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Subject: Polity

  • Lok Adalats

    The article highlights the important role played by the Lok Adalats in dispute resolution and raises concerns over underminig of justice for the sake of speedy disposal.

    Background of Lok Adalat

    • The Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976, inserted Article 39A to ensure “equal justice and free legal aid”.
    • To this end, the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987, was enacted by Parliament and it came into force in 1995.
    • The Act seeks “to provide free and competent legal services to weaker sections of the society” and to “organise Lok Adalats to secure that the operation of the legal system promotes justice on a basis of equal opportunity”.
    • As an alternative dispute resolution tool, Lok Adalats are regularly organised to help parties reach a compromise.
    • Motor-accident claims, disputes related to public-utility services, cases related to dishonour of cheques, and land, labour and matrimonial disputes (except divorce) are usually taken up by Lok Adalats.

    Significance of Lok Adalats

    • As per the National Judicial Data Grid, 16.9% of all cases in district and taluka courts are three to five years old.
    • For High Courts, 20.4% of all cases are five to 10 years old, and over 17% are 10-20 years old.
    • Furthermore, over 66,000 cases are pending before the Supreme Court, over 57 lakh cases before various HCs, and over 3 crore cases are pending before various district and subordinate courts.
    • Moreover, Lok Adalats are economically affordable, as there are no court fees for placing matters before the Lok Adalat; finality of awards, as no further appeal is allowed.
    • As a result, litigants are forced to approach Lok Adalats mainly because it is a party-driven process, allowing them to reach an amicable settlement.

    Why Lok Adalats are fast

    • When compared to litigation, and even other dispute resolution devices, such as arbitration and mediation, Lok Adalats offer parties speed of settlement.
    • Cases are disposed of in a single day.
    • The speed is due to procedural flexibility, as there is no strict application of procedural laws such as the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
    • More importantly, the award issued by a Lok Adalat, after the filing of a joint compromise petition, has the status of a civil court decree.

    Some figures about cases disposed

    • In 2015 and 2016, ten National Lok Adalats (NLAs) were held each year that disposed of 1,83,09,401 and 1,04,98,453 cases respectively.
    • In 2017 and 2018, the number of NLAs dropped to five, with 54,05,867 and 58,79,691 cases settled respectively.
    • In 2019, four NLAs were organised, and they disposed of 52,93,273 cases.
    • In 2015, the average number of cases settled per NLA was 18,30,940, which came down to 10,81,174 in 2017, but rose to 11,75,939 in 2018, and 13,23,319 cases in 2019.
    • This throws up questions about the efficiency of NLAs.
    • The data show that the average number of cases disposed of per NLA since 2017 has gone up even when the number of NLAs organised each year has reduced.
    • This proves that on average, the system is certainly efficient.

    Concerns

    • The Supreme Court, in State of Punjab vs Jalour Singh (2008), held that a Lok Adalat is purely conciliatory and it has no adjudicatory or judicial function.
    • As compromise is its central idea, there is a concern that in the endeavour for speedy disposal of cases, it undermines the idea of justice.
    •  In a majority of cases, litigants are pitted against entities with deep pockets, such as insurance companies, banks, electricity boards, among others.
    •  In many cases, compromises are imposed on the poor who often have no choice but to accept them.
    • Similarly, poor women under the so-called ‘harmony ideology’ of the state are virtually dictated by family courts to compromise matrimonial disputes under a romanticised view of marriage.
    •  Even a disaster like the Bhopal gas tragedy was coercively settled for a paltry sum, with real justice still eluding thousands of victims.

    Consider the question “Examine the significance of Lok Adalats as an alternative dispute resolution tool. What are the concerns with speedy disposal of cases by Lok Adalats?”

    Conclusion

    A just outcome of a legal process is far more important than expeditious disposal, so what we need is concrete and innovative steps in improving the quality of justice rendered by National Lok Adalats.

  • Need to remove the secrecy around the electoral bonds

    The article highlights the issues with the electoral bond scheme and suggests an alternatives.

