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Subject: Agri-Marketing

  • ‘Seeds Bill will not harm farmer rights’

    Why in the News

    The Union Agriculture Minister has said the proposed Seeds Bill will not be detrimental to the rights of farmers. The statement followed a meeting with about 20 farmers’ organisations on the draft Seeds Bill and the draft Pesticides Management Bill. The Centre’s stated case is that the Seeds Act, 1966 no longer matches contemporary farming practice, and that 70% of the seed Indian farmers use falls outside its purview. The Ministry has said every policy will be finalised on the basis of consensus after discussion with farmers, and that traditional seeds will be conserved. The contest is between tighter regulation of the seed trade, which runs on registration and traceability, and the informal exchange through which most smallholders obtain planting material.

    Why does the Centre want new seed and pesticide statutes?

    1. The governing law is six decades old: The Seeds Act, 1966 is no longer in tune with contemporary farming practices, on the Ministry’s own assessment.
    2. Most seed sits outside its reach: 70% of the seed used by Indian farmers falls outside the purview of the existing Act, so the standards it sets govern a minority of actual sowing.
    3. Spurious seed is the stated target: A crackdown on “fake” seeds is the immediate purpose of replacing the Act.
    4. Traceability is the proposed mechanism: A traceability system, which links a seed lot back to its producer through the supply chain, is intended to let a farmer identify the right seed before sowing.
    5. A parallel pesticide statute: A new pesticide management law is sought on the same logic, to identify substandard pesticides in the market.

    Who has been consulted, and on what terms?

    1. Scope of the consultation: About 20 farmers’ organisations were brought in on both draft Bills together rather than on the seed law alone.
    2. Who was in the room: The Bharatiya Kisan Sangh, various factions of the Bharatiya Kisan Union, the All India Kisan Coordination Committee (AIKCC) and the Kisan Mahapanchayat, among others, presented their views.
    3. The official side: The Union Agriculture Secretary and other senior officials of the ministry attended.
    4. The stated decision rule: The Centre has committed to finalising policy by consensus with farmers, and to conserving traditional seed varieties.

    Challenges to the Seeds Bill

    1. Registration can narrow informal exchange: Compulsory registration of varieties raises the cost of selling seed outside the formal trade, which is where most smallholder exchange happens. Eg. Farm saved and farmer to farmer seed still supplies a large share of the area under pulses and coarse cereals.
      The Fix: Write an express exemption for the sale and exchange of unbranded farm saved seed into the statute itself rather than leaving it to subordinate rules.
    2. Overlap with the existing plant variety law: Farmers’ rights to save, use, sow, exchange and sell the produce of a protected variety already sit in the Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights Act, 2001, and a new seed statute can cut across them. Eg. That Act bars a farmer only from selling branded seed of a protected variety, not from exchanging it.
      The Fix: State the relationship between the two statutes on the face of the Bill, so the earlier right is not read down by implication.
    3. Compensation for seed failure is hard to obtain: A farmer who sows spurious or poorly germinating seed loses an entire season and then has to prove causation to recover anything. Eg. Cotton growers in Telangana and Maharashtra have repeatedly reported germination failure in purchased seed lots.
      The Fix: Fix a statutory time bound compensation route through a district level seed committee rather than leaving the farmer to consumer litigation.
    4. Enforcement capacity sits with the States: Seed inspection and seed testing laboratories are run by State governments and are thinly staffed, so a traceability mandate can outrun the machinery meant to police it. Eg. Sampling and prosecution depend on notified State seed inspectors and a limited network of notified seed testing laboratories.
      The Fix: Fund State seed testing laboratory capacity and tie dealer licence renewal to sampling and reporting performance.

    Conclusion

    Neither draft has reached Parliament, and the consultation route the Ministry has chosen makes the text itself the thing to watch rather than the assurance around it. The unresolved question is where the line falls between a seed a farmer may freely exchange and a seed that must be registered, labelled and traced. An assurance that rights will not be harmed carries weight only if that line is drawn in the statute rather than in rules framed later.

