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Subject: Polity

  • SC trims law practice requirement to 1 year for judicial service

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court has upheld the requirement of prior legal practice for entry into the judicial service. The same order cuts the mandated experience from three years to one. The decision came on review petitions filed against All India Judges Association v. Union of India (May 2025). That judgment had reintroduced a minimum practice condition for candidates applying to the post of Civil Judge (Junior Division), reversing an earlier position that allowed fresh law graduates to sit the examination. The present order was passed by a majority of 2:1 in a three judge Bench headed by the Chief Justice of India. What is contested is whether one year at the Bar can supply the courtroom exposure that the three year rule was designed to guarantee, or whether the shortfall has simply been shifted into training the judiciary itself will now have to deliver.

    What has the Court now ordered on eligibility for judicial service?

    1. The principle survives: Prior legal practice remains a precondition for applying to the judicial service, so the 2025 position that a law degree alone is insufficient is undisturbed.
    2. The quantum is cut by two thirds: The required period of active legal practice falls from three years to one year.
    3. The margin was narrow: The majority opinion was delivered by two judges of a three judge Bench, with the Chief Justice of India authoring it.
    4. The vehicle was a review: The order was passed on review petitions filed against the May 2025 verdict, so it revisits that judgment rather than deciding a fresh challenge.

    How is the shortened practice requirement compensated?

    1. A year at a judicial academy follows selection: A successful applicant carrying one year of legal practice undergoes a one year intensive training programme at the State judicial academy concerned.
    2. A clerkship year follows the academy: That training is followed by a final year of law clerkship with senior judicial officers and High Court judges.
    3. The total exposure is rebuilt to three years: One year of practice, one year of academy training and one year of clerkship together restore the three year period the 2025 judgment had demanded at the Bar alone.
    4. The locus of training shifts: Two of those three years are now delivered inside the judicial system rather than in independent practice.

    What happens to candidates who applied in the interregnum?

    1. A year has already elapsed: The majority noted that a full year has passed since the May 2025 judgment, during which recruitment continued under uncertainty.
    2. Interregnum applicants are deemed compliant: Candidates who applied for the post of Civil Judge (Junior Division) in that period are treated as having completed the required one year of active legal practice.
    3. No proof will be demanded from them: They will not be asked to furnish certificates of proof of practice.
    4. The rule bites from a fixed date: The one year prior practice requirement comes into force in earnest from 1 April 2027.

    Does a one year requirement still deliver what Bar experience was meant to supply?

    1. The dissent rejects the reduction: One judge on the Bench dissented from the majority view on the shortened period.
    2. The stated ground is readiness: The dissenting opinion holds that experience at the Bar is essential for students coming straight out of college, which is an argument about courtroom judgement rather than about length of service.
    3. The majority’s answer is substitution, not agreement: The majority accepts that one year of practice is by itself insufficient, and supplies the balance through the two internal years set out above.
    4. The unresolved question is equivalence: Structured training gives uniform instruction, and practice gives exposure to litigants, adversarial pressure and case failure. The order does not establish that the two are interchangeable.

    Challenges to a prior practice requirement for judicial service

    1. It delays entry and shrinks the applicant pool: A compulsory year at the Bar pushes the earliest entry age up and deters graduates who cannot fund an unpaid year. Eg. Stipends for junior advocates in district courts frequently fall below minimum wage levels in the same district. Fix. Make the practice year count only where the candidate is paid a notified minimum stipend, funded through a Bar Council administered corpus.
    2. Proof of practice invites certification abuse: Practice is usually certified by a senior advocate or a judicial officer, which turns an eligibility condition into a patronage transaction. Eg. Certificates of practice have historically been contested in service litigation over district judiciary appointments. Fix. Replace discretionary certificates with an objective test of appearances recorded on the National Judicial Data Grid.
    3. It falls unevenly on first generation and women entrants: Candidates without family in the profession lack the chambers access that makes a practice year viable. Eg. Women have been the majority of successful candidates in several State judicial service examinations, a pattern that a mandatory chambers year puts at risk. Fix. Create funded court attachment schemes at every district court reserved for first generation law graduates.
    4. Vacancies are already the binding constraint: Adding a filter at entry slows recruitment into a cadre where roughly one fourth of sanctioned posts already lie vacant. Eg. Subordinate courts carry a pendency of about 49 million cases, with over 1.8 lakh cases pending for more than thirty years. Fix. Run recruitment cycles on a fixed annual calendar so the eligibility change does not compound the delay in filling posts.
    5. Training capacity has not been sized for the new load: The academy year now required of every recruit assumes faculty and residential capacity that most academies do not have. Eg. Several State judicial academies run induction courses of a few months rather than a full year. Fix. Fund academy expansion under the Centrally Sponsored Scheme for judicial infrastructure before the rule takes effect in 2027.
    6. The reform addresses quality of entrants, not throughput: Better prepared judges do not by themselves raise disposal where procedure, adjournments and clerical load consume court time. Eg. The case clearance rate in subordinate courts stands at about 89 per cent, so pendency accumulates even with sitting judges at work. Fix. Appoint professional court managers at every district court complex to take administrative work off judicial officers.

    Conclusion

    The Court has retained the principle that a judicial officer should reach the bench with courtroom exposure. It conceded at the same time that a three year bar at the Bar was too heavy a filter for a cadre already short of judges. The compromise moves two of the three years inside the system, and defers the whole scheme so it applies in earnest from 1 April 2027. The next step is with the State High Courts and Public Service Commissions, which must align their service rules and academy capacity before that date.

    Subordinate judiciary in India

    1. Where it sits: The subordinate judiciary comprises the district and taluka level civil and criminal courts, and it is where the overwhelming majority of litigation begins and ends.
    2. The staffing position: India has roughly 21 judges per million people, against the Law Commission’s recommended benchmark of 50.
    3. Who controls it: The High Court of each State exercises administrative and disciplinary control over the subordinate courts within its jurisdiction.

    Constitutional framework governing the subordinate judiciary

    1. Article 233: Provides for the appointment of District Judges by the Governor in consultation with the High Court.
    2. Article 234: Governs the recruitment of persons other than District Judges to the judicial service, by the Governor in consultation with the State Public Service Commission and the High Court.
    3. Article 235: Vests administrative and disciplinary control over the subordinate judiciary in the High Court.
    4. Article 236: Defines “district judge” and “judicial service” for the purposes of this Chapter.
    5. Article 312: Empowers Parliament to create an All India Judicial Service on a Rajya Sabha resolution passed by a two thirds majority.

    Government initiatives for the subordinate judiciary

    1. eCourts Mission Mode Project, Phase III: Funds digitisation of case records, virtual courts and paperless court rooms across district judiciary establishments.
    2. Centrally Sponsored Scheme for Development of Infrastructure Facilities for the Judiciary: Finances court halls, residential units, lawyers’ halls and digital computer rooms at the district and subordinate level.
    3. Fast Track Special Courts: Dedicated courts set up to try offences under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 and rape cases within statutory timelines.
    4. National Judicial Data Grid: A public dashboard publishing case pendency, disposal and age of cases for every district court, which makes court level performance comparable.

    Back2Basics: Civil Judge (Junior Division)

    1. The entry post: It is the lowest rung of the State judicial service and the post through which most judicial officers enter the district judiciary.
    2. How recruitment happens: Candidates are selected under Article 234 through an examination conducted by the State Public Service Commission or the High Court, in consultation with the High Court.
    3. What the court tries: A Civil Judge (Junior Division) exercises original civil jurisdiction up to a pecuniary limit fixed by State law, and the corresponding criminal post is Judicial Magistrate First Class.
    4. Career path: Promotion runs to Civil Judge (Senior Division) and then to the cadre of District Judge, with a share of District Judge posts filled by direct recruitment from the Bar.

    “[2025, GS2, 15 marks] Discuss the evolution of collegium system in India. Critically examine the advantages and disadvantages of the system on appointment of the Judges of the Supreme Court of India and that of the USA.”

  • Modi-ism must evolve into institution-centred nation-building

    Modi-ism must evolve into institution-centred nation-building

    Why in the News

    The political and governing order built around the Prime Minister, given the name Modi-ism, is being tested against the constitutional settlement rather than only against its delivery record. The 2024 verdict returned the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) with 240 seats and made coalition partners necessary, which qualified a leader centred mandate without rejecting it.

    What is the governing order named Modi-ism?

    1. About: Modi-ism is the name given to the political and governing order built around the Prime Minister. It is a method of acquiring power, exercising authority and defining the nation.
    2. Named features: The order is built on eight elements: a commanding leader, a disciplined party organisation, civilisational assertion, centralised decision-making, technology-driven welfare, infrastructure-led development, high-energy national security and direct communication with citizens.
    3. Central promise: The promise is a strong leader, a purposeful state and a stronger India.

    What has the order actually delivered?

    1. Political transformation: The BJP moved from being a major national formation to the central axis of Indian politics. It expanded beyond its traditional geographical and social constituencies and made leadership itself the principal electoral proposition.
    2. The 2024 qualification: The BJP fell to 240 seats in 2024 and required its National Democratic Alliance (NDA) partners to form the government. The verdict chose continuity and restored the relevance of consultation, coalition and restraint.
    3. Delivery at scale: Infrastructure construction, digital public platforms, direct benefit transfers, financial inclusion, sanitation, housing, electrification and welfare delivery at scale strengthened the state’s capacity to reach citizens.
    4. Poverty measurement: NITI Aayog estimated multidimensional poverty at 11.28 per cent in 2022-23, against 29.17 per cent in 2013-14. The methodology is contested, the improvement in delivery is not.
    5. Political containment: The order contained the undue proliferation of regional politics to some degree.
    6. Source of appeal: The order speaks in the language of aspiration, national confidence and civilisational recovery. Citizens long frustrated by delay, indecision and fragmented authority respond to a government promising speed and scale.

    Why is effectiveness not a sufficient test of democratic government?

    1. The five charges: Critics allege that the order seeks to weaken pluralism, dilute socialism, replace rights with governmental charity, capture institutions and ultimately alter the Constitution.
    2. The counter position: Supporters dismiss these charges as partisan hostility or as resistance to India’s cultural resurgence. Both positions are too absolute, since constitutional character must be judged through the actual exercise of power rather than through slogans.
    3. Evidence against dismantling: Elections remain fiercely competitive, governments change in the States, Opposition parties govern substantial parts of the country, and courts continue to examine executive action and enforce fundamental rights.
    4. The Preamble ruling: In November 2024 the Supreme Court rejected petitions challenging the inclusion of the words socialist and secular in the Preamble.
    5. The real risk: A Constitution can be weakened without its words being formally deleted. Institutions may remain intact on paper as their independence, credibility and conventions erode.
    6. What sustains democracy: Democracy rests on five supports beyond periodic elections: restraints on power, respect for dissent, parliamentary accountability, federal balance and equal citizenship.

    What do the pluralism and socialism debates actually turn on?

    1. Pluralism: Religious freedom has not been legally abolished. Majoritarian mobilisation and inflammatory language make minorities feel conditionally accepted.
    2. The distinction drawn: Cultural nationalism is constitutionally legitimate. Cultural supremacy is not.
    3. Equal citizenship: The republic belongs without qualification to every citizen. Equal citizenship cannot depend on religion, political loyalty or conformity with a preferred account of national identity.
    4. What socialism does not mean: Constitutional socialism does not demand a return to the licence-permit raj, hostility to private enterprise or indiscriminate state ownership.
    5. What socialism does mean: It requires social and economic justice, equality of opportunity and protection against degrading deprivation.

    Why must welfare reach a citizen as a right rather than as a gift?

    1. The presentation problem: Statutory entitlements are politically presented as personal gifts from a leader. Food support, employment guarantees, housing, scholarships and social security are public obligations financed by citizens and delivered under law.
    2. The ordering principle: Rights-based governance must complement beneficiary politics rather than be displaced by it. A citizen must remain a rights-holder rather than a grateful beneficiary.
    3. What technology fixes: Technology reduces leakage and accelerates delivery.
    4. What technology creates: Citizens excluded by failed authentication, inaccurate databases or administrative discretion need accessible remedies.
    5. The four safeguards: Welfare requires enforceable standards, grievance redress, social audits and legislative scrutiny.

    What does the record on Parliament and appointments show?

    1. Speed of legislation: During the seventeenth Lok Sabha, 58 per cent of bills were passed within two weeks of introduction.
    2. Committee referral: Only 16 per cent of bills were referred to parliamentary committees.
    3. Budget scrutiny: Around 80 per cent of the Union Budget was voted without discussion between 2019 and 2023.
    4. Political funding: The Supreme Court decision striking down the electoral bond scheme established that secrecy in political funding had crossed a constitutional boundary.
    5. Election commissioner appointments: The law governing the appointment of election commissioners gives the executive a majority on the selection committee, which has raised concerns about perceived independence.
    6. The test for autonomy: Institutional autonomy depends on more than technical legality. It requires transparent appointments, procedural fairness and visible distance from partisan command, so independence is protected in public perception as well as in fact.

    What corrections would a shift to institution-centred nation-building require?

    1. Parliament: Parliament must recover serious deliberation, committee scrutiny and control over public expenditure.
    2. Federalism: Federal consultation must precede major decisions affecting the States.
    3. Appointments and agencies: Appointments to constitutional and regulatory bodies should command cross-party credibility. Investigative agencies must be demonstrably even-handed.
    4. Welfare and discourse: Welfare delivery must be joined to enforceable rights, and political discourse must replace habitual polarisation with constitutional fraternity.
    5. The next development phase: The eight stated goals are productive employment, competitive manufacturing, stronger small enterprises, higher farm incomes, quality public education, accessible healthcare, liveable cities and climate resilience.
    6. Party institutionalisation: No durable national party can remain indefinitely dependent on one personality. It needs empowered ministers, credible regional leaders, internal debate and an orderly culture of succession.

    Challenges to Institution-Centred Nation-Building

    1. Executive control of the legislative calendar: A ruling coalition can clear the chamber of dissent before a contested bill is taken up. Eg. In December 2023, 146 members were suspended across both Houses, the largest mass suspension since Independence, and the Telecommunications Bill, 2023 was passed with the near entire opposition absent.
    2. A vacant Deputy Speaker’s chair: Article 93 mandates the election of a Deputy Speaker, and the post has been left unfilled for years. Eg. The post lay vacant through the entire seventeenth Lok Sabha and into the eighteenth, so a member from the Speaker’s own panel of chairpersons presided over the no-confidence motion against the Speaker in March 2026.
    3. Discretionary gatekeeping on removal motions: Section 3 of the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 uses the word may, so the presiding officer may refuse a removal motion even when the numerical threshold is met. Eg. In April 2026 a notice signed by 193 opposition members seeking removal of the Chief Election Commissioner was refused admission in both Houses without stated reasons.
    4. The Money Bill route: Certifying a bill as a Money Bill removes the Rajya Sabha’s power to amend it and places the certification beyond ordinary challenge. Eg. The Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Act, 2016 was passed as a Money Bill, and the correctness of that certification remains before a larger bench of the Supreme Court.
    5. Bypassed pre-legislative consultation: Draft legislation is often introduced without the public comment period the executive’s own policy prescribes. Eg. The Pre-Legislative Consultation Policy of 2014 requires draft bills to be placed in the public domain for thirty days, and this step is routinely skipped.
    6. Federal consultation deficit: Consultative federal forums exist on paper and meet rarely. Eg. The Inter-State Council, constituted under Article 263, met only once between 2016 and 2024.

    Conclusion

    Effectiveness alone cannot settle the constitutional character of a government, and a Constitution can be hollowed out without a word of its text being altered. The productive core of the order, decisive leadership, infrastructure, digital innovation, credible defence capability and measurable delivery, should continue. What must change is the shift from leader-centred mobilisation to institution-centred nation-building, carried by parliamentary deliberation, federal consultation, cross-party credibility in appointments and welfare delivered as enforceable right. The choice is between an order disciplined by the Constitution and one that seeks to rise above it.

