💥Crack UPSC In 1st Attempt | Admission Open | Ultimate Assessment Program 2027/2028
Talk to Mentor

Civilsdaily

Login

Subject: Bilateral Relations

1. Major World Events
2. India’s Interests in neighbourhood
3. Effects of our Policies

  • What’s at stake in talks for a UK-India Free Trade Agreement (FTA)?

    India and the UK recently revived talks for a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) to encourage trade and investment. The FTA between India and UK is expected to be signed by October.

    What is a Free Trade Agreement (FTA)?

    • It is an agreement between two or more countries to minimize barriers to imports and exports of products and services among them.
    • It includes reducing tariffs, quotas, subsidies or prohibitions which could limit exchange of goods and services across borders.
    • The FTA might allow free trade among the two nations with a few exceptions.
    • This involves a formal and mutual agreement signed between two or more countries.
    • The agreement could be comprehensive and include goods, services, investment, intellectual property, competition, government procurement and other areas.

    What is the status of the India-UK FTA?

    • India and the United Kingdom have a multi-dimensional strategic partnership and are actively engaged in bilateral trade.
    • The two countries agreed to begin formal negotiations for an FTA in January 2022, aiming to advance trade and investment relations between them.
    • The fifth round of FTA talks concluded on 29 July, and the expectation is that negotiations would be completed and the stage set for the FTA by October.
    • The FTA is important for both countries as it would provide a boost and create a robust framework of overall trade and investment between the two countries.

    Which are the countries with which India has FTAs?

    • As of April 2022, India had 13 FTAs, including the South Asian Free Trade Area, and with Nepal, Bhutan, Thailand, Singapore, Japan and Malaysia.
    • The 13 also include the agreements with Mauritius, UAE and Australia signed during the last five years.
    • Additionally, India has also signed six limited Preferential Trade Agreements.

    What is the level of India-UK trade?

    • Bilateral trade stands at $50 billion (ie approx. $35 billion in services and $15 billion in merchandise).
    • India is UK’s 12th largest trading partner and accounts for 1.9% of UK’s total trade in four quarters to the end of 2022.
    • UK is the seventh largest export destination for India.
    • The trade balance maintained by India with UK has largely been a surplus.
    • Top three services exported from India to UK are technical, trade-related and other business services, professional and management consulting services and travel.

    How will an FTA with UK benefit India?

    • Apart from reducing tariffs, the FTA also looks at lowering non-tariff barriers, particularly technical  barriers to trade around rules of origin, investor  protection and IPR.
    • MoUs on joint recognition of certain educational qualifications and an outline pact on healthcare workforce have already been signed.
    • Also, both UK and India have set up panels for a totalization deal being advocated by India and permitting Indian legal services for the UK.

    Back2Basics: Types of Trade Agreements

    (1) Free Trade Agreement – discussed above

    (2) Preferential Trade Agreement

    • In this type of agreement, two or more partners give preferential right of entry to certain products.
    • This is done by reducing duties on an agreed number of tariff lines.
    • Here a positive list is maintained i.e. the list of the products on which the two partners have agreed to provide preferential access.
    • Tariff may even be reduced to zero for some products even in a PTA.
    • India signed a PTA with Afghanistan.

    (3) Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement

    • Partnership agreement or cooperation agreement are more comprehensive than an FTA.
    • CECA/CEPA also looks into the regulatory aspect of trade and encompasses and agreement covering the regulatory issues.
    • CECA has the widest coverage. CEPA covers negotiation on the trade in services and investment, and other areas of economic partnership.
    • It may even consider negotiation on areas such as trade facilitation and customs cooperation, competition, and IPR.
    • India has signed CEPAs with South Korea and Japan.

    (4) Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement

    • CECA generally cover negotiation on trade tariff and Tariff rate quotas (TRQs) rates only.
    • It is not as comprehensive as CEPA.
    • India has signed CECA with Malaysia.

    (5) Framework Agreement

    • Framework agreement primarily defines the scope and provisions of orientation of the potential agreement between the trading partners.
    • It provides for some new area of discussions and set the period for future liberalisation.
    • India has previously signed framework agreements with the ASEAN, Japan etc.

    (6) Early Harvest Scheme

    • An Early Harvest Scheme (EHS) is a precursor to an FTA/CECA/CEPA between two trading partners. For example, early harvest scheme of RCEP has been rolled out.
    • At this stage, the negotiating countries identify certain products for tariff liberalization pending the conclusion of actual FTA negotiations.
    • An Early Harvest Scheme is thus a step towards enhanced engagement and confidence building.

     

    Also read

    [Sansad TV] Perspective: Free Trade Agreement

     

    UPSC 2023 countdown has begun! Get your personal guidance plan now! (Click here)

  • Historical and cultural connections between India and Thailand

    As part of his visit to Thailand for the ninth India-Thailand joint commission meeting, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar visited a temple in Bangkok.

    Why in news?

    • The temple is the Royal Brahmin Office of the Thai Royal Court and is the official centre of Hinduism in Thailand.
    • It highlights the long history of cultural contacts between India and Thailand.

    Making of ‘Greater India’ in Southeast Asia

    • India and the Southeast Asia region share a long history of cultural and commercial relations.
    • The classical Sanskrit and Pali texts from India carry references of the region using various names such as Kathakosha, Suvarnabhumi (the land of god) or Suvarnadvipa (the golden island), indicating that this was a region that attracted Indian merchants.
    • Trade in spices, aromatic wood and most importantly gold is known to have flourished.
    • In more recent times, European and Indian scholars have referred to Southeast Asia as ‘Farther India’, ‘Greater India’, or ‘Hinduised or Indianized states’.

    What one mean by ‘Farther India’?