    Back2Basics: Seeds Act, 1966

    1. What it regulates: The Act governs the quality of seed sold in India by empowering the Centre to notify kinds and varieties of seed and to prescribe minimum standards for them.
    2. The standards it sets: Notified seed must meet prescribed limits for germination and genetic and physical purity, and must carry a label stating them.
    3. Who enforces it: State level seed certification agencies certify seed and notified seed inspectors draw samples and prosecute violations.
    4. What it leaves out: The Act regulates only notified kinds and varieties, so seed outside that list is not covered by its standards.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2019] Consider the following statements: 1. According to the Indian Patents Act, a biological process to create a seed can be patented in India. 2. In India, there is no Intellectual Property Appellate Board. 3. Plant varieties are not eligible to be patented in India. Which of the statements given above is/are correct? (a) 1 and 3 only (b) 2 and 3 only (c) 3 only (d) 1, 2 and 3 ANSWER: (c)”

  • [3rd September 2026] The Hindu OpED: Many layers

    [3rd September 2026] The Hindu OpED: Many layers

    Question (2024, GS3): “Elucidate the importance of buffer stocks for stabilizing agricultural prices in India. What are the challenges associated with the storage of buffer stock? Discuss.
    Linkage: This question directly addresses the core policy tool used in onion management: state-led procurement and buffer stocking to counter short-term price volatility. It highlights the storage and logistical bottlenecks that lead to post-harvest collapses.

    Mentor Comment

    Onion price management has again run through a sequence of export restrictions and post collapse procurement, and neither has protected the farmer or the consumer. Since the 1960s Indian food policy has balanced affordable consumer prices against remunerative producer prices, with state intervention aimed at managing short term volatility rather than the underlying cause. Erratic weather and the absence of long term relief have made that balancing act harder to hold. The tension is that every corrective step arrives after farmers have already made production decisions and after prices have already collapsed, so the intervention reaches neither all farmers nor all grades of produce.

    What has the Centre’s onion trade policy been since 2023?

    1. The export ban: The government banned onion exports from December 2023 to May 2024.
    2. The price floor that replaced it: A minimum export price of $550 per tonne was imposed, which sets the lowest price at which a consignment may legally leave the country and works as a soft restriction on exports. A 40 per cent export duty was imposed alongside it.
    3. The rollback: The duty was reduced to 20 per cent in September 2024 and abolished in April 2025.

    Why does intervention after the event fail farmers?

    1. Policy changes after the sowing decision: The government often changes its position after farmers have made production decisions based on the price they expected.
    2. The procurement price was below cost: During the rabi harvest, onion farmers in Maharashtra, the country’s principal supplier, argued that the Centre’s procurement price of ₹12.35 per kg would not cover cultivation costs.
    3. The correction came too late for many: The Centre subsequently raised the price to up to ₹26.45 per kg. Many farmers could not capture the higher value, including some who had already sold at ₹1 per kg because of low quality and lack of storage.
    4. Coverage is partial by grade: Intervening after prices have already collapsed does not reach all farmers or all grades of produce.

    What pressures exposed the flaw this year?

    1. Rainfall at the wrong point in the cycle: Abnormal rainfall at the time of harvest hit the crop directly.
    2. A kharif shortfall in the main supplying State: Maharashtra recorded a 5 per cent to 7 per cent drop in the kharif crop.
    3. Onion resists buffering: The known difficulties of storing onion and of maintaining large buffers compound every supply shock rather than absorbing it.
    4. Manipulation is the secondary issue: The government has alluded to some price manipulation, and the dominant problem remains that policy keeps reacting rather than acting in advance.

    What proactive measures does the record point to?

    1. Storage: Improving storage options is the first named measure, since it is what allows a crop to be held past a price trough.
    2. Trade policy stability: A less erratic trade policy would let farmers price the export channel into their sowing decisions.
    3. Inter regional movement: Moving stock more efficiently between regions addresses the distribution failure rather than the production one.
    4. Price shock protection: Protecting farmers against price shocks is the fourth measure, and it operates before a collapse rather than after it.

    Does Tamil Nadu’s targeted subsidy resolve the problem or move it?

    1. The design: Tamil Nadu will buy 1,000 tonnes of onions to distribute 1 kg per ration card at ₹35.
    2. What it gets right: The design discourages hoarding while allowing private retail prices to cool down.
    3. The delivery channel is the risk: Distribution runs through a dry grain public distribution system network, which was not built for a crop that spoils quickly.
    4. The economic case has a threshold: That case could collapse if post harvest losses exceed 10 per cent to 15 per cent, and onion is more susceptible to such losses than wheat or rice.
    5. Persistence is the second risk: The case also weakens if the subsidy has to be continued rather than used once.
    6. Replication would exhaust the buffer: If other States adopt similar measures, the Central buffer could be quickly exhausted, more so given this year’s high storage losses of around 30 per cent.
    7. Pressure transfers to the Centre: The State scheme will impose pressure on the Centre to maintain a steady supply behind it.

