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  • Rajasthan’s rural power solution that other states can emulate

    Power regulatory body in Rajasthan recently ordered discoms to solarise unelectrified public schools. The move has several benefits and therefore can be emulated by the other states as well. 

    Expanded electricity access in rural areas and shortcomings in it

    • Estimates suggest that India has doubled the electrified rural households, from 55% in 2010 to 96% in 2020.
    • However, the measure of access to power supply has been the number of households that have been connected to the electricity grid.
    • This measure discounts large areas of essential and productive human activities such as public schools and primary health centres.
    • And despite greater electrification, power supply is often unreliable in rural areas.

    Solar energy: Solution to electrification in remote parts

    • To address the above problems, the Rajasthan Electricity Regulatory Commission (RERC) has ordered the State’s discoms to solarise unelectrified public schools.
    • The RERC has also suggested installation of batteries to ensure storage of power.
    • Apart from enabling education, this ruling would benefit several other crucial aspects of rural life.
    • The RERC order also directed discoms to seek corporate social responsibility (CSR) funds for the solarising drive and allows schools ownership of the power systems in a phased manner.
    • This removes the burden of infrastructure development expenses on discoms, while also ensuring clean energy for the schools.
    • The power that is generated could also be counted towards the discoms’ Renewable Purchase Obligations (RPO).
    • Large-scale projects are generally financed by companies that wish to profit from economies of scale.
    • They are less interested in investing in rural electricity as it is not as lucrative.
    • Large-grid based projects add to the supply of power in urban areas, and therefore, only marginally further greater energy access goals.

    The decentralised model of power generation

    • While Rajasthan has land mass with vast, sparsely populated tracts available to install solar parks, bulk infrastructure of this scale is susceptible to extreme weather events.
    • With climate change increasing the possibility of such events, a decentralised model of power generation would prove to be more climate resilient.
    • With battery storage, the susceptibility of grid infrastructure to extreme weather events could be mitigated.
    • This is called climate proofing.
    • As solar installations become inexpensive and with rapidly advancing battery storage technologies, decentralised solar power generation has become a reality.

    Conclusion

    The ruling by Rajasthan’s power regulator not only helps in increasing access to electricity, achieving targets of renewable energy but also suggests solutions that other States could emulate.

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  • [RSTV Archive] National Space Transportation Policy

    Context

    • India is planning to put in place a technological & regulatory framework.
    • The Department of Space (DoS) has released the draft National Space Transportation Policy.
    • Private players eager to leverage national facilities and the new policy aims to unlock the potential in space sector.

    In this article we will discuss and analyse all aspects of this issue.

    National Space Transportation Policy

    • The Department of Space (DoS) has placed the ‘Draft National Space Transportation Policy 2020 – Norms, Guidelines & Procedures (NGP)’ for implementation in public domain for comments & suggestions.
    • It covers all aspects of rocket launching, launchpads, reentry of a space object and others.
    • Indian National Space Promotion & Authorization Center (IN-SPACe), an independent body under the DoS has been specified as the nodal agency for all approvals related to launches by the private sector.

    A boost for private players

    • The policy aims to unlock the potential of the space sector in the country with respect to space transportation systems.
    • It will create a healthy ecosystem for private companies to develop launch vehicles and launch them from Indian Territory.

    (1) Launching of rockets

    • The draft policy allows Indian private companies to establish and operate rocket launch sites within and outside the country, after getting prior authorization from the government.
    • Rocket launch (orbital or sub-orbital) from Indian or overseas territory can be carried out only with authorization from IN-SPACe.
    • The launch could be from own or leased launch site and also from mobile platforms (land, sea or air).

    (2) Financial guarantee

    • As per the policy, IN-SPACe authorization requires financial guarantee or insurance cover by proposer under its ownership to fulfil nation’s liability as per international agreements.

