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Subject: BilateralXNeighbourhood

  • Why has Pakistan-occupied Kashmir erupted in protests?

    Why in the News?

    Simmering discontent over inflation and opaque governance in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) has escalated into a violent security crackdown. The Jammu Kashmir Joint Awami Action Committee (JKJAAC) is leading opposition to a three-phase election and to 12 seats reserved for refugees in the 53-seat legislature. The unrest exposes the gap between an establishment-backed electoral process and a local demand for genuine political representation.

    Who are the Jammu Kashmir Joint Awami Action Committee (JKJAAC)?

    1. The JKJAAC is an alliance of civil society groups leading the protest movement in PoK. It has been protesting in Rawalakot, Muzaffarabad, and other locations.
    2. Demand: It seeks a more representative political system and removal of the reserved seats. It alleges the current election process is rigged.

    What is Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK)?

    1. Definition: PoK is the part of the former princely State of Jammu and Kashmir under Pakistan’s control since 1947. India regards it as territory under illegal occupation.
    2. Two Regions: Pakistan administers the area as Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) and Gilgit-Baltistan.
    3. India’s position: The Ministry of External Affairs maintains that the Union Territories of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh are integral and inalienable parts of India. It asserts Pakistan is in illegal and forcible occupation and considers local laws or elections void.

    How did a price protest become a movement for representation?

    1. Origins: The movement emerged after the COVID-19 pandemic to curb the prices of essential items. It evolved over the years into a protest against the lack of local political representation.
    2. Legislature structure: The PoK legislature has 53 seats, of which 45 are elected and 8 are nominated. Of the 45 elected seats, 12 are reserved for refugees of Indian Jammu and Kashmir who migrated after 1947.
    3. Grievance over reserved seats: Voters for these 12 seats cast ballots from outside PoK. Locals claim the reserved seats reduce regional representation and let Islamabad override local concerns.
    4. Escalation: The JKJAAC called a “long march” after authorities proceeded with the election without addressing the demand. The protest gained momentum after a PhD scholar was reportedly killed in police firing in Rawalakot.

    Why is Islamabad’s relationship with PoK strained?

    1. Developmental neglect: Mainstream parties have not met the region’s developmental aspirations. Locals allege long-standing neglect by Islamabad.
    2. Inflammatory rhetoric: The Pakistan Defence Minister called the protesters “enemies just like Indians”. The remark inflamed public sentiment.
    3. Parallel with other regions: The complaints echo those long voiced in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. Both regions have seen protests and insurgencies for decades.
    4. Rigging allegations: The second phase of polling drew allegations of irregularities. The Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz swept the phase, enabling it to form the regional government.

    How have India and international actors responded?

    1. India’s condemnation: The Ministry of External Affairs blamed the Pakistani establishment for the deaths of over 40 civilians. It called the ongoing polls a cosmetic exercise to camouflage illegal occupation.
    2. JKJAAC’s distancing: The committee rejected any Indian attempt to appropriate the movement. It stated the civil rights movement is neither a proxy nor an extension of interstate rivalries.
    3. Amnesty International: Amnesty urged Pakistan to restore communications access and allow media and independent observers. It responded to a communication blackout in PoK.
    4. United Kingdom diaspora: Non-resident Mirpuri Kashmiris with a strong presence in the UK began an online campaign. It urges restraint on Pakistan’s security establishment.

    Conclusion

    The unrest reflects a contest between an establishment-managed election and a local movement rejecting its political basis. The current status is a continuing three-phase poll amid a deadly crackdown and a communication blackout. Whether the protests subside depends on whether Islamabad addresses the demand over reserved seats, which it has so far refused.

    Back2Basics

    1. PoK: Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, part of the former princely State of Jammu and Kashmir under Pakistan’s control since 1947; India treats it as illegally occupied territory.
    2. Legislature: The PoK assembly has 53 seats, 45 elected and 8 nominated, with 12 elected seats reserved for post-1947 refugees.
    3. Line of Control: The military control line dividing Indian and Pakistani-administered Kashmir, formalised after the Shimla Agreement of 1972.
    4. India’s stance: The Union Territories of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh are integral parts of India, with Pakistan in illegal and forcible occupation of parts of them.

  • The Case for Updating the Indus Waters Treaty

    Why in the News?