    Secrecy in donations

    • Before the electoral bond scheme, every transaction of more than Rs 20,000 was reported to the Election Commission.
    • Now even Rs 20 crore or Rs 200 crore could be donated anonymously. 
    • Why should donors want secrecy? To hide return favours, like contracts, licences and bank loans.
    • Both the RBI and ECI, standing up to their mandates, had registered their strong protest.

    How electoral bond scheme led to changes in provisions of other Acts

    • To make way for electoral bonds amendments were introduced in the Reserve Bank of India Act, Companies Act, Income Tax Act, Representation of the People Act and Foreign Contribution Regulations Act.
    • There were three serious changes which did not receive the deserved attention.

    1) Limit of 7.5 per cent removed

    • First, the limit of 7.5 per cent of its profits which a company could donate was not just increased but completely done away with by amending section 182 of the Companies Act, 2013.
    • Thus a company could donate 100 per cent of its profits to a political party.
    • Even a loss-making company could make political donations.
    • This is a sure step to legitimise and legalise crony capitalism.

    2) Requirement of resolution removed

    • The requirements for a resolution by the board of directors for a company to make donations to political parties and to declare the political donations in the profit and loss accounts were also removed.
    • This would allow keeping the donations secret not only from the public but the owners of the company, the shareholders — ironically, all in the name of transparency.

    3) Secrecy in contribution from foreign source

    • Section 29B of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 prohibits all political parties from accepting any contribution from a “foreign source.”
    • Section 3 of the 2010 Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act bars candidates, legislative members, political parties and party officeholders from accepting foreign contributions.
    • When the High Court of Delhi in 2014 found Congress and BJP having accepted foreign funds in violation of the FCRA 1976, the government passed a retroactive amendment through a 2016 Finance Bill which repealed the 1976 Act and replaced it with the modified 2010 statute.
    • If any foreign country is financing our elections, it will now be a protected secret.

    Way forward

    • The Supreme Court’s concern about the possibility of misuse of funds is very pertinent.
    • The EC has been demanding that a law be passed to make political parties liable to get their accounts audited by an auditor from a panel suggested by the CAG or EC.
    • If the government don’t want to abolish the electoral bond scheme it should just make changes to it to disclose the donor and the recipient.
    • Another alternative is to do away with private fund collection altogether and replace it with public funding of political parties.
    • This is not likely to be more than Rs 10,000 crore every five years, if we were to go by the entire collection all the parties make together.
    • Another feasible option is to establish a National Election Fund to which all donations could be directed.
    • This would take care of the imaginary fear of political reprisal of the donors. 

    Consider the question “What were the changes introduced in various Acts for the introduction of the electoral bond scheme? What are the issues with these changes?”

    Conclusion

    We must not forget the finance minister’s opening statement in the 2017 Budget speech that “without transparency of political funding, free and fair elections are not possible”.

  • [pib] Justice Ramana appointed as Chief Justice of India

    The President of India, in the exercise of the powers conferred by clause (2) of Article 124 of the Constitution of India, appointed Shri Justice NV Ramana, a Judge of the Supreme Court, to be the CJI.

    Chief Justice of India

    • The CJI is the chief judge of the Supreme Court of India as well as the highest-ranking officer of the Indian federal judiciary.

    Appointment

    • The Constitution of India grants power to the President to nominate, and with the advice and consent of the Parliament, appoint a chief justice, who serves until they reach the age of 65 or until removed by impeachment.
    • Earlier, it was a convention to appoint seniormost judges.
    • However, this has been broken twice. In 1973, Justice A. N. Ray was appointed superseding 3 senior judges.
    • Also, in 1977 Justice Mirza Hameedullah Beg was appointed as the chief justice superseding Justice Hans Raj Khanna.

    Qualifications

    The Indian Constitution says in Article 124 (3) that in order to be appointed as a judge in the Supreme Court of India, the person has to fit in the following criteria:

    • He/She is a citizen of India and
    • has been for at least five years a Judge of a High Court or of two or more such Courts in succession; or
    • has been for at least ten years an advocate of a High Court or of two or more such Courts in succession; or
    • is, in the opinion of the President, a distinguished jurist

    Functions

    • As head of the Supreme Court, the CJI is responsible for the allocation of cases and appointment of constitutional benches which deal with important matters of law.
    • In accordance with Article 145 of the Constitution and the Supreme Court Rules of Procedure of 1966, the chief justice allocates all work to the other judges.

