💥Join UPSC 2027,2028 Mentorship (July Batch) + XFactor Notes & Microthemes PDF
Talk to Mentor

Civilsdaily

Login

Subject: International Relations

  • Understanding the anxieties behind Chinese aggression towards India

    Context

    Chinese President Xi Jinping made a surprise visit to Tibet on July 21, signalling the seriousness with which China continues to take its Himalayan border dispute with India.

    Understanding China’s strategic challenges and intensions

    • Demonstration of political confidence through aggression: More than a year after the clash at Galwan Valley, efforts to resolve the border crisis continue to move slowly.
    • The Chinese side has previously failed to complete troop withdrawals and revert to the status quo that the Indian side believed China agreed to.
    • China’s behaviour has been calculated to demonstrate political confidence.
    • Worsening strategic environment for China: Seen from Beijing, the strategic environment for China is beginning to worsen in South and Central Asia.
    • As the US withdraws and the Taliban advances in Afghanistan, China fears the prospect of instability and an emerging haven for terrorism directed against its policies in Xinjiang.
    • Even as China seeks to scale back the debt-laden BRI, such instability may also result in Beijing increasing its already overstretched external commitments — particularly in the security domain.
    • Re-emergence of Quad: China is deeply worried by the re-emergence and strengthening of multilateral opposition to China, and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (or “Quad”) between the US, Japan, Australia and India.
    • For China, this represents a persistent threat not only economically and in foreign policy, but also militarily along its maritime periphery in the South and East China Seas, as well as the Taiwan Strait.
    • As US multilateral cooperation with its partners has increased, Beijing has come to increasingly see itself as beset by threats on all sides.

    China’s 2 possible responses to strategic challenges and its implications for India

    • 1) Wolf warrier diplomacy: So far, the response from China’s new class of “wolf warrior” diplomats to this emerging strategic challenge has been to only grow more assertive in rhetoric and behaviour.
    • China’s domestic politics: Response of wolf warrior diplomats may seem perplexing, given that it has served only to alienate other countries and isolate China further.
    •  China’s domestic politics in the lead up to the 20th Congress will mean that its leaders, diplomats and generals will be displaying maximum nationalistic fervour.
    • Implications for India: This may well mean China taking political and policy decisions, which in a normal season they would not because doing so could compromise Beijing’s longstanding diplomatic and strategic goals, including in dealings with India.
    • 2) Moderate approach to improve strategic position: But if instead of aggressive posture, China decided that it was better domestic politics to improve China’s strategic position in Asia amid its competition with Washington, Beijing’s diplomats may yet adopt a more moderate approach, including with India.
    • Implications for India: If stability can be restored to the China-India strategic relationship, this could provide a window for Asia’s two mega-economies to reopen their markets to each other.

    Conclusion

    Indeed, the choice China makes between these two alternatives will have implications for India and the rest of the world in their dealing with China.

    Feeling anxious about your UPSC preparation? Don’t worry, speak with our mentors and get your problems resolved, personally! (Click here)

  • [pib] Forum of the Election Management Bodies of South Asia (FEMBoSA)

    The Election Commission of India has handed over the Chair of FEMBoSA to the Election Commission of Bhutan for 2021-22.

    What is FEMBoSA?

    • Forum of the Election Management Bodies of South Asia (FEMBoSA) was established at the 3rd Conference of Heads of Election Management Bodies (EMBs) of SAARC Countries in 2012.
    • The forum aims to increase mutual cooperation with respect to the common interests of the SAARC’s EMBs.
    • The Forum has eight Member Election Management Bodies from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.
    • The Election Commission of India was the latest Chair of the Forum (now Bhutan).

    Its establishment

    • The first meeting of the representatives of Election Management Bodies of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal and Pakistan was held in Dhaka, Bangladesh in the year 2010.
    • It was then decided at the conclusion that an organization representing those countries should be established.
    • Consequently, annual meets were held in the member countries and the charter for the organization also was adopted with the aim of fulfilling the objectives of the organization.
    • Since the creation of FEMBoSA, Annual Meetings were held in Pakistan (2011), in India (2012), in Bhutan (2013), in Nepal (2014),  in Sri Lanka (2015), in Maldives (2016), in Afghanistan (2017) and in Bangladesh(2018).

