In a landmark ruling, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed theDoctrine of Pith and Substance, holding that the Centre cannot impose service tax on lottery distributors as the power to tax lotteries falls exclusively within the jurisdiction of state governments.
Why did the Supreme Court dismiss the Centre’s Plea?
Lotteries Are Not a Service but Gambling: The court ruled that the relationship between states and lottery distributors is buyer-seller, not principal-agent, making service tax inapplicable.
Exclusive Taxing Power of States: The Constitution grants state legislatures the authority to tax betting and gambling, including lotteries.
Parliamentcannot override this through residuary powers (Entry 97 – List I) as taxation on lotteries is already covered under Entry 62 – List II.
Doctrine of Pith and Substance Applied: The court ruled that the dominant nature of lotteries is gambling, even if marketing and promotion involve service elements.
Since the primary focus remains within the State List, the Centre cannot impose service tax on it.
Sikkim High Court Ruling Upheld: The SC upheld the 2012 Sikkim HC decision, which declared Section 65(105) of the Finance Act, 1994 (as amended in 2010) unconstitutional, as it attempted to impose service tax on lottery-related activities.
What is Doctrine of Pith and Substance?
The Doctrine of Pith and Substance helps determine whether a law’s dominant purpose falls within the legislative competence of the enacting government.
Key Features:
Examines the true nature of a law, rather than incidental overlaps.
Resolves Centre-State conflicts over legislative powers.
Allows minor encroachments if the primary subject falls within the legislature’s authority.
Major Supreme Court Cases Applying the Doctrine:
State of Bombay v. FN Balsara (1951): Upheld a state alcohol prohibition law, despite minor overlaps with Union subjects.
Prafulla Kumar Mukherjee v. Bank of Commerce (1947): Allowed incidental encroachment as long as the law’s primary focus was within its jurisdiction.
Application in Lottery Taxation Case:
The Centre’s argument for taxing lotteries under Entry 97 – List I was rejected.
The dominant purpose of lottery transactions is gambling, which states exclusively regulate and tax.
PYQ:
[2016] The Parliament of India acquires the power to legislate on any item in the State List in the national interest if a resolution to that effect is passed by the:
(a) Lok Sabha by a simple majority of its total membership
(b) Lok Sabha by a majority of not less than two-thirds of its total membership
(c) Rajya Sabha by a simple majority of its total membership
(d) Rajya Sabha by a majority of not less than two thirds of its members present and voting
India-Pakistan’s Indus Water Treaty dispute saw a key development as the Neutral Expert upheld India’s stance. For UPSC aspirants, this topic is crucial for international relations and governance. It highlights how international treaties function, the role of legal mechanisms in dispute resolution, and the broader impact of climate change on shared water resources. Understanding past challenges under the IWT, including Pakistan’s opposition to Indian projects, will provide strong examples for exam answers. The key takeaway is the importance of cooperation, transparency, and dialogue in resolving such disputes. For UPSC preparation, focus on the treaty’s practical aspects, its resolution mechanisms, and environmental challenges to tackle questions on international treaties, conflict resolution, and water governance effectively.
PYQ ANCHORING & MICROTHEMES:
GS 2: Project `Mausam’ is considered a unique foreign policy initiative of the Indian Government to improve relationship with its neighbors. Does the project have a strategic dimension? Discuss. [2015]
Microthemes: Neighbourhood
Michel Lino, the World Bank-appointed Neutral Expert (NE), declared he is “competent” to decide differences on hydroelectric projects under the Indus Water Treaty (IWT), 1960. India welcomed the decision, emphasizing that all seven technical disputes fall within the NE’s jurisdiction.
THE CURRENT DISPUTE
The disagreement between India and Pakistan revolves around two key hydroelectric projects:
Kishenganga Project: Located on the Kishenganga River, a tributary of the Jhelum.
Ratle Project: Situated on the Chenab River.
The core issue lies in the differing interpretations of the dispute resolution mechanism under the Indus Water Treaty.
India advocates using a Neutral Expert to resolve the dispute, as stipulated in the IWT of 1960.
Pakistan insists on seeking adjudication from the Permanent Court of Arbitration (CoA) in The Hague.
Timeline of Dispute Development:
2015: Pakistan raised objections to the projects, initially requesting the appointment of a Neutral Expert.
2016: Pakistan withdrew its Neutral Expert request unilaterally and directly sought adjudication by the CoA, bypassing the treaty’s prescribed sequence in Article IX.
India subsequently requested that the dispute be referred back to a Neutral Expert, adhering to the treaty’s process.
Parallel Mechanisms and Legal Challenges
In 2022, the World Bank facilitated the simultaneous functioning of both a Neutral Expert and a CoA, creating parallel mechanisms.
India rejected the CoA as “illegally constituted” and inconsistent with the treaty’s provisions.
Engagement on Treaty Review
India and Pakistan are also engaging under Article XII (3) for a review and potential modification of the treaty:
January 2023: India formally issued a notice to Pakistan for reviewing and modifying the treaty.
August 30, 2024: Another formal notice was sent, but Pakistan has not responded, despite receiving four reminders from India.
Neutral Expert’s Decision
The World Bank-appointed Neutral Expert, Michel Lino, upheld India’s stance.
