💥Mains Ready By December. Smash Mains & Smash PYQ Admissions Open
Talk to Mentor

Civilsdaily

Login

Subject: Governance

Important aspects of Society

  • The political cost of UCT schemes

    Why in the News

    Unconditional cash transfer schemes aimed at women have become a standard electoral instrument in India since 2020, and the argument now is that they carry a political cost their designers cannot remove.

    What is an unconditional cash transfer scheme?

    1. Cash paid without a behavioural condition: The transfer reaches an identified beneficiary on eligibility alone, with no requirement to enrol a child, attend a clinic or perform work.
    2. The named State schemes: Kalaignar Magalir Urimai Thittam in Tamil Nadu, Lakshmir Bhandar in West Bengal and Gruha Lakshmi Yojana in Karnataka are the principal instances.
    3. The stated welfare purpose: The schemes provide financial support to women, and partially advance Sustainable Development Goal 5.4 (recognition and valuation of women’s unpaid domestic and care work).

    Why can beneficiary targeting not be made accurate?

    1. Incomes are not observable: Governments cannot directly observe the incomes of most workers in the informal sector.
    2. Proxies stand in for income: Eligibility is inferred from land ownership, electricity consumption or household assets.
    3. Both errors follow from the proxy: Inclusion errors send benefits to ineligible households. Exclusion errors leave eligible households out.

    What does the Kalaignar Magalir Urimai Thittam experience show?

    1. The promise was universal: Rs 1,000 a month was promised to all women-headed households before the 2021 election.
    2. The launch was restricted: Fiscal constraints produced eligibility limits on income, land ownership and other criteria at launch in September 2023, covering about 1.13 crore women.
    3. Expansion followed complaints, not review: Another 16.94 lakh beneficiaries were added in December 2025 after widespread complaints from women who believed they met the criteria. The scheme cost Rs 13,807 crore in 2025-26.
    4. The expansion did not settle the grievance: Women who considered themselves unfairly excluded became more aggrieved when beneficiaries received an advance of three months’ entitlement along with a special summer relief payment.

    Why does a perceived error cost as much as a real one?

    1. Belief drives grievance, not eligibility: An individual who fails the official criteria may still believe the treatment was unfair, and votes on that belief.
    2. Qualifying households attract resentment: A household that legally qualifies may be regarded as undeserving where it appears relatively affluent.
    3. The two logics pull in opposite directions: Economics favours targeting so that scarce public resources reach those most in need. Politics rewards broader inclusion, because voters weigh benefits they believe were unfairly denied to them.
    4. Small shifts decide outcomes: The precise electoral impact cannot be measured, and modest shifts in voter preference decide closely contested constituencies.

    What is the fiscal case against unconditional transfers?

    1. The national bill: States are expected to spend about $18 billion on unconditional cash transfers in 2025-26, according to the latest Economic Survey.
    2. The money is switched rather than raised: Financing requires expenditure switching or a larger fiscal deficit.
    3. Productive spending is displaced: Resources available for employment generation and self-employment programmes fall.
    4. Withdrawal is not an option once dependence sets in: Parties escalate the amount instead of ending the transfer, which produces competitive welfarism.

    Does a conditional design perform better?

    1. The benefit is tied to an outcome: Conditional and incentive-linked transfers link payment to a socially desirable behaviour, so the money buys a developmental gain alongside relief.
    2. Self-selection replaces verification: Participation in Tamil Nadu’s Midday Meal Scheme depends on school enrolment, so beneficiaries select themselves and grievances fall.
    3. The political cost falls with the targeting burden: A programme tied to education or another desirable behaviour needs no proxy means test, so it generates no perceived exclusion error.

    Challenges to unconditional cash transfers

    1. There is no current income record to target on: Welfare lists rest on a deprivation ranking that ages faster than household circumstances change. Eg. The Socio-Economic and Caste Census of 2011 remains the base for several central and State beneficiary lists.
      The Fix: Re-run the deprivation survey on a fixed cycle and publish the ranking rules, so exclusion can be contested against a stated test.
    2. Exclusion falls hardest on those without documents: Authentication failure removes a household that is eligible on every substantive criterion. Eg. Aadhaar authentication failures in ration distribution in Jharkhand’s Simdega district were linked to a starvation death in 2017.
      The Fix: Mandate an offline exception route at every disbursement point, with the exception count published monthly.
    3. The transfer amount is fixed in nominal terms and erodes: Inflation cuts the real value of a flat monthly figure that no rule revises. Eg. The maternity benefit under the Pradhan Mantri Matru Vandana Yojana has stayed at Rs 5,000 since 2017.
      The Fix: Index the transfer to the consumer price index with an automatic annual revision.
    4. Cash cannot substitute for a service that does not exist: A transfer lets a household buy a service only where a provider is present. Eg. A cash benefit cannot purchase schooling or primary care in a block that has neither a functioning school nor a health centre.
      The Fix: Pair every new transfer with a published service-availability audit for the districts it covers.

    Conclusion

    Targeting error is not an implementation defect in an unconditional cash transfer. It is a property of paying cash on an inferred income in an economy where income cannot be observed. The design therefore buys relief at a political price the government cannot negotiate down, and raising the amount does not buy it down either. The alternative on offer is not universality but conditionality: tie the payment to a behaviour the household chooses, and the household sorts itself.

    Cash Transfer Based Welfare in India

    1. About: Benefit is paid in cash directly into a beneficiary’s bank account in place of a subsidised good, a price support or an in-kind entitlement.
    2. The delivery rails: The Jan Dhan-Aadhaar-Mobile combination supplies the account, the identity and the confirmation, and the Public Financial Management System routes the payment.
    3. Where it began at scale: Cooking gas subsidy transfer under the PAHAL scheme in 2014-15 was the first large national rollout.
    4. Present spread: Direct Benefit Transfer now runs across more than 300 central schemes in addition to State transfers.

    Government Initiatives for Cash Transfer Based Welfare

    1. Pradhan Mantri Kisan Samman Nidhi: Rs 6,000 a year in three instalments to landholding farmer families, run by the Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers’ Welfare.
    2. National Social Assistance Programme: Old age, widow and disability pensions to below poverty line households, run by the Ministry of Rural Development.
    3. Direct Benefit Transfer Mission: Housed in the Cabinet Secretariat, it coordinates transfer implementation across ministries and maintains the scheme-wise public dashboard.

    [2022, GS2, 10 marks] Reforming the government delivery system through the Direct Benefit Transfer Scheme is a progressive step, but it has its limitations too. Comment.

  • Bihar makes consent mandatory for CBI to probe public servants

    Why in the News

    The Bihar Home Department has issued a notification regulating the jurisdiction of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) in the State under Section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946. It widens the agency’s standing general consent over offences involving employees of the Government of India, central Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs) and private persons implicated alongside them. A proviso then removes that automatic authority over public servants appointed in connection with the affairs of the Bihar government and over State-owned, State-controlled and State-aided bodies. The notification supersedes every previous notification on the subject. The result is a two-tier regime. The same agency needs no permission to investigate a central employee in Bihar. It needs case-by-case permission to investigate a State employee.

    What is consent under Section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946?

    1. The statute is the CBI’s source of police powers: The CBI cannot ordinarily exercise its powers and jurisdiction inside a State without that State government’s consent.
    2. Two forms of consent: General consent allows the agency to investigate specified offences or categories of cases without seeking permission each time. Specific consent is granted for an individual case.
    3. Consent is tied to a notified offence list: The offences the agency may investigate are notified under Section 3 of the Act, so a State’s general consent operates only over that notified list.

    What does the Bihar notification alter on each side of the line?

