From 1991, Three Foreign Policy Lessons for Managing Disruption of Certainties

Why in the News:

The war that began with the killing of Iran’s Supreme Leader on February 28, together with the fifth year of the Russia Ukraine war, is disrupting India’s energy costs, Strait of Hormuz navigation, and diplomatic balancing, echoing the twin 1990 to 1991 shocks of the Gulf War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. The parallel is used to argue that India’s current foreign policy debate repeats an old pattern of ideological sympathy overriding interest based assessment of unstable partners.

What is the current disruption, and how does it parallel 1990 to 1991?

1. The 1990 to 1991 shocks: Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 sent oil prices soaring, disrupted remittances, and aggravated India’s Balance of Payments (BoP) crisis. Within months, the Soviet Union, India’s principal Cold War partner, collapsed.
2. The present disruption: The Iran war has raised energy costs and disrupted navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. A June US-Iran Memorandum of Understanding that briefly eased tensions proved premature as the conflict escalated again.
3. Ukraine’s unresolved war: The Russia Ukraine war has entered its fifth year without settlement. While Russia is not disintegrating as the Soviet Union did, the mounting costs of the war raise questions about its future.
4. Immediate US pressure: Proposed US sanctions legislation, associated with the late Senator Lindsey Graham, seeks punitive tariffs on China, India, and other importers of Russian oil. President Donald Trump has also called for extending similar measures to Iranian oil, increasing pressure on India’s energy diplomacy.
5. India’s changed capacity: India is now better positioned than in 1991 due to its larger economy, greater diplomatic influence, and broader strategic partnerships, though it is also more exposed to global shocks.

How did ideological sympathy distort India’s reading of unstable partners in 1991, and how does the same pattern recur now?

1. Contradictory 1991 conduct: India evacuated its citizens from the Gulf, sought to preserve ties with Iraq and the Arab world, and simultaneously allowed American aircraft to refuel, while Foreign Minister I. K. Gujral publicly embraced Saddam Hussein.
2. Establishment sympathy misplacing priorities: Sections of India’s political and foreign policy establishment viewed Saddam Hussein’s confrontation with the United States as more significant than his annexation of Kuwait.
3. Similar rigidity toward Gorbachev: Some foreign policy voices criticised Mikhail Gorbachev for engaging with the West and even welcomed the August 1991 coup attempt by Soviet hardliners.
4. Present day repetition: Sympathy for Iran is often rooted in its opposition to the United States rather than an objective assessment of its domestic system. Debate on Russia is frequently personalised around Vladimir Putin and influenced by memories of Soviet era support, limiting analysis of Russia’s evolving relations with China, Europe, and the United States.

What three lessons does 1991 offer for managing the current disruption?

1. No balance of power is permanent: International politics is inherently uncertain. India’s foreign policy should prepare for discontinuity as much as continuity.
2. Debate is a strategic asset: A policy community dominated by consensus may overlook emerging risks. India needs stronger expertise on Russia, Iran, and Central Asia, along with institutions that encourage independent and contrarian analysis.
3. Domestic reform is the ultimate strength: India’s recovery in 1991 is attributed primarily to economic reforms, with diplomacy playing a supporting role. The same lesson applies today: domestic economic resilience is the foundation of effective foreign policy.

Conclusion:

The article argues that India’s foreign policy should be guided by national interest rather than ideological preferences or historical sentiment. Just as delayed recognition of geopolitical change complicated India’s response in 1991, excessive reliance on past assumptions may hinder its response to today’s crises involving Iran and Russia. The central lesson is that economic reform, strategic adaptability, and evidence based policy analysis remain the strongest tools for navigating an increasingly uncertain international order.