Affirmed his jurisdiction under Paragraph 7 of Annexure F of the IWT to address differences.
Recognized the Neutral Expert as the competent authority to resolve the seven disputed issues.
India’s Response
India welcomed the Neutral Expert’s ruling and criticized the CoA’s legitimacy.
Reiterated that the treaty does not allow parallel proceedings on the same matter.
The Ministry of External Affairs affirmed that the Neutral Expert was the appropriate body to address the technical disputes, including seven key differences raised concerning the Kishenganga and Ratle projects.
Next Steps
The Neutral Expert is now set to:
Evaluate the merits of each of the seven disputes between India and Pakistan.
Deliver a final decision based on the technical and legal considerations.
This phased resolution process will determine the future trajectory of the Indus Water Treaty and its governance.
ISSUES WITH THE TREATY & ITS IMPACTS
Issue
Details
Examples
Impact
Pakistan’s Frequent Opposition
Frequent objections over Indian projects, questioning adherence to treaty specifications.
– Opposition to Kishanganga Hydroelectric Project (KHEP) on Jhelum River. – Opposition to Ratle Hydroelectric Project on Chenab River.
Delayed project timelines and increased costs, undermining developmental efforts.
Limitations of Judicial Recourse
India seeks resolution via Neutral Expert (spirit of treaty), while Pakistan uses Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) (literal interpretation).
– July 2023 PCA Verdict: Legally binding decision favoring Pakistan, rejected by India.
Lack of consensus undermines trust in the Treaty’s dispute resolution mechanism.
Strained Bilateral Relations
Treaty’s functioning influenced by geopolitical tensions.
– Suspension of biannual talks due to Pakistan’s support for state-sponsored terrorism.
Reduced cooperation, increasing risk of Treaty breakdown and potential water conflicts.
Impact of Climate Change
Altered precipitation, runoff patterns, and glacial melt affect water availability.
– Increased glacial melt in the Himalayas affects Indus Basin flows. – Unpredictable monsoons disrupt allocations.
Treaty fails to account for climate-induced variability, threatening equitable water sharing.
Third-Party Conflict Resolution
World Bank, as guarantor, lacks tools to determine whether changes in flow are illegal interventions or natural variations.
– Disputes during low-flow periods often lead to allegations of intentional blockages by India.
Misinterpretation of flow changes increases mistrust and unnecessary escalations.
Inadequate Data Sharing
Lack of regular data sharing limits understanding of river basin dynamics.
– Inconsistent hydrological data sharing on Jhelum and Chenab Rivers prevents effective management.
Reduces ability to make informed decisions and fuels disagreements.
Technical Nature of Treaty
Complex provisions enable diverse interpretations, leading to frequent disagreements.
– Ambiguities in compliance with Annexure D design standards for hydropower projects.
Delays developmental projects and creates recurring disputes between the two nations.
WAY FORWARD
Work Within the Treaty’s Framework: Both countries should make the best use of the treaty’s existing mechanisms to resolve technical issues fairly and effectively.
Be Open and Share Information: By sharing data about water flow and usage, both nations can build trust and solve shared problems.
Team Up to Manage the Basin: With climate change and growing populations putting pressure on the Indus basin, it’s essential for both sides to work together on saving water, controlling floods, and using resources responsibly.
Keep Talking and Stay Committed: Lasting solutions need both governments to stay focused on peaceful dialogue and cooperation rather than getting caught up in conflicts.
#BACK2BASICS : INDUS WATER TREATY
Indus Water Treaty: Overview and Key Provisions
The Indus Water Treaty (IWT), signed in 1960, governs the water-sharing arrangements between India and Pakistan over the Indus River system. The Treaty emerged as a solution to water disputes following the partition of India in 1947, which divided the river system between the two nations.
Key Provisions of the Indus Water Treaty
Water Sharing Arrangement:
The six rivers in the Indus Basin were divided as follows:
Western Rivers: Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab were allocated to Pakistan for unrestricted use, except for specified uses by India (e.g., non-consumptive, agricultural, and domestic uses).
Eastern Rivers: Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej were allocated to India for unrestricted use.
Approximately 80% of the water flow was allocated to Pakistan and 20% to India.
Specific Rights for India on Western Rivers:
Annexure C: Grants India rights for limited agricultural usage of waters from the western rivers.
Annexure D: Allows India to build ‘run-of-the-river’ hydropower projects (HEPs), which do not involve live water storage.
India must adhere to detailed design specifications.
Pakistan must be informed about project designs and can raise objections within three months.
Storage Provisions: India is permitted minimal storage on the western rivers for conservation and flood control purposes.
Permanent Indus Commission
A Permanent Indus Commission was established under the Treaty, comprising representatives from both nations.
Functions: Act as the first step in resolving water-related conflicts and Mandate at least one annual meeting.
Dispute Resolution Mechanism: The IWT outlines a three-step graded dispute resolution mechanism:
Permanent Indus Commission/Inter-government Talks: Initial disputes should be resolved through the Commission or inter-government dialogues.
Neutral Expert (NE): Unresolved disputes may be referred to the World Bank, which can appoint a Neutral Expert to resolve specific issues.
Court of Arbitration (CoA): If disputes involve treaty interpretation or dissatisfaction with the NE’s decision, they may be referred to a Court of Arbitration.
