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Subject: Polity

  • SC orders oversight of Bar Council decisions

    SC orders oversight of Bar Council decisions

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court has held that the Bar Council of India (BCI) chairperson is serving only as a pro tem office holder whose term ends with the next election.

    What is the Bar Council of India?

    1. Statutory regulator of the legal profession: The BCI is constituted under the Advocates Act, 1961 to regulate advocates, legal education and professional conduct across India.
    2. Its legitimacy runs through bar elections: Its members are elected by the State Bar Councils from among their own members, so a lapsed election cycle at the State level freezes the central body too.
    3. The two law officers sit on it by office: The Attorney General and the Solicitor General are permanent ex officio members of the Council.
    4. A continuity provision guards against a vacuum: The proviso to Section 4(3) of the Advocates Act, 1961 allows the last chairperson or vice chairperson to continue until a new Council is in place.

    Why is the chairperson’s continuance in question?

    1. The Rules cap the term at two years: Rule 12(2), Chapter I, Part II of the Bar Council of India Rules fixes the maximum tenure of the BCI chairperson at two years, and the current term began on 17 April 2025.
    2. A notification stretched it to 2030: A gazette notification of 21 April 2025 notified the tenure of the chairperson and vice chairperson until 16 April 2030.
    3. A notification cannot override the parent statute: The Bench observed that a notification cannot go beyond the Rules or empower a body to grant itself additional tenure.
    4. Continuity has run for over a decade: Petitioners questioned an uninterrupted term as BCI chairperson of more than 12 years since November 2014.
    5. The anti vacuum proviso has been used to postpone elections: Petitioners argued that a provision meant to prevent an administrative vacuum has instead been used to avoid holding fresh elections and to perpetuate the existing office holders.

    What allegations were placed before the Court?

    1. A trust holding the Council’s assets: Petitioners questioned the formation of the BCI Pearl First Trust in 2020, in which the chairperson and other BCI office bearers are described as “permanent managing trustees”.
    2. The earlier trust’s finances were moved into it: The financial assets and incomes of the earlier BCI Trust were transferred to the new Trust.
    3. Trusteeship outlasts elected office: The office bearers would continue as permanent managing trustees even after their Council tenures expire, which the Bench questioned as elected members becoming permanent trustees beyond their capacity.
    4. A land arrangement with a State government: A tie up between the Trust and the Goa government proposes a university on 56 acres of land in that State.
    5. Expenditure on felicitations: Counsel described the financial expenditures pulled from BCI records on felicitations, running into crores, as “jolting”.
    6. Concentration of power over successive terms: Counsel for the petitioners argued that what the record shows over the years is a concentration of powers in the same office bearers.

    What did the NALSAR episode expose?

    1. An enrolment ban aimed at one graduating batch: The BCI made an aborted attempt to bar the professional enrolment of the National Academy of Legal Studies and Research (NALSAR) batch of 2026.
    2. The trigger was student dissent: The students had objected to the Chief Justice of India attending their convocation, dissenting against oral remarks that termed youths “cockroaches” and “parasites”.
    3. The reaction spread across national law universities: Students of the National Law Universities at Delhi and Bengaluru expressed solidarity with their NALSAR counterparts.
    4. The Court itself backed the protest: The Chief Justice of India supported the students’ right to protest, and questions arose over whether the chairperson had acted on his own.
    5. The measure was withdrawn: An apology was eventually issued and the enrolment bar did not take effect.

    Why has the Court chosen supervision over removal?

    1. The Bench declined to adjudicate the allegations now: The Court said it did not want to encourage “shadow boxing” around the allegations at this stage.
    2. The stated ground is institutional: It said it would intervene to maintain the “institutional integrity and credibility” of the BCI until the next bar body elections.
    3. Routine functioning is left undisturbed: The incumbent office bearers continue pro tem so that the Council’s day to day functioning is not interrupted.
    4. The check is prior and external, not appellate: Policy decisions now require prior notice to the two law officers and an invitation to them to participate, rather than review after a decision is taken.
    5. The regulator did not resist: Counsel for the BCI told the Court they welcomed the direction to take the concurrence of the highest law officers in policy matters.

    What does the election timetable require?

    1. Women members are co opted first: The Chief Justices of the High Courts must complete the co option of two women members to the State Bar Councils within a fortnight.
    2. Composition is notified next: Each State Bar Council must then notify its new composition within a week.
    3. Office bearers and BCI representatives follow: The newly constituted State Bar Councils must elect their chairperson, vice chairperson, other office bearers and one representative to the BCI within three weeks of notification of their composition.
    4. The central body is reconstituted last: The BCI is formed from those State representatives, so the pro tem arrangement ends only once the State level cycle finishes.

    Challenges to the Bar Council of India

    1. Elections are not self executing: Nothing in the statutory scheme compels the Council to go to the polls on schedule, so a continuity proviso can substitute for a mandate indefinitely. Eg. The present dispute reached the Supreme Court only because petitioners moved it, not because any internal trigger fired.
      The Fix: Write a fixed election calendar into the Advocates Act, 1961, with the continuity proviso lapsing automatically on a stated date.
    2. The regulator writes the rules it is bound by: The BCI frames the Rules governing tenure, enrolment and legal education, and no external body vets them before they take effect. Eg. The instrument extending the chairperson’s tenure was issued by the Council itself.
      The Fix: Require prior publication and a stated objection window for any Rule affecting tenure, enrolment or recognition.
    3. Legal education answers to two regulators: BCI control over law school recognition sits alongside the University Grants Commission’s authority over degree granting universities, so institutions face two sets of standards. Eg. National Law Universities are created by State Acts and funded as universities, yet their graduates’ right to practise depends on BCI enrolment.
      The Fix: Constitute a single joint standard setting body for legal education, with the BCI confined to professional entry.
    4. Discipline moves slowly by design: Complaints against advocates go to State Bar Council disciplinary committees, and a case not decided within a year transfers to the BCI, which lengthens the process rather than shortening it. Eg. Section 36B of the Advocates Act, 1961 provides for that transfer on the expiry of one year.
      The Fix: Publish disposal timelines and pendency data for every disciplinary committee, State and central.
    5. Entry testing does not feed back into approval: The All India Bar Examination tests an individual’s eligibility to practise, and it does not evaluate the law college that produced the candidate. Eg. Colleges retain BCI approval regardless of how their graduates perform in that examination.
      The Fix: Link a law college’s continued approval to the disclosed performance of its graduates in the Bar examination.

    Conclusion

    The Court has not removed the incumbent. It has bounded him. A regulator whose elections had lapsed is now supervised by the two law officers who already sat on it by office, and its bar elections have been put on a calendar the Court set. The unresolved part is structural. Judicial supervision arrived because the profession’s own rules carried no consequence for a Council that simply did not go to the polls. The marker to watch is whether the fresh Councils are constituted on that timetable, or the interim arrangement outlasts it.

    [2022] With reference to India, consider the following statements :

    1. Government law officers and legal firms are recognised as advocates, but corporate lawyers and patent attorneys are excluded from recognition as advocates.

    2. Bar Councils have the power to lay down the rules relating to legal education and recognition of law colleges.

    Which of the statements given above is/are correct ?

    (a) 1 only

    (b) 2 only

    (c) Both 1 and 2

    (d) Neither 1 nor 2

  • Cauvery needs a distress-sharing pact

    Cauvery needs a distress-sharing pact

    Why in the News

    The Tamil Nadu Chief Minister has opened the sluice gates of the Mettur Dam, giving some relief to Cauvery Delta farmers after a delayed irrigation season. The Tamil Nadu government has ascribed the delay to a deficit in the southwest monsoon and to Karnataka’s failure to honour its water sharing obligation under the Supreme Court’s 2018 verdict.

    What is the Cauvery Management Authority?

    1. What it was set up to do: The Authority was constituted to oversee the implementation of the Supreme Court’s 2018 verdict on the sharing of the Cauvery’s waters.
    2. Its statutory basis: It was created under the Inter-State River Water Disputes Act, 1956, following the Court’s direction that a scheme be framed to give effect to the award.
    3. How it operates: A regulation committee assesses storage, inflows and crop water requirements and advises the Authority, which then directs releases between the basin States.
    4. Where it works: The Authority has functioned during normal monsoon years, when the allocation the verdict fixed can simply be applied.

    Why did this year’s Mettur schedule slip?

    1. The normal calendar: In a normal year the dam opens on 12 June and its gates are shut on 28 January, giving the region’s agriculturists a 230 day irrigation window.
    2. The schedule is not self executing: That calendar is contingent on the monsoon and on the release of water in the Cauvery’s upstream by Karnataka.
    3. What went wrong this year: The Tamil Nadu government attributed the delay to the southwest monsoon deficit and to Karnataka not meeting its release obligation.
    4. What the opening actually buys: With the rainfall deficit narrowing in August, the Tamil Nadu government has leeway to release water for 45 days, well short of a full season.

    What does the 2018 verdict not settle?

    1. No distress sharing formula: The Court did not codify a formula for water sharing in years when the rains play truant, so a deficit year has no rule to fall back on.
    2. The sustainability direction did not bind: The Court’s emphasis on sustainable water use was lost on the two States, which continued to plan as though the allocation were guaranteed.
    3. The gap shows up on the first bad monsoon: The dispute flared again in 2023, the first below par monsoon after 2018, and the same pattern has repeated this year.
    4. Litigation is the default, not the exception: Tamil Nadu has said it will continue legal efforts to secure its share, which returns the question to a forum that has already declined to write a distress rule.

