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Subject: BilateralXNeighbourhood

  • India, Sri Lanka sign three defence sector MoUs during Rajnath’s visit

    Why in the News

    India and Sri Lanka have signed three Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) on defence equipment and training. The agreements cover the upgradation of L70 guns for the Sri Lanka Air Force and cooperation between the National Cadet Corps and the National Defence Colleges of the two countries. They follow the seven MoUs signed during the Prime Minister’s visit to Sri Lanka in 2025, one of which was an overarching defence sector agreement. This is the first visit by an Indian Defence Minister to Sri Lanka in nearly 40 years. Colombo used the meeting to repeat that its territory will not be used against India’s security interests, and to state that it enters agreements with countries around the world as a sovereign State.

    What do the three agreements cover?

    1. Air defence equipment: One MoU covers the upgradation of L70 guns for the Sri Lanka Air Force. The L70 is a 40 mm towed anti-aircraft gun of Bofors design, in service with air defence units across South Asia.
    2. Cadet training: A second covers cooperation between the National Cadet Corps of the two countries, the youth military training organisations that run school and college level cadet programmes.
    3. Professional military education: The third covers cooperation between the National Defence Colleges, which train senior officers and civil officials in national security strategy.

    What else did the two sides take up?

    1. The scope of the talks: The Defence Minister and the Sri Lankan President held extensive discussions on strengthening the defence, economic, maritime and regional partnerships between the two countries.
    2. Narcotics: The Sri Lankan President briefed the visiting Defence Minister on an islandwide programme recently launched to combat drug trafficking.
    3. Fisheries: The two leaders paid special attention to the fisheries issue in the Palk Strait.

    How did Colombo frame its assurance to India?

    1. The security assurance repeated: The Sri Lankan President recalled his interactions with the Prime Minister and reiterated that Sri Lanka would never allow its territory to be used for activities inimical to India’s security interests.
    2. A sovereignty qualifier alongside it: His office stated that Sri Lanka takes its decisions considering both national and regional interests.
    3. Room left for other partners: The same statement said Sri Lanka enters agreements with countries around the world as a sovereign State, remaining mindful of regional security.

    Challenges to India-Sri Lanka defence cooperation

    1. The fisheries dispute cuts against the security relationship: Bottom trawling by Indian vessels in Palk Bay waters produces arrests of Indian fishermen by the Sri Lanka Navy every year. Eg. Sri Lankan authorities detained hundreds of Indian fishermen and dozens of boats in 2024.
      The Fix: Convert the Joint Working Group on Fisheries into a scheduled mechanism with a funded deep-sea transition plan for Tamil Nadu trawler owners.
    2. Third-country naval access remains unsettled: Port calls by foreign research and survey vessels sit outside the bilateral defence understanding and are settled politically each time. Eg. The Chinese vessel Yuan Wang 5 docked at Hambantota in August 2022, and Sri Lanka later announced a one-year moratorium on foreign research vessels from January 2024.
      The Fix: Agree a standing notification and clearance protocol for survey and research vessels, so each visit follows a rule rather than a negotiation.
    3. Colombo’s fiscal position limits what it can absorb: Defence modernisation competes with debt servicing. Eg. Sri Lanka defaulted on its external debt in April 2022 and entered an International Monetary Fund programme in March 2023.
      The Fix: Structure transfers as grant-funded upgrades and training rather than as credit lines that add to the external debt stock.
    4. Political turnover reopens settled agreements: An understanding reached with one government has been cancelled by the next. Eg. The 2019 agreement with India and Japan to develop the East Container Terminal at Colombo Port was cancelled by Sri Lanka in 2021.
      The Fix: Anchor cooperation in institution-to-institution channels such as the annual defence dialogue and the Colombo Security Conclave, so continuity does not rest on one leadership.

    Conclusion

    Defence cooperation with Colombo has moved from a framework agreement to named equipment and training projects. Colombo has given the assurance India wanted and has paired it with a stated right to sign agreements elsewhere. Those two positions have not yet had to be reconciled in a concrete case, and the next one will define the limit of the assurance. The fisheries question is the immediate test, since both sides flagged it at this meeting and neither resolved it.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2022, GS2, 10.0 marks] India is an age-old friend of Sri Lanka.’ Discuss India’s role in the recent crisis in Sri Lanka the light of the preceding statement.”

  • ‘Early Harvest’ — larger but not necessarily safer

    ‘Early Harvest’ — larger but not necessarily safer

    Why in the News

    India and China have revived the formulation of an “Early and Substantial Harvest” on the boundary question in a joint document. The 25th round of talks between the Special Representatives (SRs), the designated political channel for the India-China boundary question, was held in Beijing. The readouts issued that evening avoided the phrase. An “Eight Points of Outcomes and Consensus” released a day later restored it. Point 3 tasked the Expert Group on Boundary Delimitation and the Working Group on Border Management with advancing discussions on an Early and Substantial Harvest of boundary delimitation and border management. Both bodies were set up a year ago under the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination (WMCC), the official level channel that manages border affairs between the two foreign ministries, and their first task is still to agree on their own terms of reference. The phrase is India’s own coinage, and its reappearance does not establish that Beijing has accepted the Indian version of it rather than a partial settlement confined to the stretches where the two claims already coincide.

    What is an “Early and Substantial Harvest”?

    1. A partial settlement taken ahead of a full one: It settles the boundary in the sectors where the two positions are closest, and leaves the harder sectors for later negotiation.
    2. India’s own formulation: After Beijing proposed settling the Sikkim Sector alone, India responded around 2019 with a counter proposal covering the Sikkim Sector together with the entire Middle Sector, with the boundary delineated along the watershed. China rejected it.
    3. The version China was willing to take: In later discussions Beijing agreed to include the Sikkim Sector and some undisputed areas of the Middle Sector only, which India found unacceptable.

    Why does a sector by sector settlement cut against India’s negotiating position?

    1. Beijing accepting India’s terms would be expensive for it: The Indian formulation requires China to give up its claim to roughly 2,450 square kilometres in the Middle Sector, all of it south of the watershed boundary, covering Barahoti, Giu-Kaurik, Nilang-Jadhang, Sangcha Malla and Lapthal.
    2. The likelier outcome is an “agreement with holes”: A settlement can nominally cover both sectors while being confined to stretches where the claims already coincide, leaving the trijunctions and the contested pockets of the Middle Sector undefined.
    3. The asymmetry runs one way: India concedes ground where its own position is strong, with no movement in the Eastern and Western Sectors, where Beijing holds to “dong tiao xi rang”, meaning meaningful adjustments by India in the East and corresponding concessions by China in the West.
    4. It abandons the package principle: Article III of the Agreement on Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question, 2005 calls for a package settlement covering all sectors, precisely because the four sectors are strategically interlinked and require cross sector give and take.

    Is the Sikkim Sector the settled case it is presented as?

    1. The agreed basis is internally contradictory: Both sides accept the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 as the basis of the alignment. Article I of that Convention makes the watershed crest the boundary in its first sentence, then names Mount Gipmochi as the starting point on the Bhutan frontier in its second.
    2. The map record favours the watershed reading: British Indian maps of 1907 and 1913 placed the trijunction not at Gipmochi but roughly 6.5 kilometres to its north, on the true watershed crest.
    3. The two readings point to different trijunctions: India and Bhutan treat the watershed principle as controlling and place the trijunction at Batang La. China uses the literal reference to Gipmochi to push the trijunction south, onto the Jampheri Ridge.
    4. Silence would be read as concession: A Sikkim delimitation built on the 1890 text, unless it expressly repudiates Gipmochi, would be read in Beijing as India conceding the southern trijunction.

    What would a Sikkim settlement do to Bhutan and to the Siliguri Corridor?

    1. India loses the standing to counsel Bhutan: Even a settlement that reserves the trijunction leaves India having settled out of turn nearby, which weakens its case against a bilateral Bhutan China deal.
    2. China’s standing offer to Bhutan gains momentum: Beijing’s package proposal would relinquish about 495 sq km of its claims in northern Bhutan in exchange for Bhutan ceding about 269 sq km in the northwest, including the Doklam Plateau.
    3. The strategic consequence is a line of sight: That exchange deepens China’s presence in the Chumbi Valley and opens a path to the Jampheri Ridge, from which the entire Siliguri Corridor, India’s sole overland link to its northeastern States, comes under direct observation.
    4. The ground has already shifted: Since the 2017 Doklam standoff China has spent years building roads, villages and military facilities across western Bhutan, and has gained de facto control over Doklam.

    What would a genuine Early and Substantial Harvest require?

    1. Delineation on the highest watershed principle: The principle must apply across the entire stretch in both sectors, not selectively along the segments where the two positions already converge, since selective delineation serves no Indian purpose.
    2. Trijunctions kept out of the mandate: Batang La and any comparable point adjacent to a third country in the Middle Sector must be explicitly excluded from the Expert Group’s mandate and settled only in consultation with the country concerned, as the 2012 Common Understanding between the two SRs stipulates.
    3. Terms of reference that extend the Indian proposal: The mandate must carry the 2019 proposal forward in good faith rather than dilute it beyond recognition. Without acceptance of the highest watershed principle, silence on the trijunction is filled on the ground in Beijing’s favour in Bhutan.

