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Subject: Governance

Important aspects of Society

  • JPC members question Centre on FCRA Bill’s asset takeover provisions

    Why in the News

    Parliament’s Joint Committee on the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Amendment Bill, 2026 questioned the Centre on the Bill’s asset takeover provisions at its first meeting. The provision at issue vests foreign contributions and all assets created from them in a government appointed “designated authority” when an organisation’s Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act (FCRA) certificate is cancelled, surrendered, or lapses automatically, without a prior hearing or a judicial determination. The Union Home Ministry defended the change as making the use of foreign contributions more transparent and accountable, and said a “prescribed authority” already exists under the present law. The tension is between an administrative gap the Ministry says it is closing and the constitutional bar on deprivation of property without due process. Opposition members of the Committee invoked Article 300A of the Constitution against the provision.

    What does the “designated authority” provision do?

    1. When it is triggered: It operates on three events, cancellation of an organisation’s FCRA certificate, its surrender by the organisation, and its automatic lapse.
    2. What vests: Foreign contributions already received and every asset created out of them pass to a government appointed designated authority.
    3. What it dispenses with: The vesting takes effect without a prior hearing for the organisation and without a judicial determination that the assets should pass.
    4. How wide the power is: The authority is to hold powers of a wide ambit over those assets, which is the specific feature the Committee’s members contested.

    What is the Ministry’s stated rationale for the change?

    1. A custodian already exists in law: The present Act provides for a “prescribed authority”, identified by a notification of 5 November 2018 as the Additional Chief Secretary or Principal Secretary (Home) of the State or Union Territory concerned.
    2. The custodian cannot act: There is no deadline on that custodianship under the current law, which leaves the prescribed authority a “passive custodian” unable to take substantive decisions on assets.
    3. No procedure for the handover: The law lays down no standard procedure for taking possession of such assets, maintaining inventories, or separating foreign contribution assets from domestically funded ones.
    4. The cost of open ended custody: Prolonged custodianship leaves States facing budgetary and manpower constraints in running vested institutions such as schools, hospitals and orphanages.
    5. Two silences in the existing law: The Act says nothing on the final disposal of vested assets and nothing on the treatment of places of worship.

    On what constitutional ground is the provision contested?

    1. The provision relied on: Opposition members of the Committee argued that deprivation of property cannot be permitted without a prior hearing, relying on Article 300A of the Constitution.
    2. What Article 300A guarantees: It states that no person shall be deprived of property save by authority of law, so a taking requires a valid law and a fair procedure even though property is no longer a fundamental right.
    3. Why automatic vesting is the pressure point: Cancellation, surrender and lapse are administrative events, so tying the transfer of assets to them removes any stage at which the organisation is heard before it loses them.
    4. What it leaves unsettled: The Ministry’s own submission records that the law is silent on final disposal, so an organisation whose certificate later stands restored has no stated route back to its assets.

    Why did the Ministry’s presentation on religious groups draw objection?

    1. What the presentation contained: It catalogued foreign contributions received by different religious groups and highlighted that a majority of the funds went to Christian organisations.
    2. The objection raised: Members questioned the rationale for segregating contributions received under religious heads at all.
    3. Why the classification matters: A regulatory case built on the religious identity of recipients shifts the test from how funds were used to who received them.

    Why is the FCRA framed as a national security law?

    1. The Ministry’s characterisation: The Home Ministry told the Committee that the latest amendment is at its core a “national security” legislation.
    2. The origin of the statute: The FCRA was enacted in 1976, amid Cold War era mistrust of Western influence and concern over threats to India’s sovereignty and democratic institutions.
    3. What preceded it: Before 1976, non governmental organisations receiving foreign funds operated under general laws such as the Societies Registration Act, the Trusts Act and the Companies Act.
    4. The gap it filled: Those general laws carried no centralised mechanism to monitor foreign contributions, which is the function the FCRA introduced.

    Challenges to the FCRA regulatory framework

    1. Sanction without a judicial stage: Cancellation, and now the vesting of assets, follow executive determination, so an organisation contests the outcome after it has already taken effect. Eg. The vesting under the Bill operates with no prior hearing and no judicial determination.
      The Fix: Require a reasoned show cause order and a hearing before vesting, with the transfer suspended until an appellate forum has ruled.
    2. Suspension operates as a penalty on its own: A certificate suspended pending inquiry stops foreign funds immediately, so service delivery halts before any finding is recorded. Eg. Registration of the Centre for Policy Research was cancelled in 2024 after a prolonged suspension, ending its foreign funded research programmes.
      The Fix: Cap the suspension period in the statute and require the inquiry to conclude within it or the certificate to revive automatically.
    3. Compliance costs fall hardest on small organisations: Annual returns, a designated single bank account and renewal every five years require dedicated staff that a small grassroots body does not have. Eg. The 2020 amendment required every recipient to route foreign funds through a designated account at a single branch of the State Bank of India in New Delhi.
      The Fix: Set a simplified filing track and a longer renewal cycle for organisations below a stated annual receipt threshold.
    4. A ban on transfers breaks the funding chain: Prohibiting an FCRA holder from passing funds to another organisation cuts off smaller field level bodies that never receive foreign money directly. Eg. The Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Amendment Act, 2020 barred transfer of foreign contribution to any other person, including another FCRA registered body.
      The Fix: Permit onward transfer to a registered recipient with reporting of the transfer, so the audit trail is preserved without ending sub granting.
    5. Regulatory reach shapes advocacy as much as accounting: Where funding status turns on administrative discretion, an organisation adjusts its public positions to protect its registration. Eg. The Supreme Court upheld the 2020 amendments in Noel Harper v. Union of India (2022), holding that no organisation has a vested right to receive foreign contribution.
      The Fix: Publish the grounds and the evidentiary standard for every cancellation, so refusal is testable against a stated rule rather than inferred.

    Conclusion

    The Bill is at the start of committee scrutiny and the disagreement is already about process rather than purpose. Both sides accept that custody of assets after a certificate ends is currently unregulated, and they differ on whether the answer is an authority that can act at once or a procedure that must be completed before it acts. The unresolved question is what happens to an organisation that succeeds on appeal after its assets have already vested, since the Ministry’s own submission records that the law is silent on final disposal. The next milestone is the Joint Committee’s examination of the Bill and the report it returns to Parliament.

    Back2Basics: Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 2010

    1. What it replaced: It repealed and replaced the 1976 Act, and is administered by the Ministry of Home Affairs.
    2. What it regulates: It governs the acceptance and utilisation of foreign contribution and foreign hospitality by persons and associations, to ensure they do not act against the national interest.
    3. Registration and its renewal: An association must hold registration or prior permission to receive foreign contribution, and registration is valid for five years and renewable.
    4. Who is barred outright: Election candidates, judges, government servants, members of a legislature, journalists and editors of registered newspapers, and political parties are prohibited from accepting foreign contribution.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2015, GS2, 12] Examine critically the recent changes in the rules governing foreign funding of NGOs under the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act (FCRA), 1976.”