    Challenges to stabilising onion prices

    1. Onion is bulky, perishable and stored without a cold chain: Farm level storage relies on ventilated structures whose losses rise sharply in a wet post monsoon. Eg. The traditional onion chawls of Nashik are open sided sheds with no humidity control.
      The Fix: Link the storage capital subsidy to a verified ventilation and moisture standard rather than to built area alone.
    2. Production is geographically concentrated: A weather event in one district cluster moves the national price because supply is not spread across regions. Eg. Lasalgaon in Nashik sets the reference price for the country’s onion trade.
      The Fix: Build procurement and modern storage capacity in Madhya Pradesh, Karnataka and Gujarat so the national price is not set by one belt.
    3. Sudden trade restrictions cost long term market access: Buyers who lose supply once diversify permanently, so the export channel is thinner when the surplus returns. Eg. Bangladesh and Sri Lanka shifted to Chinese, Pakistani and Egyptian onion during the Indian export restrictions.
      The Fix: Announce any trade measure with a fixed minimum notice period and a stated expiry date written into the notification.
    4. Procurement covers only a buffer, not the crop: Agency purchase is sized to stabilise consumer supply, so the price the farmer receives is still set by the open market. Eg. National Agricultural Cooperative Marketing Federation of India (NAFED) buying is confined to buffer accumulation and market release.
      The Fix: Add a deficiency price payment triggered on the mandi price falling below assessed cultivation cost, paid directly rather than through purchase.
    5. Farmers sow without a forward price signal: Acreage decisions are made months before the price is known, which is what produces the alternating glut and shortage. Eg. A remunerative rabi price pulls extra acreage into the next kharif sowing and depresses that crop’s price.
      The Fix: Publish an official pre sowing advisory each season carrying expected national acreage and an indicative price band.

    Conclusion

    Onion policy is being run as a series of corrections applied after the price has already moved. What remains unreconciled is that every correction reaches the farmer after both the sowing decision and the distress sale are complete. Storage capacity and orderly movement of stock are the only interventions that operate before a collapse rather than after it. Whether the Centre holds one trade regime steady through a full price cycle is the test of whether the approach has changed.

  • Government to introduce fortnightly sugar allocation

    Why in the News

    The Centre has decided to replace the existing monthly sugar quota system with a fortnightly allocation system from September. A physical verification of sugar stocks at mills found that many mills held stocks well beyond their declared monthly returns, that some mills engaged in short selling by selling less sugar than their monthly allocation, and that sugar sold at the start of a month was in some cases lifted by buyers only at the month’s end. The move tightens a monitoring system the government found could be gamed under a monthly cycle.

    Why did the government find the monthly quota system inadequate?

    1. Stock under-declaration: Physical verification showed many mills were holding stocks in excess of what they had declared in their monthly returns to the government.
    2. Short selling: Some mills sold less sugar than the quantity actually allocated to them under the monthly quota, without any monthly-cycle mechanism to catch the shortfall quickly.
    3. Delayed lifting by buyers: In some cases sugar sold by a mill early in the month was dispatched or lifted by the buyer only near the end of the month, defeating the purpose of a monthly release schedule.

    What does the new fortnightly system require?

    1. Split sale mandate: Mills must sell at least 40 percent of their fortnightly allocation in the first week and the remaining balance in the second week.
    2. Faster dispatch: Mills have been directed to dispatch sold sugar within a week of sale, closing the gap that allowed delayed lifting under the monthly system.
    3. Closer monitoring: A fortnightly cycle lets the government track the demand supply position more frequently, respond faster to market changes, and release additional quota where needed.

    Challenges to the fortnightly allocation system

    1. Compliance burden on mills: A fortnightly reporting and dispatch cycle roughly doubles the administrative and logistical load mills previously carried under a monthly system. Eg. Mills must now furnish dispatch proof and stock declarations twice as often, straining smaller mills with limited administrative staff. Fix. Phase in stricter reporting first for mills previously flagged for under-declaration or short selling, rather than applying the full compliance load uniformly from day one.
    2. Enforcement capacity: The scheme depends on the government’s ability to verify declarations at the mill level frequently enough to catch violations before the next cycle begins. Eg. The August verification exercise that triggered this shift was itself a one-time physical check, not a standing monitoring mechanism. Fix. Institutionalise periodic third-party stock audits rather than relying on ad hoc verification drives.