    Objectives of FEMBOSA

    • Promote contact among the Election Management Bodies of SAARC countries
    • Facilitate the appropriate exchange of experience and expertise among members
    • Share experiences with a view to learning from each other
    • Foster efficiency and effectiveness in conducting the free, fair, transparent, and participative election

    Significant activities under FEMBoSA

    • Member organizations celebrate National Voter’s Day in a calendar year in their respective countries
    • An initiative of establishing South Asia Institute for Democracy and Electoral Studies (SAIDES) in Nepal
    • In order to increase knowledge related to elections, take initiatives to include voter education in the school-level textbooks of their respective countries
    • Implementation of recommendations of South Asian Disabilities Organizations for the inclusion of disabled people in the electoral system and the creation of a suitable election environment

    Back2Basics: SAARC

    •  In 1985, at the height of the Cold War, leaders of South Asian nations — namely Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka — created a regional forum.
    • The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was established with the goal of contributing “to mutual trust, understanding, and appreciation of one another’s problems.”
    • Afghanistan was admitted as a member in 2007.

  • Making a case for Indo-Abrahamic accord

    Context

    An Egyptian scholar, Mohammed Soliman, has recently written about the significance of what he calls the emerging “Indo-Abrahamic Accord” and its trans-regional implications to the west of India.

    About Abraham Accord

    • Abraham Accord, signed in August last year in Washington, signifies the normalisation of Israel’s relations with the UAE and Bahrain.
    • The UAE and Bahrain were followed by Sudan and Morocco in signing the Abraham Accords.
    • Although Egypt (1979) and Jordan (1994) had established diplomatic relations with Israel earlier, the Abraham Accords are widely seen as making a definitive breakthrough in the relations between Israel and the Arabs.

    Factors in favour of accord

    • Depth of trilateral relationship: Although India had relations with UAE and Israel for many years, they certainly have acquired political depth and strategic character recently.
    • Converging interests: Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s assertive claims for the leadership of the Islamic world and hostile stand against India on several issues, indicates converging interests between India, the UAE, and Israel.
    • One of the unintended consequences of Erdogan’s overweening regional ambition, his alienation of Israel as well as moderate Arabs, his conflict with Greece, and his embrace of Pakistan is the extraordinary opportunity for India to widen India’s reach to the west of the Subcontinent
    • Cooperation: There are many areas like defence, aerospace and digital innovation where the three countries can pool their resources and coordinate development policies.
    • India’s extended neighbourhood: The notion of a “Greater Middle East” can provide a huge fillip to India’s engagement with the extended neighbourhood to the west.

    India-Turkey relations

    • Hostile approach on Kashmir: Turkey has been championing Pakistan’s case on Kashmir after India changed the territorial status quo of the state in August 2019.
    • Blocking NSG entry: At Pakistan’s behest, Turkey is also blocking India’s entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
    • The new geopolitical churn is also driven by Pakistan’s growing alignment with Turkey and its alienation from its traditionally strong supporters in the Arab Gulf — the UAE and Saudi Arabia.

    Opportunities for India in extended neighbourhood to the west

    • Relations with Greece: The renewed territorial disputes between Turkey and Greece, and Turkey’s quest for regional dominance has drawn Greece and the UAE closer.
    • Greece has also looked towards India to enhance bilateral security cooperation. 
    • Greece’s European partners like France, which have a big stake in the Mediterranean as well as the Arab Gulf, have taken an active interest in countering Turkey’s regional ambitions.
    • Erdogan’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood, which seeks to overthrow the current political order in the region, has deeply angered the governments of Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
    • India’s relations with Egypt: If there is one country that can give substantive depth to the Indo-Abrahamic Accord it is Egypt.
    • Located at the cusp of Mediterranean Europe, Africa, and Asia, Egypt is the very heart of the Greater Middle East.
    • Independent India’s engagement with the region in the 1950s was centred on a close partnership with Egypt.
    • If Delhi and Cairo lost each other in recent decades, India can rebuild the strategic partnership jointly with the Egypt government which is calling for the construction of a “New Republic” in Egypt.
    • The notion of a “Greater Middle East” can provide a huge fillip to India’s engagement with the extended neighbourhood to the west.
    • The familiar regional institutions like the Arab League and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation might endure but are incapable of addressing the region’s contradictions.