    • The first person to do an in-depth study of the process of ‘Indianisation’ in Southeast Asian countries was a French scholar named George Coedes.
    • He coined the term ‘Farther India’ to refer to those states that experienced “the civilizing activity of India’.
    • Geographically, it refers to Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Myanmar and the Malay states.
    • The Sanskrit, Buddhist, and Jain texts indicate that interactions between the two regions go back more than two thousand years ago, mainly through sea voyages and that trade played an important role.
    • They were also accompanied by Brahmin priests, Buddhist monks, scholars and adventurers and all of them played an important role in the transmission of Indian culture to the natives of Southeast Asia.
    • Some of the merchants and Brahmin priests married the local girls and were often employed by the local rulers.

    Limitations to Indian influence

    • Indian expansion into Southeast Asia cannot be compared to European colonization since Indians were not complete strangers to the population of Southeast Asia and had pre-existing trade relations.
    • In the early 20th century, the nationalist historians of India frequently referred to the ancient Indian kingdoms in Southeast Asia as its ‘colony’.
    • Historian RC Majumdar noted that the Hindu colonists brought with them the whole framework of their culture and civilization.
    • This was transplanted in its entirety among the people who had not emerged from their primitive barbarism.
    • More recently the colonization theory has been rejected on the ground that there is very little evidence of conquest or direct political influence in the ancient Southeast Asian kingdoms.

    Visible cultural influence

    • The first Indian kingdom to come up in Southeast Asia was Funan, which is the predecessor of modern Cambodia and Lin-yi in southern Vietnam, both of which came up in the second century CE.
    • Contemporary Southeast Asian society carries several pieces of evidence of the cultural impact of these interactions.
    • Many local languages in the region, including Thai, Malay, and Javanese contain words of Sanskrit, Pali and Dravidian origin in significant proportions.
    • The Thai language is written in script derived from Southern Indian Pallava alphabet.
    • Perhaps the most important influence of India on Southeast Asia was in the field of religion and how Shivaism, Vaishnavism, Theravada Buddhism, Mahayana Buddhism and later Sinhalese Buddhism came to be practised in the region.
    • The political and administrative institutions and ideas, especially the concept of divine authority and kingship, are largely shaped by the Indian practices.
    • For example, the Thai king is considered as an incarnation of Vishnu.
    • The episodes of Ramayana and Mahabharata are regularly featured in puppet shows and theatre events.
    • In terms of architecture, monuments like Borobodur Stupa in Java, the Angkor Vat temple in Cambodia, My Son temple in Vietnam are some of the best examples of Indian influence in the region.

    India’s religious links to Thailand

    • In the early centuries of the Common Era, Thailand, which was historically known as Siam, was under the rule of the Funan Empire.
    • Following the decline of the Funan Empire in the sixth century CE, it was under the rule of the Buddhist kingdom of Dvaravati.
    • In the 10th century, the region came under Khmer rule, which is also known to have links with India.
    • A Tamil inscription found in Takua-pa testifies to trade links between the Pallava region of South India and southern Thailand.
    • A mercantile corporation of South Indians called Manikarramam had established a settlement here and built its own temple and tank, and lived as a ‘self-contained’ colony.
    • It is important to note that Brahmanism and Buddhism existed alongside each other in Thailand in the pre-Sukhothai period of the 13th century.

    Cult of Rama

    • The Ramayana known in Thailand as Ramakriti (the glory of Rama) or Ramakien (the account of Rama) — has provided an outlet of cultural expression in Thailand for both the elite and the common man.
    • Episodes from the epic are painted on the walls of Buddhist temples and enacted in dramas and ballets.
    • Although there is no archaeological evidence of the story of Rama in Thailand, certain towns in the country have legends related to Rama’s life connected with them.
    • For instance, Ayutthaya in Central Thailand, which emerged in the 10th century CE, is derived from Ayodhya, birthplace of Lord Rama.
    • Desai writes that “from the 13th century onwards, several Thai kings assumed the title Rama, which has become hereditary during the present dynasty.”

     

    UPSC 2023 countdown has begun! Get your personal guidance plan now! (Click here)

  • Lessons for India from the Taiwan standoff

    Context

    The brief visit by the United States House Speaker, Nancy Pelosi, to Taiwan, against stern warnings issued by China, has the potential to increase the already deteriorating relationship between the U.S. and China. For those of us in India watching the events as they unfold around Taiwan, there are valuable lessons to be learnt.

    Background

    • The crisis that began with the visit of Ms. Pelosi to Taipei is still unfolding and there is little clarity today on how it will wind down.
    •  For China, its claims about a rising superpower might ring hollow if it is unable to unify its claimed territories, in particular Taiwan.
    • For the U.S., it is about re-establishing steadily-diminishing American credibility in the eyes of its friends and foes.
    • For Taiwan, it is about standing up to Chinese bullying and making its red lines clear to Beijing.
    • Lessons for India: To be fair, there is growing recognition in New Delhi that it is important to meet the challenge posed by a belligerent China, but there appears to be a lack of clarity on how to meet this challenge.
    • To that extent, the Taiwan crisis offers New Delhi three lessons, at the very least.

    Takeaways for India

    1] Articulate red lines

    • The most important lesson from the Taiwan standoff for policymakers in New Delhi is the importance of articulating red lines and sovereign positions in an unambiguous manner.
    •  New Delhi needs to unambiguously highlight the threat from China and the sources of such a threat.
    • Any absence of such clarity will be cleverly utilised by Beijing to push Indian limits, as we have already seen.
    • Stop confusing international community: Even worse, ambiguous messaging by India also confuses its friends in the international community.
    • If India does not clearly articulate that China is in illegal occupation of its territory, how can it expect its friends in the international community to support India diplomatically or otherwise?
    • In other words, India’s current policy amounts to poor messaging, and confusing to its own people as well as the larger international community, and is therefore counterproductive.