  • How it widens social security net, why unions are claiming it is ‘too little and too late’

    Why in the News

    The Ministry of Labour and Employment has notified a rise in the wage ceiling of the Employees’ Provident Fund Organisation (EPFO) from Rs 15,000 to Rs 25,000 a month, the first revision in 12 years. The notification follows approval of the increase by the Union Cabinet. Over 8 crore subscribers must now contribute mandatorily up to the new limit under the Employees’ Provident Fund (EPF) scheme, the Employees’ Pension Scheme (EPS) and the Employees’ Deposit Linked Insurance (EDLI) scheme, and about 51 lakh more workers come under mandatory coverage. The tension is over what a ceiling fixed in rupees can do. Trade unions have called the new figure “too little and too late” and want the threshold tied to wages and inflation rather than revised once a decade.

    What is the EPFO wage ceiling and what does it trigger?

    1. What the ceiling is: It is the monthly wage level up to which membership of the EPFO’s three schemes is compulsory in a covered establishment, and beyond which a worker may choose not to contribute.
    2. What it applies to: The same figure governs mandatory coverage under all three schemes at once, the provident fund, the pension scheme and the deposit linked insurance scheme.
    3. What it does not cap: A worker already contributing on basic pay above the old limit is unaffected in the provident fund, since the ceiling bounds the compulsory floor of coverage rather than the amount that may be saved.

    What changes in the contribution arithmetic?

    1. Who pays what: The employee and the employer each contribute 12% of basic salary, dearness allowance and retaining allowance, with the employee’s entire share going to the EPF.
    2. How the employer’s share splits: Of the employer’s 12%, 3.67% goes to the EPF and 8.33% to the EPS, and the pension share is calculated on the wage ceiling for most subscribers.
    3. The pension effect: The monthly pension contribution rises to Rs 2,083 from Rs 1,250, because 8.33% is now computed on Rs 25,000 instead of Rs 15,000.
    4. The state’s own share: The government contributes 1.16% towards an employee’s pension up to the wage ceiling to cover any shortfall from low wages, and employees make no contribution of their own to the pension scheme.
    5. The insurance leg: Under the EDLI scheme the employer contributes 0.5% of wages with no deduction from the employee, and the scheme pays life insurance cover of Rs 2.5 lakh to Rs 7 lakh on death during service.
    6. Who gains most: Workers earning between Rs 15,000 and Rs 25,000 see the largest change, since their social security contributions rise from voluntary or low levels to the full mandatory rate.

    Where does this revision sit in the scheme’s own history?

    1. Frequency of revision: This is the ninth revision of the EPF scheme’s wage ceiling since the scheme began in 1952.
    2. The pattern of long gaps: It is only the third occasion on which the gap between two revisions exceeded a decade, so a frozen ceiling is a recurring feature rather than a one off lapse.
    3. The two previous steps: The ceiling was raised to Rs 15,000 from Rs 6,500 in September 2014, and to Rs 6,500 from Rs 5,000 in June 2001.
    4. Where the demand was raised: The revision had been discussed in several meetings of the Central Board of Trustees of the EPFO over the last decade before it was acted on.

    What does the new ceiling signal to the wider labour market?

    1. Statutory minimum wages had overtaken the old ceiling: At least seven major States and Union Territories set statutory minimum wages for unskilled workers above the old Rs 15,000 limit.
    2. The specific figures: Monthly minimum wages stand at Rs 17,800 in Delhi, Rs 17,000 in Maharashtra and Rs 16,800 in Karnataka.
    3. What the gap meant in practice: A ceiling below the legal minimum wage in a State excluded the lowest paid formal workers there from compulsory coverage, which inverts the purpose of a floor.
    4. The signalling effect: A higher central threshold indicates a higher expected wage scale to States and to employers, beyond its direct effect on contributions.

    Why do trade unions call the revision inadequate?

    1. The stated objection to the frozen figure: The All India Trade Union Congress (AITUC) has said a social security ceiling held at Rs 15,000 for 12 years was already out of step with prevailing wages.
    2. The demand on the number: Its General Secretary has asked for the ceiling to be raised to Rs 30,000 so that more deserving sections of employees are covered.
    3. The demand on the method: The union position is that the threshold must move in step with minimum wages, actual wages, inflation and the cost of living, rather than being reset by discretion.
    4. The take home pay concern: Employers are expected to absorb the higher contribution inside the existing cost to company structure, so a worker’s monthly take home pay falls even as the savings balance rises.

    Challenges to the EPFO wage ceiling framework

    1. A nominal ceiling loses value every year it is not revised: A threshold fixed in rupees falls in real terms with inflation, so coverage narrows automatically between revisions. Eg. The previous limit stood unchanged from 2014 while several States raised statutory minimum wages past it.
      The Fix: Link the ceiling to a published wage or price index with automatic annual revision, so coverage does not depend on a discretionary decision.
    2. Coverage is tied to the establishment, not the worker: Compulsory membership runs through establishments covered by the scheme, so gig, platform and informal workers stay outside it whatever the ceiling is. Eg. The Code on Social Security, 2020 provides for schemes for gig and platform workers, which remain outside the EPFO’s mandatory contribution structure.
      The Fix: Operationalise the aggregator contribution route for gig and platform workers so coverage follows the worker across employers.
    3. A higher mandatory contribution can push employment off the books: Where an employer treats the contribution as a cost to be avoided, the response is under reporting of wages or headcount rather than compliance. Eg. Splitting pay into allowances outside basic wages was contested up to the Supreme Court in the 2019 Regional Provident Fund Commissioner v. Vivekananda Vidyamandir line of cases on what counts as basic wages.
      The Fix: Audit wage structures of covered establishments against declared basic wages and publish sector wise compliance data.
    4. Pension outcomes remain weak despite higher contributions: The pension share is computed on the ceiling rather than on actual pay, so the pension of a worker earning well above the ceiling stays low. Eg. Pensionable salary for most subscribers is capped at the ceiling even where actual wages are several times higher.
      The Fix: Publish the actuarial position of the pension scheme at each revision, so the pension a given contribution buys is visible before the ceiling is set.
    5. Take home pay falls for the workers the change is meant to protect: A low wage worker gains a deferred benefit and loses current income, which is the trade off least affordable at that wage level. Eg. Employers absorb the higher contribution within the existing cost to company package.
      The Fix: Phase the increased employee share over two or three years for workers in the newly covered band, while the employer share applies at once.