    Why has the Mekedatu proposal deepened the deadlock?

    1. The proposal: Karnataka’s push for the Mekedatu Dam on the river has reignited old fears downstream.
    2. Karnataka’s case: The Karnataka government argues the dam would primarily serve Bengaluru’s water needs while allowing better regulation of releases.
    3. Why it has not landed: That argument has found no takers in Tamil Nadu, where a storage structure upstream reads as an instrument of control rather than of regulation.
    4. The underlying shift: The Cauvery today has to meet the competing demands of agriculture and urbanisation, and the two States sit on opposite sides of that shift.

    What would a negotiated settlement have to contain?

    1. A move away from the courtroom: Rather than lean on the judiciary, the Cauvery dependent States would do well to come together and plan for the efficient use of the river’s waters.
    2. Demand side measures: Solutions range from disincentivising water intensive crops to encouraging decentralised water management.
    3. The expertise required: Any such plan will need inputs from hydrologists, economists, agricultural scientists and farmers’ organisations.
    4. The political precondition: Representatives of the two States will need to sit together, understand each other’s fears and shed confrontationist attitudes.

    Challenges to the Cauvery Management Authority

    1. No enforcement machinery of its own: The Authority depends on the two State governments to execute its release directions and holds no independent field administration. Eg. Its directions in the deficit year of 2023 were contested by Karnataka and taken back to the Supreme Court.
      The Fix: Give the Authority operational control over gate operations at specified control points for the duration of a declared distress period.
    2. Storage and inflow data are State reported and contested: Each State submits its own figures on realisable flows, so the Authority arbitrates between rival datasets before it can decide anything. Eg. The two States have filed conflicting inflow estimates for the same periods at Biligundlu, the inter State measuring point.
      The Fix: Place telemetry at every control point under a jointly audited third party gauge network publishing real time readings.
    3. Groundwater sits outside the allocation: The award divides surface flows alone, so competing extraction continues unregulated on both sides of the border. Eg. The Central Ground Water Board classifies several assessment units in the Cauvery basin as over exploited.
      The Fix: Notify a joint basin wide extraction cap alongside the surface allocation, so a shortfall in releases is not simply pumped out of the aquifer.
    4. Electoral cycles set State positions: Water release becomes an electoral question in both States, which raises the political cost of any concession to the point where none is offered. Eg. Assembly resolutions and shutdowns in Karnataka have followed release orders in successive dispute years.
      The Fix: Shift the release decision to a pre agreed rule curve triggered by reservoir storage, so no government has to announce a discretionary concession.

    Conclusion

    A river shared by two States needs a rule for the bad years, not only for the good ones. The Cauvery has one for the good years, and every deficit season is therefore litigated afresh. The forward step is a negotiated distress sharing pact between the basin States, agreed before the next failed monsoon rather than during it, and covering the cities as well as the fields. Until such a pact exists, each shortfall will keep arriving at a court that has already declined to supply the formula the States will not write for themselves.

    Back2Basics: Mettur Dam

    1. Where it is: The dam is built across the Cauvery at Mettur in the Salem district of Tamil Nadu, at the point where the river enters the plains.
    2. When it was built: It was completed in 1934 and is one of the oldest large dams in India.
    3. What it holds: Its reservoir is known as the Stanley Reservoir, and it serves irrigation, drinking water and hydroelectric generation.
    4. What it commands: Releases from Mettur irrigate the Cauvery delta districts, which is why the date on which its gates open sets the cropping calendar for the region.

    [2013, GS2, 10 marks] Constitutional mechanisms to resolve the inter-state water disputes have failed to address and solve the problems. Is the failure due to structural or process inadequacy or both? Discuss.”

  • CJP condition, Govt request: SC quashes student protest FIRs

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court has quashed every FIR registered across the country against students who took part in the Jantar Mantar protests over exam paper leaks, invoking its power under Article 142 of the Constitution to pass any order needed for “complete justice” in a matter before it.

    How far does the quashing reach?

    1. Five applicants, one order: A three judge Bench headed by the Chief Justice of India allowed applications by the Delhi Police and the States of Maharashtra, Bihar, Assam and West Bengal.
    2. States that never asked are covered too: The Bench was told that Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh had registered FIRs without approaching the court. It directed that any FIR on the protests of July 20 to 25, 2026 in any State or Union Territory not brought to its notice shall not be pursued or investigated and is to be treated as closed.
    3. No fresh FIRs anywhere: No State or Union Territory may register a new FIR over those protest incidents.
    4. The reason given is the protesters’ future: The Bench said it invoked Article 142 keeping in view the future of young protesters who came to protest in good faith.

    Who stays outside the protection?

    1. A fresh FIR against 2,873 named individuals: The Centre and the Delhi Police may register a new FIR in respect of 2,873 people with criminal records who were allegedly present at the protest sites.
    2. The charges the police cited: The Delhi Police had told the court those individuals faced serious charges including murder, attempt to murder, dacoity, rape and offences under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012.
    3. Rights are preserved on both sides: The fresh FIR is to be registered without prejudice to the rights of the parties to take lawful recourse.

    What did each side commit to in exchange?

    1. The Centre asked for the widest quashing: The Solicitor General recalled the discussions that ended the July protests and the assurances given to the protesters. He urged the court to quash FIRs even in States and Union Territories that had not approached it, since the protesters doubted the assurances would be honoured.
    2. The Centre asked for time on compensation: The Solicitor General sought time to work out the modalities for compensating the families of students who took their lives after the paper leak, and said the government remained committed to its assurances.
    3. The CJP withdrew its march: Its spokesperson told the Bench that the positive assurances of the Government and the judicial sanctity now given to them made the march unnecessary, and that the party looks forward to compliance with the order.
    4. The order is conditional on both sides: The Bench recorded that both sides shall abide by the statements and commitments made before it, and made the Article 142 order subject to that understanding.
    5. It is not a precedent: The directions were issued in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and shall not be treated as a precedent.
    6. The Chief Justice framed it as mutual gesture: The CJI said that if both sides show a good gesture every issue can be resolved one by one, and credited both sides for creating a constructive environment for youngsters.

    What compensation framework did the Court direct?

    1. A pan India model policy: The Central government is to formulate the modalities and a policy for compensation on a pan India basis. The model policy is to be circulated to all States and Union Territories in consultation with them and adopted as a regular mechanism of compensatory measures.
    2. NEET 2026 families are paid first: For students who died by suicide in connection with NEET 2026, the Centre is to pay compensation to the affected families within three months of framing the policy.

    Challenges to settling protest FIRs through Article 142

    1. Article 142 bypasses the statutory quashing route: Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 vests the power to quash an FIR in the High Court of the State concerned, and a single Supreme Court order displaces that forum for every State at once. Eg. In Supreme Court Bar Association v Union of India (1998) a Constitution Bench held that Article 142 cannot be used to supplant substantive law or ignore a statute’s express provisions.
      The Fix: Have non-applicant States file compromise petitions in their own High Courts with the settlement terms annexed, so each quashing rests on a statutory order.
    2. Executive withdrawal was available and unused: The prosecution can withdraw a case with the court’s consent under Section 360 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, and that route keeps the accountability for dropping cases on the government that registered them. Eg. After the farm laws were repealed in December 2021, cases against protesting farmers were withdrawn by the Union and State governments through executive decisions, not a court order.
      The Fix: Record in the order that the Centre and the States remain responsible for withdrawing any residual proceedings, so the government’s assurance is enforceable against it rather than delegated to the court.
    3. A pending charge is treated as a record: The carve out uses pendency of serious charges, not conviction, as the ground for a fresh FIR, so presence at a protest becomes an offence for one class of citizens. Eg. In Amanatullah Khan v Commissioner of Police, Delhi (2024) the Supreme Court directed the Delhi Police to revisit its rules on history sheets after finding that persons were being listed mechanically.
      The Fix: Register any fresh FIR only on individual evidence of an overt act at the site, not on a police list of those present.
    4. Court directed compensation has no statutory anchor: A model policy the Centre drafts and States adopt by consultation binds no State that declines, so relief becomes uneven across the country. Eg. Victim compensation under Section 357A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, inserted in 2009, produced uneven State schemes until the Supreme Court in Nipun Saxena v Union of India (2018) had the National Legal Services Authority frame a uniform scheme.
      The Fix: Add a victim relief chapter to the Public Examinations (Prevention of Unfair Means) Act, 2024 so compensation for leak affected candidates binds every State by statute.

    Conclusion

    The order closes the confrontation between the government and the protesters, not the paper leak problem that produced it. Its force rests on a promise from each side rather than on any finding of law. The marker to watch is the Centre’s model compensation policy and whether the States that never came to court treat their FIRs as closed.

    Back2Basics: Article 142 of the Constitution

    1. Text: Article 142(1) lets the Supreme Court pass any decree or order necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it, enforceable throughout India.
    2. Supporting power: Article 142(2) lets the Court secure the attendance of any person, order the discovery of documents, and punish for contempt of itself.
    3. Nature: The power is discretionary and curative, used to fill gaps where no statutory remedy fits the case before the Court.
    4. Landmark uses: The Bhopal gas settlement of 1989 and the allotment of land to the Sunni Waqf Board in M Siddiq v Mahant Suresh Das (2019), the Ayodhya title case, both rested on Article 142.