    2] Avoid appeasement

    • Taiwan could have avoided the ongoing confrontation and the economic blockade during Chinese retaliatory military exercises around its territory by avoiding Ms. Pelosi’s visit to Taipei, or perhaps even keeping it low key.
    • Appeasement of China, Taiwan knows, is not the answer to Beijing’s aggression.
    •  India’s policy of meeting/hosting Chinese leaders while the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) continue(d) to violate established territorial norms on the LAC is a deeply flawed one.
    • Unilaterally catering to Chinese sensitivities even during the standoffs between the two militaries is a mistake.
    • For instance, the parliamentary delegation visits and legislature-level dialogues between India and Taiwan have not taken place since 2017.
    • Soft-peddling of the Quad was a mistake: During the 2000s, India (as well as Australia) decided to soft-peddle the Quad in the face of strong Chinese objections.
    • It is only in the last two years or so that we have witnessed renewed enthusiasm around the Quad.
    • In retrospect, appeasing Beijing by almost abandoning the Quad was bad strategy.

    3] Economic relationship is a two way process

    • Given that the economic relationship is a two-way process and that, as a matter of fact, the trade deficit is in China’s favour, China too has a lot to lose from a damaged trade relationship with India.
    • More so, if the Taiwan example (as well as the India-China standoff in 2020) is anything to go by, trade can continue to take place despite tensions and without India making any compromises vis-à-vis its sovereign claims.
    • India for sure should do business with China, but not on China’s own terms.

    Conclusion

    The recent crisis offers valuable lessons for India in its dealing with China.

    UPSC 2023 countdown has begun! Get your personal guidance plan now! (Click here)

  • India’s response to Sri Lanka and Myanmar crises is a study in contrast

    Context

    There is a stark contrast contrast between the Indian response to the crisis in Sri Lanka and the dawning civil war in Myanmar.

    Crisis in Myanmar

    • According to UN human rights monitors, over 2,000 people have been killed, around 14,000 are in prison, including 90 lawmakers, over 7,00,000 are refugees and half a million internally displaced.
    • Humanitarian aid to coup opponents is blocked.
    • The economy is in free fall.
    • Though the international community has not accepted the junta or its nominees as official representatives of Myanmar, it has not recognised the unity government as the legitimate successor of the pre-coup elected administration either.
    • Its armed wing, the recently-formed People’s Defence Force (PDF), exists in a shadowy limbo.
    • If it is too weak to impose significant costs on the junta, one root cause is the lack of support from neighbours.
    • As against Europe’s military support for Ukraine’s defence, no Asian country has stepped up to support the unity government and PDF.
    • Role of ASEAN:  It is ASEAN which shouldered the responsibility to mediate in Myanmar, whereas India took the initiative with Sri Lanka.
    • But ASEAN has been largely unsuccessful.
    • The five-point consensus that the junta agreed on with the regional grouping included an immediate end to violence and resumption of negotiations between the ousted administration and the Tatmadaw.
    • ASEAN’s reaction has been weak at best.
    • The US, EU, Australia and Canada announced targeted sanctions on the junta, and the EU imposed an embargo on arms sales to the country. ASEAN did not.

    India’s response and issues with it

    • The contrast between the Indian response to the crisis in Sri Lanka and the dawning civil war in Myanmar could not be starker.
    • There is no support from the India administration for Mizoram’s aid effort, and apparently there is no Indian policy vis a vis the coup either.
    • Cooperation against cross-border insurgency: Given our land and sea borders with Myanmar, and the troubled history of cross-border insurgencies between our two countries, the India’s inertia is alarming, though not entirely surprising.
    • Successive Indian administrations maintained relations with the junta in the hope that they would cooperate against cross-border Indian armed groups.
    • But these insurgencies have reduced.
    • In fact, over the 10 years of Myanmar’s partial democracy, from 2011 to 2021, cross-border support for Indian insurgents dipped sharply.
    • Direct security interest: In other words, we have a direct security interest in the restoration of our neighbour’s democracy.

    Way forward

    • Stringent sanctions: Sanctions that will starve the junta are a first step that Myanmar’s neighbours are yet to try.
    • While ASEAN has the initiative, all Myanmar’s neighbours need to unite on sanctions, especially nations such as Japan, Australia and India that are members of the Quad along with the US.
    • Myanmar ought to have topped the recent Quad summit’s agenda and it is shameful that it did not.
    • It is still not too late to call a virtual emergency meeting of Quad heads of state, along with ASEAN heads of state, to agree to stringent sanctions.

    Conclusion

    Our neighbourhood is more unstable today than it has been for decades. Four of our bordering countries are in free fall, while China’s grip comes closer to our shores by the hour. Can India afford to fiddle while wildfires ignite around us?

    UPSC 2022 countdown has begun! Get your personal guidance plan now! (Click here)

  • India, Bangladesh, Pakistan: What east can teach west

    Context

    The bilateral relationship between India and Bangladesh dominated by endless contentions at the turn of the millennium has transformed into a very productive partnership.

    Contrast between India’s relations with Bangladesh and Pakistan

    • The persistence of cross-border terrorism, the conflict over Kashmir, the militarisation of the frontier, little connectivity, poor trade relations and no formal inter-governmental negotiations paint a bleak picture of the India-Pak border.
    • The inability of successive generations of Indian and Pakistani leaders to bring a closure to Partition in the west makes the talk of a “100-year war” credible.
    • The only trend that can counter this pessimism is the good news from India’s eastern frontier with Bangladesh.
    • In contrast to the talk of a 100-year war between India and Pakistan, India and Bangladesh have proclaimed a “sonali adhyay” or “golden chapter” in bilateral relations.
    • While the unresolved land and maritime territorial disputes constitute one of the main problems in India’s relations with Pakistan, their resolution with Bangladesh transformed the context of bilateral relations.
    • For both Delhi and Dhaka, the reinvention of the bilateral relationship has been one of the most significant successes of their recent foreign policies