  • Beyond blasphemy: how laws can curtail the possibility of social reform

    Why in the News

    Section 295A and the provisions that succeeded it have been turned against writers, artists and reformers, with arrest, mob campaigns and pre emptive withdrawal delivering the harm long before any verdict. India simultaneously runs statutes that direct the State to attack religious and superstitious practice, so the same legal system both punishes criticism of religion and mandates it.

    What is Section 295A?

    1. What it penalises: Section 295A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 punished deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage the religious feelings of any class by insulting its religion or religious beliefs.
    2. Successor provision: The corresponding offence is now Section 299 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.
    3. What the offence turns on: Liability rests on the intent to outrage and not on the truth or falsity of what was said.
    4. How it operates in practice: The offence is cognisable, so a complaint can produce arrest and judicial custody before any court assesses whether malice existed.

    What is the heckler’s veto?

    1. Heckler’s veto: A heckler’s veto is the suppression of expression because a hostile audience threatens disruption or violence, so the objector rather than the law decides what may be said. Speech is stopped in order to keep the peace, which transfers the power of censorship to whoever protests loudest.

    What is a sacrilege law?

    1. Sacrilege law: A sacrilege law criminalises damage to or desecration of a religious text or object, as distinct from an offence aimed at outraging feelings through speech or writing. State level sacrilege provisions of this kind carry punishment extending to imprisonment for life.

    What does the law on outraging religious feelings currently cover in India?

    1. The core offence: Section 299 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 penalises deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious feelings by insulting religion or religious beliefs, whether by words, writing, signs or visible representation.
    2. Adjacent offences: Section 298 covers injuring or defiling a place of worship with intent to insult a religion, Section 300 covers disturbing a religious assembly and Section 302 covers uttering words with deliberate intent to wound religious feelings.
    3. Group enmity provisions: Section 196 penalises promoting enmity between groups on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, language or caste, and Section 197 covers imputations prejudicial to national integration.
    4. No standalone blasphemy statute: India has no offence of blasphemy as such, and the protection is assembled from provisions aimed at intent to outrage rather than at the content of any belief.
    5. State level escalation: Some States have enacted sacrilege provisions carrying punishment up to imprisonment for life, which sets the penalty far above the central provision.
    6. Judicial test applied: In Amish Devgan v Union of India (2020) the Supreme Court laid down a three part contextual test examining the content of the speech, the intent of the speaker and the harm caused or likely to be caused.
    7. Truth is not a defence: Courts have held that a wholly true statement can still outrage religious feelings, so accuracy does not absolve the speaker.

    Constitutional Provisions Related to Free Speech and Religious Freedom

    1. Article 19(1)(a): Guarantees every citizen the right to freedom of speech and expression.
    2. Article 19(2): Permits reasonable restrictions on that right on enumerated grounds, including public order, decency, morality, defamation and incitement to an offence.
    3. Article 25(1): Guarantees freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion, subject to public order, morality and health.
    4. Article 25(2)(a) and Article 25(2)(b): Permit the State to regulate secular activity associated with religious practice, and to provide for social welfare and reform including throwing open Hindu religious institutions to all classes.
    5. Article 26: Gives every religious denomination the right to manage its own affairs in matters of religion, subject to public order, morality and health.
    6. Article 14: Requires that a penal classification rest on an intelligible differentia bearing a rational nexus to the object of the provision.
    7. Article 21: Protects life and personal liberty, which is what arrest and pre trial custody in a speech case directly curtails.
    8. Article 15(1) and Article 17: Bar discrimination on grounds of religion and caste and abolish untouchability, which are the constitutional basis for statutes attacking exploitative religious practice.
    9. Article 51A(h): Makes it a fundamental duty of every citizen to develop the scientific temper, humanism and the spirit of inquiry and reform.
    10. Preamble: Declares India a secular republic, and secularism has been held to be part of the basic structure and therefore beyond amendment.

    How has the provision been used against writers, artists and film?

    1. Angarey, 1932: A small collection of Urdu short stories attacking obscurantist customs and the sexual hypocrisy of some religious figures was banned soon after publication, and its authors faced threats.
    2. The Satanic Verses, 1988: The government banned import of Salman Rushdie’s novel, making India one of the first countries in the world to act against it, and a secular one at that.
    3. The Da Vinci Code, 2006: Seven Indian States banned the film and the book on the ground that they offended Christian sentiment, and two States lifted the ban only after High Court intervention.
    4. The Hindus: An Alternative History, 2014: Wendy Doniger’s book was withdrawn by Penguin India after a civil suit invoking Section 295A, so the withdrawal followed a civil filing rather than any conviction.
    5. Madhorubagan, 2015 and 2016: Perumal Murugan faced a criminal complaint and a mob campaign over the novel and announced his own death as a writer in 2015; a Madras High Court judgment of 2016 quashed the case and closed with the appeal to let the author be resurrected to what he is best at, write.
    6. M.F. Husain: The painter was hounded into exile and death abroad after decades of prosecutions and threats over his nude depictions of Hindu deities.
    7. Taslima Nasrin: Her writing has met comparable treatment through bans, threats and constraints on where she may live and publish.

    Why does the harm occur before any verdict?

    1. Rehana Fathima, 2018: Weeks after the Supreme Court lifted the traditional ban on women of menstruating age entering the Sabarimala temple, the Kerala activist was arrested under Section 295A over a Facebook photograph of herself dressed as an Ayyappa devotee.
    2. Cost imposed without trial: She spent over two weeks in judicial custody and was suspended by her employer within days of the arrest, all over an image rather than an argument.
    3. Amish Devgan, 2020: The television anchor called the Sufi saint Khwaja Moinuddin Chishti a lootera during a live debate, apologised within days for what he said was an inadvertent slip for a different historical name, and still faced seven separate first information reports across five States.
    4. Multiplicity as the punishment: The Supreme Court declined to quash any of the seven and merely clubbed them together in Ajmer, so the burden of defending across five jurisdictions was reduced rather than removed.
    5. Conviction is not the point: These cases rarely end in conviction and the prosecution more often goes nowhere, so the process itself operates as the penalty.
    6. Three channels of harm: The damage is delivered through arrest, through the heckler’s veto of an aggressive and sometimes violent audience, and through the pre emptive caution of publishers and film certifiers who calculate that no book or film is worth the trouble.

    Which laws run in the opposite direction?

    1. Constituent Assembly position, 2 December 1948: During the debate on whether personal law should be shielded from legislative reform, B.R. Ambedkar rejected the idea that religion could claim a veto over social legislation merely because a custom carried religious sanction.
    2. The reasoning he gave: He said he did not understand why religion should be given a vast, expansive jurisdiction covering the whole of life and preventing the legislature from encroaching upon that field, since this liberty exists in order to reform the social system, so personal law cannot be excluded from the jurisdiction of the State.
    3. Maharashtra, 2013: The Prevention and Eradication of Human Sacrifice and Other Inhuman, Evil and Aghori Practices and Black Magic Act was passed after the assassination of the rationalist campaigner Narendra Dabholkar.
    4. What that Act criminalises: It penalises a long list of exploitative religious practices, ranging from claiming to cure disease through faith healing to inducing self flagellation.
    5. Karnataka, 2017: The State passed a comparable law against inhuman evil practices and black magic.
    6. Sati (Prevention) Act, 1987: It criminalises not only the act of widow immolation but its glorification, treating celebratory speech about a religious practice as itself an offence.
    7. The mirror image rather than the opposite: A law punishing praise of a religious practice uses the same technique as a law punishing criticism of one, since both make speech about religion a criminal question.
    8. What the coexistence exposes: Indian law has no coherent theory of when religious sentiment deserves protection, and what governs is a case by case political calculation about which practices are currently unpopular enough, or which constituencies currently powerful enough, to tip the balance.

    Why does the reformer fall on the wrong side of a blasphemy law?

    1. The State of Mysore versus Henry Rodrigues, 1961: A Catholic editor was tried under Section 295A over an article in his Konkani language magazine Crusader, titled “Honour to Mary or Dishonour?”, which accused Catholic priests of exploiting the credulous by falsely attributing miracles to the Virgin Mary.
    2. The defence offered: He argued that since the criticised beliefs and practices were superstitious and contrary to the Bible itself, the truth of his charge ought to absolve him.
    3. The court’s answer: Following an earlier Allahabad High Court ruling, the Mysore High Court rejected this outright, holding that even a wholly true statement can outrage religious feelings and that the provision punishes the intent to outrage rather than the accuracy of what is said.
    4. The insider treated as the stranger: A believer’s sincere and internally argued complaint against his own clergy was treated exactly as the law treats a stranger’s contempt.
    5. Jyotirao Phule: He spent the 1870s attacking Brahminical religious authority as the theological scaffolding of caste oppression, recasting Hindu myth in his tract Gulamgiri to expose it as a device for keeping the lower castes subjugated.
    6. Hamid Dalwai: A century later he founded the Muslim Satyashodhak Mandal explicitly on Phule’s model, marched a handful of Muslim women to the Maharashtra Assembly to demand an end to triple talaq and polygamy, and was ostracised and abused for it.
    7. The pair the law cannot separate: The offence does not distinguish a Phule or a Dalwai from a bigot baiting a rival faith for sport, since both are trying to make believers feel bad about what they believe.
    8. A line a police station cannot draw: What should separate them is whether the critic is trying to improve the community or merely humiliate it, and an officer recording a complaint is poorly placed to make that assessment.

    Major debates surrounding blasphemy and sacrilege law in India

    1. Public order against expression: A targeted law applied with judicial restraint and the safeguard of proven intent is defended as a proportionate response to sentiment that has repeatedly proved combustible, rather than as an assault on free thought.
    2. Restraint in principle against the record in practice: The historical record of Section 295A, and now of State sacrilege law, gives little confidence that restraint is what actually happens once a complaint is registered.
    3. Discussion, advocacy and incitement: Shreya Singhal v Union of India (2015) held that only incitement carrying a direct and proximate connection to public disorder may be criminalised, and that discussion and advocacy remain protected even where unpopular.
    4. Intent against effect: Whether liability should turn on what the speaker meant or on the disorder that followed, since the intent test is applied only after an audience has already reacted.
    5. Truth as a defence: Whether a demonstrably accurate factual claim about a religious practice should absolve the speaker, which the 1961 ruling denied outright.
    6. Proportionality of punishment: Whether imprisonment for life for an insult to a text can be reconciled with a Constitution whose secularism is held unamendable.
    7. New law against enforcement: In Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v Union of India (April 2026) the Supreme Court dismissed a batch of petitions seeking fresh hate speech legislation, holding that creating criminal offences belongs to the legislature and that the real problem is an enforcement deficit.
    8. Empirical gap: Data under these provisions is not published in a form that sets arrests, days in custody and withdrawn publications against convictions, so the argument runs on cases rather than on measured outcomes.

    Challenges to reforming laws on religious offence

    1. Cognisability delivers the punishment: An offence that permits arrest on a complaint produces custody before a magistrate examines whether malice existed. Eg. In Imran Pratapgarhi v State of Gujarat (2025) the Supreme Court extended the preliminary inquiry safeguard to first information reports in speech cases precisely to interpose a check before registration.
    2. Forum multiplicity: A single utterance can be prosecuted in every jurisdiction where a complainant chooses to file. Eg. Clubbing seven first information reports at Ajmer in 2020 consolidated the defence without removing the cost of defending in a distant State.
    3. Self censorship leaves no record: A publisher or certifier that withdraws before any order removes the work without producing a judicial decision that can be appealed. Eg. Penguin India withdrew and destroyed copies of The Hindus: An Alternative History in 2014 with no conviction and no court direction requiring it.
    4. Mob campaign as the real enforcement mechanism: The threat of disruption achieves what a prosecution cannot. Eg. Perumal Murugan withdrew from writing in 2015 after a mob campaign and a local shutdown, and resumed only after the Madras High Court judgment of 2016.
    5. State level bans without central legislation: Executive bans multiply at the State level and are reversed only through litigation. Eg. Seven States banned The Da Vinci Code in 2006 and two lifted the ban only after their High Courts intervened.
    6. Penalty escalation at the State level: A State provision can prescribe imprisonment for life for an offence against a text, which exceeds the penalty for many offences against the person. Eg. State sacrilege provisions carry punishment extending to imprisonment for life against a maximum of a few years under the central provision.
    7. Recodification carried the provision forward: The most recent opportunity to narrow the offence was not used. Eg. The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 re-enacted Section 295A as Section 299 unchanged, instead of confining it to incitement to violence.

    Conclusion

    Section 295A and its successor punish the intent to outrage rather than the falsity of what is said, so a reformer criticising his own faith is caught by the same words as a bigot baiting a rival one. India runs that regime alongside statutes that direct the State to criminalise faith healing, black magic and the glorification of sati, which shows there is no settled principle about when religious sentiment deserves protection. What remains unresolved is whether these provisions will be narrowed to their original and defensible purpose of preventing incitement to actual violence, leaving criticism, satire and reform of religious practice to public argument rather than to the criminal courts.

    What is Secularism?

    1. About: Secularism is the principle that the State holds no religion of its own and treats every faith on the same footing in law and in the distribution of public benefits.
    2. Rationale: It exists to keep the coercive power of the State out of the hands of any religious majority or clergy, and to make citizenship independent of belief.
    3. Strict separation model: The State and religion operate in mutually exclusive spheres, with the State neither aiding nor interfering with any religion, which is the model associated with the United States and France.
    4. Principled distance model: The State keeps no religion of its own and retains the power to intervene in religious practice for social reform and equality, which is the model the Indian Constitution follows.
    5. Positive neutrality: Equal treatment is delivered through equal respect rather than equal indifference, so the State may fund, regulate and administer religious institutions on a non preferential basis.
    6. Constitutional location: The word secular was inserted in the Preamble by the Constitution (Forty second Amendment) Act, 1976, and S.R. Bommai v Union of India (1994) held secularism to be part of the basic structure.
    7. Essential religious practices doctrine: Courts decide the reach of religious freedom by asking whether a practice is essential to the religion, which places the determination of religious content with the judiciary.

    Key Concerns Regarding Secularism in India

    1. State entanglement with religious administration: Endowment departments and statutory boards administer the institutions of some faiths and not others, so the State’s distance is uneven across religions.
    2. Judicial determination of religious content: The essential religious practices test requires judges to decide questions of theology, a function courts were not designed or equipped for.
    3. Asymmetric reform power: Article 25(2)(b) expressly permits the opening of Hindu religious institutions, and comparable reform in other communities has proceeded largely through litigation rather than legislation.
    4. Personal law plurality against Article 44: The directive for a uniform civil code remains unimplemented, so family law continues to differ by religion.
    5. Majoritarian capture of neutral language: A formally neutral provision protects the practices of the dominant community more effectively, since those practices attract fewer complaints and fewer prosecutions.
    6. No horizontal anti discrimination remedy: Discrimination on religious grounds by private landlords and employers has no general statutory remedy, since constitutional guarantees bind the State.