Q)Clean energy is the order of the day.’ Describe briefly India’s changing policy towards climate change in various international fora in the context of geopolitics. (UPSC CSE 2018)
Mentor’s Comment: UPSC mains have always focused on Climate Change (2017), and COP 26 (2021).
In the Climate Change Performance Index (CCPI) 2025, India ranks among the top 10 climate performers globally, underscoring its commitment to climate action. India has been recognized for its significant role in South-South climate cooperation, reflecting its leadership in fostering collaboration among developing nations to address climate change.
Today’s editorial highlights how South-South cooperation can help achieve climate goals, promote sustainable development, and empower developing countries to meet their climate targets, drawing attention to India’s strategic opportunities and responsibilities in this area. This content would help in substantiation of answers in Mains GS Paper III (Environment and Biodiversity).
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Let’s learn!
Why in the News?
India’s potential role in fostering climate cooperation between developing nations through South-South cooperation in the context of the Paris Agreement is needed for the global solutions to tackle climate change.
How does Article 6 of the Paris Agreement benefit India in achieving its climate goals?
Carbon Markets: Under Article 6.2, countries can trade carbon credits to meet their emissions reduction targets. India can participate in these carbon markets, generating revenue by selling surplus carbon credits earned through emission reductions in sectors like renewable energy, energy efficiency, and afforestation.
By engaging in carbon trading, India can attract foreign investments from companies in developed countries looking to offset their emissions. This can provide funding for clean energy projects, supporting India’s transition to a low-carbon economy.
Cooperative Approaches: Article 6.4 establishes a global carbon market mechanism, similar to the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) under the Kyoto Protocol, but with improvements. India could utilize this mechanism to undertake joint projects with other countries that help reduce emissions while fostering sustainable development.
Through cooperative approaches, India can access advanced technologies, practices, and expertise from other countries, enabling its industries to adopt cleaner technologies and improve energy efficiency, contributing to its climate and development goals.
Non-Market Approaches:
Article 6.8 promotes non-market mechanisms, which focus on facilitating actions like capacity-building, finance, and knowledge sharing to address climate change. This can help India strengthen its national capabilities to implement climate policies and adapt to the impacts of climate change, particularly in vulnerable regions.
India, being highly vulnerable to the effects of climate change, can benefit from non-market approaches to enhance its adaptive capacities and resilience, addressing critical sectors like agriculture, water resources, and infrastructure.
Flexibility in Meeting Targets:
The flexibility provided by Article 6 allows India to find the most cost-effective solutions for emission reductions, especially in sectors where technology deployment is expensive or challenging. It provides an opportunity to meet its Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) in a way that balances economic growth with environmental sustainability.
What are the potential challenges India faces in utilizing ITMOs and engaging in international climate finance?
Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification (MRV) Systems: India’s current MRV systems for tracking emissions reductions may not meet the rigorous standards required for ITMOs, which are crucial for ensuring transparency and accountability in carbon markets.
Inadequate MRV mechanisms could hinder India’s ability to accurately quantify and report emission reductions, limiting its participation in carbon trading and climate finance.
Accessing Climate Finance: Despite being a major developing country, India faces challenges in accessing sufficient and predictable climate finance from international sources, as the global financing mechanisms often favor smaller or more vulnerable nations.
Limited access to finance can slow down India’s ability to implement large-scale climate projects, especially in sectors like renewable energy, adaptation, and infrastructure development.
Ensuring Environmental Integrity: While ITMOs enable carbon trading, there’s a risk of “low-quality” credits or “double counting” (where emissions reductions are claimed by multiple parties), which could undermine the credibility and environmental integrity of the system.
If India is not careful in ensuring robust methodologies for generating and trading ITMOs, it might face challenges in maintaining the credibility of its climate commitments, affecting its international reputation.
Domestic Policy and Institutional Coordination: India’s domestic policies on climate change may not be fully aligned with the requirements of international climate finance mechanisms or ITMO systems. There is also a need for better coordination among various ministries and stakeholders to implement and track climate action effectively.
Misalignment between international climate goals and domestic policies could result in inefficiencies and missed opportunities to access ITMOs and climate finance.
What are the opportunities for India under South-South cooperation via Article 6.2?
Carbon Trading with Fellow Developing Countries: India can collaborate with neighbouring countries like Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and others in the South Asian region to work together to reduce emissions through renewable energy, afforestation, or energy efficiency programs.
India could sell any surplus carbon credits generated through its own emission reduction efforts to other developing countries that need help meeting their own NDCs (Nationally Determined Contributions). This allows India to both achieve its climate goals and potentially generate revenue.
Technology and Knowledge Transfer: India has already made significant progress in solar energy and can offer valuable lessons and technologies to fellow developing countries.
India can also help other countries develop adaptation strategies for climate change impacts, such as water management techniques, disaster preparedness, and climate-resilient infrastructure.
In return, India could receive new technologies, methods, and knowledge to enhance its own climate resilience.
Joint Ventures for Clean Energy Projects: India can partner with other developing countries to co-develop large-scale renewable energy projects, such as solar, wind, or hydropower. Joint initiatives could be supported by carbon markets, with emission reductions which could attract investments, expertise, and improve access to clean energy technologies.
