and construction for a project on a shared river without consulting the other riparian. Eg. Bangladesh has re-engaged China on the Teesta River Management Project.
      The Fix: Write a prior-notification and joint-appraisal requirement for any new structure into every treaty renewal, applying to externally financed projects as well.

    [2016, GS1, 12 marks] Present an account of the Indus Water Treaty and examine its ecological, economic and political implications in the context of changing bilateral relations.

  • Glacial collapse unlikely to halt China’s mega dam plan

    Why in the News

    China is going ahead with construction of a mega dam on the lower reaches of the Yarlung Zangbo, the Brahmaputra, in a seismically active part of Tibet near the border with India. Fresh concerns raised by the glacial collapse along the Nepal-China border have not changed that plan. A month before those flash floods and mudslides, China released its 15th Five-Year Plan for renewable energy, which called for advancing construction of major projects including the Yarlung Zangbo Lower Reaches Hydropower Project. India’s concern is how much water the project will store and how its diversion tunnel will alter downstream flows. Almost nothing about either has been made public, and the one channel through which India receives hydrological data from China has worked irregularly.

    What is the Yarlung Zangbo Lower Reaches Hydropower Project?

    1. What it is: It is a hydropower complex of five power stations on the lower reaches of the Yarlung Zangbo in Tibet, referred to in China as the mega dam project.
    2. How the water is used: Water is taken out of the river at the top of the Great Bend, where the river’s course falls steeply and turns towards India, and carried through a tunnel of about 40 km before rejoining the river below.
    3. The scale committed: A total investment of 1.2 trillion Yuan, around ₹14 lakh crore, was announced for the construction of the five power stations at the groundbreaking in July 2025.
    4. Who builds and runs it: A new State-run entity, the China Yajiang Group, was set up to run the entire project.

    Why has the glacial collapse not changed Beijing’s calculation?

    1. The project sits in a standing plan: The renewable energy Five-Year Plan named the project for advancement before the collapse occurred, so the collapse arrived against a target already fixed.
    2. Political weight is attached to it: China’s Vice Premier visited Nyingchi in Tibet in April and described it as a landmark mega project of the new era. The Premier had called it the project of the century at the groundbreaking.
    3. The safety response is procedural, not a pause: The stated answer to risk is strict enforcement of construction standards and of ecological and environmental protection requirements, with construction progress kept subordinate to quality and safety.
    4. Information has been withheld since the start: There has been little public information about the project since the groundbreaking, and the Vice Premier’s visit is what disclosed the new operating company.

    What exactly is India concerned about?

    1. Storage volume is unknown: How much water will be held in the reservoir is not published, and storage determines how far the timing of downstream flows can be controlled.
    2. The tunnel’s effect on flow is unknown: Diverting the river at the top of the bend and returning it below means the natural channel around the bend carries only what the tunnel does not.
    3. Wider ecological impact is unassessed: No assessment of downstream ecological effects has been released.
    4. The absence of information is itself the obstacle: The lack of published detail prevents India from assessing the impact at all, rather than merely disagreeing with China’s assessment of it.

    Why is the run-of-the-river description contested?

    1. The label implies no storage: A run-of-the-river scheme passes flow through without holding it back, so it carries limited power to change the timing of water reaching a downstream State.
    2. A reservoir is part of the design: The project involves the construction of a reservoir, which a Shanghai-based energy analyst places at the town of Mainling, upstream of Nyingchi, on the basis of reported relocations.
    3. The generating configuration is built around drop: The descending force of the diverted water powers five 12-GW powerhouses, which concentrates head rather than passing the river through unchanged.

    What does China’s earlier dam on the same river show?

    1. The precedent: China has already opened one major dam on the middle reaches of the Yarlung Zangbo at Zangmu, on which construction began in 2010, and a final acceptance meeting was held in June.
    2. The output claimed: Zangmu has generated 22.2 billion kilowatt-hours, described as equivalent to saving approximately 7.4 million tonnes of standard coal and cutting carbon dioxide emissions by around 22.2 million tonnes.
    3. The regional case made for it: State media said the dam had provided a solution to nearly 26 per cent of electricity demand in the Xizang Autonomous Region, and detailed an elaborate fishway designed to move fish between upstream and downstream sections. The project’s design engineer said the fishway would likely be used for future projects.
    4. The new project is of a different order: Chinese analysts project 60 GW of installed capacity and 300 billion kilowatt-hours a year, over three times the Three Gorges, against which Zangmu is small.

    How well does the India-China channel on rivers work?

    1. The forum exists and is about to meet: India and China will hold a meeting of the Expert-Level Mechanism on Trans-border Rivers later this month.
    2. Transmission has been intermittent: The sharing of hydrological data has not been regular and has on occasion been suspended during difficult periods in relations.
    3. China’s stated position denies downstream harm: China’s Foreign Ministry has said it maintains a highly responsible attitude toward transboundary river development, that construction is beneficial for disaster prevention and mitigation throughout the entire river basin, and that it will not have adverse effects on downstream areas.
    4. Cooperation is described in reporting terms: The Ministry cites hydrological reporting, flood control and disaster reduction cooperation with downstream countries, rather than any joint assessment or consent mechanism.

    Challenges to the Yarlung Zangbo Lower Reaches Hydropower Project

    1. Seismic exposure at the Eastern Himalayan syntaxis: The Great Bend sits where the Indian and Eurasian plates converge most sharply, which is among the most earthquake-prone locations in Asia. Eg. The 1950 Assam-Tibet earthquake, of magnitude 8.6, struck this same zone and triggered landslides that blocked and then burst Himalayan river channels.
      The Fix: Publish the seismic design basis and the dam-break inundation modelling for the reach below the project, so downstream authorities can plan against a stated failure scenario.
    2. Sediment trapping changes the floodplain downstream: The Brahmaputra carries one of the world’s heaviest sediment loads, and any storage structure holds back part of it. Eg. Majuli, the river island in Assam, has lost a large part of its area to bank erosion as the balance between deposition and scouring has shifted.
      The Fix: Fix a sediment flushing schedule and share the release calendar with the downstream riparian in advance of each flushing operation.
    3. There is no treaty, only renewable memoranda: India and China share no water-sharing treaty, and data supply rests on memoranda of understanding that expire and must be renewed. Eg. Flood-season hydrological data for the Brahmaputra was not supplied in 2017, the year of the Doklam standoff.
      The Fix: Convert the memoranda into a standing basin instrument with automatic data transmission that does not lapse with the state of political relations.
    4. India’s own detection capacity is thin at the entry point: An anomalous release is useful information only if it is detected before it reaches populated reaches. Eg. Sudden rises and sudden discolouration in the Siang in Arunachal Pradesh have been attributed to upstream activity without independent measurement to confirm the cause.
      The Fix: Build a telemetered gauging network on the Siang and the Lohit reporting in near real time to the Central Water Commission.
    5. The gorge is an ecological zone of its own: The Great Bend gorge holds an unusual altitudinal range of habitat compressed into a short distance, and diversion removes water from that reach. Eg. The Yarlung Tsangpo canyon is among the deepest in the world and carries forest types from subtropical to alpine within a few kilometres.
      The Fix: Require publication of an environmental flow regime for the bypassed reach, stating the minimum discharge to be maintained through the year.