    Consider the question “Amid Turkey’s quest for regional dominance and hostility towards India, the deepening engagement between India, the UAE and Israel can be converted into a formal coalition on the lines of Abraham Accords” Comment.

    Conclusion

    The opportunities that are coming India’s way to the west of the Subcontinent are as consequential as those that have recently emerged in the east.

  • India set to take over as President of the UNSC

    India will take over the Presidency of the UN Security Council on August 1 and is set to host signature events in three major areas of maritime security, peacekeeping, and counterterrorism during the month.

    Key agendas on the table

    During its Presidency, India will be organizing high-level signature events in three major areas:

    • Maritime security
    • Peacekeeping and
    • Counterterrorism

    About United Nations Security Council

    • The UNSC is one of the six principal organs of the United Nations and is charged with the maintenance of international peace and security.
    • Its powers include the establishment of peacekeeping operations, the establishment of international sanctions, and the authorization of military action through Security Council resolutions.
    • It is the only UN body with the authority to issue binding resolutions to member states.
    • The Security Council consists of fifteen members. Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China, and the United States—serve as the body’s five permanent members (P5).
    • These permanent members can veto any substantive Security Council resolution, including those on the admission of new member states or candidates for Secretary-General.
    • The Security Council also has 10 non-permanent members, elected on a regional basis to serve two-year terms. The body’s presidency rotates monthly among its members.

    Issues with UNSC

    (1) Non-representative

    • UNSC in its current form is not representative of the developing world and global needs — with the primacy of policy being a political tool in hands of P5.
    • By 1992, India, Brazil, Germany, and Japan (referred as G4) had put up their claims and logic for demanding inclusion as permanent members.
    • India has been part of UN since its inception and has contributed maximum peacekeepers to UN so far, has a strong case.
    • Brazil is the largest country in Latin America (unrepresented continent) and fifth-largest in the world. Japan and Germany are one of the largest financial donors to UN.

    (2) Rivalry with G4

    • The pitch for reforms of G4 was lowered by their regional rivals like Italy, Pakistan, Mexico and Egypt.
    • They started formulation of another interest group, known to be “Uniting for Consensus” opposing G4 becoming permanent members with veto power.

    (3) Rigid framework

    • Reforms in the UNSC also require an amendment to the UN charter, in accordance with Article 108.
    • This highlights that any reform of the Security Council not only requires the support of at least two-thirds of UN member states but also all the permanent members.

    (4) Veto power

    • The stance of P5 members to expansion has been varying as per their national interest, like most P5 members agree to Indian inclusion, except China.
    • It becomes obvious that even if one member of P5 doesn’t agree to any reform, the UNSC cannot be reformed.
    • There have been many proposals since its inception from totally abolishing veto power to selectively using it for vital national security issues.

    (5) No consensus

    • It has been seen in past that the UNSC, in some of the major global security issues, could not arrive at a consensus and interventions that happened by countries mainly from P5 without UNSC resolution.
    • US entry in Iraq war or Warsaw Pact war in Afghanistan are few cases in point.
    • The UNSC has thus become an organization, which can pass strong resolutions against weak countries, weak resolutions against strong countries and no resolution against P5 countries.

    Suggested reforms

    • Expansion: Besides the existing P5 members, an expansion of UNSC from five to 10 permanent members, with the addition of G4 and South Africa. This will provide equitable regional representation besides balancing the developing and developed world to meet the aspirations of humanity.
    • Abolition of veto: The expansion of P5 without veto power makes very little impact on the problems, because of which the reforms are required. Ideally the veto power should be abolished.

    Will UNSC reforms ever happen?

    • Under the given charter, articles and structures, there is very little hope for UNSC reforms in near future.
    • The lack of reforms can push the credibility crisis of UN to a degree that it becomes unsustainable for it to function, or incidences of side-lining the UN increase manifold.
    • If the UNSC does not appoint new permanent members then its primacy may be challenged by some of the new emerging countries.
    • There is also a possibility that if UN doesn’t reform itself, it may lose relevance and alternate global and regional groupings may assume greater importance.
    • No P5 member is likely to compromise this power in its own national interest, which is generally prioritized before global interest, thus making the reformation process a mirage.

  • Visualizing the Himalaya with other coordinates

    A conceptual audit of questions related to geopolitics and security concerns while talking or thinking about the Himalaya is perhaps long overdue.