By collaborating with other developing countries, India can contribute to the development of affordable, scalable solutions that are tailored to the specific needs of developing nations.
These solutions could be implemented locally, reducing emissions and improving energy access.
Strengthening Capacity and Institutional Frameworks: South-South cooperation can help India and other developing countries to assist in establishing frameworks for monitoring, reporting, and verifying (MRV) emissions reductions, benefiting both India and its partner countries.
India can help south countries in refining its strategies and implementing the best practices that suit their own development contexts.
Leveraging Climate Finance: India, by engaging in South-South cooperation, could also have access to international financial instruments that make climate action more affordable.
This would be particularly beneficial in sectors where India faces challenges in scaling up clean technologies, like electric vehicles, or in regions like rural areas that require adaptation interventions.
Kaveri 2.0, a web portal launched in 2023 to make property registrations in Karnataka easier was recently hit by a DDoS attack carried out using AI-powered bots.
What is a DDoS attack?
A Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack is a type of cyberattack where multiple computers or bots flood a website or online service with excessive traffic, overwhelming its servers and causing it to slow down or crash.
What are the key issues with Karnataka’s response to cyber attacks, specifically the DDoS attack on Kaveri 2.0?
Lack of Proactive Cybersecurity Measures: Despite previous cyber incidents like the 2017 WannaCry ransomware attack and the 2019 e-procurement portal hack, the State failed to implement robust preventive measures. The DDoS attack on Kaveri 2.0 in December 2024 – February 2025 exposed the absence of real-time threat monitoring systems.
Poor Coordination Between Departments: The e-Governance Department did not involve the State cyber crime police until February 7, 2025, despite weeks of disruption. Resistance within departments to share cybersecurity concerns with law enforcement delayed incident response, worsening the crisis.
Lack of a Dedicated Cybersecurity Infrastructure: Karnataka lacks a Cyber Security Operation Centre like Maharashtra and Odisha. A ₹20 crore cybersecurity centre, proposed in February 2023, was scrapped after the new government took over, leaving critical digital infrastructure vulnerable.
Government Response and Security Measures: While the government has initiated a police probe and FIR registration under the Information Technology Act, and the Kaveri 2.0 application has been restored with enhanced security measures,
Karnataka launched a cyber security policy in 2024 to combat rising cybercrime, focusing on awareness, skill building, and industry promotion.
How have past attacks influenced the current state of cyber security?
Failure to Implement Robust Cybersecurity Measures: Despite the 2017 WannaCry ransomware attack on the Karnataka State Data Centre and the 2019 e-Procurement portal hack (₹11.5 crore stolen), the state did not establish strong preventive mechanisms.
The lack of a dedicated Cyber Security Operation Centre resulted in inadequate monitoring and delayed responses to threats like the recent DDoS attack on Kaveri 2.0 (2024-25).
Persistent Coordination Gaps Between Departments: Earlier attacks, such as the 2022 cyber attack on NIMHANS, highlighted poor inter-departmental coordination, yet similar gaps persisted during the Kaveri 2.0 DDoS attack.
The e-Governance Department handled the crisis alone without informing the cyber crime police, delaying investigative action until February 7, 2025.
Neglect of Cybersecurity Infrastructure Development: A ₹20 crore Cyber Security Operation Centre, proposed in February 2023, was dropped in the May 2023 budget revision after a change in government.
Unlike Maharashtra and Odisha, which have dedicated cyber security setups, Karnataka still lacks a real-time threat detection system, leaving it vulnerable to repeated cyber attacks.
Why has the coordination between the e-Governance Department and the State Police been ineffective during cyber incidents?
Lack of a Unified Cybersecurity Framework: Karnataka’s Cyber Security Committee (2023) is led by bureaucrats without police representation, unlike national-level bodies like I4C (Indian Cyber Crime Coordination Centre) and NCIIPC (National Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Centre).
This results in fragmented decision-making, where cybersecurity response remains within the e-Governance Department, sidelining law enforcement agencies.
Delayed Involvement of the Cyber Crime Police: In the Kaveri 2.0 DDoS attack (2024-25), the e-Governance Department did not inform the State cyber crime police until February 7, 2025—long after the attack began in December 2024.
Earlier incidents like the 2019 e-Procurement portal hack and 2022 NIMHANS cyber attack also saw delayed police involvement, allowing attackers more time to operate.
Departmental Hesitation to Engage Law Enforcement: Sources indicate a reluctance within the e-Governance Department to involve the police, possibly due to bureaucratic hurdles or fears of administrative scrutiny.
This lack of trust and procedural clarity has led to independent firefighting efforts rather than a coordinated response between technical teams and law enforcement.
Why is it crucial for the state to establish a Cyber Security Operation Centre similar to the national model?
Real-Time Threat Detection and Response: The DDoS attack on Kaveri 2.0 (2024-25) went undetected for weeks, causing major disruptions in property registrations. A Cyber Security Operation Centre (CSOC) would enable 24/7 monitoring and early detection of cyber threats.
National agencies like I4C (Indian Cyber Crime Coordination Centre) and NCIIPC (National Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Centre) use AI-driven analytics and real-time threat intelligence to mitigate cyber risks, a model Karnataka must adopt.