    What do the Eight Points leave unanswered?

    1. Package and piecemeal have not been reconciled: The Chinese readout reiterates a commitment to a package settlement, and no explanation has been offered for how that sits with a sector by sector approach.
    2. An Expert Group has been created without a framework: Article X of the 2005 Agreement requires the SRs to arrive at an agreed framework for a boundary settlement, which is then to provide the basis for delineation and demarcation by officials and surveyors of the two sides. No agreed framework exists yet.
    3. The operative word is not in the treaty: The 2005 Agreement does not use the term “delimitation” at all, and Chinese usage treats delimitation and demarcation as interchangeable. The open question is whether the SRs will pursue the agreed framework or leave it in abeyance while officials run a partial delimitation without one.

    What else did the Eight Points carry, and what did they leave out?

    1. Incremental measures that belong to a separate track: Additional meeting points and hotlines for the General Level Mechanisms in the Eastern and Middle Sectors, continued pilgrimage and border trade, and a September meeting on trans border rivers are confidence building measures, not boundary settlement, and conflating the two in public discussion overstates the progress.
    2. Silence on the upstream dam: The document says nothing about the Medog County project on the Yarlung Tsangpo River. It records only that both sides will maintain communication on trans border river issues, including hydrological data sharing and renewal of the relevant memoranda of understanding, with no progress reported.
    3. The risk the September meeting has to raise: The project is the world’s largest hydropower plant, is being built close to the border in the Eastern Sector, and sits in a highly earthquake prone zone. Eg. The flash floods in Nepal on 26 August underscored what failure in such terrain does downstream.
    4. The 2005 Agreement is the only substantive result of the process: Twenty three years of SR talks have produced that one instrument, and China has sought to reinterpret and undermine it since its conclusion.

    Challenges to an “Early and Substantial Harvest” settlement

    1. Nothing binds a partial settlement to the completion of the rest: A sector closed early removes the negotiating currency that was meant to buy movement elsewhere. Eg. The 1993 and 1996 agreements on peace and tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control did not prevent the 2020 standoff in eastern Ladakh.
      The Fix: Write a linkage clause into the terms of reference making entry into force of any sectoral delimitation conditional on an agreed framework for the remaining sectors.
    2. Delimitation on paper is not demarcation on the ground: A settled alignment still has to be surveyed and pillared across high altitude terrain where the two sides use different survey baselines. Eg. Friction points such as the Depsang Plains and Charding Ninglung Nala remain unresolved even after disengagement in eastern Ladakh.
      The Fix: Constitute joint survey teams on an agreed geodetic datum before any delimitation text is initialled.
    3. Infrastructure asymmetry keeps building while talks continue: Negotiation does not freeze construction, so the ground position moves during the negotiation itself. Eg. China’s dual use border villages along the Line of Actual Control settle civilians in disputed pockets and create a permanent presence.
      The Fix: Tie each stage of the Expert Group’s work to verified parity in border infrastructure and force levels, reported to the WMCC.
    4. No domestic ratification route exists for a territorial settlement: A boundary agreement alters the territory of the Union without any settled parliamentary process to approve it. Eg. Transferring enclaves under the 2015 Land Boundary Agreement with Bangladesh required the 100th Constitutional Amendment.
      The Fix: Commit in advance to placing any boundary settlement before Parliament, so the negotiating mandate carries domestic legitimacy rather than acquiring it afterwards.

    Conclusion

    India’s boundary diplomacy now carries two objectives that do not sit together. One is to demonstrate movement after a long period without any. The other is to keep every sector on the table, so that a concession in one can be paid for in another. A settlement that closes the ground where India’s case is strongest, while the Eastern and Western Sectors stay frozen on Beijing’s terms, satisfies the first and forfeits the second. What to watch is whether the negotiating mandate now being drafted is narrow enough to keep third country trijunctions outside it, because silence on a trijunction is settled on the ground rather than at the table.

    About the India-China Boundary Question

    1. An undefined line, not a boundary: The Line of Actual Control (LAC) runs about 3,488 km and has never been mutually delineated or demarcated, which is why patrolling patterns rather than an agreed line determine where standoffs occur.
    2. Western Sector: India relies on the Johnson Line of 1865 while China claims the Macartney-MacDonald Line of 1899. China occupies about 38,000 sq km of Aksai Chin.
    3. Eastern Sector: The alignment follows the McMahon Line drawn at the Simla Convention of 1914. China claims about 90,000 sq km of Arunachal Pradesh as “South Tibet”.
    4. The first framework instrument: The Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control, 1993 committed both sides to resolve the question peacefully and to keep forces to a minimum along the line.

    Challenges in India-China Relations

    1. A structurally lopsided trade relationship: India’s trade deficit with China reached an all time high of $112.16 billion in March 2026, which limits how much economic leverage India can apply in a political dispute. Eg. 98.5% of Indian imports from China are industrial goods, so a supply disruption transmits straight into Indian manufacturing.
      The Fix: Tie production linked incentive disbursement in electronics, pharmaceutical intermediates and capital goods to verified reduction in single source imports.
    2. Market access is not reciprocal: Indian information technology and pharmaceutical firms face opaque non tariff barriers in the Chinese market while Chinese goods enter India freely. Eg. Indian generic drug approvals in China have moved slowly despite India being the largest supplier of generics globally.
      The Fix: Make market access parity a stated precondition in every sectoral dialogue, with a published register of pending Indian applications in China.
    3. Beijing blocks India’s multilateral advancement: China withholds consensus on India’s entry to the Nuclear Suppliers Group and opposes a permanent seat for India on the United Nations Security Council. Eg. It repeatedly placed technical holds on listing Pakistan based terrorists at the UN, delaying the designation of Masood Azhar until 2019.
      The Fix: Build the plurilateral route instead, converting Quad, Indo Pacific and export control group partnerships into standing sponsorship of India’s candidature.
    4. The China Pakistan axis converts a bilateral dispute into a two front problem: The China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a corridor of about $62 billion linking Kashgar to Gwadar, passes through territory India claims. Eg. It runs through Gilgit Baltistan, which is why India has formally protested the corridor’s alignment.
      The Fix: Sustain the two front capability build up through the Vibrant Villages Programme and border road completion, rather than treating the western and northern borders as separate planning theatres.

    [2026, GS2, 15 marks] “China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has transformed South Asia from a regional space into a theatre of great power competition.” Analyse the strategic implications of the BRI for India’s security and regional influence in South Asia.”

  • India rejects Hague court’s Indus Waters Treaty ruling, says it has no jurisdiction

    Why in the News

    The Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague has held that the Indus Waters Treaty, 1960 remains “fully in force”. The award directs India to observe its obligations under the treaty, including those on the design and operation of its hydro-electric projects on the Western Rivers. It also imposes interim measures barring India from concreting the Ratle Hydro-Electric Plant dam wall and power intake structure above certain levels until 90 days after the Neutral Expert’s final decision, expected in July 2027. The award answers India’s decision to hold the treaty in abeyance after the Pahalgam terror attack, a decision the tribunal examined and found unsupported by any of the grounds advanced. The Ministry of External Affairs has rejected the award in full and described the tribunal as illegally constituted in breach of the treaty. The tension is that the award’s own expiry is keyed to the Neutral Expert, the one forum India does take part in, so two processes now govern the same dam on incompatible terms.

    What did the arbitral award decide?

    1. The treaty was held to remain in force: The Court of Arbitration found that the Indus Waters Treaty, 1960 continues to bind both parties in full.
    2. No ground for abeyance was accepted: It examined the reasons India advanced for placing the treaty in abeyance and held that none of them could justify suspension or termination.
    3. The award covers status and interim relief together: It was issued as the Status of the Indus Waters Treaty and Order on Interim Measures concerning the Ratle Hydro-Electric Plant.
    4. The construction limits were unanimous: The Court decided without dissent to bar concreting of the Ratle dam wall and power intake structure above specified levels.
    5. The relief was granted on Pakistan’s application: The tribunal was acting on Pakistan’s plea both on the status of the treaty and on measures concerning the Ratle project.

    On what grounds does India reject the tribunal?

    1. The tribunal’s establishment is itself called a treaty violation: The Ministry of External Affairs holds that the very establishment of the arbitral body is a grave violation of the Indus Waters Treaty, 1960.
    2. The World Bank is said to have acted beyond the treaty: The Ministry states that the court was constituted by the World Bank in patent breach of the terms of the treaty.
    3. Non-participation has been consistent: India has never recognised this body in law. It has never appeared before the tribunal and takes no cognisance of its pronouncements.
    4. Jurisdiction over a sovereign decision is denied: The Ministry holds that the court cannot pronounce on India’s sovereign decisions, and that its orders will have no effect on the projects India is undertaking.
    5. The abeyance decision stands: India has reiterated that its decision to hold the treaty in abeyance remains in force.

    Why does the treaty’s dispute ladder produce two forums at once?