    About the Himalayas

    • The Himalayas are a mountain range in South and East Asia separating the plains of the Indian subcontinent from the Tibetan Plateau.
    • The range has many of Earth’s highest peaks, including the highest, Mount Everest, at the border between Nepal and China.
    • Lifted by the subduction of the Indian tectonic plate under the Eurasian Plate, the Himalayan Mountain range runs west-northwest to east-southeast in an arc 2,400 km.
    • It consists of parallel mountain ranges: the Sivalik Hills on the south; the Lower Himalayan Range; the Great Himalayas, which is the highest and central range; and the Tibetan Himalayas on the north.
    • The Karakoram are generally considered separate from the Himalayas.

    Identity of Himalayas: Only as a frontier

    • We have been examining the Himalaya mainly through the coordinates of geopolitics and security while relegating others as either irrelevant or incompatible.
    • In a certain sense, our intellectual concerns over the Himalaya have been largely shaped by the assumption of fear, suspicion, rivalry, invasion, encroachment and pugnacity.
    • If during colonial times it was Russophobia, then now it is Sinophobia or Pakistan phobia that in fact determines our concerns over the Himalayas.
    • Ironically it is the Delhi-Beijing-Islamabad triad, and not the mountain per se, that defines our concerns about the Himalayas.

    A national Himalaya

    • Border issues has given birth to the political compulsion of territorializing the Himalaya on a par with the imperatives of nationalism.
    • Thus the attempt to create a national Himalaya by each of the five nations (Nepal, Bhutan, India, Pakistan, and Tibet/China) fall within this transnational landmass called the Himalaya.

    India and the Himalayas

    • India’s understanding of the Himalayas is informed by a certain kind of realism, as it continues to remain as space largely defined in terms of sovereign territoriality.
    • It may be perceived that such an alternative conceptualization of Himalayas is not only possible but also necessary.

    Various initiatives

    • National Mission on Himalayan Studies: It is a classic case in point that provides funds for research and technological innovations, but creating policies only for the Indian Himalayan Region (IHR).

    A historical logjam of territorialization

    • The Himalayas territorialization bears a colonial legacy which also sets up its post-colonial destiny as played out within the dynamics of nation-states.
    • The arbitration of relationships between and among the five nation-states falling within the Himalayan landmass has failed to transcend.
    • The lines of peoplehood and the national border never coincided; thus, it was bound to give birth to tensions while working out projects predicated upon national sovereignty.
    • Given this historical logjam, what we can only expect is the escalation of territorial disputes as the immediate fallout.

    Borders and their differences

    • It needs to be recognized that political borders and cultural borders are not the same things.
    • Political borders are to be considered as space-making strategies of modern nation-states that do not necessarily coincide with cultural borders.
    • It needs to be realized that the domain of non-traditional security (cases of ecological devastation, climate change) is equally important.

    Conclusion

    • The Himalaya is a naturally evolved phenomenon should be understood through frameworks that have grown from within the Himalaya.
    • Viewing the Himalayas as a space of political power is a violent choice, which actually enriched ultra-sensitivity towards territorial claims and border management.

  • Needed, a more unified Asian voice for Afghanistan

    Context

    As the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) end their presence in Afghanistan and set off a churn in the neighbourhood, Central Asia is emerging as a key player.

    Challenges India faces in playing a leading role in Afghanistan

    • Events of the past few years, and the decisions of Russia, the US and China have kept India out of a leading role in Afghanistan.
    • India’s original hesitation in opening talks with the Taliban has cut India out of the current reconciliation process.
    • India’s efforts to build on trade with Afghanistan, shore up development projects and increase educational and training opportunities for Afghan youth have been appreciated, but these cannot grow bigger due to a number of factors.
    • The end of any formal dialogue between India and Pakistan since 2016 and trade since 2019, have resulted in Pakistan blocking India’s over-land access to Afghanistan.
    • India’s alternative route through Chabahar, though operational, cannot be viable or cost-effective also long as U.S. sanctions on Iran are in place.
    • India’s boycott of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2017, and now tensions at the Line of Actual Control make another route to Afghanistan off-limits.
    • The U.S. has announced a formation of a “Quad” on regional connectivity — U.S.-Uzbekistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan that does not include India.

    Why Central Asian countries are interested in Afghanistan?