    Conclusion

    The revision settles the level of the ceiling and leaves open the method of setting it. A threshold fixed in rupees and revised at intervals of a decade will drift below statutory minimum wages again, which is what produced the present anomaly of a social security floor lower than the legal wage floor in several States. The stated union demand is not merely a higher number but an indexation rule that removes the need for a political decision each time. The thing to watch is whether the Central Board of Trustees takes up a standing revision formula, since that is what decides whether this correction has to be repeated in another twelve years.

    Back2Basics: Employees’ Provident Fund Organisation (EPFO)

    1. Statutory basis: It administers schemes framed under the Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, and functions under the Ministry of Labour and Employment.
    2. Who governs it: It is steered by the Central Board of Trustees, a tripartite body of government, employer and employee representatives, chaired by the Union Labour Minister.
    3. The three schemes: It runs the EPF scheme for retirement savings, the EPS for pension, and the EDLI scheme for life insurance cover linked to provident fund membership.
    4. Scope of application: The parent Act applies to establishments employing 20 or more persons in notified industries, and coverage continues even if employment later falls below that number.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2021] With reference to casual workers employed in India, consider the following statements: 1.All casual workers are entitled to Employees Provident Fund coverage. 2.All casual workers are entitled to regular working hours and overtime payment. 3.The government can, by notification, specify that an establishment or industry shall pay wages only through its bank account. Which of the above statements are correct? (a) 1 and 2 only (b) 2 and 3 only (c) 1 and 3 only (d) 1, 2, and 3 Answer: (b)”

  • Drugs Rules, 1945: Tighter Regulation of Schedule H, H1 and X Drugs

    Why in the News?

    The Ministry of Health and Family Welfare has proposed amendments to the Drugs Rules, 1945 to strengthen oversight of Schedule H, H1 and X drugs.

    A key proposal is mandatory CCTV surveillance at medical stores to improve transparency and prevent unauthorized sale.

    Key Highlights

    • Draft Gazette Notification: G.S.R. 791 (E) dated 8 September 2026.
    • Focus: Prevent unauthorized access and sale of Schedule H, H1 and X drugs.
    • Mandatory CCTV surveillance has been proposed for medical stores.
    • Objective:
      • Strengthen monitoring of drug sales.
      • Prevent sale without valid prescriptions.
      • Improve transparency and accountability.
      • Strengthen public-health safeguards.

    Regulatory Process

    • Proposal was initially deliberated by the Drugs Consultative Committee (DCC).
    • It was subsequently circulated to the Drugs Technical Advisory Board (DTAB).
    • DTAB recommended approval of the proposal.
    • The Ministry has invited objections and suggestions from stakeholders and the public.

    Schedule H, H1 and X

    Schedule H

    • Prescription-based medicines.
    • Sale is subject to prescription requirements.

    Schedule H1

    • Contains specified medicines requiring stricter record-keeping and prescription controls.
    • Includes certain medicines for which misuse and antimicrobial resistance are concerns.

    Schedule X

    • Drugs subject to particularly stringent controls.
    • Prescription and storage requirements are stricter than ordinary prescription medicines.

    Prelims Quick Revision

    • Drugs Rules, 1945: regulatory framework for drugs and cosmetics.
    • Draft notification: G.S.R. 791 (E).
    • Proposed safeguard: CCTV surveillance at medical stores.
    • Targeted categories: Schedule H, H1 and X.
    • DCC: Drugs Consultative Committee.
    • DTAB: Drugs Technical Advisory Board.
  • Special Campaign 6: Swachhata in Government Offices

    Special Campaign 6: Swachhata in Government Offices

    Why in the News?

    The Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs (MoHUA) and Department of Food and Public Distribution (DFPD) are preparing for Special Campaign 6, to be conducted from 2-31 October 2026.

    Key Highlights

    • Objective: Institutionalise Swachhata and reduce pendency in government offices.
    • Preparatory Phase: 15-30 September 2026.
    • Implementation Phase: 2-31 October 2026.
    • Major focus:
      • E-waste collection, segregation and disposal
      • Disposal of pending references
      • Record management
      • Space management
      • Cleanliness and beautification
    • E-waste activities will follow the E-Waste (Management) Rules, 2022.
    • Special attention to field and outstation offices involved in public service delivery.

    Pending Matters Covered

    • MP and State Government references
    • Inter-Ministerial communications
    • Parliamentary Assurances
    • PMO references
    • Public Grievances and PG Appeals through CPGRAMS

    Special Campaign 5.0: DFPD Performance

    • 1,23,853 files weeded out.
    • 49,830 sq ft space freed.
    • ₹1.67 crore revenue generated.
    • Nov 2025-Aug 2026:
      • 72,577 sq ft space freed.
      • ₹25.95 lakh revenue from scrap disposal.
      • 1,493 cleanliness drives conducted.

    Important Full Forms

    • MoHUA: Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs
    • DFPD: Department of Food and Public Distribution
    • CPWD: Central Public Works Department
    • NBCC: National Buildings Construction Corporation
    • CPGRAMS: Centralised Public Grievance Redress and Monitoring System
    • PMO: Prime Minister’s Office

    Prelims Quick Revision

    • Special Campaign 6: 2-31 October 2026.
    • Preparatory Phase: 15-30 September 2026.
    • Focus: Swachhata + pendency + records + space + e-waste.
    • E-waste management follows E-Waste (Management) Rules, 2022.
    • Special Campaigns have been conducted since 2021.

  • ‘Census Town’ definition is outdated: Ministry to panel

    Why in the News

    The Housing and Urban Affairs Ministry has told the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Housing and Urban Affairs that the four decade old criteria used to classify Census Towns cannot capture the actual scale of urbanisation in India. The Ministry deposed before the panel on a draft report titled “Census Criteria for Defining Urban Areas”. It had already flagged the same objections to the Registrar General of India in a communication in February 2024. The Registrar General has decided to continue with the existing definition, holding that it is too late to alter the framework for Census 2027, so the next Census will measure a transformed settlement pattern with a test written in 1981.

    What is a Census Town?

    1. The three part test: A Census Town is a village with a minimum population of 5,000, at least 75% of the male working population engaged in non agricultural pursuits, and a population density of at least 400 persons per square kilometre.
    2. It is a statistical category, not a legal one: A settlement meeting the test is counted as urban by the Census while continuing to be governed as a village, since municipal status is conferred separately by the State.
    3. Unchanged since 1981: The definition has not been revised in four decades, so every intervening Census has applied the same thresholds.

    What does the Ministry say is wrong with the 1981 test?