    1. The offence list under general consent is widened: Consent now covers offences under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, the Information Technology Act, 2000, cybercrime, and the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 as amended.
    2. Whom the wider consent covers: It applies to employees of the Government of India, employees of PSUs under the Government of India, and private persons implicated alongside them.
    3. The proviso carves out the State’s own establishment: Prior consent of the Bihar government is mandatory for any probe of public servants appointed in connection with the affairs of the State, and of persons in any corporation, company or bank owned by, controlled by, or receiving financial assistance from the State.
    4. The State decides each request individually: On receiving a proposal from the Delhi Special Police Establishment, the State government considers it and takes a decision on granting powers of investigation case by case.

    Why is the order read as widening the agency’s reach rather than curbing it?

    1. The two-pronged reading inside the police establishment: The stated reading is that the first part of the order lets the CBI investigate cases that were the State’s prerogative, and the second part balances that by requiring the State’s permission.
    2. It is read as a template for other States: The assessment within the agency is that Bihar may have set a precedent for other States, and that the order gives the CBI more scope rather than less.
    3. The consent bar binds the executive alone: The requirement of State consent applies only to executive action by the CBI. It does not restrict a High Court or the Supreme Court from ordering a CBI investigation within a State without the State government’s consent.

    Challenges to the general consent mechanism

    1. Consent is revocable at will and leaves probes suspended: A State can withdraw general consent at any time, and the agency must then seek permission for every fresh case in that State. Eg. West Bengal withdrew its general consent in November 2018 and has required case-by-case permission since.
      The Fix: Prescribe a statutory period within which a State must decide a case-by-case request, with reasons recorded for a refusal.
    2. The agency has no charter of its own: The CBI rests on a 1946 police establishment law and a 1963 executive resolution, so its very constitution has been litigated. Eg. The Gauhati High Court in Navendra Kumar v. Union of India (2013) held the 1963 resolution constituting the CBI to be invalid, and the Supreme Court stayed that order within days.
      The Fix: Enact a dedicated CBI statute fixing its composition, its jurisdiction over notified central offences and the limits of State consent.
    3. Corruption probes against State officials face two separate gates: Consent under Section 6 is only the first permission, and a further approval is needed before an inquiry into a public servant’s official decisions can begin. Eg. Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, inserted in 2018, requires prior approval of the competent authority before any enquiry into a recommendation made or decision taken by a public servant in discharge of official functions.
      The Fix: Run both approvals through a single time-bound window, so a refusal at either gate is recorded once and is appealable.
    4. Selective consent invites a political reading of every case: The State controls access to its own officials, so each grant or refusal is readable as a political act rather than a legal one. Eg. The Supreme Court described the agency as a “caged parrot speaking in its master’s voice” in the coal blocks allocation matter in 2013.
      The Fix: Publish an annual statement of consent requests received, granted, refused and pending, State by State, so the pattern is visible rather than inferred.
    5. Joint cases now straddle two consent regimes: One case involving a central employee and a State public servant is fully open on one accused and permission-dependent on the other, which splits a single investigation. Eg. A corruption case in a centrally funded scheme executed by a State department typically names officials of both.
      The Fix: Provide that where a case includes even one accused covered by general consent, the State decides on the whole case within a fixed period rather than on each accused separately.

    Conclusion

    The notification is in force and it supersedes every earlier consent order in the State. It settles nothing about the underlying arrangement, which lets the same agency be widened and fenced by a single executive order that no legislature debated. What is worth watching is whether other States adopt the split model, and whether Bihar attaches any timeline to the permissions it has now reserved to itself. A permission with no deadline is a refusal that never has to be written down.

    Back2Basics: Central Bureau of Investigation

    1. Constitution: The CBI was set up by a resolution of the Ministry of Home Affairs in 1963, and it is not a statutory body created by its own Act.
    2. Administrative control: It functions under the Department of Personnel and Training in the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions.
    3. Superintendence is split: For offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, superintendence vests in the Central Vigilance Commission. For all other matters it vests in the Central Government.
    4. Appointment of the Director: The Director is appointed on the recommendation of a committee of the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha and the Chief Justice of India or a Supreme Court judge nominated by the Chief Justice.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “The jurisdiction of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) regarding lodging an FIR and conducting probe within a particular State is being questioned by various States. However, the power of the States to withhold consent to the CBI is not absolute. Explain with special reference to the federal character of India.”

  • Census advanced in four poll-bound States, formally deferred in Manipur

    Why in the News

    The Union government has advanced the population enumeration phase of Census 2027 in the poll-bound States of Uttar Pradesh, Punjab, Uttarakhand and Goa, scheduling it from November 16, 2026 to January 4, 2027, ahead of the nationwide enumeration planned for February 2027. The same notification formally deferred the Census exercise in Manipur till further declaration. The reference date for the four States is fixed at 00.00 hours on January 5, 2027, against March 1 for the rest of the country and October 1, 2026 for Ladakh and the snow-bound areas of Uttarakhand, Jammu and Kashmir and Himachal Pradesh. The second phase carries 40 questions and includes an open-ended field for recording caste details. The tension is that a single count needs a single moment of reference, and the schedule now bends to the electoral calendar in four States and to a citizenship register demand in one.

    What does the revised schedule change?

    1. The legal basis: The notification was issued by the Registrar General and Census Commissioner of India under the Census Act, 1948.
    2. The order of operations in the four States: Residents have the option of self-enumeration through a dedicated portal between November 16 and November 30, ahead of the door-to-door survey, which begins on December 1.
    3. The revisional round: Population enumeration in the four States is followed by a revisional round from January 5 to January 9, 2027, immediately after the reference moment.
    4. The stated reason for the advance: The exercise is being completed in these four States before assembly elections due early next year.

    What does the second phase ask?

    1. The scale of the schedule: The second phase carries 40 questions, of which at least 13 are new compared with the 2011 Census.
    2. Caste is recorded without a fixed list: The schedule includes an open-ended field for caste details. Respondents may also decline to disclose their caste or state that they do not belong to any caste.
    3. The new identity and household questions: Spouse’s name, nationality, father’s particulars and mother’s particulars are being asked for the first time.
    4. The new asset, document and service questions: Digital literacy, permanent residential address, place of Covid-19 vaccination, number of bank accounts, passport number, availability of a driving licence and a mobile phone, and Aadhaar and voter ID numbers where available.

    Why has Manipur been left out?

    1. The deferral is open ended: The notification defers the Census exercise in the State indefinitely, with no revised date attached.
    2. The demand behind it: A large section of civil society groups from the Meitei and Naga communities has demanded that a National Register of Citizens (NRC) be compiled first, before the Census is undertaken in the ethnic violence-hit State.
    3. The communities involved: Manipur has three major communities, the Meitei, the tribal Naga and the Kuki-Zo, and the demand as reported comes from groups within two of them.
    4. What deferral costs: A State counted at a different time cannot be compared with the rest of the country on the same reference date, which is the property that makes Census data usable for allocation.

    What is the Opposition’s objection?

    1. The planning objection: The Congress has said the fresh notification shows shoddy planning, since the population enumeration due in February 2027 has been advanced in four States where elections were already known to be due.
    2. The timing objection: It has framed the sudden revision as driven by political calculation rather than statistical need, given how long the schedule had been settled.
    3. The caste question objection: It has argued that the caste question is deliberately very poorly designed and will render the whole caste census exercise meaningless.
    4. The procedural complaint: The Leaders of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha wrote to the Prime Minister on August 20, 2026 on the caste question, and no mid-course correction followed.