    Laws and Rules Governing Religious Offence in India

    1. Indian Penal Code, 1860: Chapter XV grouped the offences relating to religion and remained the governing law until 2024.
    2. Section 295A was inserted by the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1927 following the Rangila Rasul prosecution.
    3. Sections 295 to 298 covered defiling a place of worship, disturbing a religious assembly, trespass on burial places and wounding religious feelings by word.
    4. Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023: Replaced the Indian Penal Code with effect from 1 July 2024 and carried this chapter forward.
    5. Section 299 corresponds to Section 295A, Section 298 to Section 295, Section 300 to Section 296 and Section 302 to Section 298.
    6. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023: Provides for a preliminary inquiry before registration of a first information report in specified categories of offence, and for prior government sanction before a court takes cognisance of certain offences relating to religion.
    7. Cinematograph Act, 1952: Empowers the certifying authority to refuse or condition certification of a film on grounds mirroring Article 19(2), including public order and decency.
    8. Information Technology Act, 2000: Section 69A permits blocking of online content on grounds that track the restrictions in Article 19(2).
    9. Sati (Prevention) Act, 1987: Criminalises the act of sati, its abetment and its glorification, and provides for Special Courts to try these offences.
    10. Maharashtra Prevention and Eradication of Human Sacrifice and Other Inhuman, Evil and Aghori Practices and Black Magic Act, 2013: Criminalises a listed set of exploitative practices including faith healing claims and induced self flagellation.
    11. Karnataka Prevention and Eradication of Inhuman Evil Practices and Black Magic Act, 2017: Enacts a comparable prohibition in that State.
    12. Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955: Penalises the enforcement of religious disabilities arising out of untouchability, including denial of temple entry.

    Back2Basics: Jyotirao Phule

    1. Life: Born in 1827 in a family of the Mali caste in present day Maharashtra, and died in 1890 in Pune.
    2. First school: Opened a school for girls at Bhide Wada in Pune in 1848, among the earliest such schools established by an Indian.
    3. Extension to the excluded castes: Opened a school in 1851 for children of the castes then treated as untouchable.
    4. Organisation founded: Founded the Satyashodhak Samaj, the Society of Truth Seekers, on 24 September 1873 in Pune, to secure social justice for the lower castes without priestly mediation.
    5. Principal writings: Wrote Gulamgiri in 1873, which read Hindu myth as a record of the subjugation of the lower castes, and Shetkaryacha Asud in 1883 on the condition of the cultivator.
    6. Vocabulary contributed: Popularised the term Dalit for the oppressed castes, which entered later political usage.
    7. Social work: Opened a home for widows and a centre for the prevention of infanticide, and supported widow remarriage.
    8. Title conferred: Given the title Mahatma in 1888 at a public gathering in Bombay.
    9. Partnership: Worked with Savitribai Phule, who taught at the Bhide Wada school and is counted among India’s first women teachers.
    10. Later influence: His model was invoked directly by Hamid Dalwai in founding the Muslim Satyashodhak Mandal in 1970.

    Way Forward

    1. Narrow the offence to incitement: Confine Section 299 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 to speech carrying a direct and proximate connection to violence, in line with the Shreya Singhal test.
    2. Make the offence non cognisable: Remove the power to arrest on a bare complaint, so that custody does not precede any judicial assessment of deliberate and malicious intent.
    3. Require prior sanction and preliminary inquiry: Make registration of a first information report conditional on a preliminary inquiry and on sanction by a designated senior officer, extending the Imran Pratapgarhi safeguard to every provision in this chapter.
    4. Consolidate multiple complaints by statute: Provide that all first information reports arising from a single publication or utterance are transferred to one jurisdiction as a matter of right, rather than case by case.
    5. Introduce a public interest defence: Allow truth combined with a reformist or scholarly purpose as a statutory defence, so an insider critic is separated from a speaker seeking only to humiliate.
    6. Cap the penalty: Bring State sacrilege provisions within a central ceiling so that an offence against a text cannot carry imprisonment for life.
    7. Protect the publisher and the certifier: Bar interim injunctions and pre publication restraints on books and films except on a judicial finding of imminent violence, so withdrawal is not the cheapest option.

    “[2014, GS2, 12.5] What do you understand by the concept “freedom of speech and expression”? Does it cover hate speech also? Why do the films in India stand on a slightly different plane from other forms of expression? Discuss.”

  • Shah hails southern states: ‘Biggest contributor to nation’s development’

    Why in the News

    The 31st meeting of the Southern Zonal Council was held at Mahabalipuram in Tamil Nadu on 20 August 2026, chaired by the Union Home Minister, who described South India as the biggest contributor to the country’s development. Every demand the southern States tabled at the same meeting asked that this contribution not cost them seats, funds or control over shared resources. The praise and the agenda therefore pointed in opposite directions.

    What are the Zonal Councils?

    1. What they are: Zonal Councils are advisory bodies that bring the States and Union Territories of a region together with the Centre to discuss matters of common interest. There are five Zonal Councils, covering the Northern, Central, Eastern, Western and Southern zones.
    2. Their legal basis: They were created by Sections 15 to 22 of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956, so they are statutory bodies and not constitutional ones.
    3. Who sits on them: The Union Home Minister is the chairman of each Zonal Council. The Chief Ministers of the member States are members, with the office of vice chairman rotating annually among them, and each State also nominates two other ministers.
    4. What they can do: They discuss and make recommendations on inter State disputes, economic and social planning, border and linguistic minority issues, and matters arising from State reorganisation. Their conclusions are recommendatory and carry no binding force.

    What did the Union Home Minister set out as the South’s contribution?

    1. The three pillars named: The development journey of South India was attributed to three pillars, namely a high literacy rate, trained manpower, and technical expertise in the utilisation of deep seas.
    2. The sectors credited: The region was said to have contributed across literature, research and development, space, information technology, artificial intelligence, industrial development and agriculture, with the automobile, pharmaceutical and infrastructure sectors also named.
    3. The instruction drawn from it: The rest of the country was asked to learn from South India on innovation and revenue generation.
    4. The timeframe set: The Independence Day message that what has not been achieved in the last seven decades must be accomplished in the next five to seven years was underlined, with every State asked to contribute.
    5. Water framed as the region’s constraint: Water was described as the soul of the region across four areas, namely agriculture, industry, healthy citizens and the environment.
    6. The proposal on rivers: Linking major rivers from the Brahmaputra to the Kaveri and the Godavari was put forward as a way to ensure the country faces no water shortage for the next 100 years.
    7. The nutrition point: Malnutrition and stunted growth were described as snowballing into a national problem, with the fight against malnutrition credited to Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh before it was accepted across India.

    What did each southern State place before the Council?

    1. Kerala: The State sought State specific premiums for the Ayushman Bharat Pradhan Mantri Jan Arogya Yojana in place of a uniform national premium, eligibility aligned with the National Food Security Act, 2013 database, and a revised central share reflecting actual expenditure incurred on centrally sponsored families. It also sought a more equitable and flexible funding approach for centrally sponsored schemes and asked that auctioning of mineral blocks along the Kerala coast be put on hold.
    2. Kerala on Mullaperiyar: The State reaffirmed its willingness to supply water to Tamil Nadu from a new dam it has proposed at Mullaperiyar in Idukki district in place of the existing structure, offering to bear the construction expense while leaving construction and location to Tamil Nadu.
    3. Karnataka: The State argued that success in population control must not be allowed to diminish southern political representation, urged the Centre to reconsider the recently passed Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Bill, 2026, and pressed for fairness in funds, voice and respect.
    4. Karnataka on delimitation: The State urged the Council to adopt a resolution calling on the Centre to honour the 1971 Census as the basis for delimitation.
    5. Tamil Nadu: The State conveyed its concerns on delimitation and pressed that the existing freeze on the number of Lok Sabha seats should continue. It asserted its position on increasing the storage height of the Mullaperiyar Dam.
    6. Tamil Nadu on the terms of the relationship: The State stated that southern States seek not preferential treatment but fair and equitable treatment that respects fiscal autonomy and rewards performance alongside equity.
    7. Andhra Pradesh: The State projected that the southern economy could reach $10 trillion by 2047, sought greater cooperation among States in the region and urged the Centre to expedite resolution of bifurcation related issues.
    8. Telangana: The State stated that established adjudicatory mechanisms on Krishna waters must be respected and reiterated that it retains lower riparian rights over surplus waters. It stated that it sought no special privilege but only its fair entitlement through the legal mechanisms already established.
    9. Telangana on the method: The State stated that cooperative federalism should provide a framework for resolving inter State issues in a fair, time bound and legally sustainable manner.
    10. The demand two States made jointly: Tamil Nadu and Karnataka both urged that the existing number of Lok Sabha seats be frozen and that women’s reservation be accommodated within the current number of seats.
    11. What the Council recorded as agreed: On the division of assets and liabilities between Andhra Pradesh and Telangana, both States agreed to resolve the matters in consultation with the Ministry of Home Affairs. On pending water issues, the southern States agreed to early resolution through meetings involving the ministries concerned, the Inter-State Council and the respective States.

    Why does delimitation dominate the southern agenda?

    1. The freeze is the source of the current seat distribution: The number of Lok Sabha seats allotted to each State has been held at the 1971 Census population, so States that reduced fertility fastest have not lost seats for doing so.
    2. The freeze has an expiry: The freeze runs until the first Census taken after 2026, after which readjustment on current population becomes constitutionally due.
    3. Performance and representation move in opposite directions: States that completed the demographic transition earliest have the slowest population growth, so a population based readjustment reduces their share of the House.
    4. The demand is for the freeze to be extended, not for a new formula: Tamil Nadu and Karnataka both asked that the existing number of seats continue rather than proposing an alternative allocation rule.
    5. Women’s reservation raises the stakes: Accommodating the reserved seats within the current total, as both States asked, keeps the reservation from becoming a reason to expand the House on a population basis.

    Why do water disputes keep returning to the Council table?

    1. The rivers are inter State and the users are not: The Krishna, the Kaveri and the Godavari cross State boundaries, so every allocation decision transfers water from one electorate to another.
    2. Adjudication and negotiation run in parallel: Telangana pressed that established adjudicatory mechanisms be respected on Krishna waters, which places a tribunal award and a Council discussion on the same question at the same time.
    3. A structure can outlive its settlement: The Mullaperiyar dispute turns on the storage height of an ageing structure, with Kerala proposing a replacement dam and Tamil Nadu asserting a claim over storage in the existing one.
    4. Ownership and operation are split: Kerala offered to bear the cost of a new dam while leaving construction and location to Tamil Nadu, which separates who pays from who controls.
    5. Interlinking is offered as the way past allocation: The proposal to link the Brahmaputra to the Kaveri and the Godavari reframes a distribution dispute as a supply problem, which shifts it out of the tribunal system and into a capital project.

    Can a body without binding power settle demands of this kind?

    1. The Council can only recommend: Nothing decided at a Zonal Council binds the Centre or any State, so agreement at the table is a statement of intent rather than a settlement.
    2. The demands are not within its gift: Delimitation is fixed by the Constitution and by Parliament, mineral taxation by a central Act, and river water allocation by tribunals under a separate statute.
    3. What it did settle was procedural: The two outcomes recorded, on Andhra Pradesh and Telangana assets and on pending water issues, were agreements to hold further consultations rather than agreements on substance.
    4. The forum multiplies rather than converges: Water issues were referred onward to the ministries concerned, the Inter-State Council and the States, which adds forums to a dispute rather than closing it.
    5. The tension the meeting exposed: The southern States were praised for performance and simultaneously asked the Centre to ensure that performance does not reduce their seats, their scheme funding or their control over coastal minerals.

    Challenges to the Zonal Council as a forum for resolving these demands

    1. Meetings are irregular and agenda driven: A Council that meets once in a year or longer cannot track an issue between sittings, so items are carried forward rather than closed. Eg. The Southern Zonal Council reached only its 31st meeting in 2026, seven decades after the Councils were created in 1956.
    2. Recommendations carry no enforcement: There is no mechanism to compel a member State or the Centre to act on a resolution the Council adopts. Eg. Karnataka’s request that the Council resolve to honour the 1971 Census for delimitation would bind neither Parliament nor the Centre even if adopted.
    3. The Council has no dispute settlement power over water: Inter State river water disputes are reserved to tribunals by statute, so the Council can discuss but not decide them. Eg. The Krishna waters question was placed before the Council even as Telangana insisted that established adjudicatory mechanisms be respected.
    4. Fiscal questions sit outside its mandate: Scheme design and the central share are decided by the Union ministries and the Finance Commission, not by a regional council. Eg. Kerala’s request for State specific Ayushman Bharat premiums has to be settled by the health ministry, not by the Council.
    5. Asymmetry of the chair: The Union Home Minister chairs the Council, so the Centre presides over a forum where the principal counterparty in most disputes is the Centre itself. Eg. Karnataka used the meeting to ask the Centre to reconsider a central Act on mineral taxation.
    6. Overlapping bodies dilute accountability: The Inter-State Council, the NITI Aayog Governing Council, the Goods and Services Tax Council and the Zonal Councils all handle Centre State coordination without a clear division of subjects. Eg. The pending water issues were referred simultaneously to the concerned ministries, the Inter-State Council and the States.

    Conclusion

    The Council closed with agreement on two procedural points, namely further consultation on the division of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana assets and further meetings on pending water issues, and the next step lies with the Ministry of Home Affairs. The substantive demands raised, on delimitation, on the freeze on Lok Sabha seats, on centrally sponsored scheme funding and on coastal mineral auctions, remain with Parliament and the Union ministries. The meeting confirmed that the southern States are asking to be held harmless for the very performance they were praised for. That question cannot be answered by a body whose conclusions are recommendatory.

    What is Cooperative Federalism?

    1. About: Cooperative federalism is a working arrangement in which the Union and the States act as collaborating levels of the same government rather than as rival sovereigns, coordinating through joint institutions on subjects that neither can handle alone.
    2. Rationale: It exists because the Indian Constitution distributes powers between two levels while leaving many problems, such as river water, internal migration, public health and taxation of a single national market, indivisible across those levels.
    3. The institutional forms it takes:
    4. Constitutional coordination bodies: The Inter-State Council and the Finance Commission are created by the Constitution itself rather than by statute.
    5. Statutory coordination bodies: The Zonal Councils under the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 and the North Eastern Council under its own 1971 statute are created by Parliament.
    6. Executive coordination bodies: The NITI Aayog Governing Council and its Regional Councils operate through executive resolution rather than statute.
    7. Constitutionally mandated joint decision bodies: The Goods and Services Tax Council under Article 279A takes decisions binding in practice on both levels through a weighted vote.
    8. The doctrinal companion: Competitive federalism describes States competing on outcome indicators for investment and rank, and operates alongside cooperative federalism rather than replacing it.

    Key Concerns Regarding Cooperative Federalism

    1. The Governor’s office as a point of friction: Reservation of Bills for the President’s consideration and indefinite withholding of assent place an appointee of the Centre inside the State legislative process.
    2. Central agencies operating in State subjects: Police and public order are State List subjects, while central investigative agencies operate within States, and several States have withdrawn general consent for such operations.
    3. Unilateral legislation on Concurrent List subjects: Parliament can legislate on Concurrent List entries without State agreement, and central law prevails over State law under Article 254 in the event of repugnancy.
    4. Central control over the higher civil service: All India Service officers serve in the States but are governed by central cadre rules, so deputation and disciplinary control sit with the Centre.
    5. Coordination bodies meet at the Centre’s discretion: The Inter-State Council and the Zonal Councils have no fixed calendar in the Constitution or the statute, so their frequency depends on the Union executive.
    6. Reorganisation obligations remain open for years: Division of assets and liabilities after State bifurcation is left to be settled by consultation, which leaves successor States negotiating long after reorganisation.

    Constitutional Framework Governing Centre State Coordination

    1. Article 246 with the Seventh Schedule: Distributes legislative power across the Union List, the State List and the Concurrent List.
    2. Article 254: Provides that central law prevails over a repugnant State law on a Concurrent List subject, subject to Presidential assent for the State law.
    3. Article 262: Empowers Parliament to provide for adjudication of disputes over the waters of inter State rivers and to bar the jurisdiction of courts, including the Supreme Court, over such disputes.
    4. Article 263: Empowers the President to establish an Inter-State Council to inquire into and advise upon inter State disputes and to investigate and discuss subjects of common interest.
    5. Article 279A: Establishes the Goods and Services Tax Council as a joint forum of the Centre and the States with a weighted voting formula.
    6. Article 280: Establishes the Finance Commission to recommend the distribution of net tax proceeds between the Union and the States and the principles governing grants in aid.
    7. Article 281 and Article 282: Require Finance Commission recommendations to be laid before Parliament, and allow the Union and the States to make grants for any public purpose, which is the constitutional basis for centrally sponsored schemes.
    8. Article 81 and Article 82: Fix the composition of the Lok Sabha and require readjustment of seat allocation among States after each Census, on the terms Parliament determines.
    9. Article 293: Places conditions on State borrowing where a State is indebted to the Union.
    10. Article 131: Confers original jurisdiction on the Supreme Court in disputes between the Government of India and one or more States.

