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Subject: Executive Vs Legislature

  • An institution in freefall: Parliament is all dressed up with nowhere to go

    Why in the News

    The recently concluded session of Parliament ended in sustained disruption rather than debate, with sitting time, public money and scrutiny all lost. The deadlock has exposed a single conflict: disruption is now the Opposition’s only means of being heard, and it is also what is emptying the institution of purpose.

    Which parliamentary instruments does disruption trade away, and what replaces them?

    1. Question Hour: The first hour of a sitting is set aside for members to question ministers on the working of their departments. Supplementary questions asked on the floor are the point of pressure, since the minister cannot prepare for them in advance.
    2. Zero Hour: The period immediately after Question Hour allows a member to raise a constituency or local matter without prior notice. It is an Indian innovation and finds no mention in the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha.
    3. Rule 377: Rule 377 lets a member place on record a matter of public importance that no other procedural device covers. The member reads a short submission, no discussion follows, and the concerned ministry responds separately.
    4. Debate on a bill: Members place their views on a bill on record before the House votes on it. A bill passed amid noise goes through without that record ever being created.
    5. Calling attention motion: Under Rule 197 a member draws a minister’s attention to a matter of urgent public importance, and the minister must make a statement in reply. It is a one member device and needs no supporting members.
    6. Adjournment motion: Under Rule 56 a member seeks to set aside the entire day’s listed business to discuss a definite matter of urgent public importance. Fifty members must rise when the Chair reads the notice, and the motion ends in a vote.
    7. Short duration discussion: Under Rule 193 a member with two supporters seeks a discussion on an urgent matter of public importance, running to no more than two and a half hours. It concludes without a vote.
    8. No confidence motion: Under Rule 198 a member of the Lok Sabha moves against the entire Council of Ministers, and fifty members must rise for leave to be granted. It states no reasons and is decided by a simple majority of members present and voting.
    9. Rule 373 and Rule 374: Under Rule 373 the Speaker directs a grossly disorderly member to withdraw for the remainder of the day’s sitting. Under Rule 374 the Speaker names a member who persistently obstructs business, and the House then votes on suspension.
    10. Rule 374A: Inserted in 2001, it suspends a member automatically for five consecutive sittings or the remainder of the session, whichever is less, for entering the well or persisting in disorder after a warning. No motion is moved and no vote is taken.

    Why has the working relationship between government and Opposition broken down?

    1. Courtesy across the benches: Atal Bihari Vajpayee recounted the courtesy shown to him by the first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, when he sat as a young Opposition backbencher. That civility operated independently of political disagreement.
    2. Care extended to a political rival: Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi arranged for the same Opposition member to receive medical treatment in the United States.
    3. An Opposition member sent to represent India: Prime Minister P V Narasimha Rao despatched that Opposition member to Geneva to represent India at a critical United Nations (UN) summit on Kashmir.
    4. Mutual demonisation: Each side now claims sole possession of virtue and writes the other off as beyond redemption. Dissent is branded anti national by the ruling side.
    5. The Opposition’s self image: The Opposition presents itself as an outnumbered force fighting a ruthless and better resourced establishment, using the Mahabharata’s image of the Pandavas ranged against the Kauravas.
    6. The presumption of good faith: Democratic functioning rests on the belief that a rival cares about national welfare even where it disagrees profoundly on method. Treating adversaries as existential enemies removes the common ground that governance requires.

    Is disruption the Opposition’s last instrument of accountability or the thing destroying Parliament?

    1. Disruption as the only remaining lever: An Opposition refused a hearing on the issues it names has no procedural route left, so it withholds the House’s ability to function at all. The tactic is defended as the enforcement of executive accountability.
    2. The same tactic as the injury: Every sitting lost to organised shouting removes the scrutiny the Opposition claims to be defending. The instrument and the damage are the same act.
    3. The case argued from the Opposition benches: The charge that disruption is hollowing out Parliament is pressed by a fourth term Opposition member of the Lok Sabha, not from the treasury benches. It places the Opposition’s own tactic under scrutiny by someone who depends on it.
    4. Reciprocal hypocrisy: Leaders who championed parliamentary obstruction as a vital accountability tool in Opposition treated it as an unpardonable sin once in office. The Opposition, having suffered those tactics for years, rejects the argument now made against them.
    5. The operating code: The reciprocity of the traditional golden rule has been replaced by a rule of retaliation, doing to the other side what was done to one’s own.
    6. A collective failure: The breakdown of democratic trust cannot be assigned to one side. Both have used the same instrument and both have condemned it from the opposite bench.