    Conclusion

    The fortnightly allocation system is a direct administrative response to mill-level under-declaration, short selling and delayed dispatch uncovered during stock verification. Crushing for the new sugar year begins on 15 October, with production of 10 lakh tonnes expected in October and 45 lakh tonnes in November, and mills are free to sell without restriction through October.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    No direct PYQ traced in the provided files.

  • Rajasthan farmers object to GI tag for Unjha jeera and saunf

    Why in News?

    Rajasthan’s cumin and fennel farmers have objected to Geographical Indication tags granted to Gujarat’s ‘Unjha Jeera’ and ‘Unjha Fennel’ (saunf), arguing Unjha is a trading hub, not the growing region.

    Key Highlights

    1. The GI tags for ‘Unjha Jeera’ and ‘Unjha Fennel’ were registered in the name of Gujarat’s Agricultural Produce Market Committee (APMC), Unjha.
    2. Farmers from Rajasthan contend that a significant share of the crops is cultivated in Rajasthan, making the GI registration misleading.
    3. The Unjha APMC has defended the GI registrations, citing over 1,000 pages of scientific, historical, and commercial evidence submitted during the registration process.
    4. The dispute raises questions over the criteria for GI registration, particularly the link between a product’s reputation, production area, and marketing centre.

    Geographical Indication (GI) Tag

    • A Geographical Indication (GI) identifies goods that possess qualities, reputation, or characteristics essentially attributable to their geographical origin.
    • Governed by the Geographical Indications of Goods (Registration and Protection) Act, 1999.
    • Registration is granted by the Geographical Indications Registry, Chennai, under the Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade (DPIIT).
    • Validity: 10 years, renewable indefinitely.
    • GI protection applies to agricultural products, natural products, handicrafts, manufactured goods, and foodstuffs.

    Value Addition

    • First GI tag in India: Darjeeling Tea (2004-05).
    • Benefits of GI: Protects producers from misuse, preserves traditional knowledge, enhances product value, promotes exports, and supports rural livelihoods.
    • Difference from Trademark: A GI belongs collectively to eligible producers from a specific region, whereas a trademark is an exclusive right owned by an individual or company.

    [2018] India enacted The Geographical Indications of Goods (Registration and Protection) Act, 1999 in order to comply with the obligations to

    (a) ILO

    (b) IMF

    (c) UNCTAD

    (d) WTO

  • Examine the role of supermarkets in supply chain management of fruits, vegetables and food items. How do they eliminate number of intermediaries?

    Supermarkets are organised retail chains that procure, store and distribute fruits, vegetables and other food items through integrated, modern supply chains.

    Role of Supermarkets in supply chain management

    Direct Procurement from Farmers – Eg- Big Basket & Reliance Retail procure directly from FPOs.

    Standardisation, Grading & Sorting improves quality consistency. Eg- Walmart trains farmers on GAP (Good Agricultural Practices).

    Efficient Logistics & Inventory Management – Eg- use of real-time inventory tracking, forecasting tools, barcoding/RFID

    Cold Chain infrastructure reduces losses of perishable goods like fruits

    Contract Farming, buy-back arrangements ensure stable demand and price security for farmers. Eg- PepsiCo in Punjab (Potato farming)

    Value Addition – Supermarkets invest in cut vegetables, ready-to-cook items etc – increases shelf-life of products.

    Diverse products– Gives greater choice for consumers and promotes crop diversification.

    Challenges faced by supermarkets

    Lack of infrastructure – Eg- cold storage can only accommodate about 11% of the country’s total produce.

    Poor forward and backward linkages – Eg- Only 13% mandis digital.

    Fragmented landholdings – 86% farmers are small and marginal – prevents economy of scale

    Regulatory Hurdles – APMC monopoly and interstate movement regulations complicate direct buying from farmers.

    Organised retail remains concentrated in metro and Tier-1 cities, with limited rural coverage

    Low investment – Private investment <1% Agri-GDP.

    Supermarkets eliminating intermediaries

    Enhancing efficiency of supply chain and doubling farmers income requires FPO strengthening, cold-chain expansion and adoption of Model contract Farming Act.

  • What are the main constraints in transport and marketing of agricultural produce in India?