    “[2022] Consider the following statements :

    1. Pursuant to the report of H.N. Sanyal Committee, the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 was passed.

    2. The Constitution of India empowers the Supreme Court and the High Courts to punish for contempt of themselves.

    3. The Constitution of India defines Civil Contempt and Criminal Contempt.

    4. In India, the Parliament is vested with the powers to make laws on Contempt of Court.

    Which of the statements given above is/are correct ?

    (a) 1 and 2 only

    (b) 1, 2 and 4

    (c) 3 and 4 only

    (d) 3 only

  • Statistical Institute Bill referred to standing committee

    Why in the News

    The Lok Sabha Speaker has referred the Indian Statistical Institute Bill, 2026 to the Department-Related Standing Committee on Finance for examination. The Bill was introduced in the Lok Sabha during the Monsoon Session. It seeks to repeal the Indian Statistical Institute Act, 1959 and to incorporate the institute as a “body corporate” with a Board of Governors accountable to the Central government. The referral follows protests by the institute’s faculty and an Opposition demand that the Bill go to a standing committee. The tension is between a governance overhaul the government says the 1959 Act cannot deliver and a faculty that protested the Bill before it reached a committee.

    What does the Bill propose for the institute?

    1. Incorporation as a body corporate: The institute is to be incorporated to strengthen governance, promote academic excellence and research, and serve emerging needs in statistics and allied fields.
    2. The President as Visitor: The Bill makes the President the Visitor of the institute.
    3. A Board of Governors answerable to the Centre: The board is the principal policy executive body, headed by a chairperson drawn from academia, industry, education, public policy or statistical sciences. The Bill makes the board accountable to the Central government.
    4. An Academic Council under the director: The council is the principal academic body, headed by the institute’s director, with every full time professor and full time faculty member on it.
    5. A talent pipeline as the stated purpose: The Bill says the reform will build an ecosystem to train a new generation of high quality data scientists and statisticians and close the talent gap in India’s technology and financial sectors.

    Why does the government say the 1959 Act must go?

    1. The 1959 Act fixed status and one degree power: The Indian Statistical Institute Act, 1959 declared the institute an institution of national importance and let it grant degrees and diplomas in statistics.
    2. The 1995 amendment widened degrees, not governance: It added mathematics, quantitative economics, computer science and other subjects related to statistics as the institute determines from time to time.
    3. Five areas are called inadequate: The Bill says the Act has limited provisions on governance, administration, finance, accountability and functioning, and cannot respond to an evolving academic and research environment.
    4. Repeal rather than a second amendment: The government chose to repeal the 1959 Act and replace it with a comprehensive incorporation law.

    Challenges to the Indian Statistical Institute Bill, 2026

    1. A Centre accountable board reverses the founding design: The institute has run since 1932 as a registered society governed by its own council, and a statutory board answerable to the Central government moves the final say outside the institute. Eg. The Indian Institutes of Management (Amendment) Act, 2023 made the President the Visitor of the IIMs with power to appoint and remove directors, six years after the 2017 Act had handed those powers to their boards.
      The Fix: Write the board’s autonomy in academic and appointment matters into the Bill as a statutory guarantee, with the Centre’s role limited to audit and financial accountability.
    2. Statistical credibility rests on perceived independence: The institute’s faculty design methods used in national statistics, and executive control over its board invites doubt about the numbers at a time of live disputes over GDP methodology. Eg. In January 2019 two members of the National Statistical Commission, including its acting chairman, resigned after release of the Periodic Labour Force Survey for 2017-18 was withheld.
      The Fix: Fix the institute’s faculty and external statisticians as a majority on the board so the Centre’s nominees cannot outvote them.
    3. Faculty consent was not built into the process: The Bill reached introduction over faculty protest, and a governance law imposed on an academic community produces sustained non-cooperation. Eg. Delhi University’s Four Year Undergraduate Programme, introduced in 2013 without faculty consensus, was rolled back in 2014 on the University Grants Commission’s direction after sustained teacher opposition.
      The Fix: Have the standing committee take evidence from the faculty and the institute’s council before the Bill returns to the House.

    Conclusion

    The Bill’s stage is referral to the Department-Related Standing Committee on Finance after introduction in the Lok Sabha. The committee’s report is due within three months, and the Bill waits in the House until it comes. The committee’s treatment of the board’s accountability clause is what decides whether the faculty’s objection is answered or overridden.

    Back2Basics: Department-Related Standing Committees

    1. Origin: Parliament set up 17 Department-Related Standing Committees in 1993 and expanded them to 24 in 2004, each covering a set of ministries.
    2. Composition: Each has 31 members, 21 from the Lok Sabha and 10 from the Rajya Sabha, nominated by the Speaker and the Chairman, and a minister cannot be a member.
    3. Control: Sixteen committees, including Finance, work under the Lok Sabha Speaker and eight under the Rajya Sabha Chairman.
    4. Output: Their reports on Bills, demands for grants and policy are recommendatory, and the government tables an action taken report on them.

    “[2026] Consider the following statements about the Committee on the Welfare of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes of the Parliament of India:

    1. Although members of this Committee are elected from both Houses of Parliament, the Chairperson of this Committee is appointed by the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha.

    2. Twenty members are elected by the Rajya Sabha and ten members by the Lok Sabha.

    3. No Minister, except for the Union Minister of Social Justice and Empowerment, is eligible to be a member of this Committee.

    4. Members are elected for a fixed term of two years from the date they enter their office.

    Which one of the following conclusions based on the above statements is correct?

    (a) There are four correct statements

    (b) There is only one correct statement, that is statement 2

    (c) There are two correct statements, that include statement 1

    (d) There is no correct statement

  • Jharkhand SIR faceoff: BJP agents seek to delete voters, BLOs raise red flag

    Why in the News

    Booth Level Officers (BLOs) in at least four booths of Jharkhand’s Godda district have refused stacks of Form 7 applications seeking deletion of voters from the draft electoral roll, flagging them as not genuine or not procedurally sound. The applications were brought by Booth Level Agents (BLAs) of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), and most of the names on them are from the minority community. The draft roll was published under the State’s Special Intensive Revision (SIR), and the claims and objections round on it is still open. The BJP has complained that the BLOs are at fault for refusing the forms. BLOs are State government employees, and the State is governed by a Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM)-Congress alliance, so the standoff has acquired a party colour and has reached the Chief Electoral Officer (CEO). The tension is that Form 7 requires no evidence and has no filing cap, so the only safeguard against targeted bulk deletion is the inquiry after intake, and the CEO and the local Electoral Registration Officer (ERO) disagree on whether a BLO may refuse a form at all.

    How is a Form 7 deletion supposed to work?

    1. The statutory power sits with the ERO: Section 22 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950 lets the ERO correct or delete an entry on its own motion or on an application. In each case the ERO must hold an inquiry, give the elector time to respond and then pass an order.
    2. Only three grounds justify deletion: The ERO can remove an entry where the person has died, is no longer ordinarily resident in the constituency, or is ineligible because they are not a citizen or are under 18.
    3. Form 7 is the objection instrument: Under the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960, Form 7 carries an objection to a proposed inclusion or a deletion of a name in an existing roll. Any elector may use it to delete their own name or to object to another elector in the same constituency.
    4. The applicant proves nothing but signs a declaration: The form asks for one of five reasons, death, under age, absent or permanently shifted, already enrolled, or not Indian citizen, and needs no evidence. The applicant signs a declaration that a statement known to be false is punishable.

    Where does the online filing system leave the safeguard?

    1. Filing has moved online: The form can be downloaded from the voters’ portal and handed to the BLO, or filed on the portal or the ECINet app after the applicant links a phone number to their Electors Photo Identity Card (EPIC) number. Only a person registered in the same constituency can object to a name in it.
    2. The form identifies both parties: It carries the applicant’s name, EPIC number and phone number, and the name, EPIC number if available and address of the person objected to.
    3. Processing was centralised in 2018 but decisions were not: ERONet replaced the States’ own applications with one portal for EROs, and in 2025 the Election Commission of India (ECI) folded about 40 apps and portals into ECINet. Each form is still decided by the ERO concerned, not centrally.
    4. The portal verifies nothing at filing: No proof is required, and the system does not check that the EPIC number and phone number belong to the applicant.
    5. The inquiry is the safeguard, per the ECI: The ERO must issue a notice to the elector, allow seven days to respond, hold a hearing and pass an order, and the BLO must verify by a field visit. ECI officials say a deletion happens only after this ground inquiry.

    What did the investigation find in Godda’s booths?

    1. One BLA, 25 forms in one booth: At Booth No. 9 of Maheshtikri village a single BJP BLA filed Form 7s against 25 voters.
    2. The forms were not the official ones: The Maheshtikri BLO said the BLA brought forms that were not original, described them as covering voters absent from the village, and promised 50 more. Every form named a Muslim voter.
    3. She accepted the first batch and refused the rest: The BLO took the 25 forms, then declined further forms after the Block Development Officer (BDO) instructed BLOs that such documents were not official forms.
    4. A neighbouring BLA burned 75 forms: At Pachua Kita the BLO was handed around 75 Form 7s that differed from the forms the block office had issued. The BLA said he had been told they were for adding names, and he burned all of them when questioned.
    5. Almost every objected name was Muslim: At Pachua Kita almost all the names on the 75 forms were of Muslims, and at Maheshtikri all the forms carried Muslim voters.
    6. Complaints reached the ERO from four booths: The Basantrai BDO, acting as ERO, received complaints from Maheshtikri, Pachua Kita, Lochni and Baghakol. Villagers of Maheshtikri filed their own complaint against the mass objections in Booth No. 9.