    Why does poor parliamentary performance carry no electoral cost?

    1. Re-election turns on other things: Members are elected and re-elected for reasons that have almost nothing to do with their performance in the House. Voters judge them on constituency services rendered and on raw local political strength.
    2. Debating skill has no electoral value: The ability to press a minister during Question Hour or to take apart a flawed bill does not convert into votes. That removes any incentive to acquire the skill.
    3. Talent has moved to the studio: The debating ability that would once have been displayed on the floor of the House is now displayed in television studios. The audience that rewards it is not in the chamber.
    4. Party whips direct the disruption: Members are corralled into the well of the House to disrupt proceedings through organised shouting rather than reasoned debate. The instruction comes from the party, not from the individual member.
    5. Parties reward aggression over excellence: By issuing that instruction, party leaderships signal that partisan aggression is valued far above parliamentary skill. The signal then shapes who rises within the party.

    What is lost when the politics of the street occupies the space of parliamentary politics?

    1. Two distinct political skills: Parties once valued mass mobilisation, the politics of the street, and debating prowess, the politics of Parliament, as separate competences. Leaders were assessed on both.
    2. One has displaced the other: The politics of the street has moved inside the chamber, leaving the politics of Parliament with no place to operate.
    3. Consequence for national consensus: Democratic discourse is impoverished and agreement across parties on any question of national progress becomes unattainable.
    4. Committees still function: Substantive work continues in parliamentary committees, which meet away from the media glare and without cameras. The absence of cameras removes the premium that disruptive grandstanding otherwise carries.
    5. What the public actually sees: The visible record is disruption, the absence of dialogue and a complete breakdown in communication. Disillusionment with the functioning of Parliament is rife across the country.

    How has the executive reduced Parliament’s place in the constitutional scheme?

    1. Contempt for the legislature: The government prefers to ride roughshod over the Opposition rather than engage it, and treats accommodation of even some of its demands as unnecessary.
    2. Attendance of the head of government: The first Prime Minister attended Parliament daily and treated it as the beating heart of Indian democracy. The current Prime Minister is rarely present in the House.
    3. From consultative chamber to noticeboard: Parliament’s function has shifted from deliberation to the announcement of decisions the executive has already taken.
    4. From scrutiny to legalisation: The House is used to give legal form to those decisions rather than to test them. That converts the vote into a formality.
    5. Custodians permitting the hollowing out: The institution is being emptied of purpose by the very people responsible for protecting it. The end point is a public that no longer misses it once it is rendered meaningless.

    Do other parliamentary democracies show that guaranteed Opposition time is workable?

    1. The comparative reference is general: The proposal of dedicated Opposition time is described only as successfully used elsewhere, with no country named and no design detail supplied. The comparative case therefore rests on the standing practice of other Westminster legislatures.
    2. United Kingdom, Opposition Days: Standing Order No. 14 of the House of Commons reserves twenty days in each session for Opposition business. Seventeen are at the disposal of the Leader of the Opposition and three at the disposal of the second largest Opposition party.
    3. Canada, allotted days: The House of Commons sets aside a fixed number of allotted days in each supply period on which an Opposition party chooses the subject of debate. A motion moved on such a day may be made votable.
    4. Australia, Matter of Public Importance: The House of Representatives sets aside time on sitting days for a Matter of Public Importance proposed in writing to the Speaker. The discussion is time limited and ends without a vote.
    5. The common design feature: In each case the time is fixed by standing order rather than negotiated session by session. The Opposition’s access does not depend on the government’s willingness in a given week.

    What would restore the balance between contestation and cooperation?