    Efficient transport and marketing are critical components of the agriculture value chain. However, gaps in logistics and markets hinder farmers’ ability to access markets, realise fair prices, and reduce post-harvest losses.

    Main Constraints in Transport of Agricultural Produce

    FCI transit loss stands at Rs 300 crore/annum

    Poor Rural Road Connectivity– About 25% rural habitations lack pucca road connectivity .

    Lack of Multi-Model connectivity – heavy dependence on roads for transport

    Inadequate First-Mile Logistics – Scarcity of tractors, mini-trucks, and affordable transport

    High Post-Harvest Losses in Transit due to improper packaging, rough handling, and delays. 6-18% losses in fruits & vegetables (NABARD/FAO).

    Cold storage capacity in India can only accommodate about 11% of the country’s total produce.

    Fragmented Landholdings – 86% farmers are small/marginal – increase per-unit transport cost

    High Logistics Cost of 14% of GDP – raise farm-to-market cost.

    Main Constraints in Marketing of Agricultural Produce

    63% of agricultural households sold their crops to local markets and only 7.2% sold to APMCs.

    Dominance of Intermediaries leads to low price realisation. Eg- Farmers get only 25-30% of final price in perishables.

    Inadequate Market Infrastructure – Mandis lack grading, sorting, storage, and drying yards. Only 10% of mandis meet required norms (Dalwai Committee).

    APMC operating in monopolised silos limit free inter-state movement and competition.

    Poor Access to real-time price and demand Information – weakens bargaining power of farmers

    Low Digital Integration – Only about 1500 mandis integrated with e-NAM (2024).

    Quality & SPS Compliance Gaps – Inadequate testing infrastructure impacts domestic sales and exports. Eg- EU rejecting Mango consignment

    Way Forward

    Strengthening FPOs to enhance collective bargaining and direct market access for farmers. Eg- Sahyadri FPO in Maharashtra – increased incomes by 30%

    Cold-Chain-as-a-Service (CCaaS) – IoT-based cold storage + logistics integration reduces post-harvest losses

    MSP 2.0 based on 3 D’s – Decentralisation, Diversification and Digital Procurement. Eg- instant payments through e-RUPI.

    Rural Agri-Logistics Nodes under Gati Shakti Framework to develop cold chains, aggregation centers, and packhouses near farm gates.

    Strengthening supply chain management is key to ‘Doubling Farmers Income’.

  • What are the main bottlenecks in upstream and downstream process of marketing of agricultural products in India ?

    Agricultural marketing refers to the entire process involved in moving farm produce from the farmer to the final consumer. In India, this system faces bottlenecks at both upstream (farm-level) and downstream (market-to-consumer) stages.

    Fragmented Landholdings – 86% small and marginal farmers with low production volumes make aggregation difficult.

    Poor First-Mile Connectivity – About 25% rural habitations lack pucca road connectivity – increases spoilage of perishables.

    Lack of On-Farm Storage leads to distress sales. Eg- 166 MMT storage capacity gap (FAO)

    Inadequate Primary Processing – Minimal grading, sorting, cleaning, and drying at the farm level

    High Post-Harvest Losses – Losses of 6-18% in fruits & vegetables due to poor handling.

    Weak Farmer Institutions – FPO/cooperatives have limited capacity for aggregation and marketing

    Limited Access to Information – Farmers lack real-time data on prices, demand and arrivals.

    High Input & Transport Costs makes farm-to-mandi movement expensive. Eg- logistics cost is 14% of GDP

    Demand and supply gap due to Cobweb Phenomenon (Economic Survey) – Crop production depends on prices in previous periods rather than present demand

    63% of agricultural households sold their crops to local markets and only 7.2% sold to APMCs.

    APMC operating in monopolised silos limit free inter-state movement and competition. Eg- Licensing barriers and cartelisation

    Dominance of Intermediaries leads to low price realisation. Eg- Farmers get only 25-30% of final price in perishables.

    Inadequate Market Infrastructure – Mandis lack grading, sorting, storage, and drying yards. Only 10% of mandis meet required norms (Dalwai Committee).

    Low Digital Integration – Only about 1500 mandis integrated with e-NAM (2024).

    Quality & SPS Compliance Gaps – Inadequate testing infrastructure impacts domestic sales and exports. Eg- EU rejecting Mango consignment

    Organised retail remains concentrated in metro and Tier-1 cities, with limited rural coverage

    Low investment – Private investment <1% Agri-GDP.