    On the administrative side, the CJI carries out the following functions:

    • maintenance of the roster; appointment of court officials and general and miscellaneous matters relating to the supervision and functioning of the Supreme Court

    Try this PYQ:

    Q. Who/Which of the following is the custodian of the Constitution of India?

    (a) The President of India

    (b) The Prime Minister of India

    (c) The Lok Sabha Secretariat

    (d) The Supreme Court of India

    Removal

    • Article 124(4) of the Constitution lays down the procedure for removal of a judge of the Supreme Court which is applicable to chief justices as well.
    • Once appointed, the chief justice remains in the office until the age of 65 years. He can be removed only through a process of removal by Parliament as follows:
    • He/She can be removed by an order of the President passed after an address by each House of Parliament supported by a majority of the total membership of that House and by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members of that House present.
    • The voting has been presented to the President in the same session for such removal on the ground of proved misbehavior or incapacity.

    About Justice Ramana

    • Justice Ramana will take over as 48th Chief Justice of India.
    • He is a first-generation lawyer, having an agricultural background, and hails from Ponnavaram Village, Krishna District in Andhra Pradesh.
    • He is an avid reader and literature enthusiast. He is passionate about Carnatic music.

    His legal career

    • He was called on to the Bar on 10.02.1983.
    • Initially, he was appointed as a Permanent Judge of Andhra Pradesh High Court on 27.06.2000. He also functioned as Acting Chief Justice of his parent High Court from 10.3.2013 to 20.5.2013.
    • He practiced in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, Central and Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunals, and the Supreme Court of India.
    • He specialized in Constitutional, Civil, Labour, Service, and Election matters. He has also practiced before Inter-State River Tribunals.
    • He served as Judge of the Supreme Court of India from 17.02.2014.
    • He has also served as the Executive Chairman of the National Legal Services Authority (NALSA) since 27.11.2019.

  • Time to undo the RTE bias against private non-minority institutions

    The article highlights the issues with the exemption of aided and non-aided minority institutions from the Right to Education Act.

    Is RTE enforceable against individuals?

    • Most fundamental rights are enforceable against the state, not against private individuals.
    • Certain rights, however, are horizontally enforceable too, that is, they can be enforced against individuals.
    • The Right to Free and Compulsory Education Act or RTE falls in the latter category.
    • The right to education was initially mentioned in Article 45 as a part of the Directive Principles.

    Evolution of Article 21A

    • The Supreme Court in 1992 held in Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka that the right to education was a part of the right to life recognised in Article 21.
    • The next year, the court in Unnikrishnan JP v. State of Andhra Pradesh held that the state was duty-bound to provide education to children up to the age of 14 within its economic capacity.
    • The court also acknowledged that private educational institutions, including minority institutions, would have to play a role alongside government schools.
    • The right to education was finally given the status of a fundamental right by the 86th constitutional amendment in the year 2002 by the addition of Article 21A in the Constitution.
    • The Supreme Court held in P. A. Inamdar case that there shall be no reservation in private institutions and that minority and non-minority institutions would not be treated differently.

    Impact of 93rd amendment

    • In 2005, the Constitution was amended by the 93rd amendment to include Clause(5) to Article 15 which dealt with the fundamental right against discrimination.
    • The clause permitted the state to provide for advancement of “backward” classes by ensuring their admission in institutions, including private institutions.
    • The clause, however, excluded both aided and unaided minority educational institutions thus overruling the Supreme Court’s judgment in P.A. Inamdar case.