    (3) Launches outside India

    • If the launch site is overseas, all necessary approvals for undertaking the activities in another country must be under the applicable laws of that country.
    • IN-SPACe will authorize the launch activity by the Indian Entity after verifying clearances accorded by Ministry of External Affairs or any other Ministry.
    • IN-SPACe or India shall not have any liability related to launches performed outside of the territory of India.

    (4) Green technologies

    • The draft policy states that ISRO should focus on Research and Development (R&D), green fuels, robotic space exploration and reusable rockets.
    • It states that focused research on new propulsion systems based on semi-cryogenic, liquid oxygen-methane and green propellants is essential.
    • ISRO is developing green propulsion through hydrogen peroxide for the rocket that will power the ‘Gaganyaan’ mission (India’s 1st Human Space Flight Programme).
    • ISRO is developing a green fuel – LOX (Liquid Oxygen)/Methane – LOX as oxidiser and methane as fuel.

    Why need such a policy?

    • Indian entities can eye the big opportunity to capture a share of the global launch services market.
    • It facilitates R&D to build space transportation capabilities for future space endeavours along with commercial exploitation.
    • The establishment of space enterprises has the potential to boost the economy by creating direct & indirect employment.
    • It enables the commercial utilization of the launch capacity and space transportation technologies developed by the DoS through its commercial arms.
    • Private sector ecosystem in Space Transportation is growing globally.
    • It paves the way for engaging in mutually beneficial partnerships with international space agencies/technology providers towards the joint development of advanced space transportation capabilities. 

    Salient features of the policy

    • The policy is a comprehensive document with guidelines right from the start of the mission and till the coming back of the rocket.
    • The draft policy also talks about robotics which is needed for space stations.
    • The policy is really a futuristic document since it talks of private launch pads.

    Some shortcomings

    • Space is an important sector where we require capital investments from outside. This is where the policy is silent.  
    • Indian big players have no keen interest in space-based industries. This would make the private arm totally based on startups.
    • The policy is also silent on the military, space weapons, suborbital tourism etc.
    • The policy also talks about launching activities from Seas.  This can create security issues that need to be taken care of.
    • It can create challenges in implementation since it has created a single-window approval agency like IN-SPACe. This could hamper the Ease of Doing Business.
    • Also, the policy is not clear about startups and research.

    Way forward

    • It is essential for the DOS to work towards advanced space transportation capabilities including new propulsion systems, reusability as well as heavy lift capabilities to undertake robotic/human space exploration.
    • In order to enable missions like human spaceflight and robotic space exploration, the current capabilities of DOS/ISRO have to be significantly enhanced towards heavy lift and reusable space transportation systems.

    Conclusion

    • ISRO till now proved it’s worth and has brought a lot of laurels to India. Now the time has come that Indian industry also lives up to the standards set up by ISRO.

    Reference

  • [Burning Issue] Integrated Theatre Command

    Content

    India is set to begin a formal roll-out of its long-awaited theaterisation plan to best utilise its military’s resources amid growing security threats, with the Air Defense Command and the Maritime Theatre Command set to be launched by May.

    Present structure

    • The Indian armed forces currently have 17 commands.
    • There are 7 commands each of the Army [Northern, Eastern, Southern, Western, Central, South-western and Army Training Command (ARTRAC)].
    • Air Force has [Western, Eastern, Southern, South-western, Central, Training and Maintenance].
    • The Navy has 3 commands [Western, Eastern and Southern].
    • Each command is headed by a 4-star rank military officer.
    • Interestingly, none of these 17 commands is co-located at the same station, nor are their areas of operational responsibility contiguous.
    • In addition, there are 2 tri-service commands [Strategic Forces Command (SFC)] and Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC)], which is headed by rotation by officers from the 3 Services.

    How do the 17 commands coordinate during the war?