    Conclusion

    The dispute is not yet about water, it is about disclosure. India cannot contest a projection it has not been given. A downstream State that learns a reservoir’s capacity only after commissioning has lost the one point at which design can still be influenced. The meeting of the Expert-Level Mechanism this month is the marker to watch, and the test of it is narrow: whether operating rules are put on the table, or whether the meeting produces another reaffirmation of responsible conduct.

    Back2Basics: Expert-Level Mechanism on Trans-border Rivers

    1. It is the standing India-China official channel on shared rivers, established in 2006 following an agreement between the two governments.
    2. Its declared business is the provision of hydrological information by China during the flood season, and cooperation on emergency management of trans-border rivers.
    3. It covers the Brahmaputra and the Sutlej, the two rivers on which separate memoranda of understanding govern data supply.
    4. It is a consultative forum with no adjudicatory power, and it does not allocate water between the two countries.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “Identify the river of the Indian sub-continent on the basis of the following information: 1. Antecedent drainage system. 2. Flows through three countries. 3. Originates in the Tibetan Plateau; important for irrigation. 4. Does not form distributaries. Select the answer from the following: (a) Brahmaputra (b) Indus (c) Sutlej (d) Teesta”

  • Thermal sector grapples with coal stock management

    Why in the News

    Thermal power generators that hold adequate coal inventories are disadvantaged when limited domestic supply is redirected to plants that have fallen below their prescribed stock norms. Those norms are plant specific and have run under the Central Electricity Authority (CEA) framework that took effect on 6 December 2021. The revised Scheme for Harnessing and Allocating Koyala (Coal) Transparently in India (SHAKTI) policy, approved by the Central Government in May 2025, streamlined coal linkage allocation into two windows. Emergency redistribution keeps a low stock plant running and protects grid reliability. Repeating it removes the reason for any generator to carry stock at or above its norm, since the surplus is what gets moved.

    How is coal allocated to a thermal power plant?

    1. The linkage: A coal linkage is a long term assurance of supply from a specified source to a specified plant.
    2. The contract: A Fuel Supply Agreement (FSA) gives that linkage contractual form, fixing the quantity the coal company owes the generator.
    3. Window I: Central government owned generating companies and State utilities receive linkages at notified prices.
    4. Window II: Other eligible producers, including plants running on imported coal, procure coal through auctions at a premium over the notified price.

    Why does redistribution penalise the generator that stocked adequately?

    1. Compliance is measured plant by plant: The revised norms set a stocking level for each plant, so a generator is judged against its own requirement rather than a common one.
    2. Scarce coal moves toward the shortfall: When domestic supply is limited, deliveries are redirected to plants below their norms, and the generator that planned surrenders tonnage it had secured.
    3. The incentive runs backwards: Repeated redistribution removes any reason to carry stock above the norm, because the surplus is precisely what is taken.
    4. The proposed correction: A former Managing Director of PTC India, earlier the Power Trading Corporation of India, argued that coal inventory should be recognised as a system reliability service. Generators holding adequate or higher than normative stocks would be incentivised, and repeated shortfalls without genuine external cause would carry consequences.

    When is emergency redistribution justified?

    1. Grid stability and consumer supply: Assistance to plants at critically low stocks is defensible where consumer interests and grid stability are at risk.
    2. The distinction that decides it: Support must separate a genuine supply chain disruption from a persistent shortage caused by inventory mismanagement.
    3. The causes that qualify: Mine side constraints, railway bottlenecks, force majeure events and unexpected spikes in electricity demand are the genuine disruptions for which redistribution is meant.
    4. Where the framework came from: The Ministries of Coal, Power and Railways coordinate to monitor supplies and move coal, and the revised supply framework followed the COVID-19 pandemic, when all modes of transport came to a standstill.

    Is the problem a shortage of coal or a failure of logistics?

    1. Production has crossed a billion tonnes twice: Output reached 1,047.52 million tonnes in 2024-25 and 1,040.08 million tonnes in 2025-26.
    2. The current year’s run rate: Cumulative production through July stood at 302.04 million tonnes, and dispatches rose about 6 percent year on year to 354.7 million tonnes.
    3. Stock exists but sits in the wrong place: Thermal power plants held 34.55 million tonnes, with another 113 million tonnes at pitheads or in transit, a combined stock of about 148 million tonnes.
    4. Availability at the mine is not availability at the plant: Fuel security depends on the whole chain of production, loading, railway availability, transit, unloading and stockyard management.
    5. The binding constraint: The difficulty is how supplies are allocated, transported and converted into plant level inventories, not the national quantity of coal.

    Challenges to coal stock management in the thermal sector

    1. Rail capacity sets the replenishment ceiling: Coal moves mainly by rail, so rake availability decides how quickly a plant below its norm can be refilled. Eg. Passenger services were cancelled in 2022 to free rakes for coal movement to power stations.
      The Fix: Expand corridor capacity on the mine to plant routes and publish rake allocation in advance, so a generator can plan against a known schedule.
    2. Distance from the pithead is not priced into the norm: A plant far from its linked mine carries a longer transit and needs a larger buffer to hold the same days of cover. Eg. Plants in the western and southern States drawing from the Talcher and Mahanadi coalfields run multi day rail transits.
      The Fix: Set stocking levels by transit distance rather than by a uniform days of cover, so a distant plant is not judged on a pithead plant’s buffer.
    3. Grade slippage erodes the stock that is counted: A gap between the declared grade and the delivered grade means a tonne in the yard carries less heat than the norm assumes. Eg. Third party sampling of coal supplies was introduced after persistent grade slippage complaints from generators.
      The Fix: Express stocking norms in days of energy rather than days of tonnage, so quality shortfalls appear in the compliance number itself.
    4. Imported coal blending is abandoned when landed costs rise: Plants designed to blend imported coal cut back when the rupee weakens, which increases their draw on domestic supply. Eg. Blending directions issued to State generators in 2022 were resisted on cost grounds.
      The Fix: Allow the incremental fuel cost of a directed import to pass through in tariff automatically, so a blending direction does not sit on the generator’s balance sheet.
    5. Payment stress travels back up the chain: A generator owed money by distribution companies delays its own coal payments and cannot fund a larger inventory. Eg. Accumulated dues from State distribution companies prompted the Late Payment Surcharge Rules, 2022.
      The Fix: Enforce the existing payment security mechanism strictly, so working capital is not the reason a plant slips below its norm.

    Conclusion

    The dispute is not about how much coal the country digs out. It is about who absorbs the cost when a scarce delivery is moved from a plant that planned to one that did not. The tension is unresolved, because the authority that must keep a low stock plant running has no instrument to compensate the generator whose coal is diverted to it. Until a stocking norm carries a payment on one side and a consequence on the other, redistribution will keep shifting the cost of poor planning onto the generators that planned.

    Back2Basics: Central Electricity Authority

    1. What it is: The Central Electricity Authority is the technical advisory body of the Ministry of Power.
    2. Statutory basis: It functions under the Electricity Act, 2003, continuing the body first constituted under the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948.
    3. Advisory role: It advises the Central Government on national electricity policy and prepares the National Electricity Plan.
    4. Technical role: It sets technical standards for the construction and operation of electrical plants and lines, and monitors daily coal stock positions at thermal stations.