    1. Conviction during elections, cooperation after: Democratic functioning requires fierce ideological conviction at the time of an election and active cooperation once the ballots are cast.
    2. National interest above partisan rivalry: Where both sides concur that national interests outrank party rivalries, governance shifts from zero sum obstructionism to constructive collaboration.
    3. Not an abandonment of ideology: The approach requires no party to give up its ideology or its principles. Parties offer different routes to the same destination of national welfare, safety and prosperity.
    4. A fixed slot for the Opposition: Granting the Opposition one day a week, or two hours a day, to raise any issue it deems essential would let the rest of Parliament’s business proceed undisturbed.
    5. The missing ingredient is willingness: The compromise needs no constitutional amendment and no new institution. It needs a government prepared to imagine and concede the time.

    Conclusion

    Parliament’s decline is a failure of the presumption of good faith between government and Opposition, not a failure of procedure, and disruption has become both the Opposition’s only instrument and the agent of the institution’s hollowing out. The remedy identified is small and does not require a constitutional change. It requires guaranteed time in which the Opposition can be heard, and a government willing to concede it. Without that concession the House will continue to meet, pass bills and adjourn, and the deliberative function that gives it authority will not survive.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2017] The Parliament of India exercises control over the functions of the Council of Ministers through 1. Adjournment motion 2. Question hour 3. Supplementary questions Select the correct answer using the code given below: (a) 1 only (b) 2 and 3 only (c) 1 and 3 only (d) 1, 2 and 3 Answer: (d)”

    “[2020] Consider the following statements: 1. The President of India can summon a session of the Parliament at such place as he/she thinks fit. 2. The Constitution of India provides for three sessions of the Parliament in a year, but it is not mandatory to conduct all three sessions. 3. There is no minimum number of days of that the Parliament is required to meet in a year. Which of the statements given above is/are correct? (a) 1 only (b) 2 only (c) 1 and 3 only (d) 2 and 3 only Answer: (c)”

    “[2014] Consider the following statements regarding a No-Confidence Motion in India: 1. There is no mention of a No-Confidence Motion in the Constitution of India. 2. A motion of No-Confidence can be introduced in the Lok Sabha only. Which of the statements given above is/are correct? (a) 1 only (b) 2 only (c) Both 1 and 2 (d) Neither 1 nor 2 Answer: (c)”

    “[2021, GS2, 10 marks] To what extent, in your view, the Parliament is able to ensure accountability of the executive in India?”

    “[2019, GS2, 15 marks] Individual Parliamentarian’s role as the national lawmaker is on a decline, which in turn, has adversely impacted the quality of debates and their outcome. Discuss.”

    “[2024, GS2, 10 marks] “The growth of cabinet system has practically resulted in the marginalisation of the parliamentary supremacy.” Elucidate.”

    “[2013, GS2, 10 marks] The role of individual MPs (Members of Parliament) has diminished over the years and as a result healthy constructive debates on policy issues are not usually witnessed. How far can this be attributed to the anti-defection law, which was legislated but with a different intention?”

  • Monsoon session passes Bills with minimal deliberation as legislative scrutiny weakens

    Why in the news?

    The monsoon session that began on 20 July passed nine of its eleven Bills with only the minister in charge speaking, and recorded a productivity rate of 15 per cent. Legislation that redraws Centre State powers over minerals therefore cleared Parliament without the examination the House exists to provide. Two further proposals, on delimitation and on foreign contributions, were stalled rather than scrutinised, and both remain alive.

    What is the Pre-Legislative Consultation Policy, 2014?

    1. About: It is a policy of the Department of Legal Affairs requiring every department to place a draft Bill in the public domain before it is introduced in Parliament.
    2. What must be disclosed: The draft, an explanatory note in simple language, the financial implications, and an estimate of the impact on the environment, fundamental rights and livelihoods.
    3. Consultation period: A minimum of thirty days is to be given for public feedback, and a summary of the responses received is to be published.
    4. Link to the House: The summary of feedback is to be placed before the departmentally related standing committee that examines the Bill.
    5. Status: The policy is executive and not statutory, so it carries no enforcement mechanism and departments comply selectively.

    What is a Joint Parliamentary Committee?