    India has continued to hold on to the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) in abeyance, following the terrorist strikes in Pahalgam. This has drawn war threats from Pakistan and revived attention to India’s separate, pending request to renegotiate the 65-year-old treaty. Pakistan has publicly treated the abeyance and the renegotiation notices as a single hostile act. This is despite  India’s actual 2023 and 2024 notices for treaty revision unanswered.

    Why is India’s push to renegotiate the IWT not an unusual or hostile move?

    1. Global norm of treaty revision: At least 250 separate transboundary river-water treaties exist worldwide, covering 113 river systems, as per a 2013 study. Supplementary protocols, amendments and data-sharing arrangements had already taken the total number of agreements to 688 by then.
    2. Continuing growth in revisions: The International Freshwater Treaties database (Oregon State University) now records over 800 such agreements, showing that transboundary treaties are routinely reviewed and updated.
    3. India’s own precedent: India’s 1996 Ganga water-sharing treaty with Bangladesh carries a 30-year validity and is due for renewal this year, showing India itself treats such treaties as time-bound instruments needing renewal.
    4. IWT already permits revision: Article VII allows the Permanent Indus Commissions of both countries to agree on new drainage or engineering works, though this has never been invoked. Article XII allows treaty modification “from time to time” through a fresh government-level treaty: the provision India invoked to serve its 2023 and 2024 notices.
    5. Not a new demand: Pakistani experts and scholars themselves called for review of the IWT well before the present standoff. India’s notices are the first official move by either side, not the first such call.

    What modern water-management elements does the IWT’s design fail to address?

    1. No groundwater provision: The treaty does not mention groundwater resources at all, despite groundwater being connected across borders in the same way as surface water.
    2. No water-quality standards: The treaty sets no requirements for water quality in the shared rivers.
    3. No environmental-flow provision: There is no mechanism to maintain minimum ecological flows in the rivers.
    4. Pakistan’s own grievance illustrates the gap: Pakistan has repeatedly complained that India releases municipal and sewage waste into the eastern rivers, over which India has full control under the treaty, affecting Pakistan’s soil and water health, a complaint the treaty’s silence on water quality leaves unresolved.
    5. Climate change was structurally excluded: No treaty negotiated before the 1990s could have factored in climate change; the IWT (1960) is no exception.
    6. Partition rather than sharing: Most water-sharing treaties guarantee a fixed volume or percentage of flow to each party. The IWT instead allocates entire rivers to one party or the other, making it more a partition agreement than a sharing arrangement, a design that has reduced incentive for joint river-basin management.

    How does the Mekong River Commission show the institutional flexibility the IWT’s commission lacks?

    1. Mekong River Commission (Southeast Asia, established 1995): Functions as a joint river water-management system, not merely a treaty-implementation body.
    2. Power to revise strategies: While it cannot alter the original treaty’s provisions, it is empowered to develop and revise joint basin-management strategies, data-sharing protocols, and water-quality rules.
    3. Contrast with the Permanent Indus Commission (PIC): The PIC, set up under the IWT, functions merely as the treaty’s implementing agency and has so far focused largely on ensuring the treaty’s existing provisions are not violated. It has no comparable mandate to revise or adapt joint management practices.

    Is India’s renegotiation push a technical necessity or an extension of the security standoff?

    1. Pakistan’s conflation: Pakistan organised an “international” conference on the treaty, with ministers and leaders threatening war over any disruption to the Indus basin’s rivers. They treat the abeyance and the renegotiation request as one hostile package.
    2. Selective response: Despite this rhetoric, Pakistan has still not responded to India’s actual 2023 and 2024 notices seeking treaty modification.
    3. Independent climate evidence: A study by researchers Vimal Mishra and Urmin Vegad of IIT Gandhinagar found climate change is affecting the two basins differently.
    4. Divergent basin trends: The eastern river basins have seen a 20% decline in annual rainfall over the last 70 years, while precipitation in the western river basins has remained largely unchanged.
    5. The delinking argument: India’s request to renegotiate the treaty must be seen as separate from its decision to hold it in abeyance. Agreeing to renegotiate, rather than continued brinkmanship, is presented as Pakistan’s most reliable route to ending the abeyance.

    Conclusion

    The Indus Waters Treaty was designed for a 1960 hydrological and political reality. It partitions entire rivers rather than sharing flows, omits groundwater, water-quality and environmental-flow provisions, and gives its joint commission no mandate to revise the treaty. These are the gaps that comparable transboundary arrangements, including the Mekong River Commission, address through built-in review mechanisms. This creates an independent, technical case for updating the IWT. India’s renegotiation request must be evaluated on this basis, delinked from its abeyance decision; Pakistan’s willingness to renegotiate, not further confrontation, is what would end the abeyance.