    Rebuilding the Bangladesh-India ties after 2010

    • The work on rebuilding ties began in earnest in 2010, when Sheikh Hasina came to India after taking charge of Bangladesh as prime minister for the second time in 2009.
    • Addressing bilateral problems: Both sides embarked on an extraordinary effort to address most bilateral problems—including border settlement, river water sharing, cross-border terrorism, market access to Bangladeshi goods, and connectivity.
    • The land boundary deal got parliamentary approval in 2015 in India.
    • India also accepted the award of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague on settling the maritime boundary dispute between Delhi and Dhaka. 
    • Security cooperation: Cooperation on cross-border terrorism that began a couple of years earlier helped build much-needed political trust between the two national security establishments.
    • Connectivity: On the connectivity front, we have seen a substantive movement towards reopening the border that was largely shut down after the 1965 war between India and Pakistan.
    • Trans-boundary bus services, reopening of railway lines, and the revitalisation of waterways are restoring connectivity in the eastern subcontinent that was severed.
    • Bilateral trade: Bilateral trade volumes have grown by leaps and bounds in recent years touching nearly $16 billion last year.
    • Bangladesh is one of India’s top export markets.
    •  India and Bangladesh have also developed inter-connected power grids facilitating Dhaka’s purchase of power from India.
    • It currently buys about 1200 MW of power from India and an additional 1500 MW is in the pipeline.
    • Development of the northeastern India: Today the northeastern states have realised the immense benefits of deeper economic engagement with Bangladesh — none of them more important than ending the geographic isolation of the region.
    • Assam today is at the forefront of imagining a bolder agenda for deepening economic ties with Bangladesh.
    • Peace and prosperity in the region: For India, the expansive partnership with Bangladesh has significantly eased its security challenges and laid the basis for peace and prosperity in the eastern subcontinent.
    • For Bangladesh, discarding the temptation to balance India and embark on a cooperative strategy has allowed Dhaka to focus on its economic growth and lift itself in the regional and global hierarchy.

    Way forward

    • Consolidating the gains: Rather than regret the unfortunate dynamic on the western frontier and bemoan Pakistan’s reluctance to let the SAARC become a vehicle for regional cooperation, Delhi should focus on consolidating the “golden moment” in the east.
    • The issues that need resolution are protecting the rights of minorities, sharing the waters of more than 50 rivers, promoting cross-border investments, managing one of the longest borders in the world, facilitating trade and preventing illegal migration, countering forces of religious extremism, promoting maritime security in the Bay of Bengal, expanding defence cooperation, and mitigating climate change in the shared regional environment to name a few.
    • Solving problems and tending to the relationship must necessarily be a continuous effort rather than episodic.

    Conclusion

    Nor can Delhi and Dhaka take each other for granted and let domestic politics overwhelm the logic of bilateral cooperation. The 75th anniversary of independence offers Delhi and Dhaka a special opportunity to elevate the ambition for their bilateral partnership.

    UPSC 2023 countdown has begun! Get your personal guidance plan now! (Click here)

  • India-Bangladesh River Disputes

    India and Bangladesh are likely to ink at least one major river agreement later this month.

    It is gauged that India has agreed to offer Bangladesh a package on river waters-related deals that will be considered a significant advancement in terms of sharing of river resources with Dhaka.

    Why in news?

    • There is a strong possibility that an agreement on the River Kushiyara that flows from Assam into Bangladesh is part of one such agreement.
    • This river got its fame in recent Assam floods.
    • Water sharing is considered a sensitive subject given the fact that it often takes political meaning.

    Rivers between India and Bangladesh

    • Overall, India and Bangladesh have 54 transboundary rivers between them, all of which are part of the drainage system of the Ganga-Brahmaputra-Meghna (GBM) basin.
    • The Padma (the Ganga), the Jamuna (the Brahmaputra) and the Meghna (the Barak) and their tributaries are integral in maintaining food and water security in Bangladesh.
    • In most of these cases, Bangladesh is the lower riparian.
    • This causes concern in Bangladesh that India—being both the upper riparian and first to develop the water resources—can have far more disproportionate control over the rivers.
    • Compounded by the lack of transparent data regarding trans-boundary rivers, such concern can lead to a more serious conflict between the two otherwise friendly neighbours.

    Genesis of the disputes

    • The issues between India and Bangladesh regarding water resource allotment can be traced to the time Bangladesh was still East Pakistan.
    • In 1961, India began construction of the Farakka Barrage—which was to be operational by April 1975—to divert a portion of the dry-season flow and increase the navigability of Kolkata port.
    • When India began its preliminary planning for the project in 1950-51, Pakistan immediately expressed concerns over the potential effect of the project on East Pakistan.

    Moves for disputes resolution: Joint River Commission

    • Soon after the independence of Bangladesh in 1971, the Joint River Commission was formed between India and Bangladesh in 1972.
    • In a joint declaration issued on 16 May 1974, the PM of Bangladesh and India acknowledged the need for the flow augmentation of the Ganga in the lean season to meet the requirements of both countries.

    Often in news: Teesta River Dispute

    • The Bangladesh government has been insistent on sealing the Teesta Waters Agreement, which has eluded settlement so far.
    • Teesta River is a 315 km long river that rises in the eastern Himalayas, flows through the Indian states of Sikkim and West Bengal through Bangladesh and enters the Bay of Bengal.
    • It is a tributary of the Brahmaputra (known as Jamuna in Bangladesh), flowing through India and Bangladesh.
    • It originates in the Himalayas near Chunthang, Sikkim and flows to the south through West Bengal before entering Bangladesh.
    • Originally, it continued southward to empty directly into the Padma River but around 1787 the river changed its course to flow eastward to join the Jamuna river.
    • The Teesta Barrage dam helps to provide irrigation for the plains between the upper Padma and the Jamuna.

    What is the dispute about?

    • The point of contention between India and Bangladesh is mainly the lean season flow in the Teesta draining into Bangladesh.
    • The river covers nearly the entire floodplains of Sikkim while draining 2,800 sq km of Bangladesh, governing the lives of hundreds of thousands of people.
    • For West Bengal, Teesta is equally important, considered the lifeline of half-a-dozen districts in North Bengal.
    • Bangladesh has sought an “equitable” distribution of Teesta waters from India, on the lines of the Ganga Water Treaty of 1996, but to no avail.
    • The failure to ink a deal had its fallout on the country’s politics, putting the ruling party of PM Sheikh Hasina in a spot.