    Discrimination in RTE

    • When the RTE Act was subsequently enacted in 2009, it did not directly discriminate between students studying in minority and non-minority institutions.
    • Subsequently, the provision of 25 per cent reservation in private institutions was however challenged in Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India where the court upheld the validity of the legislation exempting only unaided minority schools from its purview.
    • In response to the judgment, the RTE Act was amended in 2012 to mention that its provisions were subject to Articles 29 and 30 which protect the administrative rights of minority educational institutions.
    • So, the onus on private unaided schools was much higher than that on government schools, while even aided minority schools were exempt.
    • But the constitutional provision enabling the RTE Act, that is, Article 21, does not make any discrimination between minority and non-minority institutions.

    Issues

    • The above provisions of RTE made it violative of Article 14 and also economically unviable for many private schools.
    •  Not only has RTE unreasonably differentiated between minority and non-minority schools without any explicable basis, there is also no rational nexus between the object of universal education sought to be achieved by this act and the step of excluding minority schools from its purview.
    • Given the doctrine of harmonious construction of fundamental rights, it is unclear why the court granted complete immunity to minority institutions when several provisions of RTE would not interfere with their administrative rights.
    • RTE has provisions such as prevention of physical/mental cruelty towards students as well as quality checks on pedagogical and teacher standards which children studying in minority institutions should not be deprived of and to that extent be discriminated against.

    Way forward

    • The Kerala High Court held in Sobha George v. State of Kerala that Section 16 of RTE, which forbids non-promotion till the completion of elementary education, will be applicable to minority schools as well. 
    • The bench said that the courts must examine whether provisions such as Section 16 of RTE are statutory rights or fundamental rights expressed in a statutory form.
    • If the latter, then the Pramati case judgement will not be fully available to minority institutions.
    • The Supreme Court should take inspiration from the prudent decision delivered by the Kerala High Court and overrule its own judgment delivered in the Pramati Educational Society.

    Consider the question “What are the issues with the exemption of aided and non-aided minority institution from the RTE Act.”

    Conclusion

    RTE as legislation may be well-intentioned, but the time has come to relook at the discriminatory nature of RTE against private non-minority institutions, and to that extent, undo the damage done by 93rd Amendment and the subsequent SC judgments.

  • Still no recognition of the third tier

    The article highlights the issues with the Fifteenth Finance Commission recommendations with regard to the third tier of the local governments.

    Significance of Finance Commission recommendations for local government

    • The primary task of the Union Finance Commission is to rectify the vertical and horizontal imbalances in resources and expenditure responsibilities between Union and States including the third tier of local governments.
    • Part IX and Part IX-A were incorporated into the Constitution by the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendment.
    • Part IX and Part IX-A mandate the Union Finance Commission to supplement the resources of panchayats and municipalities on the basis of the recommendations of the State Finance Commission.
    • Now, nearly 2.5 lakh local governments and over 3.4 million elected representatives form the real democratic base of the Indian federal polity.

    Increase in vertical devolution

    • The Fifteenth Finance Commission has raised the vertical devolution recommended to local governments to 4.23% with a reasonably estimated amount of ₹4,36,361 crore.
    • Compared with the Fourteenth Finance Commission there is a 52% increase in the vertical share.
    • Even if we deduct the grant of ₹70,051 crore earmarked for improving primary health centres, the share is still an all-time high of 4.19%.
    • All the Commissions since the Eleventh Commission have tied specific items of expenditure to local grants and the Fifteenth Finance Commission has raised this share to 60% and linked them to drinking water, rainwater harvesting, sanitation and other national priorities in the spirit of cooperative federalism.

    Reduction in performance-based  grants

    • The Fifteenth Finance Commission has reduced the performance-based grant to just ₹8,000 crore — and that too for building new cities, leaving out the Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) altogether.
    • The performance-linked grants were introduced by the Thirteenth Finance Commission and covered a wide range of reforms.
    • The transformative potential in designing performance-linked conditionalities for improving the quality of decentralised governance in the context of indifferent states is missed.