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2026] Present an account of the Indus Water Treaty and examine its ecological, economic and bilateral relation.

    Linkage: The PYQ directly asks for an account of the IWT and its bilateral implications. This article supplies the treaty’s institutional design flaws and the current bilateral context directly answering such a question today.

  • What is meant by Gujral doctrine? Does it have any relevance today? Discuss.

  • In respect of India-Sri Lanka relations, discuss how domestic factors influence foreign policy.

  • The protests in Shahbag Square in Dhaka in Bangladesh reveal a fundamental split in society between the nationalists and Islamic forces. What is its significance for India?

  • Project `Mausam’ is considered a unique foreign policy initiative of the Indian Government to improve relationship with its neighbors. Does the project have a strategic dimension? Discuss.

  • Terrorist activities and mutual distrust have clouded India-Pakistan relations. To what extent the use of soft power like sports and cultural exchanges could help generate goodwill between the two countries? Discuss with suitable examples.

  • India is an age-old friend of Sri Lanka.’ Discuss India’s role in the recent crisis in Sri Lanka the light of the preceding statement.

    India and Sri Lanka share civilizational, cultural, and economic linkages dating back over 2,500 years, rooted in Buddhist ties, maritime trade, and shared colonial history.

    Financial Assistance

    India extended over USD 4 billion in assistance through credit lines, currency swaps, and grants

    Provided a USD 1 billion credit line for essentials such as food, medicines, and fuel.

    Supplied over 400,000 MT of fuel, life-saving drugs, and rice consignments

    USD 400 million currency swap under the SAARC framework and deferred USD 515 million in ACU payments, easing liquidity pressure.

    Support for Debt Restructuring and IMF Assistance

    India became the first country to provide written assurance to the IMF supporting Sri Lanka’s debt restructuring plan, crucial for securing the USD 2.9 billion IMF bailout.

    Advocated for equitable debt treatment among all creditors.

    Trade, Connectivity, and Energy Cooperation

    Advanced the India-Sri Lanka Economic and Technology Cooperation Agreement (ETCA) and Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) for economic revival.

    Revived strategic projects such as the Trincomalee Oil Tank Farm modernization and proposed India-Sri Lanka power grid interconnection.

    Symbol of Age-Old Friendship

    Non Reciprocity (Neighbourhood First Policy) – India’s assistance came without strategic strings.

    Embodied the ethos of “Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam”, upholding regional solidarity and stability.

    Reaffirmed India’s role as a trustworthy regional leader and first responder in crises.

    India’s response reflected its “humanitarian diplomacy”-guided by empathy, not conditionality.

  • [10th June 2026] The Hindu OpED: India’s road through Myanmar is one of engagement

    PYQ Relevance[UPSC 2022] India is an age-old friend of Sri Lanka. Discuss India’s role in the recent crisis in Sri Lanka in the light of the preceding statement.Linkage: The PYQ examines India’s approach towards political and economic instability in its neighbourhood. Similar to Sri Lanka, India’s engagement with Myanmar reflects a pragmatic neighbourhood policy that prioritises regional stability, connectivity, and strategic interests despite domestic political challenges.

    Mentor’s Comment

    Myanmar President U Min Aung Hlaing visited India from May 30 to June 3, 2026, marking the first visit by a Myanmar President to India since the 2021 military coup. The visit highlights New Delhi’s preference for pragmatic engagement over diplomatic isolation. The visit gains significance amid China’s growing influence in Myanmar, delays in India’s connectivity projects, instability along the India-Myanmar border, and the strategic importance of Myanmar in the Act East Policy.

    How Does Myanmar Occupy a Central Position in India’s Strategic Calculus?

    1. Geographical Gateway: Connects India directly with Southeast Asia and serves as the land bridge for the Act East Policy.
    2. Shared Border: Shares a 1,643-km border with four Northeastern States of India.
    3. Neighbourhood First Imperative: Ensures stability in India’s immediate strategic environment.
    4. Regional Connectivity: Supports physical, economic, and people-to-people integration with ASEAN.
    5. Strategic Buffer: Limits excessive external influence in India’s eastern neighbourhood.

    Why Has India Chosen Engagement Instead of Isolation?

