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Subject: Finance/Capital Market

  • Derivatives trader base falls for first time in four years in FY26

    Why in the News

    The number of individual traders participating in the equity derivatives market fell 19% to 78.6 lakh in 2025-26 from 98.1 lakh a year earlier, according to data released by the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) on 20 August 2026. A smaller market has not turned into a safer one, since the average loss carried by each loss-making trader rose to its highest level since the analysis began.

    What are equity derivatives?

    1. About: Equity derivatives are contracts whose value is derived from an underlying share or share index, settled at or before a stated expiry date rather than by delivery of the underlying at the time of trade.
    2. Futures and options: A futures contract obliges both sides to transact at an agreed price on expiry. An option gives the buyer the right without the obligation, in exchange for a premium paid upfront.
    3. Why losses concentrate here: A small premium controls a large notional exposure, so a modest adverse price move can erase the entire amount committed.
    4. Contract value: Each contract carries a minimum notional value fixed by the regulator, which sets the smallest position an individual can take.

    What is the extreme loss margin?

    1. About: The extreme loss margin is an additional margin collected over and above the standard margin, calibrated to cover losses outside the range that normal margining assumes.
    2. How it was used here: SEBI increased the extreme loss margin for expiry-day trading by 2%, raising the cost of holding a position on the day price movement is sharpest.

    What is a weekly expiry?

    1. About: A weekly expiry is a contract that settles at the end of a given week rather than at the end of a month, which multiplies the number of short-dated, low-premium contracts available to trade.
    2. How it was restricted: SEBI limited weekly expiries to one index per exchange, cutting the number of high-turnover expiry events in a week.

    What do SEBI’s two studies show about participation and losses?

    1. Participation: The individual trader base fell 19% to 78.6 lakh in 2025-26 from 98.1 lakh in 2024-25, the first fall in four years, against 42.74 lakh in 2021-22 when the analysis began.
    2. Share of losing traders: The proportion of traders who incurred losses declined marginally to 87.7% in 2025-26 from 90.9% in 2024-25, the lowest level recorded since 2021-22.
    3. Aggregate losses: Aggregate losses fell 18% year-on-year to Rs 91,685 crore in 2025-26, and still remained higher than the levels recorded between 2021-22 and 2023-24.
    4. Loss per trader: The average loss per loss-making trader rose to Rs 1.16 lakh from Rs 1.13 lakh in 2024-25, the highest average loss recorded since 2021-22.
    5. Who remains the largest cohort: Individual traders continued to account for the largest cohort in the derivatives market despite the decline in participation.
    6. What the studies are: The two studies cover the profitability and the trading behaviour of individual derivatives traders, and were released on 20 August 2026 by SEBI’s Department of Economic and Policy Analysis II.

    Why does a smaller trader base not amount to a safer market?

    1. The averages moved in opposite directions: Aggregate losses fell 18% while the average loss per loss-making trader rose to a five-year high, so the burden concentrated rather than eased.
    2. The improvement in the loss ratio is marginal: A fall from 90.9% to 87.7% still leaves close to nine in ten participants losing money.
    3. The remaining participants are the more exposed ones: Those who stayed after the curbs are the traders willing to meet a higher minimum contract value and a higher expiry-day margin.
    4. Aggregate losses are still above the pre-boom level: Even after an 18% decline, losses in 2025-26 exceeded the levels recorded between 2021-22 and 2023-24.

    What explains the fall in participation?

    1. Fewer weekly expiry events: SEBI limited weekly expiries to one index per exchange, removing several of the short-dated contracts that carried the highest retail turnover.
    2. A higher entry ticket: The minimum contract value was raised to Rs 15 lakh to Rs 20 lakh, which prices out the smallest participants.
    3. A costlier expiry day: The extreme loss margin for expiry-day trading was increased by 2%, raising the capital required to hold the most volatile positions.
    4. The regulator’s own caveat: SEBI cautioned against attributing the decline entirely to the regulatory measures, stating that participation had already begun moderating before their implementation.

    What does the persistence data reveal about trader behaviour?

    1. Losses do not by themselves deter continuation: The second study found that incurring losses did not necessarily discourage traders from continuing to participate in derivatives.
    2. Persistence weakened this year: Only about 57% of the traders who formed the 2024-25 cohort continued trading in 2025-26, against a long-term average of around 65%.
    3. Nearly half stopped: 43% of that cohort stopped trading during the year.
    4. Experience does not improve outcomes: In 2023-24, 91.6% of traders who had reported losses in both 2021-22 and 2022-23 also reported losses in 2023-24.
    5. The probability holds across the experience range: The probability of making losses remained above 90% across traders with one to five years of experience.

    What challenges does retail investor protection in the derivatives market face?