    Encouraging standardisation of accounting system

    • An important recommendation of the Fifteenth Finance Commission is the entry-level criterion to avail the union local grant (except health grant) by local governments.
    • For panchayats, the condition is the online submission of annual accounts for the previous year and audited accounts for the year before.
    • For urban local governments, two more conditions are specified: fixation of the minimum floor for property tax and improvement in its collection.
    •  It is not clear why gram panchayats are left out from this.
    • Although Finance Commissions, from the Eleventh to the Fourteenth, have recommended measures to standardise the accounting system and update the auditing of accounts, the progress made has been halting.
    • Therefore, the entry-level criteria of the Fifteenth Finance Commission are timely.

    Missed opportunity to ensure minimum public services

    • The Fifteenth Finance Commission failed to carry policy choices forward systematically.
    • Articles 243G, 243W and 243ZD read along with the functional decentralisation of basic services like drinking water, public health care, etc., mandated in the Eleventh and Twelfth schedules demand better public services and delivery of ‘economic development and social justice’ at the local level.
    • A good opportunity to ensure comparable minimum public services to every citizen irrespective of her choice of residential location has not been taken forward in an integrated manner.

    Missing equalisation principle for the local government

    • The Fifteenth Finance Commission claims that it seeks to achieve the “desirable objective of evenly balancing the union and the states”.
    • It is not clear why there is no recognition of the third tier in this balancing act.
    • It may be relevant to recall that the Alma-Ata declaration of the World Health Organization (1978) which outlined an integrated, local government-centric approach with a simultaneous focus on access to water, sanitation, shelter and the like.
    • There is no integrated approach in the recommendations of the Fifteenth Finance Commission about the local governments (in contrast to the recommendations of the Thirteenth Finance Commission).
    • Although the Fifteenth Finance Commission stresses the need to implement the equalisation principle, it is virtually silent when it comes to the local governments.

    Equity and efficiency sidelined

    • The Fifteenth Finance Commission employed population (2011 Census) with 90% and area 10% weightage for determining the distribution of grant to States for local governments.
    • The same criteria were followed by the Fourteenth Finance Commission.
    • While this ensures continuity, equity and efficiency criteria are sidelined.
    • Abandoning tax effort criterion incentivises dependency, inefficiency and non-accountability.

    Consider the question “Discuss the various aspects of the Fifteenth Finance Commission’s recommendations with regard to local governments.”

    Conclusion

    In sum, if decentralisation is meant to empower local people, the primary task is to fiscally empower local governments to deliver territorial equity. We are far from this goal.

  • Article 244 (A) of the Constitution

    A national party leader has promised to implement Article 244 (A) of the Constitution to safeguard the interests of the people in Assam’s tribal-majority districts.

    What is Article 244(A)?

    • Article 244(A) allows for the creation of an ‘autonomous state’ within Assam in certain tribal areas.
    • Inserted into the Constitution in 1969 by the then government, it also has a provision for a Legislature and a Council of Ministers.

    Try this PYQ from CSP 2018:

    Q.The Government enacted the Panchayat Extension to Scheduled Areas (PESA) Act in 1996. Which one of the following is not identified as its objective?

    (a) To provide self-governance

    (b) To recognize traditional rights

    (c) To create autonomous regions in tribal areas

    (d) To free tribal people from exploitation

    How is it different from the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution?

    • The Sixth Schedule of the Constitution — Articles 244(2) and 275(1) — is a special provision that allows for greater political autonomy and decentralized governance.
    • It is applicable to certain tribal areas of the Northeast through autonomous councils that are administered by elected representatives.
    • Article 244(A) accounts for more autonomous powers to tribal areas.
    • In Autonomous Councils under the Sixth Schedule, they do not have jurisdiction of law and order.

    How did the demand arise?

    • In the 1950s, a demand for a separate hill state arose around certain sections of the tribal population of undivided Assam.
    • In 1960, various political parties of the hill areas merged to form the All Party Hill Leaders Conference, demanding a separate state.
    • After prolonged agitations, Meghalaya gained statehood in 1972.
    • The leaders of the Karbi Anglong and North Cachar Hills were also part of this movement. They were given the option to stay in Assam or join Meghalaya.
    • They stayed back as the then government promised more powers, including Article 244 (A). Since then, there has been a demand for its implementation.
    • In the 1980s, this demand took the form of a movement with a number of Karbi groups resorting to violence. It soon became an armed separatist insurgency demanding full statehood.