    • The hope is that the Central Asian window, with the “Stans” (five Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) will open new possibilities for India.
    • Calculations of Central Asian neighbours are three-fold:
    • The first is that prosperity for these land-locked countries can only flow from access through Afghanistan to the closest ocean, i.e. the Indian Ocean.
    • Second, that all transit through Afghanistan depends on guarantees of safe passage from the Taliban, backed by the group’s mentors in Pakistan.
    • Third, each of the “Stans” are now a part of China’s BRI, and tying their connectivity initiatives with Beijing’s will bring the double promise of investment and some modicum of control over Pakistan.

    Way forward for India

    • Given the odds, India’s room for manoeuvre with these five countries on Afghanistan appears limited but not without hope.
    • Work on common concerns: To begin with, India and the Central Asian States share common concerns about an Afghanistan overrun by the Taliban.
    • Their common concerns are the worries of battles at their borders, safe havens for jihadist terror groups inside Afghanistan and the spill-over of radicalism into their own countries.
    • Support financially: It is necessary for India to work with them, and other neighbours to shore up finances for the government in Kabul, particularly to ensure that the government structure does not collapse.
    • Cooperation on anti-terrorism: As part of the SCO’s Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS), India must also step up its engagement with the Central Asian countries on fighting terror.
    • India can support the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) in terms of airpower.
    • Better ties between neighbours: South Asia must learn from Central Asia’s recent example in knitting together this region more tightly, a task that can only be completed with better ties between India and Pakistan.
    • India’s furtive discussions with the Taliban leadership in Doha make little sense unless a less tactical and more strategic engagement with Pakistan is also envisaged.

    Conclusion

    Countries of Central Asia and South Asia need to find a more unified voice, as they have in recent weeks. Afghanistan’s future will affect both regions much more than it will the distant global powers that currently dominate the debate.

  • South China Sea Dispute

     

    Pentagon chief has said that Beijing’s expansive claims in the South China Sea have “no basis in international law”, taking aim at China’s growing assertiveness in the hotly contested waters.

    South China Sea Dispute

    • It is a dispute over territory and sovereignty over ocean areas, and the Paracels and the Spratlys – two island chains claimed in whole or in part by a number of countries.
    • China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Brunei all have competing claims.
    • Alongside the fully-fledged islands, there are dozens of rocky outcrops, atolls, sandbanks, and reefs, such as the Scarborough Shoal.
    • China claims by far the largest portion of territory – an area defined by the “nine-dash line” which stretches hundreds of miles south and east from its most southerly province of Hainan.
    • Beijing says its right to the area goes back centuries to when the Paracel and Spratly island chains were regarded as integral parts of the Chinese nation, and in 1947 it issued a map detailing its claims.
    • It showed the two island groups falling entirely within its territory. Those claims are mirrored by Taiwan.

    Spat over Chinese claims

    • China has backed its expansive claims with island-building and naval patrols.
    • The US says it does not take sides in territorial disputes but has sent military ships and planes near disputed islands, calling them “freedom of navigation” operations to ensure access to key shipping and air routes.
    • Both sides have accused each other of “militarizing” the South China Sea.
    • There are fears that the area is becoming a flashpoint, with potentially serious global consequences.

  • The convergence and lag in Indo-US partnership

    Context

    As the Indian leadership reviews US ties this week with the visiting Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, a paradox stands out.

    Deepening Indo-US ties

    • India and the US have come a long way since the 1990s.
    • There is growing political and security cooperation, expanding economic engagement, widening interface between the two societies, and the intensifying footprint of the Indian diaspora in the US.
    • Convergence of interests: That ambition, in turn, is based on the unprecedented convergence of Indian and American national interests.
    • Agenda for cooperation: The two countries have already agreed on an ambitious agenda for bilateral, regional and global cooperation.

    Debate in India over Indo-US relation: A paradox

    • The discourse within India’s strategic community continues to be anxious.
    • Some of the questions that animate the media and political classes have not changed since the 1990s.
    • Issues in the debate: Debate focuses on US’s stand on the Kashmir issue, democracy and human rights and its impact on India-US relations.
    • Contradictory fears: There are also contradictory fears such as whether the US extend full support in coping with China.
    • While we expect the US to give guarantees on supporting us, we insist that India will never enter into an alliance with the US.
    • Small state syndrome in India: As India’s relative weight in the international system continues to grow, it creates much room for give and take between India and the US.
    • Yet, a small state syndrome continues to grip the foreign policy elite.
    • The situation is similar on the economic front.
    • Although India is now the sixth-largest economy in the world, there is unending concern about the US imposing globalisation on India.
    • Even as India’s salience for solutions to climate change has increased, India’s debate remains deeply defensive.

