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Subject: Polity

  • Delay in prorogation of Parliament leading to suspicion: Ramesh

    Why in the News

    The Monsoon Session of Parliament has not been prorogued 17 days after both Houses were adjourned sine die, so the session remains technically alive. The consequence is that the government can reconvene Parliament without issuing a fresh presidential summons, and speculation has followed about a Special Session to revive the Delimitation Bill. The Congress has formally objected, calling the delay mystifying and saying it suggests mischief. The tension is that a step treated as a formality decides who controls the timing of the next sitting, and that control currently rests entirely with the executive.

    What is prorogation?

    1. Definition: Prorogation formally terminates a session of Parliament, as distinct from an adjournment, which only ends a sitting.
    2. Who exercises it: It is done by the President, acting on the advice of the Council of Ministers, and a fresh session after it requires a fresh summons.
    3. Adjournment sine die is not the same thing: Adjournment sine die ends the sittings of a session without fixing a date to reassemble, and the presiding officer may still call the House back until prorogation is notified.
    4. Effect on business: Pending Bills do not lapse on prorogation. Pending notices, motions and questions before the House do lapse.

    What has actually happened with the Monsoon Session?

    1. The sittings ended in mid August: Both the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha were adjourned sine die on 13 August, bringing the Monsoon Session to a close in practical terms.
    2. The session was never formally ended: Prorogation has not been notified 17 days after the last meeting of the House.
    3. The gap has a functional value: Keeping the session alive allows the government to reconvene Parliament without a fresh presidential summons.
    4. A specific legislative purpose is suspected: The delay has generated speculation about a Special Session to revive the Delimitation Bill.

    What is the Opposition objecting to?

    1. The objection is to the silence, not the delay alone: The Congress communications chief said the continued delay leads to suspicions that mischief is afoot.
    2. The numbers argument is being made publicly: The party’s position is that the Union Home Minister does not command the two thirds majority the legislation would need, and is engaging in bluff.
    3. The objection was raised at the highest level: The Congress president wrote to the Prime Minister restating the party’s position on delimitation and on the expansion of the Lok Sabha.

    What are the Congress’s linked demands?

    1. A freeze on Lok Sabha strength: The party has asked that the existing strength of the Lower House be frozen at 543 seats for the next 15 years.
    2. Implementation of women’s reservation: It has sought implementation of the legislation reserving a third of the seats for women Members of Parliament in time for the 2029 Lok Sabha election.

    Challenges in the exercise of the prorogation and summoning power

    1. The Constitution fixes no minimum number of sitting days: Article 85 requires only that six months not elapse between two sessions, which sets a floor on gaps and none on work. Eg. The Lok Sabha has in several recent years sat for fewer than 70 days against the roughly 130 days it averaged in the 1950s. Fix. Enact a fixed parliamentary calendar prescribing a minimum number of annual sitting days, as the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution recommended.
    2. Summoning is effectively an executive decision: The President acts on ministerial advice, so the government decides when the legislature that scrutinises it will meet. Eg. Legislatures in several States have met for single day sessions to satisfy the six month requirement. Fix. Give a fixed proportion of members the power to requisition a sitting, as several parliamentary systems provide.
    3. Long inter session gaps enable government by ordinance: Where the House is not in session, the executive can legislate through ordinances under Article 123 and seek approval later. Eg. Ordinances have been repromulgated across successive gaps, a practice the Supreme Court criticised in Krishna Kumar Singh vs State of Bihar (2017). Fix. Require an ordinance to be laid with a written statement of the immediate necessity that justified bypassing the House.
    4. Deferred prorogation leaves members in an undefined status: With the session alive but not sitting, notices and motions neither lapse nor come up for disposal. Eg. Questions and motions admitted for a session that is neither prorogued nor reconvened simply remain pending without a listing date. Fix. Provide by rule that prorogation follows adjournment sine die within a fixed number of days unless the House is recalled.

    Conclusion

    The dispute is not about whether the government may keep a session alive, since the power plainly permits it, but about whether a power designed as a formal closing step can be held open to preserve an option over legislation. What to watch is whether a Special Session is convened before prorogation is notified, since that would confirm the delay was a legislative strategy rather than an administrative lapse.

    Back2Basics

    1. Definition: Delimitation is the redrawing of the boundaries and the reallocation of the number of seats of Lok Sabha and State Assembly constituencies to reflect changes in population.
    2. Constitutional basis: Article 82 requires readjustment after every census, on principles Parliament determines by law.
    3. Machinery: A Delimitation Commission is constituted under a Delimitation Act, and its orders cannot be questioned in any court.
    4. The current freeze: The 84th Constitutional Amendment Act, 2001 froze the number of Lok Sabha seats allocated to each State on the 1971 census figures until the first census taken after 2026.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2024] With reference to the Parliament of India, consider the following statements: 1. Prorogation of a House by the President of India does not require the advice of the Council of Ministers. 2. Prorogation of a House is generally done after the House is adjourned sine die, but there is no bar to the President of India proroguing the House which is in session. 3. Dissolution of the Lok Sabha is done by the President of India who, save in exceptional circumstances, does so on the advice of the Council of Ministers. Which of the statements given above is/are correct? (a) 1 only (b) 1 and 2 (c) 2 and 3* (d) 3 only ANSWER: (c)”

  • OBC creamy layer and the income test

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court will consider setting up a Bench to hear the Centre’s application seeking clarification on its judgment on the income test used to identify the creamy layer among the Other Backward Classes (OBC). The judgment, Union of India vs Rohith Nathan, was delivered by a Division Bench on 11 March. It held that salary income cannot be used to exclude OBC candidates whose parents work in public sector undertakings or in private employment where the equivalence of those posts with government service has not been established. The Centre says implementing that reading retrospectively is “extremely difficult” and would have a “cascading effect” on services settled from 2012 onwards, with the impact extending to all categories including the Unreserved category. The contest has therefore moved from what the income test means to how far back the corrected meaning reaches.

    What is the creamy layer income and wealth test?

    1. Origin: The creamy layer concept among OBCs emerged from the Supreme Court’s 1992 ruling in the Indra Sawhney case, which paved the way for OBC reservations, and was meant to exclude families that had accumulated social and economic privilege.
    2. The governing instrument: The Department of Personnel and Training (DoPT) issued an Office Memorandum in September 1993 laying down the exclusion categories, including children of senior constitutional, judicial, government and armed forces officers.
    3. The test itself: A candidate falls in the creamy layer if the parents’ gross family income exceeds the prescribed limit for three consecutive years, or if the family holds wealth above the exemption limit under the Wealth Tax Act, 1957.
    4. What the 1993 Memorandum left out: Income from salaries and from agricultural land was consciously excluded from the calculation, with income from property, business or capital gains counted instead. The income limit was Rs 1 lakh in 1993 and now stands at Rs 8 lakh, last revised in 2017.

    What did the Court hold in Union of India vs Rohith Nathan?