Coordinated and Rapid Incident Response: Karnataka’s e-Governance Department handled the Kaveri 2.0 attack alone, only involving cyber crime police weeks later, delaying mitigation efforts.
A CSOC would centralize cybersecurity efforts, ensuring immediate coordination between technical experts, government departments, and law enforcement agencies to prevent prolonged disruptions.
Way forward:
Establish a Cyber Security Operation Centre (CSOC): Revive the ₹20 crore CSOC proposal with real-time threat monitoring, AI-driven analytics, and centralized coordination between government agencies and law enforcement.
Implement automated response mechanisms to detect and neutralize cyber threats before they escalate.
Strengthen Inter-Departmental Coordination and Cybersecurity Framework: Mandate immediate police involvement in cyber incidents and integrate law enforcement into cybersecurity governance structures like the Cyber Security Committee.
Conduct joint cybersecurity drills between the e-Governance Department, State Police, and IT experts to improve incident response efficiency.
Mains PYQ:
Q What are the different elements of cyber security? Keeping in view the challenges in cyber security, examine the extent to which India has successfully developed a comprehensive National Cyber Security Strategy. (UPSC IAS/2022)
Increasing the number of women in the workforce is not just about equality and it is also essential for economic growth.
What are their challenges in enabling women’s economic participation in India?
Unpaid Care Work Burden: Women in India spend 7.2 hours per day on unpaid domestic work, compared to 2.8 hours by men (Time Use in India Report, 2019). This leaves them with less time for paid employment.
Example: Many women drop out of the workforce after marriage due to caregiving responsibilities, particularly in rural areas where childcare facilities are scarce.
Lack of Formal Part-time Employment: India lacks legally regulated part-time work, unlike OECD countries where part-time work is protected by law and provides benefits.
Example: According to the NCAER study (2024), 57% of women prefer part-time jobs for flexibility, but due to the absence of formal options, many take low-wage, informal sector jobs without security.
Gender Discrimination and Wage Gap: Women in India earn only 77% of what men earn for the same work (World Economic Forum, Global Gender Gap Report 2023).
Example: The STEM sector in India has only 16% female representation, limiting women’s access to high-paying jobs and leadership roles.
Limited Access to Safe and Affordable Transport: Lack of safe and reliable transport restricts women’s mobility for work, especially in cities with high crime rates against women.
Example: A study by Ola Mobility Institute (2022) found that over 50% of women in Delhi and Mumbai reject job opportunities due to safety concerns while commuting.
Low Financial and Digital Literacy: Women in India have lower financial and digital literacy, limiting their participation in modern, high-skilled jobs and entrepreneurship.
Example: According to the National Family Health Survey-5 (2019-21), only 33% of Indian women use the Internet, reducing their access to online job markets and digital banking.
What are the Study and Findings from the LFPR Report?
Low Female Labour Force Participation Rate (LFPR) in India: India’s Female LFPR stands at 37%, which is much lower than the global average of 47% and the OECD average of 67%. The primary reasons for this low participation include unpaid care work, lack of formal part-time jobs, gender discrimination, and mobility constraints.
Impact of Addressing Barriers on LFPR Growth: The study used the McCall-Mortensen job search model to simulate the effects of policy changes. It found that addressing two major barriers (formalizing part-time work and redistributing unpaid care work) could increase women’s LFPR by 6 percentage points, from 37% to 43%.
Projected Increase in LFPR: The study found that addressing these two barriers could raise India’s female LFPR by six percentage points, increasing it from the current 37% to 43%.
Formalizing Part-Time Employment: The study highlighted that introducing formally recognized part-time work contracts with pro-rated wages and benefits would offer women the flexibility they need.
Redistributing Unpaid Care Work: Achieving gender equality in caregiving responsibilities, through policies like paid parental leave and investment in childcare along with cultural changes, is crucial for enabling women’s participation in the labour force.
What are the steps taken by the government?
Maternity and Childcare Support – The Maternity Benefit (Amendment) Act, 2017 increased paid maternity leave to 26 weeks, and schemes like PM Matru Vandana Yojana provide financial aid to pregnant women.
Skill Development and Entrepreneurship – Programs like PM Kaushal Vikas Yojana (PMKVY) train women in various skills, while Mudra Yojana and Stand-Up India provide financial support for women entrepreneurs.
Workplace Safety and Legal Protections – The Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace Act, 2013 ensures safer workplaces and the Working Women’s Hostels Scheme provides secure housing for working women.
Way forward:
Policy Reforms for Flexible Work and Social Security: Introduce formal part-time work laws with pro-rated wages and benefits, ensuring job security and flexibility for women. Expand paid parental leave and affordable childcare facilities to reduce the unpaid care work burden.
Improving Safety, Mobility, and Digital Inclusion: Strengthen safe public transport infrastructure and women-only commuting options to enhance workplace accessibility. Promote financial and digital literacy programs, ensuring women’s participation in online job markets and entrepreneurship.
Mains PYQ:
Q ‘Women’s movement in India has not addressed the issues of women of lower social strata.’ Substantiate your view. (UPSC IAS/2018)
Union Minister for Health and Family Welfare has launched the Annual Nationwide Mass Drug Administration (MDA) Campaign to eliminate Lymphatic Filariasis (LF).