    Factors responsible paradox

    • Missing the big picture: The narrow focus on the bilateral precludes an assessment of the larger forces shaping American domestic and international politics.
    • That, in turn, limits the appreciation of new possibilities for the bilateral relationship.
    • Underinvestment in American studies: The problem is reinforced by India’s under-investment in public understanding of American society.
    • Russia and China have put large resources in American studies at their universities and think tanks.
    • The Indian government and private sector will hopefully address this gap in the not-too-distant future.

    Policy shifts unfolding in the US

    • Domestic economic policies: If the economic policy drift in the last four decades was to the right, Biden is moving left on the relationship between the state and the market — on raising taxes, increasing public spending and addressing the problem of sharp economic inequality.
    • Economic policy and globalisation: Biden has also joined Trump in questioning America’s uncritical economic globalisation of the past.
    • If Trump talked of putting America First, Biden wants to make sure that America’s foreign and economic policies serve the US middle class.
    • Foreign policy: Biden has concluded that four decades of America’s uncritical engagement with China must be reconstituted into a policy that faces up to the many challenges that Beijing presents to the US.
    •  Biden is also focused on renewing the traditional US alliances to present a united front against China.
    • He is also seeking to overcome Washington’s hostility to Russia by resetting ties with Moscow.

    Question of democracy and human rights

    • Democracy is very much part of America’s founding ideology.
    • But living up to that ideal at home and abroad has not been easy for the United States over the last two centuries.
    • Delhi and Washington will also have much to discuss on the challenges that new surveillance technologies and big tech monopolies pose to democratic governance.
    • The exclusive American focus on democracy promotion has been rare, costly and unsuccessful.
    • India’s own experience at spreading democracy in its neighbourhood is quite similar.
    • But that discussion is only one part of the expansive new agenda — from Afghanistan to Indo-Pacific, reforming global economic institutions to addressing climate change, and vaccine diplomacy to governing new technologies that beckon India and the United States.

    Conclusion

    As they intensify the bilateral cooperation, the two sides will hopefully turn the Indo-US partnership from a perennial curiosity to a quotidian affair.

  • SAARC

    Context

    Despite the framework SAARC provides for cooperation amongst South Asian nations, it has remained sidelined and dormant since its 18th summit of 2014 in Kathmandu. No alternative capable of bringing together South Asian countries for mutually beneficial diplomacy has emerged.

    Common challenges facing South Asia

    • The region is beset with unsettled territorial disputes, as well as trans-border criminal and subversive activities and cross-border terrorism.
    • The region also remains a theatre for ethnic, cultural, and religious tensions and rivalries besides a current rise in ultra-nationalism
    • Nuclear-armed neighbours India and Pakistan are at loggerheads.
    • US military withdrawal from Afghanistan has fuelled fears of intensification of these trends.

    Significance of SAARC

    • As the largest regional cooperation organisation, SAARC’s importance in stabilising and effectively transforming the region is becoming increasingly self-evident.
    • SAARC is needed as institutional scaffolding to allow for the diplomacy and coordination that is needed between member-states in order to adequately address the numerous threats and challenges the region faces.
    • Though SAARC’s charter prohibits bilateral issues at formal forums, SAARC summits provide a unique, informal window — the retreat — for leaders to meet without aides and chart future courses of action.
    • The coming together of leaders, even at the height of tensions, in a region laden with congenital suspicions, misunderstandings, and hostility is a significant strength of SAARC that cannot be overlooked.
    • In March last year, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi seized the Covid-19 crisis and utilised SAARC’s seal to convene a video conference of SAARC leaders.
    • Such capacity to bring member-states together shows the potential power of SAARC.

    What role SAARC can play in Afghanistan

    • Commitment to get rid of terrorism: The third SAARC summit in 1987 adopted a Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism and updated it in 2004 with the signing of an additional protocol.
    • These instruments demonstrate the collective commitment to rid the region of terror and promote regional peace, stability, and prosperity.
    • Using the network of institutions: In 36 years of existence, SAARC has developed a dense network of institutions, linkages, and mechanisms.
    • SAARC members are among the top troop-contributing countries to UN peacekeeping missions.
    • Joint peacekeeping force: With the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, a joint peacekeeping force from the SAARC region under the UN aegis could be explored to fill the power vacuum that would otherwise be filled by terrorist and extremist forces.