    1. Curbs raise the entry price without changing the odds: A higher minimum contract value screens out small participants rather than improving the outcomes of those who remain. Eg. The probability of making losses stayed above 90% across traders with one to five years of experience.
    2. Losses do not teach: Repeated loss-making does not reliably drive exit, so a behavioural remedy cannot be assumed. Eg. 91.6% of traders who lost money in both 2021-22 and 2022-23 lost money again in 2023-24.
    3. Unregistered advisers and finfluencers: Trading advice reaches retail participants through channels outside the registered investment adviser framework. Eg. SEBI has issued repeated orders against unregistered persons offering stock recommendations on social media platforms.
    4. Migration to unregulated venues: Tightening a regulated segment can push activity to opaque alternatives rather than out of speculation altogether. Eg. SEBI and the Reserve Bank of India have repeatedly warned against unauthorised electronic trading platforms offering leveraged contracts.
    5. Exchange revenue tied to the volumes being curbed: Transaction charges and the derivatives segment are a significant part of exchange income, which creates a tension with tighter product rules. Eg. Weekly index expiries generated the highest turnover days on Indian exchanges before being limited to one index per exchange.
    6. Investor grievance redress capacity: Losses from a legitimate but unsuitable product are not a grievance, so the redress machinery does not reach the harm being measured. Eg. Aggregate losses of Rs 91,685 crore in 2025-26 arose from lawful transactions on regulated exchanges.
    7. Measurement lag on a fast-moving market: Behaviour is analysed a full financial year after it occurs, so remedies address a market that has already changed. Eg. The studies released in August 2026 report on the year ended March 2026.

    “[2025] Consider the following statements:

    I. India accounts for a very large portion of all equity option contracts traded globally, thus exhibiting a great boom.

    II. India’s stock market has grown rapidly in the recent past, even overtaking Hong Kong’s at some point in time.

    III. There is no regulatory body either to warn small investors about the risks of options trading or to act on unregistered financial advisors in this regard.

    Which of the statements given above are correct?

    (a) I and II only

    (b) II and III only

    (c) I and III only

    (d) I, II and III

  • SEBI’s Closing Auction Session: Better Price Discovery, and the First Manipulation Case

    Why in the News

    The Closing Auction Session (CAS), introduced by the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) on 3 August 2026 to replace the average based method of fixing stock market closing prices, has raised mutual fund participation from 5% to 7% earlier to 25%. Within ten days of launch the regulator imposed a Rs 3.7 crore penalty on two entities for manipulating the same window, which exposes the trade off at the centre of the reform, that concentrating price discovery into a single transparent auction also concentrates the target for manipulation.

    How does the Closing Auction Session work?

    1. A fixed auction window: CAS is an official 20 minute auction held between 3:15 p.m. and 3:35 p.m., during which the exchange collects buy and sell orders from participants instead of executing continuous trades.
    2. A blind auction: Participants cannot see the full order book during the window, which prevents an order placed at the last instant from being priced against a visible book.
    3. Matching at the equilibrium price: At the end of the window all orders are matched at a single equilibrium price, defined as the price at which the maximum number of shares can be traded.
    4. Deferred execution: In contrast to continuous trading, where bids and offers match instantly, an auction can only result in a trade after the exchange ends it, which allows more time for supply and demand to find a new equilibrium.

    What is the Volume Weighted Average Price?

    1. An average of executed trades: The Volume Weighted Average Price (VWAP) is the average price of trades executed over a defined period, weighted by the quantity traded at each price, and it was the basis on which exchanges earlier fixed the closing price from the last 30 minutes of continuous trading.
    2. Why an average is vulnerable: Because it averages trades that have already happened, a few large trades placed at the end of the period can pull the average disproportionately without any change in the underlying supply and demand.

    What is order imbalance?

    1. The gap between buy and sell interest: Order imbalance is the gap between cumulative buy quantity and cumulative sell quantity at different price levels within the auction, and a low imbalance indicates that the discovered price represents a more stable consensus.

    What is tracking error?

    1. Deviation of a fund from its benchmark: Tracking error is the extent to which an index fund's or exchange traded fund's return diverges from the return of the index it is meant to replicate, and it widens when the closing price used to value the fund differs from the price at which the index is computed.

    Why did SEBI replace the VWAP based closing price?

    1. The closing price is a reference, not a number: The closing price of a security is used for portfolio valuation, index computation, derivative settlement, mutual fund net asset value calculation and institutional investment decisions, so it must reflect the expectations of both buyers and sellers.
    2. The old method's weakness: Exchanges determined the closing price largely through the VWAP of trades in the last 30 minutes of continuous trading, and a few large last minute trades could disproportionately affect the final average, creating the possibility of price distortion.
    3. When distortion was worst: The vulnerability was concentrated on large event days, specifically index rebalancing days and derivative expiry days, when order flow is heavily one sided.
    4. The measured evidence: For NIFTY 50 stocks, volatility in the last half hour exceeded the volatility observed between 09:15 and 14:30 by 1.8 times on MSCI index rebalancing days and by 1.5 times on FTSE index rebalancing days in 2024.
    5. The conceptual shift: CAS converts closing price determination from passive averaging of past trades into dynamic demand and supply discovery, and reduces price noise while improving the information efficiency of Indian equity markets.
    6. The regulatory gain: The SEBI Chairperson stated that CAS provides the regulator with greater capability to identify manipulation than the earlier VWAP based system.