    • Coordination of operations is expected to be carried out at the level of Service Headquarters through the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC), which is headed by the senior-most Service Chief who is designated as Chairman, COSC.
    • He is expected to simultaneously perform both the roles of Chief of his Service as well as the Chairman, COSC.
    • The COSC generally functions on the principle of consensus, and this makes decision making on jointness very difficult.
    • India has an integrated theatre command only in ANC.
    • The other tri-service command, the SFC, looks after the delivery and operational control of the country’s nuclear assets.
    • It was created in 2003, but because it has no specific geographic responsibility and a designated role, it is not an integrated theatre command but an integrated functional command.
    • There has been a demand for other integrated functional commands, such as the cyber, aerospace and Special Operations commands, but the government is yet to approve any.

    What is a theatre command?

    • An integrated theatre command envisages a unified command of the three Services, under a single commander, for geographical theatres that are of security concern.
    • The commander of such a force will be able to bring to bear all resources at his disposal (from the IAF, the Army and the Navy) with seamless efficacy.
    • It will not be answerable to individual Services and will be free to train, equip and exercise his command to make it a cohesive fighting force capable of achieving designated goals.
    • The logistic resources required to support his operations will also be placed at the disposal of the theatre commander so that he does not have to look for anything when operations are ongoing.
    • This is in contrast to the model of service-specific commands which India currently has, wherein the Army, Air Force and Navy all have their own commands all over the country.
    • In case of war, each Service Chief is expected to control the operations of his Service through individual commands, while they operate jointly.

    The committee, which was headed by Lt General DB Shekatkar (retd) has recommended the creation of 3 integrated theatre commands i.e.;  

    1. Northern for the China border,
    2. Western for the Pakistan border and
    3. Southern for the maritime role.

    Why is the need to integrate Armed Forces?

    • The remarkable technological advancements in science and technology in the 20th century have revolutionized the art of warfighting.
    • The nature of warfare itself has witnessed a paradigm shift in the planning and execution of operations.
    • The modern concept of warfighting relies on the tenets of real-time battlefield transparency 24 x 7, swift all-weather mobility under all battlefield conditions and immense lethality of firepower independent of range limitations.
    • The modern-day wars will be fought with simultaneity in a non-linear pattern across the spectrum of land, sea and air.
    • The execution of operations would entail well-coordinated offensive-defensive manoeuvres, net-centric operations, information warfare, cyber-attacks, possibly under nuclear overhang etc.
    • India has two hostile nuclear neighbours. Additionally, India’s security threats include Pak sponsored terror in J&K as part of an instrument of state power, Left Wing Extremism (LWE) in almost half the districts in the country and international power play unfolding in the Indian Ocean region (IOR) as well as Asia-Pacific Regions.
    • India today, as an economic & military power, must play a much larger role in the evolving geo-strategic environment in the region, particularly in the maritime domain.
    • In such a complex operational environment, militaries have little option but to adopt methods of integrated warfighting.
    • To effectively counter the list of security challenges, India will have to integrate the Armed Forces.

    How is Joint Command different from Integrated Command?

    • Jointness means that while the 3 Services progress and develop in their respective spheres with their independent identity, they function together and so coordinate their operations in war.
    • Integrated commands, on the other hand, seek to merge individual service identities to achieve a composite and cohesive whole.
    • It implies enmeshing the three Services together at different levels and placing them under one commander for the execution of operational plans.

    Pros

    • Better acclimatisation of troops to the given battle space, which will assist them to comprehend the operational requirements correctly in the assigned area of operation.
    • Training needs and administrative requirements of the troops can be better understood, which would allow specialisation and suitable honing of battle drills at all levels.
    • Equipment can be procured, maintained and pre-positioned for quick mobilisation and apt application during the envisaged, short-duration, high-intensity war.
    • The allocation of military hardware, in terms of weapon systems, command, control and communication equipment and combat support elements will be theatre specific and result in optimisation of the resources.
    • Unified command of the three Services under one designated commander will allow for prompt and precise decision making and will remove unnecessary tri-services one-man-up ship.
    • Hence, it goes without saying, that the theatre commands will afford better coordination, intelligence sharing, apt advice and seamless conduct of operations in a given theatre of operation.