    1. Male bias: Only the male working population is used as a parameter to define a town, and the Ministry has said female workforce participation should also be used.
    2. Uniform national thresholds: A single population and density threshold applied across the country disadvantages hilly and northeastern States, where settlement sizes and densities differ structurally.
    3. Density measured on the wrong area: Density is calculated using administrative boundaries rather than built-up areas, which misclassifies settlements.
    4. The rural and urban binary: The binary classification overlooks peri-urban settlements and growth corridors that function as urban areas without qualifying as one.
    5. Stale input data: The current system works off data from the previous Census, which produces both exclusion and inclusion errors.

    What has the Ministry proposed instead?

    1. Satellite imagery: Greater use of imagery would identify built-up extent directly rather than inferring it from administrative units.
    2. A ‘transitional areas’ category: A third category between rural and urban would capture rapidly urbanising regions that neither label fits.
    3. Female workforce participation as a parameter: Adding it to the non farm employment test would measure the settlement’s economy rather than half of its workforce.

    How much urbanisation does the current definition miss?

    1. The official count: Census 2011 recorded a total population of 121 crore, of which about 83.3 crore or 68.8% lived in rural areas and 37.7 crore or 31.2% in urban areas.
    2. The satellite based estimate: The Economic Advisory Council to the Prime Minister (EAC-PM), the advisory body reporting to the Prime Minister on economic policy, argues that India’s urbanisation level could have been as high as 63% in 2015 on satellite data.
    3. The size of the gap: The satellite based figure is more than double the official Census 2011 estimate, which is the measure of what the definition is failing to register.

    Why will Census 2027 still use the old framework?

    1. The Registrar General’s position: The framework cannot be altered at this stage of preparation for Census 2027.
    2. Field architecture is already built on it: Enumeration blocks, boundaries, enumerator training and field deployment all depend on the rural and urban classification being finalised in advance.
    3. The consequence: The classification produced by Census 2027 will be the base for scheme eligibility and urban planning through the following decade.

    Challenges to reforming the Census Town definition

    1. Classification drives governance and finance: A settlement counted as urban by the Census keeps rural governance and stays outside municipal planning and finance powers. Eg. Most Census Towns remain under panchayats and outside municipal law.
      The Fix: Tie any ‘transitional areas’ category to a statutory route for a State decision on municipal status under Article 243Q.
    2. Decadal measurement lag: A test applied once every ten years classifies settlements long after they have urbanised. Eg. Census 2027 will apply thresholds last revised in 1981.
      The Fix: Update classification against annual satellite built-up area data between Censuses rather than only at enumeration.
    3. Misclassification misdirects money: Grant devolution and scheme eligibility follow the rural or urban label, so a wrong label sends the wrong programme to a settlement. Eg. The Swachh Bharat Mission runs separate rural and urban verticals with different funding norms.
      The Fix: Allow a settlement classified as transitional to draw on both rural and urban scheme windows for one funding cycle.
    4. Satellite data measures construction, not employment: Built-up extent records buildings and cannot by itself establish the non farm economic activity the definition is meant to test. Eg. Warehousing clusters and plotted layouts register as built-up while the surrounding workforce stays agricultural.
      The Fix: Combine built-up area with workforce and night lights data rather than substituting one indicator for another.
    5. States control the next step: Creating a municipality is a State decision, and States carry fiscal and political reasons to leave urbanised settlements classified as villages. Eg. Kerala and West Bengal account for a large share of Census Towns still governed by panchayats.
      The Fix: Make a Census Town classification trigger a time bound State decision on municipal status with reasons recorded.

    Conclusion

    The Ministry and the Registrar General are not disagreeing about the facts of urbanisation. They are disagreeing about whether a measurement framework can be changed once field preparation has begun. That conflict is now settled in favour of continuity, and it settles the terms on which India will be counted as urban for another decade. The thing to watch is whether the Standing Committee’s final report converts the Ministry’s objections into a dated mandate for the Census after this one, since an objection recorded and not scheduled expires with the report.

    Back2Basics

    1. Registrar General and Census Commissioner of India: An office under the Ministry of Home Affairs, created in 1949, that conducts the decennial Census.
    2. Other functions: It maintains the Civil Registration System for births and deaths and runs the Sample Registration System, the source of India’s birth, death and infant mortality rate estimates.
    3. Statutory basis: The Census is conducted under the Census Act, 1948, which makes furnishing information compulsory and individual records confidential.
    4. Language data: The office also compiles the linguistic survey and mother tongue returns used to classify scheduled and non scheduled languages.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “Which of the following are among the million-plus cities in India on the basis of data of the Census, 2001?”

  • VB-G RAM G scheme trails MGNREGS by 9% in August

    Why in the News

    The Viksit Bharat Guarantee for Rozgar and Ajeevika Mission (Gramin), known as VB-G RAM G, generated 9.01 percent fewer persondays in August than the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS) did in the same month a year earlier. The new scheme replaced MGNREGS from July 2026, and its first month recorded a far steeper fall, so the two months together sit well below the corresponding period of 2025. The Union Ministry of Rural Development has said it is too early to judge the scheme, attributing part of the dip to a 60 day pause linked to notified peak agricultural periods, which is a feature the new Act introduces. The contested point is whether a smaller volume of work reflects a transition between two systems or a design that narrows the guarantee itself.

    What is the Viksit Bharat Guarantee for Rozgar and Ajeevika Mission (Gramin)?

    1. VB-G RAM G: It is the Centre’s rural wage employment programme, operational from July 2026, which has replaced MGNREGS as the vehicle for guaranteed work to rural households.
    2. Peak agricultural period flexibility: The governing Act lets each State notify its own peak agricultural periods, during which the programme pauses so it complements farm work rather than competing with it for labour.
    3. Sub State notification: States may issue area specific notifications for districts, blocks or gram panchayats, based on agro climatic conditions and local cropping patterns.
    4. Entitlement document: Work is accessed through a Gramin Rozgar Guarantee card, and job cards already issued under MGNREGS remain valid for the purpose.

    How far has work generation fallen?

    1. First month: Persondays fell from 17.65 crore in July 2025 under MGNREGS to 9.18 crore in July 2026, a decline of 48.01 percent.
    2. Second month: Persondays fell from 12.12 crore in August 2025 to 11.03 crore this August, the decline narrowing sharply against July.
    3. Cumulative position: Across July and August together the figure fell from 29.78 crore to 20.21 crore persondays, a decline of 32.13 percent.
    4. Direction inside the new scheme: August recorded a modest improvement in employment generation over July, so the programme is rising month on month while still trailing its predecessor year on year.

    Why is the year on year comparison understated?

    1. A missing State in the base year: No persondays at all were generated in West Bengal under MGNREGS in 2025, so the comparison base excludes one large State’s entire contribution.
    2. Origin of the stoppage: Implementation of MGNREGS in West Bengal was stalled in December 2021.
    3. Formal suspension of funds: The Union government officially froze all financial disbursements to the State on 9 March 2022.
    4. Effect on the measured gap: With the base year short of one major State’s persondays, the true fall in work generated is wider than the reported percentages show.