    [2019] Consider the following statements:

    1. Coal sector was nationalized by the Government of India under Indira Gandhi.

    2. Now, coal blocks are allocated on lottery basis.

    3. Till recently, India imported coal to meet the shortages of domestic supply, but now India is self-sufficient in coal production.

    Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

    (a) 1 only

    (b) 2 and 3 only

    (c) 3 only

    (d) 1, 2 and 3

  • WMO warns of ‘very’ strong El Nino, to last until February 2027

    WMO warns of ‘very’ strong El Nino, to last until February 2027

    Why in the News

    The World Meteorological Organization (WMO) has warned of an impending very strong El Nino that is expected to strengthen and last until February 2027. Its Secretary General stated that El Nino is firmly established and has the potential to deliver a massive blow to communities and economies across the world.

    How does El Nino work?

    1. The mechanism: El Nino is a periodic warming of sea surface temperatures in the equatorial and eastern Pacific Ocean, caused by a weakening of the trade winds.
    2. Why it travels: The warming moves the region where heat and moisture rise into the atmosphere, which alters temperature and rainfall patterns far from the Pacific.
    3. Its rhythm: The phenomenon recurs every two to seven years and a single event lasts up to about twelve months.
    4. What it produces: It is known to trigger heatwaves, wet spells and extreme temperatures.

    How strong is this event, and how is that graded?

    1. The index used: Intensity is determined by the sea surface temperature averaged over three months in the Nino 3.4 region along the equatorial Pacific Ocean.
    2. The readings so far: The index surpassed 1.5 degrees Celsius above normal during May to July and crossed 2 degrees Celsius above normal in July.
    3. The persistence forecast: The likelihood of El Nino continuing through February 2027 is put at close to 100 percent, the first time the agency has forecast an event at that degree of certainty.
    4. A possible record: Exceptionally warm Pacific temperatures make this potentially the strongest El Nino since monitoring began.

    What does it mean for India this season?

    1. The monsoon largely escaped: The India Meteorological Department (IMD) confirmed that rainfall in the later half of August came under the influence of the developing El Nino. With three fourths of the season over, the monsoon has largely escaped it.
    2. A countervailing signal: A positive phase of the Indian Ocean Dipole is expected to develop during September to November, with a seasonal mean value of 0.9 degrees Celsius.
    3. Why the offset matters: A positive Dipole strengthens rainfall over the Indian region and can therefore work against El Nino’s drying influence.
    4. The offset is not assured: The Dipole swung briefly towards the positive phase in late August and then returned to neutral.

    What is the WMO doing about it?

    1. A mobilisation without precedent in the agency: The Secretary General described this as the largest mobilisation with National Meteorological and Hydrological Services in the WMO’s fifty year history.
    2. Why those agencies: National meteorological services are the bodies that convert a global seasonal outlook into forecasts and warnings people can act on.
    3. Impacts are already visible: Droughts and floods are already causing disruption, and the agency expects these to intensify as the event strengthens.
    4. The recent record: Europe recorded one of its hottest summers in recent decades this year, and August brought record temperatures in many parts of the globe.

    Challenges to acting on an El Nino warning

    1. A seasonal outlook is not a local forecast: El Nino shifts the odds of dry conditions across a season and cannot say what a particular district receives in a particular week. Eg. The 2023 monsoon closed about 6 percent below normal for India as a whole, and several subdivisions still recorded surplus rain.
      The Fix: Issue impact based forecasts at district level that translate the seasonal outlook into expected effects on sowing dates, reservoir filling and power demand.
    2. The Indian Ocean modifies the Pacific signal: El Nino’s effect on the Indian monsoon depends on the state of the Indian Ocean, so an El Nino year is not automatically a drought year. Eg. The 1997 event was among the strongest recorded and the Indian monsoon that year was normal.
      The Fix: Publish the El Nino and Dipole outlooks as one combined regional signal rather than as two separate advisories a user has to reconcile.
    3. Warnings stop short of the last mile: Early warning coverage remains uneven for small farmers and fishing communities who cannot act on a technical bulletin. Eg. The United Nations Early Warnings for All initiative exists because a large share of the world’s population is still not covered by any early warning system.
      The Fix: Route advisories through State agriculture extension and fisheries departments in local languages, tied to one specific recommended action.
    4. Reservoirs are operated on inflows, not on forecasts: Storage decisions respond to water already received, so a deficit is managed only after it has appeared. Eg. Southern region reservoirs stood far below their ten year average through the summer of 2024, after the previous year’s deficient monsoon.
      The Fix: Write seasonal forecasts into reservoir rule curves so storage is conserved in advance of a forecast dry season.
    5. The consequences outlast the monsoon: El Nino affects the rabi season and global crops, so the exposure continues well after the Indian monsoon withdraws. Eg. India restricted rice exports during the 2023 El Nino year on domestic supply concerns.
      The Fix: Set buffer stock and import cover decisions against the forecast horizon rather than against the harvest just completed.

    Conclusion

    The forecast has settled the question of whether the event arrives and left open only what is done before it peaks. India’s monsoon has escaped this season, so the exposure shifts to the rabi crop, to reservoir storage and to the summer that follows. The marker to watch is whether the Indian Ocean Dipole holds its positive phase long enough to blunt the Pacific signal over the region.

    Back2Basics: Indian Ocean Dipole

    1. What it is: The Indian Ocean Dipole is the difference in sea surface temperature between the western and the eastern parts of the tropical Indian Ocean.
    2. Positive phase: The western Indian Ocean is warmer than the eastern part near Indonesia, which favours stronger rainfall over the Indian subcontinent and East Africa.
    3. Negative phase: The eastern part is warmer, which suppresses rainfall over India and shifts it towards Indonesia and Australia.
    4. How it is tracked: It is measured as the Dipole Mode Index, the temperature gradient between the two poles of the ocean.

    [2017] With reference to ‘Indian Ocean Dipole (IOD)’ sometimes mentioned in the news while forecasting Indian monsoon, which of the following statements is/are correct?

    1. IOD phenomenon is characterized by a difference in sea surface temperature between tropical Western Indian Ocean and tropical Eastern Pacific Ocean.

    2. An IOD phenomenon can influence an El Nino’s impact on the monsoon.

    Select the correct answer using the code given below:

    (a) 1 only

    (b) 2 only

    (c) Both 1 and 2

    (d) Neither 1 nor 2

  • Why risk-monitoring in the Himalayas is like looking for ‘needles in haystacks’

    Why risk-monitoring in the Himalayas is like looking for ‘needles in haystacks’

    Why in the News

    A Senior Fellow of the Energy, Water and Sustainability Program at the Stimson Center, a US based non-profit think tank, has set out the sequence of the recent Nepal flood and the lessons it holds for hazard monitoring across the Himalayas.

    What triggered the Nepal flood, and why is the trigger still uncertain?

    1. A glacial detachment carrying bedrock: The present consensus is that the initial trigger was a glacial detachment that included bedrock on the northern slopes of Langtang Lirung, a 7,000-plus-metre peak in the Langtang range.
    2. The triggering process is not understood: The failure could be related to climate-related risks or to gradual shifts at the site itself.
    3. A slow creep, then a tipping point: Preliminary analysis indicates minor movement of the glacial mass in the weeks or months before the event, followed by a tipping point.