    1. The Permanent Indus Commission is the first step: The treaty requires the commissioners of both countries to take up a question before any external forum is approached.
    2. A Neutral Expert settles a technical difference: Article IX sends a listed technical question to a Neutral Expert appointed by the World Bank, whose decision is final and binding on the points referred.
    3. A Court of Arbitration settles a legal dispute: A matter outside the Neutral Expert’s list goes to a seven member Court of Arbitration under Annexure G, with two arbitrators named by each country and three umpires.
    4. Both forums were seized of the same projects: The World Bank appointed a Neutral Expert and constituted a Court of Arbitration in 2022 over the Kishenganga and Ratle projects, on separate requests made by India and by Pakistan.
    5. The award defers to the forum India accepts: The tribunal tied the expiry of its own interim measures to the Neutral Expert’s ruling, so the body India rejects has made its order run on the timetable of the process India joined.

    Challenges to India’s abeyance of the Indus Waters Treaty

    1. The treaty text carries no exit or suspension clause: Article XII permits termination only through a ratified treaty between both governments, so abeyance is a position asserted outside the instrument rather than a right within it. Eg. The treaty survived the conflicts of 1965, 1971 and 1999 without either side suspending it.
      The Fix: Convert the position into a formal proposal for modification under Article XII and open the negotiation that article provides for, so the claim rests on a treaty route rather than outside one.
    2. Storage capacity does not exist to give the position effect: India’s permitted storage on the Western Rivers is largely unbuilt, so withholding water is not physically available even where it is legally asserted. Eg. The Indus system carries roughly 135 million acre feet a year, and India’s live storage on the Western Rivers is a small fraction of that volume.
      The Fix: Complete the permitted storage and flushing works on the Chenab and the Jhelum first, so the legal position is matched by works that can act on it.
    3. Non-appearance leaves the record to one side: A tribunal proceeding in the absence of a party decides on the evidence only the other party filed. Eg. India did participate in the Kishenganga arbitration, and the 2013 award fixed a minimum environmental flow India was able to build to.
      The Fix: Enter a limited appearance contesting jurisdiction alone, which preserves the objection and still puts India’s technical record before the tribunal.
    4. India is a lower riparian on another transboundary system: A precedent for unilateral suspension by an upper riparian is one India is exposed to on the rivers that reach it from Tibet. Eg. The Brahmaputra rises in Tibet and India has no water sharing treaty with China, only memoranda on hydrological data sharing.
      The Fix: Pair the treaty position with a push for a binding flow and data guarantee on the Brahmaputra, so the standard India asserts is one it also demands.
    5. The first cost of restricting flows lands inside India: Holding back water without storage backs it up in Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab rather than in Pakistan. Eg. Reservoir flushing at Salal and Baglihar in May 2025 altered flows on the Chenab for a matter of days before normal releases resumed.
      The Fix: Confine any restriction to the desilting and flushing operations the treaty already permits, which recover generation capacity without creating an upstream flood risk.

    Conclusion

    India and the tribunal are now operating on premises that cannot both hold. One holds that the treaty binds and that the abeyance changes nothing. The other holds that the tribunal has no legal existence and that its orders change nothing. The unresolved tension is that both positions point at the same dam, and neither side controls a mechanism that can make the other’s position irrelevant.

    Back2Basics: Permanent Court of Arbitration

    1. Establishment: Created by the Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, 1899, making it the oldest standing institution for international dispute settlement.
    2. Seat: It is headquartered at the Peace Palace in The Hague, Netherlands.
    3. What it is not: It is neither a court with sitting judges nor a United Nations body. It supplies a registry and a panel of arbitrators for tribunals the parties themselves constitute.
    4. India’s link to it: India is a party to the 1899 Convention, and the institution provides registry services for tribunals formed under the Indus Waters Treaty, 1960.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2016, GS1, 12.5 marks] Present an account of the Indus Water Treaty and examine its ecological, economic and political implications in the context of changing bilateral relations.”

  • Lanka beckons, but for refugees in TN, too much time and distance lie in between

    Lanka beckons, but for refugees in TN, too much time and distance lie in between

    Why in the News

    Sri Lanka’s Cabinet has removed the longstanding legal obstacle to the voluntary return of refugees who fled the civil war without valid passports or through unauthorised departure points. Returnees whose Sri Lankan nationality is established may enter through an authorised port after clearance by the State Intelligence Service. Those cleared will not face prosecution under immigration law merely for having left the country without authorisation, and the decision applies to everyone who left before 19 May 2009, the day the civil war ended. The tension is that the barrier being removed was never the operative one: nearly 90,000 Sri Lankan refugees remain in India, and what holds them is land, livelihood and the fact that a large share of them were born here.

    Why did the legal bar matter in practice?

    1. Prosecution on arrival was real: As late as August 2025, four returnees were detained on arrival in Sri Lanka because they had originally left the country illegally.
    2. International endorsement: The United Nations welcomed the decision as an important step towards the “safe and dignified return” of Sri Lanka’s people.
    3. No package is attached: The Cabinet decision does not spell out any new resettlement package, so it removes a criminal exposure and adds no material support.
    4. Movement has already begun: 246 people belonging to 46 families returned between July 2025 and February 2026 without facing official pushback.

    What is the scale and profile of the refugee population in India?

    1. The total: Nearly 90,000 Sri Lankan refugees live in India.
    2. The camp population: More than 58,000 live in 103 camps spread across 29 districts of Tamil Nadu, including one special camp within the Tiruchi Central Prison complex.
    3. Outside the camps: Another 30,000 live outside the camp system.
    4. Duration and birthplace: Nearly 73 percent of those in camps have been in India for more than 30 years, and 44 to 46 percent were born in India.

    What does the return data show?

    1. The early years: Annual returns ran at 1,673 in 2011, 1,264 in 2012, 711 in 2013, 396 in 2014 and 452 in 2015.
    2. A brief recovery: They rose to 852 in 2016 and 1,520 in 2017, then fell to 1,283 in 2018 and 963 in 2019.
    3. The collapse: Returns dropped to 196 in 2020, 96 in 2021, 208 in 2022, 326 in 2023, 203 in 2024 and 92 in 2025.
    4. No response to the decision: About 400 refugees returned over the past two years, 36 are currently on the waiting list from applications filed over nine months, and no surge in applications has been reported since the Cabinet decision.

    Why is return still not attractive?

    1. The obstacle is economic: The reluctance to return turns on Sri Lanka’s economic crisis and uncertainty over livelihoods rather than on immigration law.
    2. Most have nothing to return to: Only around 15 to 20 percent of the refugees own land in Sri Lanka.
    3. The return grant has shrunk: The repatriation grant fell from Rs 11,250 per person to Rs 8,000 because of the United Nations funding crunch.

    What conditions do refugees face in India?

    1. Registration never ends: Refugees remain registered with the police and subject to periodic renewals, sometimes weekly, more than three decades after arrival.
    2. Movement is timed: Camp residents may leave the premises at 6 a.m. and are generally required to return by 6 p.m., with curbs on travel outside Tamil Nadu.
    3. Housing was provided: The State government gave refugee families houses of 320 square feet.
    4. No documents means no economy: Without a ration card or a voter identity card, a camp resident cannot take a loan or register a vehicle, so earnings do not convert into assets.

    Return or a durable solution in India?

    1. The first generation weighs both: Those who arrived as children measure land, shelter, employment and their children’s education against a settled but restricted life in India.
    2. The second generation splits: Some born in India who have never visited Sri Lanka want to leave for want of work, since a government job is closed to them and private wages are low.
    3. What most are asking for: A large share hope India will offer a durable status here, including citizenship or dual citizenship, rather than requiring return.
    4. India has no framework to offer it: India has no refugee specific statute, so residence is administered under the Foreigners Act, 1946 through executive policy that can be varied without legislation.

    What remains unsettled on the Sri Lankan side?

    1. The military has not withdrawn: A visible military presence remains in the north, where the Tamil population is concentrated.
    2. Complaints continue: Tamil groups report surveillance, unresolved land disputes and restrictions around political activity.
    3. The political demands are unmet: Tamil parties are demanding greater devolution, land release and a new Constitution addressing long standing Tamil aspirations.

    Challenges to the voluntary repatriation of Sri Lankan refugees

    1. Voluntariness cannot be verified without monitoring: A return that is legally voluntary becomes coerced in practice where conditions in the host country deteriorate. Eg. Rohingya returns from Bangladesh have repeatedly stalled over exactly this verification problem. Fix. Allow a neutral agency to interview departing families at the point of exit and to monitor them for a fixed period after arrival.
    2. Land restitution is the binding constraint: Returnees find their plots occupied by the military, by the state or by other occupants, so a grant buys no place to live. Eg. Land in the Valikamam North high security zone near Jaffna was released to owners only in stages after 2015, decades after acquisition. Fix. Publish a title verification and release timetable for each returning family before departure rather than after arrival.
    3. Documentation gaps block proof of nationality: Those who left as infants or were born in camps often hold no Sri Lankan birth record, so establishing nationality becomes the first hurdle. Eg. Children born in Tamil Nadu camps are registered with Indian civil authorities, which does not by itself establish Sri Lankan nationality. Fix. Run consular documentation camps inside the settlements, so nationality is settled before an application is filed.
    4. Support depends on a shrinking international budget: Repatriation assistance is tied to international agency funding rather than to a bilateral commitment, so it contracts whenever donor budgets contract. Eg. Humanitarian funding cuts in 2025 forced agencies to reduce per capita assistance across South Asian operations. Fix. Convert repatriation support into a bilateral package with a fixed per family entitlement agreed between the two governments.
    5. Qualifications earned in India do not transfer: Schooling and degrees obtained in Tamil Nadu are not automatically recognised in Sri Lanka, which strands the generation most able to work. Eg. A graduate degree earned in India needs equivalence certification before it can be used for employment or further study in Sri Lanka. Fix. Agree a mutual recognition arrangement for school and university qualifications as part of the return framework.