    What explains the dip, according to the Ministry?

    1. Too early to judge: The Union Ministry of Rural Development’s stated position is that two months of operation are not a basis on which to assess the scheme’s performance.
    2. The agricultural pause: A 60 day pause in employment through the peak agricultural season is cited as a contributor to the lower persondays generated.
    3. Notification progress: 16 States and Union Territories have so far notified their respective peak agricultural periods.
    4. The stated design intent: Tailoring the pause to local calendars is meant to let the employment programme complement peak agricultural activity instead of drawing labour away from it.

    What has the migration from MGNREGS involved?

    1. Automatic migration: Every worker registered under the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, 2005 has been migrated to VB-G RAM G, irrespective of the e-KYC status of the job card.
    2. New cards issued: 6,40,779 new Gramin Rozgar Guarantee cards have been issued across States and Union Territories since the scheme became operational.
    3. e-KYC completion: e-KYC has been completed for 15.89 crore workers, including 10.27 crore of the 10.84 crore active workers, roughly 95 percent.
    4. Pending e-KYC is not a bar: The Ministry has clarified that incomplete e-KYC does not prevent a worker from demanding or receiving employment.

    Challenges to VB-G RAM G

    1. A notified pause narrows the guarantee: Suspending work for a fixed stretch each year withdraws the entitlement in exactly the districts where farm distress and the farm calendar overlap. Eg. A landless labourer in a rainfall deficient district finds less farm work available precisely in the season the pause assumes is busy.
      The Fix: Make the notified pause conditional on a district level rainfall or sown area trigger, so it lapses automatically in a deficient season.
    2. A demand driven scheme is only as good as recorded demand: Persondays fall when work is not sought or not registered, and the same number can be read either way. Eg. Unmet demand under MGNREGS was persistently understated because applications were often not entered against a dated receipt.
      The Fix: Publish district wise work applications received alongside persondays generated, so unmet demand is visible in the same dataset.
    3. Verification requirements exclude at the margin: Digital attendance and identity steps drop workers who cannot complete them, even where the rule says they are not disqualified. Eg. The National Mobile Monitoring System attendance requirement under MGNREGS cost workers their day’s record at sites with poor connectivity.
      The Fix: Provide a recorded offline fallback for attendance and verification at every worksite, with the physical muster roll valid on its own.
    4. Wage payment delays suppress participation: Work is unattractive where wages arrive weeks after it is done, and the delay depends on fund release rather than on anything the worker controls. Eg. Compensation for delayed wages has been a standing complaint against MGNREGS despite the statutory timeline behind it.
      The Fix: Release delay compensation automatically from the same system that records the delay, without requiring a separate claim from the worker.
    5. A funding dispute can suspend an entire State: Where the Centre withholds funds over compliance findings, the entitlement lapses for every worker in that State at once. Eg. Disbursements to West Bengal were frozen and the scheme produced no work there for years afterwards.
      The Fix: Route any withholding through a time bound adjudication carrying an interim wage payment channel, so a compliance dispute does not extinguish a statutory entitlement.

    Conclusion

    Two months are a thin basis for a verdict on a programme that has replaced a statutory guarantee covering most of rural India’s registered workforce. The unresolved tension is between a seasonal pause designed to leave farm labour undisturbed and a guarantee whose whole purpose is to be available when other work is not. The marker to watch is what the remaining States notify as their peak agricultural periods, since the length and the timing of those windows will decide how much of the year the guarantee actually covers.

    Back2Basics: Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, 2005

    1. Nature: It created a legal right to wage employment in rural areas, enforceable on demand rather than granted at administrative discretion.
    2. Entitlement: It guaranteed 100 days of unskilled manual work in a financial year to every rural household whose adult members volunteered for it.
    3. Design safeguards: It required work within 15 days of demand, an unemployment allowance where work was not provided in time, and at least one third of beneficiaries to be women.
    4. Administration: It was implemented by the Union Ministry of Rural Development through gram panchayats, with works selected in the gram sabha and wages paid into workers’ accounts.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “Among the following who are eligible to benefit from the “Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act”?”

  • Experts back warnings for high level of each nutrient — not just fats, sugar, or salt content

    Why in the News

    A front of pack warning should be triggered when a food carries a high level of any single nutrient, and not only when it is high in two nutrients at once. That position has been put to the Food Safety and Standards Authority of India (FSSAI), the country’s food safety regulator, by global nutrition researchers and by the ICMR National Institute of Nutrition (NIN), whose Dietary Guidelines for Indians 2024 supply the thresholds being used. FSSAI has proposed a red hexagonal warning triggered only where a food is high in two of three nutrients in the first phase, moving to each nutrient in the second. The Supreme Court is separately examining a petition to make front of pack labels mandatory on foods high in fats, sugar or salt. What is contested is how far the first phase label can be diluted before it stops doing the work it exists to do.

    What is a front of pack warning label?

    1. Front of pack warning label: A mark placed on the front face of a packaged food declaring that the product carries a high level of a nutrient of concern.
    2. Nutrients covered: The Indian proposal covers fats, sugar and salt.
    3. Threshold basis: A warning appears once the nutrient crosses a defined cut off, and those cut offs are referenced to the Dietary Guidelines for Indians 2024.

    What do the experts want the trigger rule to be?

    1. Single nutrient trigger: The warning should be triggered for each nutrient separately, so a food high in salt and in fat carries a red hexagon stating each.
    2. Multiple labels as a signal: Evidence from Chile shows consumers understand products carrying more warning labels to be less healthy than products with fewer or none.
    3. Evidence of impact: Warning labels are the only type of label with real world evidence of impact. That evidence covers consumer beliefs and behaviour, the nutritional profile of the food supply, and the healthfulness of purchases and dietary intake.

    Why are the colour and background of the label contested?

    1. Visual absorption into packaging: A colour based label placed over packaging of a similar colour becomes less noticeable, and surrounding graphic elements can minimise it further.
    2. Black hexagons: The experts asked for black hexagonal boxes in place of the red one, since black and white designs are harder to visually mask on colourful packaging.
    3. A fixed contrasting background: Mandating a white background behind the warning preserves its purpose, which is rapid identification at a glance.

    What does the ICMR National Institute of Nutrition add on thresholds?