    1. Pragmatic Diplomacy: Maintains engagement irrespective of Myanmar’s internal political arrangements.
    2. Strategic Necessity: Recognises Myanmar’s importance for connectivity, trade, and security interests.
    3. Policy Continuity: Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri reiterated that India does not intend to comment on Myanmar’s internal political arrangements.
    4. Regional Stability: Ensures sustained communication channels during political transitions.
    5. Counter-Isolation Approach: Prevents strategic vacuum creation in Myanmar.

    How Does China’s Expanding Influence Shape India’s Myanmar Policy?

    1. Strategic Competition: China has expanded engagement with Myanmar after the 2021 coup.
    2. Infrastructure Financing: Beijing filled gaps created by Western disengagement.
    3. Arms Supplies: Increased military cooperation with Myanmar authorities.
    4. Diplomatic Cover: Provides international support to Naypyidaw.
    5. Strategic Concern: Complete Chinese dominance in Myanmar would constrain India’s strategic space.

    Why Are Connectivity Projects Central to India’s Myanmar Engagement?

    Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project

    1. Objective: Connects Kolkata to Sittwe Port by sea and further links Myanmar’s inland waterways and roads to Mizoram.
    2. Maritime Component: Operational.
    3. Riverine Component: Operational.
    4. Cargo Milestone: First cargo shipment reached Sittwe in May 2023.
    5. Critical Gap: 109-km Paletwa-Zorinpui Road remains incomplete.
    6. Target Completion: Full operationalisation targeted for 2027.

    India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway

    1. Route: Moreh (Manipur) to Mae Sot (Thailand).
    2. Length: Approximately 1,360 km.
    3. Regional Ambition: Planned extensions to Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam.
    4. Strategic Outcome: Converts Northeast India into a gateway to Southeast Asia.
    5. Implementation Challenge: Missed the original completion target of 2019.

    Significance of IMT for Northeast India

    1. Market Access: Expands export opportunities.
    2. Economic Integration: Facilitates participation in ASEAN supply chains.
    3. Infrastructure Development: Improves logistics and transport efficiency.
    4. Employment Generation: Supports trade-led economic growth.

    What Challenges Continue to Delay Connectivity Projects?

    1. Internal Conflict: Myanmar’s civil conflict has intensified since the 2021 coup.
    2. Territorial Control: Armed groups control large stretches along project corridors.
    3. Construction Disruptions: Security threats increase costs and delays.
    4. Administrative Constraints: Weak governance affects implementation.
    5. Political Uncertainty: Creates investment and operational risks.

    How Does Security Cooperation Influence Bilateral Relations?

    1. Counter-Insurgency Cooperation: Addresses activities of Indian insurgent groups operating from Myanmar.
      1. NSCN-K (National Socialist Council of Nagaland–Khaplang): Historically operated camps in Myanmar’s Sagaing Region and carried out activities in Nagaland, Manipur, and Arunachal Pradesh.
      2. ULFA (Independent): Maintained safe havens in Myanmar after being pushed out of Bangladesh; cadres reportedly used Myanmar’s border areas for training and logistics.
      3. PLA (People’s Liberation Army of Manipur): One of several Meitei insurgent groups that established bases across the border.
      4. UNLF (United National Liberation Front): Operated from Myanmar’s territory for decades before several leaders and cadres were apprehended or surrendered.
      5. PREPAK (People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak) and KYKL (Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup): Maintained camps in Myanmar’s remote border regions.
    2. Territorial Assurance: Myanmar reiterated that its territory would not be used against India.
    3. Cybercrime Cooperation: Joint efforts target transnational cyber-scam networks.
    4. Rescue Operations: More than 2,400 Indian nationals rescued from scam centres in the last 18 months.
    5. Border Management: Enhances coordination against illegal activities.

    How Can Economic Cooperation Deepen India-Myanmar Relations?

    1. Bilateral Trade: Reached approximately $1.95 billion during 2025-26.
    2. Rupee-Kyat Settlement Mechanism: Reduces dependence on third-country currencies.
    3. Critical Minerals Cooperation: Supports supply chain diversification.
    4. Rare Earth Cooperation: Enhances strategic resource security.
    5. Investment Potential: Strengthens regional economic integration.

    Conclusion

    Myanmar remains central to India’s Act East strategy, border security, and regional connectivity goals. The recent engagement reflects New Delhi’s pragmatic approach that prioritises strategic interests, recognising that sustained cooperation is essential for stability, connectivity, and balancing external influence in the region.