    Q.The hydrological linkages between India and Bangladesh are a product of geography and a matter of shared history. Discuss this statement in line with the Teesta water sharing dispute.

    The deal

    • Following a half-hearted deal in 1983, when a nearly equal division of water was proposed, the countries hit a roadblock. The transient agreement could not be implemented.
    • Talks resumed after the Awami League returned to power in 2008 and the former Indian PM Manmohan Singh visited Dhaka in 2011.
    • In 2015, PM Modi’s visit to Dhaka generated more ebullient lines: deliberations were underway involving all the stakeholders to conclude the agreement as soon as possible.

    Issues from the Indian side

    • It remains an unfinished project and one of the key stakeholders — West Bengal CM is yet to endorse the deal.
    • Her objection is connected to “global warming. Many of the glaciers on the Teesta basin have retreated.
    • The importance of the flow and the seasonal variation of this river is felt during the lean season (from October to April/May) as the average flow is about 500 million cubic metres (MCM) per month.
    • The CM opposed an arrangement in 2011, by which India would get 42.5% and Bangladesh 37.5% of the water during the lean season, and the plan was shelved.

    Why does this deal matters?

    • India and Bangladesh have resolved border problems through the Land Boundary Agreement of 2015.
    • However, both nations have locked horns over the sharing of multiple rivers that define the borders and impact lives and livelihoods on both sides.

     

    UPSC 2023 countdown has begun! Get your personal guidance plan now! (Click here)

  • India-UK Relations

    Context

    • The year 2022 is significant for both India and the UK as our country commemorates the 75th anniversary of its Independence and the two celebrate 75 years of bilateral ties.
    • India-UK relations were elevated to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2021, based on a shared commitment towards democracy, fundamental freedoms and multilateralism.

    Background of the India-UK ties

    • Partnership: The historical legacy has its own imprint on the relationship. But what is truly remarkable is the broad range of partnerships that have evolved between the two countries, transcending trade, investment and strategic affairs.
    • Close ties: This broader partnership between the world’s fifth and sixth largest economies has its foundations on three critical aspects: education, common law system and the increasingly influential role and impact of the Indian diaspora in the UK.
    • Shared values: The India-UK partnership is based on shared values, respect for the rule of law and common law, and institutional integrity protected by democratic institutions in the both the countries.

    What progress has been made in the India-UK relationship?

    1.Economic: During 2019-20, trade between the two countries stood at US$ 15.45 billion with the balance in favor of India. Between April 2021-February 2022, Indian exports to the UK stood at US$ 9.4 billion (2.5% of India’s exports). The imports in the corresponding period were US$ 6.59 billion (1.2% of India’s imports). There is a scope for significant improvement. Both countries expect that the bilateral trade can reach US$ 100 billion by 2030.

    2.Defense and Security: India and the UK signed the Defence and International Security Partnership (DISP) in November 2015. It provides a strategic roadmap and direction to the evolving India-UK Defence Relations. At present some 70 companies in the UK supply goods for aircraft and related equipment besides supporting platforms like the Jaguar, Mirage and Kiran aircraft.

    3.Indian Diaspora: Around 1.5 million people of Indian origin live in Britain. Indian diaspora are making significant contributions to the British Society. This includes 15 Members of Parliament, three members in Cabinet, and two in high office as Finance and Home Ministers.

    4.Education: The UK-India Education and Research Initiative (UKIERI) was launched in 2005. A new ‘UKEIRI Mobility Programme: Study in India’ was also launched in 2019. Under this Britain’s universities collaborate with Indian partners and send UK students to India.

    5.Health: The successful partnership between Oxford University, AstraZeneca and SII on COVID-19 vaccine demonstrated the potential of Indian and UK expertise working together to solve international challenges. The two sides are also working on pandemic preparedness, Antimicrobial Resistance (AMR), digital health, Ayurveda and alternative medicines, as well as health worker mobility.

    What is the significance of India-UK Relationship?

    1.Regional and global issues of mutual interest: A healthy relationship between the two is imperative for enhancing cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, Afghanistan, UNSC, G20 and Commonwealth. For instance, India welcomed the UK’s accession in the Indo-Pacific Ocean’s Initiative under the Maritime Security pillar.

    2.Tackling Climate Change: The cooperation between them can be helpful to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement and in implementing the Glasgow Climate Pact. For instance, the countries have agreed to work for early operationalisation of the Global Green Grids-One Sun One World One Grid Initiative (OSOWOG) under ISA. They are also working on the IRIS platform under CDRI which was jointly launched by India and UK at COP26.

    3.Supporting 3rd World Countries: Through the Global Innovation Partnership, India and UK have agreed to co-finance up to £ 75 million to support the transfer and scale up of climate smart sustainable innovations to third countries. The novel GIP Fund created under this Partnership will also aim to raise additional £ 100 million from the market to support Indian innovations.

    3.Strategic Considerations: India can engage with the UK to counter China’s rise in the Indian Ocean Region. The UK on other hand can use India as an alternative destination to China and its companies can invest in India as part of China plus one strategy. It is the business strategy to avoid investing only in China and diversify business into other countries.

    Challenges in India-UK relations

    1.BREXIT

    • Impact on Diaspora– Many members of Indian Diaspora in Britain had voted against BREXIT because it is likely that Indian IT Professional in Britain will face tough competition when UK will open up its border for more skilled migration.
    • Impact on Indian Companies in UK– A hard Brexit would inevitably impact more than 800 Indian companies in UK in crucial sectors of British economy Indian. But data has shown that companies are increasing investments in the UK and creating many thousands of new jobs. This demonstrates that, Brexit or no Brexit, India supports Britain.
    • Impact on India-EU Relations –With €72.5 billion worth of India-EU trade and €19.4 billion of India UK trade at stake, all partners needed to think through this issue carefully in the business and commercial context. Brexit seems to be a challenge to the India EU strategic partnership but India would need to learn to manage its relations with the EU without UK
    • Impact on Trade–Forging a Free Trade Agreement with India will not be a priority for UK as it leaves EU. Instead, Britain would initially focus on tackling existing barriers to trade. But India should grab the opportunity to fill the trade gap in UK, post-Brexit.