    Conclusion

    What to watch is whether the Sri Lankan government attaches a resettlement package covering land and housing to its decision, since removing a prosecution risk changes nothing that a returning family actually lives on. The second question sits on India, and it is whether renewable police registration eventually gives way to a durable status for the generation that has known no other country.

    Back2Basics

    1. What it does: Adopted in 1951, it defines who qualifies as a refugee and sets out the rights of refugees and the obligations of the states hosting them.
    2. Core protection: Article 33 states the principle of non refoulement, which bars returning a refugee to a territory where their life or freedom would be threatened.
    3. The Protocol: The 1967 Protocol removed the original limitation to events occurring in Europe before 1951, making the Convention universal in scope.
    4. India’s position: India is not a party to the Convention or its Protocol, though it has served repeated terms on the executive committee of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

    [2022, GS2, 10 marks] India is an age-old friend of Sri Lanka.’ Discuss India’s role in the recent crisis in Sri Lanka the light of the preceding statement.

  • Why Bihar wants the 1996 India-Bangladesh Farakka water-sharing treaty scrapped

    Why in the News

    The State government of Bihar has opposed renewal of the 1996 Ganga Waters Treaty between India and Bangladesh, which governs water-sharing at the Farakka Barrage and is due to expire in December 2026, citing floods and river siltation in Bihar that it links to the barrage’s operation. The treaty’s renewal is a matter for the Union government to negotiate with Bangladesh, but a State government’s opposition to renewing it creates a diplomatic bind: the Centre must weigh a State’s domestic flood and siltation concerns against the foreign-policy cost of not renewing, or of renegotiating, a treaty that has anchored river-water diplomacy with Bangladesh for three decades.

    What does the 1996 Ganga Waters Treaty govern, and why does it matter now?

    1. Water-sharing formula at the Farakka Barrage: The 1996 Ganga Waters Treaty sets out a formula for sharing the Ganga’s flow between India and Bangladesh at the Farakka Barrage, the structure built to divert water into the Hooghly river to keep the Kolkata port navigable.
    2. A 30-year term expiring in December 2026: The treaty was signed for a 30-year term, which brings it up for renewal or renegotiation in December 2026, the deadline against which Bihar’s opposition is now being weighed.
    3. Bihar’s flood and siltation grievance: Bihar’s government links flooding and riverbed siltation in the State to the barrage’s operation, arguing that the structure alters the Ganga’s natural flow and sediment pattern in ways that worsen the State’s annual flood exposure.

    Why does this create a bind for the Centre?

    1. Water-sharing treaties are a Union subject, but their effects are State-specific: The Union government negotiates and signs river-water treaties with foreign countries under its exclusive foreign-affairs competence, but the physical effects of a structure like the Farakka Barrage fall on a specific State’s territory, giving Bihar a stake in a decision it does not control.
    2. Non-renewal carries a diplomatic cost with Bangladesh: Allowing the treaty to lapse without a replacement arrangement would remove a settled water-sharing formula that has avoided a recurring bilateral dispute over the Ganga’s flow for three decades, a relationship India has reasons to preserve given its broader strategic stake in Bangladesh.
    3. Renegotiation on Bihar’s terms may not be acceptable to Bangladesh: Any renegotiation that reduces Bangladesh’s guaranteed share to address Bihar’s siltation concerns would need Bangladesh’s agreement, and Bangladesh’s own dry-season water needs make it unlikely to accept a formula that leaves it worse off.

    Conclusion

    Bihar’s opposition to renewing the 1996 Ganga Waters Treaty puts the Centre in the position of balancing a State’s flood and siltation grievance against the diplomatic cost of disrupting a three-decade-old water-sharing arrangement with Bangladesh ahead of the treaty’s December 2026 expiry. How the Centre resolves this before the deadline will be an early test of how India manages river-water diplomacy where a State’s domestic concerns and a neighbour’s expectations pull in different directions.

    Back2Basics: Farakka Barrage

    1. A barrage across the Ganga in West Bengal, commissioned in 1975, built primarily to divert water into the Hooghly river during the dry season to keep the Kolkata port’s approach channel navigable.
    2. Its construction and downstream flow effects have been a recurring point of contention with Bangladesh, which lies further downstream on the Ganga.
    3. The 1996 Ganga Waters Treaty was signed to formalise a 30-year water-sharing formula at the barrage between India and Bangladesh, replacing earlier short-term, ad hoc sharing arrangements.
    4. Also cited within India, including by Bihar, as a factor in upstream siltation and altered flood patterns on the Ganga.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026] Match:
    A. Mangdechhu Hydroelectric Project
    B. Restoration of Stor Palace
    C. District Hospital at Dickoya
    D. Institute of Security and Law Enforcement Studies

    1. Maldives 2. Afghanistan 3. Bhutan 4. Sri Lanka
    (a) A-1, B-4, C-2, D-3
    (b) A-3, B-2, C-4, D-1
    (c) A-3, B-4, C-2, D-1
    (d) A-1, B-2, C-4, D-3
    ANSWER: B”

  • 5 years on, how India has warmed up to the Taliban

    5 years on, how India has warmed up to the Taliban

    Why in the News

    The Afghanistan embassy in New Delhi marked “victory day” on 15 August 2026, five years after the Taliban’s takeover of the country. Indian diplomats and about two dozen foreign diplomats attended the event. The occasion sits against a reversal: on 17 August 2021 India hurriedly evacuated its entire embassy from Kabul after the Ashraf Ghani led government collapsed. That collapse came ahead of the 31 August deadline set by the United States President for the withdrawal of American troops. India now conducts business with the Islamist regime without granting it official diplomatic recognition. Indian officials describe this as “cautious engagement”, and critics describe it as “opportunistic”.

    What is engagement without official recognition?

    1. The status being withheld: Diplomatic recognition is a state’s formal acceptance that a given authority is the lawful government of a country, which allows full ambassadorial exchange and treaty dealings. India has not granted it to the Taliban.
    2. What India does instead: India deals with the Taliban as the effective administering authority, running missions, delivering aid and negotiating projects, without conceding legal status. Recognition can then be traded later for concessions.
    3. The visible marker of the gap: The Afghan missions in Delhi, Mumbai and Hyderabad are manned by Taliban appointed diplomats. The main flagpole of the Delhi embassy continues to fly the old Afghan Republic’s tricolour.

    How did India move from evacuation to engagement?

    1. First official contact, 31 August 2021: Hours after the last United States military aircraft flew out of Kabul, ending a 20 year war, India made its first official contact with the Taliban. India’s Ambassador to Qatar met the head of the Taliban political office in Doha at the embassy.
    2. First acknowledgement, September 2021: India recognised the Taliban as “those in positions of power and authority across Afghanistan”, the first clear description of the group as a state actor.
    3. First aid consignment, December 2021: India sent its first consignment of medicines to Afghanistan under the new Taliban regime, choosing to distinguish the regime from the Afghan people.
    4. Technical team, late June 2022: India sent a “technical team” to the embassy in Kabul to coordinate delivery of humanitarian aid.
    5. Ministerial contact opens, January 2024: The Taliban Foreign Minister met diplomats from regional nations including India in January 2024. The Foreign Secretary held a substantive meeting with him in Dubai in January 2025.
    6. Contact reaches Cabinet level, May 2025: The External Affairs Minister spoke to the Taliban Foreign Minister by phone on 15 May 2025. The call came days after India and Pakistan agreed to stop military strikes.
    7. Mission upgrade, April to October 2025: India sent the Joint Secretary in charge of the Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran division of the Ministry of External Affairs to Kabul in April 2025. The Taliban Foreign Minister then visited India in October 2025, and both sides decided to upgrade their missions to embassy level and appoint charge d’affaires.

    Why is India deepening ties with the regime it once shunned?

    1. Protecting a sunk investment: India invested for years in Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban in 2001, and the government concluded that it had to upgrade engagement or watch its USD 2 to 3 billion investment go down the drain.
    2. Leverage, not charity: The investment was meant for the people of Afghanistan and to create leverage and influence inside the country. Withdrawal would have surrendered both.
    3. Pakistan has become the Taliban’s adversary: The Taliban’s once benefactor and ally has turned into a deadly opponent, with multiple clashes along their contested border. New Delhi reads this as a window of opportunity.
    4. China is filling the Western vacuum: Beijing has started building bridges with the Taliban and is eyeing Afghanistan’s natural resources.
    5. Russia is the pacing partner: Russia is the only country to have established diplomatic ties with the Taliban, and Delhi has been working with Moscow on the Taliban to keep track of Chinese influence.
    6. Presence inside Delhi’s own calendar: The Taliban appointed Charge d’affaires, Mufti Noor Ahmad Noor, has attended the Prime Minister’s Independence Day address, the President’s At Home reception and a diplomatic event at the Norwegian embassy.