    Laws and Rules Governing Inter State Coordination

    1. States Reorganisation Act, 1956: Reorganised the States on a linguistic basis and created the five Zonal Councils.
    2. Sections 15 to 22 establish the Councils, fix their composition and define their advisory functions on inter State and Centre State matters.
    3. North Eastern Council Act, 1971: Created a sixth regional council for the north eastern States, later amended in 2002 to add Sikkim and to make the Council a regional planning body.
    4. Inter-State River Water Disputes Act, 1956: Provides for the constitution of a tribunal where a State complains that its interests in an inter State river are affected.
    5. The 2002 amendment fixed a one year deadline for constituting a tribunal and a three year deadline for its award, with a further two year extension permitted.
    6. Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2014: Governs the bifurcation of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana, including the division of assets, liabilities and institutions still under negotiation.
    7. Inter-State Council Order, 1990: The Presidential order that constituted the Inter-State Council on a recommendation of the Sarkaria Commission on Centre State relations, and defined its duties.
    8. It makes the Prime Minister the chairman, with the Chief Ministers of all States, the Chief Ministers of Union Territories with legislatures, administrators of other Union Territories and six Union Cabinet Ministers nominated by the Prime Minister as members.
    9. A Standing Committee chaired by the Union Home Minister handles continuous consultation, and the Council Secretariat functions under the Ministry of Home Affairs.
    10. Its recommendations are not binding on the Centre or on any State.

    Challenges in Centre State Fiscal and Resource Relations

    1. The divisible pool is smaller than the tax collected: Cesses and surcharges are not shared with the States, so revenue can rise without the States’ share rising with it. Eg. Kerala pressed at the Council for a revised central share reflecting actual expenditure incurred on centrally sponsored families.
    2. Centrally sponsored schemes carry uniform design across unequal States: A single national parameter ignores differences in cost, disease burden and delivery capacity across States. Eg. Kerala asked for State specific premiums under the Ayushman Bharat Pradhan Mantri Jan Arogya Yojana in place of a uniform national premium.
    3. Resource decisions on State territory are taken centrally: Auction and regulation of major minerals sit with the Centre while the resource and its social costs sit in the State. Eg. Kerala asked that auctioning of mineral blocks along its coast be put on hold, and Karnataka asked the Centre to reconsider the 2026 mineral law amendment.
    4. River water adjudication is slow enough to become a political dispute: Tribunal timelines stretch across electoral cycles, so States negotiate politically while adjudication is pending. Eg. The Krishna waters allocation between Andhra Pradesh and Telangana remained live at the Council table.
    5. Bifurcation settlements remain unfinished for years: Division of assets, liabilities and institutions is left to consultation without a deadline. Eg. Andhra Pradesh and Telangana agreed at this meeting to resolve asset and liability division in consultation with the Ministry of Home Affairs, twelve years after reorganisation.
    6. Fiscal performance is not rewarded in the transfer formula: Devolution weights population and income distance heavily, so States with better demographic and fiscal outcomes receive a smaller share. Eg. Tamil Nadu stated at the meeting that it seeks treatment that rewards performance alongside equity.
    7. Borrowing headroom is set by the Centre: State borrowing limits are fixed centrally under Article 293 and under the fiscal responsibility framework, which caps State led capital spending. Eg. Andhra Pradesh projected a $10 trillion southern economy by 2047, a target that depends on capital expenditure the States do not independently control.

    Way Forward

    1. Fix a statutory meeting calendar for the Councils: Require the Zonal Councils and the Inter-State Council to meet at a defined minimum frequency, with published agendas and action taken reports on earlier resolutions.
    2. Create an action taken mechanism: Record each Council recommendation against a named ministry with a response deadline, so a recommendation produces a documented decision rather than a carry forward.
    3. Settle the delimitation question before the freeze lapses: Resolve the basis for readjustment through a parliamentary process now, rather than allowing the constitutional deadline to force it.
    4. Cap cesses and surcharges as a share of gross tax revenue: Limit the proportion of central tax revenue kept outside the divisible pool so that devolution tracks actual collections.
    5. Allow State specific parameters within national schemes: Permit variation in premium, unit cost and beneficiary definition within centrally sponsored schemes where a State demonstrates a different cost structure.
    6. Enforce the statutory timelines for water tribunals: Apply the one year constitution and three year award deadlines strictly, and use a single permanent tribunal with benches to prevent each dispute restarting from the beginning.
    7. Close reorganisation settlements with a deadline: Fix an outer date for completing the division of assets, liabilities and institutions under reorganisation statutes, with an arbitral mechanism where consultation fails.

    “[2025] With reference to India, consider the following:

    I. The Inter-State Council

    II. The National Security Council

    III. Zonal Councils

    How many of the above were established as per the provisions of the Constitution of India?

    (a) Only one

    (b) Only two

    (c) All the three

    (d) None

  • Union Cabinet clears HC bench for Ladakh

    Why in the News

    The Union Cabinet has decided to establish a bench of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court in Ladakh, aimed at improving access to justice in the Union Territory. The decision answers a long-standing demand on judicial access at a point when the agitation in Ladakh is pressing a different set of demands on statehood, Sixth Schedule protection and an empowered legislature.

    What is a High Court bench?

    1. About: A High Court bench is a permanent sitting of a High Court at a place other than its principal seat, where judges hear cases arising from a defined territory.
    2. Purpose: A bench reduces the distance and cost of approaching the higher judiciary for litigants living far from the principal seat, without creating a separate High Court.
    3. How it is established: The place of the principal seat and of any other place of sitting is fixed by the President by notification, and the establishment of a bench ordinarily follows a proposal from the State or Union Territory government with the concurrence of the High Court’s Chief Justice and the Union Law Ministry.
    4. The court concerned: The Jammu and Kashmir High Court, renamed the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh, is the common High Court for the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir and the Union Territory of Ladakh under the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019.

    What is the Leh Apex Body?

    1. About: The Leh Apex Body is the umbrella platform of political, religious and social organisations from Leh district, formed to press Ladakh’s demands for constitutional safeguards.
    2. Role: It leads the Ladakh agitation jointly with the Kargil Democratic Alliance and negotiates with the Ministry of Home Affairs.

    What is the Kargil Democratic Alliance?

    1. About: The Kargil Democratic Alliance is the corresponding umbrella platform of political, religious and social organisations from Kargil district.
    2. Role: It negotiates alongside the Leh Apex Body, so the two districts present a single set of demands to the Centre.

    What does the decision do?

    1. The decision: The Union Cabinet decided to establish a bench of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court in Ladakh, announced by the Union Home Minister on 20 August 2026.
    2. Stated effect: The bench will enhance access to justice for citizens living in remote areas of Ladakh by reducing the time required to avail the legal services they are entitled to.
    3. Framing by the Centre: The announcement reaffirmed the Centre’s commitment to ensuring constitutional safeguards and the all-round development of the region.
    4. Response from the Union Territory: The Lieutenant Governor of Ladakh welcomed it as a historic decision and said it would ensure speedy justice and reaffirm commitment to the region’s development.
    5. The demand it answers: Officials said the bench is expected to address a long-standing demand for easier and faster access to the higher judiciary for people in Ladakh.

    Does a High Court bench answer what the Ladakh agitation is asking for?

    1. What the agitation seeks: Local stakeholders are seeking stronger safeguards in four areas: land, employment, culture and political representation.
    2. The non-negotiable demands: The Leh Apex Body and the Kargil Democratic Alliance submitted a memorandum listing three non-negotiable demands: financial powers for the proposed elected Ladakh Legislative Assembly, a separate Public Service Commission for jobs in the Union Territory, and unconditional withdrawal of all cases against those affected by the violence of 24 September last year.
    3. The gap: A judicial bench addresses the distance to the higher judiciary and does not touch legislative powers, recruitment autonomy or constitutional protection of land and culture.
    4. Why the timing matters: The announcement comes against the backdrop of continuing discussions over the political, administrative and constitutional future of Ladakh.
    5. What the Centre is offering instead: The Centre is exploring a Union Territory level legislative body under certain provisions of Article 371, rather than the Sixth Schedule extension the agitation has demanded.

    What happened in Leh on 24 September last year and what has followed?

    1. The incident: Four persons were killed and at least 50 injured in Leh when a protest demanding statehood and extension of Sixth Schedule protections turned violent and police opened fire on protesters.
    2. Cases registered: About 87 people were booked following the violence, of whom about nine were chargesheeted.
    3. Withdrawal of cases: The Ladakh administration announced that cases against 25 people will be withdrawn, with closure reports to be filed in court in due course.
    4. Further review: The Chief Secretary said the Director General of Police has been directed to review the cases of the remaining persons still under investigation, to identify others who did not have an active role.
    5. Official characterisation: The Chief Secretary termed the incident a blot on the pages of India’s history.
    6. Detention of the activist: Climate activist Sonam Wangchuk, who was on a hunger strike for nearly 35 days in support of Ladakh’s demands, called off his fast, and was booked under the National Security Act, 1980 and lodged in Jodhpur jail for six months.

    What is the Article 371 route being explored?

    1. The proposal: A Union Territory level legislative body is being envisaged for Ladakh under certain provisions of Article 371.
    2. Work in progress: The Ministry of Home Affairs is working with the Law Ministry to prepare a framework for the arrangement.
    3. Questions the framework must settle: The framework has to decide how the body will be elected, what powers it will hold and the shape of the executive.
    4. Next step: The discussions will be taken further in a formal structured meeting of the sub-committee, expected in the first week of September.
    5. The stated horizon: The Chief Secretary said these things will not happen overnight and that a new model will be established for Ladakh.

    Challenges to Ladakh’s Demand for Constitutional Safeguards

    1. Sixth Schedule applicability: The Sixth Schedule as it stands applies to tribal areas in Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram, so extending it to a Union Territory requires a constitutional amendment. Eg. The National Commission for Scheduled Tribes recommended Sixth Schedule inclusion for Ladakh in 2019, and the recommendation has not been acted upon.
    2. Union Territory without a legislature: Ladakh was constituted as a Union Territory without a legislature on 31 October 2019, so all law-making for it rests with Parliament and the administrator. Eg. The Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019 gave a legislature to the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir and none to Ladakh.
    3. Employment and recruitment: Without a separate Public Service Commission, recruitment for Ladakh runs through arrangements that local stakeholders say do not reserve posts for residents. Eg. The demand for a dedicated Ladakh Public Service Commission is one of the three non-negotiable demands submitted to the Chief Secretary.
    4. Land and demographic protection: Absence of domicile-linked land restrictions is the core anxiety behind the safeguards demand. Eg. Leh and Kargil bodies have sought protection of land and culture alongside political representation in every round of talks.
    5. Trust deficit after the firing: Criminal proceedings against protesters continue during the talks, which constrains negotiation. Eg. Of about 87 people booked after the 24 September violence, cases against 25 are being withdrawn and the rest remain under review.
    6. Ecological limits on development: Ladakh is a cold desert with acute water stress, so development promises collide with carrying capacity. Eg. Leh town’s groundwater and spring-fed supply has come under strain from tourism growth and construction.
    7. Continuity of dialogue: Negotiations depend on periodic meetings without a statutory framework or timeline. Eg. The next round of talks with the Ministry of Home Affairs team is scheduled for the following month, with a sub-committee meeting expected in the first week of September.

    Conclusion

    The Union Cabinet has cleared a bench of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court for Ladakh, and the Lieutenant Governor has welcomed it as answering a long-standing demand on judicial access. The demands driving the agitation, statehood, Sixth Schedule protection, financial powers for an elected assembly and a separate Public Service Commission, remain unresolved. The Centre is preparing a framework for a Union Territory level legislative body under provisions of Article 371, with the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Law Ministry deciding its election method, powers and executive structure. The next milestone is a formal structured sub-committee meeting expected in the first week of September, ahead of the next round of talks with the Ministry of Home Affairs team.

    “[2025, GS2, 10] Discuss the nature of Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly after the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganization Act, 2019. Briefly describe the powers and functions of the Assembly of the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir.”

  • Former SC judge-led panel to probe ‘police excesses’ against protesters

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court has constituted a five member High-Powered Enquiry Committee headed by a former Supreme Court judge to examine alleged excesses and disproportionate use of force by police and security personnel at Jantar Mantar and other locations during last month’s protests over the National Eligibility cum Entrance Test (Undergraduate) paper leak. The Court framed twelve issues for the inquiry, covering both police conduct and violence by protesters. The order therefore turns a policing controversy into an examination of the constitutional limits on how the State may respond to assembly.

    What is the High-Powered Enquiry Committee?

    1. What it is: The High-Powered Enquiry Committee (HPEC) is a fact finding body constituted by the Supreme Court to examine allegations of excessive force by police and security personnel during the protests, and to report back to the Court.
    2. Who heads it and who sits on it: It is headed by former Supreme Court judge R Subhash Reddy. Its members are former Punjab and Haryana High Court Chief Justice Ravi Shankar Jha, former Delhi High Court judge Justice Shalinder Kaur, former Central Bureau of Investigation Director Rishi Kumar Shukla, and retired Director General of Police of Meghalaya L R Bishnoi.
    3. How it must function: The inquiry is not to be a one time exercise. The Committee is to undertake a continuous and periodic assessment of the enumerated issues and submit interim findings periodically, so the Court can issue directions as warranted.
    4. What it does not displace: The Court clarified that the constitution of the Committee shall in no way deter or debar police authorities or security forces from taking administrative or disciplinary action against officers found in contravention of the rules governing their conduct.

    What is the current status of the right to protest in India?

    1. The right itself: The right to protest is drawn from Article 19(1)(a), the freedom of speech and expression, and Article 19(1)(b), the right to assemble peaceably and without arms, read together.
    2. The condition built into the text: The assembly must be peaceable and without arms, so the protection falls away for an assembly that turns violent or armed.
    3. The limits on the right: Restrictions may be imposed under Article 19(2) on speech and Article 19(3) on assembly, and the restriction must be reasonable and imposed by law rather than by executive discretion alone.
    4. No right to occupy a public space indefinitely: The Supreme Court in Amit Sahni v Commissioner of Police (2020) held that public ways and public spaces cannot be occupied indefinitely, and that demonstrations must take place in designated areas.
    5. A blanket ban on a protest site is not permissible: In Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan v Union of India (2018) the Court set aside an absolute prohibition on demonstrations at Jantar Mantar and directed that guidelines be framed regulating rather than eliminating protest there.
    6. Force must be proportionate and compensable: In Anita Thakur v State of Jammu and Kashmir (2016) the Court held that use of excessive force by police against demonstrators violates Article 21 and awarded compensation to the injured.
    7. The operative statutory levers: Prohibitory orders are issued under Section 163 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, and speech and assembly prosecutions have been brought under Section 152 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.