    1. About: It is an ad hoc committee constituted by a motion adopted in one House and concurred in by the other, carrying members from both Houses.
    2. Function: It examines a specific Bill or subject, takes evidence from officials, experts and the public, and reports its recommendations to Parliament.
    3. Composition: Membership is proportional to party strength, which gives the ruling party a majority within the committee.
    4. Binding force: Its recommendations are advisory, and the government may accept or reject them when the Bill returns to the House.

    What is delimitation?

    1. About: It is the redrawing of the boundaries and the allocation of parliamentary and Assembly constituencies to reflect population change.
    2. Machinery: A Delimitation Commission constituted under a law made by Parliament carries it out, and its orders cannot be called in question in any court.
    3. The freeze: The 42nd Amendment froze seat allocation on the 1971 Census, and the 84th Amendment, 2001 extended that freeze until the first Census taken after 2026.
    4. Why it is contested: States that reduced fertility fastest stand to lose relative weight in the Lok Sabha once the freeze lapses, which makes the design of the exercise a federal question.

    What is the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 2010?

    1. About: It regulates the acceptance and use of foreign contributions and foreign hospitality by persons, associations and companies in India.
    2. Mechanism: It requires registration or prior permission from the Ministry of Home Affairs, and after the 2020 amendment every contribution must first be received in a designated State Bank of India, New Delhi account.
    3. Restrictions: The 2020 amendment barred the transfer of foreign contributions to any other person and capped administrative expenses at 20 per cent.
    4. Why it recurs: Cancellations and refusals of renewal have repeatedly been challenged as a control on civil society rather than a check on funding.

    How is parliamentary productivity measured?

    1. About: It is the ratio of the time a House actually transacts its listed business to the time for which it was scheduled to sit.
    2. What lowers it: Adjournments caused by disruption, sittings cut short, and business dropped without being taken up.
    3. What it does not capture: A Bill passed in minutes without discussion raises legislative output while reducing scrutiny, so productivity and deliberation can move in opposite directions.

    What did the monsoon session pass and what did it leave pending?

    1. Session dates: The session began on 20 July.
    2. Volume and debate: Nine of the eleven Bills passed had only the minister concerned speaking on them.
    3. Productivity: The session recorded a productivity rate of 15 per cent.
    4. National song Bill: A Bill was passed facilitating the operation of a February guideline of the Ministry of Home Affairs on mandatory singing of the full version of Vande Mataram, the national song, at state functions.
    5. Mines and minerals: The Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Bill was passed amid Opposition protests.
    6. Examinations: The session legislated stronger measures against malpractices in examinations, in an effort to address student anger.
    7. Delimitation: An attempt to rush through a new architecture for the delimitation process did not entirely materialise.
    8. Foreign contributions: The Bill to amend the law on foreign contributions was not passed and stands referred to a Joint Parliamentary Committee.
    9. Both alive: Neither the delimitation proposal nor the foreign contribution amendments have lapsed, and both can be brought back.

    Why did the session’s political context override its legislative function?

    1. The trigger: The student protest demanding the resignation of the Union Education Minister gathered momentum just as the session began.
    2. The governing party’s expectation: The ruling party entered the session with the context and the confidence to make it a theatre of triumph, powered by its victory in the West Bengal Assembly election.
    3. What reversed it: Public reaction to the crackdown on the protesting students by the Delhi Police, with police personnel filmed assaulting and attempting to sexually abuse young people.
    4. Accountability gap: No accountability has yet been fixed for those blatant violations of the law by police personnel.
    5. Absent leadership: The Prime Minister and the Union Home Minister barely attended the proceedings.
    6. The one resolution: The Union Education Minister eventually resigned during the session.

    What does hurried lawmaking do to federalism?

    1. The specific Bill: The mineral law amendment was passed without addressing its potential to undermine federalism.
    2. Whose rights were skipped: The concerns of those living on resource rich land were not examined during its passage.
    3. The pattern: Hurried lawmaking has accompanied a continuing expansion of the powers of the central government at the cost of States and local communities.
    4. Why deliberation matters here: A Bill that redistributes power between the Union and the States requires the States to be heard, which only committee examination provides.
    5. The missing step: No all party meeting and no consultation with State Chief Ministers preceded either this Bill or the delimitation proposal.