    What does the spread of closing auctions across major exchanges establish about the model?

    1. The peer group: With this move the National Stock Exchange and the Bombay Stock Exchange have joined NASDAQ, the New York Stock Exchange, the London Stock Exchange, Euronext, the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, Singapore Exchange, the Tokyo Stock Exchange and the Australian Securities Exchange, all of which fix closing prices by auction.
    2. United States, NASDAQ Closing Cross: A single price auction at the close that publishes indicative closing prices and order imbalance information in the minutes before the cross, so that participants can supply liquidity against a visible imbalance.
    3. United States, New York Stock Exchange Closing Auction: Designated Market Makers publish imbalance information before the close and are obliged to offset residual imbalance, which places an accountable intermediary inside the auction.
    4. United Kingdom, London Stock Exchange: A closing auction with a randomised end to the uncrossing phase, so that no participant can time an order to the exact final instant.
    5. Hong Kong Stock Exchange: Reintroduced its Closing Auction Session in 2016 with price limits and a random closing period, after an earlier version launched in 2008 was suspended in 2009 following manipulation concerns, which is the closest precedent for India's present position.
    6. Japan, Tokyo Stock Exchange: Uses the Itayose single price call auction method to determine the closing price, matching all eligible orders at one price.
    7. Australian Securities Exchange: Runs a single price closing auction with a randomised start, again to defeat last instant order timing.
    8. What the set demonstrates: Closing auctions were initially adopted to achieve efficient price discovery and have since become a liquidity event in their own right, with the volume share of closing auctions increasing across both Europe and America.

    Who gains from a cleaner closing price?

    1. Passive funds first: India's passive funds, which have expanded from a relatively small base to a multi crore asset base driven by exchange traded funds and index funds, are likely to be the biggest beneficiaries initially, because they depend on accurate closing prices to replicate benchmarks.
    2. Mutual funds have already moved: The SEBI Chairperson stated that mutual funds' participation rate in CAS has risen sharply to 25%, compared with 5% to 7% earlier.
    3. Large orders execute without leaking information: The auction allows large investors to participate anonymously and execute at a commonly discovered price, which reduces information leakage and the price impact that usually accompanies large orders placed close to market closing time.
    4. Foreign institutional capital: Foreign investors managing billions of dollars prefer markets with predictable closing mechanisms, so aligning India with international practice can improve institutional inflows into Indian equities.
    5. Better execution technology: Execution algorithms that analyse order imbalance, liquidity patterns and equilibrium prices push Indian markets toward institutional quality trading practices.
    6. A stronger valuation benchmark: A well functioning CAS makes the closing price a stronger valuation benchmark by incorporating the bid spread, order imbalance, liquidity and investor conviction, rather than only executed trade prices.

    Does concentrating price discovery into one window reduce manipulation or relocate it?

    1. The case that it reduces manipulation: Matching at a single equilibrium price with a blind order book removes the ability of a few late trades to pull an average, and the regulator gains a complete record of every order placed and cancelled inside the window.
    2. The case that it relocates manipulation: Concentrating the entire closing price determination into 20 minutes creates one high value target, and the first enforcement action arrived within ten days of launch.
    3. The evidence for the second reading: The alleged manipulation involved placing very large orders and cancelling them within seconds, a technique that works precisely because the auction aggregates orders before matching them.
    4. What actually changed: The manipulation did not disappear, it became visible, since the regulator could identify the pattern from the order and cancellation record in a way the VWAP system did not permit.
    5. The unresolved part: Detection after the event does not prevent the closing price on that day from being distorted, and the closing price then flows into index computation, net asset values and derivative settlement before the enforcement order is issued.

    What did SEBI's first CAS manipulation order find?

    1. The penalty and the entities: SEBI imposed a penalty of Rs 3.7 crore on Copthall Mauritius Investment Ltd. and Mansi Share and Stock Broking Private Ltd. and barred them from the market for allegedly manipulating trades during the CAS.
    2. The date and the context: The alleged violations occurred on 13 August 2026, the day on which weekly derivative contracts linked to the Sensex expired.
    3. The reference price rule: SEBI fixes the maximum permitted deviation from the reference price at 3% within the CAS.
    4. The buy side conduct: One entity placed large buy orders constituting at least 85% of all buy orders made in the minutes before the Sensex closed, all of them above the 3% deviation mark, and simultaneously cancelled its latest buy order.
    5. The sell side conduct: The other entity placed large sell orders across eight Sensex constituents totalling about 12.65 lakh shares, of which more than seven lakh shares were placed 2.5% below the reference price and 4.6 lakh shares below 1%, and cancelled them within four to five seconds.
    6. The alleged effect: The manipulation led to three price spikes.
    7. The alleged motive: SEBI's preliminary findings state that placing and then cancelling these large buy and sell orders allowed the noticees to avoid losses or wrongfully profit from positions in derivative trades that would otherwise have expired worthless.
    8. The stage of proceedings: The noticees have been given 21 days to respond to the interim order.
    9. The regulator's stated posture: The SEBI Chairperson stated that anyone manipulating the CAS would face strict and immediate action, that CAS exists for transparency, and that those who think they can manipulate CAS in order to discredit it are mistaken.