    Constitutional Provisions Related to the Right to Protest and Police Accountability

    1. Article 19(1)(a): Guarantees to all citizens the freedom of speech and expression, from which the right to voice dissent is drawn.
    2. Article 19(1)(b): Guarantees the right to assemble peaceably and without arms.
    3. Article 19(1)(c): Guarantees the right to form associations or unions, under which protest organisations operate.
    4. Article 19(2): Permits the State to impose reasonable restrictions on the freedom of speech and expression on enumerated grounds.
    5. Article 19(3): Permits reasonable restrictions on the right of assembly in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India or public order.
    6. Article 21: Guarantees that no person shall be deprived of life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law, the provision under which bodily harm caused by disproportionate force is examined.
    7. Article 22: Provides safeguards on arrest and detention, including the right to be informed of the grounds of arrest and to consult a legal practitioner.
    8. Article 20(3): Protects a person accused of an offence against being compelled to be a witness against himself.
    9. Article 32 and Article 226: Provide the remedies before the Supreme Court and the High Courts through which protest related grievances and monitored inquiries are brought.
    10. Seventh Schedule, State List Entry 1 and Entry 2: Place public order and police within the legislative and executive competence of the States, which is why a national inquiry into police conduct proceeds through the Court rather than through a central department.

    What is Section 163 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023?

    1. What it does: Section 163 empowers a District Magistrate, a Sub-divisional Magistrate or an Executive Magistrate to issue a written order directing a person or the public generally to abstain from a specified act, where there is an apprehension of obstruction, annoyance, danger to human life or a disturbance of public tranquillity.
    2. Its limits: An order under the section is temporary and cannot ordinarily remain in force beyond two months, and it corresponds to the power earlier exercised under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

    What is Section 152 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023?

    1. What it criminalises: Section 152 punishes acts that excite secession, armed rebellion, subversive activities or separatist feelings, or that endanger the sovereignty, unity and integrity of India, with punishment extending to life imprisonment or seven years with fine.
    2. What it replaced: It came into force on 1 July 2024 in place of Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, the sedition provision inserted in 1870, and its constitutional validity is under challenge on grounds of vagueness and overbreadth.

    What are metallic kinetic projectiles?

    1. What they are: Metallic kinetic projectiles, commonly called pellets, are small metal shot fired in a scattering pattern from pump-action rifles or projectile-action guns, used as a crowd control weapon.
    2. Why they are contested: The scatter pattern makes the point of impact uncontrollable, so injuries to the eyes and upper body are common and the resulting harm is often irreversible.

    What are the twelve issues the Committee will examine?

    1. Issue 1, excessive force: Alleged use of excessive force and violence against protesters by police authorities and other agencies, including deployment of pellet guns, electric batons, lathi charges and tear gas without adequate warning or proportionality, resulting in severe bodily harm and injuries, some alleged to be of a grievous and lasting nature.
    2. Issue 2, proportionality of response: Ensuring a proportionate and measured police response during protests, public gatherings and peaceful assemblies, so as to strike an appropriate balance between maintaining public order and exercising the constitutional right to peaceful dissent.
    3. Issue 3, banning pellets: The desirability of banning the use of metallic kinetic projectiles or pellets fired from pump-action rifles or projectile-action guns, having regard to the grave and at times irreversible bodily harm they cause.
    4. Issue 4, identification of officers: The necessity of ensuring that police and security personnel wear proper uniforms and visible nameplates while effecting arrests or using force during crowd control operations, to secure accountability and enable identification of individual officers.
    5. Issue 5, surveillance: Allegations of monitoring and surveillance of protesters by police personnel, and the extent to which such measures were consistent with the protesters’ constitutional rights to privacy and free assembly.
    6. Issue 6, female protesters: Alleged incidents of targeted violence, harassment, molestation and secondary victimisation directed against female protesters, which warrant a focused and expeditious enquiry.
    7. Issue 7, medical support and compensation: The provision of medical and other requisite support, including award of compensation, to victims of alleged police abuse, and the manner and adequacy of the support extended so far.
    8. Issue 8, prohibitory orders: Regulation of the issuance of blanket prohibitory orders under Section 163 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, to prevent their use as a routine or pre-emptive measure that forecloses peaceful assembly rather than as a proportionate response to a real and imminent threat to public order.
    9. Issue 9, thresholds for Section 152: The establishment of strict constitutional thresholds and safeguards to prevent Section 152 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 from being invoked to stifle political dissent and peaceful protest, so that it is not permitted to operate as a chilling restraint on constitutionally protected speech and assembly.
    10. Issue 10, violence by protesters: Alleged use of force and violence by protesters against police officers and other security personnel.
    11. Issue 11, damage to property: Damage to public property caused by the actions of protesters, including destruction of and injury to government installations, vehicles and other assets belonging to the State and to private citizens alike.
    12. Issue 12, injuries to police: The injuries sustained by police forces in the course of discharging their duties, and the consequent mental and emotional trauma borne by their families.

    Which issues has the Court told the Committee to take up first?

    1. The two priority issues: The Committee is to address Issue 1 on excessive force and Issue 6 on targeted violence against female protesters on a priority basis, bearing in mind the sensitivity attendant on them.
    2. The first deliverable: The Committee has been asked to complete its inquiry and deliberations on those two issues and submit its First Interim Report at the earliest.
    3. The additional head opened: The Committee may also examine the grant of interim compensation to those injured on either side, whether police personnel or protesters.
    4. The reporting design: Interim findings are to be submitted periodically rather than a single report at the end, so the Court can issue directions while the inquiry continues.
    5. When the order was made: The order is dated 19 August 2026 and was released on 20 August 2026.

    Why does the Court’s framing place police conduct and protester conduct on the same list?

    1. The list is symmetrical by design: Nine issues concern police and State conduct and three concern protester conduct, so the inquiry is not framed solely as an investigation of the police.
    2. The compensation head runs both ways: Interim compensation is opened for those injured on either side, which places an injured constable and an injured student within the same remedial frame.
    3. Trauma is recognised on the police side: Issue 12 extends to the mental and emotional trauma borne by the families of injured police personnel, a head rarely written into an inquiry mandate.
    4. Symmetry is not equivalence: The two issues marked for priority treatment are both allegations against the police, so the sequencing signals which set of allegations the Court treats as most urgent.
    5. The disciplinary channel stays open in parallel: The Court expressly preserved the power of police authorities to take administrative or disciplinary action against their own officers, so the inquiry does not become a reason to suspend departmental accountability.
    6. The tension the design carries: A committee asked simultaneously to judge police excess and protester violence must apply one standard of proportionality to an armed disciplined force and another to an unorganised crowd, without a settled test for either.

    Major debates surrounding the right to protest and the use of force

    1. Regulation against prohibition: One position holds that designated protest sites and prior permission are reasonable regulation of a public space, and the other holds that permission requirements convert a right into a licence.
    2. Two rulings pulling in opposite directions: Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (2018) struck down a blanket prohibition at a protest site, and Amit Sahni (2020) held that public ways cannot be occupied indefinitely, so the boundary between the two remains contested.
    3. The proportionality standard for lethal and less lethal weapons: There is no settled judicial test fixing when tear gas, water cannon, batons or pellets may be used, so proportionality is assessed after the event rather than fixed in advance.
    4. Whether pellet weapons can be regulated or must be banned: One position accepts them as a less lethal alternative to firearms, and the other holds that an uncontrollable scatter pattern makes proportionate use impossible in principle.
    5. Prohibitory orders as prevention against pre-emption: Section 163 is defended as a preventive power against imminent threats and contested as a routine instrument that forecloses assembly before any threat materialises.
    6. Whether the narrowing of sedition survives its replacement: The Kedar Nath Singh (1962) requirement of incitement to violence narrowed the old sedition provision, and whether that narrowing automatically transfers to Section 152 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 is unsettled.
    7. Command responsibility against individual liability: Accountability for crowd control failures is contested between the individual officer who used force and the supervising officer who ordered the deployment.
    8. The evidentiary gap the dispute turns on: Without uniforms carrying visible identification, body worn cameras and a contemporaneous record of orders, allegations on both sides rest on competing testimony rather than on documented fact.

    Challenges to the inquiry delivering accountability

    1. A fact finding committee is not a prosecuting authority: The Committee reports to the Court and cannot itself frame charges or convict, so accountability depends on what follows the report. Eg. The Court has separately preserved the departmental power to take disciplinary action, which sits outside the Committee’s control.
    2. Evidence degrades with time in crowd control cases: Injury records, video footage, control room logs and deployment orders have to be secured early or they cease to be reliable. Eg. Issue 4 arises precisely because officers using force were allegedly not identifiable by uniform or nameplate.
    3. Prosecution of police officers requires sanction: Proceeding against a public servant for acts done in the discharge of official duty depends on prior sanction from the government that employs him. Eg. The requirement of prior sanction has historically been the reason many custodial and encounter cases do not reach trial.
    4. Police is a State subject and the incidents spanned States: The Committee’s findings must be implemented by multiple State governments, each of which controls its own force. Eg. The mandate covers Jantar Mantar and other locations across the country during the same protest wave.
    5. Compensation without a fixed scale invites disparity: Interim compensation awarded case by case, on both sides, has no published scale to anchor it. Eg. In Anita Thakur (2016) compensation was fixed by the Court itself in the absence of any statutory schedule for excessive force.
    6. Monitored inquiries lose momentum once attention moves: A periodic assessment mandate depends on the Court continuing to list and act on interim reports over years. Eg. The Prakash Singh directions on police reform were issued in 2006 and remain incompletely implemented across States two decades later.
    7. The unresolved statutory questions sit outside the Committee’s power: Issues 8 and 9 ask for constitutional thresholds on Section 163 and Section 152, which only the Court or Parliament can settle. Eg. The constitutional challenge to Section 152 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 is pending separately before the Supreme Court.

    Conclusion

    The Committee stands constituted with five members under an order dated 19 August 2026, and its immediate task is a First Interim Report on excessive force and on targeted violence against female protesters. The mandate is unusually wide, covering not only what the police did but also the statutory instruments through which protest was restricted, namely prohibitory orders under Section 163 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 and prosecutions under Section 152 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. The constitutional question the order raises is whether the State can be held to a proportionality standard in crowd control when no such standard exists in written form. Until that standard is fixed in advance, each episode will continue to be judged after the fact by a fresh committee.

    “[2013, GS2, 10] Discuss Section 66A of IT Act, with reference to its alleged violation of Article 19 of the Constitution.”

  • Collectors empowered to grant citizenship under CAA

    Why in the News

    The Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) has transferred the processing of pending citizenship applications under the Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019 from centrally staffed Empowered Committees to District Collectors in eight States and Union Territories. The transfer reverses a centralising arrangement built two years earlier specifically to keep State machinery out of the process. It arrives after the political composition of the State that had resisted the law most strongly changed.

    What is the Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019?

    1. What it does: It amends the Citizenship Act, 1955 to create a route to Indian citizenship for members of six communities from three neighbouring countries who entered India before a fixed cut off date.
    2. Who it covers: It applies to Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist, Jain, Parsi and Christian migrants from Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bangladesh who entered India on or before 31 December 2014 without documents or illegally.
    3. How it operates: It inserts Section 6B into the Citizenship Act, 1955, under which such persons may be granted citizenship by registration or naturalisation, and it exempts them from being treated as illegal migrants.
    4. When it became operational: The Act was passed in December 2019, and the Citizenship (Amendment) Rules that made it operational came into effect on 11 March 2024, days before the 2024 General Election.

    What is Section 6B of the Citizenship Act, 1955?

    1. The provision: Section 6B is the enabling clause inserted by the 2019 amendment, under which the Central Government or an authority specified by it may grant a certificate of registration or naturalisation to a person covered by the Act.
    2. What it removes: It provides that proceedings pending against such a person in respect of illegal migration or citizenship stand abated on grant of citizenship, and that the person is deemed a citizen from the date of entry into India.

    What were the Empowered Committees?

    1. Composition: Each Empowered Committee was made up of Central Government officials, drawn from bodies including the Census organisation, the Intelligence Bureau (IB) and the postal department.
    2. Purpose: They were created to receive and clear citizenship applications without routing them through State government machinery, with at least four constituted, two of them at the district level.

    What does the 19 August order change in the processing chain?

    1. The transfer of pending cases: All applications pending before the Empowered Committees and the District Level Committees in the eight jurisdictions stand transferred to the concerned Collector.
    2. The jurisdictions covered: Gujarat, Rajasthan, Punjab, West Bengal, Assam except tribal areas, Tripura except tribal areas, Jammu and Kashmir, and Ladakh.
    3. The instrument used: The Citizenship (Third Amendment) Rules, 2026, notified on 19 August 2026, empower Collectors in these jurisdictions to receive, scrutinise and dispose of applications for registration or naturalisation under Section 6B.
    4. What the Collector must now do: The Collector is required to verify the documents submitted by an applicant and determine whether the applicant meets the eligibility requirements.
    5. The earlier notification is displaced: The order makes the MHA notification of 11 March 2024 implementing the Citizenship Amendment Rules inapplicable to these jurisdictions.
    6. The committee route is spent: The order renders the earlier multi agency committee arrangement redundant in the eight jurisdictions.

    Why was the power centralised in the first place?

    1. State opposition to the law: The Citizenship Amendment Act was strongly opposed by the then Trinamool Congress government in West Bengal.
    2. The design was built to bypass the State: Empowered Committees headed by Central Government officials were constituted specifically to keep the State government out of the processing of applications.
    3. The timing tracked the electoral calendar: The committees were created days before the Assembly polls in West Bengal in April 2026, and the amendment now decentralising the process was notified after the Bharatiya Janata Party came to power in that State.
    4. The first grants preceded the committees: The Home Ministry handed the first set of citizenship certificates to 14 applicants in May 2024.

    Why does a Union List subject still need the States?

    1. The subject is central: Citizenship, naturalisation and aliens fall under the Union List of the Seventh Schedule, so legislative and executive competence rests with the Centre.
    2. The delivery is district level: Receiving applications, verifying documents and issuing certificates are field functions that need offices, staff and records located in the district.
    3. Police verification sits with the State: Police is a State List subject, so verification of an applicant’s antecedents runs through the State police machinery whatever the processing authority.
    4. The State’s role was reduced to logistics: Under the centralised arrangement the State’s contribution was limited to providing office space and police verification of applicants.
    5. The Collector belongs to both systems: A District Collector is an officer of the State administration and simultaneously the Centre’s principal field functionary in the district, which is why the transfer restores State machinery without transferring the subject.

    What are the other major changes the Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019 made?

    1. Shortened naturalisation period: For the covered communities the residence requirement in the qualifying period for naturalisation was reduced from eleven years to five years, a change made to the Third Schedule of the Citizenship Act, 1955.
    2. Exemption from illegal migrant status: Covered persons were exempted from the operation of the Passport (Entry into India) Act, 1920 and the Foreigners Act, 1946, so their entry without documents no longer bars citizenship.
    3. Abatement of pending proceedings: Proceedings pending against a covered person in respect of illegal migration or citizenship abate on grant of citizenship.
    4. Geographic carve outs: The Act does not apply to the tribal areas of Assam, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Tripura covered by the Sixth Schedule, nor to areas under the Inner Line Permit regime in Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Mizoram and Manipur.
    5. Effect on Overseas Citizen of India registration: The Act added a ground for cancellation of Overseas Citizen of India registration where the holder violates any law notified by the Central Government, with an opportunity of being heard.

    Major debates surrounding the Citizenship Amendment Act

    1. Religion as a statutory classification: The Act identifies its beneficiaries by naming six religious communities, which is contested as a classification that fails the reasonable classification test under Article 14.
    2. The defence of the classification: The stated basis is that the three named countries have a State religion and that the six communities are religious minorities there facing persecution, which is offered as an intelligible differentia with a rational nexus.
    3. The excluded groups: Persecuted groups outside the classification, including Ahmadis and Shias in Pakistan, Rohingya from Myanmar and Tamils from Sri Lanka, fall outside the Act’s coverage.
    4. The cut off date and the Assam Accord: The 31 December 2014 cut off for the covered communities sits against the 24 March 1971 cut off fixed for Assam by Section 6A of the Citizenship Act, 1955, inserted after the Assam Accord of 1985 to regularise migrants in that State. The gap between the two dates is the source of the objection in Assam.
    5. Section 6A itself has been upheld: A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court upheld the validity of Section 6A in 2024, confirming the 1971 cut off for Assam as constitutionally valid.
    6. The link with a national register: The objection that the Act operates as a filter alongside a nationwide citizens register turns on whether the two exercises are read together, since the Act creates a route to citizenship but no obligation to prove it.
    7. The federal objection: Several State legislatures passed resolutions seeking repeal of the Act, and Kerala filed an original suit in the Supreme Court under Article 131, raising the question whether a State can sue over a Union List subject.