    Challenges to Census 2027

    1. An open-ended caste field cannot be aggregated: Self-reported caste names arrive in many spellings, synonyms and sub-group labels, and no total can be produced from them without a coding frame prepared in advance. Eg. The Socio Economic and Caste Census of 2011 threw up roughly 46 lakh distinct caste entries, and its caste data was never released.
      The Fix: Publish a draft State-wise caste list for public objection before enumeration, and code every response against that list at the point of collection.
    2. A delayed count ages every entitlement built on it: Welfare coverage fixed as a share of population continues to use the last enumerated population until a new one exists. Eg. Coverage under the National Food Security Act, 2013 remains anchored to the 2011 Census, so population added since then sits outside the ration entitlement.
      The Fix: Provide in the enumeration notification for automatic revision of population-linked entitlement ceilings once provisional totals are published.
    3. Self-enumeration presumes the capability being measured: A portal-first round shifts the first pass onto respondents who need a device, connectivity and the confidence to file. Eg. Digital literacy is itself one of the questions being asked in this schedule, which indicates it cannot be assumed across households.
      The Fix: Treat the portal response as one input into the door-to-door visit rather than as a substitute for it, and verify every self-filed record in the field round.
    4. The count competes with the election machinery for the same staff: Enumerators in India are largely school teachers and local officials, who are also the staff deployed on electoral roll work and poll duty. Eg. The advanced enumeration in the four States runs in the months immediately preceding their assembly elections.
      The Fix: Ring-fence the enumeration workforce from election duty for the enumeration and revisional rounds, and record the deployment so overlaps are visible.

    Conclusion

    The count is now running on two clocks, one set by the electoral calendar and one by the need for a common moment of reference. Comparability survives only if enumeration in each region closes cleanly before the next begins, and an advanced schedule in four States narrows that margin. The revisional round that follows the advanced enumeration is the last point at which its errors can be corrected. Manipur’s deferral carries no end date, so the country’s first count in over a decade will be incomplete until the demand that produced the deferral is settled.

    Back2Basics: Census Act, 1948

    1. It provides the legal basis for taking the Census in India and empowers the Centre to notify the schedule, the questions and the reference date.
    2. The exercise is conducted by the Registrar General and Census Commissioner of India, which functions under the Ministry of Home Affairs.
    3. Individual returns are confidential, are not open to inspection and are not admissible as evidence in any court; only aggregated data is published.
    4. Answering the Census questions is a legal obligation on the respondent, and giving false information or refusing to answer is a punishable offence.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “Consider the following statements : 1. Between Census 1951 and Census 2001, the density of the population of India has increased more than three times. 2. Between Census 1951 and Census 2001, the annual growth rate (exponential) of the population of India has doubled. Which of the statements given abova is/are correct ? (a) 1 only (b) 2 only (c) Both 1 and 2 (d) Neither 1 nor 2”

  • NAMASTE Cards distributed to waste pickers in Najafgarh zone

    NAMASTE Cards distributed to waste pickers in Najafgarh zone

    Why in News

    The Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment (MoSJE) inaugurated distribution of NAMASTE Cards to waste pickers in the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) Najafgarh Zone on 4 September 2026.

    Core facts

    1. Scheme name: NAMASTE stands for National Action for Mechanised Sanitation Ecosystem. It is a central scheme for the safety and dignity of sanitation workers.
    2. Implementing bodies: The scheme is run jointly by the MoSJE and the Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs (MoHUA).
    3. Event substance: Profiled waste pickers received NAMASTE identity cards. The cards formally recognise the worker and link the worker to scheme benefits.
    4. Officeholder: The distribution was inaugurated by the Union Minister of State for Social Justice and Empowerment. The individual identity is not material to the policy content.

    Static Context

    1. Objective: NAMASTE targets zero fatalities in sanitation work in India. It seeks to end direct human contact with faecal matter in sewer and septic tank cleaning.
    2. Coverage expansion: NAMASTE originally covered sewer and septic tank workers (SSWs). The scheme was later extended to enumerate and cover waste pickers. A national digital application for profiling waste pickers was launched on World Environment Day 2025.
    3. Benefits design: The scheme provides occupational profiling, Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) kits, Ayushman Bharat health cover, and a capital subsidy for sanitation related livelihoods.
    4. Predecessor: NAMASTE subsumed the earlier Self Employment Scheme for Rehabilitation of Manual Scavengers (SRMS).
    5. Governing law: Manual scavenging is prohibited under the Prohibition of Employment as Manual Scavengers and their Rehabilitation Act, 2013.

    Prelims angle

    1. Scheme full form and nodal ministries: NAMASTE is run by the MoSJE with the MoHUA. Expect a purpose or ministry match question.
    2. Beneficiary categories: Sewer and septic tank workers, and waste pickers. The waste picker inclusion is the newest hook.
    3. Benefit bundle: PPE, Ayushman Bharat health cover, capital subsidy, occupational profiling.
    4. Predecessor scheme: SRMS. Governing Act: Manual Scavengers Act, 2013.

    Mains angle

    GS Paper 2, welfare schemes for vulnerable sections. A question can frame the shift from a rehabilitation model (SRMS) to a mechanisation and formalisation model (NAMASTE), and ask whether profiling and card based inclusion secures the rights of informal sanitation workers.

    “[2016] Rashtriya Garima Abhiyaan’ is a national campaign to

    (a) rehabilitate the homeless and destitute persons and provide them with suitable sources of livelihood

    (b) release the sex workers from their practice and provide them with alternative sources of livelihood

    (c) eradicate the practice of manual scavenging and rehabilitate the manual scavengers

    (d) release the bonded labourers from their bondage and rehabilitate them.

  • Centre’s rationale for not using OBC lists for caste enumeration is flawed, say associations

    Centre’s rationale for not using OBC lists for caste enumeration is flawed, say associations

    Why in the News

    Associations representing Other Backward Classes (OBC) have rejected the Union government’s stated reason for not using the Central and State OBC lists in the caste enumeration component of the 2027 Census. The government’s position is that those lists record classes rather than castes, so caste names cannot be drawn and codified from them. Castes other than the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes will instead be recorded through an open column, in which the enumerator writes down what the respondent states. The associations argue that a government which recognises these communities as OBCs for reservation cannot disregard their caste identities when it collects population data. What is contested is whether an enumeration run without a pre-coded caste frame can produce a usable OBC population figure at all.

    How would the two methods of enumeration differ?

    1. The open column method: Castes other than the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes are recorded as stated by the respondent, without a pre-coded list of caste names for the enumerator to select from.
    2. The list based alternative: Caste names would have been drawn from the Central and State OBC lists and codified in advance, so responses map onto a fixed set of entries.
    3. Where the lists already exist: The Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes are enumerated against notified lists, which is the precedent the associations point to.

    What is the government’s reason, and how do the associations answer it?

    1. The stated rationale: The OBC lists identify backward classes rather than castes, so caste names cannot be lifted from them for enumeration.
    2. The associations’ core objection: The All India OBC Students’ Association (AIOBCSA) calls the class and caste distinction artificial, arguing that a government recognising these communities as OBCs for reservation and other affirmative action cannot then disregard their caste identities when collecting population data.
    3. Fix the lists rather than drop them: The associations say that if the existing lists are inadequate or carry inconsistencies for enumeration, the government should use experts to draw and rationalise the caste names from them, not “drop them altogether”.
    4. Administrative records already do both: The AIOBCSA points out that certificates and official records routinely identify communities by their specific social and caste identities, and that even Economically Weaker Section certificates identify the beneficiary through prescribed social or category criteria. Administrative classification and social identity therefore coexist in practice.
    5. A charge of bad faith: The OBC Public Representatives Forum said the justification adds to the perception that the government agreed to enumerate castes with no real intention of doing it properly.

    Why do the associations link this to the EWS estimate?