About Lymphatic Filariasis (LF):
Lymphatic Filariasis (LF), or “Hathi Paon”, is a mosquito-borne parasitic disease caused by Wuchereria bancrofti, Brugia malayi, and Brugia timori.
It affects the lymphatic system, leading to swelling of limbs (lymphoedema) and scrotal swelling (hydrocele), causing permanent disability.
LF spreads through repeated mosquito bites, making it a major public health challenge in tropical regions, including India.
India aims to eliminate LF by 2027, ahead of the 2030 Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) target.
What is Mass Drug Administration (MDA)?
MDA is a large-scale public health campaign where anti-filarial medicines are administered to all eligible individuals in endemic areas to stop LF transmission.
Medication Regimens:
Double Drug Therapy (DA): Diethylcarbamazine Citrate (DEC) + Albendazole
Triple Drug Therapy (IDA): Ivermectin + DEC + Albendazole
Key Features of MDA
Door-to-door supervised drug administration ensures high coverage.
Drugs are safe, free, and given twice a year in targeted districts.
MDA is crucial for eliminating LF, as it reduces parasite transmission and protects millions from disability.
EXCEPTIONS: Children below 2 years, pregnant women, and seriously ill individuals.
PYQ:
[2017] Consider the following statements:
1. In tropical regions, Zika virus disease is transmitted by the same mosquito that transmits dengue.
2. Sexual transmission of Zika virus disease is possible.
Which of the statements given above is/are correct?
The 3rd edition of Joint Special Forces Exercise CYCLONE commenced at Mahajan Field Firing Ranges in Rajasthan.
Note: India and the UAE held the ‘Desert Cyclone 2024’ joint military exercise in Rajasthan in January 2024. One must not get confused with this.
About ExerciseCYCLONE-III
It is the 3rd edition of the Joint Special Forces Exercise between India and Egypt, aimed at enhancing interoperability, joint tactical operations, and counter-terrorism capabilities.
The exercise is conducted at Mahajan Field Firing Ranges in Rajasthan from 10th to 23rd February 2025.
CYCLONE is an annual exercise, held alternately in India and Egypt.
The previous edition (CYCLONE-II) was conducted in Egypt in January 2024.
The exercise focuses on high-intensity special forces training in desert and semi-desert terrains.
Features and Significance:
This exercise involves 25 personnel from each side, focusing on counterterrorism, CQB, hostage rescue, and heliborne operations in desert terrain.
The 48-hour final validation exercise tests combat strategies in semi-desert conditions, while an Indian defense technology showcase strengthens military ties.
The exercise enhances India-Egypt defense cooperation, improves joint counter-terrorism capabilities, and builds readiness for future operations.
It also boosts India’s strategic outreach in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, reinforcing defense collaborations and regional security.
The 4th India-UK Energy Dialogue, chaired by the Union Minister of Power and the UK’s Energy Security Secretary, was recently held in New Delhi. The dignitaries launched Phase-2 of the ASPIRE programme to improve power supply, energy efficiency, and renewable energy.
About the ASPIRE Programme
The ASPIRE (Accelerating Smart Power and Renewable Energy in India) program was officially launched in November 2021 during the India-UK Energy for Growth Partnership.
It focuses on renewable energy expansion, power distribution reforms, and energy efficiency improvements.
The program is implemented in collaboration with India’s Ministry of Power (MoP), Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (MNRE), and the UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO).
Key Features of ASPIRE Phase-2:
Round-the-Clock (RTC) Power Supply: Ensuring uninterrupted electricity with smart grid integration.
Renewable Energy Expansion: Scaling up solar, wind, and offshore wind projects with investment support.
Industrial Energy Efficiency & Decarbonization: Reducing carbon emissions in key industries like steel, aluminum, and cement.
Power Distribution & Market Reforms: Enhancing smart metering, grid resilience, and regulatory cooperation between CERC (India) and OFGEM (UK).
Offshore Wind Development: Establishing a UK-India Offshore Wind Taskforce to boost supply chains & financing models.
Electric Mobility & Green Data Centers: Expanding EV charging infrastructure and sustainable energy solutions.
India has introduced a Harmonised System (HS) code for geographical indication (GI) recognised rice exports under an amendment to the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 announced by Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman in the 2025-26 Union Budget on February 1, 2025.
AboutHarmonised System (HS) Code
HS Code is an internationally recognizedclassification system for traded goods, developed by the World Customs Organization (WCO).
It is used to standardize the identification of products in global trade, ensuring uniformity in customs procedures, tariffs, and trade policies.
The HS Code is a six-digit numerical code, categorized as follows:
First two digits: Represent the chapter of goods (e.g., “10” for cereals).
Next two digits: Indicate the heading (e.g., “06” for rice).
Last two digits: Define the subheading (e.g., “30” for semi-milled or wholly milled rice).
Countries can extend the HS Code beyond six digits to accommodate specific national requirements (e.g., India uses an 8-digit system).
Impact of HS Code on GI Rice Exports:
Trade experts believe that the introduction of an HS code will:
Facilitate GI rice exports, even when general rice exports are restricted.
Ensure better market access for specialty rice varieties in global markets.
Differentiate GI-tagged rice from conventional rice exports to prevent mislabelling.