    Why do the targeted voters say the objections cannot stand?

    1. The 2003 roll should protect them: Many of the targeted voters are verified in the 2003 intensive revision, and under the ECI’s own rules this eases their inclusion in the ongoing SIR. The BLOs said every objected voter at Maheshtikri and most at Pachua Kita were mapped to the 2003 roll.
    2. Residence runs back generations: The voters trace their families in the village across generations and hold the khatian, the land record used as proof of being Jharkhandi, along with Aadhaar cards and addresses in the State.
    3. Migration for work is the likely trigger: Several are labourers who work in Delhi, Ghaziabad or outside the State and return to vote in Jharkhand. One learned of the objection against him only from an anganwadi worker.
    4. The fear is benefits and citizenship, not only the vote: Eight voters spoken to feared disenfranchisement, loss of government scheme entitlements or being treated as non-citizens, and several said they were not educated enough to understand the consequences.
    5. Preliminary checks support them: The ERO said preliminary information shows some voters sought to be deleted are living at their registered addresses, and every deletion request will be field verified.

    How does the BJP defend the bulk filings?

    1. Objections are the BLA’s job: The former BJP MLA for Godda said filing objections is part of a BLA’s responsibility. BLAs are trained in Form 6 for new voters, Form 7 for objections and Form 8 for shifting or correction of entries.
    2. Duplicate registration is the stated ground: The party’s position is that a BLA can seek deletion where a name appears at two places, and that verifying the objection is the election authorities’ job.
    3. No cap exists on filings: There is no prescribed limit on the number of applications a BLA can submit, so a single BLA filing dozens breaks no rule.
    4. The BLO breached confidentiality, per the party: A BLO must keep the details of the objected person and of the BLA confidential, and disclosure can amount to a violation of the Representation of the People Act. The BJP says the Booth No. 9 BLO’s disclosure of its BLA’s identity caused pressure and threats against him.
    5. The complaint went to the Additional CEO: The BJP’s Jharkhand SIR convenor submitted a memorandum on discrepancies in the SIR, particularly in Sahibganj and Godda districts, accusing BLOs of two booths of refusing Form 7s from its BLAs.
    6. The BLAs describe a top down supply of forms: The Maheshtikri BLA said the former MLA gave him around 25 forms with the instruction to bring them back if the BLO refused, and some came back. The Pachua Kita BLA said he got the forms from party cadres, barely knew what they were, and thought they added names.

    Why have the ERO and the CEO split on what a BLO may do?

    1. The ERO told BLOs not to act: The BDO said BLOs were instructed not to act on the forms because the source of the forms was unknown, and that an inquiry report will follow field verification.
    2. The ERO wants a complaint route instead: In his view the BLAs should first have filed a written complaint with the Sub Divisional Officer (SDO) or the ERO asking for an investigation. Any objection should come from the family concerned or carry solid evidence.
    3. The CEO found no illegality: After speaking to the Godda Assistant ERO and the Deputy Commissioner, the Jharkhand CEO said objections were filed through Form 7 and can be submitted in bulk.
    4. The CEO holds that filing itself is legitimate: A BLA who believes a voter is registered in multiple States can object, and there is nothing wrong in filing objections.
    5. The CEO says BLOs cannot reject: The BLO must first inform the Assistant ERO (AERO), who decides what is to be done, and the BLO then records a recommendation in the observation report.

    Why has a roll revision become a party contest?

    1. The revision is large and the window is short: The SIR began in Jharkhand on June 30, and the draft roll published on August 5 removed 16.48 percent of voters, around 43 lakh. The claims and objections round closes on September 4.
    2. BLOs answer to a State government of the other side: The BJP frames the refusals as partisan because the BLOs are employees of a State run by its rivals.
    3. Godda is a marginal seat: The BJP candidate lost Godda in the 2024 Assembly election to the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) by more than 20,000 votes after winning it in 2020 by around 4,500.
    4. The ruling alliance calls it targeted deletion: The JMM’s local block president called the forms a BJP conspiracy to remove Muslim voters, and the Congress general secretary said the party is monitoring Form 7 deletions across the State. The RJD MLA for Godda said the BDO told him action is being taken.

    Challenges to the Form 7 objection mechanism

    1. The burden shifts to the objected elector: A voter must answer a notice within a week and attend a hearing, and a migrant worker away from home routinely misses both. Eg. In Lal Babu Hussein v Electoral Registration Officer (1995) the Supreme Court set aside deletions in Bombay where names had been struck off on suspicion of foreign nationality without a proper opportunity to be heard.
      The Fix: Serve the notice on the phone number linked to the elector’s EPIC and allow a response through the portal or a family member at the hearing.
    2. The objector’s identity is unverified: An objection can be filed under someone else’s EPIC number and phone number since nothing checks that they belong to the applicant. Eg. In Bengaluru in 2022, staff of a private firm, Chilume Enterprises, posed as Booth Level Officers and collected voter data door to door, showing how easily the intake layer is impersonated.
      The Fix: Require a one time password on the phone registered against the objector’s EPIC before the portal accepts a Form 7.
    3. False declarations carry no practical cost: Section 31 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950 makes a false declaration punishable with imprisonment of up to one year, but prosecutions of objectors are rare, so bulk filing is free. Eg. In the Bihar SIR of 2025 the Supreme Court had to direct the ECI to publish booth wise lists of the about 65 lakh excluded names with reasons before any individual could contest an exclusion.
      The Fix: Track every rejected objection to its filer and prosecute repeat filers under Section 31.
    4. Party appointed agents drive the objection pipeline: BLAs are nominated by political parties, so the volume and targeting of objections follow party incentive rather than roll accuracy. Eg. The Bihar SIR of 2025 let each BLA submit up to 50 certified enumeration forms a day, formally placing party agents inside the roll’s verification chain.
      The Fix: Require the ERO to publish booth wise counts of objections by filer during the claims window so bulk targeting is visible before the roll is finalised.

    Conclusion

    The Godda dispute is about where the safeguard against targeted deletion sits, at the BLO’s counter or in the ERO’s inquiry. The CEO has ruled that intake cannot be refused, so every objection now goes to field verification. The marker to watch is the Basantrai ERO’s inquiry report and how many of the objections it upholds once the claims window closes.

    Back2Basics: Special Intensive Revision (SIR)

    1. Legal basis: Section 21 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950 lets the Election Commission of India direct a special revision of the electoral roll for any constituency, in addition to the annual summary revision.
    2. What makes it intensive: BLOs visit every household with enumeration forms and the roll is rebuilt from those forms, rather than corrected entry by entry as in a summary revision.
    3. The current cycle: The nationwide exercise began with Bihar in June 2025 and has proceeded State by State in phases since.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026, GS2, 10 marks] Is the right to vote a fundamental right? Discuss the position of the Election Commission of India while undertaking the revision of electoral rolls. Can it also examine the question of citizenship of voters?”

  • SC seeks Centre’s response on use of ‘totalisers’ in EVM vote counting

    SC seeks Centre’s response on use of ‘totalisers’ in EVM vote counting

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court has sought the Centre’s response on the use of “totalisers”, machines that consolidate and count votes from multiple electronic voting machine (EVM) control units at once without revealing booth-wise voting trends, as a “fall-back option”. The order came on a petition arguing that totalisers would protect voters’ privacy by concealing booth-wise voting patterns and shield them from reprisals. The Election Commission (EC) had warned the Court against the move, saying that introducing a new and unregulated mechanism at a time when the integrity of EVMs is itself under frequent public questioning could give rise to fresh allegations and controversy. The tension is between the voter’s privacy at the booth level and the booth-wise, machine-wise trail that the EC calls the backbone of a self-verifying count.

    What is a totaliser?

    1. What it does: A totaliser consolidates and counts votes from multiple EVM control units simultaneously, so the result is declared for the group rather than for each booth.
    2. How it connects: It links a cluster of 14 control units, from 14 polling stations, via a cable.
    3. What it outputs: It provides a consolidated result for each candidate across that group of EVMs, with no booth-wise breakdown.

    Why does the petitioner want totalisers?

    1. Privacy of the individual voter: Booth-wise results reveal how a locality voted, and the petitioner argued that totalisers would safeguard the privacy of individual voters.
    2. Protection from reprisals: Political parties victimise voters at the local level after identifying voting patterns in particular polling booths, and concealing the pattern removes the target.
    3. A fall-back, not a replacement: The Court framed the question to the Centre as one of a “fall-back option”, not a wholesale change in counting.

    On what legal and political grounds does the Election Commission object?

    1. The climate is wrong: The EC told the Court that the functioning and integrity of EVMs are still a subject of frequent public questioning, and that a new and as yet unregulated mechanism would further complicate public confidence in an already sensitive area.
    2. There is no law for it: Neither the Representation of the People Act, 1951 nor the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961 nor any allied enactment contains a provision recognising, regulating or governing the use of a totaliser in counting.
    3. Amendments would be needed: Substantive amendments and a revision of the statutory procedure governing the counting of votes would have to be made to include totalisers.
    4. Parties have said no: Three of six national parties and 18 of 29 State parties opposed the idea, and only the Law Commission of India, in its 255th report, suggested their selective use.