    1. The estimate behind EWS: When the Economically Weaker Section (EWS) quota was introduced, the government worked with an estimate that the population outside the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and OBCs was about 35 to 40 percent.
    2. What a rigorous count would do to it: The Backwards Classes Intellectual Forum argues that a scientific enumeration of OBC populations would show that estimate to be an overestimation.
    3. The alleged motive: The same body argues that the refusal to codify existing caste names and count caste group populations, as is done for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, is intended to cover up the basis on which EWS reservation was justified.

    Why has the OBC count been the core of the caste Census demand?

    1. The figure has never been counted: The OBC population across the country has only ever been estimated in India, based on the caste Census data of 1931.
    2. The demand was built on that gap: Enumerating the OBC population has historically been the principal argument driving the demand for a caste Census.
    3. The method is what is now questioned: Senior Opposition leaders have questioned the utility of the open column methodology for enumerating every caste other than the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes.

    Challenges to caste enumeration through an open column

    1. Free text responses multiply into unusable entries: A column with no pre-coded frame collects spellings, surnames, sub castes and clan names as separate answers, and classifying them afterwards becomes a second exercise larger than the count. Eg. The Socio Economic and Caste Census, 2011 returned roughly 46 lakh distinct caste and related entries, and its caste data was never released.
      The Fix: Publish a codified caste directory built from the Central and State lists and State commission reports before enumeration, and let the open column carry only the entries that directory does not hold.
    2. No single classification governs across States: Central and State OBC lists differ, so the same caste name can carry backward class status in one State and not in another or at the Centre. Eg. Jats were added to the Central OBC list in 2014 and the inclusion was set aside by the Supreme Court in Ram Singh versus Union of India (2015), while several States continue to list them.
      The Fix: Record the State of enumeration against each caste entry, so the count can be read against the list actually applicable to that respondent.
    3. Data collected without a publication commitment invites contest: A count whose tables and methodology are not released cannot settle any claim, and every group then disputes its own number. Eg. Bihar’s caste survey of 2023 was challenged in court, and several communities publicly disputed the figures recorded for them.
      The Fix: Fix a statutory deadline for publishing the caste tables together with the methodology note.
    4. Self declaration can be strategic: Where recognition carries reservation benefits, the answer given to an enumerator responds to the benefit rather than to the record. Eg. Sections of the Maratha community in Maharashtra have pressed for recognition as Kunbi in official records in order to access OBC reservation.
      The Fix: Cross check declared entries against existing caste certificate records at the tabulation stage rather than at the point of enumeration.

    Conclusion

    The same administration recognises these communities by caste for the purpose of reservation and declines to name them by caste for the purpose of counting. That is the contradiction the associations have put on the record, and no procedural reason offered so far reconciles the two positions. The decision also determines whether the coming enumeration produces a number that can be used in policy or one that has to be reclassified before anyone can read it. What to watch is whether a codified caste directory is issued to enumerators before fieldwork begins.

    Back2Basics: Economically Weaker Section reservation

    1. What it is: A 10 percent reservation in government jobs and educational institutions for economically weaker sections outside the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes.
    2. Its constitutional basis: It was introduced by the Constitution (One Hundred and Third Amendment) Act, 2019, inserting Articles 15(6) and 16(6).
    3. How eligibility is set: Eligibility rests on income and asset criteria notified by the government, not on social or educational backwardness.
    4. Its judicial status: The Supreme Court upheld the amendment in Janhit Abhiyan versus Union of India (2022) by a majority of three to two.

    [2022, GS2, 10 marks] Discuss the role of the National Commission for Backward Classes in the wake of its transformation from a statutory body to a constitutional body.

  • Govt has deferred Census in Manipur amid calls for NRC to be carried out

    Govt has deferred Census in Manipur amid calls for NRC to be carried out

    Why in the News

    The Union government has decided to defer the 2027 Census in Manipur. The decision followed a meeting of the Union Home Minister with the Governor and the Chief Minister of Manipur, and the State government said it came out of discussions on the demand that the Census be held only after a National Register of Citizens (NRC), a register of persons verified as Indian citizens, is implemented in the State. Meitei and Naga organisations want citizenship settled before any population figure is recorded. Kuki-Zo organisations want the reverse order, arguing that the Census is the credible data source against which citizenship allegations should be tested. The count is contested because the same figures will eventually decide how Assembly seats are shared between the valley and the hills.

    Why is the Census being opposed?

    1. Citizenship and demographic change: Meitei civil society groups in the valley and Naga communities in the hill districts allege that migration from Myanmar and elsewhere has altered Manipur’s demographic composition. They want an exercise distinguishing Indian citizens from illegal immigrants before population figures are recorded.
    2. Displacement from the ethnic conflict: Thousands remain displaced more than three years after the violence that began in May 2023. Meitei groups say a count taken while people live away from their homes would record the consequences of displacement rather than the underlying population pattern.
    3. Political representation: Census figures will eventually govern delimitation, and Manipur has had no fresh delimitation implemented since the 1970s.

    How old is the NRC demand?

    1. It predates the current conflict: The demand existed before the May 2023 violence, and the influx from Myanmar and the conflict later gave it a sharper political and security dimension.
    2. A joint memorandum in 2022: In June 2022 the Coordinating Committee on Manipur Integrity (COCOMI), representing Meitei civil society, and the United Naga Council (UNC) jointly demanded an NRC and a State Population Commission.
    3. The Assembly endorsed it twice: The Manipur Assembly adopted a resolution seeking both on 5 August 2022, and reaffirmed it on 1 March 2024.
    4. The growth figures the resolution cited: The resolution recorded population growth of 153.3 percent between 1971 and 2001 and 250.9 percent between 2001 and 2011 in the hill districts, against 94.8 percent and 125.4 percent respectively in the valley. Those figures do not by themselves establish illegal immigration.
    5. An institution was created: The State government constituted the Manipur State Population Commission in February 2023.

    What did the Myanmar crisis add?

    1. Displacement across the border: Fighting in Myanmar’s Chin State and adjoining areas after the 2021 military coup drove thousands across the border into India.
    2. Ethnic links on both sides of the border: Many of those arriving belonged to Chin and related communities with ethnic and familial ties to the Kuki-Zomi population in Manipur.
    3. The State government’s framing: The Manipur government linked the influx to new settlements, poppy cultivation, encroachment and demographic change.
    4. The counter position: Kuki organisations disputed that framing, arguing that legitimate Indian citizens were being conflated with recent arrivals from Myanmar.
    5. A border policy change: The Centre scrapped the Free Movement Regime with Myanmar in February 2024, citing security and demographic concerns.

    What are the Meitei and Naga groups demanding now?

    1. A fixed sequence: The UNC stated on 18 August, “NRC first: No Census, No Delimitation Before Implementation of NRC in Manipur.”
    2. An old base year: It demanded an NRC with 1951 as the base year, followed by the Census and then delimitation.
    3. The demand cuts across party lines: The State Congress president, himself a former Chief Minister, supported the demand for an NRC before the Census on 19 and 20 August, placing the two main parties broadly on the same side.

    Why do the Kuki-Zo groups oppose it?

    1. A national exercise, not a State one: The Kuki-Zo Council called an NRC before the Census “premature and unjustified”, stating on 23 August that there is no provision for a community or a State government to unilaterally initiate a separate NRC in one State.
    2. Allegations should be tested against data: It argued that the demand rests on unsubstantiated allegations about the Kuki-Zo community, and that such claims should be tested against credible demographic data. The Census is the appropriate source of that data.
    3. It supports delimitation on verified data: The Council has backed delimitation once verified demographic figures exist.
    4. The documentary cut off is the underlying fear: Kuki, Zomi and Chin communities straddle the India-Myanmar border, so a register built on an old documentary cut off could raise doubts about people who have lived in Manipur for generations.