    Challenges

    • The very first challenge is the mindset of the military hierarchy. There is deep-rooted insecurity among the Services, arising out of loss of absolute authority over its Service, loss of identity of each Service in an integrated set up and erosion of empire within each Service. This may lead to unwillingness among the Armed Forces to integrate.
    • Secondly, the lack of political will despite being convinced about the requirement of integration of the Armed Forces. There is a sense of reluctance arising out of insecurity to bestow the complete authority of Armed Forces with one individual.
    • Thirdly, the structure of command, i.e. who will report to who within the tri-services and joint theatre command configurations, and who will have operational command over personnel and machinery, service chiefs or theatre commanders.
    • Fourthly, shortage of resources within the Indian Air Force (IAF) which has only 31 operational squadrons against a modest sanctioned strength of 42, would make it difficult for the IAF to permanently station assets in a particular command with territorial boundaries.
    • The fifth challenge is the inter-services competition wherein each service zealously oversees its own assets and strives for a greater share of the defense budget and influence might prove to be an obstacle in creating synergy among the services.
    • Last but not the least, India’s limited experience with integrated command structures may require a fair bit of mid-course corrections which would require problems to be timely identified and remedied, and slow down the integration process regardless.

    Is everybody happy with the proposed idea?

    • While the Army and the Navy are on board with the proposal, the Air Force has certain reservations.
      • One, the Air Force does not want the Air Force chief to lose operational control of Air assets.
      • Two, the Air Force is concerned that all of its assets might be divided within these integrated theatres.
    • All such concerns need to be addressed before such a significant transformation of the defence set-up takes place.

    Conclusion

    • Even though both merits and demerits highlight logical arguments, the truth is this was a much-needed reform in Indian Armed Forces.
    • Thus this integration would lead to theaterisation which would further lead to the modernization of forces. Until now, modernization was implemented from the equipment and weapons system per se but this restructuring into unified commands is the other side of modernization of forces.
    • Even though there is a line of difference between Jointmanship among armed forces and Integration of Armed Forces, cooperation is a prerequisite of armed forces.

  • The problem now with the military synergy plan

    The recent controversy over the alleged marginalization of the Indian Air Force (IAF) in the proposed ‘theaterisation’ of the national security landscape has led to some debates.

    IAF concerned over ITC

    • The Indian military continues to work in silos, like all governmental agencies in India, and a need was rightly felt and directions issued by PM to bring about jointness.
    • The aim is to bring about synergy in operations while economizing through the elimination of duplication and wasteful practices or processes.
    • IAF is keen to bring in the requisite reforms to improve the war-fighting capabilities of the Indian military as a whole while also economizing.

    Reservations of IAF

    • In the current formulation of theatres, the objections from the IAF have essentially been due to air power being seen as an adjunct to the two surface forces.
    • IAF veterans feel that the IAF is being divided into penny packets which would seriously degrade the effectiveness of air operations in any future conflict or contingency.
    • They feel that the use of air power is found to be sub-optimal under the military ethos of “an order is an order”.

    Hurry by the CDS

    • Concurrently, such an intellectual exercise would identify duplication, wasteful resources and practices.
    • This is what the CDS should have been pursuing before first freezing the structure and then trying to glue the pieces together or hammer square pegs in round holes.
    • Only such a strategy can define the types of contingencies the military is expected to address, leading to appropriate military strategies, doctrines and required capabilities.

    Why is the IAF right?

    • Airpower is the lead element, particularly since the Indian political aim, even in the foreseeable future, is unlikely to be the occupation of new territories.
    • A large, manpower-intensive army with unusable armour formations would then also come into focus.
    • Even the proposed air defence command conflicts with the domain command in the seamless employment of airpower.
    • It is due to the absence of such an intellectual exercise that the IAF does not wish to see its limited resources scattered away in fighting defensive battles by a land force commander with little expertise.
    • The Army fails to realise that offensive air power is best not seen, busy keeping the enemy air force pinned down elsewhere as shown in 1971.