About the World Customs Organization (WCO):
The WCO is an intergovernmental organization responsible for overseeing and standardizing global customs regulations.
It was established in 1952 as the Customs Co-operation Council (CCC) and later renamed the WCO in 1994.
Key Functions of the WCO:
Develops and maintains the HS Code, used by over 200 countries and territories.
Regulates customs procedures, trade facilitation, and enforcement of trade laws.
Supports the fight against illegal trade, smuggling, and counterfeit goods.
The organization works closely with the World Trade Organization (WTO) and United Nations (UN) to promote global trade efficiency.
India is a member of the WCO and follows its HS classification system for trade regulations.
The WCO’s Revised Kyoto Convention (RKC) serves as a blueprint for India’s customs modernization efforts.
PYQ:
[2017] Consider the following statements:
India has ratified the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) of WTO.
TFA is a part of WTO’s Bali Ministerial Package of 2013.
TFA came into force in January 2016.
Which of the statements given above is/are correct?
Q) “India’s relations with Israel have, of late, acquired a depth and diversity, which cannot be rolled back.” Discuss. (UPSC CSE 2018)
Q) Consider the following statements: (2023)
Statement I: Israel has established diplomatic relations with some Arab States.
Statement-II: The ‘Arab Peace Initiative’ mediated by Saudi Arabia was signed by Israel and Arab League.
Which one of the following is correct in respect of the above statements?
(a) Both Statement-I and Statement-II are correct and Statement II is the correct explanation for Statement I
(b) Both Statement-I and Statement-II are correct and Statement-II is not the correct explanation for Statement-I
(c) Statement I is correct but Statement II is incorrect
(d) Statement I is incorrect but Statement II is correct
Mentor’s Comment: UPSC mains have always focused on India’s relations with Israel (2018), and the Arab Peace Initiative for Israel and Palestine ( 2023).
On February 4, 2025, Donald Trump proposed relocating Gaza’s 2.3 million residents to Egypt and Jordan, turning the area into a global resort under U.S. control. He hinted at a West Bank plan soon. Alongside Netanyahu, he praised Saudi Crown Prince Mb Salman, who reaffirmed that Saudi-Israel ties depend on a Palestinian state’s creation.
Today’s editorial talks about issues in the Middle East which is always in the news because of the Israel and Palestine conflict. This topic is also the favourite of UPSC in GS Paper2 mains and prelims related to International relations above mentioned in the box (PYQ Relevance). This content would help in substantiation of answers in Mains GS Paper 2.
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Let’s learn!
Why in the News?
Donald Trump recently proposed an audacious plan to relocate 2.3 million residents of the Gaza Strip to Egypt and Jordan, turning Gaza into a global resort, which has stirred geopolitical tension.
This suggestion, along with his praise for Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS), hints at possible changes in the West Asia region, especially concerning the Israel-Palestine issue and Saudi Arabia’s potential involvement in the Abraham Accords.
What is meant by Trump’s ‘expanding the canvas’ strategy?
Trump’s “expanding the canvas” strategy refers to his approach of broadening the scope of a negotiation or conflict resolution by introducing bold, often extreme proposals to provoke reaction and stimulate further discussions.
By presenting an audacious or exaggerated idea, he aims to shift the focus and push opposing parties to consider more realistic and agreeable counter-offers. The idea is that this “shock tactic” can help break a stalemate and create space for new solutions.
In the context of the Gaza proposal, Trump’s suggestion to depopulate Gaza and turn it into a global resort serves as an example of this strategy—pushing the boundaries of negotiation to force other stakeholders to come up with a more balanced, practical solution.
What are the implications of the proposed strategy for the Gaza conflict, and how might it reshape the geopolitical landscape in West Asia?
Geopolitical Tensions and Pushback: This proposal would likely anger Palestinians and Arab nations, as it bypasses the core issue of Palestinian statehood and self-determination. It could worsen tensions between Israel, Palestinians, and neighboring Arab countries.
The suggestion might also be viewed as a land grab or colonial move, particularly because it disregards the established claim of Palestinians to their land, creating significant backlash in the region and beyond.
Impact on Palestinian Statehood: Trump’s plan shifts focus away from the two-state solution (Israel and Palestine coexisting as separate states), which many international actors, including the U.S. and the UN, support.
The proposal undermines the push for Palestinian independence and could derail efforts to achieve a lasting peace settlement.
Saudi Arabia and Other Arab Nations’ Involvement: Trump’s proposal could alter the balance in Arab-Israeli relations. Saudi Arabia, which is being courted for inclusion in the Abraham Accords, might find it difficult to reconcile such a plan with its own stance on Palestinian rights, especially since Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has linked normalization with Israel to the creation of a Palestinian state.
It could either push Saudi Arabia and other Arab states further toward Israel or create more division, depending on how the proposal is received by the region’s leaders.
Shifting Regional Alliances: If Saudi Arabia were to move toward accepting the proposal, it could signal a significant shift in Middle Eastern alliances, possibly leading to greater cooperation between Arab states and Israel, while sidelining Palestinian aspirations for statehood.
On the other hand, if the plan fails, it could deepen regional divisions, particularly between Israel and the Arab world, and intensify the existing geopolitical instability in the region.