    Why does a single minister speaking on a Bill amount to a scrutiny failure?

    1. What passage then means: The House records its assent without testing the Bill against any competing view or amendment.
    2. Whose loss it is: The electorate is deprived of its representatives’ scrutiny, which is the service a legislature exists to deliver.
    3. Disruption as an alibi: Disruption is routinely blamed, but a 15 per cent productivity rate points to a structural failure rather than an episodic one.
    4. Committee substitution: Referral to a committee is the standard remedy for a truncated floor debate, and it was used for only one of these Bills.
    5. Consequence for the statute: A Bill passed without debate leaves no legislative record from which courts can read its purpose when it is later challenged.

    Is a stalled Bill a win for parliamentary scrutiny?

    1. The case for the Opposition: It prevented passage of the delimitation architecture and the foreign contribution amendments without examination.
    2. The case against triumph: Blocking a Bill is not the same as examining it, and both proposals remain alive for reintroduction on the same terms.
    3. The committee risk: The Joint Parliamentary Committee on the foreign contribution Bill can be reduced to a mere numbers game in which the majority records its own view.
    4. The reversibility point: Political circumstances turn rapidly, as the governing party discovered within this very session.
    5. What is actually needed: An all party meeting, circulation of draft legislation and consultation with State Chief Ministers, none of which a stalling tactic delivers.
    6. The framing error: Treating the House as a gladiatorial arena where one side vanquishes the other removes the possibility of a collective solution.

    What would genuine consultation on these two proposals look like?

    1. All party meeting: The Centre convening a meeting of all parties before introducing the delimitation architecture.
    2. Draft in the public domain: Circulation of the draft legislation so that affected parties can respond before introduction rather than after passage.
    3. Consulting the States: Consultation with State Chief Ministers, since delimitation redistributes representation between States.
    4. Substance in committee: The Joint Parliamentary Committee on the foreign contribution Bill taking evidence from affected organisations rather than voting on party lines.
    5. Transparency of feedback: Publication of the responses received and the reasons for accepting or rejecting each substantive objection.

    Challenges to Parliamentary Scrutiny of Legislation

    1. Falling committee referrals: The share of Bills sent to departmentally related standing committees has collapsed, e.g. about 16 per cent of Bills were referred in the 16th Lok Sabha against 71 per cent in the 15th.
    2. Passage without debate: Bills clear the House in minutes when it is in disorder, e.g. nine of the eleven Bills of this monsoon session were passed with only the minister in charge speaking.
    3. The Money Bill route: Certifying a Bill as a Money Bill removes the Rajya Sabha’s power to amend it, e.g. the Aadhaar Act, 2016, whose certification was referred to a larger Bench in Rojer Mathew v. South Indian Bank (2019).
    4. Ordinance dependence: The executive legislates between sessions and seeks ratification later, e.g. the Supreme Court in Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar (2017) held that repeated re promulgation of ordinances is a fraud on the Constitution.
    5. Shrinking sitting days: The House now sits far fewer days than in its early decades, e.g. average annual sittings have fallen from over 120 days in the 1950s to around 60 days in recent years.
    6. Anti defection chill: The Tenth Schedule ties a member’s vote to the party whip, which removes the incentive to argue a case on the floor, e.g. a member voting against a party direction on a Bill faces disqualification.
    7. No review after enactment: No standing mechanism examines whether an enacted law achieved its stated purpose, e.g. the Pre-Legislative Consultation Policy, 2014 carries no compliance audit and is bypassed routinely.

    Conclusion

    A session that passed nine of eleven Bills with a single speaker each and closed at 15 per cent productivity did not fail merely because of disruption; it failed because passage was decoupled from examination. Blocking two proposals gave the Opposition a tactical result without restoring scrutiny, since both remain available for reintroduction unchanged. What must change is procedure rather than temper: mandatory committee referral, circulation of draft legislation, and consultation with the States before any Bill that alters their powers is introduced.

    What is Executive Accountability to the Legislature?