    2.Visas and Immigration

    • Illegal Migration: There are more than 1 lakh illegal Indian immigrants in UK. Britain has started putting pressure on Indian government to ensure that Indians who have no right to remain in UK be sent back to India
    • Latest Measures: On the other hand, a white paper on post-Brexit visas and immigration strategy has been unveiled. It is expected to benefit Indian students and professionals, with a focus on skills rather than country of origin. An annual cap of 20,700 on the number of skilled work visas issued will also be removed.

    3.Terrorism

    • In the context of Brexit, unlike the United States’ contemporary view, India continues to be hyphenated with Pakistan in London’s outlook.
    • India states the fact that bilateral relations went beyond the economic realm to issues such as security and terrorism were not being heeded in Britain, despite continuous efforts by India over the past decades.

    4.Totalization agreement

    • The UK government has also made it mandatory for people to pay a health care surcharge as part of their immigration application.
    • When employees are there for a short term as part of their work, it is important that they get to keep their hard-earned money rather than giving UK thousands of pounds of free money as social security taxes.
    • Therefore, it is important for UK and India to sign the totalization agreement at the earliest.
    • The totalization agreement with the UK would have exempted Indian professionals who are working for a certain period of time in the UK from paying those social security taxes if they are paying such taxes in India.

    Way forward

    • The historical baggage also needs to be addressed cooperatively to diminish the possibility of hindrance in future cooperation.
    • The India-United Kingdom are dynamic democracies and the world’s leading economies with impressive advancements in human resources, manufacturing, innovation, research, education, space, defence, green technologies, and clean energy, among other areas.
    • This relationship can be utilized for the betterment of the fields and more collaborations should be undertaken.

    Conclusion

    • As we celebrate the historic collaboration between the UK and India in producing the Covishield vaccine, and look forward to the much-awaited signing of the bilateral Free Trade Agreement, we should not lose sight of the tremendous power that transnational university-wide collaborations can leverage in the accord. Education, research and knowledge partnership ought to become the centre-piece of the India-UK relationship at 75, as we move forward.

    Mains question

    Q.Analyse India-UK bilateral relations with scope of upscaling and challenges they need to overcome .

     

  • India-EU Relations

    Context

    • While India celebrates its 75th year of Independence, it also celebrates 60 years of diplomatic relations with the European Union (EU).
    • A cooperation agreement signed in 1994 took the bilateral relationship beyond trade and economic cooperation.

    Definition

    • Relations between the European Union and the Republic of India are currently defined by the 1994 EU–India Cooperation Agreement. The EU is a significant trade partner for India and the two sides have been attempting to negotiate a free trade deal since 2007.

    Common roadmap and shared vision

    • The road map highlights engagement across five domains: foreign policy and security cooperation; trade and economy; sustainable modernisation partnership; global governance; and people-to-people relations.

     

    Brief history

    • India-EU relations date to the early 1960s, with India being amongst the first countries to establish diplomatic relations with the European Economic Community.
    • At the 5th India-EU Summit at The Hague in 2004, the relationship was upgraded to a ‘Strategic Partnership’.
    • The two sides adopted a Joint Action Plan in 2005 (which was reviewed in 2008) that provided for strengthening dialogue and consultation mechanisms in the political and economic spheres, enhancing trade and investment, and bringing peoples and cultures together.

    What is strategic partnership?

    • A ‘strategic partnership’, as the term suggests, involves a shared understanding between the two or more states involved on the nature of threats in the environment and the place of their collective power in helping mitigate the threats.

    Why they are important?

    • As the world’s two largest democracies, the EU and India share a commitment to protecting and promoting human rights, a rules-based global order, effective multilateralism, sustainable development and open trade.

    Significance

    [A] Political Partnership

    • The Joint Political Statement signed in 1993, opened the way for annual ministerial meetings and a broad political dialogue.
    • The Cooperation Agreement signed in 1994 took the bilateral relationship beyond trade and economic cooperation.
    • A multi-tiered institutional architecture of cooperation has since been created, presided over by the India-EU Summit since 2000.
    • Today EU stands as a major reference for India’s legislative process in the field of Data security and privacy.

    [B] Economic Ties

    • Bilateral trade: The EU is India’s largest trading partner, while India is the EU’s 9th largest trading partner. It is the second-largest destination for Indian exports after the United States.
    • Investment: The EU’s share in foreign investment inflows to India has more than doubled from 8% to 18% in the last decade. This makes the EU an important foreign investor in India.
    • Preferential treatment: India is the benefactor of the unilateral preferential tariffs under the EU Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP).
    • Energy: Both sides have finalised civil nuclear cooperation agreement after 13 years of negotiations called as the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). It involves collaboration in the civil nuclear energy sector.
    • Development cooperation: Over €150 million worth of projects by EU are currently ongoing in India. European Investment Bank (EIB) is providing loans for Lucknow, Bangalore, and Pune Metro Projects.

    [C] Defence & Security

    • EU and India have instituted several mechanisms for greater cooperation on pressing security challenges like counterterrorism, maritime security, and nuclear non-proliferation.
    • Information Fusion Centre – Indian Ocean Region in New Delhi (IFC-IOR) has recently been linked-up with the Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa (MSC-HOA) established by the EU Naval Force (NAVFOR).

    [D] Climate Change

    • EU and India also underline their highest political commitment to the effective implementation of the Paris Agreement and the UNFCCC despite US withdrawing from the same.
    • India-EU Clean Energy and Climate Partnership was agreed at the 2016 Summit – to promote access to and disseminate clean energy and climate friendly technologies and encourage R&D.
    • Energy cooperation is now ongoing on a broad range of energy issues, like smart grids, energy efficiency, offshore wind and solar infrastructure, and research and innovation.
    • EU and India also cooperate closely on the Clean Ganga initiative and deal with other water-related challenges in coordinated manner.