    Why does the Election Commission say totalisers would reduce transparency?

    1. Counting is witnessed booth by booth: Polling and counting are conducted in the presence of candidates and their agents.
    2. Form 17C is the reconciliation tool: Candidates and agents use Form 17C to match the vote count at the end of polling and again after counting at every polling station, and those comparisons are used in adjudications before election tribunals and courts.
    3. The trail is the backbone: The one-to-one, booth-wise and EVM-wise correspondence under Form 17C is what the EC calls the backbone of the self-verifying and transparent character of counting, and that transparency gives credence to the outcome.
    4. Parties use the pattern legitimately: Knowledge of booth-level voting lets parties improve outreach in booths where they underperformed and make corrective organisational decisions.
    5. Aggregation hides faults: Totalisers would mask technical malfunction and human error in individual EVMs, since clubbed machines stand concealed within the aggregate figure and cannot be identified or independently verified by any party.
    6. The main worry: The EC’s chief concern is that totalisers would become fodder for further misapprehension about EVMs.

    Challenges to introducing totalisers

    1. Machine-level verification would lose its anchor: The Court-ordered paper trail check works per machine, and an aggregated result has no machine to check against. Eg. Association for Democratic Reforms v. Election Commission of India (2024) required Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) slips to be counted for five randomly selected EVMs per Assembly segment.
      The Fix: Keep the machine-wise VVPAT count and Form 17C reconciliation internal to the counting hall, and publish only the aggregated result.
    2. Small clusters still reveal patterns: In sparsely populated segments a cluster of 14 booths can map onto one or two villages, so aggregation does not conceal the locality’s vote. Eg. Hill and tribal constituencies routinely have polling stations serving a few hundred electors each.
      The Fix: Set the cluster size by elector count rather than by a fixed number of machines.
    3. The EC’s own position has moved: The Commission proposed totalisers to the Law Ministry in 2008 and the Law Commission endorsed selective use in 2015, so its present opposition invites the charge of inconsistency. Eg. The 255th report on electoral reforms cited the EC’s proposal when recommending the change.
      The Fix: Publish a reasoned position paper setting out what changed between the 2008 proposal and the present affidavit.

    Conclusion

    The Court has kept the question open and asked the Centre rather than deciding it. The next step is the Centre’s reply, and the source gives no date for it. The marker to watch is whether the Centre is willing to amend the election rules, since without that amendment the EC’s legal objection stands whatever the Court thinks of the privacy claim.

    Back2Basics: Form 17C

    1. What it is: The “Account of Votes Recorded” prepared by the presiding officer of each polling station under the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961.
    2. Part I: Records the identification numbers of the EVMs used, the total electors, the votes recorded in the machine and the number of tendered votes, and a copy goes to each polling agent at the close of poll.
    3. Part II: Records the result of counting for that machine, filled in at the counting centre and signed by the counting supervisor and candidates’ agents.
    4. Why it matters: It is the only document that lets a candidate compare votes polled at a booth with votes counted from that booth.

    [2026, GS2, 10 marks] Is the right to vote a fundamental right? Discuss the position of the Election Commission of India while undertaking the revision of electoral rolls. Can it also examine the question of citizenship of voters?”

  • Distinguished jurist: The unused route to appoint an SC judge

    Why in the News

    A sitting Supreme Court judge has called the “distinguished jurist” route to the Supreme Court under Article 124(3) an “unused mandate” of the Constitution that “needs our serious attention”. The provision has existed since the Constitution came into force, and in more than seven decades no one has been appointed under it. The judge argued that a jurist on the Bench would “diversify the Bench” and would not be “constricted by narrow technicalities”, leaving the Court better placed on public law questions. The tension is that the text permits the appointment while the process, a collegium of judges recommending candidates and Bar rules that keep academics out of practice, has never produced one.

    What is the distinguished jurist route under Article 124(3)?

    1. Three routes to the Court: Article 124(3) allows the appointment of a citizen of India who has served as a High Court judge for five years, practised as an advocate for ten years, or “is, in the opinion of the President, a distinguished jurist”.
    2. Two routes have staffed it: Most judges have been elevated from the High Courts, and a smaller number of lawyers have been appointed directly from the Bar.
    3. The third has never been used: No distinguished jurist has been appointed to the Supreme Court since 1950.

    Where did the clause come from?

    1. A Constituent Assembly amendment: H.V. Kamath moved the clause on 24 May 1949, arguing that the pool of candidates should not be “necessarily confined to Judges or Advocates”.
    2. The case he made: India needed a way to bring in men or women “possessed of outstanding legal and juristic learning” even if they had never practised law, and judges of the International Court of Justice at The Hague are chosen on similar terms.
    3. Ambedkar’s only reservation: B.R. Ambedkar did not object to the idea, wondered whether “eminent” would fit better than “distinguished”, and left the wording to the Drafting Committee, after which the amendment went through.
    4. The High Court parallel was repealed: The Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976, enacted during the Emergency, added a distinguished jurist route for High Court judges under Article 217, and the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978 removed it.

    What would a jurist on the Bench change?

    1. Diversity of the Bench: The judge’s argument is that a jurist brings a background the Court’s present composition, drawn from High Courts and the Bar, does not.
    2. Public law capacity: A jurist would not remain constricted by narrow technicalities and would be in a stronger position to deal with public law issues.
    3. Academia’s influence on judging: The participation of legal academia and scholars would have a defining impact on the judicial functioning of the Supreme Court.

    Why has the route never been used?

    1. Two explanations from the judge: First, the central government and later the collegium took the view that Indian academia lacks the depth for elevation to the Supreme Court; second, neither the central government nor the collegium has seriously explored the provision.
    2. Who counts as a jurist: The term is generally understood to cover anyone engaged in serious work in the practice, teaching or research of law, including those without courtroom experience.
    3. The Bar rules shut the practice door: Bar Council rules generally prevent full-time law teachers from practising law, so an academic cannot accumulate the ten years at the Bar that the second route needs.
    4. The collegium is the gate: Appointments are initiated through the collegium (the Chief Justice of India and the senior-most judges who recommend names), so a jurist must first be recommended by the Supreme Court collegium before the appointment reaches the government.
    5. The one near miss: Upendra Baxi recalled in 2015 being addressed as “Judge Baxi” by a professor whom Justice P.N. Bhagwati had told that Baxi would be made a judge within months, an appointment that never materialised.
    6. Baxi’s verdict: “The Presidents of India have been looking with a telescope and have not found any jurist worth appointing”, which led him to call the route “a dead issue”.
    7. The Bar route still works: The most recent appointment from the Bar was Justice V. Mohana, recommended by the collegium in May 2026 and sworn in the following month.

    Challenges to using the distinguished jurist route

    1. The collegium evaluates what it knows: A body of judges assesses candidates on judgments written and cases argued, which an academic does not have. Eg. The Memorandum of Procedure for Supreme Court appointments sets out consultation for High Court judges and advocates and carries no chapter on jurists.
      The Fix: Add published criteria for the jurist route to the Memorandum of Procedure, covering scholarship, public law expertise and professional standing.
    2. The President’s “opinion” has no test: The clause leaves the standard undefined, so any appointment invites challenge as arbitrary. Eg. Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India (2015) struck down the National Judicial Appointments Commission, leaving no body outside the judiciary to frame such a test.
      The Fix: Let the collegium adopt and publish a reasoned selection note for any jurist it recommends, as it now does for some elevations.
    3. Tenure would be short: A scholar considered at the age judges are elevated would retire at 65 within a few years, which limits the institutional gain. Eg. Justice Indu Malhotra, appointed from the Bar in 2018, served three years.
      The Fix: Consider jurists in their early fifties, matching the age at which High Court judges are elevated.
    4. The depth objection is asserted, not tested: The claim that Indian academia lacks depth has never been tested against a shortlist, and other supreme courts have seated academics without judicial or Bar seniority. Eg. The United States Supreme Court seated Felix Frankfurter from Harvard Law School in 1939 and Elena Kagan, who had never been a judge, in 2010.
      The Fix: Have the collegium consider a named shortlist of jurists at least once, so the objection rests on an assessment rather than an assumption.

    Conclusion

    The route is alive in the text and dead in practice, and the reason is procedural rather than constitutional. The status is a public call from within the Court, with no proposal from the collegium or the government to act on it. The marker to watch is whether the collegium or the Memorandum of Procedure names any criterion for the route, since without one the clause stays a dead letter.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2024, GS2, 15 marks] Explain the reasons for the growth of public interest litigation in India. As a result of it, has the Indian Supreme Court emerged as the world’s most powerful judiciary?”

  • The south’s muted voice as political power shifts north

    Why in the News

    The five southern States failed to speak with one voice on delimitation at the recently concluded 31st meeting of the Southern Zonal Council. The Karnataka Chief Minister demanded that the 1971 Census remain the basis for delimitation for another 25 years, and no other Chief Minister matched that position. The south’s “political retreat” from its once-influential national role comes amid growing anxieties over representation and federalism. The tension is between a structural shift, a Lok Sabha that a few Hindi heartland States can dominate, and a self-inflicted one, southern Chief Ministers whose dependence on New Delhi for funds has turned them into supplicants.

