Why in the News
Bangladesh’s new Prime Minister, whose Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) returned to power in February 2026, is expected to visit New Delhi in November or December. The visit comes amid a mutual suspicion rooted in the 1971 Liberation War, which the overthrow of Sheikh Hasina in August 2024 has deepened.
Why does 1971 divide as much as it binds?
- Gratitude and resentment: Bangladesh’s elites have wavered between gratitude for India’s role in their liberation and resentment that India had to play liberator, a role they felt was theirs.
- Liberation narrative: Nations cherish stories in which they free themselves. The Mukti Bahini, Bangladesh’s liberation fighters, fought, but India delivered the decisive military blow against Pakistan.
- West Bengal fear: Dhaka feared that India’s policy would run through Hindu-majority West Bengal, whose cultural ties could weaken Bangladesh’s separate identity. Open borders revived memories of the Hindu bhadralok (gentry) dominating pre-Partition Bengal.
- The takeaway: The liberation that created the bond also created the resentment, so 1971 cuts both ways.
How did geography and identity politics deepen distrust?
- Encircling geography: Bangladesh is almost surrounded by India, across a border of over 4,000 km, and its main rivers rise in or cross India. So fear of Indian domination entered its nationalism.
- Islamic redefinition: Governments after Sheikh Mujib distanced themselves from India. Ziaur Rahman redefined Bangladeshi nationalism in Islamic terms, replacing the linguistic nationalism of the liberation movement.
- Counterweights: Dhaka sought closer ties with Pakistan, China and the United States. What New Delhi read as anti-Indianism was, for Dhaka, strategic autonomy, a weaker neighbour’s freedom to choose its partners.
- Partisan split: The Awami League carried the secular, Bengali-nationalist legacy of 1971 and favoured India, and the BNP stayed suspicious. Attitudes to India became part of the contest over national identity.
How did India’s bet on Sheikh Hasina backfire?
- One-party bet: India tied its interests to Ms. Hasina and the Awami League. As her rule grew authoritarian, New Delhi was seen as putting its security above Bangladesh’s democracy.
- Crisis of 2024: Her overthrow was a crisis for Indian policy, and her flight to India fed suspicion that New Delhi had propped up the old order.
- Extradition irritant: India’s refusal to extradite her keeps the “Hasina question” a major bilateral irritant.
Why can neither side afford alienation?
- Engagement resumed: Both capitals have compelling reasons to avoid permanent alienation, and functional engagement has resumed.
- Interest outlasts gratitude: India cannot expect gratitude for 1971 to be the permanent base of Bangladeshi foreign policy. Gratitude fades, but national interest tied to identity endures.
- Indispensable neighbour: No tie with Beijing, Islamabad or Washington can replace India, which is vital to Bangladesh’s connectivity.
- Shared security: The two countries’ security and stability are bound together, which is the most important legacy of 1971.
Challenges
- Teesta deadlock: A 2011 draft for 50:50 sharing of Teesta waters has not been implemented.
- Ganga treaty renewal: The Ganga Waters Treaty, 1996 expires in December 2026, with disputes over Farakka Barrage water levels.
- China’s inroads: Bangladesh has re-engaged China on the Teesta River Management Project. Eg. Upgrading the Lalmonirhat airfield near the Siliguri Corridor.
- Pakistan thaw: Bangladesh and Pakistan began trading directly in 2025 and revived direct flights and military contacts.
- “India Out” rhetoric: Anti-India campaigns run on Bangladeshi social media and campuses.
Way Forward
- Restraint on rivers: India should use its far greater power with restraint and drop demands for reciprocity in sharing river waters.
- Stop invoking 1971: Indian diplomacy should stop leaning on its liberation role, which feeds resentment.
- Autonomy without hostility: Dhaka should pursue ties with others without defining its autonomy through knee-jerk opposition to India.
- Basin-wide management: Both should manage all shared rivers together through the Joint Rivers Commission.
Conclusion
The relationship rests on a geography neither side can change and a politics both keep reopening. What to watch is whether the expected visit moves river water sharing and the Hasina question forward.
India-Bangladesh Relations
- Recognition: India was the first country to recognise Bangladesh as a separate state in 1971.
- Boundary settlement: The Land Boundary Agreement (2015) and the delimitation of the maritime boundary settled border disputes.
- Trade and credit: Bangladesh is India’s biggest trading partner in South Asia and the largest recipient of Indian Lines of Credit, over $8 billion.
- Shared rivers: The two share 54 rivers but have signed only two water treaties, on the Ganga and the Kushiyara.
Matching Previous Year Question
“No direct PYQ traced in the provided files. Thematic PYQ: [2026, GS2, 15 marks] “China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has transformed South Asia from a regional space into a theatre of great power competition.” Analyse the strategic implications of the BRI for India’s security and regional influence in South Asia.”