    How did a single glacial failure cascade more than 100 kilometres downstream?

    1. The descent: The failed mass swept down a gully toward the Lhende River, which reaches the Chinese border. The source area was around 5,200 metres, so the flow descended a couple of thousand metres.
    2. A temporary natural dam: The flow deposited a mixture of ice, rock and sediment that blocked the river.
    3. Three contested water sources: Debate continues on how much water came from the glacier itself, from melting of entrained ice, and from water that accumulated behind the landslide dam.
    4. Nine minutes to the border: The dam failed and sent a major pulse of water downstream, which reached the China border in roughly nine minutes. Footage from the Gyirong border facility shows a massive dark wave carrying a large volume of material, not just water.
    5. Back into Nepal within seconds: The border facility sat at a confluence with the Gyirong River tributary, and within seconds of hitting it the flow was already moving back into Nepal. There was no realistic opportunity to warn communities downstream, and many of those who could have generated an alert were themselves swept away.
    6. Dams, hydropower and villages: The flow destroyed dams and hydropower projects downstream, recruited additional sediment, and swept through villages along the river corridor.
    7. Beyond every mapped floodplain: The event continued into Nuwakot district and affected larger market towns in the floodplain, in areas well beyond the 100-year or 500-year floodplain (the extent a flood of that average recurrence interval is expected to reach). This was a thousand-year-plus flood event.
    8. Registered at the India-Nepal border: Significant impacts extended more than 100 kilometres downstream, and the flood pulse also registered at the India-Nepal border.

    Why are cascading hazard chains the larger Himalayan problem?

    1. A pattern across three countries: The same chain has appeared in Chamoli, in Sikkim with the South Lhonak GLOF (glacial lake outburst flood), and in Nepal with the Melamchi disaster.
    2. Climate risk as an amplifier: Climate risks are interacting with and amplifying other disaster risks, and these events are becoming more frequent and more intense.

    Why does hazard monitoring keep missing the sites that fail?

    1. Known high-risk sites exist, and this was not one: Several places around Nepal have been identified as high-risk areas for glacial detachment and surges, and glaciers immediately on the other side of Langtang Lirung are high-priority research sites. This particular location had no red flags.
    2. Hindsight still needs a target: Analysts are examining whether changes could have been detected in the days before the event, but that would still require knowing where to look.
    3. No signal to separate from noise: Monitoring every glacier and every mountainside that could collapse is not feasible without some signal that narrows the search.
    4. Satellites answer only the question they were pointed at: Remote sensing and satellite-based analysis are important, but different satellite tools answer different questions, and each needs a target. Engaging local communities is how the target is found.
    5. Almost every event came from an unknown place: Of over a dozen extreme events in the Himalayas over 10 years, almost all came from unknown places, the South Lhonak GLOF being the one known risk.
    6. No borrowed training data: Patterns are beginning to emerge, but no training dataset from the Alps or Norway can simply be transferred to the Himalayas, which have their own context and significant data scarcity and data sparsity.

    What monitoring triangle does the interview propose for India, Nepal and the Himalayas?

    1. Mapping is the baseline: The mapping exercise undertaken by India’s Home Ministry and space agencies to monitor glacial lakes and hazards is an absolute necessity. Nepal does not have the same level of resources. Some mapping has been done there, and it is not as comprehensive.
    2. Maps enable zoning; monitoring is the key: Once maps exist, hazard zoning and modelling can begin, but detection depends on continuous monitoring.
    3. Corner one, remote sensing: Remote sensing and satellite imagery form one part of the triangle.
    4. Corner two, fixed station networks: Hydromet (hydrological and meteorological) and seismic stations form the second.
    5. Corner three, localised monitoring through local government: Local governments, disaster managers and Community Disaster Management Committees can collect local data, report landslides and monitor impacts after storms.
    6. Localised monitoring through people immersed in the terrain: Yak herders and fishermen notice changes in rivers, glaciers and glacial lakes. Oral histories with elders reveal smaller avalanches, glacial-lake floods and other events that science has not recorded, helping identify potential hotspots.
    7. The combination is the detector: Combining the station network, remote sensing and localised monitoring gives a better chance of detecting changes and distinguishing the signal from the noise that tells you where to look.

    Challenges to Himalayan hazard monitoring

    1. Hydropower sited in hazard corridors without upstream sensing: Projects sit in narrow gorges below unstable ice and rock with no instrument between the source and the intake. Eg. The February 2021 Chamoli rock and ice avalanche from Ronti peak destroyed the Rishiganga and Tapovan-Vishnugad projects with no upstream warning.
      The Fix: Make a hazard chain assessment and ridge line sensors with satellite telemetry a condition of clearance for every Himalayan hydropower project.
    2. Instruments die with the event they are meant to detect: A sensor placed at the lake or in the channel is destroyed by the first surge and reports nothing. Eg. Monitoring equipment installed at South Lhonak lake in September 2023 was washed away in the October 2023 outburst that also breached the Teesta III dam at Chungthang.
      The Fix: Place redundant stations on high ground and at staggered distances downstream so at least one survives to trigger sirens.
    3. Cross-border flows carry no shared alert: The upstream country holds the first minutes of warning and no protocol obliges it to pass them on. Eg. India’s hydrological data sharing arrangement with China on the Brahmaputra lapsed in 2023.
      The Fix: Adopt a Hindu Kush Himalaya alert protocol through the International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD) that pushes automatic upstream alerts to downstream disaster authorities within minutes.
    4. Warnings that never reach the last mile: A satellite detection is useless to a village asleep in a gorge with no siren and no signal. Eg. The Sikkim outburst struck after 10 pm on 3 October 2023 and reached the Teesta valley settlements in the dark.
      The Fix: Pair the National Disaster Management Authority’s Common Alerting Protocol based cell broadcast with battery-backed community sirens in every mapped downstream settlement.

    Conclusion

    India has the baseline map; Nepal has part of one. Neither has the monitoring triangle that turns a map into a warning. The unresolved gap is that detection still depends on knowing where to look, and the herders, fishermen and village committees who hold that knowledge are not yet wired into any station network. The test of the next monsoon is whether a single high mountain site with no red flag gets watched because a community reported it first.

    Back2Basics

    1. What it is: A sudden release of water from a lake formed by melting glaciers, held back by a natural dam of loose moraine debris or ice rather than bedrock.
    2. How it starts: An avalanche, rockfall or ice calving into the lake sends a displacement wave over the dam, or seepage erodes the moraine from within until it collapses.
    3. Why it is deadlier than a rain flood: The surge carries rock and sediment, arrives with minutes of warning, and can breach infrastructure far below the lake.
    4. India’s framework: The National Disaster Management Authority issued dedicated guidelines on GLOF and Landslide Lake Outburst Flood management in 2020.