    Challenges to the Closing Auction Session

    1. Cash and derivative markets close at different times: Cash market closing prices are set through CAS while equity derivatives continue trading beyond the window, creating a temporary gap between spot and futures prices. e.g. on Sensex weekly expiry days the mismatch is largest, and it was on the 13 August 2026 expiry that the first manipulation case arose.
    2. Arbitrage strategies lose their reference: Arbitrage traders who price the spot against the future cannot do so cleanly when one leg is settled by auction and the other by continuous trading. e.g. cash and carry arbitrage positions built on a VWAP close now carry an unhedged residual through the auction window.
    3. Algorithmic and institutional models were built on the old mechanism: Institutional traders and algorithmic firms must rebuild strategies that assumed a VWAP based close, factoring in auction imbalances, indicative prices and real time order flow. e.g. SEBI itself stated that the problem is a lack of understanding, because algorithms and other players historically based their models on the old mechanism.
    4. Index levels jumped across the auction in early sessions: Participants raised concerns over the sharp difference between index levels recorded before CAS and after the auction on the first two trading days, though SEBI ruled out foul play. e.g. this gap appeared immediately after the 3 August 2026 launch, before participation had stabilised.
    5. Illiquid securities cannot generate a representative price: The efficiency of CAS depends on sufficient order participation, and in less liquid securities limited buy and sell orders may produce a closing price that does not represent broader market sentiment. e.g. this is why the mechanism was launched only for stocks with futures and options contracts rather than the whole cash market.
    6. Retail investors do not recognise the new closing price: For many retail investors the closing price has traditionally meant the last traded price or a VWAP figure, so intraday traders and derivative participants may find the auction price confusing. e.g. an investor comparing a broker application's last traded price with the official closing price on the same screen sees two different numbers.
    7. Order cancellation is a manipulation channel the auction structure enables: Large orders placed to shift the indicative equilibrium and then withdrawn before matching are the classic auction manipulation technique. e.g. the 13 August 2026 case involved sell orders cancelled within four to five seconds of being placed.
    8. The 3% deviation band can itself be gamed: A cap on deviation from the reference price becomes a target that orders cluster against rather than a limit they respect. e.g. all of the buy orders in the first enforcement case were placed above the 3% deviation mark.
    9. Derivative expiry concentration magnifies the stake: Restricting the number of weekly expiries per exchange concentrated open interest into fewer expiry days, so the value riding on a single closing price rose. e.g. the alleged manipulation was targeted at derivative positions that would otherwise have expired worthless.
    10. Enforcement is after the fact: An interim order issued days later cannot restore a distorted closing price that has already flowed into net asset values, index levels and settlement. e.g. the Rs 3.7 crore order came with a 21 day response window, long after the 13 August settlement had been completed.

    Conclusion

    CAS replaces a passively computed average with an actively discovered equilibrium, and on the evidence of the first three weeks it is working as intended, with mutual fund participation quadrupling and the regulator able to reconstruct manipulation from the order record in a way the VWAP system did not allow. What the first enforcement case shows is that the reform relocates manipulation rather than eliminating it, moving it from a diffuse 30 minute average into a concentrated 20 minute auction where it is more consequential but also more visible. The correct test of the mechanism is not the volatility of its first fortnight but measurable improvement in market quality, specifically lower tracking errors, reduced closing price variance, narrower spreads, improved liquidity and stronger price efficiency.

    India's Securities Market

    1. What it is: The securities market is the set of institutions through which companies and governments raise capital by issuing securities and through which those securities are subsequently traded, valued and settled.
    2. Two segments: The primary market handles fresh issuance through public offers and private placements, while the secondary market handles trading of already issued securities on exchanges.
    3. Regulatory architecture: SEBI regulates the securities market, the RBI regulates the government securities and money markets, and the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority of India and the Pension Fund Regulatory and Development Authority regulate the institutional investors that participate in it.
    4. Two national exchanges: The Bombay Stock Exchange, established in 1875, is Asia's oldest stock exchange, and the National Stock Exchange, which began operations in 1994, introduced screen based nationwide electronic trading.
    5. Global standing in derivatives: India accounts for a very large share of equity option contracts traded globally, and the National Stock Exchange has ranked as the world's largest derivatives exchange by number of contracts traded for several consecutive years.
    6. Dematerialised holding: Securities are held in electronic form through two depositories, the National Securities Depository Limited and the Central Depository Services Limited, established under the Depositories Act, 1996.
    7. Settlement cycle: India moved to a T plus 1 settlement cycle for all listed equities by January 2023, becoming one of the first large markets to do so, and has since introduced an optional same day settlement segment.
    8. Rising retail and passive participation: Growth in demat account openings, systematic investment plans and index linked products has made passive funds a structurally important source of demand, which is why the accuracy of the closing price now carries system wide consequences.
    9. Investor protection funds: Exchanges maintain Investor Protection Funds and SEBI operates an Investor Protection and Education Fund funded partly from disgorged amounts and penalties.