    Why has national politics tilted north since Independence?

    1. The national movement itself was north-led: Gandhi, Nehru, Netaji and Patel were the tallest leaders, and C. Rajagopalachari of Madras, T. Prakasam of Andhra and E.M.S. Namboodiripad of Keralam never had comparable national presence.
    2. Southern resistance is not part of the national memory: The resistance movements and anti-British revolts of the south are not valorised across the country, least of all in northern India.
    3. The early Congress was still inclusive: A galaxy of southern leaders in its leadership ranks let the original Indian National Congress be seen as an all-inclusive umbrella party.
    4. Demographics and language did the rest: Blame demographics or the penchant for a “national” language, parliamentary politics has produced northern domination, and both the Congress and the Jana Sangh and its successor the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) have been led from the north.
    5. Only one full-term southern Prime Minister: In nearly eight decades of independence, only one Prime Minister from the south completed a full term, and other southern Prime Ministers were seen as placeholders.
    6. Party structures reinforce it: The domination of the Nehru-Gandhi family in the Congress, and the ideological dominance of Hindi and political dominance of the Hindi heartland in the BJP, have overshadowed southern leadership.

    Where have southern leaders of stature come from, and why not from national parties?

    1. The Congress once had strong regional leaders: K. Kamaraj and C. Subramaniam in Tamil Nadu; Neelam Sanjiva Reddy, Kasu Brahmananda Reddy, Marri Chenna Reddy and Y.S. Rajasekhara Reddy in Andhra Pradesh; S. Nijalingappa, Devaraj Urs and S.M. Krishna in Karnataka; and K. Karunakaran in Keralam.
    2. The BJP has none: The party has no south Indian leader of stature in its leadership ranks, and the one who rose from within, B.S. Yediyurappa, quickly faded.
    3. Distinction came from regional parties: M.G. Ramachandran and Jayalalithaa in Tamil Nadu, Namboodiripad in Keralam, N.T. Rama Rao in Andhra Pradesh, K. Chandrashekar Rao in Telangana, and H.D. Deve Gowda, Ramakrishna Hegde and Siddaramaiah in Karnataka all rose through regional parties or national parties with a markedly regional presence.
    4. National parties deny the space: They have rarely let southern leaders acquire a national profile, and P.V. Narasimha Rao, the first south Indian Prime Minister, owed the office largely to his Hindi-speaking skills and was denied his due place in the Congress pantheon.

    What did the Southern Zonal Council reveal about the south’s stand on delimitation?

    1. One strong intervention: The Karnataka Chief Minister also called for the Lok Sabha’s strength to be retained at the present 543 seats and for women’s reservation to be implemented.
    2. One tepid mention: The Keralam Chief Minister made only a passing reference to delimitation.
    3. One retreat: The Tamil Nadu Chief Minister revised his earlier strong opposition and sought only an assurance that States would not be denied their present proportional share of representation in the Lok Sabha.
    4. One absence: The Telangana Chief Minister missed the meeting and deputed the Deputy Chief Minister.
    5. The rest was administrative: The other demands concerned financial devolution, river water disputes and administrative issues, and the most politically consequential issue did not compel the five Chief Ministers onto a common platform.

    How has dependence on New Delhi muted the southern States?

    1. Supplication for funds: Varying degrees of dependence on the Centre make each southern State supplicate for funds and echo some of the BJP’s ideological obsessions.
    2. Andhra Pradesh as the sharpest case: The Chief Minister and Deputy Chief Minister have become more communal in their political articulation than some of the BJP’s allies in the National Democratic Alliance, and the Chief Minister’s need for central funds has diminished his stature as a representative of the Telugu people, a role his party, the Telugu Desam Party, once embodied.
    3. A Centre-State committee ignored: The committee on Centre-State relations chaired by Justice Kurian Joseph, appointed last year by the then Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam government in Tamil Nadu, received little attention in the media or among the southern leadership, a silence that amounts to Chief Ministers abdicating their responsibility.
    4. Keralam’s leadership has weakened: The former Chief Minister from the Communist Party of India (Marxist) took a submissive approach to the Union government, and over two decades both the CPI(M)-led and Congress-led alliances have been unable to make their presence felt nationally.
    5. A silent forum, and silence about it: The National Development Council (NDC) has not met even once under the present Prime Minister, and hardly anyone across the political spectrum has expressed disquiet.

    What did an assertive south once extract from Delhi?

    1. A Commission from a slogan: N.T. Rama Rao’s declaration that “The Centre is a conceptual myth”, alongside other Opposition Chief Ministers, prompted the Prime Minister to appoint the Sarkaria Commission on Centre-State relations in June 1983, and its report was widely reported and discussed.
    2. A funding formula from a coalition of States: In 1968-69, Namboodiripad mobilised the Chief Ministers of Andhra Pradesh and Rajasthan to get the NDC to endorse the Gadgil Formula (the population-weighted formula for distributing Plan assistance among States).
    3. Earlier national leaderships listened: The Congress, the Janata Party and the Janata Parivar coalitions were not dismissive of southern concerns on language, Centre-State relations, allocation of funds or railway lines, and policy direction was less Hindi-heartland-centric.
    4. Those parties had a southern base: They had a consequential presence in the southern States and included influential leaders from the region, so the south did not feel its voice was stifled whatever the outcome.

    Is the south’s muted voice a product of arithmetic or of abdication?

    1. The arithmetic is already against the south: Peninsular India’s political presence in the federation is weak even under the present distribution of Lok Sabha seats.
    2. A few States can decide: The entire southern region could be rendered politically inconsequential by the strength of two and a half to three Hindi heartland States in the Lok Sabha.
    3. The delimitation design will sharpen the fear: If such scenarios enter southern political discourse, the delimitation design the Union government is pushing will only heighten political anxieties in the region.
    4. Anxiety will outrun the supplicants: Those anxieties will overwhelm the present crop of supplicant Chief Ministers, the point at which abdication stops being an option.

    Challenges to the south’s voice in national politics

    1. The seat freeze has a sunset: The freeze on Lok Sabha seat allocation lasts only until the first Census after 2026, after which a population-based readjustment reallocates seats northward. Eg. Tamil Nadu’s share of the House could fall from 7.1 percent to 6.3 percent under a population-based expansion.
      The Fix: Fix each State’s share of the Lok Sabha rather than its seat count, so any expansion preserves present proportions.
    2. Fiscal transfers also weight population: Finance Commission formulas that weight 2011 population reduce the share of States that controlled fertility early. Eg. Karnataka’s share of the divisible pool fell from 4.713 percent under the Fourteenth Finance Commission to 3.647 percent under the Fifteenth.
      The Fix: Raise the weight for demographic performance in the devolution formula so fertility decline is rewarded, not penalised.
    3. The Rajya Sabha does not protect States: Seats in the Council of States are allotted by population under the Fourth Schedule, so the second chamber replicates rather than offsets the north’s numerical weight. Eg. Uttar Pradesh holds 31 Rajya Sabha seats against Keralam’s 9.
      The Fix: Give State governments a weighted vote on Bills affecting Centre-State relations, on the model of Germany’s Bundesrat.
    4. Language policy is set centrally: Central education policy carries a language design southern States have resisted for six decades, and funds are tied to its adoption. Eg. Tamil Nadu’s two-language policy against the three-language formula of the National Education Policy, 2020, with Samagra Shiksha funds withheld over the dispute.
      The Fix: Delink scheme funding from acceptance of the language formula and leave the choice to the State, as the Constitution’s State List entry on education once did.

    Conclusion

    The south’s weakness has two sources and both are real. The seat arithmetic is beyond any Chief Minister’s control, but the failure to build a common platform is not. What to watch is whether the five southern Chief Ministers table a joint position on the basis for delimitation before the Union government’s design is legislated. Until they do, the region’s anxiety over representation has no political vehicle.

    What is the current status of Centre-State relations in India?

    1. Two commissions frame the agenda: The Sarkaria Commission, appointed in 1983 and reporting in 1988, and the Punchhi Commission of 2010 remain the reference points for reform of Centre-State relations.
    2. Plan bargaining has ended: The Planning Commission was replaced by NITI Aayog in 2015, and the NDC, the forum where States once negotiated Plan funds, has fallen dormant.
    3. Devolution stands at 41 percent: The Sixteenth Finance Commission retained the States’ share of the divisible pool at 41 percent.
    4. A delimitation design is on the table: The Constitution (One Hundred and Thirty-first Amendment) Bill, 2026 proposed expanding the Lok Sabha from 543 to 850 seats (815 for States, 35 for Union Territories) on 2011 Census data, linked the 33 percent women’s quota to that exercise, and would shift the Lok Sabha to Rajya Sabha ratio from 2.2:1 to 3.3:1.

    Constitutional Provisions Related to Centre-State Relations

    1. Article 3: Parliament may form, merge or alter States and their names without the consent of the State concerned.
    2. Article 80 and the Fourth Schedule: Rajya Sabha seats are allotted to States by population, not equally.
    3. Article 81: Fixes the composition of the Lok Sabha and the proportionality of seats to population across States.
    4. Article 82: Requires readjustment of seats after every Census by a law of Parliament.
    5. Article 263: Empowers the President to establish an Inter-State Council to inquire into and advise on inter-State disputes and common interests.
    6. Article 280: Constitutes the Finance Commission to recommend the distribution of tax proceeds between the Union and the States.
    7. Article 356: Allows President’s Rule where a State’s constitutional machinery fails.