    The Army-Air Force silo

    • Historically, the Indian Army has always kept the IAF out of the information loop and demonstrated a penchant to ‘go it alone’.
    • The charge that the IAF joined the party late during Kargil (1999) is also totally baseless and shows a lack of knowledge of events and a failure to learn from historical facts.
    • Recorded facts and a dispassionate view would clearly show that the IAF began conducting reconnaissance missions as soon as the Army just made a request for attack helicopters.
    • This despite the IAF pointing out the unsuitability of armed helicopters at these altitudes and their vulnerability.
    • The use of offensive air power close to the Line of Control also required that the political leadership be kept informed due to possibilities of escalation, something that the Army was unwilling to do.

    Echoes from Kargil

    • Seen in this light, the Chinese incursion into Eastern Ladakh last year is reminiscent of Kargil.
    • While the response has been swift, it is evident that a clear intent to use combat air power, as against 1962, has significantly contributed in deterring China.
    • However, such intent and a joint strategy would have been forcefully signalled by the presence of air force representatives in the ongoing negotiations to restore status quo ante.
    • The continuing build-up of the infrastructure for the PLA Air Force in Tibet further emphasizes the need for an air-land strategy, with air power as the lead element to deter or defeat the Chinese designs at coercion.

    National security strategy should be at the centerstage

    • If war is the continuation of politics by other means, then it is essential to first define the political objectives flowing into a national security strategy before any effective use of force can be truly contemplated.
    • The failures of the mightiest militaries in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and even our own Indian misadventure in Sri Lanka bear testimony to the lack of clear political objectives and appropriate military strategies.
    • It is, therefore, unfortunate that even after over seven decades after Independence, India still does not have a clearly articulated national security strategy.

    Address the structural gaps

    • Finally, theatre or any lower structure requires an institutionalized higher defence organization, which has been sadly missing.
    • This has lead to little regular dialogue between the political and military leadership, except in crises resulting in knee-jerk responses.
    • This led to a remark from a scholar-warrior that, “it is ironic that the Cabinet has an Accommodation Committee but not a Defence Committee”.
    • In the current proposal, it appears that the CDS, as the permanent chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (CoSC), would also exercise operational control of the theatre/functional commands.

    Way forward

    • Prudence demands that instead of ramming down such structures without adequate deliberations and discussions with all stakeholders.
    • We need to first evolve appropriate military strategies in a nuclear backdrop in concert with the political objectives.
    • Thereafter, joint planning and training for all foreseen contingencies, with war-gaming, would automatically indicate the required structures with suitable command, control and communications.

    Conclusion

    • We must remember that in war there is no prize for the runner-up.
    • It is better that such objections and dissenting opinions come out now before the structure is formalized than once it is set in stone.
    • The nation would then end up paying a heavy price, with the Air Force carrying the burden and blame for the failures.

  • Why the dairy sector needs more private players

    One of India’s largest dairy cooperative societies has just raised its milk prices for consumers by Rs 2/litre and this has become national news.

    Sparking off a debate

    • Many in the media are debating how this will push up Consumer Price Index causing inflationary pressures, which may soon force the RBI to change its “accommodative stance” on monetary policy.

    Why such hues over Milk?

    Milk is an important case study for our overall agriculture sector.

    • First, milk is our biggest agri-commodity in terms of value, greater than paddy (rice), wheat, and sugarcane combined.
    • Second, India is the largest producer of milk in the world with an estimated production of about 208 million tonnes in 2020-21, way above its closest competitor, the US, whose milk production hovers around 100 million tonnes.
    • Third, our dairy sector is dominated by smallholders with an average herd size of 4-5 animals.
    • Fourth, and this is important, there is no minimum support price (MSP) for milk. It is more like a contract between the company and the farmers.

    How is the milk price determined?