    Challenges to implementing the CAA framework

    1. Documentary proof of origin is the binding constraint: An applicant who entered without documents has to establish nationality of the country of origin and the date of entry, which is precisely what the flight left behind. Eg. The Home Ministry issued its first set of certificates to only 14 applicants in May 2024, years after the Act was passed.
    2. Eligibility determination sits with a generalist officer: The Collector must now assess questions of foreign nationality, religious identity and date of entry alongside a full district administration workload. Eg. The function was earlier assigned to committees staffed by Census, Intelligence Bureau and postal officials specifically for that expertise.
    3. Verification depends on a machinery the Centre does not control: Police verification of applicants runs through the State police, a State List subject, so the pace of processing depends on State cooperation. Eg. The centralised committee design was itself adopted because the West Bengal government opposed the law.
    4. Applicants risk exposure by applying: Filing an application is an admission of having entered India without valid documents, which deters applicants where the outcome is uncertain. Eg. The Act exempts covered persons from the Foreigners Act, 1946 only on grant of citizenship, not on filing.
    5. Uniformity across eight jurisdictions is hard to hold: Decentralising to district officers across eight States and Union Territories creates as many decision practices as there are districts. Eg. The 19 August order applies to Gujarat, Rajasthan, Punjab, West Bengal, Assam, Tripura, Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh, each with a different administrative history on migration.
    6. The carve outs cut through the areas of highest migrant density: Excluding Sixth Schedule areas and Inner Line Permit States removes from coverage several districts where the affected population actually lives. Eg. Tribal areas of Assam and Tripura are expressly excluded from the 19 August transfer as well.
    7. The constitutional challenge remains live: A framework operating while its parent Act is under challenge risks decisions being unsettled later. Eg. More than 200 petitions challenging the Act were filed before the Supreme Court after its enactment.

    Conclusion

    The Citizenship (Third Amendment) Rules, 2026 stand notified with effect from 19 August 2026, and pending applications in the eight named jurisdictions have been transferred to District Collectors, who will now verify documents and determine eligibility. The 11 March 2024 notification no longer applies in those jurisdictions and the Empowered Committee route is spent there. The source names no further date or milestone for the disposal of the transferred applications. The change is administrative in form, and it records that the reason for centralising the process, namely State government opposition, is no longer present in the State it was designed for.

    “[2021] With reference to India, consider the following statements:

    1. There is only one citizenship and one domicile.

    2. A citizen by birth only can become the Head of State.

    3. A foreigner, once granted citizenship, cannot be deprived of it under any circumstances.

    Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

    (a) 1 only

    (b) 2 only

    (c) 1 and 3

    (d) 2 and 3

  • Dignity in death: Supreme Court upholds hanging under Article 21

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court has dismissed a public interest litigation arguing that death by hanging is scientifically unreliable and violates the right to a dignified death under Article 21 of the Constitution. The ruling holds that a method of execution devised in colonial India still satisfies the constitutional promise of dignity, while leaving the question open to a future challenge built on fresh scientific material.

    What is the long drop method of hanging?

    1. The colonial inheritance: Hanging is the prescribed method of executing death sentences in India and derives from British Common Law.
    2. The older short drop method: Historically, hanging was carried out through a short drop, which causes death by asphyxiation.
    3. What the long drop is meant to do: A longer drop is calibrated to snap the second and third cervical vertebrae, the C2 and C3, and with them the spinal cord, rendering the person immediately unconscious.
    4. Why calibration decides the outcome: The drop must be matched to the individual’s weight and height, since a drop that is too short causes prolonged strangulation and one that is too long risks decapitation.
    5. The protocol afterwards: Standard prison protocols require the body to be left hanging for 30 minutes after the trap door opens.

    What is the current status of capital punishment and the right to die with dignity in India?

    1. Executions carried out: 971 executions have taken place in India between 1947 and 2025.
    2. Executions in this century: Only six executions have taken place since 2001, the most recent in 2020, of the four convicts in the Delhi gang rape and murder case.
    3. Sentences imposed: 1,281 convicts were sentenced to death between 2016 and 2025, which is far larger than the number of executions carried out.
    4. The sentencing threshold: The death penalty may be imposed only in the rarest of rare cases, the standard laid down in Bachan Singh v State of Punjab (1980).
    5. The statutory command: Section 393(5) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023 provides that where a person is sentenced to death, the sentence shall direct that he be hanged by the neck till he is dead.
    6. How old the clause is: The clause has barely changed since it was introduced in the Code of Criminal Procedure in 1861 and has survived multiple amendments.
    7. The recognised right: The Supreme Court in Gian Kaur v State of Punjab (1996) held that the right to life under Article 21 includes the right to live with dignity and consequently to die with dignity.
    8. The limits on that right: The right to die with dignity does not extend to a right to take one’s own life, and its recognised application is to end of life decisions rather than to the manner of a lawful execution.

    Constitutional Provisions Related to Capital Punishment

    1. Article 21: Guarantees that no person shall be deprived of life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law, and this procedure must be fair, just and reasonable.
    2. Article 14: Requires that the classification of offences and offenders attracting the death penalty be reasonable and non arbitrary.
    3. Article 20(1): Bars the imposition of a penalty greater than that prescribed by the law in force at the time the offence was committed.
    4. Article 22: Provides procedural protections on arrest and detention, including the right to consult and be defended by a legal practitioner.
    5. Article 72: Empowers the President to grant pardon, reprieve, respite or remission of punishment, and to suspend, remit or commute a sentence of death.
    6. Article 161: Empowers the Governor to grant pardon and to commute sentences, though the power to pardon a death sentence rests with the President.
    7. Article 134: Provides an appeal to the Supreme Court in a criminal proceeding where a High Court has reversed an acquittal and imposed a death sentence.
    8. Article 136: Provides for special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against any judgment or order in any cause or matter.
    9. Article 137: Provides the power of review, under which death row convicts are entitled to an open court hearing of a review petition.
    10. Concurrent List, Entry 1 and Entry 2: Place criminal law and criminal procedure in the Concurrent List, so both Parliament and State legislatures may legislate on them.

    What did the petition argue?

    1. The relief sought: A declaration that the provision prescribing hanging is unconstitutional, on the ground that Article 21 includes a right to die through a dignified procedure.
    2. The characterisation of the method: The method was described as accompanied by intense physical torture and pain, and as inherently unpredictable.
    3. The scientific material relied on: A 1992 study of the remains of 34 people hanged in England between 1882 and 1945.
    4. What the study found: Fractures at C2 and C3 were common, but the hangman’s fracture, assumed to cause near instant death, appeared in only three of the 34 cases, and six died of asphyxiation instead.
    5. The inference drawn: Hanging is therefore neither quick nor controllable in the way the law assumes it to be.
    6. The intervenor’s evidence: The Executive Director of a university death penalty clinic that intervened in the proceedings stated that researchers examining the remains of executed prisoners found that people had not died by an instant breaking of the neck, and that a range of painful and long drawn causes had produced their deaths.

    Why did the Court decline to revisit the 1983 precedent?

    1. The binding precedent: A three judge bench in Deena vs Union of India (1983) had upheld hanging as a constitutional mode of execution.
    2. What Deena examined: That bench considered medical evidence, expert opinion and comparative execution methods before ruling.
    3. What Deena held: Hanging, when properly administered, is a quick and certain method, causes no greater pain than any other known method, and avoids barbarity, torture and degradation.
    4. The legislative hurdle: Parliament chose to retain hanging while enacting the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, which is a recent legislative reaffirmation of the method.
    5. The evidentiary finding: The new scientific material did not displace the basis on which Deena was decided.
    6. The comparative finding: The material did not establish that lethal injection, electrocution, lethal gas or shooting offered any advantage over hanging.
    7. The constitutional conclusion: The existing method continues to satisfy the State’s obligation to carry out a death sentence with decency and decorum and without degradation or brutality.

    What is the Union government’s position?

    1. The claim made: Hanging remains the safest and quickest available method of execution.
    2. The domestic record cited: No botched execution has ever been recorded in India.
    3. The comparative argument: Lethal injection in the United States carries a well documented history of failures.
    4. What this position implies: The burden of demonstrating that an alternative is measurably less painful and more reliable rests on the challenger, not on the State.

    What did the Court leave open?

    1. No permanent closure: The bench stopped short of treating the question as settled forever.
    2. The ground for a future challenge: Constitutional law evolves, and a future challenge may succeed if new scientific, medical or empirical material fundamentally alters the assumptions on which Deena was decided.
    3. The executive route: The Court left it open to the Union government to examine alternative methods of execution should it choose to do so.
    4. What this means in practice: The method now depends on the state of the evidence rather than on the age of the precedent.

    What do other countries’ execution methods show about the search for a humane method?

    1. Hanging’s reach: A 2012 Cornell Law School database identified 60 countries that authorised hanging as a method of execution, concentrated in jurisdictions influenced by British Common Law, including India, Singapore and Japan.
    2. Lethal injection: The primary method in several United States states where the death penalty is allowed and heavily used in China, administering an anaesthetic, then a paralytic, then potassium chloride, and frequently botched where venous access is compromised.
    3. Shooting: Used in China, North Korea, Somalia and parts of West Asia, visually violent and traumatic for executioners, with proponents citing near instantaneous cardiac or neurological destruction.
    4. Beheading: Carried out with a sword in Saudi Arabia, and reliant entirely on the executioner’s precision.
    5. Nitrogen hypoxia: Recently introduced in the United States, using inhalation of pure nitrogen to cause asphyxiation without triggering the hypercapnic alarm response, the panicked sensation of suffocation, and criticised as insufficiently vetted and amounting to human experimentation.
    6. The abolition trend: More than two thirds of the world’s nations, around 113, have ended the death penalty in law or in practice, according to Amnesty International.
    7. The countervailing trend: A 2025 Amnesty International report recorded a 12 percent increase in executions over the previous year, so fewer states execute while those that do execute more.
    8. The 2025 concentration: The countries recording the most executions in 2025 were Iran at 2,159 or more, Saudi Arabia at 356 or more and Yemen at 51 or more, with China’s total running into the thousands and not published.
    9. What the comparison establishes: Every available method carries its own scientific and ethical controversy, which is why no alternative could be shown to be superior to hanging.

    Major debates surrounding capital punishment and the method of execution

    1. Retribution against reform: The claim that the gravest offences require the ultimate sanction stands against the claim that the state’s own conduct must not replicate the violence it punishes.
    2. Deterrence unproven: The deterrent effect of capital punishment has not been empirically established, which weakens the principal utilitarian justification offered for it.
    3. Two rulings in tension: Gian Kaur (1996) recognises a right to die with dignity within Article 21, while Deena (1983) holds that a method causing potential asphyxiation satisfies the same Article, and the present ruling resolves that tension in favour of the earlier precedent.
    4. Judge centric sentencing: The rarest of rare test is applied unevenly across benches, which makes the sentence depend in part on the composition of the court.
    5. Delay as cruelty: Prolonged delay in deciding mercy petitions has been held to be a ground for commutation, which converts the length of the process itself into a constitutional question.
    6. Socio economic profile of death row: A disproportionate share of death row prisoners come from poor and marginalised backgrounds with inadequate legal representation, which raises an equality question under Article 14.
    7. Irreversibility and wrongful conviction: The penalty cannot be corrected after execution, and acquittals in appeal after years on death row demonstrate that error occurs.
    8. The evidence gap the present dispute turns on: No systematic post mortem study of executions in India exists, so both the State’s claim of no botched execution and the petitioner’s claim of prolonged suffering rest on foreign data.
    9. Legislative expansion against judicial restriction: Parliament has extended the death penalty to more offences while the courts have narrowed the circumstances in which it may be imposed.

    Challenges to ensuring a constitutional mode of execution

    1. No Indian evidence base: India has no published forensic study of executions, so the constitutional question is argued on English data from 1882 to 1945. e.g. the 1992 study relied on by the petitioners examined 34 remains from England, not from any Indian prison.
    2. Calibration depends on execution skill: The drop length must be computed for each individual, so the outcome varies with the competence of prison staff. e.g. the official drop tables in use derive from colonial era manuals rather than from contemporary biomechanical evidence.
    3. Every alternative carries its own failure mode: No method has been shown to be reliably painless. e.g. lethal injection executions in the United States have taken over an hour where venous access failed.
    4. Absence of monitoring: No independent medical observation or record of the execution process is published. e.g. prison protocols require the body to hang for 30 minutes without any requirement to record the time or cause of death.
    5. Delay converts the sentence into a separate punishment: Prisoners spend years under sentence while appeals and mercy petitions are pending. e.g. the Supreme Court in Shatrughan Chauhan v Union of India (2014) commuted 15 death sentences on the ground of inordinate delay in deciding mercy petitions.
    6. Unequal access to competent defence: The quality of representation at the sentencing stage decides who receives the sentence. e.g. mitigating circumstances are often not placed on record at all in trial courts, which the Supreme Court addressed in Manoj v State of Madhya Pradesh (2022).
    7. Legislative expansion without sentencing guidance: New offences attract the death penalty without any accompanying sentencing framework. e.g. the death penalty was extended to the rape of a child below twelve years by the amendment to the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act in 2019.

    Conclusion

    The Court has held that hanging under Section 393(5) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 remains constitutional, on the twin grounds that Deena (1983) has not been displaced and that Parliament reaffirmed the method when it enacted the new Sanhita. The scientific material placed before it was found insufficient to dislodge the assumptions on which the 1983 ruling rests, and no alternative method was shown to be superior. The petition is dismissed, but the question is not closed, since a future challenge may succeed on fresh scientific, medical or empirical material. The Union government has also been left free to examine alternative methods of execution should it choose to do so.

    What is the rarest of rare doctrine?

    1. About: The rarest of rare doctrine is the sentencing standard under which the death penalty may be imposed only where the alternative of life imprisonment is unquestionably foreclosed.
    2. Rationale: It exists because the Constitution permits capital punishment while Article 21 requires that its imposition be exceptional, reasoned and non arbitrary, so life imprisonment is the rule and death the exception.
    3. Where it comes from: Laid down in Bachan Singh v State of Punjab (1980), which upheld the constitutionality of the death penalty by a majority while confining it to the rarest of rare cases.
    4. The named typology it rests on:
      • Aggravating circumstances: Factors relating to the crime, such as extreme brutality, premeditation and the vulnerability of the victim, which weigh in favour of the maximum sentence.
      • Mitigating circumstances: Factors relating to the offender, such as age, mental condition, socio economic background and the probability of reform, which weigh against it.
      • The five categories in Machhi Singh v State of Punjab (1983): Manner of commission, motive, anti social or socially abhorrent nature of the crime, magnitude of the crime, and personality of the victim.
      • The balancing requirement: The court must weigh aggravating against mitigating circumstances and record why life imprisonment is unquestionably foreclosed.

    Laws Governing Capital Punishment in India

    1. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023: The procedural code governing trial, sentencing, confirmation and execution of the death sentence, which replaced the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
    2. Section 393(5): Directs that a person sentenced to death be hanged by the neck till he is dead.
    3. Confirmation requirement: A death sentence passed by a Sessions Court has no effect until it is confirmed by the High Court.
    4. Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023: The substantive penal code listing the offences that carry the death penalty, including murder, waging war against the Government of India, and certain aggravated forms of rape.
    5. Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967: Provides the death penalty for a terrorist act resulting in death.
    6. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985: Provides the death penalty for repeat offences involving specified commercial quantities, made discretionary rather than mandatory after judicial challenge.
    7. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012: As amended in 2019, provides the death penalty for aggravated penetrative sexual assault on a child.
    8. Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 and Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2018: Extended the death penalty to repeat rape offences and to the rape of a child below twelve years respectively.
    9. Army Act, 1950, Navy Act, 1957 and Air Force Act, 1950: Provide the death penalty for specified offences under military law, where the alternative method of shooting is available.
    10. Prisons Act, 1894 and State prison manuals: Govern the conditions of confinement of death row prisoners and the procedure at the place of execution.