    What are India’s security concerns in Afghanistan?

    1. The operating principle: New Delhi has operated on the principle that Afghanistan’s territory should not be used for anti-India activities or for support to terrorist groups.
    2. The threat assessment is unchanged: An 10 August 2026 report of the United Nations Security Council’s 1267 sanctions committee stated that the terrorist threat emanating from Afghanistan remained largely unchanged.
    3. The de facto authorities cannot suppress it: The same report found that despite efforts by the de facto authorities to combat Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant-Khorasan (ISIL-K) and contain other groups, they were unable to suppress the terrorist problem. It also said Al-Qaeda’s status and strength in Afghanistan remains unchanged.
    4. What the report did not say: It carried no mention of anti-India terror groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad, a silence New Delhi reads as relief rather than assurance.
    5. Assurances so far are verbal: Engagement has been “limited”, and the Taliban has indicated it will be “reasonable” in the way it “handles” Indian concerns. The security provided to Indian diplomats in Kabul has given the Indian establishment some confidence.
    6. The regime’s own pitch: The Charge d’affaires told the victory day gathering that Afghanistan’s geography “should not be a field for negative competition, but rather a bridge for connectivity, cooperation and shared prosperity”, a message read as directed at both India and Pakistan.

    What has India given up to secure this engagement?

    1. The aid record is substantial: Since August 2021 India has delivered 50,000 metric tonnes of wheat and over 445 tonnes of essential life saving medicines, vaccines and disaster relief material.
    2. The rights record is not: Since taking control the Taliban has eroded the rights of Afghanistan’s 22 million women, barring school access for girls over 12, curbing travel without a male chaperone and bringing a law implying legal approval for child marriage.
    3. India once led on this at the United Nations: A Security Council resolution on 30 August 2021 on upholding human rights and women’s rights in Afghanistan was adopted under India’s rotating presidency. In December 2022 India expressed concern over the Taliban banning women from universities.
    4. The red lines have been dropped: Rights for minorities and women are no longer part of either the Taliban’s or India’s publicly stated red lines, and India has not insisted on the old positions.
    5. What replaced them: India has agreed to move forward on development cooperation for Indian funded projects and on visas for Afghans visiting India for medical treatment, business and education.

    Challenges to India’s engagement with the Taliban

    1. Recognition is a one way concession: Formal recognition is the only remaining bargaining chip, and granting it removes India’s last point of leverage over the regime’s conduct. Eg. The Delhi embassy’s flagpole still carries the Afghan Republic’s tricolour, the single visible marker of what has not yet been conceded. Fix. Tie any move on recognition to specified, verifiable commitments on counter terrorism access and on women’s education, published as conditions rather than expectations.
    2. Assurances rest on no verification mechanism: India has no independent means of confirming that Afghan territory is not being used against it, and depends on United Nations monitoring reports issued months apart. Eg. The 1267 committee’s own assessment says the de facto authorities were unable to suppress the terrorist problem. Fix. Seek a standing bilateral security channel with agreed reporting on named groups, modelled on India’s existing joint working groups on counter terrorism.
    3. The rights silence carries a reputational cost: India’s abandonment of the positions it advanced at the Security Council in 2021 weakens its standing as a votary of rules based conduct. Eg. India’s own presidency delivered the 30 August 2021 resolution on women’s rights that it no longer presses. Fix. Separate the humanitarian and development track from the political track, so aid continues while India keeps stating the rights position in multilateral forums.
    4. Projects have no legal protection: Indian funded assets sit in a country whose government India does not recognise, so no treaty or investment protection framework covers them. Eg. Development cooperation on Indian funded projects has restarted without any bilateral investment instrument in force. Fix. Route new project commitments through United Nations agencies and multilateral funds that carry their own immunities and audit trails.
    5. The Pakistan window can close: The engagement rests on the Taliban’s current estrangement from Pakistan, which is a function of border clashes rather than of any settled alignment. Eg. Both sides have seen multiple clashes along their contested border. Fix. Build the relationship on connectivity and trade assets India controls, such as Chabahar port access, which survive a swing back in Kabul’s alignment.

    Conclusion

    India has completed a strategic embrace of the Taliban in everything except name, trading its 2021 human rights positions for security assurances and the protection of a two to three billion dollar investment. The engagement is now institutional, with Taliban appointed diplomats manning three Afghan missions in India and both sides committed to embassy level representation. What remains unresolved is recognition itself, and with it the only leverage India still holds over the regime’s conduct on terrorism and on women’s rights.

    [2026] “Match List I with List II and select the answer using the code given below the Lists:
    List I (Project Supported by India)List II (Country)
    A. Mangdechhu Hydroelectric Project1. Maldivas
    B. Restoration of Stor Palace2. Afghanistan
    C. District Hospital at Dickoya3. Bhutan
    D. Institute of Security and Law Enforcement Studies4. Sri Lanka
    Code: A B C D

    [A] 1 4 2 3

    [B] 3 2 4 1

    [C] 3 4 2 1

    [D] 1 2 4 3

  • BNP’s Alamgir elected new President of Bangladesh

    Why in the News

    Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir, long time secretary general of the ruling Bangladesh Nationalist Party, was elected President of Bangladesh on 20 August 2026 in the first contested poll for the office in 35 years. He secured 255 of the 343 votes cast in Parliament against 88 for the nominee of the Jamaat-e-Islami led opposition alliance. The contest itself is the significant fact, since the office has been filled by consensus and uncontested polls for decades.

    How is the President of Bangladesh elected?

    1. Who votes: The President is elected indirectly by the members of Parliament, so the outcome reflects the composition of the House rather than a popular vote.
    2. Who conducts it: The Chief Election Commissioner acts as the Election Returning Officer and declares the result after counting.
    3. The vacancy rule: Under the Constitution, a new President is required to be elected within 90 days of the office falling vacant.
    4. What the office holds: The presidency is largely ceremonial, with executive authority resting with the Prime Minister and the Cabinet.

    What is the Jatiya Sangsad?

    1. What it is: The Jatiya Sangsad is Bangladesh’s unicameral Parliament, which both elects the President and provides the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Its composition therefore determines the presidential outcome in advance of the vote.

    What is Bangabhaban?

    1. What it is: Bangabhaban in Dhaka is the official residence and workplace of the President of Bangladesh. Its Darbar Hall is the venue at which the President takes the oath of office.

    What did the vote actually show about the balance in Parliament?

    1. The electorate: Of the total 349 registered voters, 343 voted in the election, and six lawmakers did not vote.
    2. The result: Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir secured 255 votes and Oli Ahmed secured 88 votes.
    3. The losing candidate: Oli Ahmed, aged 84, is a retired Colonel and chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party, and was the nominee of the Jamaat-e-Islami led eleven party opposition alliance.
    4. The winning candidate’s standing: Alamgir, aged 78, is a long time secretary general of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and a close ally of former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia.
    5. What the margin reflects: The ruling party and its allies hold a two thirds majority in Parliament following the general election that returned them to power.
    6. The break with recent practice: It was the first contested presidential election in Bangladesh since 1991, the office having largely been filled through consensus and uncontested polls in recent decades.

    Why did the presidency fall vacant?

    1. The resignation: Mohammed Shahabuddin resigned last month on health grounds before completing his five year tenure.
    2. His political association: He was a close aide of the deposed Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, whose government fell in 2024.
    3. The constitutional consequence: The vacancy triggered the 90 day requirement for electing a successor.
    4. Why it became contested: With a changed parliamentary composition following the transition, the consensus mechanism that had filled the office in recent decades no longer held.

    What does a ceremonial presidency mean in Bangladesh’s system?

    1. Head of state, not head of government: The President is the head of state, while executive authority is exercised by the Prime Minister and the Cabinet.
    2. The formal military role: The President is designated supreme commander of the defence services, a title exercised on the advice of the government.
    3. Where discretion survives: The President’s independent discretion is confined to the appointment of the Prime Minister and the Chief Justice, and otherwise the office acts on advice.
    4. The order of succession: The Speaker of Parliament acts as President when the office falls vacant, until a successor is elected.
    5. The oath: The President elect will take the oath as Bangladesh’s 23rd President on Friday evening at the Darbar Hall of Bangabhaban.

    Why does the return of contested presidential politics matter?

    1. What consensus polls concealed: Uncontested elections meant the office was allocated by the ruling party rather than won, which removed any parliamentary test of the nominee.
    2. What a contest introduces: A recorded vote of 255 to 88 registers the size and composition of the opposition bloc inside Parliament.
    3. The opposition’s new configuration: The Jamaat-e-Islami led eleven party alliance fielded a joint candidate, which formalises an opposition grouping that had previously been fragmented.
    4. The signal of the abstentions: Six lawmakers declined to vote, which records dissent that a consensus procedure would have absorbed silently.
    5. The continuity of the office: The presidency remains ceremonial, so the contest changes the politics of the office without changing its powers.