    Laws and Rules Governing Centre-State Relations

    1. States Reorganisation Act, 1956: Creates the five Zonal Councils (Northern, Central, Eastern, Western and Southern), statutory advisory bodies chaired by the Union Home Minister with State Chief Ministers as rotating Vice-Chairpersons.
    2. Inter-State River Water Disputes Act, 1956: Lets a State request the Centre to refer a water dispute to a tribunal whose award, once gazetted, has the force of a Supreme Court order.
    3. Inter-State Council Order, 1990: Constituted the Inter-State Council under Article 263 on the Sarkaria Commission’s recommendation.
    4. Delimitation Act, 2002: Governed the last readjustment of constituency boundaries, which was done without altering any State’s seat total.

    Challenges in Centre-State Relations

    1. Politicisation of the Governor’s office: Governors from the ruling party at the Centre have withheld assent to State Bills for years. Eg. Tamil Nadu and Kerala took their Governors to the Supreme Court over delayed assent.
      The Fix: Adopt the Punchhi Commission’s fixed five-year tenure for Governors, with appointment after consulting the Chief Minister.
    2. A dormant coordination forum: The Inter-State Council has no binding authority and meets rarely, so Centre-State disputes go to court instead of to dialogue. Eg. The Council has met only 11 times since 1990, most recently in 2016.
      The Fix: Implement the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution’s recommendation of at least three Council meetings a year, with a dedicated secretariat.
    3. Centralisation through the fiscal channel: The Centre raises revenue through cesses and surcharges that are not shared, and delays transfers that are owed. Eg. GST compensation cess payments to States were delayed between 2019 and 2022.
      The Fix: Cap cesses and surcharges at 10 percent of gross tax revenue so the divisible pool is not artificially shrunk.
    4. Rigid Centrally Sponsored Schemes: Uniform scheme parameters ignore geographic and ecological variation across States. Eg. Recent changes to the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme’s funding shifted burden onto States.
      The Fix: Allow States to customise 25 to 30 percent of scheme parameters to local needs.

    [2026, GS2, 15 marks] How far has the Indian federal framework been successful in accommodating regional and cultural diversities? Highlight the role of asymmetric federalism and suggest measures to make dispute resolution mechanisms more effective.”

  • SIR draft rolls see over 13 cr deletions so far, Delhi leads with 33% left out

    Why in the News

    Over 13 crore names have been deleted from draft electoral rolls across 30 States and Union Territories under the Election Commission’s Special Intensive Revision (SIR). Delhi’s draft roll records a cut of 32.8 per cent and Maharashtra’s a cut of 21.1 per cent. The revision began with Bihar in June 2025 and has since moved through phases, the third of which covers 16 States and three Union Territories. The tension is that a deletion at the draft stage reverses the burden of proof, since a person already on the roll must now apply afresh to be restored within a one month window. Almost a third of Delhi’s electors were removed under a single composite head covering absence, shifting and unstated reasons.

    What is the Special Intensive Revision?

    1. It is a house to house re-verification of the roll: Booth level officers distribute and collect enumeration forms from every existing elector rather than processing only new claims.
    2. Non-return of the form leads to deletion: An elector whose enumeration form is not received is left out of the draft roll.
    3. It is run in phases across States: The exercise started in Bihar and has been extended in successive rounds to the rest of the country.
    4. The draft roll is not the final roll: Claims and objections follow publication, and the final roll issues after they are disposed of.

    What do the deletion numbers actually show?

    1. The all-India draft deletion crosses 13 crore: The figure covers 30 States and Union Territories where draft rolls have been published.
    2. The third phase alone accounts for 6.15 crore: Draft rolls have been published in 17 of the units in that phase.
    3. Delhi records the largest proportionate cut: Its electors fell from 1.45 crore before the revision to 97.53 lakh, a drop of 47.56 lakh.
    4. Maharashtra lost about 2.07 crore electors: Its roll fell from 9.78 crore to 7.71 crore.
    5. Three other units cross 20 per cent: Dadra and Nagar Haveli and Daman and Diu at 29.6 per cent, Telangana at 21.7 per cent, and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands at 20.6 per cent.
    6. Two units are yet to begin: Enumeration is scheduled to start in Nagaland and Tripura over the next two months.

    What reasons are recorded for the deletions?

    1. Delhi’s largest head is absent, shifted or others: It covers 43.32 lakh electors, or 29.86 per cent of the pre-revision roll.
    2. Deceased electors are a small share: They number 2.82 lakh in Delhi, or 1.95 per cent, against 3.56 per cent in Maharashtra.
    3. Duplicate enrolment is smaller still: 1.41 lakh Delhi electors, or 0.98 per cent, were found enrolled at multiple places, against 1.81 per cent in Maharashtra.
    4. Maharashtra’s composite head is 15.78 per cent: Electors permanently shifted, absent or classed as others make up that share of its deletions.
    5. The composite head is doing most of the work: In both States the single largest reason groups movement, absence and unstated causes into one number.

    Why does the official explanation for Delhi not settle the question?

    1. Migration is the stated reason: The stated reason for the highest deletion share is the floating population of the National Capital, where people arrive for work and return to their home States.
    2. The same head also covers electors simply not traced: Booth level officers recorded electors whose enumeration forms were not returned, who were not found in existence, or who did not submit by the cut off date.
    3. Refusal to register sits in the same bucket: An elector unwilling to register for any reason is recorded under the identical head as one who has moved away.
    4. Four different situations produce one figure: Migration, an untraced record, non-submission and refusal cannot be separated from the published number.

    How is a deleted elector supposed to get back on the roll?

    1. The route is Form 6 with a declaration: An aggrieved person files it with the prescribed declaration form and supporting documents.
    2. The Delhi window runs one month: Claims may be filed between 31 August and 30 September.
    3. Disposal runs to late October: Claims and objections are examined and disposed of till 29 October, and the final roll is due on 4 November.
    4. The exclusion lists are published for inspection: Booth wise lists of absent, shifted, dead and duplicate electors are displayed at registration offices and polling stations, and carried on the Chief Electoral Officer’s website.
    5. Multiple enrolment is resolved by retention at one place: An elector found on more than one roll is kept on a single one rather than removed from all.

    Challenges to the Special Intensive Revision

    1. The burden of proof shifts onto the elector: A person deleted at the draft stage must file a fresh claim to be restored, so an existing entitlement becomes a new application. Eg. The Bihar revision in 2025 removed about 65 lakh names at the draft stage and left restoration to individual claims.
      The Fix: Require the booth level officer to record and serve an individual written reason on the elector before a name is dropped from the draft roll.
    2. Migrant workers are structurally the most exposed: An elector away from the registered address during enumeration is marked absent whether the move is seasonal or permanent. Eg. Construction and seasonal agricultural workers are typically away from their home constituency for several months of the year.
      The Fix: Extend the enumeration window in constituencies with high recorded out-migration and accept the form by post from any location.
    3. Booth level officers carry an unmanageable load: One officer covers over a thousand electors in a short window while continuing with a full time job elsewhere. Eg. Booth level officers are usually school teachers or anganwadi workers performing the duty alongside their regular work.
      The Fix: Appoint dedicated temporary enumerators for the revision and pay them against verified forms rather than against booths covered.
    4. Documentary requirements exclude the poorest first: Restoration depends on supporting documents that a person without stable residence or records cannot produce. Eg. A large share of the population holds no birth certificate, which document lists for such exercises treat as primary proof of eligibility.
      The Fix: Accept the existing elector photo identity card with a self declaration at the claims stage, and verify after inclusion rather than before it.
    5. The published data cannot be audited: Merging distinct causes into one head means the accuracy of the exercise cannot be tested from what is released. Eg. No State wise account is published of how many deleted electors are subsequently restored through claims.
      The Fix: Publish cause wise and outcome wise figures for every revision, including restorations, alongside the final roll.

    Conclusion

    This is the largest single reduction of India’s electoral roll on record, and a draft roll cannot show whether it was accurate. Whether ineligible entries or eligible electors were removed depends on how many of those left out come back through the claims process. The unresolved position is that the exercise treats absence during a short enumeration window as evidence of ineligibility, in a country where seasonal movement of labour is ordinary. The marker to watch is the gap between draft and final rolls in the two largest affected units, since that difference is the only available measure of how much of the deletion was error.

    Back2Basics: Electoral roll revision under the Representation of the People Act, 1950

    1. Governing provision: Section 21 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950 provides for the preparation and revision of electoral rolls by the Electoral Registration Officer.
    2. Two forms of revision: A summary revision updates an existing roll through claims and objections, and an intensive revision re-prepares it through house to house enumeration.
    3. Qualifying dates: A person must be 18 years of age on 1 January of the year of revision, with three additional qualifying dates of 1 April, 1 July and 1 October introduced in 2021.
    4. The statutory forms: Form 6 seeks inclusion of a name, Form 7 objects to an inclusion or seeks a deletion, and Form 8 corrects details in an existing entry.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2017] For election to the Lok Sabha, a nomination paper can be filed by (a) Anyone residing in India. (b) A resident of the constituency from which the election is to be contested. (c) Any citizen of India whose name appears in the electoral roll of a constituency. (d) GI any citizen of India. ANSWER: (c)”

  • Political demography, the future of democracy

    Why in the News

    Census 2027 operations are under way in India, and delimitation of Lok Sabha constituencies is to follow the first Census after 2026. Political and religious leaders across parties and across countries are separately urging their own communities to have more children.