    1. About: It is the principle that the council of ministers holds office only while it retains the confidence of the popularly elected House and must answer to it for every executive act.
    2. Rationale: In a parliamentary system the executive is drawn from the legislature, so scrutiny by the House is the only continuous check between two elections.
    3. Collective responsibility: Article 75(3) makes the council of ministers collectively responsible to the Lok Sabha, which is the constitutional root of the principle.
    4. Question Hour and Zero Hour: Members question ministers on administrative action, and raise urgent matters without prior notice.
    5. Motions: Adjournment motions, calling attention notices, censure motions and the no confidence motion allow the House to force a discussion or remove the government.
    6. Financial control: Cut motions, the demands for grants, and the Comptroller and Auditor General’s reports examined by the Public Accounts Committee control the executive’s use of money.
    7. Committee scrutiny: Departmentally related standing committees, joint committees and select committees examine Bills, budgets and departmental performance away from the floor.

    Key Concerns Regarding Legislative Oversight

    1. Guillotine on budget scrutiny: Most demands for grants are voted without discussion when the guillotine is applied at the end of the budget session.
    2. Truncated Question Hour: Question Hour is frequently lost to disruption or curtailed by the presiding officer, which removes the routine accountability mechanism.
    3. Committee reports without follow up: Recommendations are advisory, and no mechanism tracks whether the government acted on them.
    4. Weak research support: Individual members lack dedicated legislative research staff to interrogate a technical Bill.
    5. Party control over speech: The whip system converts a member’s vote into a party decision, which removes the incentive to examine a Bill independently.
    6. Declining sittings: Fewer sitting days compress every function of oversight into a shorter window each year.

    Constitutional Framework Governing Parliamentary Lawmaking and Oversight

    1. Article 75(3): Makes the council of ministers collectively responsible to the House of the People.
    2. Article 79: Constitutes Parliament as the President, the Council of States and the House of the People.
    3. Article 85: Requires that six months not elapse between two sittings, and governs prorogation and dissolution.
    4. Article 93: Provides for the Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the House of the People.
    5. Article 100: Governs voting, the quorum of one tenth of the total membership, and the effect of vacancies.
    6. Article 105: Confers freedom of speech in Parliament and the privileges of the Houses and their members.
    7. Article 107: Governs the introduction and passing of Bills in both Houses.
    8. Article 108: Provides for a joint sitting of both Houses to resolve a deadlock over a Bill.
    9. Articles 109 and 110: Define a Money Bill and confine the Rajya Sabha to recommendations on it.
    10. Article 111: Governs assent, withholding of assent and the return of a Bill by the President.
    11. Article 117: Requires the President’s recommendation for financial Bills.
    12. Article 118: Empowers each House to make rules of procedure for the conduct of its business.
    13. Article 122: Bars courts from inquiring into proceedings of Parliament on the ground of irregularity of procedure.
    14. Article 82: Requires readjustment of seats and constituencies after every Census, which is the basis of delimitation.
    15. Article 148: Establishes the Comptroller and Auditor General, whose reports anchor financial oversight.
    16. Tenth Schedule: Provides for disqualification on the ground of defection, which binds a member to the party whip.

    Back2Basics: Parliamentary Committees in India

    1. Constitutional basis: Article 105 and Article 118 supply the privileges and the rule making power under which committees function.
    2. Two broad types: Standing committees, which are permanent and reconstituted every year, and ad hoc committees, which cease to exist once they report.
    3. Financial committees: The Public Accounts Committee, the Estimates Committee and the Committee on Public Undertakings.
    4. Public Accounts Committee: Constituted in 1921, it has 22 members and is chaired by convention by a member of the Opposition.
    5. Departmentally related standing committees: Introduced in 1993, now 24 in number, each with 31 members drawn from both Houses.
    6. Ad hoc committees: Select committees of one House and joint committees of both Houses, constituted to examine a particular Bill or subject.
    7. Nature of reports: Committee recommendations are recommendatory and do not bind the government.
    8. Value of the forum: Committees work outside the glare of the House, which allows cross party agreement that floor debate rarely produces.