    Why does delimitation matter so much here?

    1. The present seat split: Manipur has 60 Assembly seats, 40 in the valley and 20 in the hills.
    2. The demographic map behind it: The State’s 16 districts divide broadly into hills, where Nagas and Kuki-Zomis predominate, and the valley, where Meiteis are in the majority.
    3. The map is more than fifty years old: The present political map goes back to the 1973 delimitation, which was based on the 1971 Census.
    4. Manipur was left out of the last exercise: A national delimitation based on the 2001 Census ran between 2002 and 2008, and Manipur, Assam, Arunachal Pradesh and Nagaland were excluded after the Centre deferred it in 2008, citing security concerns and challenges to the credibility of the 2001 Census data in the region.
    5. The disputed 2001 figures: In nine hill subdivisions the increase between 1991 and 2001 was over 40 percent, and in four it exceeded 100 percent.
    6. What the valley’s political class fears: A new Census followed by delimitation could move the 40:20 distribution to something closer to 35:25 or 30:30.

    Can an NRC be held only in Manipur, and what else is the Centre weighing?

    1. The usual national sequence is stalled: A nationwide NRC is supposed to follow an update of the National Population Register (NPR), a register of usual residents, and the government has not notified the NPR to be taken up with the 2027 Census.
    2. No legal bar on a State specific exercise: Section 14A of the Citizenship Act, 1955 vests the power to compulsorily register citizens and maintain the National Register of Indian Citizens in the Centre. No statutory requirement makes simultaneous nationwide deployment necessary.
    3. The decision is political rather than legal: The Centre could in principle notify the exercise for a particular State or border region, and the recorded position is that this is a political call.
    4. An alternative route already exists: A High-Level Committee on Demographic Change, announced in May this year, is examining demographic change arising from illegal immigration and other abnormal causes, and will recommend policy, legislative and administrative measures. Its findings could form the basis of a policy specific to Manipur.

    Challenges to holding the Census in Manipur

    1. Displacement distorts where people are counted: An enumeration records a person where they are living on the reference date, so a district hosting relief camps absorbs the population of the district people fled. Eg. Displaced Kashmiri Pandit families have been counted in Jammu and Delhi rather than in their home districts across successive Censuses.
      The Fix: Record a home district field for persons enumerated in relief camps, so displacement is visible in the data instead of silently altering district totals.
    2. A register built on an old base year excludes documented residents: Citizenship registration turns on producing legacy documents, which the poorest and the most mobile are least able to hold. Eg. Assam’s updated register, worked against a 1971 cut off, left 19,06,657 persons out of the final list published in August 2019, and the appeals process has still not concluded.
      The Fix: Publish the documentary standard and a binding appeal timeline before enumeration begins, so exclusion is contestable within a fixed period.
    3. A deferred count leaves the State on stale data: Allocations for welfare programmes are pegged to Census population, so a State that is skipped keeps running on figures more than a decade old. Eg. Coverage under the National Food Security Act, 2013 is still fixed against the 2011 Census population.
      The Fix: Notify an alternative statutory data source, such as updated ration and electoral rolls, for allocations in the deferred State until enumeration is held.
    4. The credibility of the count is itself contested in the region: A count that any side believes is inflated cannot settle the question it is being deferred to answer. Eg. Nagaland recorded decadal growth of about 64 percent in the 2001 Census and a fall of about 0.6 percent in 2011, and the earlier count was widely described within the State as inflated.
      The Fix: Publish subdivision level growth anomalies alongside post enumeration survey results, so a disputed count is audited rather than defended.

    Conclusion

    Deferring the count postpones the dispute without resolving either question behind it. The two demands cannot be met on the same timetable, since one side wants citizenship settled before people are counted and the other wants the count to test the citizenship allegations. A deferral also leaves the State without the current population data that its own programmes and its own representation ultimately rest on. What to watch is whether the Centre fixes a date for enumeration in the State or lets the deferral run open ended.

    Back2Basics: National Register of Indian Citizens

    1. What it is: A register of persons verified as citizens of India, maintained by the Centre.
    2. Its statutory basis: Section 14A of the Citizenship Act, 1955 empowers the Centre to compulsorily register every citizen and to issue national identity cards.
    3. How it is meant to be built: The rules contemplate verification of the particulars collected in the National Population Register to sort residents into citizens and doubtful cases.
    4. Where it has been done: The only State level exercise so far was in Assam, carried out under Supreme Court supervision, with the final list published in 2019.

    “[2009] Consider the following statements :

    1. Between Census 1951 and Census 2001, the density of the population of India has increased more than three times.

    2. Between Census 1951 and Census 2001, the annual growth rate (exponential) of the population of India has doubled.

    Which of the statements given abova is/are correct ?

    (a) 1 only

    (b) 2 only

    (c) Both 1 and 2

    (d) Neither 1 nor 2

  • [4th September 2026] The Hindu OpED: For newborns, the answer is hospital plus home

    [4th September 2026] The Hindu OpED: For newborns, the answer is hospital plus home

    Question (2024, GS2): “In a crucial domain like the public healthcare system, the Indian State should play a vital role to contain the adverse impact of marketisation of the system. Suggest some measures through which the State can enhance the reach of public healthcare at the grassroots level.
    Linkage: The proposed solution to move a portion of newborn care back to the home is a direct attempt to “enhance the reach of public healthcare at the grassroots level”. This question prompts candidates to suggest structural measures to decentralise care, relieving the burden on overloaded urban hospitals.

    Mentor Comment

    Three newborns died in an accidental fire at the government women’s hospital in Amravati, Maharashtra. That episode is placed alongside a list of clustered newborn deaths in government institutions since 2017, running from BRD Medical College in Gorakhpur and a government hospital in Ahmedabad through JK Lon Hospital in Kota, and on to district and medical college hospitals in Shahdol, Bhandara, Bhopal, Ambikapur, Nanded, Jhansi and Budaun. The argument drawn from that list is that these are a recurring pattern produced by the system, not a series of isolated accidents. The tension is that the policy success which moved birth out of the home is what has overloaded the units that receive the sick newborn, and the proposed answer is to move part of newborn care back to the home.

    What is home based newborn care?

    1. Trained community health workers deliver care where the baby is: They identify and manage neonatal infections at home, support breastfeeding and warmth, and manage low birth weight and preterm babies.
    2. It is already a package inside the public system: The Ministry of Health and Family Welfare adopted it in 2011, and roughly 8,00,000 Accredited Social Health Activists (ASHAs) have been trained on modules built from the Gadchiroli experience.
    3. It does not replace intensive care: A baby with severe prematurity, respiratory distress, shock, severe sepsis or serious birth asphyxia needs immediate facility based treatment.

    Why are newborn deaths clustering in government units?

    1. Overcrowding is the first reason: Institutional deliveries rose from 39 percent in 2005-06 to 90 percent in 2023-24 under the National Family Health Survey-6, and the absolute number of institutional deliveries rose from 109 lakh to 194 lakh. Admissions to public Special Newborn Care Units (SNCUs), the secondary level units that treat sick newborns, rose 28 percent in two years, from 11.3 lakh in 2021-22 to 14.45 lakh in 2023-24.
    2. The case mix has become sicker: Government hospitals now receive premature, low birth weight and sick newborns referred from peripheral facilities, alongside the normal deliveries they always handled.
    3. Infrastructure failure is the third reason: The Gorakhpur deaths of August 2017 were attributed by a district level inquiry to oxygen deprivation following an interruption in supply. Fires at Bhandara in January 2021, Bhopal in November 2021 and Jhansi in November 2024 show the electrical and fire risk in units running warmers, incubators and ventilators.
    4. Infection and staffing form the fourth: Inadequate nurse-to-baby ratios, equipment shortages and weak infection prevention practice let hospital acquired infection spread quickly through a crowded unit.

