Subject: BilateralXNeighbourhood

Why in the News?

India has continued to hold on to the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) in abeyance, following the terrorist strikes in Pahalgam. This has drawn war threats from Pakistan and revived attention to India’s separate, pending request to renegotiate the 65-year-old treaty. Pakistan has publicly treated the abeyance and the renegotiation notices as a single hostile act. This is despite  India’s actual 2023 and 2024 notices for treaty revision unanswered.

Why is India’s push to renegotiate the IWT not an unusual or hostile move?

1. Global norm of treaty revision: At least 250 separate transboundary river-water treaties exist worldwide, covering 113 river systems, as per a 2013 study. Supplementary protocols, amendments and data-sharing arrangements had already taken the total number of agreements to 688 by then.
2. Continuing growth in revisions: The International Freshwater Treaties database (Oregon State University) now records over 800 such agreements, showing that transboundary treaties are routinely reviewed and updated.
3. India’s own precedent: India’s 1996 Ganga water-sharing treaty with Bangladesh carries a 30-year validity and is due for renewal this year, showing India itself treats such treaties as time-bound instruments needing renewal.
4. IWT already permits revision: Article VII allows the Permanent Indus Commissions of both countries to agree on new drainage or engineering works, though this has never been invoked. Article XII allows treaty modification “from time to time” through a fresh government-level treaty: the provision India invoked to serve its 2023 and 2024 notices.
5. Not a new demand: Pakistani experts and scholars themselves called for review of the IWT well before the present standoff. India’s notices are the first official move by either side, not the first such call.

What modern water-management elements does the IWT’s design fail to address?

1. No groundwater provision: The treaty does not mention groundwater resources at all, despite groundwater being connected across borders in the same way as surface water.
2. No water-quality standards: The treaty sets no requirements for water quality in the shared rivers.
3. No environmental-flow provision: There is no mechanism to maintain minimum ecological flows in the rivers.
4. Pakistan’s own grievance illustrates the gap: Pakistan has repeatedly complained that India releases municipal and sewage waste into the eastern rivers, over which India has full control under the treaty, affecting Pakistan’s soil and water health, a complaint the treaty’s silence on water quality leaves unresolved.
5. Climate change was structurally excluded: No treaty negotiated before the 1990s could have factored in climate change; the IWT (1960) is no exception.
6. Partition rather than sharing: Most water-sharing treaties guarantee a fixed volume or percentage of flow to each party. The IWT instead allocates entire rivers to one party or the other, making it more a partition agreement than a sharing arrangement, a design that has reduced incentive for joint river-basin management.

How does the Mekong River Commission show the institutional flexibility the IWT’s commission lacks?

1. Mekong River Commission (Southeast Asia, established 1995): Functions as a joint river water-management system, not merely a treaty-implementation body.
2. Power to revise strategies: While it cannot alter the original treaty’s provisions, it is empowered to develop and revise joint basin-management strategies, data-sharing protocols, and water-quality rules.
3. Contrast with the Permanent Indus Commission (PIC): The PIC, set up under the IWT, functions merely as the treaty’s implementing agency and has so far focused largely on ensuring the treaty’s existing provisions are not violated. It has no comparable mandate to revise or adapt joint management practices.

Is India’s renegotiation push a technical necessity or an extension of the security standoff?

1. Pakistan’s conflation: Pakistan organised an “international” conference on the treaty, with ministers and leaders threatening war over any disruption to the Indus basin’s rivers. They treat the abeyance and the renegotiation request as one hostile package.
2. Selective response: Despite this rhetoric, Pakistan has still not responded to India’s actual 2023 and 2024 notices seeking treaty modification.
3. Independent climate evidence: A study by researchers Vimal Mishra and Urmin Vegad of IIT Gandhinagar found climate change is affecting the two basins differently.
4. Divergent basin trends: The eastern river basins have seen a 20% decline in annual rainfall over the last 70 years, while precipitation in the western river basins has remained largely unchanged.
5. The delinking argument: India’s request to renegotiate the treaty must be seen as separate from its decision to hold it in abeyance. Agreeing to renegotiate, rather than continued brinkmanship, is presented as Pakistan’s most reliable route to ending the abeyance.

Conclusion

The Indus Waters Treaty was designed for a 1960 hydrological and political reality. It partitions entire rivers rather than sharing flows, omits groundwater, water-quality and environmental-flow provisions, and gives its joint commission no mandate to revise the treaty. These are the gaps that comparable transboundary arrangements, including the Mekong River Commission, address through built-in review mechanisms. This creates an independent, technical case for updating the IWT. India’s renegotiation request must be evaluated on this basis, delinked from its abeyance decision; Pakistan’s willingness to renegotiate, not further confrontation, is what would end the abeyance.

PYQ Relevance

[UPSC 2026] Present an account of the Indus Water Treaty and examine its ecological, economic and bilateral relation.

Linkage: The PYQ directly asks for an account of the IWT and its bilateral implications. This article supplies the treaty’s institutional design flaws and the current bilateral context directly answering such a question today.