    Government Initiatives for Legislative Process and Transparency

    1. Pre-Legislative Consultation Policy, 2014: Requires publication of draft Bills with an explanatory note and a minimum thirty day window for public feedback.
    2. National e-Vidhan Application (NeVA): Makes legislatures paperless by digitising notices, questions, bulletins and Bills for members.
    3. One Nation One Application initiative: Brings all State legislatures and Parliament onto a common digital platform for legislative business.
    4. Digital Sansad: Provides public access to debates, member profiles, questions and legislative documents in searchable form.
    5. Parliamentary Research and Information Support to Members (PRISM): Supplies research responses to members on subjects of their choice through the Parliament Library.
    6. Parliamentary Research and Training Institute for Democracies (PRIDE): Trains members and legislature staff in parliamentary procedure and legislative drafting.

    Key Facts about the Parliament of India

    1. Composition: The President, the Rajya Sabha with a maximum of 250 members and the Lok Sabha with a maximum of 550 members drawn from States and Union Territories.
    2. Sessions: Three sessions each year by convention, namely budget, monsoon and winter, with the six month rule set by Article 85.
    3. Quorum: One tenth of the total membership of the House, under Article 100.
    4. Joint sitting: Provided by Article 108 and used three times, for the Dowry Prohibition Bill in 1961, the Banking Service Commission Repeal Bill in 1978 and the Prevention of Terrorism Bill in 2002.
    5. Departmentally related standing committees: Introduced in 1993 and now numbering 24.
    6. Anti defection law: Introduced by the 52nd Amendment, 1985 through the Tenth Schedule, and amended in 2003 to remove the split exemption.
    7. New building: Parliament shifted to the new building in September 2023, with the Lok Sabha chamber seating 888 members.

    Challenges in Ensuring Legislative Scrutiny in India

    1. Disruption as a strategy: Both sides use disorder to avoid a debate they expect to lose, e.g. the monsoon session of 2026 closed at 15 per cent productivity with the presiding officers unable to restore order.
    2. Budget passed without discussion: The guillotine forces demands for grants through in a single vote, e.g. most ministry demands are guillotined every year with only a handful discussed on the floor.
    3. Weak private member legislation: Private member Bills are rarely taken up and almost never passed, e.g. only fourteen private member Bills have become law since 1952.
    4. Vacancy in the Deputy Speaker’s office: Article 93 requires the post to be filled, and prolonged vacancies weaken the presiding structure, e.g. the office remained vacant through the entire 17th Lok Sabha.
    5. Thin State legislature calendars: Many State Assemblies sit for a fraction of the days Parliament sits, e.g. several State Assemblies have recorded fewer than twenty sitting days in a year.
    6. Limited member capacity: Members lack dedicated legislative staff to examine technical Bills, e.g. a data protection or nuclear liability Bill reaches the floor with no independent member analysis available.
    7. Delayed committee constitution: Committees are reconstituted late in the parliamentary year, which shortens the time available to examine Bills referred to them.

    Way Forward

    1. Mandatory referral rule: Amend the rules of procedure so that every Bill stands referred to a committee unless the House expressly resolves otherwise, with reasons recorded.
    2. Statutory pre legislative consultation: Convert the 2014 policy into a binding requirement, with introduction barred until the consultation summary is tabled.
    3. Fixed legislative calendar: Adopt a minimum number of sitting days each year, fixed in advance, so that the executive cannot compress the session.
    4. Independent scheduling authority: Vest the power to convene sittings in a business advisory committee rather than in the executive alone.
    5. Automatic budget scrutiny: Require at least a fixed number of ministries’ demands to be discussed before the guillotine can be applied.
    6. Action taken discipline: Require the government to table a reasoned response to every committee recommendation within a fixed period.
    7. Strengthen member research: Fund dedicated legislative research staff for members and expand the Parliament Library’s analytical output on pending Bills.
    8. Federal consultation before federal Bills: Institutionalise consultation with State Chief Ministers through the Inter State Council before any Bill that alters State powers is introduced.

    “[2021, GS2, 10 marks] To what extent, in your view, the Parliament is able to ensure accountability of the executive in India?”

  • To what extent, in your view, the Parliament is able to ensure accountability of the executive in India?