    What does the change in Dhaka alter for India’s neighbourhood policy?

    1. A new majority to work with: The Bangladesh Nationalist Party and its allies hold a two thirds majority, which gives India a single interlocutor with the parliamentary strength to conclude agreements.
    2. A pending water file: The India Bangladesh Ganga Water Treaty of 1996 expires on 31 December, and its renewal must be negotiated with the new dispensation.
    3. The unresolved Teesta question: The Teesta water sharing agreement drafted in 2011 remains unsigned and has been Dhaka’s standing demand across governments.
    4. Connectivity projects in progress: Rail, road and port links built over the previous decade, including the Akhaura Agartala rail link and the Maitri Setu bridge, require continuity of commitment on both sides.
    5. The security file: Border management, insurgent sanctuaries in the northeast and the safety of minority communities are the standing items on which India seeks assurances from any government in Dhaka.

    Challenges to Bangladesh’s political transition

    1. A ceremonial head of state elected on party lines: A partisan presidency strains the office’s role as a neutral arbiter in disputes over government formation. Eg. The outgoing President was a close aide of the deposed Prime Minister and resigned before completing his tenure.
    2. Consolidation of power under a two thirds majority: A supermajority removes the parliamentary check on constitutional amendment. Eg. The ruling party and its allies hold a two thirds majority in the Jatiya Sangsad after the general election.
    3. An opposition organised around a religious party alliance: The main opposition bloc is led by a party with a contested constitutional history. Eg. The eleven party opposition alliance that fielded the losing presidential candidate is led by Jamaat-e-Islami.
    4. Institutional damage from the previous transition: Administrative and judicial appointments made under the earlier government remain politically contested. Eg. The presidency itself fell vacant through the resignation of an appointee of the deposed government.
    5. Economic pressure on a garment dependent economy: External demand shocks translate directly into employment and foreign exchange stress. Eg. Bangladesh’s export earnings are concentrated in ready made garments, which leaves the current account exposed to a single sector.
    6. Security of minority communities: Political transitions in Bangladesh have historically been followed by attacks on minorities. Eg. The period following the fall of the previous government in 2024 saw reported attacks on Hindu households and temples.
    7. Restoring routine electoral practice: A single contested election does not by itself re-establish competitive norms. Eg. It took 35 years for a contested presidential poll to recur after 1991.

    Conclusion

    Bangladesh has elected a new head of state through its first contested presidential poll in 35 years, with the ruling party’s nominee securing 255 votes against 88 for the opposition alliance’s candidate, from 343 of 349 registered voters. The office remains ceremonial, so the outcome registers the parliamentary balance after the political transition rather than shifting executive power. The next milestone is the oath of office as Bangladesh’s 23rd President on Friday evening at the Darbar Hall of Bangabhaban.

    About India Bangladesh Relations

    1. The border: India and Bangladesh share a land boundary of 4,096.7 km, India’s longest with any neighbour, running along West Bengal, Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram.
    2. The rivers: The two countries share 54 common rivers, and water sharing is the most persistent item on the bilateral agenda.
    3. Trade: Bangladesh is India’s largest trade partner in South Asia, and India is among the largest sources of Bangladesh’s imports.
    4. Connectivity: Rail links, inland waterway protocol routes, bus services and port access arrangements have been progressively restored since 2015 after decades of disuse.
    5. Energy: India supplies electricity to Bangladesh across the interconnection at Bheramara and through cross border transmission links, and the two countries operate a diesel pipeline between them.
    6. Development partnership: India has extended three Lines of Credit to Bangladesh totalling about $7.862 billion, its largest such commitment to any single country.

    Constitutional Framework Governing the Presidency in Bangladesh

    1. Article 48: Provides for a President elected by the members of Parliament, and requires the President to act on the advice of the Prime Minister except in appointing the Prime Minister and the Chief Justice.
    2. Article 50: Fixes the President’s term at five years from the date of entering office, and bars any person from holding the office for more than two terms.
    3. Article 54: Provides that the Speaker of Parliament shall act as President when the office is vacant or the President is unable to discharge functions.
    4. Article 55: Vests the executive power of the Republic in the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, which is the provision that makes the presidency ceremonial.
    5. Article 123: Governs the timing of elections to the office, including the requirement that a vacancy be filled within a fixed period of its occurrence.
    6. Presidential Election Act, 1991: Provides the procedure for nomination, polling and declaration of the result, with the Chief Election Commissioner acting as Returning Officer.

    India Bangladesh Cooperation Initiatives

    1. Maitri Setu: A bridge over the Feni river connecting Sabroom in Tripura with Ramgarh in Bangladesh, inaugurated in March 2021, giving the northeast access to Chattogram port.
    2. Akhaura Agartala rail link: A cross border rail connection commissioned in November 2023 that shortens the route between Agartala and Kolkata through Bangladeshi territory.
    3. Port access agreement: An arrangement permitting the use of Chattogram and Mongla ports for the movement of Indian goods to and from the northeastern States.
    4. India Bangladesh Friendship Pipeline: A cross border diesel pipeline from Siliguri to Parbatipur, inaugurated in March 2023, supplying high speed diesel to northern Bangladesh.
    5. Maitree Super Thermal Power Project: A joint venture coal fired power project at Rampal in Bangladesh, developed by an Indian and Bangladeshi partnership.
    6. Border Haats: Designated markets along the boundary allowing residents of nearby villages on both sides to trade specified local goods without formal customs procedures.

    Key Facts about Bangladesh and its Relations with India

    1. Independence: Bangladesh became independent in 1971, and India was among the first countries to recognise it.
    2. Land Boundary Agreement: The 1974 agreement was operationalised through the 100th Constitutional Amendment Act, 2015, under which India transferred 111 enclaves to Bangladesh and received 51.
    3. Maritime boundary: A Permanent Court of Arbitration tribunal delivered its award on the maritime boundary between the two countries in July 2014, which both accepted.
    4. Kushiyara agreement: The withdrawal of water from the Kushiyara river was agreed in September 2022, the second water sharing instrument after the Ganga treaty.
    5. Population: Bangladesh has a population of about 173 million people.
    6. Presidential history: The office being filled on 21 August 2026 is that of Bangladesh’s 23rd President.
    7. Joint river institution: The Joint Rivers Commission has functioned since 1972 as the standing bilateral mechanism on shared rivers.

    Back2Basics: Bangladesh Nationalist Party

    1. Founded: The party was founded in 1978 by Ziaur Rahman, then the country’s military ruler and later President.
    2. Ideology: It is built around Bangladeshi nationalism, which defines national identity by territory and religion rather than by the language based Bengali nationalism of its principal rival.
    3. Leadership: It has been led since 1984 by Khaleda Zia, widow of the founder, who served as Prime Minister on three occasions.
    4. Principal rival: Its long standing opponent is the Awami League, and the two parties have alternated in power for most of the country’s competitive electoral history.
    5. Electoral boycotts: The party boycotted the general elections of 2014 and 2024, which kept it out of Parliament for extended periods.
    6. Current position: It returned to power in the general election held in February 2026, and holds a two thirds majority in Parliament with its allies.

    Challenges in India Bangladesh Relations

    1. The unresolved Teesta agreement: The most contested river sharing file has remained unsigned for over a decade. Eg. The Teesta draft agreed in 2011 was not signed after West Bengal withheld support.
    2. Border killings: Fatalities along the boundary remain the most publicly damaging irritant in the relationship. Eg. Incidents involving the Border Security Force and Bangladeshi nationals along the fenced boundary recur and draw formal protests from Dhaka.
    3. Illegal migration and its domestic politics: Migration questions feed into Indian State level politics and produce friction with Dhaka. Eg. The National Register of Citizens exercise in Assam produced sustained diplomatic concern in Bangladesh.
    4. Trade imbalance: Bangladesh runs a large deficit with India, which sustains a domestic constituency against closer economic integration. Eg. Indian exports to Bangladesh far exceed Bangladeshi exports to India despite duty free access under the South Asian Free Trade Area.
    5. Competition from external partners: Infrastructure and defence offers from other powers reduce India’s relative weight. Eg. Chinese financing has funded major Bangladeshi infrastructure including bridges, power plants and port projects.
    6. The Rohingya caseload: More than a million refugees in Cox’s Bazar constrain Bangladesh’s policy space and create a shared security concern. Eg. Repatriation attempts to Myanmar have repeatedly failed since the influx of 2017.
    7. Security of minority communities: Attacks on minorities during political transitions generate pressure on Indian policy. Eg. The 2024 transition was followed by reported attacks on Hindu households and places of worship.
    8. Insurgent sanctuaries and connectivity security: Northeast Indian connectivity through Bangladesh depends on continued cooperation against insurgent groups. Eg. Transit corridors through Bangladeshi territory to the northeast require sustained security cooperation to remain viable.