    [2021, GS1, 15 marks] How does the melting of the Arctic ice and glaciers of the Antarctic differently affect the weather patterns and human activities on the Earth? Explain. (250 words)

  • After hottest August, bleak outlook for September rain

    After hottest August, bleak outlook for September rain

    Why in the News

    The India Meteorological Department (IMD) has forecast September rainfall at least 9 per cent short of the long period average of 167.9 mm, the average rainfall recorded for that month over several decades against which every seasonal forecast is stated.

    What does the September outlook actually say?

    1. September carries about a fifth of the season’s rain: July contributes 32 per cent and August 29 per cent of the June to September monsoon total.
    2. Some regions are exempt from the deficit call: Parts of northwest, northeast, east and east-central India and isolated areas of southeast peninsular India could receive “normal to above-normal rainfall”.
    3. Temperatures are forecast above normal at both ends: Maximum temperatures are expected above normal over most of India and minimum temperatures above normal over most areas.
    4. Recent Septembers have run against the longer pattern: September rainfall has seen a relative uptick in recent years.
    5. The previous outlook proved accurate: The IMD’s 31 July outlook had indicated below normal rainfall for August over much of the country, and the agency assessed that it matched observations over many regions.

    What made August the hottest since 1901?

    1. The average minimum temperature was the highest on record: It reached 24.36 degrees Celsius for the month.
    2. Rainfall was among the lowest for the month this century: India received 213.3 mm in August, the seventh lowest since 2001.
    3. El Nino is the stated cause: The IMD Director General attributed the heat to the ongoing El Nino, which dries out the atmosphere and raises temperatures.
    4. The month was not uniformly dry: Repeated low pressure systems brought heavy rain across the Indo-Gangetic Plains and parts of central and eastern India.
    5. The warming phase is expected to strengthen: IMD models indicate El Nino conditions will intensify through the remainder of the 2026 southwest monsoon season.

    Why did an unusually long run of low pressure days not lift the rainfall total?

    1. Four systems persisted for 26 days: Low pressure systems, the precursors to cyclonic storms, lasted a combined 26 days in August against a climatological average of 16.3 days.
    2. The systems all took the same track: They formed repeatedly over the Bay of Bengal, moved west-northwest and weakened over central and northern India.
    3. Their rain stayed within one belt: Rainfall activity from those systems was confined to the Indo-Gangetic Plain.
    4. Western Disturbances narrowed the spread further: These extra-tropical storms originating in the Mediterranean interacted with the monsoon circulation and with low pressure and cyclonic circulations. The interaction concentrated intense rainfall over eastern, east-central and parts of northwestern India rather than producing a widespread monsoon revival.

    How uneven has the season been across regions?

    1. Only central India ended August in surplus: Every other region closed the month below its normal cumulative rainfall.
    2. Three large regions carry the shortfall: The northwest, the east and northeast, and the south peninsula all recorded deficits.
    3. The deficit is deepest in the east and the south: The shortfall was particularly pronounced in the east and northeast and in the southern peninsula.
    4. A dry September would land on the same regions: Many parts of the country are expected to remain drier than normal, so the areas already short of rain gain no correction from the final month.

    Challenges to seasonal monsoon forecasting in India

    1. Seasonal skill is weakest exactly where it is needed: A national rainfall percentage carries far more confidence than the district level distribution a farmer sows against. Eg. The August forecast was correct on direction at the national level and did not anticipate that the month’s rain would concentrate on the Indo-Gangetic Plain.
      The Fix: Publish probabilistic district level outlooks with stated confidence intervals alongside the national figure, so an advisory can be issued at the scale sowing decisions are taken.
    2. The benchmark itself shifts: The long period average is recalculated against a moving set of decades, so a deficit against one baseline is not comparable with a deficit against another. Eg. The IMD revised the all-India seasonal normal downward when it updated the reference period, which changed what counted as a normal monsoon year.
      The Fix: Fix a published revision cycle for the normals and report every seasonal figure against both the old and the new baseline in the transition year.
    3. A normal seasonal total conceals destructive intensity: Rainfall delivered in a few heavy spells produces flooding and crop loss even where the season closes at normal. Eg. Kerala in 2018 recorded heavy concentrated spells in August that caused the State’s worst floods in a century.
      The Fix: Report the number of heavy and very heavy rainfall days alongside the seasonal total, so intensity enters the headline measure.
    4. El Nino does not translate into deficit with any reliability: The correlation between a warm Pacific and a weak Indian monsoon holds on average and fails in individual years. Eg. 1997 was among the strongest El Nino years on record and India’s monsoon rainfall that year was normal.
      The Fix: Report the Indian Ocean Dipole state and the Madden-Julian Oscillation phase alongside El Nino, since these are the drivers that offset it.
    5. A rainfall deficit becomes a crop loss through irrigation gaps: Under half of India’s net sown area is irrigated, so a shortfall passes directly into kharif output and food prices. Eg. Marathwada’s consecutive deficit years in 2015 and 2016 emptied reservoirs and forced water to be moved to Latur by rail.
      The Fix: Tie contingency crop planning and seed buffer releases to the mid-season forecast rather than to the end of season assessment.

    Conclusion

    Overall, the September outlook highlights the increasing variability of India’s monsoon. Better regional forecasting, climate monitoring, water management and timely farm advisories can help reduce the impact of rainfall deficits and build greater climate resilience.

    Back2Basics: El Nino Southern Oscillation

    1. What it is: The El Nino Southern Oscillation (ENSO) is the coupled ocean and atmosphere cycle in the tropical Pacific that redistributes rainfall across the tropics on a two to seven year rhythm.
    2. Three phases: El Nino is the warm phase, La Nina the cool phase, and the neutral phase sits between them.
    3. How it is measured: The Oceanic Nino Index tracks sea surface temperature anomalies in the central Pacific Nino 3.4 region, and the Southern Oscillation Index tracks the sea level pressure difference between Tahiti and Darwin.
    4. Why India tracks it: El Nino years are statistically associated with weaker southwest monsoon rainfall, and a positive Indian Ocean Dipole can partly offset that effect.

    “[2015, GS1, 12.5 marks] How far do you agree that the behavior of the Indian monsoon has been changing due to humanizing landscapes? Discuss.”

  • Jharkhand, Bihar sign pact on Sone water sharing

    Jharkhand, Bihar sign pact on Sone water sharing

    Why in the News

    Bihar and Jharkhand have signed a memorandum of understanding on sharing the water of the Sone river, allocating 5.75 million acre feet to Bihar and 2 million acre feet to Jharkhand.

    What has been agreed on the Sone, and what was in dispute?

    1. The dispute was over one inherited allocation: The 1973 agreement allotted 7.75 million acre feet (MAF), one acre foot being the volume that covers an acre of land to a depth of a foot, or about 1,233 cubic metres, to then undivided Bihar.
    2. Bihar takes the larger share: The formal consensus allocates 5.75 MAF of the river’s water to Bihar.
    3. Jharkhand takes the remainder: The remaining 2 MAF is allocated to Jharkhand.
    4. The route chosen is agreement rather than adjudication: The States settled by memorandum instead of taking the claim to a tribunal constituted under the Inter-State River Water Disputes Act, 1956.

    What does the settlement change on the ground?