    • The price of milk is largely determined by the overall forces of demand and supply.
    • Increasing costs of production enter through the supply side, but the demand side cannot be ignored.
    • As a result of all this, the overall growth in the dairy sector for the last 20 years has been between 4-5 per cent per annum, and lately, it has accelerated to even 6 per cent.

    Concerns of dairy farmers

    • For dairy farmers, this increase in milk prices is not commensurate to the increase in their feed and other costs, and they feel that their margins are getting squeezed.
    • They also feel that this price still does not count their logistics cost.

    Transformation since Op Flood

    • It is well known that “Operation Flood” (OF) that started in the 1970s transformed this sector.
    • The institutional innovation of a cooperative model, steered by Verghese Kurien, changed the structure of this sector.
    • However, even after five decades, cooperatives processed only 10 per cent of the overall milk production.
    • India needed the double-engine force of the organised private sector to process another 10 per cent.
    • The doors for the private sector were opened partially with the 1991 reforms, but fully in 2002-03 under the leadership of Vajpayee, when the dairy sector was completely de-licenced.

    Rise of dairypreneurs

    • Many start-ups “dairypreneurs” have come in promising a farm-to-home experience of milk.
    • There is one company that delivers fresh milk at the consumer’s doorstep and gives quality testing kits at home.
    • These have digitized cattle health, milk production, milk procurement, milk testing, and cold chain management.

    Effective breeding

    • Sexed semen technology helps in predetermining the sex of offspring by sorting X and Y chromosomes from the natural sperm mix.
    • This can solve the problem of unwanted bulls on Indian roads.
    • Although the current cost of sexed sorted semen is high, Maharashtra has taken a bold step in subsidizing it for artificial insemination.

    Way forward

    • The upshot of all this is that let prices be determined by market forces, with marginal support from the government or cooperatives in times of extreme.
    • The major focus should be on innovations to cut down costs, raise productivity, ensure food safety, and be globally competitive.
    • That will help both farmers and consumers alike.
    • The cooperatives did a great job during OF, and are still doing that, but the private sector entering this sector in a big way has opened the gates of creativity and competition.

  • What lies ahead for Afghanistan after US exit?

    The US troops are departing away after coordinating the 20-year-long war in Afghanistan, effectively ending their military operations in the country.

    Why did the US invade Afghanistan?

    • Weeks after the 9-11 terrorist attacks, the US declared war on Afghanistan.
    • It was then ruled by the Taliban.

    Terror then gets safe heaven

    • Al-Qaeda’s leaders and key operatives fled to safe havens in Pakistan.
    • The US rejected an offer from the Taliban to surrender and vowed to defeat the insurgents in every corner of Afghanistan.
    • In 2003, US announced that major military operations in the country were over.
    • The US focus shifted to the Iraq invasion, while in Afghanistan, western powers helped build a centralized democratic system and institutions.
    • But that neither ended the war nor stabilised the country.

    Why is the US pulling back?

    • The US had reached the conclusion long ago that the war was unwinnable.
    • It wanted a face-saving exit.

    What are the terms of US exit?

    • Before the Doha talks started, the Taliban had maintained that they would hold direct talks only with the US, and not with the Kabul government, which they did not recognize.
    • The US effectively accepted this demand when they cut the Afghan government off the process and entered direct talks with the insurgents.
    • The deal dealt with four aspects of the conflict — violence, foreign troops, intra-Afghan peace talks and the use of Afghan soil by terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda and the IS.
    • According to the agreement, the Taliban promised to reduce violence, join intra-Afghan peace talks and cut all ties with foreign terrorist groups, while the US pledged to withdraw all its troops.

    Present situation in Afghanistan

    • After the agreement was signed, the US put pressure on the Afghan government to release thousands of Taliban prisoners — a key Taliban precondition for starting intra-Afghan talks.
    • Talks between Taliban representatives and the Afghan government began in Doha in September 2020 but did not reach any breakthrough.
    • At present, the peace process is frozen. And the US is hurrying for the exit.
    • The Taliban reduced hostilities against foreign troops but continued to attack Afghan forces even after the agreement was signed.
    • Kabul maintains that the Pakistan support for the Taliban is allowing the insurgents to overcome military pressure and carry forward with their agenda.