    1. Parity across employment categories: OBC candidates whose parents work in public sector undertakings or the private sector, where post equivalence with government service is not established, cannot be treated differently from OBC candidates in other categories.
    2. The income test is a residual filter: The income and wealth component of the exclusion exercise must be seen and operated as a “residual filter”, not as the primary basis for exclusion.
    3. The test applies equally until equivalence exists: Until the government establishes equivalence between public sector undertaking posts and government service posts, the income and wealth test must continue to apply equally to both.
    4. A specific remedy was ordered: The Centre was directed to implement this reading within six months by creating supernumerary posts for the petitioners and allotting them services according to their ranks in their respective Civil Services Examination years.

    How did the discrimination arise between the 1993 Memorandum and the 2004 letter?

    1. The 2004 letter reopened a settled exclusion: The DoPT issued a letter in October 2004 to clarify interpretive issues, and paragraph 9 of it dealt with OBCs whose parents held posts in Central or State public sector undertakings without established equivalence.
    2. It appeared to reverse the salary exclusion: The letter suggested that salary income was to be counted in testing whether the family crossed the threshold for three consecutive years, in circumstances the letter did not clearly specify.
    3. Two identically placed groups were tested differently: Children of government servants were tested without salary income. Children of public sector and private employees were tested with it, which the Court called “hostile discrimination”.
    4. The Court stated the equality failure directly: Excluding children of public sector or private employees on the basis of salary income alone, without reference to whether the post was Group A or B or Group C or D, amounted to equals being treated unequally.

    Who was affected by the old reading?

    1. The petitioners were serving aspirants: At least 50 OBC candidates who had appeared in the Civil Services Examination since 2015 were excluded from consideration for OBC reserved posts.
    2. The exclusion turned on one variable: They were classified as creamy layer solely on the basis of their parents’ income, with the parents working in public sector undertakings or the private sector.
    3. The dispute is not recent: The batch of cases had been pending for close to a decade before judgment.

    Why does the Centre call retrospective implementation extremely difficult?

    1. The reach extends beyond the reserved category: Reopening allocations settled from 2012 onwards would affect all categories, including the Unreserved category.
    2. Adjustment generates its own claims: The DoPT reports an increasing number of claims for adjustment and consequent disputes over seniority.
    3. The remedy could produce fresh unfairness: The Centre argues the supernumerary posts exercise could itself be unfair to a different category of OBC candidates.
    4. The precedent has already multiplied: 22 other judgments have applied the principles laid down in the ruling, and 12 new cases have been filed by candidates who had not previously approached the courts, seeking reconsideration of their non creamy layer status.

    What has the government actually done since the ruling?

    1. The file moved between ministries: The Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions wrote to the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment on 3 June seeking advice on implementing the directions.
    2. The referral rested on a rules point: The Personnel Ministry cited the Allocation of Business Rules, under which the Social Justice Ministry formulates policy on reservations, and sought advice on the instructions the DoPT should notify.
    3. The stated position changed within days: As of 19 August the Centre told the Central Administrative Tribunal, in an identical matter, that it was in the process of implementing the judgment. The DoPT then filed an application setting out why the directions were not workable retrospectively.
    4. A parallel application seeks an interim carve out: The Centre has asked to continue allotting services on the old reading of the income test for Civil Services Examination 2025 candidates, since more than 950 of them were recommended on that basis and were about to begin their Foundation Course.

    What is contested about the Centre’s position?

    1. The timing of the objection is questioned: The affected candidates ask why the DoPT did not raise these implementation difficulties earlier in a litigation that ran for close to a decade.
    2. The scope of the old practice is disputed: The candidates say the reading the Court found discriminatory was applied only by the DoPT, and applied arbitrarily at that.
    3. The Centre defends salary as a distinguishing factor: It argues that salary income may in some cases be the “sole intelligible differentia” between two OBC candidates from similar social backgrounds.
    4. It raises an outer limit case: Without salary consideration, candidates whose parents earn up to Rs 1 crore could be treated as non creamy layer.

    Challenges to the creamy layer exclusion

    1. Post equivalence has never been completed: The entire dispute exists because the government has not established which public sector undertaking posts correspond to which government service grades, decades after the requirement was written in. Eg. The 1993 Office Memorandum itself made the income test conditional on equivalence, and the 2004 letter was issued precisely because equivalence was still absent. Fix. Set a statutory deadline for the Department of Public Enterprises to notify a grade to grade equivalence table, after which the income test lapses for unequated posts.
    2. The income ceiling is revised by discretion, not by rule: With no indexation formula, the threshold stays static through years of inflation and then jumps, so the excluded population changes for reasons unrelated to backwardness. Eg. The ceiling moved from Rs 1 lakh in 1993 to Rs 8 lakh in 2017 through irregular administrative revisions. Fix. Link the ceiling to a published price or income index with automatic annual revision.
    3. Verification of income claims is weak: Certificates rest on self declaration and local revenue verification, which produces both wrongful exclusion and wrongful inclusion. Eg. Recruitment bodies routinely cancel candidatures years after selection on the ground of a defective non creamy layer certificate. Fix. Validate income declarations against the income tax database at the certificate issuing stage rather than at the appointment stage.
    4. There is no data on who captures the benefit: Without caste and sub caste wise data on selections, the argument that a small set of OBC families corners reserved posts cannot be tested either way. Eg. The Rohini Commission on sub categorisation of OBCs worked without a comprehensive survey of the actual distribution of benefits across OBC communities. Fix. Publish anonymised, sub caste wise selection data for central services on a fixed annual cycle.
    5. Central and State lists diverge: A community treated as OBC by a State may not be on the central list, and the income test is administered differently across the two. Eg. Candidates have been denied central reservation benefits despite holding a State issued OBC certificate. Fix. Publish a reconciled concordance between the central list and each State list, updated whenever either changes.

    Conclusion

    An equality finding that identifies discrimination and then applies only prospectively leaves the identified wrong unremedied for everyone it already hit, and that is the contradiction the clarification application asks the Court to resolve. What to watch is whether a Bench is constituted, and whether it permits the interim carve out for the 2025 examination cohort until the wider question of reach is decided.

    Back2Basics

    1. Constitutional basis: It was established under Article 323A, which permits Parliament to provide for adjudication of service disputes of public servants by tribunals.
    2. Governing statute: It functions under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, and began working in 1985.
    3. Jurisdiction: It hears recruitment and service matters of persons appointed to All India Services, central civil services and posts under the Union.
    4. Appeals: Its orders are challengeable before the High Court, following the Supreme Court’s ruling in L. Chandra Kumar vs Union of India (1997).