    Laws and Rules Governing India's Securities Market

    1. Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992: Constitutes SEBI as a statutory body and gives it the powers to protect investor interests, promote market development and regulate the securities market.
    2. Section 11 confers the general power to regulate, and Section 11B the power to issue directions, including the interim orders under which market access is barred.
    3. Section 15HA provides the penalty for fraudulent and unfair trade practices, and Section 15J sets the factors for determining the quantum of penalty.
    4. Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956: Governs the recognition and regulation of stock exchanges, the definition of securities and the listing of securities.
    5. Securities Contracts (Regulation) Rules, 1957: Prescribe minimum public shareholding requirements and the conditions for continued listing.
    6. Depositories Act, 1996: Provides for the dematerialisation of securities and the constitution and regulation of depositories and depository participants.
    7. Companies Act, 2013: Governs public issues, prospectus disclosure, related party transactions and corporate governance obligations of listed companies.
    8. SEBI (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices relating to Securities Market) Regulations, 2003: Prohibit manipulative and deceptive devices, including placing orders with no intention of executing them, which is the provision under which order and cancellation manipulation is pursued.
    9. SEBI (Prohibition of Insider Trading) Regulations, 2015: Prohibit trading on unpublished price sensitive information and require listed companies to maintain structured digital databases of such information.
    10. SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015: Fix continuous disclosure, board composition and related party approval requirements for listed entities.
    11. SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) Regulations, 2011: Govern open offers on acquisition of control or of specified shareholding thresholds.
    12. SEBI (Intermediaries) Regulations, 2008: Govern registration and conduct of brokers, merchant bankers and other intermediaries, under which broking entities are proceeded against.
    13. Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002: Applies know your customer and beneficial ownership obligations to market intermediaries and foreign portfolio investors.

    Key Facts about SEBI and India's Exchanges

    1. CAS was launched on 3 August 2026, initially for stocks having futures and options contracts, and runs from 3:15 p.m. to 3:35 p.m.
    2. SEBI fixes the maximum deviation from the reference price within the CAS at 3%.
    3. Mutual fund participation in CAS rose to 25% from 5% to 7% earlier within the first weeks of operation.
    4. SEBI released its study on retail and non retail participation in the derivatives market for 2025-26 on 20 August 2026.
    5. An earlier SEBI study flagged that over 90% of trades by retail investors in the derivatives segment resulted in losses.
    6. SEBI's measures to curb excessive derivatives volatility include increasing lot sizes and limiting the number of expiries per exchange, while the Union Budget raised the Securities Transaction Tax on the segment.
    7. SEBI was established as a non statutory body in April 1988 and given statutory status by the SEBI Act, 1992 with effect from 30 January 1992.
    8. SEBI's headquarters is at the Bandra Kurla Complex in Mumbai, with regional offices in New Delhi, Kolkata, Chennai and Ahmedabad.
    9. Appeals against SEBI orders lie to the Securities Appellate Tribunal, and from there to the Supreme Court on a question of law.
    10. National Investors' Day, marking investor awareness, and the Investor Protection and Education Fund are both instruments through which SEBI discharges its investor protection mandate.

    Back2Basics: Securities and Exchange Board of India

    1. Governing Act: Constituted under the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992.
    2. Year established: Set up as an administrative body in April 1988 and given statutory powers with effect from 30 January 1992.
    3. Administrative ministry: Functions under the Department of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finance.
    4. Threefold mandate: To protect the interests of investors in securities, to promote the development of the securities market, and to regulate the securities market.
    5. Composition: A Chairperson, two members from among officials of the Union Ministries dealing with finance and law, one member from the RBI, and five other members appointed by the Union Government, of whom at least three are whole time members.
    6. Appointment: The Chairperson and members are appointed by the Union Government, and the Chairperson can be removed only on the grounds specified in the Act.
    7. Jurisdiction: Covers stock exchanges, depositories, brokers, merchant bankers, mutual funds, foreign portfolio investors, credit rating agencies, listed companies and investment advisers.
    8. Quasi legislative power: Frames regulations binding on all market participants without requiring prior parliamentary approval, subject to laying before Parliament.
    9. Quasi judicial power: Conducts inquiries, passes interim and final orders, imposes monetary penalties, bars entities from the market and orders disgorgement of unlawful gains.
    10. Quasi executive power: Investigates, conducts search and seizure with the approval of a designated court, and calls for records from any person associated with the securities market.
    11. Appellate route: Its orders are appealable to the Securities Appellate Tribunal, a statutory tribunal constituted under the same Act.