    What is the evidence that care at home works?

    1. A field trial cut neonatal mortality by 62.2 percent: The Society for Education, Action and Research in Community Health (SEARCH) ran the trial in rural Gadchiroli using trained community health workers, and published the result in The Lancet in 1999.
    2. Most small babies were managed without a bed: Between 1996 and 2003, 97 percent of low birth weight and preterm babies in Gadchiroli, including those above 1,800 g and beyond 34 weeks of gestation, were managed at home with a very low case fatality rate, published in the Journal of Perinatology in 2005.
    3. The delivery channel already exists nationally: India does not have to invent a system, so the binding constraint is training, supervision and support of the workers already deployed.

    What is the three part strategy proposed?

    1. Decongest the neonatal units: Strengthen home based care by ASHAs so that appropriate, stable newborns receive care at home rather than occupying a scarce SNCU bed.
    2. Staff and equip the units properly: Adequate numbers of doctors and nurses, appropriate nurse-to-baby ratios, functioning equipment, reliable oxygen and electricity with backup systems, and rigorous infection prevention.
    3. Make the units intrinsically safe: Fire detection and suppression systems, electrical and oxygen system safety measures, emergency evacuation drills and independent safety audits, all made mandatory rather than advisory.

    Challenges to home based newborn care

    1. The worker carrying the package is not an employee: An ASHA is an honorary volunteer paid through task linked incentives, so an expanded clinical role rests on availability that is not contractually owed. Eg. The fixed monthly incentive for routine tasks is Rs 2,000, with the remainder paid activity by activity.
      The Fix: Create a semi-formal cadre under the National Health Mission with a fixed salary component, insurance and pension attached to the newborn care role.
    2. Skill retention needs supervision that is not staffed: A worker trained once and never observed loses the clinical judgement the package depends on. Eg. The Auxiliary Nurse Midwives who supervise ASHAs also carry immunisation, antenatal and reporting duties at the same sub-centre.
      The Fix: Fund a dedicated supervisory post per cluster of workers with a fixed monthly schedule of observed home visits.
    3. Home care fails when referral fails: A baby that deteriorates at home needs transport and a bed within hours, and neither is guaranteed. Eg. A newborn deteriorating at night depends on a district ambulance network reached through the 102 service.
      The Fix: Link every worker to a live bed availability record for her referral unit and a guaranteed transport response window.
    4. The model was proven rural and remains rural: Urban newborns in slum and peri-urban households sit largely outside the package. Eg. Urban worker deployment norms are pitched at one worker per 1,000 to 2,500 slum population, and non-slum urban households fall outside that count.
      The Fix: Extend the package through urban primary health centres with a stated urban deployment norm and a defined household list.

    Conclusion

    Institutional delivery moved birth out of the home and saved both mothers and babies. It did not create the capacity to look after every newborn who arrives with the mother. The next phase has to divide the work, sending the sick newborn to a unit that is staffed and safe and keeping the stable newborn with a trained worker at home. The measure to watch is whether SNCU admissions fall and neonatal mortality keeps falling, since that combination is what separates decongestion from denial of care.

    Newborn and Child Health in India

    1. The mortality position: The Neonatal Mortality Rate stands at about 17 per 1,000 live births, the Infant Mortality Rate at about 25 and the Under-5 Mortality Rate at about 28 per 1,000 live births.
    2. Maternal mortality has fallen alongside it: The Maternal Mortality Ratio is about 80 per lakh live births.
    3. Immunisation coverage is high: Full immunisation coverage reached 93.5 percent under Mission Indradhanush 5.0.
    4. The disease mix has shifted: The share of communicable, maternal and neonatal conditions in India’s total disease burden fell to 33 percent, from 61 percent in 1990.

    Government Initiatives for Newborn and Child Health

    1. Janani Shishu Suraksha Karyakram: Provides free and cashless treatment to sick infants up to one year of age in government institutions, covering drugs, diagnostics and transport.
    2. Rashtriya Bal Swasthya Karyakram: Screens children for the four Ds, meaning defects at birth, deficiencies, diseases and developmental delays, with tertiary care for those identified.
    3. Mission Indradhanush 6.0: Targets 95 percent full immunisation coverage and tracks every pregnant woman and child through the U-WIN portal.
    4. Saksham Anganwadi and Poshan 2.0: Delivers supplementary nutrition aimed at reducing stunting and wasting among children under six.

    Key Facts about Newborn and Child Health

    1. National Newborn Week is observed from 15 to 21 November each year.
    2. The India Newborn Action Plan, 2014 set the goal of a single digit neonatal mortality rate by 2030.

    Challenges in Newborn and Child Health

    1. Specialist posts at the referral tier stay unfilled: A district newborn unit needs a paediatrician on its roster, and the sanctioned post is often vacant. Eg. Rural Community Health Centres carry a shortfall of about 80 percent against sanctioned specialist posts.
      The Fix: Build district paediatric cadres with a rural service obligation tied to postgraduate admission.
    2. Nursing supply is the binding constraint on every unit level standard: A nurse-to-baby ratio cannot be enforced where the nurses do not exist. Eg. India needs an additional 6.5 lakh nurses by 2030 to meet basic World Health Organization staffing norms.
      The Fix: Fund nursing school expansion in the districts with the highest birth volumes rather than in State capitals.
    3. Public health spending sits below its own policy target: Unit upgrades compete with every other demand inside a constrained health budget. Eg. Public health expenditure stands at about 1.9 percent of gross domestic product against the National Health Policy, 2017 target of 2.5 percent.
      The Fix: Ring-fence a newborn care line within National Health Mission allocations so unit safety upgrades are not crowded out.

    Back2Basics

    1. Janani Suraksha Yojana was launched in 2005 under the National Rural Health Mission, now the National Health Mission.
    2. It is a conditional cash transfer paid to promote institutional delivery among poor pregnant women.
      • Its benefits are differentiated between low performing and high performing States, and between rural and urban beneficiaries.
    3. The ASHA is its link worker, escorting the woman to the facility for a performance linked incentive.

  • More than 40 crore Indians are caught in a healthcare gap: panel

    Why in the News

    More than 40 crore Indians, over a quarter of the population, are covered neither by government health insurance nor by private cover, a Parliamentary Standing Committee on Health and Family Welfare has found. Its report, Affordability and Accessibility of Healthcare Facilities in Public and Private Sector, was presented to Parliament last month and carries 368 recommendations. The group it identifies sits above the eligibility line for fully subsidised cover and below the income at which private care is affordable. The committee’s conclusion is that insurance alone cannot close that gap, and that the fix lies in public capacity and in regulation of private prices.

    What is the ‘missing middle’ in health coverage?

    1. It is a group defined by exclusion from both systems: These households are too well off to rely on government subsidies and not financially secure enough to absorb the rising cost of private care.
    2. Its size is over a quarter of the population: More than 40 crore people fall into it, sitting between the poorest, who hold government protection, and the affluent, who can buy private care.
    3. The risk it faces is attrition, not catastrophe: The threat is the slow erosion of household income through medicines, consultations, tests and repeated treatment, rather than a single large hospital bill.

    Where do Indians actually seek care, and at what price?

    1. The private sector delivers most of the care: Over 60 percent of inpatient care and 70 percent of outpatient care is provided by private facilities, so households without financial protection meet private prices directly.
    2. Medicines are the single largest drain: They account for nearly 30 percent of current health expenditure.
    3. Chronic illness converts a cost into a recurring one: For a person with diabetes, hypertension or cardiovascular disease, medicines, consultations and diagnostic tests become a lifelong expense, and the non-communicable disease burden is climbing steadily.
    4. Childbirth shows the gap in one comparison: Average out-of-pocket spending is Rs 37,630 in private facilities against Rs 2,299 in public ones, more than sixteen times higher.