    1. Energy density as the basis: The thresholds for identifying foods high in fats, sugars and salt should be set on the total energy density of the food.
    2. No cut off read in isolation: Added fat and added sugar cut offs should not be considered apart from the accompanying energy and total nutrient content. FSSAI told the court that the warnings would be triggered on the levels of added sugars and added fats.
    3. The failure mode of a two nutrient rule: Products substantially high in one nutrient escape consumer attention while the two nutrient trigger operates.
    4. Higher thresholds, time bound: Where phasing is operationally necessary, a time bound transition at higher thresholds, progressively lowered, avoids indefinite postponement.

    What has the Supreme Court asked the regulator for?

    1. A justified timeline: The Court has asked FSSAI for a scientifically justified and clearly defined timeline for implementing the second phase.
    2. The recorded reason: Without such a timeline, the Court said, implementation may take a backseat or be postponed indefinitely.
    3. Sweetened beverages: The Court also sought clarity on which sweetened beverages will receive the warning in the first phase.

    Challenges to the front of pack warning label

    1. Reach into the unpackaged food trade: A label rule touches only packaged food, and a large share of what is sold in India moves loose or through small manufacturers. Eg. Street sold namkeen and locally packed sweets carry no nutrition panel at all.
      The Fix: Tie labelling compliance to the FSSAI licence and registration number small manufacturers already hold, so enforcement runs through an existing list.
    2. Reformulation to the threshold rather than to health: A manufacturer can cut a flagged nutrient just below the cut off while leaving the product’s overall energy unchanged. Eg. Sugar trimmed slightly and offset by fat keeps a product under the trigger.
      The Fix: Review the cut offs on a fixed cycle against reformulation data collected from the market.
    3. Legibility on small packs: A hexagon on a single serve sachet occupies too little area to be read at a glance, which defeats the design’s purpose. Eg. Single serve sachets dominate rural sales of biscuits, chips and instant noodles.
      The Fix: Set a minimum label size as a share of the front panel rather than as an absolute dimension.
    4. Regulatory delay through consultation: Labelling rules draw sustained industry objection, and each further round of consultation pushes implementation out. Eg. The Indian Nutrition Rating star system, put out in draft in 2022, has still not taken effect.
      The Fix: Notify the second phase thresholds in the same regulation as the first, so the transition needs no fresh rule making.

    Conclusion

    The question is no longer whether India will label packaged food but whether the first version of the label is strong enough to be worth carrying. A trigger that waits for a second nutrient builds a gap into the rule and gives manufacturers a period in which the worst single nutrient products stay unmarked. The regulator now has to answer the Court with a dated transition rather than a stated intention, and that answer is what decides the value of everything already agreed.

    Back2Basics: Food Safety and Standards Authority of India

    1. Statutory body established under the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006.
    2. Functions under the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare.
    3. Lays down science based standards for food articles and regulates their manufacture, storage, distribution, sale and import.
    4. Issues licences and registrations to food businesses and runs the national food safety surveillance system.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2016] With reference to pre-packaged items in India, it is mandatory to the manufacturer to put which of the following information on the main label, as per the Food Safety and Standards (Packaging and Labelling) Regulations, 2011? 1. List of ingredients including additives 2. Nutrition information 3. Recommendation, if any, made by the medical profession about the possibility of any allergic reactions 4. Vegetarian/non-vegetarian Select the correct answer using the code given below. (a) 1, 2 and 3 (b) 2, 3 and 4 (c) 1, 2 and 4 (d) 1 and 4 only Answer: (c)”

  • The evidence gap in dole politics

    Why in the News

    Unconditional cash transfers to women have spread from two States in 2022-23 to 12 States in 2025-26, at an estimated annual cost of Rs 1.68 lakh crore, about 0.5 per cent of GDP, per PRS Legislative Research. Governments attach purposes such as dignity and empowerment to these payments but publish no model linking the payment to an outcome, and a study by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) prepared for the 16th Finance Commission found that India has no systematic dataset of government expenditure on cash transfer schemes at all. The comparison drawn is the Speenhamland system of 1795, under which English parishes topped up agricultural wages from public funds and folded wage support, poor relief and public finance into a single instrument. The tension is that the fewer the conditions attached to a transfer, the heavier the obligation to prove what it does, and Indian cash transfer politics has grown in exactly the opposite direction.

    What was the Speenhamland system?

    1. The 1795 Speenhamland resolution: English magistrates meeting at Speenhamland in Berkshire in May 1795 resolved to top up agricultural wages from parish funds, with the payout linked to bread prices and to family size.
    2. Rising bread prices and political unrest: Food prices were rising and the French Revolution had unsettled the English establishment, so relief was framed as social stabilisation rather than as poverty policy.
    3. Polanyi’s reading against the critics’ reading: The economic historian Karl Polanyi treated it as an early assertion of a human “right to live” against the harshness of the market. Critics held that folding wage support, poor relief and public finance into one instrument blurred price signals and weakened incentives.
    4. The merged purposes problem: Once the three purposes were merged, it became unclear whether the system was protecting poor families, the wage structure, employers, or social peace, which is the test any relief instrument still has to meet.

    How large has India’s cash transfer commitment become?

    1. The spread across States: Unconditional transfers to women alone moved from two States to 12 States in three years, per PRS Legislative Research.
    2. West Bengal: The State has moved from Lakshmir Bhandar to Annapurna Yojana, budgeting Rs 36,000 crore for a Rs 3,000 monthly transfer to about 1.3 crore women.
    3. Tamil Nadu: The State allocated Rs 14,412 crore for the Kalaignar Magalir Urimai Thogai in its 2026-27 interim budget.
    4. Assam: The State set aside Rs 5,000 crore for Orunodoi.
    5. The wider family of instruments: Cash transfers sit alongside free electricity, free bus travel, subsidised food and utility subsidies, so the monthly payment is one line inside a larger recurring claim on State finances.

    What does the transfer actually do for the recipient?

    1. Transfer as a share of a woman’s monthly income: Transfers to women amount to 11 per cent to 24 per cent of the monthly income of women daily wage workers, and 11 per cent to 87 per cent of that of self employed women, per the Economic Survey 2025-26.
    2. Cash is genuinely useful in an informal economy: In a poor economy with irregular earnings, a predictable monthly payment does work that no in kind benefit can.
    3. Services a transfer cannot substitute for: The same woman who values Rs 1,500 to Rs 3,000 a month also needs a functioning health centre, childcare, a good government school and access to better work, and a transfer softens the strain created by weak institutions without addressing them.
    4. Relief hardening into a permanent commitment: A transfer that begins as relief turns into a permanent fiscal commitment unless there is a clear account of who receives it, what it changes and what it displaces.

    Where exactly is the evidence gap?