    Pakistani role in reviving Taliban

    • Pakistan was one of the three countries that had recognized the Taliban regime in the 1990s.
    • The Taliban captured much of the country with help from Pakistan’s ISI.
    • After the 9/11 attacks, Pakistan’s military dictator Musharraf, under pressure from the Bush administration, cut formal ties with the Taliban and joined America’s war on terror.
    • But Pakistan played a double game. It provided shelter to the Talabani leaders and regrouped their organization which helped them make a staged comeback in Afghanistan.
    • Pakistan successfully expected these groups to launch terror activities against India.

    Again in the spotlight

    • A violent military takeover of Afghanistan by the Taliban may not serve Pakistan’s core interests.
    • It wants to check India’s influence in Afghanistan and bring the Taliban to Kabul.
    • But a violent takeover, like in the 1990s, would lack international acceptability, leaving Afghanistan unstable for a foreseeable future.
    • In such a scenario, Pakistan could face another influx of refugees from Afghanistan and strengthening of anti-Pakistan terror groups, such as the Tehrik-i-Taliban.
    • From a strategic point of view, Pakistan would prefer the Taliban being accommodated in power through negotiations and a peaceful settlement.
    • But it’s not clear whether Pakistan has the capacity to shape the post-American outcome in Afghanistan.

    Why is India reaching out to the Taliban?

    • India had made contacts with the Taliban in Doha. New Delhi has not denied reports of its outreach to the Taliban.
    • India has three critical areas in dealing with the Taliban:
    1. One, protecting its investments, which run into billions of rupees, in Afghanistan;
    2. Two, preventing a future Taliban regime from being a pawn of the ISI;
    3. Three, making sure that the Pakistan-backed anti-India terrorist groups do not get support from the Taliban.

    Is the Afghanistan government doomed?

    • The American intelligence community has concluded that Kabul could fall within six months.
    • None of the global leaders are certain about the survival of the Afghan government.

    Taliban is pacing its action

    • One thing is certain — the American withdrawal has turned the balance of power in the battleground in favour of the Taliban.
    • They are already making rapid advances, and could launch a major offensive targeting the city centers and provincial capitals once the last American leaves.

    Future of Afghanistan

    There seems three possibilities:

    1. One, there could be a political settlement in which the Taliban and the government agree to some power-sharing mechanism and jointly shape the future of Afghanistan. As of now, this looks like a remote possibility.
    2. Two, an all-out civil war may be possible, in which the government, economically backed and militarily trained by the West, holds on to its positions in key cities. This is already unfolding.
    3. A third scenario would be of the Taliban taking over the country.

    Any nation planning to deal with Afghanistan should be prepared for all three scenarios.

  • Issues in Ladakh after abolition of Art. 370

    When Jammu and Kashmir were bifurcated into two UTs, Ladakh was seen welcoming the reorganization. However, different demands are coming from its two districts of Ladakh, Leh and Kargil.

    Leh and Kargil, not alike

    • The leaders from Kargil demanded that the district should remain part of J&K.
    • The Leh-based Ladakh Buddhist Association has put forth its demand for an autonomous hill council under the Sixth Schedule, modelled on the lines of the Bodoland Territorial Council in Assam.
    • But what Leh leaders did not bargain for was the complete loss of legislative powers.
    • Earlier, the two districts each sent four representatives to the J&K legislature. After the changes, they were down to one legislator — their sole MP— with all powers vested in the UT bureaucracy.
    • Unlike the UT of J&K, Ladakh was a UT without an assembly.

    What are their concerns?

    • What both Ladakh districts fear is the alienation of land, loss of identity, culture, language, and change in demography.
    • They fear that it will follow their political disempowerment.