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2023] Consider the following statements : Statement-I: The Supreme Court of India has held in some judgements that the reservation policies made under Article 16(4) of the Constitution of India would be limited by Article 335 for maintenance of efficiency of administration. Statement-II : Article 335 of the Constitution of India defines the term ‘efficiency of administration’. Which one of the following is correct in respect of the above statements? (a) Both Statement-I and Statement-II are correct and Statement-II is the correct explanation for Statement-I (b) Both Statement-I and Statement-II are correct and Statement-II is not the correct explanation for Statement-I (c) Statement-I is correct but Statement-II is incorrect (d) Statement-I is incorrect but Statement-II is correct ANSWER: (c)”

  • A law that could criminalise compassion

    Why in the News

    A former Mumbai college principal has criticised Maharashtra’s new Freedom of Religion Act, commonly called the anti-conversion law, arguing it makes the offence non-bailable and places the burden of proving innocence on the accused, provisions the writer compares to the anti-terror Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA). The piece argues the law threatens not only an individual’s freedom to choose a religion but also humanitarian activities, including education, healthcare and social services, run by religious institutions for disadvantaged communities.

    What does the new Maharashtra law provide, and why does the writer call it disproportionate?

    1. A reversed burden of proof: The law makes the offence of unlawful conversion non-bailable and places the onus on the accused to prove innocence, a standard the writer likens to the UAPA, rather than the ordinary criminal law principle that the prosecution must prove guilt.
    2. No demonstrated evidence of large-scale forced conversion: The writer states that no data has been provided anywhere in the country establishing large-scale conversions by force, fraud or inducement, the harm the law is intended to address.
    3. Existing criminal law already covers illegal conversion: The writer notes the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 can already address criminal acts of conversion carried out through illegal means, without a separate non-bailable, reverse-onus law.
    4. Third-party complaints and an undefined “inducement”: Accusations under the law can be filed by third parties or family members, and the law does not clearly define “inducement,” which the writer argues could bring ordinary educational, medical or social services within its scope.

    What activities does the writer say the law could criminalise?

    1. Education, healthcare and welfare run by religious institutions: The writer cites decades of Catholic Church-run education, certified by bodies such as the University Grants Commission (UGC), medical facilities and social services extended without religious restriction, and financial aid to students and patients regardless of faith.
    2. Inter-religious marriages: The writer notes 30 to 40 percent of marriages recorded by the Catholic Church in parts of the country are inter-religious and do not require the non-Catholic partner to convert; the new law’s requirement of a public declaration weeks before such a marriage could invite false allegations of attempted conversion.
    3. Prayer and healing practices: The writer describes prayers for healing, including the practice of laying hands on a person in need, as normal Christian worship that the new law could bring under suspicion if extended to people of other faiths who request it.

    Challenges in India’s anti-conversion legal framework

    1. Absence of a safeguard against false complaints: The law does not penalise complainants whose allegations are later found false, allowing accusers to act without consequence. Eg. The writer notes attacks by non-state actors on prayer meetings in private halls or homes, after which police have filed FIRs mainly against the persons attacked rather than the attackers. Fix. Insert a provision imposing penalties, including a jail term, on complainants whose allegations are established as false, to deter misuse of the reverse-onus provision.
    2. Reverse onus enabling prolonged pre-trial detention: Making the offence non-bailable while shifting the burden of proof to the accused risks turning the judicial process itself into the punishment. Eg. The writer draws a parallel with the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), under which persons have allegedly remained in jail for years without anything being proved against them. Fix. Restore the ordinary bail standard and the prosecution’s burden of proof for conversion offences that do not involve demonstrated force or fraud.

    Conclusion

    The writer argues that Maharashtra’s anti-conversion law, by combining a non-bailable offence with a reversed burden of proof and an undefined threshold for inducement, risks criminalising ordinary humanitarian and educational work as well as inter-religious marriage, without any demonstrated evidence of the large-scale forced conversion the law claims to address.

    What is Article 25 of the Constitution?

    1. Freedom of conscience and religion: Article 25 guarantees all persons freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practise and propagate religion, subject to public order, morality, health and other fundamental rights.
    2. Subject to state regulation: The Article allows the state to regulate secular activities associated with religious practice and to provide for social welfare and reform, the constitutional basis states cite when enacting anti-conversion legislation.

  • The SYL canal saga: Why Punjab won’t yield, and Haryana cannot let go (Northern Lights column)

    Why in the News

    Chief Justice of India Surya Kant remarked, while hearing the three-decade-old Satluj-Yamuna Link (SYL) canal case, that “once the heart opens, the door also opens,” after Attorney General R. Venkataramani told the Bench that Punjab and Haryana now “speak in a joint voice.” The conciliatory language follows a 1996 suit by Haryana seeking completion of the SYL canal and comes months before Punjab’s Assembly elections, raising the question of whether it signals a genuine shift or another turn of phrase in a dispute where both states have historically hardened their positions, including a standoff last year when Punjab refused to loan Haryana water from the Bhakra dam for thirsty villages in Hisar and Fatehabad.

    What is the SYL canal dispute?

    1. A link canal ordered under a 1981 tripartite agreement: The SYL was designed as a 214-km canal, 122 km in Punjab and 92 km in Haryana, to carry surplus Ravi-Beas waters assessed at 17.17 million acre feet (MAF) under a 1981 agreement brokered by then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi between Punjab, Haryana and Rajasthan.
    2. Haryana has completed its share, Punjab has not: Haryana finished its 92-km portion years ago, while construction on Punjab’s stretch has remained stalled since the 1980s.
    3. Legal basis on both sides: Haryana rests its claim on its status as a successor state of undivided Punjab, the 1981 agreement and successive Supreme Court rulings directing Punjab to complete its share. Punjab invokes the riparian principle, under which states through which a river flows hold primary rights to its waters, to challenge the 1981 allocation.

    Why has construction on the canal stalled for decades?

    1. Militancy halted work at its peak: The Shiromani Akali Dal’s Nehar Roko Morcha against the canal evolved into the Dharam Yudh Morcha after the Akalis joined radical ideologue Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale. In 1990, Babbar Khalsa International militants shot dead SYL chief engineer M.L. Sikri, superintending engineer Avtar Singh Aulakh, and 32 labourers at the site.
    2. Punjab legislated itself out of the pact: In 2004, the Congress government headed by then Chief Minister Amarinder Singh passed the Punjab Termination of Agreements Act, 2004, ending Punjab’s obligations under the 1981 pact; the Supreme Court struck the Act down in 2016.
    3. Land returned to original owners: In 2016, the Akali government in Punjab returned the land acquired for canal construction to its original owners, a practical and political obstacle to reviving construction on the Punjab side.

    Why does Punjab resist sharing the water?

    1. Groundwater is already overexploited: Roughly 73 to 76 percent of Punjab’s blocks are overexploited, forcing farmers to dig progressively deeper wells, while border districts in southern Punjab at the tail end of the canal network struggle to irrigate.
    2. The 1955 allocation is seen as historically unfair to Punjab: The Centre in 1955 allocated non-riparian Rajasthan 8 MAF of water, leaving undivided Punjab with 7.2 MAF of the Ravi-Beas waters, a division Punjab’s political class continues to cite as the root grievance.
    3. Water unites Punjabi public opinion: Opposition to sharing water with Haryana cuts across political lines in Punjab. Eg. Rapper Sidhu Moosewala’s song “SYL,” released after his death, sang “Paani chhado, tibka nahin dinde (forget about water, we won’t give a drop)” and drew a large public response before being taken down.