    1. No published model connects payment to outcome: Governments state social purposes for these transfers but do not publish the model that links the payment to the result claimed for it.
    2. The design questions are unanswered: Who is being targeted, and what baseline data justifies the scheme, are not established before rollout.
    3. The outcome questions are unmeasured: No anticipated effect is stated for consumption, debt, nutrition, schooling, health spending, labour supply or women’s bargaining power.
    4. Expenditure data on cash transfer schemes: The ADB study for the 16th Finance Commission found that India lacks a systematic dataset of government expenditure on cash transfer schemes.
    5. Moral language in place of evidence: With those answers missing, cash transfer politics is defended through the moral language of welfare rather than through evidence.

    What do other democracies attach to their transfers?

    1. Unemployment insurance: Payment is tied to a contribution record, so entitlement is earned through prior participation in the formal labour market rather than asserted by category.
    2. Food support: Eligibility rules govern who qualifies, and the benefit is reassessed periodically rather than treated as permanent.
    3. Healthcare subsidies: Support is conditioned on stated eligibility criteria that can be tested against a household’s circumstances.
    4. Job search obligations: Several systems attach a continuing behavioural requirement to receipt, which creates a record of what the benefit is meant to be bridging.
    5. Limits of the comparison: These systems are not immune to welfare politics, and India need not copy them mechanically, since transfers to women in poor households may be better left unconditional. The conditions in those systems generate evidence as a by product, and where India drops the conditions it has to generate that evidence directly.

    What would a welfare impact statement require?

    1. Pre rollout welfare impact statement: A large recurring transfer should carry a published statement setting out the objective, the eligibility rule, the expected coverage, the five year fiscal cost, the alternatives considered, the likely leakage and exclusion errors, and the measurable outcomes.
    2. Post rollout household survey: Household surveys should record not only whether the transfer was received but how it affected consumption, debt, health spending, schooling, mobility, work incentives, control over household expenditure and subjective well being.
    3. Open microdata: Anonymised microdata from those surveys should be released so that independent researchers can test the claims made for the scheme.
    4. Evidence as a check on the political claim: Evidence will not remove politics from welfare, and it is not intended to, but it makes the political claim about a scheme checkable rather than merely asserted.

    Challenges to India’s unconditional cash transfer regime

    1. A recurring transfer is politically irreversible: Once a monthly payment reaches a large identifiable group, no government can withdraw or shrink it, so the fiscal commitment compounds regardless of performance. Eg. West Bengal replaced Lakshmir Bhandar with a larger transfer under Annapurna Yojana rather than reviewing it.
      The Fix: Legislate a sunset clause and a mandatory reauthorisation vote on every large transfer, so continuation requires a positive decision rather than inertia.
    2. Transfers compete with the capital spending that builds public goods: State budgets are constrained, and a revenue commitment of this size crowds out the schools, health centres and childcare the same recipients need. Eg. Transfers to women alone now cost about 0.5 per cent of GDP a year across 12 States.
      The Fix: Require every transfer proposal to state the capital expenditure it displaces in the same budget document, so the trade off is visible at the point of approval.
    3. Category based targeting is not the same as need based targeting: A transfer keyed to gender or to a possession based exclusion reaches many households that do not need it and misses poor households outside the category. Eg. The National Food Security Act, 2013 still allocates State quotas on the 2011 Census, which has left later entrants to poverty outside the ration net.
      The Fix: Build eligibility on a periodically updated deprivation register rather than on a one time category list, and publish the exclusion error rate with each disbursal cycle.
    4. Digital delivery excludes at the last step: A transfer credited to an account still fails where the account is dormant, the seeding is wrong or the recipient cannot reach a banking point. Eg. Rejected and failed Direct Benefit Transfer credits arising from incorrect account seeding are a recurring finding in scheme audits.
      The Fix: Publish a failed credit register by block with a fixed resolution deadline, so a failure is a tracked case rather than a statistic.
    5. No independent evaluator exists for State transfers: State schemes are designed, disbursed and assessed by the same department, so there is no institution positioned to contradict the claim made for a scheme. Eg. The ADB study for the 16th Finance Commission had to record the absence of even an expenditure dataset before any evaluation could begin.
      The Fix: Route evaluation of large State transfers through an independent statutory evaluation office reporting to the State legislature, on the model applied to performance audit.
    6. Wage subsidies distort the labour market they operate in: A public top up to household income changes reservation wages and employer incentives, which is the specific mechanism the Speenhamland critics identified. Eg. The transfer equals up to 87 per cent of the monthly income of a self employed woman.
      The Fix: Track labour force participation and wage rates for recipient households in the post rollout survey, so the labour market effect is measured rather than argued about.

    Conclusion

    The instrument at issue is not indefensible, and cash in a poor informal economy does real work no in kind benefit does. What is missing is the apparatus that would let anyone, including the government paying for it, say whether a given transfer changed anything. The obligation runs in proportion to the freedom taken: a transfer with no conditions attached carries the heaviest evidentiary duty, not the lightest. The concrete marker is whether the 16th Finance Commission’s award period opens with a standard expenditure reporting format for State cash transfer schemes, since the dataset the ADB found missing has to exist before any evaluation can be built on it.

    Welfare Cash Transfers in India

    1. Welfare cash transfer: A welfare cash transfer pays money directly into a beneficiary’s bank account in place of a subsidised good or a price subsidy, so the State’s support reaches the household as purchasing power rather than as a commodity.
    2. The JAM trinity: Transfers move through the JAM trinity, meaning the Jan Dhan bank account, the Aadhaar identity number and the mobile phone, which together allow a payment to be authenticated and credited without an intermediary.
    3. Scale of the delivery system: More than 55 crore Jan Dhan accounts now exist, which is what makes near universal direct crediting technically possible.
    4. Claimed Direct Benefit Transfer savings: Aadhaar linked Direct Benefit Transfer (DBT) is credited with cumulative savings of about Rs 3.48 lakh crore from removing duplicate and ghost beneficiaries across fertiliser, cooking gas and food subsidies.

    Government Initiatives for Welfare Transfers

    1. Direct Benefit Transfer, 2013: The umbrella architecture that routes scheme payments straight to beneficiary accounts, now covering several hundred central and State schemes.
    2. PM Jan Dhan Yojana, 2014: The financial inclusion mission that created the zero balance accounts into which transfers are credited.
    3. PM Kisan Samman Nidhi: An income support transfer paying landholding farmer families a fixed annual sum in three instalments.
    4. PM Ujjwala Yojana: A connection plus subsidy scheme for cooking gas, which distributed over 10 crore connections and moved the subsidy itself to the beneficiary’s account.
    5. Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, 2005: A rights based wage programme guaranteeing 100 days of work, with wages paid electronically into the worker’s own account.
    6. National Food Security Act, 2013: The statutory entitlement to subsidised grain, which also permits a State to substitute a cash transfer for the grain entitlement.