    [E] Research and Development

    • India-EU Science & Technology Steering Committee meets annually to review scientific cooperation.
    • Both have official mechanisms in fields such as Digital Communications, 5G technology, Biotechnology, artificial intelligence etc.
    • ISRO has a long-standing cooperation with the European Union, since 1970s. It has contributed towards the EU’s satellite navigation system Galileo.

    Future scope

    • Trade figures and Investments: Bilateral trade between the two surpassed $116 billion in 2021-22. The EU is India’s second largest trading partner after the U.S., and the second largest destination for Indian exports.
    • Job creation: There are 6,000 European companies in the country that directly and indirectly create 6.7 million jobs.
    • Green strategic partnership: between India and Denmark aims to address climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution, and the India-Nordic Summit focused on green technologies and industry transformation that are vital for sustainable and inclusive growth.
    • Energy security: Energy serves as an important aspect of the relationship between India and the EU. Given the impacts of climate change, this aspect has become extremely crucial today. Both entities have been pursuing cooperation for the joint development of clean energy.
    • Political cooperation: India and the EU may benefit from increasing cooperation in the resolution of issues such as terrorism and radicalization, cyber-security, coordinating on certain key and relevant aspects of foreign policy, and other humanitarian issues.
    • International support: It is crucial that Europe recognize India as a partner for peace that is committed to human rights, both regionally and internationally.

    Challenges before them

    • Deadlock over BTIA: The negotiations for a Broad-based Bilateral Trade and Investment Agreement (BTIA) were held between 2007 to 2013 but have remained dormant/suspended since then.
    • Export hurdles: Indian demands for ‘Data secure’ status (important for India’s IT sector) to ease norms on temporary movement of skilled workers, relaxation of Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS), etc. stands largely ignored.
    • Trade imbalance: This heavily leans towards China. India accounts for only 1.9% of EU total trade in goods in 2019, well behind China (13.8%).
    • Brexit altercations: In the longer term of balancing of global powers, a smaller Europe without the key military and economic force UK, is much weaker in the wake of an ambitious China and an increasingly protectionist US.
    • EU primarily remains a trade bloc: This has resulted in a lack of substantive agreements on matters such as regional security and connectivity.
    • Undue references to sovereign concerns: The European Parliament was critical of both the Indian government’s decision to scrap Jammu and Kashmir’s special status in 2019 and the Citizenship (Amendment) Act.
    • China’s influence: EU’s affinity lies with China. This is because of its high dependence on the Chinese market. It is a major partner in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
    • Ukrainian war: EAM S. Jaishankar’s witty reply about EU’s oil import from Russia has not been welcomed across the EU. It still expects India to criticize Russia.

    EU’s interests in India

    • Reducing dependence on China: It is necessary for both sides as it is making them highly vulnerable to Chinese aggression.
    • Western lobby: EU acknowledges its supply chain’s vulnerability, the risk posed by overdependence on China, and the need to strengthen the global community of democracies.
    • Healthcare: The on-going pandemic has shown the need for cooperation in global health. India and the EU have called for a reform of the World Health Organisation (WHO).
    • Perception of India as a huge market: EU still largely perceives India as huge market rather than a partner.
    • Promotion of multilateralism: Both sides are facing issues related to US-China trade war and uncertainty of the US’ policies. They have common interest in avoiding a bipolarised world and developing a rules-based order.

    India’s stakes in EU

    • Global leadership vacuum: Retreat of the U.S. from global leadership has provided opportunities for EU- India cooperation and trilateral dialogues with countries in the Middle Fast, Central Asia, and Africa.
    • Chinese Aggression: China’s increasing presence in Eurasia and South Asia is creating similar security, political and economic concerns for Europe and India.
    • Fall of the conventional global order: Trade war, crumbling WTO and break down of TPP etc. has made EU understand the economic importance of India.
    • BREXIT: Brexit is pushing India to look for new ‘gateways’ to Europe, as its traditional partner leaves the union. A renewed trade and political cooperation are the need of the hour.
    • Conformity over Indo-Pacific: The Indo-Pacific is the main conduit for global trade and energy flows. Rule-based Indo-pacific is of everyone’s interest with EU no exception.

    Way forward

    • A close bilateral relation between India and the EU has far-reaching economic, political and strategic implications on the crisis-driven international order.
    • Both sides should realise this potential and must further the growth of the bilateral ties with a strong political will.
    • As highlighted by EU strategy on India 2018, India-EU should take their relations beyond “trade lens”, recognizing their important geopolitical, strategic convergences.
    • India can pursue EU countries to engage in Indo-pacific narrative, geo-economically if not from security prism.

    Mains question

    What do you understand by the term strategic partnership? India and EU are celebrating 60 years of diplomatic relations trace their journey with significance and challenges in their ties.

     

    B2BASICS

    About European Union (EU)

    • The EU is a political and economic union of 27 member states that are located primarily in Europe.
    • The union and EU citizenship were established when the Maastricht Treaty came into force in 1993.
    • The EU grew out of a desire to strengthen international economic and political co-operation on the European continent in the wake of World War II.
    • It has often been described as a sui generis political entity (without precedent or comparison) with the characteristics of either a federation or confederation.
    • The eurozone consists of all countries that use the euro as official currency. All EU members pledge to convert to the euro, but only 19 have done so as of 2022.

    Members of the EU

    • Through successive enlargements, the European Union has grown from the six founding states (Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) to 27 members.
    • This entails a partial delegation of sovereignty to the institutions in return for representation within those institutions, a practice often referred to as “pooling of sovereignty“.
    • In the 2016 ‘Brexit’ referendum, the UK voted to leave the EU. The UK officially left the EU in 2020

     

    Mains question

    What do you understand by the term strategic partnership? India and EU are celebrating 60 years of diplomatic relations trace their journey with significance and challenges in their ties.