    Why does Haryana insist the canal must be completed?

    1. Its own water stress is worsening: Haryana’s southern and south-western districts face falling water tables, down to 1,700 feet in places, and Chief Minister Nayab Singh Saini has repeatedly appealed to Punjab to share water, this year earmarking Rs 100 crore for the canal.
    2. It considers the legal position settled in its favour: Haryana points to its status as successor state, the 1981 agreement and repeated Supreme Court directions to Punjab as establishing its entitlement to the share of Ravi-Beas waters the canal was meant to carry.

    What is the Eradi Tribunal assessing, and what can it not do?

    1. Re-verifying the water assumed available: The Ravi-Beas Waters Tribunal, commonly called the Eradi Tribunal after its first chairman Justice V. Balakrishna Eradi, was set up in 1986 to re-verify water claims. The present tribunal, headed by retired Supreme Court judge Justice Vineet Saran with Justices P. Naveen Rao and Suman Shyam, conducted fresh field inspections in Punjab this summer, examining river inflows, canal outflows and hydraulic structures.
    2. Punjab’s position before the tribunal: Punjab’s Chief Minister and officials told the tribunal the state faces severe groundwater depletion and an acute canal water shortage, has no surplus for Haryana or Rajasthan, and that only Punjab, Himachal Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir fall within the actual Ravi-Beas basin.
    3. A tribunal finding cannot force construction: Whatever the tribunal concludes on whether the water assumed under the 1981 agreement still exists, it cannot itself build the canal or make Punjab’s people accept a settlement they consider damaging; only a negotiated political solution between the two states can do that.

    Conclusion

    The cordial language before the Supreme Court reflects political intent at the highest level, but it sits atop a dispute rooted in militancy, a legislated repudiation of the original pact and unresolved questions before the Eradi Tribunal about whether the water assumed under the 1981 agreement still exists. With Punjab’s Assembly elections approaching, whether the two states can convert this rhetorical shift into an actual settlement remains uncertain.

    What is Fiscal Federalism?

    1. About: Fiscal federalism is the division of financial powers, resources and responsibilities between the Union and the states, governing how revenue, expenditure and shared resources such as inter-state river waters are allocated and adjudicated.
    2. Rationale: It exists because states have unequal revenue capacity and unequal access to shared natural resources, requiring a constitutional and institutional mechanism to allocate resources and resolve disputes between states and the Centre.
    3. Named typology: Centre-state financial relations operate through tax devolution, grants-in-aid, and inter-state dispute mechanisms such as river water tribunals under Article 262 and the Inter-State River Water Disputes Act, 1956.

    Constitutional Framework Governing Fiscal Federalism

    1. Article 262: Empowers Parliament to provide for the adjudication of disputes relating to the use, distribution or control of waters of inter-state rivers, and to bar the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and other courts over such disputes if Parliament so provides.
    2. Inter-State River Water Disputes Act, 1956: Provides the statutory framework under which river water tribunals, such as the Eradi Tribunal, are constituted to adjudicate disputes between riparian states.
    3. Seventh Schedule, State List Entry 17: Places water, including water supplies and irrigation, within the states’ legislative domain, subject to the Union’s power under Entry 56 of the Union List over inter-state rivers declared expedient in the public interest.

    Challenges in Centre-State River Water Sharing

    1. Tribunal awards without enforcement teeth: River water tribunal decisions can remain unimplemented for decades without an enforcement mechanism binding the states. Eg. The SYL canal dispute has remained unresolved for over three decades despite multiple Supreme Court directions to complete construction. Fix. Empower the Inter-State River Water Disputes Act framework with a standing implementation authority with a fixed timeline, rather than leaving execution to the state governments involved in the dispute.
    2. Elections repeatedly delaying settlement: Water disputes become politically charged ahead of state elections, discouraging incumbent governments from conceding ground. Eg. The renewed conciliatory statements before the Supreme Court in the SYL case have come months ahead of the Punjab Assembly elections, raising doubts about whether they reflect a genuine shift.

  • Before SC Collegium: Can Acting CJs of HCs send names for judge appointments?

    Why in the News

    A controversy over the conduct of Rajasthan High Court’s Acting Chief Justice, Justice Sanjeev Prakash Sharma, has revived a recurring question before the Supreme Court Collegium: whether recommendations for High Court judge appointments sent by an Acting Chief Justice should be treated on the same footing as those sent by a permanent Chief Justice. The Collegium, headed by CJI Surya Kant and comprising Justices Vikram Nath, B.V. Nagarathna, M.M. Sundresh and P.S. Narasimha, must now consider at least four names recommended by Justice Sharma, who has held the acting post for almost a year. Supreme Court judge Justice Sandeep Mehta, a former Rajasthan High Court judge, has written three letters to the CJI seeking Sharma’s replacement by a chief justice from outside the state, alleging manipulation of case listings and misuse of administrative powers, allegations the CJI has said must go through institutional channels rather than the media.

    Why does an Acting Chief Justice’s recommendation raise a genuine question for the Collegium?

    1. Convention discourages it, but does not bar it: Acting Chief Justices conventionally do not make recommendations for judicial appointments because of their typically short tenures, though the Collegium has in the past accepted such recommendations in exceptional cases.
    2. One view favours considering recommendations on merit: Sources say part of the Collegium holds that names sent by an Acting Chief Justice should not be returned solely because of the official’s title, and should instead be assessed on merit.
    3. A competing view warns against normalising long acting tenures: The opposing view cautions that accepting names from Acting Chief Justices removes the pressure to appoint a permanent Chief Justice promptly, since there would be no apparent urgency.
    4. Justice Sharma’s tenure and lineage make this case unusual: Justice Sharma has been Acting Chief Justice of Rajasthan High Court for almost a year since September 2025, and Rajasthan is also his parent High Court, factors cited in support of considering his recommendations.

    What precedent exists for how the Collegium has handled Acting Chief Justice recommendations?

    1. The Bombay High Court precedent split the Collegium’s consultees: When Justice Dharmadhikari was Acting Chief Justice of Bombay High Court in 2020, he prepared a list of 22 names; two consultee judges objected in writing that no Acting Chief Justice could properly vet 22 candidates in so short a tenure, while a third consultee judge disagreed, noting Dharmadhikari’s long service on that High Court.
    2. The Collegium still forwarded most of the list: Despite the objections, the Collegium headed by then CJI S.A. Bobde sent 18 of the 22 recommended names to the Centre, relying on the third consultee’s affirmative response.
    3. A comparable case arose in Rajasthan in 2022: The Centre raised objections to at least 12 names sent by then Rajasthan High Court Chief Justice Akil Kureshi on the ground that they were made at the fag end of his tenure, and the Collegium headed by then CJI D.Y. Chandrachud ultimately cleared 8 of the 12 names after the Centre did not specify objections to particular candidates.

    What does the present Rajasthan controversy add to the recurring question?