    “[2023, GS2, 15 marks] “The Constitution of India is a living instrument with capabilities of enormous dynamism. It is a constitution made for a progressive society”. Illustrate with special reference to the expanding horizons of the right to life and personal liberty.”

  • An institution in freefall: Parliament is all dressed up with nowhere to go

    Why in the News

    The recently concluded session of Parliament ended in sustained disruption rather than debate, with sitting time, public money and scrutiny all lost. The deadlock has exposed a single conflict: disruption is now the Opposition’s only means of being heard, and it is also what is emptying the institution of purpose.

    Which parliamentary instruments does disruption trade away, and what replaces them?

    1. Question Hour: The first hour of a sitting is set aside for members to question ministers on the working of their departments. Supplementary questions asked on the floor are the point of pressure, since the minister cannot prepare for them in advance.
    2. Zero Hour: The period immediately after Question Hour allows a member to raise a constituency or local matter without prior notice. It is an Indian innovation and finds no mention in the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha.
    3. Rule 377: Rule 377 lets a member place on record a matter of public importance that no other procedural device covers. The member reads a short submission, no discussion follows, and the concerned ministry responds separately.
    4. Debate on a bill: Members place their views on a bill on record before the House votes on it. A bill passed amid noise goes through without that record ever being created.
    5. Calling attention motion: Under Rule 197 a member draws a minister’s attention to a matter of urgent public importance, and the minister must make a statement in reply. It is a one member device and needs no supporting members.
    6. Adjournment motion: Under Rule 56 a member seeks to set aside the entire day’s listed business to discuss a definite matter of urgent public importance. Fifty members must rise when the Chair reads the notice, and the motion ends in a vote.
    7. Short duration discussion: Under Rule 193 a member with two supporters seeks a discussion on an urgent matter of public importance, running to no more than two and a half hours. It concludes without a vote.
    8. No confidence motion: Under Rule 198 a member of the Lok Sabha moves against the entire Council of Ministers, and fifty members must rise for leave to be granted. It states no reasons and is decided by a simple majority of members present and voting.
    9. Rule 373 and Rule 374: Under Rule 373 the Speaker directs a grossly disorderly member to withdraw for the remainder of the day’s sitting. Under Rule 374 the Speaker names a member who persistently obstructs business, and the House then votes on suspension.
    10. Rule 374A: Inserted in 2001, it suspends a member automatically for five consecutive sittings or the remainder of the session, whichever is less, for entering the well or persisting in disorder after a warning. No motion is moved and no vote is taken.

    Why has the working relationship between government and Opposition broken down?

    1. Courtesy across the benches: Atal Bihari Vajpayee recounted the courtesy shown to him by the first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, when he sat as a young Opposition backbencher. That civility operated independently of political disagreement.
    2. Care extended to a political rival: Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi arranged for the same Opposition member to receive medical treatment in the United States.
    3. An Opposition member sent to represent India: Prime Minister P V Narasimha Rao despatched that Opposition member to Geneva to represent India at a critical United Nations (UN) summit on Kashmir.
    4. Mutual demonisation: Each side now claims sole possession of virtue and writes the other off as beyond redemption. Dissent is branded anti national by the ruling side.
    5. The Opposition’s self image: The Opposition presents itself as an outnumbered force fighting a ruthless and better resourced establishment, using the Mahabharata’s image of the Pandavas ranged against the Kauravas.
    6. The presumption of good faith: Democratic functioning rests on the belief that a rival cares about national welfare even where it disagrees profoundly on method. Treating adversaries as existential enemies removes the common ground that governance requires.

    Is disruption the Opposition’s last instrument of accountability or the thing destroying Parliament?

    1. Disruption as the only remaining lever: An Opposition refused a hearing on the issues it names has no procedural route left, so it withholds the House’s ability to function at all. The tactic is defended as the enforcement of executive accountability.
    2. The same tactic as the injury: Every sitting lost to organised shouting removes the scrutiny the Opposition claims to be defending. The instrument and the damage are the same act.
    3. The case argued from the Opposition benches: The charge that disruption is hollowing out Parliament is pressed by a fourth term Opposition member of the Lok Sabha, not from the treasury benches. It places the Opposition’s own tactic under scrutiny by someone who depends on it.
    4. Reciprocal hypocrisy: Leaders who championed parliamentary obstruction as a vital accountability tool in Opposition treated it as an unpardonable sin once in office. The Opposition, having suffered those tactics for years, rejects the argument now made against them.
    5. The operating code: The reciprocity of the traditional golden rule has been replaced by a rule of retaliation, doing to the other side what was done to one’s own.
    6. A collective failure: The breakdown of democratic trust cannot be assigned to one side. Both have used the same instrument and both have condemned it from the opposite bench.

    Why does poor parliamentary performance carry no electoral cost?

    1. Re-election turns on other things: Members are elected and re-elected for reasons that have almost nothing to do with their performance in the House. Voters judge them on constituency services rendered and on raw local political strength.
    2. Debating skill has no electoral value: The ability to press a minister during Question Hour or to take apart a flawed bill does not convert into votes. That removes any incentive to acquire the skill.
    3. Talent has moved to the studio: The debating ability that would once have been displayed on the floor of the House is now displayed in television studios. The audience that rewards it is not in the chamber.
    4. Party whips direct the disruption: Members are corralled into the well of the House to disrupt proceedings through organised shouting rather than reasoned debate. The instruction comes from the party, not from the individual member.
    5. Parties reward aggression over excellence: By issuing that instruction, party leaderships signal that partisan aggression is valued far above parliamentary skill. The signal then shapes who rises within the party.

    What is lost when the politics of the street occupies the space of parliamentary politics?

    1. Two distinct political skills: Parties once valued mass mobilisation, the politics of the street, and debating prowess, the politics of Parliament, as separate competences. Leaders were assessed on both.
    2. One has displaced the other: The politics of the street has moved inside the chamber, leaving the politics of Parliament with no place to operate.
    3. Consequence for national consensus: Democratic discourse is impoverished and agreement across parties on any question of national progress becomes unattainable.
    4. Committees still function: Substantive work continues in parliamentary committees, which meet away from the media glare and without cameras. The absence of cameras removes the premium that disruptive grandstanding otherwise carries.
    5. What the public actually sees: The visible record is disruption, the absence of dialogue and a complete breakdown in communication. Disillusionment with the functioning of Parliament is rife across the country.

    How has the executive reduced Parliament’s place in the constitutional scheme?

    1. Contempt for the legislature: The government prefers to ride roughshod over the Opposition rather than engage it, and treats accommodation of even some of its demands as unnecessary.
    2. Attendance of the head of government: The first Prime Minister attended Parliament daily and treated it as the beating heart of Indian democracy. The current Prime Minister is rarely present in the House.
    3. From consultative chamber to noticeboard: Parliament’s function has shifted from deliberation to the announcement of decisions the executive has already taken.
    4. From scrutiny to legalisation: The House is used to give legal form to those decisions rather than to test them. That converts the vote into a formality.
    5. Custodians permitting the hollowing out: The institution is being emptied of purpose by the very people responsible for protecting it. The end point is a public that no longer misses it once it is rendered meaningless.

    Do other parliamentary democracies show that guaranteed Opposition time is workable?

    1. The comparative reference is general: The proposal of dedicated Opposition time is described only as successfully used elsewhere, with no country named and no design detail supplied. The comparative case therefore rests on the standing practice of other Westminster legislatures.
    2. United Kingdom, Opposition Days: Standing Order No. 14 of the House of Commons reserves twenty days in each session for Opposition business. Seventeen are at the disposal of the Leader of the Opposition and three at the disposal of the second largest Opposition party.
    3. Canada, allotted days: The House of Commons sets aside a fixed number of allotted days in each supply period on which an Opposition party chooses the subject of debate. A motion moved on such a day may be made votable.
    4. Australia, Matter of Public Importance: The House of Representatives sets aside time on sitting days for a Matter of Public Importance proposed in writing to the Speaker. The discussion is time limited and ends without a vote.
    5. The common design feature: In each case the time is fixed by standing order rather than negotiated session by session. The Opposition’s access does not depend on the government’s willingness in a given week.

    What would restore the balance between contestation and cooperation?

    1. Conviction during elections, cooperation after: Democratic functioning requires fierce ideological conviction at the time of an election and active cooperation once the ballots are cast.
    2. National interest above partisan rivalry: Where both sides concur that national interests outrank party rivalries, governance shifts from zero sum obstructionism to constructive collaboration.
    3. Not an abandonment of ideology: The approach requires no party to give up its ideology or its principles. Parties offer different routes to the same destination of national welfare, safety and prosperity.
    4. A fixed slot for the Opposition: Granting the Opposition one day a week, or two hours a day, to raise any issue it deems essential would let the rest of Parliament’s business proceed undisturbed.
    5. The missing ingredient is willingness: The compromise needs no constitutional amendment and no new institution. It needs a government prepared to imagine and concede the time.

    Conclusion

    Parliament’s decline is a failure of the presumption of good faith between government and Opposition, not a failure of procedure, and disruption has become both the Opposition’s only instrument and the agent of the institution’s hollowing out. The remedy identified is small and does not require a constitutional change. It requires guaranteed time in which the Opposition can be heard, and a government willing to concede it. Without that concession the House will continue to meet, pass bills and adjourn, and the deliberative function that gives it authority will not survive.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2017] The Parliament of India exercises control over the functions of the Council of Ministers through 1. Adjournment motion 2. Question hour 3. Supplementary questions Select the correct answer using the code given below: (a) 1 only (b) 2 and 3 only (c) 1 and 3 only (d) 1, 2 and 3 Answer: (d)”

    “[2020] Consider the following statements: 1. The President of India can summon a session of the Parliament at such place as he/she thinks fit. 2. The Constitution of India provides for three sessions of the Parliament in a year, but it is not mandatory to conduct all three sessions. 3. There is no minimum number of days of that the Parliament is required to meet in a year. Which of the statements given above is/are correct? (a) 1 only (b) 2 only (c) 1 and 3 only (d) 2 and 3 only Answer: (c)”

    “[2014] Consider the following statements regarding a No-Confidence Motion in India: 1. There is no mention of a No-Confidence Motion in the Constitution of India. 2. A motion of No-Confidence can be introduced in the Lok Sabha only. Which of the statements given above is/are correct? (a) 1 only (b) 2 only (c) Both 1 and 2 (d) Neither 1 nor 2 Answer: (c)”

    “[2021, GS2, 10 marks] To what extent, in your view, the Parliament is able to ensure accountability of the executive in India?”

    “[2019, GS2, 15 marks] Individual Parliamentarian’s role as the national lawmaker is on a decline, which in turn, has adversely impacted the quality of debates and their outcome. Discuss.”

    “[2024, GS2, 10 marks] “The growth of cabinet system has practically resulted in the marginalisation of the parliamentary supremacy.” Elucidate.”

    “[2013, GS2, 10 marks] The role of individual MPs (Members of Parliament) has diminished over the years and as a result healthy constructive debates on policy issues are not usually witnessed. How far can this be attributed to the anti-defection law, which was legislated but with a different intention?”

  • Workers protesting for higher wages spent over 50 days in jail on average until courts intervened

    Why in the News

    An investigation into 222 bail orders arising from the April 2026 wage protests by factory workers in Noida found that relief was granted in 188 of them, or 84 per cent, after courts repeatedly held that mere presence in a protesting crowd is not evidence of criminal intent. The average protester nonetheless spent 53 days in custody before that relief arrived. Two protests over comparable grievances in the same month produced opposite outcomes, one ending in a ministerial resignation and an assurance of no prosecution, the other in mass arrests and preventive detention.

    What is the National Security Act, 1980?

    1. What it is: A central preventive detention law that allows the State to detain a person to prevent an apprehended act, without trial and without a criminal charge being proved.
    2. The period it permits: It allows detention for up to one year without trial.
    3. Who orders it: A district magistrate, a commissioner of police or the State government may pass the detention order, and the State government must confirm it.
    4. Its use in this case: Two of those arrested in the Noida protests were booked under the Act, a former journalist and a university graduate, and their pleas are pending before the Supreme Court and the Allahabad High Court respectively.

    What is the current status of the right to protest in India?

    1. A derived right, not an enumerated one: The right to protest is not written into the Constitution as a separate right, it is derived from the freedom of speech under Article 19(1)(a) and the freedom to assemble peaceably and without arms under Article 19(1)(b).
    2. The qualification on it: Both freedoms are subject to reasonable restrictions in the interests of public order and the sovereignty and integrity of India.
    3. The peaceful assembly limit: Protection extends only to assembly that is peaceable and unarmed, so the State may act against an assembly once it turns violent.
    4. The bail standard courts applied here: Judges in these cases held that mere presence at a protest is not evidence to deny bail, that the absence of specific evidence outweighs the gravity of the charges, and that ordinary workers cannot be equated with those found organising or instigating violence.
    5. Preventive detention sits alongside it: A person may be detained without trial under a preventive detention law even where no offence has been proved, which is the route taken against two of the accused here.

    Constitutional Provisions Related to Protest, Liberty and Preventive Detention

    1. Article 19(1)(a): Guarantees freedom of speech and expression, from which the right to protest is derived.
    2. Article 19(1)(b): Guarantees the right to assemble peaceably and without arms.
    3. Article 19(1)(c): Guarantees the right to form associations or unions, the basis of the right to organise labour.
    4. Article 19(2) and 19(3): Permit reasonable restrictions on speech and on assembly in the interests of public order.
    5. Article 21: Guarantees that no person shall be deprived of life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law, read to require a just, fair and reasonable procedure.
    6. Article 22(1) and 22(2): Guarantee an arrested person the right to be informed of the grounds of arrest, to consult a legal practitioner, and to be produced before a magistrate within twenty four hours.
    7. Article 22(3): Expressly withdraws those protections from a person detained under a preventive detention law.
    8. Article 22(4) and 22(5): Cap preventive detention at three months unless an Advisory Board of persons qualified to be High Court judges reports sufficient cause, and require the grounds of detention to be communicated to the detainee.
    9. Entry 9, Union List and Entry 3, Concurrent List: Place preventive detention connected with defence and foreign affairs with the Union, and preventive detention for reasons connected with State security and the maintenance of public order on the Concurrent List.
    10. Article 23: Prohibits forced labour, the constitutional anchor of minimum wage jurisprudence.
    11. Article 43: Directs the State to secure a living wage and conditions of work ensuring a decent standard of life, as a Directive Principle.

    What triggered the Noida wage protests?

    1. Rising fuel costs: Rising liquefied petroleum gas cylinder prices amid the West Asia crisis, with workers additionally citing black market prices for cylinders.
    2. A rumour about the Labour Codes: WhatsApp rumours in late March that the new Labour Codes would raise minimum wages.
    3. A neighbouring wage settlement: Wage hike protests in Haryana's Manesar, which produced a settlement that workers in Noida then demanded for themselves.
    4. The underlying grievances: Workers cited unrealistic work targets, the absence of social security benefits such as provident fund, and hiring on a temporary basis through contractors.
    5. Working hours in practice: Workers said they were officially on eight hour shifts but routinely worked ten to twelve hours with few breaks, with safety, especially for women, a further concern.

    What did the wage revisions actually deliver?