    Consider the question “What role SAARC can play in stabilising the region after the US withdrawal from Afghanistan? Is SAARC still relevant for the region?”

    Conclusion

    Allowing SAARC to become dysfunctional and irrelevant greatly distorts our ability to address the realities and mounting challenges facing SAARC nations.

    Back2Basics: About SAARC

    •  In 1985, at the height of the Cold War, leaders of South Asian nations — namely Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka — created a regional forum.
    • The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was established with the goal of contributing “to mutual trust, understanding and appreciation of one another’s problems.”
    • Afghanistan was admitted as a member in 2007.

  • OPEC Reaches Compromise With U.A.E. Over Oil Production

    Context

    The end to the UAE’s weeks-long impasse with Saudi Arabia and Russia, a non-OPEC state, was brought about by Sunday’s deal.

    What was the deal about?

    • United Arab Emirates (UAE), said to hold the world’s largest untapped crude reserves, had demanded an increase in its oil output quotas.
    • The end to the UAE’s weeks-long impasse with Saudi Arabia, one of the world’s biggest crude exporters, and Russia, a non-OPEC state, was brought about by Sunday’s deal.
    • Under its terms, the UAE’s demand for an increase in its oil output quotas, in recognition of its higher production capacity, has been conceded.
    • The baselines have also been raised for Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iraq, and Kuwait.
    • The bloc will now step up crude production by 400,000 barrels a day starting in August.
    • The output boost is in response to rising oil prices in the wake of the rebound in economic activity.
    • The cartel had cut oil production by 9.7 million barrels a day (mbd) as oil demand fell from 100 mbd to 91.1 mbd and prices plummeted from $70 in January 2020 to around $20 in April.

    Strain in Saudi Arabia-UAE relations

    • The UAE has played hardball during the bloc’s attempts to deal with the pandemic-induced price volatility.
    • Thus, while the internal rift has been resolved for now, the danger cannot be ruled out of an increasingly economically and politically assertive UAE flexing its muscle.
    • Bilateral relations between the traditional allies, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, have been especially strained since the UAE established diplomatic ties with Israel last year and withdrew troops from the Saudi-spearheaded war in Yemen the year before.
    • A more recent arena of tension is the tariffs Riyadh has imposed on imports from the six-nation Gulf Cooperation Council.
    • Saudi Arabia will now exclude from the GCC tariff agreement goods made by companies with a workforce of less than 25% of locals and industrial products with less than 40% of the added value after their transformation process.
    • Home to a predominantly migrant population, the move could hit the UAE especially hard.

    OPEC’s concerns

    • The OPEC, forecast in 2016 that a strict implementation of the Paris climate accord could see the demand for oil peak by 2030.
    • There is an eagerness to maximise the returns on their substantial hydrocarbon resources, amid growing speculation of a peak in oil demand within sight.
    • The International Energy Agency (IEA), which in 2016 forecast a continued rise in oil consumption until the 2040s, has more recently hinted at about a 5% rise or fall relative to the demand before the pandemic within a decade.
    • OPEC’s other concerns are the stabilization of world oil prices without jeopardizing national expenditure programs, and the diversification of economies in anticipation of the unfolding global energy transition.

    Conclusion

    The latest OPEC compromise echoes growing recognition of the delicate balance between competing domestic and global priorities.

    B2BASICS

    OPEC

    • The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) is a permanent, intergovernmental organization, created at the Baghdad Conference in 1960, by Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela.
    • It aims to manage the supply of oil in an effort to set the price of oil in the world market, in order to avoid fluctuations that might affect the economies of both producing and purchasing countries.
    • It is headquartered in Vienna, Austria.
    • OPEC membership is open to any country that is a substantial exporter of oil and which shares the ideals of the organization.
    • Gabon terminated its membership in January 1995. However, it rejoined the Organization in July 2016.
    • As of 2019, OPEC has a total of 14 Member Countries viz. Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates(UAE), Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Libya, Nigeria, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Republic of Congo, Angola, Ecuador, and Venezuela are members of OPEC.