    1. The dispute is no longer only about tenure length: Justice Mehta’s letters to the CJI allege manipulation of case listings and threats to fellow judges citing closeness to the CJI, extending the question from whether an Acting Chief Justice’s recommendations should count to whether the officeholder’s conduct in the post is itself compromised.
    2. Justice Sharma’s career path preceded his return to Rajasthan: He served as a Rajasthan High Court judge from 2016, moved to Patna High Court in 2022, was sent to Punjab and Haryana High Court after the Collegium declined his 2023 request to return to Rajasthan on health grounds, and was brought back to Rajasthan under a 2025 resolution.
    3. The Collegium has so far deferred adjudication: CJI Surya Kant responded to the allegations by stating that claims against a sitting judge cannot be adjudicated through the media and must go through institutional channels, leaving the underlying question of Justice Sharma’s four recommended names still pending.

    Conclusion

    The Supreme Court Collegium must now decide, in the specific case of Justice Sharma’s four recommendations, a question it has answered inconsistently in the past: whether an Acting Chief Justice’s nominations for High Court judgeships carry the same weight as a permanent Chief Justice’s. How it resolves this, against the backdrop of allegations against Justice Sharma’s own conduct in office, will shape whether prolonged acting tenures continue to carry recommending power in future.

    Back2Basics

    1. Supreme Court Collegium: An extra-constitutional, judicially evolved mechanism comprising the Chief Justice of India and the four senior-most Supreme Court judges, which recommends appointments and transfers of judges to the higher judiciary.
    2. Acting Chief Justice: Appointed under Article 223 of the Constitution by the President when a High Court’s Chief Justice post falls vacant or the incumbent is unable to perform duties, distinct from a permanent Chief Justice appointment.
    3. Consultee judges: Sitting or former judges, typically with prior experience of the High Court concerned, whom the Collegium consults on the suitability of recommended names before finalising a list.

    (GS2-05, 2025) Discuss the evolution of collegium system in India. Critically examine the advantages and disadvantages of the system on appointment of the Judges of the Supreme Court of India and that of the USA.

  • [29th August 2026] The Hindu OpED: Unkind cuts: On the Telangana and Karnataka electoral rolls

    [29th August 2026] The Hindu OpED: Unkind cuts: On the Telangana and Karnataka electoral rolls

    Question (2018, GS2): “In the light of recent controversy regarding the use of Electronic Voting Machines (EVM), what are the challenges before the Election Commission of India to ensure the trustworthiness of elections in India?
    Linkage: The core of the current news is the concern over potential wrongful disenfranchisement vs. genuine roll clean-up. When the ECI implements large-scale deletions (up to 50% in some urban constituencies) without releasing verifiable metrics like the elector-to-population ratio, it creates a transparency deficit. This directly mirrors the challenge of maintaining public trust in the electoral process, similar to the EVM debate.

    Mentor Comment:

    The Election Commission of India’s Special Intensive Revision (SIR) has struck off nearly a fifth of the electoral rolls in Telangana and Karnataka, about 22 per cent and 19.5 per cent respectively, with some Bengaluru and Hyderabad constituencies losing more than 40 to 50 per cent of their electors. The revision has proceeded after the Supreme Court of India permitted the SIR process to continue, and follows the Bihar SIR, where the Court had questioned why political parties filed so few objections to wrongful deletions. The Commission has not published the elector-to-population ratio, the only test of under-enrolment, for any state during the revision, making it impossible to verify whether the deletions reflect genuine bloat or wrongful disenfranchisement.

    What is the Special Intensive Revision (SIR)?

    1. What it is: The SIR is an intensive revision of electoral rolls conducted by the Election Commission of India, distinct from its routine summary revision process.
    2. How it works: It places the onus on electors and political parties to file objections against wrongful deletions.
    3. Its template: The Bihar SIR set the process the Commission has since extended to other states, including Telangana and Karnataka.

    What does the scale of deletions in Telangana and Karnataka show?

    1. High deletion rates: Telangana lost about 22 per cent and Karnataka about 19.5 per cent of electoral roll names, among the highest deletion rates in the country.
    2. Sharpest cuts in capital cities: Five Bengaluru constituencies lost more than half their electors, and nine of Hyderabad’s 15 constituencies saw deletions of more than 40 per cent.
    3. Implausible as genuine bloat: Both states have high net in-migration from the rest of India, and a deletion is justified only if the elector left the state altogether, since a move within the state would only relocate a name on the same roll rather than remove it.

    Why is the Commission’s justification hard to verify?

    1. Mandatory ratio withheld: The Commission has not published the elector-to-population ratio for any state during the revision, though doing so is mandatory and is the only test of under-enrolment.
    2. Opaque data release: Karnataka’s Chief Electoral Officer has not released a gender-wise breakdown of deletions and has scattered lists across Google Drive links without the old booth numbers, making verification difficult.
    3. A precedent of wrongful exclusion: A similar “logical discrepancy” process in West Bengal disenfranchised lakhs of electors; a Right to Information request found barely 82,000 of nearly 38 lakh appeals before 19 tribunals had been decided months after the state’s elections, with more than 90 per cent of decided appeals restoring the elector.

    Challenges to the SIR process

    1. Onus on electors invites under-objection: Requiring electors and parties to actively contest wrongful deletions means low awareness and the infrequent use of a voter identity card lead to few objections being filed. Eg. During the Bihar SIR, the Supreme Court itself asked why political parties had filed so few objections. Fix. Shift the burden to the Commission by requiring it to proactively verify a deletion against updated residence or migration data before finalising it.
    2. Opacity defeats verification: Withholding the elector-to-population ratio and publishing deletion lists without booth numbers or gender breakdowns prevents independent scrutiny of whether cuts are justified. Eg. The Karnataka Chief Electoral Officer scattered deletion lists across Google Drive links without old booth numbers. Fix. Mandate publication of the elector-to-population ratio and a standardised, booth-wise deletion list for every state before a revision is finalised.

    Conclusion

    Unless the Commission publishes the verification data it is required to release, the scale of the Telangana and Karnataka deletions will remain unexplained, and the West Bengal experience suggests a substantial share of those struck off may eventually prove to have been wrongly excluded.

  • On workers rights, shrinking spaces and cruel state response

    On workers rights, shrinking spaces and cruel state response

    Why in the News

    An opinion piece has linked the invocation of the National Security Act, 1980 (NSA) against wage protesters in Noida and Ghaziabad to a longer decline in trade unionism and a spread of casual, contract based labour across India’s unorganised sector. The piece follows a wage protest by thousands of workers on 13 April, after which the Noida police floated a theory that the agitation was sponsored by “Pakistan based handlers” and radical leftists, and about 200 people were arrested, two of them booked under the NSA. The piece argues that the same law once reserved for genuine threats to State security is now being used against ordinary economic protest and ideological dissent.

    What is the National Security Act, 1980?