    1. A long-pending eastern India dispute closes: The agreement resolves a water dispute that had run unresolved between the two States since the bifurcation.
    2. Irrigation is the stated primary gain: It is expected to provide irrigation water to lakhs of farmers in rural Bihar and rural Jharkhand.
    3. Drinking water supply is the second use: It is also expected to supply drinking water to a large population across both States.
    4. It is the fourth such deal this year: This is the fourth water agreement concluded between States in the year, each intended to raise water availability for irrigation, rural development and drinking purposes.

    Challenges to the Sone water sharing agreement

    1. An executive memorandum carries no adjudicatory backing: A memorandum binds two governments politically and gives neither a forum to enforce it when a release is withheld. Eg. The Krishna and Cauvery allocations required tribunal awards under the Inter-State River Water Disputes Act, 1956 and were litigated for decades afterwards.
      The Fix: Convert the split into a scheduled allocation under a joint Sone board with a statutory review clause and a defined dispute reference.
    2. A fixed annual quantity assumes a fixed annual yield: An allocation stated in acre feet holds only in a normal year, and the Sone’s flow is monsoon dominated and highly variable. Eg. The Indrapuri barrage at Dehri has repeatedly failed to fill its canal command in deficit years.
      The Fix: Restate the split as a share of realised flow measured at agreed gauging points, with a separate lean season protocol.
    3. No joint measurement machinery is named: Neither State is committed to a common gauging point or a common data record, so each will compute its own entitlement from its own readings. Eg. The Cauvery dispute turned for years on the absence of agreed real-time flow data at the inter-State point.
      The Fix: Install telemetered gauges at the State boundary and publish daily flow and release data on a single public portal.
    4. Upstream storage decisions sit outside the deal: New reservoirs and diversions on tributaries above the boundary change what reaches the downstream State without breaching any allocation figure. Eg. Storage projects on Sone basin tributaries in Jharkhand alter the flow arriving at Bihar’s canal headworks.
      The Fix: Make any new storage above the boundary subject to prior consultation with a defined objection window for the downstream State.
    5. Delivery efficiency is untouched by the allocation: A larger paper share does not reach a farmer where the canal system loses much of the release before the tail end. Eg. Unlined and silted distributaries in the Sone canal command leave tail end villages dependent on groundwater in the same season the head reach is irrigated.
      The Fix: Tie the drawal of the agreed share to verified canal lining and command area development milestones reported annually.

    Conclusion

    Bihar-Jharkhand Sone water agreement is a positive step toward cooperative river management, improving irrigation and drinking water availability. With transparent monitoring, flexible sharing during droughts and joint planning, it can ensure long-term water security and regional development.

    Back2Basics: Sone River

    1. Source and course: It rises on the Amarkantak plateau in Madhya Pradesh, close to the source of the Narmada, and flows in the opposite direction to it.
    2. Status in the Ganga system: It is the largest of the southern tributaries of the Ganga, and it joins the main river upstream of Patna.
    3. States traversed: Its course runs through Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Bihar.
    4. Principal structure: The Indrapuri barrage at Dehri feeds the Sone canal system, among the oldest large canal networks built in India.

    “[2013, GS2, 10 marks] Constitutional mechanisms to resolve the inter-state water disputes have failed to address and solve the problems. Is the failure due to structural or process inadequacy or both? Discuss.”

  • A Himalayan tragedy

    Why in the News

    Scientists investigating the flash flood on the Bhotekoshi river in Nepal have attributed it to a sturzstrom, a high speed rock and ice avalanche near Langtang Lirung on the Nepal China border, rather than to a glacial lake outburst flood (GLOF). The reattribution matters because a flood on the same river in July of the previous year, which also occurred without rainfall, was concluded to be a glacial lake outburst flood, and that conclusion shaped what was being watched for. The flood struck at around 8.40 a.m. and has left more than 600 dead and close to 2,500 missing, including foreign nationals, mostly from India. What is now contested is whether a monitoring and warning system built around glacial lakes can see a hazard that begins as a bedrock and ice collapse.

    What is a sturzstrom?

    1. The definition: A massive rock avalanche in which a large volume of rock suddenly collapses and travels at extremely high speed over a long distance.
    2. Its high mountain form: Where the collapsing rock is mixed with ice, snow, firn and frozen soil, the same event is described as a rock and ice avalanche.
    3. Why the runout is so long: Pressure and friction inside the moving mass generate meltwater, which lubricates the mass and its base, reduces resistance and carries the debris much further than a dry rockslide would.
    4. How it ends: As it descends it takes in more ice, snow, rock, soil and water, and can transform into a massive debris flow before depositing its material.

    Why was the glacial lake explanation set aside?

    1. The precedent pointed the other way: A rainless flood on the Bhotekoshi in July of the previous year was concluded by scientists to be associated with a glacial lake outburst flood, so that was the first hypothesis tested.
    2. The velocity did not fit: The speed and ferocity of this flood, which washed away villages across three districts, Rasuwa, Nuwakot and Dhading, prompted experts to examine it from a different angle.
    3. The onset signature differs: A lake breach releases a stored volume over a measurable period, while this flood arrived with no such build up recorded at downstream gauges.
    4. It has no Nepali precedent: No comparable disaster involving a sturzstrom had been recorded in Nepal before this event.

    What does the transboundary geography add to the problem?

    1. The source area straddles the border: Nepalese and Chinese authorities have concluded that the source lay in the Langtang Lirung area, and identifying the exact collapse point and which side of the boundary it sat on may not be possible.
    2. The trigger was a compound event: Satellite imagery shared by the Chinese side pointed to a combination of an ice avalanche, permafrost movement and a rockslide, with the rockslide on the Chinese side and its impact extending into Nepal.
    3. The avalanche began in Nepal: A senior divisional hydrologist at Nepal’s Department of Hydrology and Meteorology states the avalanche originated on Nepalese territory very close to the boundary and induced flooding that crossed into China, damaging both sides.
    4. The channel is itself transboundary: The location identified is the Lhende Khola, a high altitude river rising in Gyirong County in Tibet and flowing south into Nepal as a tributary of the Bhotekoshi and Trishuli systems.
    5. The corridor carries trade and pilgrims: Rasuwagadhi in Rasuwa is the checkpoint through which most of Nepal’s trade with China passes, and from May to September hundreds of pilgrims cross there into Tibet for the Kailash Mansarovar pilgrimage, with Indians the largest share.

    How far did early warning and climate attribution actually get?

    1. The systems worked and still failed: Experts state that early warning systems were activated as intended but were rendered ineffective by the speed of the flood.
    2. The structural difficulty is the terrain: The head of the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR) has said the event again showed how fragile mountain ecosystems are and how hard it is to build early warning in mountain environments.
    3. Attribution stops short of a direct link: Scientists have not ruled out a role for climate change and point to rising temperatures warming the Himalayas and accelerating glacier melt, without directly linking this disaster to global warming.
    4. Access is limiting the assessment itself: The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) reports that remoteness combined with damaged infrastructure is obstructing both damage assessment and the delivery of assistance, with around 93,000 people estimated to be affected.

    What does the 2021 Chamoli comparison establish?