    Back2Basics: 16th Finance Commission

    1. Constitutional basis under Article 280: A constitutional body appointed under Article 280 to recommend how Union tax revenue is shared with the States and among them.
    2. Award period from 2026-27: Its recommendations cover the five years beginning 2026-27.
    3. Grants in aid and local body funds: It recommends the principles governing grants in aid to States from the Consolidated Fund of India, and the measures needed to augment State funds for panchayats and municipalities.
    4. Commissioned studies as the evidence base: Commissioned studies form part of the evidence base on which the transfer and grant architecture for the award period is fixed.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2022, GS2, 10 marks] Reforming the government delivery system through the Direct Benefit Transfer Scheme is a progressive step, but it has its limitations too. Comment.”

  • Seventh Gender Samvaad centres women’s leadership in rural livelihoods

    Why in News

    The Deendayal Antyodaya Yojana National Rural Livelihoods Mission (DAY NRLM) held the seventh Gender Samvaad on women’s agency in livelihoods.

    Core facts

    1. Theme: The edition focused on moving women from participation to leadership in livelihoods.
    2. Scale: Over 6 lakh stakeholders joined. Participation rose from 1,400 in April 2021 to near 6 lakh by September 2025.
    3. SHG base: The Self Help Group (SHG) movement represents over 100 million women.
    4. Lakhpati Didi: 346 million Lakhpati Didis earn over ₹1,00,000 a year. A Lakhpati Didi is an SHG woman with annual household income at or above ₹1 lakh.
    5. State models cited: Maharashtra’s Women Farmers’ Empowerment Bill recognises women without formal land titles. Odisha’s Bhubaneswar Declaration advances women’s land rights. Andhra Pradesh’s natural farming is led by women’s SHGs.
    6. Institution building: The focus is on strengthening Cluster Level Federations, Producer Groups and Farmer Producer Organisations (FPO). Governance, financial record keeping and credit readiness are flagged for the United Nations International Year of Women Farmers 2026.
    7. Entrepreneurship drive: The National Campaign on Entrepreneurship II runs from 21 August to 21 November 2026. It promotes enterprise development, value chains and market access for SHG women.

    Static Context

    1. DAY NRLM launched in 2011 as Aajeevika. It mobilises rural poor women into SHGs and their federations. The Ministry of Rural Development runs it.
    2. Gender Samvaad launched in April 2021. It is a joint platform of DAY NRLM and the Institute for What Works to Advance Gender Equality (IWWAGE). It shares gender practice across State Rural Livelihoods Missions.
    3. An SHG is a small voluntary savings and credit group, usually of 10 to 20 members. The SHG Bank Linkage Programme connects these groups to formal bank credit.

    Prelims angle

    DAY NRLM launch as Aajeevika in 2011 under the Ministry of Rural Development; Lakhpati Didi income threshold of ₹1 lakh; the SHG Bank Linkage Programme; distinction between Self Help Groups and Farmer Producer Organisations.

    Mains angle

    GS Paper 2, development processes and the role of SHGs. The theme fits a question on SHGs as vehicles of women’s economic empowerment and poverty reduction.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2012] How does the National Rural Livelihood Mission seek to improve livelihood options of rural poor?
    1. By setting up a large number of new manufacturing industries and agri-business centres in rural areas
    2. By strengthening ‘Self-Help Groups’ and providing skill development
    3. By supplying seeds, fertilizers, diesel pumpsets, and micro-irrigation equipment free of cost to farmers
    (a) 1 and 2 only
    (b) 2 only
    (c) 1 and 3 only
    (d) 1, 2 and 3
    Answer: (b)”

    “[2020, GS2, 15 marks] “Micro-Finance as an anti-poverty vaccine, is aimed at asset creation and income security of the rural poor in India”. Evaluate the role of Self Help Groups in achieving the twin objectives along with empowering women in rural India.”

  • Securing Farmers’ Future with Dignity: seven years of the farmer pension scheme

    Why in News

    The Pradhan Mantri Kisan Maandhan Yojana (PM KMY) completed seven years. PM KMY is a voluntary contributory pension scheme for small and marginal farmers.

    Core facts

    1. Launch: PM KMY launched on 12 September 2019.
    2. Core benefit: It assures a minimum pension of ₹3,000 per month from the age of 60.
    3. Enrolment: Total enrolment is 24,96,252 farmers as of February 2026. Haryana leads with 5.75 lakh. Bihar follows with 3.46 lakh.
    4. Outlay used: Government investment since 2019 is ₹540.66 crore.
    5. Administration: It is a Central Sector Scheme under the Department of Agriculture and Farmers Welfare. The Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC) is the pension fund manager.
    6. Eligibility: It covers farmers holding cultivable land up to two hectares. The entry age band is 18 to 40 years. Names must appear in land records as of 1 August 2019.
    7. Contribution: The farmer pays ₹55 to ₹200 per month by entry age. The government matches the farmer’s contribution equally.
    8. Family pension: A surviving spouse receives 50% of the pension, that is ₹1,500 per month.
    9. Exclusions: Income tax payers, registered professionals and beneficiaries of other pension schemes are barred. These other schemes include the National Pension System (NPS), the Employees State Insurance Corporation (ESIC), the Pradhan Mantri Shram Yogi Maandhan (PM SYM) and the Pradhan Mantri Laghu Vyapari Maandhan (PM LVM).
    10. Enrolment route: Enrolment runs through Common Service Centres using Aadhaar, a bank account and mobile One Time Password. A farmer may route PM KISAN benefits into the PM KMY contribution.

    Static Context

    1. PM KISAN is the Pradhan Mantri Kisan Samman Nidhi. It transfers ₹6,000 per year in three instalments to landholding farmer families.
    2. A Central Sector Scheme is funded fully by the Union government. A Centrally Sponsored Scheme splits funding between the Centre and the states.
    3. LIC is a statutory insurer. It was set up under the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956.

    Prelims angle

    PM KMY pension amount of ₹3,000 and entry age 18 to 40; LIC as the fund manager; the two hectare landholding ceiling; the distinction between Central Sector and Centrally Sponsored schemes; overlap bars with PM SYM and NPS.

    Mains angle

    GS Paper 2, welfare schemes for vulnerable sections. The scheme suits a question on old age income security for the unorganised and agrarian workforce.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2016] Regarding ‘Atal Pension Yojana’, which of the following statements is/are correct?
    1. It is a minimum guaranteed pension scheme mainly targeted at unorganized sector workers.
    2. Only one member of a family can join the scheme.
    3. Same amount of pension is guaranteed for the spouse for life after subscriber’s death.
    Select the correct answer using the code given below.
    (a) 1 only
    (b) 2 and 3 only
    (c) 1 and 3 only
    (d) 1, 2 and 3
    Answer: (c)”