    Way Forward

    1. Open the Ganga treaty renewal early: Begin the final round of renewal talks well before the 31 December expiry so that the instrument does not lapse during a political transition.
    2. Separate the Teesta from the Ganga negotiation: Handle the two rivers on independent tracks so that a stalled file does not hold a functioning one hostage.
    3. Institutionalise engagement beyond the ruling party: Maintain contact across the political spectrum in Dhaka so that the relationship does not have to be rebuilt at each change of government.
    4. Correct the trade asymmetry: Expand duty free access, remove non tariff barriers and complete the proposed comprehensive economic partnership so that the deficit ceases to be a political argument.
    5. Complete connectivity projects on schedule: Deliver the remaining rail, road and inland waterway links so that the economic case for cooperation is visible to the Bangladeshi public.
    6. Reduce border fatalities to zero: Shift to non lethal means and joint patrolling protocols along the boundary, since this single issue does the most reputational damage.
    7. Coordinate on the Rohingya question: Support repatriation diplomacy with Myanmar and continue humanitarian assistance to Cox’s Bazar, which addresses a Bangladeshi priority at limited cost.

  • Ganga treaty not in Bihar’s interests, says JD(U) leader

    Why in the News

    The national working president of the Janata Dal (United), who was Bihar’s Minister for Water Resources between 2021 and 2024, has advocated against renewal of the 1996 India Bangladesh Ganga Water Treaty on the ground that renewal would hurt Bihar’s interests. The treaty expires on 31 December and the two sides are yet to hold the last round of talks on its renewal. A federal objection has therefore entered a bilateral negotiation that the Union alone has the power to conclude.

    What is the India Bangladesh Ganga Water Treaty, 1996?

    1. What it is: A bilateral treaty signed on 12 December 1996 for a term of 30 years, governing the sharing of Ganga waters between India and Bangladesh at the Farakka Barrage.
    2. What it covers: It applies only to the dry season, from 1 January to 31 May, when flow at Farakka is lowest and competition between the two uses is sharpest.
    3. How sharing is measured: Availability is measured in ten day periods at Farakka, and shares are calculated separately for each period rather than as an annual total.
    4. How disputes are handled: A Joint Committee observes and records flows at Farakka and at the Hardinge Bridge in Bangladesh, and the treaty provides for review of the arrangement at five yearly intervals or earlier by mutual agreement.

    What is a cusec?

    1. What it means: A cusec is one cubic foot of water flowing per second, the standard unit in which river discharge and canal capacity are stated in South Asia. All the sharing thresholds in the Ganga treaty are expressed in this unit.

    What does the sharing formula actually do at Farakka?

    1. When availability is 70,000 cusecs or less: The flow is divided equally, with India and Bangladesh receiving 50 percent each.
    2. When availability is between 70,000 and 75,000 cusecs: Bangladesh receives 35,000 cusecs and the balance of the flow goes to India.
    3. When availability is 75,000 cusecs or more: India receives 40,000 cusecs and the balance of the flow goes to Bangladesh.
    4. The guarantee clause: Between 1 March and 10 May, India and Bangladesh each receive a guaranteed 35,000 cusecs in alternate blocks of three ten day periods.
    5. The fallback provision: Where the two sides cannot agree at review, India is to release not less than 90 percent of Bangladesh’s share until an understanding is reached.

    Why does Bihar say the treaty has hurt its interests?

    1. The claim made: Thirty years of data under the treaty show that the interests of Bihar have been negatively impacted.
    2. The separation of interests asserted: Diplomatic issues between the two countries must be sorted out, but Bihar’s interests too must be kept in mind while doing so.
    3. The trade off named: The treaty may have checked a few boxes in terms of international messaging, but it has hurt the State’s interests.
    4. The physical mechanism behind the grievance: Maintaining pond level at Farakka raises the water surface upstream, which slows the river and deposits silt in the Ganga bed across Bihar, reducing channel capacity.
    5. The flood consequence: Reduced channel capacity aggravates flooding and drainage congestion in the Bihar districts along the Ganga, including Bhagalpur, Katihar and Munger.
    6. The State’s standing demand: Bihar has for years sought large scale desilting of the Ganga, a national silt management policy, and at one point the decommissioning of the Farakka Barrage.

    Why does the renewal decision sit with the Union alone?

    1. Treaty making power: Article 253 empowers Parliament to make any law for implementing an international treaty or agreement, and the executive power to conclude treaties rests with the Union.
    2. Water as a State subject: Water, including water supplies, irrigation and canals, drainage and embankments, is Entry 17 of the State List, which is why States claim a stake in any water sharing arrangement.
    3. The Union’s own entry: Entry 56 of the Union List gives Parliament power over the regulation and development of inter State rivers and river valleys where declared expedient in the public interest.
    4. Consultation is practice, not obligation: Riparian States are consulted as a matter of convention in transboundary water negotiations, but the Constitution does not require their concurrence.
    5. The precedent of exclusion: West Bengal objected in 2024 to being left out of the committee constituted for the Ganga treaty renewal and the Teesta discussions, which shows the grievance is not confined to Bihar.

    Why is the renewal a test of the wider India Bangladesh relationship?

    1. The deadline: The treaty expires on 31 December, which fixes the outer limit of the negotiation.
    2. The pending step: The two sides are yet to hold the last round of talks on renewal.
    3. The linked file: The Teesta water sharing arrangement has remained unconcluded since 2011, and the Ganga renewal is the only functioning template the two sides have.
    4. The upstream downstream asymmetry: India is the upper riparian on the Ganga, so the treaty is the principal instrument through which Bangladesh secures a predictable dry season flow.
    5. The domestic politics on both sides: A renewal that satisfies Dhaka must also survive objections from Bihar and West Bengal, which makes the negotiation a two level one.

    Challenges to the renewal of the Ganga Water Treaty

    1. No mechanism to compensate an affected upstream State: The treaty allocates water between countries and is silent on internal distribution of costs. Eg. Bihar’s siltation and flood costs from Farakka pondage have no route to redress inside the treaty text.
    2. Declining lean season flow: The volume the formula divides has itself been shrinking, which sharpens the distributional fight. Eg. The guaranteed 35,000 cusecs blocks between 1 March and 10 May become harder to honour when total availability falls below 70,000 cusecs.
    3. Absence of a State role in the negotiating machinery: Riparian States have no formal seat, which produces objection after the fact rather than input before it. Eg. West Bengal objected in 2024 to exclusion from the renewal committee.
    4. Silt management remains unfunded and unassigned: No agency has both the mandate and the budget for basin scale desilting. Eg. Bihar’s demand for a national silt management policy has been pending across successive Union budgets.
    5. Political transition in Dhaka: A renewal negotiated with one government may be reopened by its successor. Eg. Bangladesh has undergone a change of government since the fall of the Awami League administration in 2024, with the Bangladesh Nationalist Party returning to power in February 2026.
    6. Linkage risk with other rivers: Dhaka has consistently sought to tie the Ganga arrangement to progress on the Teesta. Eg. The Teesta sharing draft agreed in 2011 was not signed because of West Bengal’s objection, and remains unresolved.
    7. No basin wide framework with upper riparians: The Ganga basin extends beyond the two signatories, so a bilateral treaty cannot govern total flow. Eg. Nepal controls the headwaters of the Kosi, Gandak and Ghaghara, which contribute a large share of the Ganga’s dry season flow.

    Conclusion

    The India Bangladesh Ganga Water Treaty, 1996 expires on 31 December, the last round of renewal talks has not yet been held, and a party in Bihar’s ruling coalition has now publicly opposed renewal on the ground that thirty years of the arrangement have damaged the State’s interests. The dispute is not about the sharing ratio alone but about whether an upstream State’s siltation and flood costs can be recognised inside an instrument the Union alone concludes. The next milestone is the final round of renewal talks between the two sides before the treaty lapses.

  • India courts will decide extradition of Hasina, talks on to change course

    Why in the News

    Dhaka has made the extradition of the former Bangladesh Prime Minister a precondition for a planned bilateral visit, and Indian officials state the request must go before Indian courts rather than being settled diplomatically. The route runs through the India Bangladesh Extradition Treaty, 2013 and the Extradition Act, 1962. The tension is between a treaty designed to remove the political offence defence for serious crimes and a request whose political character is contested.

    What is the India Bangladesh Extradition Treaty, 2013?

    1. About: The treaty, signed in 2013, provides for extradition between India and Bangladesh for offences punishable by at least one year of imprisonment.
    2. Dual criminality: The conduct must constitute an offence in both countries for extradition to proceed.
    3. Political offence exception: Article 6 allows refusal where the offence is of a political character, subject to a list of carve outs.
    4. The carve outs: Twelve categories, including murder, terrorism related offences and kidnapping, are expressly excluded from the political offence defence.
    5. 2016 amendment: The evidentiary requirement was relaxed so that a warrant issued by a competent court of the requesting state suffices, without prima facie evidence.

    How does an extradition request actually proceed in India?

    1. Request stage: The request is received through diplomatic channels and processed by the Consular, Passport and Visa Division of the Ministry of External Affairs.
    2. Magisterial inquiry: The central government may direct a magistrate to conduct an inquiry into the request.
    3. Judicial finding: The magistrate reports whether a prima facie case for surrender is made out.
    4. Executive decision: The final surrender decision rests with the central government, which may still refuse.
    5. Judicial review: The order is subject to challenge in the High Court and the Supreme Court, which is what makes the process a judicial one in practice.