    What does the financing record show?

    1. Public spending sits below the policy’s own target: Government health expenditure is 1.43 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) against the 2.5 percent target set by the National Health Policy, 2017.
    2. Health’s share of the budget is shrinking: It fell from 6.12 percent of total government expenditure in 2021-22 to 4.89 percent in 2022-23, below the 5.02 percent recorded in 2019-20.
    3. The shortfall lands on households: Public capacity that is not built is care that is bought privately, which is what converts a spending decision into an out-of-pocket bill.

    Why does insurance alone not close the gap?

    1. Government cover is targeted at the poorest: Ayushman Bharat Pradhan Mantri Jan Arogya Yojana (PM-JAY) protects vulnerable households against hospitalisation costs, and the missing middle falls outside fully subsidised coverage.
    2. Private cover carries its own filters: A household that buys a policy still faces premiums, exclusions, waiting periods and co-payments.
    3. Both instruments insure the wrong event: Hospitalisation cover does not reach outpatient consultations, diagnostics and medicines, which is where this group’s expenditure actually accumulates.

    What has the committee recommended?

    1. A single regulatory floor for private providers: Nationwide implementation of the Clinical Establishments Act, so registration and minimum standards apply uniformly rather than State by State.
    2. Mandatory quality standards: Facilities would be held to a defined standard of services as a condition of operation rather than as a voluntary accreditation.
    3. Price transparency in private facilities: Rates for procedures, consultations and diagnostics would be published and displayed.
    4. Curbs on retail pharmacy practice: The report flags excessive trade margins and the non-prescription sale of antibiotics, and recommends stronger audits and enforcement.
    5. Stronger public healthcare infrastructure: The committee argued for building public capacity directly rather than relying on insurance to purchase care from private providers.

    Challenges to closing the missing middle

    1. A contributory product for this group has failed to launch before: The design has been proposed repeatedly and never converted into a national scheme with take-up. Eg. A NITI Aayog report in 2021 proposed extending PM-JAY to the missing middle on a contributory basis, and no national product followed it.
      The Fix: Collect the premium through an existing payment channel the household already uses, so enrolment does not depend on a separate voluntary transaction.
    2. The Clinical Establishments Act is not in force everywhere: Health is a State subject, so the central Act applies only where a State has adopted it. Eg. Large States including Karnataka, Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra regulate through their own statutes instead.
      The Fix: Tie a share of National Health Mission funds to adoption of a common minimum standard, whichever statute a State chooses to enforce it under.
    3. Transparency without a ceiling changes little: A published rate does not restrain a price where the patient is in no position to shop. Eg. Ceiling prices set by the National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority cover scheduled medicines, and non-scheduled formulations sit outside that control.
      The Fix: Extend price capping to the high volume diagnostics and consumables that make up the bulk of a private bill.
    4. Cheap medicine supply is a fraction of the retail network: A generic price ceiling reaches a household only where a generic outlet exists. Eg. Jan Aushadhi Kendras number about 15,000 against roughly nine lakh retail pharmacies.
      The Fix: Mandate prescription by generic name and stock the full essential drug list at every public facility, so the public system itself becomes the cheap outlet.
    5. Human resources, not finance, cap public capacity: Money released for a facility does not produce the specialist who has to staff it. Eg. Rural Community Health Centres run with a shortfall of roughly 80 percent against sanctioned specialist posts.
      The Fix: Create a public health management cadre so clinical posts are not consumed by administrative duty.

    Conclusion

    The committee’s finding is not that coverage is absent. It is that coverage is built around hospitalisation. The expense that erodes household income is recurring and outpatient. Closing that requires a financing instrument that pays for consultations, diagnostics and medicines, and no such instrument operates at scale today. Whether the committee’s recommendations produce one, or produce another set of standards for private providers to display, is what the government’s action taken reply will show.

    Back2Basics

    1. The Clinical Establishments (Registration and Regulation) Act, 2010 provides for the registration and regulation of all clinical establishments, public and private, across recognised systems of medicine.
    2. Health is a State subject, so the Act operates in the Union Territories and in States that adopt it by resolution, and several States regulate under their own laws instead.
    3. It prescribes minimum standards of facilities and services as a condition of registration.
    4. It requires establishments to display their rates and to maintain and report records to the National Council for Clinical Establishments.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2024, GS2, 15 marks] In a crucial domain like the public healthcare system, the Indian State should play a vital role to contain the adverse impact of marketisation of the system. Suggest some measures through which the State can enhance the reach of public healthcare at the grassroots level.”

  • ‘OBC lists were not used for Census as they featured classes, not castes’

    Why in the News

    The Union government has settled the 2027 Census on an open column method of recording caste, under which every caste outside the Presidential Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe lists is written down as the household states it. The Central and State lists of Other Backward Classes (OBCs) were considered as the alternative and rejected, on the recorded ground that the list of OBCs is a list of classes and not a list of castes. The Union Cabinet had approved the inclusion of caste in the Census forms a year after the Opposition campaigned for a caste census, and the need to enumerate the OBC population was that campaign’s main argument. The method now chosen produces no OBC count of its own, which is the point the Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha and the Congress president are contesting. This is the first Census to enumerate caste beyond the Scheduled lists since 1931.

    What is the open column method of caste enumeration?

    1. The household’s own answer is recorded: The enumerator writes the caste name as it is stated, without matching it against a list drawn up in advance.
    2. The Scheduled categories stay list based: Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe communities continue to be enumerated against the corresponding Presidential lists, as has always been done.
    3. Classification is a separate, later step: The raw names collected are grouped into categories after enumeration is complete, rather than at the doorstep.

    Why were the Central and State OBC lists rejected?

    1. Several entries name something other than a caste: The lists carry entries describing occupational groups, settler groups, and a specific class of labourers.
    2. The examples cited are concrete: Officials pointed to “local borns” in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and tea garden workers in Assam.
    3. Such entries are a minority of the lists: They sit among nearly 3,000 communities classified as OBC across the Central and State lists.
    4. The same community changes category across States: Several communities carried on OBC lists are classified as Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe depending on the State.
    5. The State survey route was assessed on the same test: The problem surfaced when the government examined whether the methodology of State conducted caste surveys, such as those in Bihar and Telangana, could be replicated nationally.

    What is the objection to the open column?

    1. It yields no enumerated list of communities: OBC groups and Opposition leaders want the communities named, listed and counted specifically rather than written in freehand.
    2. The 2011 precedent is the stated worry: The Socio Economic and Caste Census of 2011 threw up over 46 lakh caste names, which critics expect an open column to reproduce.
    3. The government has used that same result before: It cited the 46 lakh names as its reason for not releasing the caste data from that exercise.
    4. The utility of the method is what is questioned: The objection is not that the count will not happen, but that its output will not be usable for policy.

    Does the government’s own record support the reason it gave?

    1. A statutory body concluded the opposite: A 2015 National Commission for Backward Classes document held that a caste can be, and quite often is, a social class in India.
    2. That document treated caste as the workable starting unit: It recorded that caste represents an existing, identifiable social group, and that an exercise can begin there and then extend to other groups, sections and classes.
    3. The choice was made at the top of the system: Officials involved in the methodology recorded that each option carried its own advantages and drawbacks, and that the open column was finalised only after the alternatives were considered at the highest levels.