    Challenges in India's Securities Market

    1. Retail losses concentrated in derivatives: Retail participation has grown fastest in the segment where retail outcomes are worst. e.g. a SEBI study found that over 90% of trades by retail investors in the futures and options segment led to losses.
    2. Speed advantage of co-located algorithmic trading: Firms with exchange co-located servers execute in fractions of the time available to other participants, raising questions of unequal access. e.g. the National Stock Exchange co-location matter, in which SEBI passed disgorgement orders, ran for years before resolution.
    3. Manipulation in small and mid cap counters: Thin float and low liquidity make price manipulation cheap in smaller listed companies. e.g. SEBI's action against Dhenu Buildcon Infra Ltd. for allegedly creating a Rs 1,000 crore unsecured loan through 46 transactions over eight days and converting part of it into equity through preferential allotment, leaving six entities with 99.70% of outstanding equity.
    4. Unregistered investment advice through digital channels: Social media based tip providers operate outside the registered investment adviser framework. e.g. SEBI has repeatedly issued orders against finfluencers running paid advisory channels without registration.
    5. Enforcement timelines outrun market timelines: Investigation, interim order, final order and appeal can take years while the price effect is realised in minutes. e.g. an interim order carrying a 21 day response window is issued after the affected settlement is complete.
    6. Corporate governance failures at listed entities: Related party transactions and fund diversion continue to surface after the fact. e.g. the Central Bureau of Investigation registered a case against Gensol Engineering Limited, Gensol EV Lease Limited and their promoters for allegedly causing a loss of Rs 672.74 crore to the Indian Renewable Energy Development Agency Limited.
    7. Concentration risk from passive investing: As index funds grow, index inclusion and rebalancing decisions move prices independently of company fundamentals. e.g. volatility on MSCI and FTSE rebalancing days for NIFTY 50 stocks ran 1.8 times and 1.5 times the normal session volatility in 2024.
    8. Cross border and offshore derivative exposure: Positions built through offshore derivative instruments and foreign entities complicate beneficial ownership tracing. e.g. the first CAS manipulation order named a Mauritius domiciled investment entity.
    9. Investor grievance redress capacity: The volume of complaints from a rapidly widening retail base outpaces the capacity of the online dispute resolution and grievance mechanisms. e.g. the SCORES platform and the Online Dispute Resolution portal were both introduced in response to backlogs rather than in anticipation of them.

    Way Forward

    1. Align the derivative and cash market close: Extend an auction based or reference linked close to the derivatives segment, so that the spot and futures legs settle against a consistent price and the expiry day arbitrage gap closes.
    2. Publish indicative equilibrium prices and imbalance during the window: Adopt the NASDAQ and New York Stock Exchange practice of disseminating indicative prices and order imbalance, so that participants can supply liquidity against a visible imbalance rather than trade blind.
    3. Randomise the auction close: Follow the London Stock Exchange and Australian Securities Exchange practice of a randomised uncrossing moment, so that an order timed to the final instant cannot determine the outcome.
    4. Penalise order and cancellation patterns directly: Frame an explicit order to trade ratio and cancellation threshold for the auction window, so that placing large orders with no intention of execution is actionable on the pattern itself rather than only on proof of derivative gain.
    5. Phase the extension to illiquid securities: Extend CAS beyond futures and options eligible stocks only where a minimum order participation threshold is demonstrated, so that thin counters are not given a closing price that no consensus supports.
    6. Run a structured transition programme for algorithmic participants: Publish auction microstructure documentation and offer a simulated environment, since the regulator has itself identified model dependence on the old mechanism as the core adjustment problem.
    7. Invest in retail investor communication: Explain through exchange and broker interfaces why the last traded price and the official closing price now differ, so that the change does not itself become a source of mistrust.
    8. Publish a market quality dashboard: Report tracking error, closing price variance, bid ask spreads and auction liquidity on a rolling basis, so that CAS is evaluated on the metrics the reform was designed to improve rather than on daily volatility.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025] Consider the following statements: I. India accounts for a very large portion of all equity option contracts traded globally, thus exhibiting a great boom. II. India's stock market has grown rapidly in the recent past, even overtaking Hong Kong's at some point in time. III. There is no regulatory body either to warn small investors about the risks of options trading or to act on unregistered financial advisors in this regard. Which of the statements given above are correct? (a) I and II only (b) II and III only (c) I and III only (d) I, II and III Answer: (a)”

  • What’s behind the vault of India’s gold exchange

    Why in the News?

    India’s gold exchange ecosystem, built on Electronic Gold Receipts (EGR), now sits at the centre of how Indians hold and trade gold. The shift exposes a tension between gold as a physical, trust based asset and a dematerialised, exchange traded instrument.

    What is an Electronic Gold Receipt?

    • Definition: An Electronic Gold Receipt (EGR) is a Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) regulated digital security representing actual physical gold stored in secure, accredited vaults.
    • Purpose: EGRs let investors buy, sell, and trade gold on exchanges such as the National Stock Exchange of India (NSE) and the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE), without holding physical metal at home.

    How does an Electronic Gold Receipt actually work?