  • OCI card holders no longer required to carry old passports for India travel

    People of Indian origin (PIO) and the Indian diaspora having Overseas Citizens of India (OCI) cards are now not required to carry their old, expired passports for travel to India.

    UPSC can ask statement based question in prelims based on the definition and privileges of OCI card-holders.

    Who is an Overseas Citizen?

    • An OCI is a category introduced by the government in 2005.
    • Persons of Indian Origin (PIOs) of certain categories as specified in the Citizenship Act, 1955 are eligible for being OCI cardholders.
    • Some of the benefits for PIO and OCI cardholders were different until 2015 when the government merged these two categories.
    • The MHA defines an OCI as a person who was a citizen of India on or after January 26, 1950; or was eligible to become a citizen of India on that date; or who is a child or grandchild of such a person, among other eligibility criteria.
    • According to Section 7A of the OCI card rules, an applicant is not eligible for the OCI card if he, his parents or grandparents have ever been a citizen of Pakistan or Bangladesh.

    Privileges to an OCI

    • OCI cardholders can enter India multiple times, get a multipurpose lifelong visa to visit India, and are exempt from registering with Foreigners Regional Registration Office (FRRO) no matter how long their stay.
    • If an individual is registered as an OCI for a period of five years, he/she are eligible to apply for Indian citizenship.
    • At all Indian international airports, OCI cardholders are provided with special immigration counters.
    • OCI cardholders can open special bank accounts in India, they can buy the non-farm property and exercise ownership rights and can also apply for a driver’s license and PAN card.
    • However, OCI cardholders do not get voting rights, cannot hold a government job and purchase agricultural or farmland.
    • They cannot run for public office either, nor can they travel to restricted areas without government permission.

    Why such a move?

    • There had been inconvenience caused to members of the Indian diaspora due to certain OCI card rules as they undertook to travel to India during the pandemic.
    • He said some of the passengers were not allowed to board flights to India and were sent back from airports as they were not carrying their old foreign passports, which was required as per government rules.
    • The OCI card, among other benefits, allows multiple entries, multi-purpose lifelong visa to an Indian-origin foreign national to visit India.
    • Under the provisions of the OCI card, which gives the cardholder a lifelong visa to India, those below 20 years and above 50 years need to renew their OCI card every time they have their passport renewed.

    Back2Basics: PIO vs. OCI

  • Ending ambiguity in Delhi government through amendment to NCT Act

    The article highlights the objectives of amendments to the Government of the National Capital Territory (NCT) of Delhi Act.

    Background of Article 239AA and 239AB

    • On December 20, 1991, Home Minister S B Chavan tabled the Constitution Amendment Bill in the Lok Sabha to add Article 239AA and 239AB to our Constitution.
    • The Bill was passed unanimously with all 349 members in the Lok Sabha supporting the bill.
    • The amendment paved the way for setting up a legislative assembly and a council of ministers for the National Capital Territory (NCT) of Delhi.

    What the recent amendment to NCT Act seeks to achieve

    • The amendments aimed to clear ambiguities in the roles of various stakeholders.
    • It also seeks to provide a constructive rules-based framework for stakeholders within the government of Delhi to work in tandem with the Union government.
    • The amendment that was passed by Parliament aims to bring in consistency that the Delhi government has acknowledged and course-corrected on.
    • As the Act now has the President’s assent, we also need to ensure that the LG is made more accountable.
    • This can be done by stipulating a maximum time limit to decide on matters that are referred to the LG in the case of legislative proposals and administrative matters in the rules.
    • The constitutional amendment passed in 1991 empowers the Parliament to enact laws supplementing constitutional provisions.
    • Similarly, the Government of NCT of Delhi also has the power to enact laws regarding matters specified under the state list and concurrent list, to the extent these apply to a Union territory.
    •  In the case of the Government of NCT of Delhi, it has no legislative competence in matters pertaining to the police, public order, and land, which are in the state list but do not apply to Union Territories.
    • The risk of incremental encroachments on these subjects by the Delhi Legislative Assembly can have severe ramifications for Delhi.
    • Similarly, making the Delhi assembly rules consistent with the rules of the Lok Sabha or ensuring that the opinion of the LG is taken can only ensure clarity and foster an environment of co-operation.