    Challenges to caste enumeration through an open column

    1. Spelling and synonym variants inflate the count: One community is recorded under several names across districts, dialects and languages, and each variant enters the data as a separate entity. Eg. Bihar’s 2023 caste survey recorded 215 distinct castes because its enumerators worked from a fixed list rather than a blank field.
      The Fix: Publish a standardised State wise caste directory before enumeration and map every write-in entry to it during data processing.
    2. The classification authority is not named in advance: Grouping raw names into Backward Class and other categories is a decision taken after the count by a body the enumeration design does not identify. Eg. An expert group was constituted in 2015 to classify the caste data collected in the 2011 exercise, and that data was never released.
      The Fix: Notify the classifying authority, its composition and its publication timetable before the first form is filled.
    3. Self reported caste responds to incentive: A household may report the name that improves its standing or its eligibility rather than the one it ordinarily uses. Eg. Karnataka’s 2015 socio economic and educational survey drew objections from dominant communities over its recorded counts and stayed unpublished for years.
      The Fix: Verify a sample of write-in entries against household level administrative records before the totals are finalised.
    4. The quality of the answer rests on the enumerator: A caste question asked without a fixed probe sequence produces a sub-caste from one household and a broader cluster name from its neighbour. Eg. Census enumeration is carried out by roughly 30 lakh school teachers and government staff deployed for a few weeks.
      The Fix: Script the caste question with a mandatory probe sequence and test every enumerator on it before deployment.

    Conclusion

    The method of collection is now settled. What is not settled is who converts several lakh written answers into a list of communities, and by what rule. That step, and not the column on the form, is what decides whether the exercise produces a usable Backward Class number at all. It sits outside the methodology the government has announced, and it has no published owner.

    Back2Basics

    1. The Census is conducted under the Census Act, 1948 and the rules framed under it, which make participation compulsory and the individual returns confidential.
    2. It is carried out by the Office of the Registrar General and Census Commissioner of India, which functions under the Ministry of Home Affairs.
    3. It is decennial, and the last completed round was in 2011, the 2021 round having been deferred.
    4. The 2027 round runs in two phases, houselisting followed by population enumeration, with a reference date of 1 March 2027 and 1 October 2026 for snow bound areas.

    “[2023, GS1, 15 marks] Why is caste identity in India both fluid and static?

  • Quality elementary teachers are vital to lives of children, nation-building: top court

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court has added teacher education institutions and the National Council for Teacher Education (NCTE) as the sixth and seventh duty bearers of the right to free and compulsory elementary education. A Division Bench held that free and compulsory education for children aged six to fourteen has attained the status of an enforceable fundamental right, and that teacher education has not been given the attention it deserves. The ruling came on an appeal against a Delhi High Court order of 13 March 2023, which had held the NCTE’s Public Notice of 22 September 2019 to be arbitrary and illegal. That notice requires every teacher education institution to file an annual Performance Appraisal Report. The contest was over the source of the power: the notice was challenged on the ground that only the Council itself, and not its Executive Committee, could issue and implement it.

    What is the National Council for Teacher Education?

    1. A statutory regulator of the teacher supply chain: It is constituted under the National Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993 to achieve the planned and coordinated development of the teacher education system in the country.
    2. It regulates the institutions that train teachers: A teacher education institution is defined in Section 2(e) of that Act as an institution offering a course or training in teacher education.
    3. It sets the qualifications a teacher must hold: Section 23 of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 makes it the academic authority for laying down the minimum qualifications for appointment as a teacher.

    Who are the duty bearers of the right to elementary education?

    1. Five were already recognised: Judicial precedent had identified the government, the local authority, the neighbourhood school, the parents or guardians, and the teacher.
    2. Teacher education institutions become the sixth: The institutions defined in Section 2(e) now carry a duty toward the right, rather than only a licensing relationship with their regulator.
    3. The Council becomes the seventh: It is required to ensure that those institutions function effectively and efficiently and conduct their affairs with integrity.
    4. The addition changes what is justiciable: A duty bearer’s failure is actionable, so a lapse in the training of teachers is now capable of being pleaded as a failure of the right itself.

    What did the Court hold on the power to demand appraisal reports?

    1. The Public Notice is legal and valid: The Court upheld the requirement that institutions upload an annual Performance Appraisal Report, and set aside the High Court order that had quashed it.
    2. The Executive Committee acted within jurisdiction: The Court found ample empowerment in both the Council and its Executive Committee to call for the report.
    3. The power is incidental and ancillary: A regulatory measure of this kind flows from the duties and functions of a regulator even without a specific empowerment in the statute.
    4. The regulator is itself appraised: The NCTE undergoes a performance audit by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG), so requiring the same discipline from institutions it regulates follows from its own position.

    Why does the Court place teacher training at the centre of the right?

    1. No resource ranks higher than a student’s mind and character: The Court held that elementary school teachers carry the most important role in nation-building and are to be treated with respect and care.
    2. The entitlement is only as good as the person delivering it: A right to education delivered by an untrained teacher is formally satisfied and substantively empty, which is why the regulator of training is being read into the right.
    3. Accountability of institutions is the stated purpose: The Court recorded that it is necessary for the Council and its bodies to ensure accountability of educational institutions.

    Challenges to the National Council for Teacher Education

    1. Recognition ran ahead of capacity: Approval was granted to private institutions at a pace that outstripped any ability to verify what they actually taught. Eg. The Justice J.S. Verma Commission on Teacher Education reported in 2012 that a large number of private institutions were commercial rather than academic in character.
      The Fix: Tie continued recognition to a published appraisal score reviewed on a fixed cycle, so approval becomes renewable rather than permanent.
    2. Retrospective validation weakens the standard: Recognition granted after the fact rewards institutions that ran courses without approval. Eg. The National Council for Teacher Education (Amendment) Act, 2019 conferred retrospective recognition and permission on specified institutions.
      The Fix: Bar retrospective recognition outright and require approval to be in place before an academic session opens.
    3. Quality is measured only at the exit, and only by the State: The regulator holds no outcome data on the graduates its recognised institutions produce. Eg. Pass rates in teacher eligibility tests have generally stayed under a fifth of the candidates appearing.
      The Fix: Publish institution wise eligibility test pass rates, so the appraisal report carries an outcome measure rather than a compliance declaration.
    4. Enforcement rests on self reported filings: A report filed by the institution about itself carries no independent verification. Eg. The Council reaches institutions across every State through four regional committees.
      The Fix: Sample audit a fixed share of filed reports each year through State education departments, with recognition suspended on a false filing.

    Conclusion

    The Court has widened the set of actors who owe a duty under the right to elementary education. It has not created the instrument that measures whether that duty is being met. The appraisal report is now the only candidate for that role. Whether it becomes a published, comparable record of what an institution produces, or settles into an annual compliance filing, is what will decide whether the two new duty bearers carry a duty in substance.

    Back2Basics

    1. The Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 gives statutory effect to Article 21A, which was inserted by the Constitution (Eighty-sixth Amendment) Act, 2002.
    2. Section 12(1)(c) requires private unaided schools to reserve 25 percent of entry level seats for children from disadvantaged groups and weaker sections.
    3. It bars screening procedures and capitation fees at the point of admission.
    4. It requires a School Management Committee in every government and aided school, with three fourths of its members drawn from parents and guardians.

    “[2018] Consider the following statements:

    1. As per the Right to Education (RTE) Act, to be eligible for appointment as a teacher in a State, a person would be required to possess the minimum qualification laid down by the concerned State Council of Teacher Education.

    2. As per the RTE Act, for teaching primary classes, a candidate is required to pass a Teacher Eligibility Test conducted in accordance with the National Council of Teacher Education guidelines.

    3. In India, more than 90% of teacher education institutions are directly under the State Governments

    Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

    (a) 1 and 2

    (b) 2 only

    (c) 1 and 3

    (d) 3 only