    The Parliament of India is the supreme instrument of democratic accountability. Under Article 75(3) of the Constitution, the Council of Ministers is collectively responsible to the Lok Sabha

    Parliament ensuring accountability of the executive

    Question Hour – Enables MPs to question ministers and expose administrative lapses

    Zero Hour – Allows MPs to raise urgent matters of public importance without prior notice.

    Adjournment and Censure Motions – Hold the executive accountable on specific issues of public or national concern.

    No-Confidence Motion – Tests the majority support of the government and can lead to its fall if lost.

    Budgetary Control (Articles 112-114)power of the purse by approving or rejecting demands for grants.

    Cut Motions to reduce or disapprove government expenditure, signalling disapproval of policy.

    Parliamentary Committees

    Public Accounts Committee (PAC) – Examines CAG reports and ensures post-audit accountability (e.g., 2G and coal scam scrutiny).

    Estimates Committee – Evaluates government expenditure efficiency.

    DRSCs) in-depth scrutiny of ministries.

    Joint Parliamentary Committees (JPCs) – Eg- Waqf Amendment Bill

    Parliamentary Privileges – Allow MPs to speak freely and fearlessly, enhancing deliberative accountability.

    Issues with parliamentary form of government

    Decline in the number of sittings- The 17th Lok Sabha sat for only 55 days

    Frequent Disruptions and Adjournments due to protests and unruly behavior, leading to wasted time and resources.

    Low Productivity- Eg- the 2023 winter session saw significant disruptions, resulting in the suspension of over 140 MPs and hindering legislative business.

    Inadequate Discussion- 58% of the Bills were passed within two weeks of their introduction in 17th LS. Eg- J&K Reorganisation Bill, 2019, and the Women’s Reservation Bill, 2023 were passed within two days

    About 31% of the total functioning time in Lok Sabha, and 32% in Rajya Sabha was spent on discussions other than legislation and budgets. Eg- President’s Address to Parliament, matters of public importance, and trust votes.

    Between 2019 and 2023, about 80% of the Budget was passed without discussion, and in 2023, the entire Budget was approved without debate.

    Rise Legislation through Ordinances bypassing the usual legislative process.

    Along with ‘maximum governance, there needs to be ‘maximum accountability’, which must start with an empowered and effective Parliament.

  • “The growth of cabinet system has practically resulted in the marginalisation of the parliamentary supremacy.” Elucidate.

    The Cabinet system, a legacy of the British parliamentary model, is based on the principle of collective responsibility of the executive to the Legislature. However, the growth of the Cabinet system has concentrated power in the hands of the Prime Minister and Council of Ministers.

    Cabinet System Marginalising Parliamentary Supremacy

    Party Whip curtails independence of MPs, limiting free deliberation.

    Ordinance Power (Articles 123 & 213) bypasses legislative scrutiny.

    Prime Ministerial Supremacy due to centralisation of authority in PMO.

    Decline of Private Members’ Bills – The last such Bill was passed in 1970.

    Weak Legislative Scrutiny – Increasing absenteeism, fewer sittings, and guillotining of Demands for Grants.

    Decline of parliamentary Committees have weakened executive accountability.

    Coalition Politics results in bargaining politics instead of genuine legislative oversight.

    However, parliamentary control over executive can also be seen

    Executive Accountabilitycollective responsibility to Parliament under Article 75(3).

    Financial OversightFinance committees scrutinise government expenditure. Eg- PAC review of GST framework

    Budgetary Control (Art. 112) through Demands for Grants, and Appropriation Acts.

    Opposition’s Role – Eg- Farm Laws withdrawal.

    Role in Foreign Policy – Eg- debate on Civil Nuclear Deal with the US.

    Way Forward

    Publish Annual Parliamentary Calendar (NCRWC)

    Adopt Shadow Cabinet Model of UK, to institutionalise constructive opposition oversight.

    Allocate fixed time for Private Members’ Bills and Questions.

    Mandatory referral of Bill to Committees (UK system)

    “Parliament is the keystone of the democratic arch.” – Harold Laski

    For a resilient democracy, Parliament must function as the centre of deliberation and control, not as a department of the executive.