    1. Preventive detention power: The Act lets the Union or a State government detain a person without trial for up to twelve months where it is satisfied that the person’s activities are prejudicial to the defence of India, State security, public order or the maintenance of essential supplies.
    2. Subjective satisfaction standard: Detention rests on the detaining authority’s own assessment of a future risk rather than on a proven criminal act, so no conviction or specific offence needs to be established beforehand.
    3. Limited disclosure of grounds: The grounds for detention must ordinarily be communicated to the detainee within days of the order, but can be withheld where disclosure is considered against the public interest.
    4. Advisory Board review: An Advisory Board that includes sitting or former High Court judges reviews each detention within a set period, though its proceedings are not equivalent to a full trial.

    How did the state respond to the Noida and Ghaziabad wage protest?

    1. A wage protest turned into a security case: Thousands of workers in Noida and Ghaziabad took to the streets on 13 April demanding higher wages. The Noida police, caught off guard, floated a theory that the agitation was sponsored by “Pakistan based handlers” and radical leftists.
    2. Mass arrests followed: About 200 people were arrested on charges of inciting violence.
    3. Two individuals were booked under the NSA: Journalist Satyam Verma and Delhi University student Akriti Chaudhary were held under the NSA, for their ideological leanings rather than for any specific act.
    4. The underlying wage demand was met, but the case was not withdrawn: The Uttar Pradesh government announced higher wages for the workers, while those arrested fought a difficult legal battle and continue to face its aftermath even after coming out of jail.

    Why has India’s unorganised workforce lost the power to resist such treatment?

    1. A largely unrecorded toll: Forty thousand to fifty thousand casual workers die every year from occupational hazards in India’s unorganised sector, according to numerous research studies, and many more deaths go unrecorded in official data altogether.
    2. A sector too large to protect through informal goodwill alone: The unorganised sector employs nearly 80 percent of India’s workforce, so lapses in protection affect the majority of working people rather than a small margin.
    3. Trade unionism has receded since liberalisation: The movement that once produced leaders such as George Fernandes has weakened sharply as India’s economy has liberalised.
    4. Casualisation spread from the media into government itself: From the 1990s, news organisations began hiring staff on contract rather than on the payroll, part of a wider trend already under way in other sectors. The Centre and State governments, the country’s largest employers, eventually adopted the same contract based hiring as a way to save cost, entrenching the casualisation of labour.
    5. The result is a workforce with no leverage: Workers and employees today have little means to demand better conditions or resist injustice.
    6. Left parties have lost political weight: The Left is losing political strength and relevance, and the term “leftist” is now used as a pejorative in social media discourse.

    What historical precedent of ideological accommodation has been abandoned?

    1. Trade unions once worked across ideological lines: In Kanpur in 1985, leaders of the CITU (Centre of Indian Trade Unions), the AITUC (All India Trade Union Congress), the INTUC (Indian National Trade Union Congress) and the BMS (Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh) shared a camaraderie and jointly took up the cause of labour despite their ideological differences.
    2. Workers won rights through sustained struggle, not political patronage: Workers in textile mills and in the defence sector earned their rights through consistent struggles against management.
    3. A trade unionist held a Brahmin dominated seat for two decades: Kanpur, despite being a predominantly Brahmin constituency, was represented in the Lok Sabha by S M Banerjee, a veteran trade union leader, from 1957 to 1977.
    4. Political rivals once mourned an ideological opponent: In 1997, the BJP’s national executive passed a resolution mourning the assassination of AISA (All India Students Association) leader and former JNU (Jawaharlal Nehru University) Students Union president Chandrashekhar, killed by Mohammed Shahabuddin in Siwan. Chandrashekhar belonged to a Naxal aligned ideological stream.
    5. That same accommodation would now be treated as suspect: The piece argues that the 1997 BJP resolution, if found in someone’s possession today, would itself risk being treated as seditious material by the Uttar Pradesh Police.

    What tension does criminalising ideological material expose?

    1. Possession of a book is being treated as an offence: A book on Marxism, or on Gaza or the Palestinian struggle, is being categorised as criminal material when found in an individual’s possession.
    2. Marxist ideology sits within India’s constitutional mainstream: Marxist ideology is as much a part of India’s political mainstream as the Congress or the BJP, and every political party that swears loyalty to the Constitution is allowed to grow and function in the country.

    Challenges to invoking the National Security Act against protest and dissent

    1. Vague and subjective grounds for invocation: The Act permits detention on the executive’s own subjective satisfaction that a person’s activities are prejudicial to public order, without a defined evidentiary threshold. Eg. In 2020, the National Security Act was invoked against a doctor in Uttar Pradesh over a public speech, and the Allahabad High Court quashed the detention in 2021 for lacking any evidence of an actual threat to public order. Fix. Require a documented, judicially reviewable threshold of imminent public order harm before invocation, rather than the detaining authority’s subjective satisfaction alone.
    2. Weak disclosure of the case against the detainee: Grounds for detention can be withheld where disclosure is considered against the public interest, leaving the detainee unable to mount a full challenge. Eg. Detainees under the Act have often learned the specific allegations against them only after approaching High Courts through habeas corpus petitions. Fix. Mandate disclosure of detention grounds within a fixed period, with any exception reviewed by a judicial officer rather than decided by the detaining authority itself.
    3. The Advisory Board functions as an executive check rather than a judicial one: The Board that reviews detention orders has historically confirmed most of the orders referred to it, and its proceedings offer limited scope for legal representation. Fix. Allow legal representation before the Advisory Board and require it to publish reasoned orders, so its review carries genuine weight.
    4. A chilling effect on journalists and students: Using a preventive security law against people over their reading material or ideological leanings, rather than any proven act, discourages lawful reporting and dissent. Eg. A Manipur journalist was detained under the Act in 2018 over a social media post criticising the state’s Chief Minister. Fix. Confine invocation of the Act to demonstrable threats to public order, with judicial pre screening required in cases involving journalists and students.

    Conclusion

    The Noida episode shows that as trade union protections have eroded and labour has been casualised, the state has increasingly reached for security legislation such as the National Security Act to answer a wage protest, extending a pattern of criminalising political dissent that earlier generations of political rivals once resisted. Whether the arrested journalist and student receive a fair hearing, and whether India’s civil liberties framework is reformed to prevent such recourse to preventive detention against economic protest, remains unresolved.

    Current Status of Personal Liberty in India

    1. A broad but conditional guarantee: Personal liberty covers freedom of speech, assembly, association, and movement under Article 19(1)(a) to (e), and the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21, all subject to reasonable restrictions the state may impose by law.
    2. A carved out exception for preventive detention: Article 22 protects against arbitrary arrest and detention, but specifically permits preventive detention laws such as the National Security Act, 1980 and the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, under which a person can be held without a trial.
    3. Judicial reading has widened even as detention powers remain broad: Courts have steadily expanded what Article 21 protects, yet the power to preventively detain still rests largely on the executive’s own satisfaction rather than on prior judicial approval.