    UPSC 2023 countdown has begun! Get your personal guidance plan now! (Click here)

     

     

  • Controversial visit of a Chinese vessel to Hambantota

    Much recently, Sri Lanka approved the arrival of a Chinese satellite-tracking vessel to its southern Chinese-funded Hambantota port.

    Why in news?

    • India has raised concerns over the ship’s visit.
    • Caught in a delicate diplomatic and geopolitical spot, Colombo gave its nod despites India’s requests to deny the permission.
    • It is asserted that bankrupt Sri Lanka succumbed to Chinese pressure after initially refusing the ship to dock.

    Yuan Wang 5: The vessel

    • Yuan Wang 5 was described by the Sri Lankan government as a “scientific research ship”.
    • The BRISL (Belt & Road Initiative Sri Lanka), a Colombo-based organisation studying China’s ambitious connectivity project, was the first to draw attention to the visit.
    • It said that the Yuan Wang 5 will conduct “satellite control and research tracking in the northwestern part of the Indian Ocean Region”.
    • Vessels of the Yuan Wang class are said to be used for tracking and supporting satellite as well as intercontinental ballistic missiles by the People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force.

    India’s reaction

    • India has expressed its concern over the Chinese vessel visit.
    • It is carefully monitoring any development having a bearing on its security and economic interests.

    How have other countries reacted?

    • The developments showed that Colombo was caught between the U.S. and India on the one hand, and China on the other.
    • That too at a time when the Sri Lankan government is counting on all their support as the island nation, hit by a devastating economic crisis, embarks on debt restructuring ahead of a promised IMF package.

    How did China respond?

    • China reacted strongly at Sri Lanka, following concerns voiced by India.
    • It clarified that Sri Lanka is a transportation hub in the Indian Ocean.
    • Scientific research vessels from various countries including China have made port calls in Sri Lanka for replenishment.
    • Secondly, it invoked Sri Lanka’s sovereignty and the right to develop relations with other countries based on its development interests.

    What is Sri Lanka’s stand?

    • It is reported that the US and Indian envoys were asked to provide concrete reasons for their objections.
    • Not satisfied with the reasons being sufficient to refuse entry to the Chinese vessel, SL decided to inform the Chinese embassy in Colombo to inform the ship to continue its journey to Hambantota.

     

    UPSC 2023 countdown has begun! Get your personal guidance plan now! (Click here)

  • Explained: Baloch Freedom Movement

    Baloch separatism under the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) has been an ongoing issue in Pakistan since the birth of the nation in 1947.

    Who are the BLA fighters?

    • The BLA announced itself in 2005 with a rocket attack on a paramilitary camp in Balochistan Kohlu during a visit by then President Pervez Musharraf.
    • It is a nationalist militant group that has been waging an insurgency for Baloch self-determination and a separate homeland for the Baloch people.

    Rise of Baloch nationalism

    • While the BLA’s armed insurgency is about two decades old, demands of Baloch nationalists for political autonomy and threats of secession date back to 1947.
    • The Khan of Kalat (who claimed sovereignty over the four princely states of Kalat, Lasbela, Kharan and Makran) held out for independence, and the Pakistan Army forced his accession in March 1948.
    • Between 1973 and 1977, the Zulfikar Ali Bhutto-led government sent in the Pakistan Army to crush a leftist guerilla war inspired by the liberation of Bangladesh.
    • The tribal sardars of Balochistan, who had been at the forefront of Baloch nationalism, and were co-opted by the state in the late 1970s, grew rebellious again.
    • The insurgency gathered momentum from 2006, after the Pakistan Army killed the Bugti sardar, Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, who had been also been a chief minister and governor of the province.

    Why it is gaining momentum now?

    • The Pakistan Army’s operations against Baloch nationalists over the last two decades have seen hundreds of disappearances, and other alleged human rights violations.
    • Baloch nationalists also see the sudden influx of jihadist groups in the province as a move by the Pakistan security establishment to counter their nationalist demands.
    • In 2012, the US Congress convened a hearing on Balochistan and supported the demand for a free Baloch land.
    • In a significant shift in policy, back then in 2016, PM Modi had made a reference to the Baloch freedom struggle in his Independence Day speech.

    Why does Balochistan matters?

    • Balochistan borders Afghanistan and Iran.
    • The people are mostly tribal with secular principles and are admirers of ties with India.
    • With gas, oil, copper and gold deposits, it is the most resource-rich of Pakistan’s four provinces.
    • It makes up half of Pakistan’s area, but has only 3.6% of its population.
    • Pakistan alleges that the insurgency is backed by India.
    • This is the region where a former Indian Navy officer Kulbhushan Jadhav was abducted from Iran and charged for espionage supporting Baloch activism in Pakistan.
    • Many Baloch activists had been seeking asylum and has applied for Indian citizenship. New Delhi neither confirmed nor deny the reports.

    Why did BLA target the Chinese now?

    • The BLA claimed it attacks Chinese nationals because Beijing ignored warnings not to enter deals and agreements regarding Balochistan before the province had been “liberated”.
    • Baloch people see China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) as a neo-colonist move against their sovereignty.
    • Among China’s major projects in Balochistan is the port of Gwadar, strategically located near the Strait of Hormuz – a crucial oil shipping route in the Arabian Sea.
    • The security of its nationals in Pakistan has become a major issue for Beijing, especially since it launched the CPEC.
    • Such attacks has literally stalled the work in progress of CPEC projects making it a sheer failure.

    Significance of recent events

    • It is rare that the BLA deployed female suicide bombers. Recent attack was done by a highly educated lady and mother of two.
    • This is also the first time that a non-jihadist ethno-nationalist group has deployed a woman suicide bomber in the manner of Sri Lanka’s LTTE.
    • According to security experts familiar with the Baloch insurgency, it marks a worsening security situation in Pakistan.
    • As the training camps are alleged by Pakistan to be in Afghanistan, the incident may also be a pointer to Pakistan’s loss of control over the Talibans.

     

    UPSC 2023 countdown has begun! Get your personal guidance plan now! (Click here)