    Why is this request legally contested?

    1. Sentence in absentia: The International Crimes Tribunal in Bangladesh awarded a death sentence in November 2025 for crimes against humanity, delivered in absentia.
    2. Fair trial objection: In absentia trials and death sentences are challenged as inconsistent with international fair trial standards.
    3. Political character claim: The defence argues the prosecution arises from a change of government, engaging Article 6 of the treaty.
    4. Carve out counter: The offences charged fall within categories the treaty excludes from the political offence defence.
    5. Comparable precedent: The same fair trial objection was raised against the Syrian court’s in absentia death sentences delivered on 11 August 2026 for the Daraa crackdown.

    What is the diplomatic cost of the dispute?

    1. Visit at risk: The planned bilateral visit on 21 August is in doubt because extradition has been made a precondition.
    2. Regional forum linkage: The Bangladesh leadership was invited to a multilateral summit as chair of the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation, so the bilateral rift affects a regional grouping.
    3. Trigger event: A press conference held in Delhi by the former Prime Minister on 5 August hardened Dhaka’s position.
    4. Possible resolution: Officials note the question becomes moot if the former Prime Minister returns to Bangladesh voluntarily in December as she has said she will.

    Challenges in India’s extradition practice

    1. Low success rate: India secures a small fraction of the fugitives it seeks. e.g. the prolonged proceedings in the United Kingdom over economic offenders sought by India.
    2. Prison conditions objection: Requested states refuse surrender citing Indian prison standards. e.g. the assurances India had to give on Barrack 12 of Arthur Road Jail in the Vijay Mallya proceedings.
    3. Human rights and death penalty bar: Many states will not extradite where the death penalty may be imposed. e.g. the assurances routinely sought by European states before surrender.
    4. Treaty coverage gaps: India has extradition treaties with a limited set of countries and arrangements with others. e.g. the absence of a treaty with several jurisdictions where fugitives relocate.
    5. Political offence litigation: The political character defence generates prolonged appellate litigation. e.g. the multi year appellate process in cases involving asylum claims.
    6. Reciprocity expectations: A refusal in one direction weakens the case for cooperation in the other. e.g. India’s own pending requests to Bangladesh for insurgent leaders sheltered across the border.

    Conclusion

    Routing the request to the courts converts a bilateral demand into a judicial question that the executive cannot concede quickly, which is itself the diplomatic outcome India has chosen. The treaty’s twelve carve outs make the political offence defence hard to sustain, while the in absentia death sentence supplies an independent ground for refusal. The next milestone is whether the 21 August visit proceeds, and whether a formal extradition request is filed for magisterial inquiry.

    Back2Basics: Extradition Act, 1962

    1. Governs the extradition of fugitive criminals from India to foreign states and the receipt of fugitives into India.
    2. Applies to treaty states under Chapter II, and permits extradition to non treaty states through a notified arrangement.
    3. Requires that the offence be an extradition offence, defined as one punishable with imprisonment of at least one year under the laws of both countries.
    4. Provides for a magisterial inquiry, with the magistrate reporting to the central government on whether a prima facie case exists.
    5. Bars extradition for an offence of a political character, subject to the exclusions in the applicable treaty.
    6. The Ministry of External Affairs is the central authority for processing requests.

    Way Forward

    1. Keep the process judicial: Insist on the statutory magisterial inquiry route, since a diplomatic surrender would set a precedent against India’s own pending requests.
    2. Seek assurances on sentence: Obtain an undertaking against execution before any surrender, consistent with international practice on capital cases.
    3. De link the bilateral agenda: Continue trade, connectivity and water cooperation tracks independently of the extradition question.
    4. Use the regional forum: Sustain engagement through the Bay of Bengal grouping so the bilateral rift does not stall regional cooperation.
    5. Press reciprocal requests: Pursue India’s own outstanding extradition requests to Bangladesh in the same process, establishing symmetry.

    [2013, GS2, 10 marks] The protests in Shahbag Square in Dhaka in Bangladesh reveal a fundamental split in society between the nationalists and Islamic forces. What is its significance for India?”

  • China calls border generally stable after the 36th WMCC meeting

    Why in the news?

    China’s Foreign Ministry described the India-China border as generally stable, responding to reports of rising tensions in Arunachal Pradesh’s eastern sector. The statement followed the 36th meeting of the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on China-India Border Affairs, held the previous week. The exchange highlights how a diplomatic and military consultation mechanism, rather than a boundary settlement, is what currently manages face-offs along an undemarcated frontier.

    What is the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination (WMCC) on China-India Border Affairs?

    1. About: The WMCC is an institutional mechanism, established in 2012, for diplomatic-level consultation and coordination on maintaining peace along the India-China border.
    2. Function: It provides a standing channel to communicate on border developments and defuse face-offs, and it does not itself negotiate the resolution of the boundary question.

    What is the Line of Actual Control (LAC)?

    1. About: The LAC is the notional line separating Indian-controlled and Chinese-controlled territory, and it is neither fully demarcated nor mutually agreed on the ground.
    2. Consequence: Because the boundary is undemarcated, patrols from the two sides at times face off against each other in areas of overlapping claims.

    What did the 36th WMCC meeting produce?

    1. Communication channels: The two sides agreed to maintain communication via diplomatic and military channels.
    2. Peace commitment: They agreed to jointly uphold peace and tranquillity in the border areas.
    3. Official framing: China’s Foreign Ministry described the situation as generally stable at the moment.

    What triggered the current concern in the eastern sector?

    1. Reported crossing: Reports last week suggested that Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops crossed the LAC at Pukar La and Ollo in the Taksing circle of Upper Subansiri.
    2. State-level denial: On 7 August the Arunachal Pradesh Chief Minister denied reports of an incursion and said he would verify with the Army and local bodies.
    3. Indian framing: India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) said the maintenance of peace and tranquillity in border areas was of utmost importance, and did not deny a reported rise in tensions since late July.
    4. Ground posture: The Army and the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) are positioned to dominate the border and monitor Chinese activities.

    Why does the mechanism matter more than the label of stability?

    1. Undemarcated boundary: With no agreed line on the ground, incidents are inherent to patrolling and cannot be eliminated by declarations of stability.
    2. Existing protocols: Face-offs are resolved through existing mechanisms and protocols rather than through a settled boundary.
    3. Communication over settlement: The WMCC manages friction and keeps channels open, but it substitutes crisis management for a final resolution of the dispute.

    Conclusion

    The current status is that both sides publicly describe the border as generally stable and have agreed through the 36th WMCC meeting to keep diplomatic and military channels open. Reports of a PLA crossing in Upper Subansiri remain unconfirmed by officials. The next expected development is continued WMCC-level engagement and further border-area monitoring by the Army and the ITBP.

    Border Management with China: About

    1. Length and sectors: The India-China frontier runs about 3,488 km across three sectors, the western, middle, and eastern.
    2. Nature: The alignment follows the LAC, which is disputed and undemarcated in several stretches.
    3. Institutional layers: Border affairs are handled through the WMCC at the diplomatic level and the Special Representatives mechanism at the political level.

    Statutory and Agreement Framework Governing the India-China Border

    1. 1993 Agreement: Provided for maintaining peace and tranquillity along the LAC.
    2. 1996 Agreement: Established military confidence-building measures in the border areas.
    3. 2005 Protocol: Set modalities for implementing military confidence-building measures.
    4. 2012 mechanism: Created the WMCC as a standing consultation channel.
    5. 2013 Agreement: The Border Defence Cooperation Agreement laid down procedures to avoid escalation during face-offs.

    Government Initiatives for Border Areas

    1. Border Area Development Programme (BADP): Funds development of villages near international borders to improve access and living conditions.
    2. Border Infrastructure and Management (BIM) Scheme: Supports roads, fencing, floodlighting, and observation infrastructure along the borders.
    3. Vibrant Villages Programme: Targets comprehensive development of border villages, including those along the northern frontier, to check outmigration.

    Challenges in Border Management

    1. Undemarcated LAC: Differing perceptions of the line cause recurring patrol face-offs.
    2. Terrain and access: High-altitude terrain complicates infrastructure and rapid mobilisation.
    3. Infrastructure asymmetry: Faster construction on the Chinese side pressures Indian logistics.
    4. Grey-zone activity: Salami-slicing and forward patrolling test Indian positions below the threshold of conflict.
    5. Coordination: Multiple agencies guarding different stretches require tight inter-force coordination.

    Way Forward

    1. Accelerate infrastructure: Complete border roads, tunnels, and forward connectivity to match logistics needs.
    2. Strengthen mechanisms: Use WMCC and Special Representatives channels consistently to de-escalate.
    3. Border-area development: Expand BADP, BIM, and the Vibrant Villages Programme to anchor populations.
    4. Surveillance: Enhance ITBP and Army monitoring with technology-based domain awareness.

    “[2024 GS3 15m] India has a long and troubled border with China and Pakistan fraught with contentious issues. Examine the conflicting issues and security challenges along the border. Also give out the development being undertaken in these areas under the Border Area Development Programme (BADP) and Border Infrastructure and Management (BIM) Scheme.”