    Constitutional Provisions Related to Personal Liberty

    1. Article 19(1)(a): Guarantees freedom of speech and expression.
    2. Article 19(1)(b): Guarantees freedom of peaceful assembly.
    3. Article 19(1)(c): Guarantees freedom of association.
    4. Article 21: Guarantees the right to life and personal liberty, protecting against arbitrary state action.
    5. Article 22: Protects against arbitrary arrest and detention, while permitting preventive detention laws as a specific exception.

    Major debates surrounding Personal Liberty

    1. Security law versus proportionality: Whether preventive detention laws such as the National Security Act curtail personal liberty beyond what public order genuinely requires.
    2. Dissent versus disorder: Whether vague grounds such as public order or prejudicial activity are being used to criminalise lawful dissent rather than address genuine security threats.
    3. Judicial expansion versus executive discretion: The gap between the judiciary’s expansive reading of Article 21 protections and the limited judicial oversight available at the point of preventive arrest itself.

    Laws and Rules Governing Personal Liberty and Preventive Detention

    1. Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967: Allows the government to designate organisations and individuals as unlawful or as terrorists, and permits prolonged detention before trial in cases involving alleged threats to India’s sovereignty and integrity.
    2. Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, Section 152: Replaced the sedition offence earlier defined under Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, penalising acts that excite secession, armed rebellion, or subversive activity.
    3. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023: Governs the ordinary process of arrest, remand and bail that a preventive detention law such as the National Security Act bypasses.

    [2024] Right to privacy is intrinsic to life and personal liberty and is inherently protected under Article 21 of the Constitution. Explain. In this reference discuss the law relating to D.N.A. testing of a child in the womb to establish its paternity.”

  • Why 543 should remain 543

    Why 543 should remain 543

    Why in the News

    After both Houses of Parliament were adjourned sine die, the monsoon session has yet to be formally prorogued, prompting speculation that Parliament could be reconvened for another attempt at the constitutional amendment linked to delimitation and women’s reservation. That uncertainty sharpens a question Parliament must confront: whether delimitation, the redrawing of constituency boundaries to reflect population change, must necessarily mean enlarging the Lok Sabha beyond its present 543 seats. The government has reportedly suggested increasing every State’s representation by roughly 50 percent so each keeps its current proportion of seats, a formula that leaves the proportional balance between States unchanged even as it widens the absolute gap in their voting strength.

    What is the constitutional basis linking delimitation to the Lok Sabha’s size?

    1. The representation principle: Article 81 requires that representation broadly correspond to population “so far as practicable,” while Article 82 provides for a fresh delimitation exercise after every Census.
    2. The 1976 freeze: The 42nd Constitutional Amendment, 1976 froze the inter State allocation of Lok Sabha seats on the basis of the 1971 Census, so States that succeeded in family planning were not politically penalised for slowing population growth.
    3. The extension: The freeze was extended by the 84th Constitutional Amendment, 2001 until the first Census conducted after 2026 is published.

    Why does a proportional expansion still favour larger States?

    1. Proportions stay the same: A roughly 50 percent increase in every State’s seats would keep each State’s share of the Lok Sabha unchanged from today.
    2. But the absolute gap widens: If Uttar Pradesh’s seats rose from 80 to 120 and Tamil Nadu’s from 39 to about 59, the proportional relationship would hold, yet the absolute gap in voting strength would widen from 41 Members of Parliament to around 61.
    3. Why the gap matters: Parliament votes in absolute numbers rather than proportions, so governments, confidence motions and constitutional amendments would all turn on a wider numerical gap than exists today.

    Can delimitation happen without enlarging the House?

    1. A precedent already exists: The delimitation exercise after the 2001 Census reorganised constituencies within States while leaving the existing inter State seat allocation untouched.
    2. The same principle can apply again: The Census expected in 2027 could provide the basis for redrawing constituencies within each State to reflect demographic movement and urbanisation, without increasing the Lok Sabha beyond 543 seats.

    What do other democracies show about legislature size and population growth?

    1. United States: The House of Representatives has remained at 435 voting members for more than a century, despite the country’s population growing many times over.
    2. Switzerland: The National Council has stayed at 200 members since 1963.
    3. Hungary: Parliament was reduced from 386 members to 199.
    4. Italy: The Chamber of Deputies was cut from 630 members to 400.

    What would a larger Lok Sabha do to Parliament’s own functioning?

    1. Fixed parliamentary time: Parliamentary time does not expand with the number of Members of Parliament, so even with 543 members, many already get few opportunities to speak, ask questions or raise matters of public importance.
    2. A larger House would worsen this: A Lok Sabha enlarged to more than 800 members would reduce those opportunities further even as numerical representation rises.
    3. Already outsized constituencies: Indian Members of Parliament already represent the largest average constituencies among the world’s major democracies, several times the size of a United States congressional district or a United Kingdom constituency.

    Where should the accessibility pressure from population growth be absorbed instead?

    1. No federal arithmetic constraint at the State level: A larger Vidhan Sabha, or State Legislative Assembly, shifts no balance between States, since each Assembly answers only to its own State’s population.
    2. The proposed shift: Strengthening representation through more Members of the Legislative Assembly and smaller Assembly constituencies can bring representatives closer to citizens without enlarging the national legislature, since most citizens approach elected representatives over matters substantially within the State sphere, such as roads, schools and hospitals.

    How does women’s reservation fit within a frozen 543 seat House?

    1. The existing House can absorb it: One third of the present Lok Sabha is approximately 181 seats, and women’s constitutionally promised representation can be delivered within the existing House of 543 rather than through additional seats.
    2. What reservation is meant to do: The purpose of reservation is to alter who occupies parliamentary seats, not to create hundreds of additional ones.
    3. The risk of combining it with enlargement: An expansion on the proposed scale could raise the number of women Members of Parliament while also deepening the numerical dominance of the already larger States, so a reform addressing one imbalance could deepen another.

    Challenges to keeping the Lok Sabha frozen at 543

    1. Political resistance from faster growing States: States whose population has grown fastest since 1971 may resist a freeze that keeps their Lok Sabha strength unchanged relative to their current population share. Eg. States with higher population growth could press for the government’s enlargement proposal precisely because it raises their absolute seat count. Fix. Pair the freeze with strengthened State level representation, so faster growing States gain proportionate voice through larger Assemblies rather than through the Lok Sabha.
    2. Redrawing constituencies within States is itself contentious: Internal redelimitation shifts constituency boundaries and can alter the political weight of specific regions or social groups within a State, so it invites dispute even where a State’s total seat count is untouched. Eg. The Jammu and Kashmir Delimitation Commission’s 2022 exercise was contested by opposition parties as tilting the balance toward one region over another. Fix. Anchor any internal redelimitation in updated, transparent 2027 Census data, with a public objection and hearing process before boundaries are finalised.
    3. A prolonged freeze delays updated representation: Continuing the freeze until the first post 2026 Census pushes any change in the Lok Sabha’s internal distribution well into the future, leaving current population shifts unreflected for years. Eg. The freeze first imposed in 1976 has already run for close to half a century without a fresh count of inter State seat shares. Fix. Commit to a fixed timeline for the post 2026 Census based delimitation, so the freeze does not become indefinite by default.