    1. The Haryana settlement: After the Manesar protests, the State government announced a 35 per cent hike in minimum monthly wages on 9 April, backdated to 1 April.
    2. The Haryana figures: Rs 15,220.71 for unskilled workers and Rs 19,425.85 for highly skilled workers.
    3. The effect on Noida: The Haryana announcement intensified the Noida protests, which turned violent as workers and activists took to the streets.
    4. The Uttar Pradesh interim hike: Calm returned after the State announced its own interim revision on 14 April, raising unskilled wages from Rs 11,313 to Rs 13,690 and skilled wages from Rs 13,940 to Rs 16,868 in Gautam Buddh Nagar and Ghaziabad.
    5. The parallel warning: Authorities in Noida warned contractors that complaints against them would be dealt with harshly.

    What did the bail orders across the seven FIRs establish?

    1. First Information Report 149 of 2026, Noida Phase III: 31 granted bail and 6 denied, on an allegation that 300 to 400 accused entered an electronics firm's premises in Sector 67 on 13 April carrying lathis, sticks, bricks, stones and deadly weapons and extended threats to kill. The sessions court held that the mere fact that an accused was part of the crowd cannot by itself lead to the conclusion that he possessed the same grave criminal intent, and found that the prosecution had described the crowd's acts in a collective manner without specifying individual roles. Fourteen further grants came from the High Court.
    2. First Information Report 151 of 2026, Noida Phase III: 37 granted bail, on an allegation of stone pelting with intent to cause death and vandalism of security gates, closed circuit television cameras, glass structures and office property. The prosecution relied on an informant's statement, an inspection of the site and closed circuit television footage, and the court found that no such footage or electronic record had been placed on record depicting the accused in any violent activity.
    3. First Information Report 163 of 2026, Noida Phase II: 3 granted bail and 10 denied, arising from protests by workers of three garment and apparel firms between 10 and 11 April. Bail went to three who had remained in judicial custody for a long period once the chargesheet was filed, and was refused to ten on prima facie allegations of an active conspiratorial role, including the creation of WhatsApp groups in the names of companies and the recovery of banners, posters and pamphlets from their residences.
    4. First Information Report 165 of 2026, Noida Phase II: 29 granted bail and 6 denied, on an allegation that 450 to 500 workers assembled in Sector 84 and elsewhere on 13 April over wages, overtime and bonuses, and that the protest turned violent between 8.30 am and 9.30 pm. The prosecution cited independent witnesses including a water vendor, a chowmein cart owner and a rickshaw puller, and the court found it was not clear how they were previously acquainted with or able to identify the accused, adding that the presence of an accused at a labourers' protest is not unnatural. Six further grants came from the High Court.
    5. First Information Report 169 of 2026, Noida Phase II: 26 granted bail and 1 denied, on an allegation that garment exporter employees blocked gates, restrained workers from entering and threatened vandalism and arson from 10 April. The court noted the First Information Report was lodged nearly ten days after the incident with several accused not named in it and no explanation for the delay, and that the complaint reflected no actual incident of arson or injuries. The single refusal rested on closed circuit television footage establishing a specific role.
    6. First Information Report 172 of 2026, Noida Phase I: 21 granted bail and 7 denied, on an allegation that workers of an auto components manufacturer blocked a public road, damaged government and company property and injured police personnel. The court held that the only allegation was presence in the protesting crowd, that the role of every person in a crowd cannot be treated the same, and that mere presence does not by itself make every accused equally liable where no specific act is attributed.
    7. First Information Report 164 of 2026, Noida Phase II: 41 granted bail and 4 denied, with 39 of the 41 grants coming from the Allahabad High Court, which applied a broad standard resting on the facts and circumstances of the case, the evidence on record and grounds of parity.

    On what grounds was bail refused?

    1. The common accusation: Those denied relief face an alleged role in the conspiracy rather than an alleged act at the protest.
    2. Administering WhatsApp groups: Courts cited data showing certain accused were administrators of a WhatsApp group alleged to have been created to facilitate the commission of violence.
    3. Mobilisation from outside: Bail was refused to accused said to have called others to Noida for the protests or to have run groups to mobilise and instigate workers.
    4. Absence of an employment link: One court held that persons with no direct employment relationship with the companies concerned stand on a different footing from the companies' own workers.
    5. Statements of co accused: In one case bail was refused on the statements of co accused despite the defence pointing to the absence of prior criminal antecedents.
    6. Preventive detention instead of bail: On 13 May, nearly a month after the protests turned violent, the State invoked the National Security Act, 1980 against a 60 year old former journalist from Lucknow and a 25 year old Delhi University graduate, taking both outside the bail process altogether.
    7. The material cited in the detention orders: The grounds included membership of a political organisation, writing described as inciting a new generation to join a rebel organisation, joining a library run by a co accused, the recovery of a book on Indian revolutionaries described as a controversial work of literature, and participation in earlier protests over citizenship registration and over Gaza. One police report used the term andolanjeevi.

    What did the arrests cost the workers and their families?

    1. Time in custody: Across the 106 arrests carrying substantive allegations, ranging from rioting and arson to attempt to murder, the average period a protester spent in custody was 53 days.
    2. Arrest away from any protest: A 34 year old daily wage worker was picked up from Labour Chowk on 14 April while looking for work, and was released on bail 40 days later.
    3. Cost of the process itself: That worker's family, migrants from Bihar, spent nearly Rs 50,000 on jail and court visits alone, and his mother lost her factory job over the frequency of those visits.
    4. The scale of borrowing: The families of two young men aged 20 and 18 from Sitamarhi spent almost Rs 3 lakh between them on bail, and sought relatives' help for surety bonds.
    5. Length of detention for the young: One of those two completed three months and a day in jail, and was released two days after the other because of a documentation problem.
    6. The lasting effect: A 19 year old picked up on 14 April after stepping out of his workplace for a meal was released on 18 May, and reports that his parents now call six times a day fearing he will be picked up again.

    Why did two protests over comparable grievances end so differently?

    1. The first outcome: The Jantar Mantar protest demanding a leak proof examination system ended with the Union Education Minister's resignation and an assurance by the Centre and the States that the police would pursue no case against the protesters.
    2. The second outcome: The week long protest beginning 10 April by factory workers in Noida demanding higher wages drew a police crackdown, with up to 200 people taken into custody.
    3. The distinction was not the demand: Both protests raised a grievance against a State failure, one over examination integrity and the other over the statutory minimum wage.
    4. The distinction was the protester: The workers were largely contract hires, migrants and daily wagers with no institutional voice, which is what left them dependent on the courts for relief the other protesters received by executive assurance.
    5. The State conceded the demand anyway: Uttar Pradesh raised wages on 14 April, so the substance of the workers' claim was accepted while the workers themselves remained in custody.
    6. The relief was judicial, not political: Courts granted relief in 84 per cent of the bail pleas, which means the correction came from the judiciary rather than from the executive that had made the arrests.

    Major debates surrounding preventive detention and the right to protest

    1. Preventive detention inside a rights guaranteeing Constitution: India is among the few democracies to carry preventive detention in the Constitution itself, and Article 22(3) removes the very safeguards Article 22(1) and 22(2) create for an arrested person.
    2. Public order against ordinary law and order: Preventive detention is available only for a threat to public order, and the line between a law and order breach and a public order breach determines whether the ordinary criminal process or detention without trial applies.
    3. Collective liability against individual act: The prosecution treats the crowd as the accused while the courts require a specific act attributed to a named individual, and the bail record here shows the two standards producing opposite results.
    4. Bail as the rule and jail as the exception: The settled principle collides with a practice in which the average protester spent 53 days in custody before a court applied it.
    5. Speech and association as evidence: Books read, library membership, publishing and participation in earlier protests were cited in the detention grounds, which raises whether protected expression can supply the material for a preventive order.
    6. Advisory Board review against judicial review: Preventive detention is reviewed by an Advisory Board rather than by a trial, so the detenu's remedy is a writ petition, which is slower than a bail application.
    7. The right to strike: Indian law recognises no fundamental right to strike, so a wage agitation has no protected status independent of the general freedom of assembly.

    Challenges to protecting the right to protest

    1. Procedure as punishment: Even where charges fail, the time spent in custody before bail is itself the penalty. e.g. the 53 day average custody in these Noida cases against an 84 per cent eventual bail rate.
    2. Collective First Information Reports: Naming 300 to 500 unidentified persons in a single complaint makes individual defence impossible and shifts the burden onto the accused. e.g. First Information Report 149 of 2026, where the sessions court found the prosecution had described the crowd's acts in a collective manner without specifying individual roles.
    3. Preventive detention bypasses bail entirely: Once a detention order is passed, the bail jurisprudence stops applying and the detenu must approach a constitutional court. e.g. the two National Security Act, 1980 detentions of 13 May 2026, whose pleas remain pending before the Supreme Court and the Allahabad High Court.
    4. Cost of accessing justice: Surety bonds, travel, lawyers and jail visits impoverish families whose original grievance was a wage below subsistence. e.g. one family spending nearly Rs 50,000 on visits and another almost Rs 3 lakh on two sons.
    5. Contract hiring removes institutional protection: Workers hired through contractors have no recognised union and no employer of record to negotiate on their behalf. e.g. courts here treated persons with no direct employer employee relationship with the companies as standing on a different footing when refusing bail.
    6. Delay in registering complaints: Complaints filed days after the event allow names to be added without contemporaneous evidence. e.g. First Information Report 169 of 2026, lodged nearly ten days after the incident with several accused not named in it.
    7. Unequal executive response: The executive can extend an assurance of no prosecution to one set of protesters and none to another, with no standard governing the choice. e.g. the Jantar Mantar assurance against the Noida crackdown in the same month.
    8. Absence of accountability for wrongful arrest: No consequence attaches to an investigating agency whose case collapses at the bail stage. e.g. senior police officers linked to this investigation declined comment on the findings.

    Conclusion

    The Noida record shows a criminal process in which the crowd, rather than a named individual with a proved act, was treated as the accused, and in which the correction came from the courts rather than from the agency that made the arrests. The State conceded the wage demand on 14 April while the workers who raised it remained in custody for weeks longer, so the substance of the grievance was accepted without any consequence for the arrests. The pending challenges to the two National Security Act, 1980 detentions, before the Supreme Court and the Allahabad High Court respectively, are the next milestone in the matter.

    What is Preventive Detention?

    1. About: Preventive detention is the confinement of a person to prevent an apprehended future act, rather than to punish a proved past offence, and it therefore involves no charge, trial or conviction.
    2. Rationale: It exists to allow the State to act on an anticipated threat to public order or State security in advance of the harm, on the reasoning that a completed offence would be too late to prevent.
    3. Punitive detention distinguished: Punitive detention follows conviction after a trial, preventive detention precedes any trial and rests on the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority.
    4. The constitutional cap: Detention beyond three months requires an Advisory Board of persons qualified to be High Court judges to report sufficient cause, under Article 22(4).
    5. The grounds requirement: The authority must communicate the grounds of detention to the detainee and afford the earliest opportunity to make a representation, under Article 22(5).
    6. The judicial standard: Because the satisfaction is subjective, courts review the procedure and the relevance of the material rather than the sufficiency of the grounds themselves.

    Key Concerns Regarding Preventive Detention

    1. Constitutional safeguards expressly withdrawn: Article 22(3) removes the right to be informed of grounds of arrest, to counsel and to production before a magistrate for a preventively detained person.
    2. No requirement to prove an offence: Detention rests on apprehension rather than evidence of a committed act, so the ordinary standard of proof never applies.
    3. Executive rather than judicial review: An Advisory Board, not a trial court, examines the detention, and the detenu's only judicial route is a writ petition.
    4. Vague standards for public order: The distinction between a law and order breach and a public order breach is not statutorily defined, so classification is a matter of executive judgment.
    5. Successive detention orders: A fresh order can follow the revocation of an earlier one, extending confinement beyond the period any single order permits.
    6. Use against speech and association: Writing, publishing, reading and participating in earlier protests have been cited as material in detention grounds, converting protected expression into evidence of apprehended threat.

    Laws and Rules Governing Preventive Detention and Public Order in India

    1. Preventive Detention Act, 1950: The first post independence preventive detention statute, tested in A.K. Gopalan versus State of Madras in 1950, and allowed to lapse in 1969.
    2. Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971: Provided for preventive detention on internal security grounds and was repealed in 1978.
    3. Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974: Permits preventive detention in smuggling and foreign exchange matters, and remains in force.
    4. National Security Act, 1980: Permits detention for up to one year to prevent a person from acting prejudicially to the defence of India, the security of the State, relations with foreign powers, the maintenance of public order, or the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community.
    5. Detention orders may be passed by a district magistrate, a commissioner of police or the State government, and must be confirmed by the State government.
    6. Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988: Provides preventive detention in narcotics cases.
    7. Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967: Governs terrorist and unlawful association offences, with restrictive bail conditions in place of ordinary bail jurisprudence.
    8. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023: Replaced the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and carries the preventive powers of the police and the magistracy, including the dispersal of unlawful assemblies.
    9. Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023: Carries the substantive offences of rioting, unlawful assembly, mischief and criminal conspiracy on which protest prosecutions are built.
    10. State security legislation: Several States operate their own public safety or goonda acts providing for preventive detention on locally defined grounds.

    Back2Basics: The Four Labour Codes

    1. What they are: Four consolidated central statutes that subsume 29 earlier central labour laws into a single framework covering wages, industrial relations, social security and workplace safety.
    2. Code on Wages, 2019: Merges four laws including the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 and the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, and provides for a statutory floor wage set by the Centre below which no State may fix its minimum wage.
    3. Industrial Relations Code, 2020: Merges three laws on trade unions, standing orders and industrial disputes, and raises the threshold for prior government permission for retrenchment and closure to establishments with 300 or more workers.
    4. Code on Social Security, 2020: Merges nine laws on provident fund, gratuity, maternity benefit and employees' state insurance, and for the first time brings gig and platform workers within the definition of beneficiaries.
    5. Occupational Safety, Health and Working Conditions Code, 2020: Merges 13 laws on factories, contract labour, migrant workmen and specific hazardous sectors.
    6. Coverage of minimum wages: The Code on Wages, 2019 extends minimum wage entitlement to all employees in both organised and unorganised sectors, whereas the earlier law applied only to scheduled employments.
    7. Why they figure here: A rumour in late March 2026 that the Codes would raise minimum wages was one of the three stated triggers of the Noida protests.

    Way Forward

    1. Require individualised allegations in a First Information Report: A complaint naming an unascertained crowd should be treated as insufficient to sustain custody absent a specific act attributed to a named person.
    2. Apply a statutory bail timeline in protest cases: A fixed outer limit for the first bail hearing would prevent the process itself becoming the punishment, as the 53 day average shows it did.
    3. Restrict preventive detention to defined public order threats: A statutory definition distinguishing a law and order breach from a public order breach would narrow the discretion the National Security Act, 1980 currently leaves to the detaining authority.
    4. Bar expression and association as sole detention grounds: Books read, publications authored and participation in earlier lawful protests should not by themselves constitute material for a preventive order.
    5. Enforce the Code on Wages, 2019 floor wage: Timely notification and revision of minimum wages removes the grievance that produced the agitation, since Uttar Pradesh conceded the revision within four days of the protests.
    6. Regulate contract hiring: Registration of contractors and a statutory grievance route for contract workers gives them a channel short of street protest, addressing the absence of any union or employer of record.
    7. Institutionalise a protest response protocol: A published standard for how the police respond to a peaceful assembly, applied uniformly, would end the disparity between the assurance given at Jantar Mantar and the crackdown at Noida.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2023] Consider the following statements: 1. According to the Constitution of India, the Central Government has a duty to protect States from internal disturbances. 2. The Constitution of India exempts the States from providing legal counsel to person being held for preventive detention 3. According to the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002, confession of the accused before the police cannot be used as evidence. How many of the above statements are correct? (a) Only one (b) Only two (c) All three (d) None Answer: (a)”