    Value Addition: 

    China’s Key Interests in Myanmar

    1. China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC): Connects Yunnan province with the Indian Ocean.
    2. Kyaukpyu Port: Provides maritime access bypassing the Malacca Strait.
    3. Energy Security: Facilitates oil and gas pipelines from the Bay of Bengal.
    4. Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): Expands China’s regional footprint.

    Major Ethnic Armed Organisations

    1. Kachin Independence Army (KIA): Active in northern Myanmar.
    2. Arakan Army (AA): Influential in Rakhine State.
    3. Karen National Union (KNU): Active in southeastern Myanmar.
    4. Three Brotherhood Alliance: Significant anti-junta coalition.

    Security Concerns Along the India-Myanmar Border

    1. Insurgency: Provides safe havens for Northeastern insurgent groups such as NSCN-K, ULFA(I), PLA, PREPAK and KYKL, complicating border security and counter-insurgency operations.
    2. Drug Trafficking: Myanmar forms part of the Golden Triangle (Myanmar-Laos-Thailand), one of the world’s largest narcotics-producing regions, facilitating the trafficking of heroin and synthetic drugs into India’s Northeast.
    3. Arms Smuggling: Enables illicit movement of small arms and ammunition through porous borders, strengthening insurgent and criminal networks.
    4. Human Trafficking: Facilitates cross-border trafficking of women, children and migrant workers through informal routes and weak border controls.
    5. Cyber Fraud Networks: Hosts transnational scam centres involved in online fraud, cryptocurrency scams and human trafficking; over 2,400 Indian nationals have been rescued through bilateral cooperation in the past 18 months.

  • Nepal on Kalapani-Lipulekh-Limpiyadhura Dispute

    Why in the news?

    Shisir Khanal, Foreign Minister of Nepal, stated that Nepal seeks resolution of the Kalapani-Lipulekh-Limpiyadhura border dispute with India through diplomatic means and is not seeking third-party mediation.

    Key Highlights

    • Nepal reiterated its claim over the Kalapani, Lipulekh, and Limpiyadhura trijunction.
    • Nepal clarified: Contact with the United Kingdom was regarding access to historical documents, not mediation.
    • India’s stand: Border issue should be resolved through existing bilateral mechanisms. No scope for third-party intervention.
    • Issue resurfaced after India announced the 2026 Kailash-Mansarovar Yatra route through Lipulekh Pass.
    • Nepal protested to India and China regarding use of the disputed area.

    About the Kalapani-Lipulekh-Limpiyadhura Dispute

    • Tri-junction area involving: India, Nepal and China (Tibet Autonomous Region).

    Strategic Importance

    • Lipulekh Pass: An important Himalayan mountain pass.
      • Used for: Kailash-Mansarovar Yatra and Trade with Tibet.

    Origin of the Dispute

    Treaty of Sugauli (1816)

    • Signed between British East India Company and Kingdom of Nepal.
    • Treaty defined Kali River as western boundary of Nepal.

    Core Issue

    • Disagreement over Origin/source of Kali River.
    • Nepal claims Limpiyadhura is the river’s origin. Hence Kalapani, Lipulekh, and Limpiyadhura belong to Nepal.
    • India maintains a different interpretation of river origin and boundary alignment.

    Recent Developments

    2020 Map Controversy

    • Nepal released a new political map including Kalapani, Lipulekh, and Limpiyadhura.
    • Nepal amended constitution to incorporate the map.

    Nepal’s New Political Context

    • Current government led by Balendra Shah.The
    • Foreign Minister said Nepal seeks a development-focused relationship with India. Wants to move beyond “old geopolitical baggage”.

    India-Nepal Cooperation

    • Recent Developments: Operationalisation of Peer-to-peer cross-border digital payment system.
    • Agreement Between: Nepal Clearing House Ltd and National Payments Corporation of India (NPCI).

    About Kailash-Mansarovar Yatra

    • Pilgrimage to Mount Kailash and Lake Mansarovar.
    • Sacred to Hindus, Buddhists, Jains, Bon followers.
    • Indian routes Lipulekh Pass (Uttarakhand) and Nathu La Pass (Sikkim).

    [2020] Consider the following statements:

    1. The value of Indo-Sri Lanka trade has consistently increased in the last decade.
    2.“Textile and textile articles” constitute an important item of trade between India and Bangladesh.
    3. In the last five years, Nepal has been the largest trading partner of India in South Asia.

    Which of the statements given above is/are correct?
    a) 1 and 2 only
    b) 2 only
    c) 3 only
    d) 1, 2 and 3