    Hill Development Councils

    • Leh and Kargil have separate Autonomous Hill Development Councils, set up under the Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Councils Act, 1997.
    • However, the AHDCs have no legislative powers.
    • The councils are elected and have executive powers over the allotment, use and occupation of land vested in them by the Centre, and the powers to collect some local taxes, such as parking fees, taxes on shops etc.
    • But the real powers are now wielded by the UT administration, which is seen as even more remote than the erstwhile state government of J&K.

    What is the sixth schedule?

    • The Sixth Schedule is a provision of Article 244(A) of the Constitution, originally meant for the creation of autonomous tribal regions in Assam, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Tripura.
    • Hill councils under this provision have legislative powers.

    Evolving demands

    • But with no progress on Leh’s demand for Sixth Schedule protections, the Leh leadership has now upped its demands.
    • Other issues under discussion are protections for language, culture, land and jobs, plus a long-standing demand for a route between Kargil and Skardu in territory under Pakistan in Gilgit- Baltistan.

  • US puts Pakistan, Turkey on Child Soldier Recruiter List

    The US has added Pakistan and 14 other countries to a Child Soldier Recruiter List that identifies foreign governments having government-supported armed groups that recruit or use child soldiers.

    Who is a child soldier?

    • The recruitment or use of children below the age of 15 as soldiers is prohibited by the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).
    • Currently, 193 countries have ratified the CRC.
    • The CRC requires state parties to “take all feasible measures” to ensure that children under 18 are not engaged in direct hostilities.
    • It further prohibits the state parties from recruiting children under 15 into the armed forces.
    • It is considered a war crime under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.
    • In addition, the Optional Protocol to the CRC further prohibits kids under the age 18 from being compulsorily recruited into state or non-state armed forces or directly engaging in hostilities.
    • The United States is a party to the Optional Protocol.

    What is US law?

    • The US adopted the Child Soldiers Prevention Act (CSPA) in 2008.
    • The CSPA prohibits the US government from providing military assistance, including money, military education and training, or direct sales of military equipment, to alleged countries.

    What is prohibited for countries on the list?

    The following types of security assistance are prohibited for countries that are on the list:

    • Licenses for direct commercial sales of military equipment
    • Foreign military financing for the purchase of defence articles and services, as well as design and construction services
    • International military education and training
    • Excess defence articles
    • Peacekeeping operations

    Criticism of the treaty

    • International treaties like CRS are valuable and necessary tools to establish international norms as they raise awareness regarding human rights abuses.
    • However, these treaties are limited in scope and nature, and they tend to be idealistic rather than practicable.
    • The UN’s mechanisms only bind state parties that ratify the treaties.
    • It, therefore, has no authority over countries that are not parties to the convention or are non-state entities, such as rebel militias recruiting child soldiers.
    • While the UN views its treaties and conventions as binding on state parties, it has no police power mechanism to enforce its decisions.
    • Therefore, the CRC and its Optional Protocol are limited by the signatories’ willingness to comply. Somalia, for example, is a signatory but it hasn’t ratified the convention.
  • There’s An IAS Officer In You. Let’s Discuss How You Can Become One!

    There’s An IAS Officer In You. Let’s Discuss How You Can Become One!

    Hey!

    We know that you have been working hard to realise the dream of becoming an IAS officer. And we believe in you! Join us for FREE sessions and discussions on Habitat and let’s explore how we can make that a reality.

    What you need to do:

    1. Join the FREE sessions at Habitat by clicking here.
    2. In the Geenral club, you will find students and mentors discussing different topics.
    3. Browse through the conversations.
    4. Read the discussions that have already happened.
    Join Habitat free sessions here (click)

    And then,

    1. Engage with the group.
    2. Feel completely free to express yourself.
    3. Speak about the issues you are facing.
    4. Talk to the mentors.
    5. Participate with your peers who are in the same boat as you!

    And EXCEL!

    There’s no obstacle to a conversation. Be a part of the most driven group and actively engage in discussion. It’s a perfectly safe place for you to be yourself!

    Come on board now! 

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