    Promoting cooperative federalism

    • The government has been promoting cooperative federalism, which is evident from the tangible steps that have been taken.
    • The creation of NITI Aayog, the establishment of the GST council, and the restructuring of central schemes are clear examples of promoting fiscal federalism.
    • Cooperative federalism requires an environment of trust and mutual cooperation.
    • A necessary condition for such an environment is the distinct delineation of roles and responsibilities, the removal of ambiguities, and the definition of a clear chain of command among stakeholders.
    • In this regard, it was important to define, without a doubt, who represents the government in the unique case of Delhi.

    Consider the question “What are the objectives of the recent amendment to the NCT Act? What will be its implications for governance in Delhi?” 

    Conclusion

    Our national capital hosts the country’s legislature, the seat of the Union government, the judiciary, diplomatic missions, and other institutions of national importance. It deserves smooth functioning and cannot be subject to misadventures arising from the ambiguities in the roles and responsibilities of its stakeholders.

  • Declining importance of Parliament

    The article highlight the deterioration in the function of Parliament  and its implications.

    Declining seating of houses of Parliament

    • The current Budget session of Parliament ended on Thursday, two weeks ahead of the original plan.
    • This follows the trend of the last few sessions:
    • The Budget session of 2020 was curtailed ahead of the lockdown.
    • A short 18-day monsoon session ended after 10 days as several Members of Parliament and Parliament staff got affected by COVID-19.
    • The winter session was cancelled.
    • As a result, the fiscal year 2020-21 saw the Lok Sabha sitting for 34 days (and the Rajya Sabha for 33), the lowest ever.
    • This has implications for the proper legislative scrutiny of proposed legislation as well as government functioning and finances.
    • There is no reason why Parliament could not adopt remote working and technological solutions, as several other countries did.

    Passage of important bills without scrutiny

    • During this session, 13 Bills were introduced, and not even one of them was referred to a parliamentary committee for examination.
    • The Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi (Amendment) Bill, 2021 was passed by the Parliament.
    • This bill shifts governance from the legislature and the Chief Minister to the Lieutenant Governor.
    • The Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Bill, 2021, amends the Mines and Minerals Act, 1957 to remove end-use restrictions on mines and ease conditions for captive mines.
    • This Bill was passed by both Houses within a week.
    • The National Bank for Financing Infrastructure and Development (NaBFID) Bill, 2021 — to create a new government infrastructure finance institution and permit private ones in this sector was passed within three days of introduction.
    • The Insurance (Amendment) Bill, 2021 which increases FDI in insurance companies from 49% to 74% also took just a week between introduction and passing by both Houses.
    • In all, 13 Bills were introduced in this session, and eight of them were passed within the session.
    • This quick work should be read as a sign of abdication by Parliament of its duty to scrutinise Bills, rather than as a sign of efficiency.
    • Also, the percentage of Bills referred to committees declined from 60% and 71% in the 14th Lok Sabha (2004-09) and the 15th Lok Sabha, respectively, to 27% in the 16th Lok Sabha and just 11% in the current one.

    Money Bill classification issue

    • The Finance Bills, over the last few years, have contained several unconnected items such as restructuring of tribunals, introduction of electoral bonds, and amendments to the foreign contribution act.
    • Some of the earlier Acts, including the Aadhaar Act and Finance Act, have been referred to a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court.
    • It would be useful if the Court can give a clear interpretation of the definition of Money Bills and provide guide rails within which Bills have to stay to be termed as such.

    Passage of Budget without discussion

    • The Constitution requires the Lok Sabha to approve the expenditure Budget of each department and Ministry.
    • The Lok Sabha had listed the budget of just five Ministries for detailed discussion and discussed only three of these; 76% of the total Budget was approved without any discussion.
    • This behaviour was in line with the trend of the last 15 years.