    • Vaulting: A depositor delivers physical gold to a SEBI accredited vault manager, who verifies purity and weight.
    • Dematerialisation: The vault manager issues an EGR, a dematerialised instrument representing the deposited gold. It is credited to the depositor’s demat account.
    • Exchange trading: The EGR then trades on the gold exchange like a security, separating the instrument’s liquidity from the physical gold’s custody.
    • Fungibility: Standardised purity and weight bands let EGRs from different depositors trade interchangeably, making the exchange function like a market rather than a set of individual claims.

    What problem does this solve that physical gold trading could not?

    • Price discovery: A centralised exchange produces a transparent, real time domestic gold price instead of fragmented jeweller quotes.
    • Storage risk: Vault custody by regulated managers removes the theft and storage burden from individual holders.
    • Import dependence: A liquid domestic exchange gives India a reference price less dependent on London or Dubai benchmarks.
    • Quality assurance: Mandatory purity verification and standardised weight bands remove the adulteration risk common in unorganised physical gold trade.
    • Two way convertibility: An EGR can convert back into physical gold and back again, allowing arbitrage that keeps the receipt aligned with physical gold prices.

    Challenges to Electronic Gold Receipts

    • Ecosystem complexity as due diligence burden: The EGR ecosystem distributes responsibility across vault managers, depositories, exchanges, clearing corporations, and brokers. An investor’s risk assessment must span multiple entities.
    • Early stage caution: Informed participation requires investors to understand this multi institutional framework before adoption.
    • Liquidity constraints: EGR trading volumes remain well behind Gold Exchange Traded Funds (ETF), resulting in thinner markets and wider bid ask spreads.
    • Ongoing holding costs: Vaulting, storage, and withdrawal fees continue as long as the gold remains deposited, unlike Gold ETFs and Sovereign Gold Bonds (SGB).
    • Vault manager risk: SEBI mandates minimum net worth, insurance, and a financial security deposit for every vault manager, but residual operational and financial risk remains.

    Conclusion

    The EGR system converts gold from an asset held on trust in a locker into a regulated, tradeable instrument. Its long term success depends on depositor confidence, vault managers, and depositories performing as certified.

  • What are India’s problems with most credit rating agencies

    Why in the News?

    Union Minister of Commerce, at a London business conference, accused global sovereign credit rating agencies of being “unfair to India” while praising India-headquartered CareEdge Ratings as “objective.” The remark reopens a standing government charge that international agencies keep India’s rating just above junk grade by over-weighting subjective, opinion-based judgments of “willingness to repay” over India’s stronger, verifiable “ability to repay” data.

    What are sovereign credit ratings?

    1. A sovereign credit rating is an independent evaluation of a country’s creditworthiness. 
    2. It measures a government’s ability and willingness to repay its debt obligations, helping global investors assess the risk of investing in that nation’s bonds or lending it money.
    3. Working: Ratings are assigned by independent credit rating agencies, most notably Standard & Poor’s (S&P), Moody’s, and Fitch Ratings.
      1. High Ratings (e.g., AAA, Aaa): Signal strong economic stability, low risk of default, and allow the government to borrow money at lower interest rates.
      2. Low Ratings (e.g., BB+, Ba1): Indicate higher credit risk and are typically labeled as “speculative” or “junk” grade, forcing the country to pay higher interest to compensate investors for the increased risk.

    How do rating agencies define and measure sovereign creditworthiness?

    1. Rating universe: India is rated by seven international sovereign credit rating agencies, S&P, Moody’s, Morningstar DBRS, Fitch, Japanese Credit Rating Agency (JCRA), Rating and Investment Information (R&I), and CareEdge Ratings. The three most widely accepted globally are S&P, Fitch, and Moody’s.
    2. Rated entities: The same alphabet-scale logic applies not only to sovereigns but to companies, municipal corporations, and state governments.
    3. Scale mechanics: Fitch and S&P run from AAA downward through AA+, AA, AA-, A+, A, A- into the B-grade band, ending at D for default. Moody’s follows an identical structure using different letters, starting at Aaa.
    4. Price-of-risk function: The rating fixes the interest rate at which an entity can borrow. AAA signals zero default risk and the lowest borrowing cost; each downward notch raises the rate to compensate lenders for higher perceived risk.
    5. The dual metric: Ability to repay is quantitative, drawn from hard, verifiable macroeconomic data. Willingness to repay is qualitative, resting on an agency’s opinion of intent rather than capacity. This distinction structures India’s later grievance against the agencies.

    What has India’s rating trajectory looked like?

    1. Persistent floor: Across most agencies, India has stayed at the lowest rung of investment grade, a grade or two above junk status, the threshold at which institutions stop lending for fear of default.
    2. Long stagnation: Until recently, this rating stayed unchanged for more than a decade, and in some cases for nearly two decades.
    3. S&P upgrade: S&P raised India’s long-term sovereign rating to BBB from BBB- in August 2025, its first upgrade of India in 18 years.
    4. Moody’s upgrade: Moody’s raised India to Baa2 (equivalent to BBB) from Baa3 in 2017, its first upgrade of India in 13 years.
    5. Other 2025 movements: R&I upgraded India to BBB+ from BBB in September 2025; Morningstar DBRS upgraded India to BBB in May 2025.