    Who is making the pronatalist call, and what are they asking for?

    1. A technology entrepreneur frames it as civilisational: Elon Musk describes falling birth rates as a major threat to civilisation, particularly western civilisation.
    2. The Andhra Pradesh appeal is addressed to Telugu families: The president of the Telugu Desam Party, who is also Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh, has urged Telugu families to have more children.
    3. The Tamil appeal was made rhetorically: The president of the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam and former Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu invoked the idea of having “16 children” for Tamils.
    4. The Sangh call names a number: The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) chief has explicitly called for Indian, and specifically Hindu, families to have three children.
    5. A religious institution makes the same ask: The Catholic Church asks its members to have bigger families.
    6. Tamil Nadu has converted rhetoric into an entitlement: The State government has extended one year maternity leave to women government employees who have a third child.
    7. A demographic remark drew censure from within: A Trinamool Congress Minister in West Bengal remarked in 2024 that Muslims could soon become a majority in the State, and the party distanced itself from the comment and condemned it.

    Why is political demography a thin field of study?

    1. The field treats population change as a political variable: Political demography studies how births, deaths, ageing and migration affect government policies, political power and international security.
    2. Two opposite pressures suppress the scholarship: Conspiracy theorists seeking political capital and demographic sceptics who read any discussion as nativism both crowd out serious work.
    3. It is marginal within both parent disciplines: The subject sits at the edge of political science and of demography rather than at the centre of either.
    4. Federal structure raises the stakes: In countries such as the United States and India, federalism interacts with demography and the economy at the same time.

    What does India’s fertility data actually show?

    1. The total fertility rate has fallen to 2.0: India is below replacement level at 2.0 children per woman according to the National Family Health Survey (NFHS)-5.
    2. Every major religious community has seen decline: Fertility fell across all of them, and the gap between communities is narrowing.
    3. Muslim fertility nearly halved in three decades: Pew Research using NFHS data found it fell from 4.4 children per woman in 1992 to 2.4 in 2019-21.
    4. The pace of decline is uneven: Regions and communities moved through the transition at different speeds even as the endpoint converged.

    Why is ageing, not fertility, the variable that separates States?

    1. Kerala is the oldest State: Its median age is estimated at 37 years in 2026 and projected to reach 47 years by 2051.
    2. Uttar Pradesh is among the youngest: Its median age is approximately 26.9 years.
    3. The national figure sits between the two: India’s projected median age is about 29.2 years in 2026.
    4. The gap will not close within a decade: Uttar Pradesh is projected to reach a median age of only 31.7 years even by 2036.
    5. Early success brings early ageing: Southern States achieved fertility decline earlier and face the possibility of ageing faster than States with younger populations.

    What does the international record show about reversing fertility decline?

    1. No country has reversed a sustained decline: Japan, South Korea, China and Italy introduced financial incentives, childcare support and parental leave, and none restored fertility to the levels seen in earlier decades.
    2. South Korea shows the limit of policy generosity: It continues to record extraordinarily low fertility despite extensive family policies.
    3. Italy repeats the result in Europe: Births have continued to decline there despite financial incentives and family support measures.
    4. Money is not the binding constraint: Fertility is tied to housing, employment, education, gender relations, the cost of raising children and people’s expectations about the future.

    How does the movement of people complicate representation?

    1. Internal migration is on a very large scale: The 2011 Census recorded about 45 crore internal migrants in India.
    2. Emigration is steady at the top end: Around two lakh Indians have given up Indian citizenship on average each year in recent years.
    3. The poor move for opportunity: Movement runs from places with fewer opportunities to places with greater opportunities, and the rich move for their own reasons.
    4. Vote value is not applied blindly: The principle of one person, one vote, one value operates in consonance with group rights of representation, so social federalism and political federalism are both part of India’s democratic design.

    What do demographic differences do to planning and politics?

    1. Larger groups will claim greater power: Groups whose numbers rise will press for a bigger share of political authority.
    2. Shrinking groups will feel insecure: A group losing share experiences that change as a threat to its standing.
    3. Care of the old becomes a fiscal claim: As the number of older and retired people grows relative to the working age population, their care requires a higher commitment of national resources.
    4. Movement of people and resources creates friction between States: Both flow from regions where there is more to regions where there is less.
    5. The disputes surface as fiscal and electoral questions: Regional demographic differences generate disputes over taxation, fiscal transfers, development and political representation.

    Why is the problem not that groups exist?

    1. Recognition of group identity is integral to democracy: Democratic practice already accommodates group identity rather than treating it as alien to itself.
    2. The political question is not who has more people: It is who has invested in development, who has fewer young people entering the workforce, who needs resources, and how representation should respond to those differences.
    3. The risk is permanence, not difference: Demographic difference becomes a democratic problem only when institutions convert it into permanent political antagonism.

    Challenges to pronatalism as a response to fertility decline

    1. Incentives do not reach the decision they target: Cash transfers and leave entitlements address the cost of a birth rather than the conditions that make raising a child feasible. Eg. Hungary exempted mothers of four children from personal income tax for life, and its fertility rate has stayed below replacement level.
      The Fix: Move spending from birth linked bonuses to childcare places, housing supply and secure employment, which are what the decision actually turns on.
    2. Pronatalist rhetoric attaches fertility to group identity: A call addressed to one’s own community converts a household decision into a demographic contest between communities. Eg. Replacement theory has moved from fringe forums into mainstream electoral campaigning in Europe and the United States.
      The Fix: Publish community wise fertility trends from official surveys at fixed intervals, so contested claims are settled against data rather than assertion.
    3. A higher birth rate cannot fix an ageing ratio in time: A child born today enters the workforce two decades later, and the care burden of an ageing population is immediate. Eg. Japan’s working age population began shrinking in the 1990s, and three decades of family policy have not altered its dependency trajectory.
      The Fix: Build long term care financing and raise participation by women and older workers, which change the ratio within the same decade.
    4. The cost of pronatalism falls on women: Higher birth targets translate into unpaid care time that reduces women’s participation in paid work. Eg. Domestic duties are recorded as the main reason women in India remain outside the labour force.
      The Fix: Tie any natalist entitlement to matched investment in creches, safe transport and paid paternity leave, so the time cost is shared.
    5. Population based seat allocation penalises the State that succeeded: A State that reduced fertility earlier ends with a smaller share of seats under any strictly population based formula. Eg. Tamil Nadu’s share of Lok Sabha seats would fall relative to its 1971 based share if seats were reallocated purely on current population.
      The Fix: Weight seat allocation with development and demographic performance indicators alongside population, rather than on population alone.

    Conclusion

    Demographic change in India is real, uneven and slow to reverse, and no political appeal has altered that pattern anywhere it has been tried. The democratic problem it creates is not that groups exist. It is how seats and money are divided between them at the moment the next redistribution falls due. What must change is that the formula be agreed before the population count is in hand, since every State’s position hardens the day its own number becomes public.

    Current Status of Delimitation in India

    1. Seat allocation is frozen on the 1971 Census: The 42nd Amendment, 1976 froze the allocation of Lok Sabha seats among States on 1971 population figures until 2000.
    2. The freeze was extended to the first Census after 2026: The 84th Amendment, 2001 carried it forward, which is why the next Census is the trigger for the exercise.
    3. Four Delimitation Commissions have been constituted: They were set up in 1952, 1963, 1973 and 2002.
    4. The 2002 exercise changed boundaries, not State shares: Constituency boundaries within States were readjusted while each State’s total number of seats stayed at its 1971 based level.

    Constitutional Framework Governing Delimitation

    1. Article 81: Fixes the composition of the Lok Sabha and the principle that seats are allotted to States in proportion to population.
    2. Article 82: Requires Parliament to enact a Delimitation Act after every Census for readjustment of Lok Sabha seats.
    3. Article 170: Provides for readjustment of seats in State Legislative Assemblies after every Census.
    4. Article 327: Empowers Parliament to make provisions on all matters relating to elections, including delimitation.
    5. Article 329: Bars courts from interfering in electoral matters, including a delimitation order, except through an election petition.

    Major debates surrounding delimitation

    1. The value of a vote is unequal across States: A member from a populous State represents several times the electorate of a member from a small one, and correcting that is the case for revision.
    2. Federal balance sits against numerical parity: A revision keyed to current population moves weight towards States with slower fertility decline, which raises the question of what weight the Council of States should carry to offset it.
    3. The size of the House is contested: A substantially larger Lok Sabha raises questions about the quality of deliberation and the recurring cost of the institution.
    4. The women’s quota is linked to the exercise: The Constitution (One Hundred and Sixth Amendment) Act, 2023 makes the 33 per cent reservation for women in the Lok Sabha and State Assemblies operative only after the next Census and delimitation.
    5. Boundary drawing is itself disputed: Redrawing constituencies invites gerrymandering allegations, and in the Northeast it runs into ethnic tension over tribal and non-tribal representation.

    [2024] How many Delimitation Commissions have been constituted by the Government of India till December 2023?

    (a) One

    (b) Two

    (c) Three

    (d) Four