    No Deputy Speaker

    • Article 93 of the Constitution states that “… The House of the People shall, as soon as may be, choose two members of the House to be respectively Speaker and Deputy Speaker….”
    • A striking feature of the current Lok Sabha is the absence of a Deputy Speaker.
    • By the time of the next session of Parliament, two years would have elapsed without the election of a Deputy Speaker.

    Way forward

    • In order to fulfil its constitutional mandate, it is imperative that Parliament functions effectively.
    • This will require making and following processes:
    • 1) Creating a system of research support to Members of Parliament.
    • 2) Providing sufficient time for MPs to examine issues.
    • 3 )Requiring that all Bills and budgets are examined by committees and public feedback is taken.

    Consider the question “Parliament as a representative body is expected to examine all legislative proposals, understand their nuances and implications and decide on the appropriate way forward. Yet, more and more Bills are passed without enough deliberations. What are the implications of it? Suggest the measures to deal with it.”

    Conclusion

    In sum, Parliament needs to ensure sufficient scrutiny over the proposals and actions of the government.

  • Here is why the electoral bonds scheme must go

    The article highlights the constitutional objections to the electoral bond scheme.

    Context

    • The Supreme Court, after a brief hearing on March 24, reserved orders on the question of whether or not to stay the electoral bond scheme, ahead of the upcoming State elections.

    Issues

    1) Against democracy

    • When citizens cast their votes they have the right to do so on the basis of full and complete information.
    • And there is no piece of information more important than the knowledge of who funds political parties.
    • The Indian Supreme Court has long held — and rightly so — that the “right to know”, especially in the context of elections, is an integral part of the right to freedom of expression under the Indian Constitution.
    • By keeping this knowledge from citizens and voters, the electoral bonds scheme violates fundamental tenets of our democracy.

    2) Aids role of money in influencing politics

    • It is equally important that if a democracy is to thrive, the role of money in influencing politics ought to be limited.
    • In many advanced countries, for example, elections are funded publicly.
    • The purpose of this is to guarantee a somewhat level playing field, so that elections are a battle of ideas and not money.
    • The electoral bonds scheme, however, removes all pre-existing limits on political donations, and effectively allows well-resourced corporations to buy politicians by paying immense sums of money.

    3) Creates asymmetry in donation

    • Electoral bonds allow receiving limitless donation and that too asymmetrically.
    •  Since the donations are routed through the State Bank of India, it is possible for the government to find out who is donating to which party, but not for the political opposition to know.
    • This, in turn, means that every donor is aware that the central government can trace their donations back to them.
    • Statistics bear this out: a vast majority of the immensely vast sums donated through multiple electoral cycles over the last three years, have gone to the ruling party.

    Issues with the government’s defence

    • The government has attempted to justify the electoral bonds scheme by arguing that its purpose is to prevent the flow of black money into elections.
    •  It is entirely unclear what preventing black money has to do with donor anonymity, making donations limitless, and leaving citizens in the dark.
    • Indeed, as the electoral bonds scheme allows even foreign donations to political parties.
    • With this the prospects of institutional corruption including by foreign sources increases with the electoral bonds scheme, instead of decreasing.

    Constitutional objections

    • The objections to the electoral bonds scheme, highlighted above, are not objections rooted in political morality, or in public policy, they are constitutional objections.
    • The right to know has long been enshrined as a part of the right to freedom of expression.
    • Uncapping political donations and introducing a structural bias into the form of the donations violate both the guarantee of equality before law, as well as being manifestly arbitrary.

    Judiciary must act

    • Governments derive their legitimacy from elections.
    • However, for just that reason the process that leads up to the formation of the government should be policed with particular vigilance.
    • In other words, the electoral legitimacy of the government is questionable if the electoral process has become questionable.
    • The courts is the only independent body that can adequately umpire and enforce the ground rules of democracy.

    Consider the question “How electoral bond scheme can play role in preventing black money in elections? What are the issues with the electoral bond scheme? 

    Conclusion

    The government should take into account the distorting effect of the electoral bonds scheme and take measures to remove the provisions in the scheme that leaves the scope for its misuse.