    1. The mechanism has an Indian precedent: The 2021 Chamoli disaster in Uttarakhand began with a bedrock failure beneath a glacier, which triggered a rock and ice avalanche that transformed into a debris flow and flood.
    2. It is described the same way in the literature: Chamoli has been scientifically described as a rock and ice avalanche and, in some literature, explicitly as a sturzstrom.
    3. The scale of material involved: Research found that more than 25 million cubic metres of rock and ice broke loose high in the Uttarakhand Himalaya before moving rapidly downstream.
    4. The comparison narrows the watch list: Two events of the same mechanism a few years apart in the same mountain system establish an unstable rock and ice slope, not only a moraine dammed lake, as a recurring source of catastrophic flooding.

    Challenges to early warning in high mountain catchments

    1. The monitored hazard is the wrong hazard: Warning networks in the Himalaya are built around glacial lake inventories and lake level telemetry, which observe nothing at an unstable rock and ice face. Eg. Nepal’s national hazard inventories catalogue glacial lakes by area and moraine condition, with no equivalent register of unstable rock and ice faces. Fix. Add slope stability and permafrost monitoring at identified rock and ice faces to the existing glacial lake inventories.
    2. Lead time collapses to minutes: A sturzstrom accelerates and reaches settlements in the time a lake outburst would take to build, so a warning chain designed for hours has nothing to work with. Eg. Riverside towns such as Betrawati in Nuwakot were buried on the same morning the collapse occurred. Fix. Move from advisory dissemination to automatic siren triggering at gauge stations, removing the human decision step from the chain.
    3. The hazard does not respect the border: The collapse zone straddles the Nepal China boundary, so neither state’s monitoring network alone observes the full source area. Eg. The trigger was established only from satellite imagery shared by the Chinese side. Fix. Put the Lhende Khola and comparable transboundary catchments under a standing data sharing arrangement with agreed real time thresholds.
    4. Exposure is concentrated in the valley floor: Trade routes, hydropower works, bazaars and pilgrimage traffic all occupy the same narrow corridor a debris flow uses. Eg. The Rasuwagadhi corridor carries most of Nepal’s China trade and the seasonal Kailash Mansarovar pilgrimage. Fix. Apply a debris flow runout based building line along these corridors rather than a flood return period line drawn from rainfall records.
    5. Assessment capacity fails exactly when it is needed: Remote terrain and destroyed access mean the size of the disaster is unknown for weeks, which delays both relief and reconstruction decisions. Eg. Officials state the full scale of damage may take weeks or months to assess. Fix. Pre position aerial survey and satellite tasking agreements so a post event damage assessment does not depend on ground access.

    Conclusion

    The scientific account of this flood has moved from a glacial lake outburst to a sturzstrom originating on an unstable rock and ice slope near the Nepal China border. That shift changes what has to be monitored, since a lake inventory does not observe a bedrock face, and it places the source area inside a boundary zone neither country monitors alone. Search and rescue continues with more than 15,000 personnel deployed. The next milestone is the joint Nepalese and Chinese determination of the exact collapse point, which will decide whether transboundary monitoring of that catchment is put in place.

    Back2Basics: Glacial Lake Outburst Flood (GLOF)

    1. What it is: The sudden release of water held in a glacial lake, which sends a large volume downstream in a short period.
    2. How the lake forms: Meltwater collects behind a moraine ridge or an ice dam left by a retreating glacier, so the impounding structure is loose debris or ice rather than rock.
    3. What breaches it: Overtopping by an avalanche or landslide into the lake, seepage that erodes the moraine from within, or failure of the ice dam itself.
    4. Why it is tracked in the Himalaya: Glacier retreat is adding to both the number and the volume of these lakes, which is why national inventories monitor them and why they were the first explanation tested for this flood.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2021, GS1, 10 marks] Differentiate the causes of landslides in the Himalayan region and Western Ghats. (150 words) हिमालय क्षेत्र तथा पश्चिमी घाटों में भू-स्खलनों के विभिन्न कारणों का अंतर स्पष्ट कीजिए। (150 शब्दों में उत्तर दीजिए)”

  • Congress-ruled states to move court against new mines law

    Why in the News

    State governments where the Congress is in power are preparing to challenge the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2026 in the Supreme Court, on the ground that it undermines the rights of the States. The Act, passed by the House on 13 August 2026, seeks to curb the power of States to levy taxes on mineral rights and mineral bearing lands. That power was confirmed as belonging to the States by a nine judge Bench two years ago, so the dispute is over whether Parliament can legislate away a taxing entry the Court has read as independent.

    What is the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957?

    1. What it is: The Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957, referred to as the MMDR Act, is the parent law governing every mineral in India except petroleum and natural gas.
    2. The core split it creates: The State Government owns the mineral in its territory. The Central Government decides the rules, fixes the royalty rate for major minerals and, for some categories, conducts the auction.
    3. How a block reaches a miner: Someone auctions the block, the State signs the lease, and the company mines. The State signs the lease in every case, including where the Centre ran the auction.
    4. Where the money goes: Royalty, dead rent and the auction premium go to the State in every case, with offshore blocks the only exception.

    What is the current status of State taxing power over minerals in India?

    1. The settled position since 2024: A nine judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Mineral Area Development Authority v Steel Authority of India, decided eight to one in 2024, held that States hold an independent power under Entry 50 of the State List to levy taxes on mineral rights, and that the MMDR Act does not take that power away.
    2. The distinction the ruling rests on: Royalty is not a tax. It is consideration paid to the State as the owner of the mineral, which is why a State levy on mineral rights is a separate and additional exercise of power.
    3. What the ruling overturned: India Cement v State of Tamil Nadu (1990), which had held royalty to be a tax and State cesses on royalty to be beyond State competence, stands overruled.
    4. The recovery window: States may recover past dues from 1 April 2005, in instalments spread over twelve years beginning 1 April 2026, without interest or penalty on the earlier period.
    5. What the ruling did not give the States: It conferred a power to tax mineral rights, not a power to fix the royalty rate. Royalty rates for major minerals continue to be set centrally under the Second Schedule to the MMDR Act.
    6. What the 2026 amendment now does to that position: The Act passed on 13 August 2026 seeks to curb the power of States to levy taxes on mineral rights and mineral bearing lands, which is the power the 2024 ruling had recognised.

    Constitutional Provisions Related to Mineral Rights and Legislative Competence

    1. Entry 54, Union List: Regulation of mines and mineral development, to the extent that Parliament by law declares such Union control to be expedient in the public interest.
    2. Entry 23, State List: Regulation of mines and mineral development, expressly made subject to the provisions of Entry 54 of the Union List.
    3. Entry 50, State List: Taxes on mineral rights, subject to any limitations imposed by Parliament by law relating to mineral development.
    4. Entry 49, State List: Taxes on lands and buildings, the entry under which States tax mineral bearing land.
    5. Entry 55, Union List: Regulation of labour and safety in mines and oilfields.
    6. Article 297: Vests in the Union all lands, minerals and other things of value underlying the ocean within the territorial waters, the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone.
    7. Article 246: Distributes legislative power between Parliament and the State legislatures across the three Lists.
    8. Article 265: Provides that no tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law.
    9. Article 131: Confers original jurisdiction on the Supreme Court in a dispute between the Government of India and one or more States, the route through which a State sues over a central statute.

    What is royalty on minerals?