    Why does the government call the ratings agencies’ methodology unfair to India? 

    1. Persisting grievance despite upgrades: Even after the 2025 upgrades, India’s rating remains just above junk grade. India argues that agencies have not credited India’s growth story, its fundamentals, or its sovereign capabilities as a rating agency should.
    2. Official continuity: The Finance Minister of India has separately called for reform of the agencies’ methodologies, establishing this as a standing government position rather than a one-off remark.
    3. Economic Survey precedent: The 2020-21 Economic Survey devoted a full chapter to the issue. It noted this was the first time the world’s fifth-largest economy had been assigned such a low rating.
      1. Ability case made: The Survey argued India’s macroeconomic fundamentals were strong enough to demonstrate ability to repay debt.
      2. Willingness case made: It also argued India’s record of never defaulting on sovereign debt despite multiple crises should establish willingness to repay.
    4. Core allegation: The central charge is that agencies weigh the qualitative willingness metric (grounded in the opinions of a small group of experts and prone to subjectivity) more heavily than the quantitative ability metric, on which India performs comparatively well but which carries lower weightage.

    Why is CareEdge Ratings being held up as the corrective model?

    1. Origin and perception: CareEdge is the first sovereign ratings agency headquartered in India, feeding the perception that it can better capture the ground realities of the Indian economy.
    2. Methodological difference: CareEdge’s own methodology note assigns primary importance to quantitative factors, directly inverting the qualitative-heavy approach India accuses the major agencies of using.
    3. Political endorsement: Goyal singling out CareEdge as “objective” aligns with the government’s broader argument that a quantitative-first method would rate India more favourably.

    Conclusion

    India’s persistently sub-BBB sovereign rating, despite improving fundamentals, stems from ratings agencies’ structural preference for qualitative, opinion-driven assessments of willingness to repay over quantitative measures of ability to repay. This is a metric on which India performs well. The government’s promotion of CareEdge Ratings, a domestic agency that weights quantitative factors more heavily, functions less as a technical fix than as an assertion that India deserves to be rated on its own terms. This does not resolve who sets the criteria for creditworthiness: India’s grievance can only be addressed if the major agencies alter their own weighting, a decision outside New Delhi’s control. Until then, India’s rating will likely continue to lag its economic weight.

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2017] Among several factors for India’s potential growth, the savings rate is the most effective one. Do you agree? What are the other factors available for growth potential?

    Linkage: Sovereign credit ratings directly influence investment flows and borrowing costs, which affect capital formation and India’s long-term growth potential. The article argues that global rating agencies undervalue India’s macroeconomic strengths and growth prospects, thereby increasing borrowing costs despite strong economic fundamentals.

  • Consider the following statements

    Consider the following statements:
    The functions of commercial banks in India include
    1. Purchase and sale of shares and securities on behalf of customers
    2. Acting as executors and trustees of wills.
    Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

  • With reference to the Indian economy, consider the following statements

    With reference to the Indian economy, consider the following statements:
    1. ‘Commercial Paper’ is a short-term unsecured promissory note.
    2. ‘Certificate of Deposit’ is a long-term instrument issued by the Reserve Bank of India
    to a corporation.
    3. ‘Call Money’ is a short-term finance used for interbank transactions.
    4. ‘Zero-Coupon Bonds’ are the interest bearing short-term bonds issued by the
    Scheduled Commercial Banks to corporations.
    Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

  • With reference to India, consider the following statements

    With reference to India, consider the following statements:

    1.Retail investors through a demat account can invest in ‘Treasury Bills’ and ‘Government of India Debt Bonds’ in the primary market.
    2.The ‘Negotiated Dealing System-Order Matching’ is a government securities trading platform of the Reserve Bank of India.
    3.The ‘Central Depository Services Ltd’ is jointly promoted by the Reserve Bank of India and the Bombay Stock Exchange.

    Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

  • Consider the following statements

    Consider the following statements :
    1. In India, credit rating agencies are regulated by Reserve Bank of India.
    2. The rating agency popularly known as ICRA is a public limited company.
    3. Brickwork Ratings is an Indian credit rating agency.
    Which of the statements given above are correct ?

  • Consider the following statements

    Consider the following statements:
    I. India accounts for a very large portion of all equity option contracts traded globally, thus exhibiting a great boom.
    II. India’s stock market has grown rapidly in the recent past, even overtaking Hong Kong’s at some point in time.
    III. There is no regulatory body either to warn small investors about the risks of options trading or to act on unregistered financial advisors in this regard.

    Which of the statements given above are correct?

  • Consider the following statements

    Consider the following statements:
    Statement I: As regards returns from an investment in a company, generally, bondholders are considered to be relatively at lower risk than stockholders.
    Statement II: Bondholders are lenders to a company whereas stockholders are its owners.
    Statement III: For repayment purpose, bondholders are prioritized over stockholders by a company.

    Which one of the following is correct in respect of the above statements?