    Way Forward

    Strengthening FPOs to enhance collective bargaining and direct market access for farmers. Eg- Sahyadri FPO in Maharashtra – increased incomes by 30%

    Cold-Chain-as-a-Service (CCaaS) – IoT-based cold storage + logistics integration to reduce post-harvest losses

    MSP 2.0 based on 3 D’s – Decentralisation, Diversification and Digital Procurement.

    Rural Agri-Logistics Nodes under Gati Shakti Framework to develop cold chains, aggregation centers near farm gates.

    Legal Reforms – Eg- adoption Model contract farming Act by states

    Strengthening supply chain management is key to ‘Doubling Farmers Income’.

    Agriculture Inputs

  • Elaborate the scope and significance of supply chain management of agricultural commodities in India.

    The agricultural supply chain refers to activities involved in moving agricultural produce from farm to consumers.

    Scope of Supply Chain Management of Agricultural Commodities

    Post-Harvest Management- Handling, cleaning, grading, drying to reduce losses.

    Storage & Warehousing – Scientific storage, packhouses, warehouses, silos.

    Cold Chain for Perishables – Pre-cooling, refrigerated transport, cold storages.

    Transportation & Logistics – Efficient transport, aggregation, multimodal connectivity. Eg- Kisan Rail.

    Organised Retail & Export Integration: Connecting farmers with supermarkets, processors, exporters, and e-commerce channels. Eg- e-NAM

    Value Addition & Processing – packaging, branding, food processing.

    Export & Quality Compliance – Eg- SPS standards, AGMARK, FSSAI certification

    Significance of Supply Chain Management

    Reduces Post-Harvest Losses: India loses nearly (FAO).

    Enhances Farmer Income due to reduced intermediaries. Eg- FPOs increase farmer income by 20-25% (SFAC).

    Price Stability: Better logistics reduce volatility and transaction costs.

    Boosts Agri-Exports due to better quality products & cold chain infrastructure. Eg- $53 billion in 2022-23.

    Promotes Crop Diversification: Encourages high-value crops like horticulture, dairy, spices, and fisheries.

    Strengthens Food & Nutritional Security: Efficient supply chains ensure timely availability and safe, hygienic food across regions.

    Supports Rural Employment & Agri-Processing: Creates jobs in storage, logistics, milling, packaging, and retail.

    Challenges to Agricultural Supply Chain Management

    High Post-Harvest Losses: 6-18% losses due to poor handling, storage gaps, and weak cold chain.

    Inadequate Infrastructure: Limited cold storages, packhouses, rural warehouses, and multimodal logistics.

    Fragmented Supply Chains: Small landholdings (0.74 Hectare) and inefficient APMCs

    Low Digital Adoption: Eg- only around 1500 APMCs integrated with APMCs

    Strengthening supply chain management is key to ‘Doubling Farmers Income’. This can be done through

    Expand modern storage

    Promote FPO-led aggregation

    Reform APMC laws

    Promote value addition and FPIs.

    Develop export-oriented supply chains with SPS labs and certification.

    Enhance multimodal logistics

  • First Export of GI-Tagged Tezpur Litchi to Dubai

    Why in the news?

    The Agricultural and Processed Food Products Export Development Authority (APEDA) facilitated the first export consignment of GI-tagged Tezpur Litchi from Assam to Dubai on 7 June 2026, boosting agricultural exports from the North Eastern Region.

    Key Highlights

    • Product Exported: GI-tagged Tezpur Litchi
    • Quantity: 1 metric tonne
    • Export Destination: Dubai
    • State: Assam
    • Facilitating Agency: APEDA
    • Significance: First international shipment of Tezpur Litchi.

    About Tezpur Litchi

    • Tezpur Litchi is renowned for its: Exceptional sweetness, Bright-red appearance, Distinctive aroma, Superior eating quality, High consumer preference
    • Major Varieties: Bombaya, Bilati, Elaichi, Piyaji, and Sahi

    [2018] With reference to organic farming in India, consider the following statements:
    1.‘The National ‘Programme for Organic Production’ (NPOP) is operated under the guidelines and ‘directions of the Union Ministry of Rural Development.
    2.‘The Agricultural and Processed Food Product Export Development Authority ‘(APEDA) functions as the Secretariat for the implementation of NPOP.
    3.Sikkim has become India’s first fully organic State.
    Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

    [A] 1 and 2 only

    [B] 2 and 3 only

    [C] 3 only

    [D] 1, 2 and 3