    1. What it is: Royalty is the payment a lessee makes to the owner of the mineral for the mineral removed or consumed, calculated mostly on an ad valorem basis on the average sale price published by the Indian Bureau of Mines.
    2. Who sets it and who receives it: The Centre fixes the rate for major minerals through the Second Schedule to the MMDR Act, and the State fixes it for minor minerals. The State Government receives it in both cases.

    What is a minor mineral?

    1. The statutory definition: Section 3(e) of the MMDR Act names building stones, gravel, ordinary clay and ordinary sand as minor minerals, and allows the Centre to notify any other mineral as minor. Everything not notified as minor is a major mineral, defined negatively with no positive list.
    2. Who controls them: Section 15 gives States exclusive power to frame minor mineral rules and to fix minor mineral royalty, so the Centre’s power over minor minerals is limited to deciding what enters the category.

    What does the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2026 change?

    1. The core change: The Act seeks to curb the power of States to levy taxes on mineral rights and on mineral bearing lands.
    2. The scope claimed for it: The Centre states that it is seeking to regulate only major minerals such as coal, limestone, iron ore, copper and manganese.
    3. What is stated to be left untouched: The States would continue to have powers over 49 minor minerals.
    4. The stated purpose: The Union Minister of Mines told the Rajya Sabha that the legislation does not seek to interfere with the autonomy or revenue rights of States, and that it aims only to ensure uniform mineral rates across the country.
    5. The stage it has reached: The Act was passed by the House on 13 August 2026.

    Which States are challenging the Act and on what ground?

    1. The States on board: Karnataka, Telangana and Himachal Pradesh are already committed to challenging the amendment Act in the Supreme Court.
    2. The State still being negotiated: The Congress is in talks with its ally the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha to get the Jharkhand government to join the challenge.
    3. The stated ground: The party alleges that the law undermines the rights of the States.
    4. The demand short of litigation: The Karnataka Deputy Chief Minister urged the Centre to withdraw the amendment Act, objecting to its restrictive provisions.
    5. The federal framing from Kerala: The Kerala Chief Minister stated that the amendments to the Act are against federal principles.

    How can a State challenge a central law?

    1. The original suit route: A State may institute an original suit against the Government of India in the Supreme Court under Article 131, which is the route available where the dispute involves a question on which a legal right of the State depends.
    2. The writ route is not open to a State in the same way: Article 32 is a remedy for enforcement of fundamental rights, and a State is not a person entitled to fundamental rights, so a State ordinarily proceeds under Article 131 rather than Article 32.
    3. Why the choice of route matters here: An Article 131 suit frames the matter as a Centre State dispute over legislative competence rather than as a grievance of an affected mining company.
    4. The competence question that will be argued: The dispute turns on whether the 2026 Act is a limitation of the kind Entry 50 permits Parliament to impose, or an extinguishing of the entry itself.
    5. The precedent that will be relied on: The 2024 nine judge ruling held that the MMDR Act as it then stood did not take away the Entry 50 power, which leaves open whether a later Act can impose limitations that empty it.

    Major debates surrounding State taxation of mineral rights

    1. Ownership against regulation: The State owns the mineral and receives the royalty, while the Centre fixes the rate and writes the rules, so the party bearing the social and environmental cost of mining does not set the price of it.
    2. Competing readings of one entry: Entry 50 is read either as a State power with a boundary Parliament may draw, or as a power Parliament may narrow until nothing is left of it.
    3. A tax entry against a regulatory entry: Entry 54 of the Union List is a regulatory entry over mineral development, and the question is whether a regulatory power carries with it the power to restrict a taxing entry in the State List.
    4. Two landmark rulings in tension: India Cement (1990) treated royalty as a tax and denied State competence, and Mineral Area Development Authority (2024) treated royalty as consideration and affirmed it, so the sector has operated under opposite rules within one generation.
    5. Uniform rates against fiscal autonomy: Uniform mineral rates across the country lower input cost volatility for steel, aluminium, cement and power, and remove a revenue instrument from the States where those minerals lie.
    6. The retrospective recovery question: Permitting recovery of dues from 1 April 2005 in instalments from 1 April 2026 exposes mineral users to a large accumulated liability, which is the practical trigger for legislative intervention.
    7. The empirical gap the dispute turns on: There is no agreed estimate of what the recovered dues and future State levies would add to the delivered cost of coal, iron ore and limestone, so both the revenue claim and the input cost claim rest on projections.

    Challenges to the new mineral taxation framework

    1. A single change alters two revenue streams at once: Curbing taxes on mineral rights and on mineral bearing lands touches Entry 50 and Entry 49 together, so States lose both an activity based and a property based levy. Eg. Several mineral States had begun framing levies immediately after the 2024 ruling recognised the Entry 50 power.
    2. Litigation freezes revenue planning on both sides: States cannot budget on a levy under challenge, and miners cannot provide for a liability that may be extinguished. Eg. Karnataka, Telangana and Himachal Pradesh have already committed to moving the Supreme Court against the Act.
    3. Uniform national rates ignore differences in deposit quality: A single rate across States taxes a high grade and a low grade deposit identically, which penalises the State with the harder ore body. Eg. Iron ore grades differ sharply between Odisha, Karnataka and Goa, with different beneficiation costs.
    4. The retrospective window collides with the amendment: Recovery of dues from 1 April 2005 was to start in instalments from 1 April 2026, the same period in which the curbing Act was passed. Eg. The twelve year instalment schedule the Court allowed begins precisely when the new restriction takes effect.
    5. The distinction between royalty and tax remains contestable in practice: A State levy structured on the royalty amount can be characterised as a tax on mineral rights or as a levy on land, which invites classification disputes at every notification. Eg. District Mineral Foundation contributions are already computed on the royalty amount rather than on sale value.
    6. Mining States bear the externalities regardless of the tax outcome: Land degradation, dust pollution, groundwater disruption and displacement fall on the district whether or not the State can levy. Eg. The mineral belt overlaps the Fifth Schedule tribal belt almost exactly.
    7. Investment decisions stall while competence is unsettled: Long gestation mining projects require certainty on the total payment stack over a fifty year lease. Eg. A mining lease under the MMDR Act runs for fifty years, far longer than the litigation cycle over the levy.

    Conclusion

    The Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2026 has been passed by the House on 13 August 2026 and seeks to curb State powers to tax mineral rights and mineral bearing lands. The next step is a challenge in the Supreme Court, with Karnataka, Telangana and Himachal Pradesh committed and Jharkhand still under negotiation, and the source states no date for filing. The dispute is not about who owns the mineral, which is settled, but about whether a taxing entry in the State List can be narrowed by a central law made under a regulatory entry in the Union List. Until that is answered, the sector operates with two revenue claims on the same rupee.

    “[2025] Consider the following statements:

    Statement I: In India, State Governments have no power for making rules for grant of concessions in respect of extraction of minor minerals even though such minerals are located in their territories.

    Statement II: In India, the Central Government has the power to notify minor minerals under the relevant law.

    Which one of the following is correct in respect of the above statements?

    (a) Both Statement I and Statement II are correct and Statement II explains Statement I

    (b) Both Statement I and Statement II are correct but Statement II does not explain Statement I

    (c) Statement I is correct but Statement II is not correct

    (d) Statement I is not correct but Statement II is correct |