How are the ongoing conflicts and economic challenges in West Asia affecting the region’s future?
Political Impact of Conflicts: The wars and conflicts in places like Gaza, Syria, Yemen, and Lebanon have created deep divisions and instability. The region has been repolarized, leading to less cooperation and more distrust between nations.
Issues such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Iran’s nuclear ambitions, and Kurdish national aspirations remain unresolved, keeping tensions high and preventing lasting peace.
Economic Challenges: The conflicts have caused massive destruction, with the rebuilding costs in places like Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria. However, economic recovery is impossible without resolving the political issues first.
The region’s economy is also heavily dependent on oil, which is a vulnerable resource. The global push to move away from fossil fuels and the volatility of oil prices make the region’s future uncertain.
Countries like Saudi Arabia are aware of this and are trying to diversify their economies, but this process is slow.
What are the Abraham Accords?
The Abraham Accords refer to a series of normalization agreements between Israel and several Arab countries, aimed at establishing diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations. These agreements were brokered by the USA, and they marked a significant shift in Middle Eastern geopolitics.
Here are the four major features of the Abraham Accords:
Normalization of Relations: Israel established diplomatic ties with Arab countries like UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco.
Economic Collaboration: The signatories are working together to enhance trade relations, investment opportunities, and economic partnerships. Israel’s advanced technology sector, including cybersecurity and innovation, is seen as a valuable area for collaboration with the Arab countries.
Security Cooperation: Enhances defense and intelligence sharing, especially to address regional threats like Iran. As part of the normalization, the Accords encourage cultural exchange programs, tourism, and people-to-people connections.
Exclusion of the Palestinian Issue: One of the most notable features—and points of controversy—of the Abraham Accords is that the agreements were made without resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
While Palestinian leaders and many in the Arab world have opposed the Accords, claiming they betray the Palestinian cause, the agreements were framed as separate tracks that do not require the resolution of Palestinian statehood for Arab-Israeli relations to normalize.
Saudi Arabia’s Role in Shaping Stability:
Economic Influence: Saudi Arabia, as the largest economy in the region, plays a major role in the economic stability of West Asia. It has massive reserves of wealth, particularly from its oil exports, and is using this to invest in rebuilding and diversifying the region’s economy. The Saudi Public Investment Fund, for example, is helping to fuel new development projects.
Diplomatic Influence: Saudi Arabia’s political influence is also crucial. Under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS), the country has made efforts to mediate regional conflicts, like the war in Yemen and tensions with Iran. It has also sought to balance relationships with global powers, including the U.S., China, and Russia, while maintaining its leadership role in the Arab and Islamic world.
Potential to Guide Regional Stability: Despite the conflicts around it, Saudi Arabia has largely avoided direct involvement in the region’s major wars. It can use its wealth and diplomatic leverage to fund reconstruction efforts and push for more peaceful, negotiated solutions to ongoing conflicts. It also holds significant sway over organizations like OPEC, which can affect the global oil market and, by extension, the region’s economy.
What are the challenges the US faces in advancing the Abraham Accords, and how does it complicate vision for broader Arab-Israeli normalization?
Palestinian Statehood and the Core Issue of the Conflict: The Palestinian issue is a major barrier to Arab-Israeli normalization, with many Arab nations, including Saudi Arabia, insisting on a Palestinian state as a prerequisite.
Trump’s focus on individual peace deals with Arab states bypasses this issue, making it difficult for countries like Saudi Arabia to fully normalize relations with Israel.
Opposition from Palestinian Leaders and Supporters: The Palestinian leadership has consistently rejected the Abraham Accords, seeing them as a betrayal of their cause. They argue that normalizing relations with Israel without addressing Palestinian rights and the establishment of a Palestinian state undermines their struggle for sovereignty and independence.
This complicates the situation. As long as Palestinians feel excluded from peace processes or see no meaningful progress toward a state of their own, it will be difficult to secure broad Arab-Israeli normalization.
Resistance from Ultra-Religious Israeli Groups: Within Israel, the growing influence of ultra-religious Jewish groups also complicates Trump’s plans. These groups often oppose any peace deal and their influence makes it harder for the Israeli government to adopt policies that could lead to broader peace agreements, even with Arab states.
Competing Interests Among Arab States: While some Arab states like the UAE and Bahrain have embraced the Abraham Accords, others, particularly in the Gulf, have been more cautious.
Saudi Arabia, for example, has signaled interest in normalizing relations with Israel, but only on the condition that Palestinian statehood is part of the deal.
This puts Trump in a difficult position, as he must balance the desire to expand the Accords with the realities of Arab and Palestinian demands.
Way Forward:
Need for Revised Diplomacy: A lasting solution must address Palestinian statehood, with a two-state solution being central to gaining support from Arab nations and Palestinian leaders. Direct negotiations, backed by international mediators, are crucial.
Arab states, Israel, and global powers must work together through multilateral platforms, with Saudi Arabia playing a key role in fostering peace and stability in the region.
Humanitarian Focus: Immediate efforts are needed to address the humanitarian crisis in Gaza and surrounding areas, with international aid supporting reconstruction and stability.
Economic Diversification: The region must move beyond oil dependency by investing in other industries, with collaboration between the U.S. and Gulf states to promote long-term economic stability.