    Conclusion

    Delimitation and the size of the Lok Sabha are separable questions, and preserving the House at 543 seats while redrawing constituencies within States and absorbing accessibility pressure through larger State Assemblies would deliver updated representation, women’s reservation and federal fairness without disturbing the balance between larger and smaller States. Whether Parliament chooses this route or an across the board enlargement that widens the absolute gap between States even as it keeps their proportions unchanged will shape the federal balance of the Republic for decades, a question that stays open as long as the constitutional amendment remains pending.

    Back2Basics: What is a Delimitation Commission?

    1. What it is: A Delimitation Commission is a body constituted under a Delimitation Act to redraw the boundaries of parliamentary and Assembly constituencies based on the latest Census.
    2. How many: Delimitation Commissions have been constituted four times in independent India, in 1952, 1963, 1973 and 2002.
    3. Legal basis: Its orders have the force of law and cannot be challenged in a court.
    4. Latest exercise: The most recent Commission, based on the 2001 Census, redrew constituency boundaries within States without altering the inter State allocation of Lok Sabha seats frozen since 1976.

    [2024] How many Delimitation Commissions have been constituted by the Government of India till December 2023?

    [A] One

    [B] Two

    [C] Three

    [D] Four

  • Deletions in recent SIRs suggest arbitrary application of reasons

    Deletions in recent SIRs suggest arbitrary application of reasons

    Why in the News

    Draft electoral rolls released after the enumeration phase of the Special Intensive Revision (SIR), an exercise conducted by the Election Commission to verify every elector afresh rather than only updating additions and deletions, show wide variation in the reasons recorded for deleting names in Karnataka and Telangana. Both states saw roughly one-fifth of their electors deleted, the highest share among major states. A reason-wise breakdown of the deletions shows extreme, inconsistent use of the two largest deletion categories, “Shifted” and “Absent”, across constituencies of comparable size. The Election Commission has not defined when a Booth-level Officer (BLO) should mark an elector “Shifted” rather than “Absent”, and has never published the break-up between the two categories.

    What do the numbers show?

    1. No defined threshold between categories: The Election Commission’s Manual on Electoral Rolls, 2023 states that a person absent temporarily from their ordinary residence does not, by law, cease to be ordinarily resident there, which raises the question of whether an elector found “Absent” during enumeration should be deleted at all. The manual gives BLOs no rule for choosing between “Shifted” and “Absent”.
    2. Wide swings between similar constituencies in Telangana: Of 1,79,510 deletions in Jubilee Hills, 83% were marked “Shifted” and only 15,000 “Absent”. In the comparably sized Nizamabad (Urban), 50,307 of 83,282 deletions were marked “Absent”. In Nakrekal (SC), all 20,169 deletions were marked as reasons other than “Absent”, with not a single elector recorded as absent.
    3. Wide swings in Karnataka: In Hebbal, 87% of 1.3 lakh deletions were marked “Shifted” and only 287 “Absent”. In Hubli-Dharwad-East, roughly 25,000 of 47,000 deletions were marked “Absent”. In Bommanahalli, 2.65 lakh electors, 54.8% of the roll, were deleted, with only about 9,700 marked deceased.
    4. Aggregated official reporting hides the pattern: The Election Commission has only ever published a combined figure for “Shifted” and “Absent” deletions in every state where the SIR has run. The category-wise breakdown used in this analysis was derived independently by processing thousands of constituency-level deletion lists.

    Conclusion

    The scale of variation in reason-coding for deletions, without a defined rule separating “Shifted” from “Absent”, points to inconsistent application rather than a uniformly applied enumeration standard. The Election Commission has not made public a category-wise breakdown for any SIR state, leaving independent verification as the only route to auditing how deletions are being classified.

    Back2Basics: Special Intensive Revision (SIR)

    1. SIR is a full re-verification of the electoral roll, requiring every elector to be freshly enumerated, unlike the routine annual “Summary Revision” that only processes additions, deletions and corrections against the existing roll.
    2. Deletions during SIR are coded under four broad reasons: Shifted (or Permanently Shifted), Absent, Deceased and Duplicate.

    “[2024, GS2, 10 marks] Examine the need for electoral reforms as suggested by various committees with particular reference to “one nation-one election” principle.”

  • Centre-state compromise on mines, minerals is in tatters

    Centre-state compromise on mines, minerals is in tatters

    Why in the News

    An opinion piece argues that the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2026 (MMDR Amendment Act) has centralised mineral taxation authority at the expense of States. This disturbs a long standing settlement, dating to the original Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957, under which States collected royalty on minerals within their territory without a corresponding compensation mechanism now built in. The piece contends this follows a pattern already seen in the Goods and Services Tax (GST) Council, where States have progressively lost autonomous taxation power to a Union-dominated body. The tension is between the Union’s claim that uniform mineral taxation supports national resource planning, and States’ claim that this erodes a revenue base the Seventh Schedule recognises as theirs.

    What changed under the amendment?

    1. Centralised rate-setting power: The amendment shifts the power to determine certain mineral levies and cesses from State legislatures to the Union government, narrowing what States can independently tax.
    2. Erosion of a settled compromise: Mineral royalty had functioned as a relatively stable, State-collected revenue source since the 1957 Act. The amendment disturbs that settlement without a corresponding compensation mechanism.

    Why is this compared to the GST Council experience?

    1. Repeated pattern of centralisation: The piece argues that the GST Council, though structured as a joint Centre-State body, has in practice let Union preferences dominate rate decisions, and that the same dynamic is now repeating in mineral taxation.
    2. States left to negotiate after the fact: Under both regimes, States raise objections after a rate or rule is set centrally, rather than co-designing the rule up front.

    Current Status of Fiscal Federalism in India

    1. The Union controls the most buoyant tax sources, income tax, corporate tax and the dominant share of the GST base, while States carry larger expenditure responsibilities in health, education and welfare, producing a standing vertical fiscal imbalance.
    2. Devolution to States is currently governed by the 16th Finance Commission’s award, which fixed the States’ share of the divisible pool at 41 percent.
    3. Mineral royalty and cesses have historically sat with States as an independent, non-shared revenue source, which is the specific arrangement this amendment narrows.

    Constitutional Provisions Related to Fiscal Federalism

    1. Article 246 and the Seventh Schedule: Distribute taxation and legislative subjects between the Union, State and Concurrent Lists, and mineral development is a subject that straddles Union and State competence under Entry 54 of the Union List and Entry 23 of the State List.
    2. Article 280: Establishes the Finance Commission to recommend the distribution of net tax proceeds between the Union and the States.
    3. Article 246A and Article 279A: Together create the GST regime and the GST Council as the joint body that recommends GST rates and administration.
    4. Article 293: Governs the Union’s control over State borrowing where a State remains indebted to the Union.

    Major debates surrounding Fiscal Federalism

    1. Divisible pool erosion through cesses and surcharges: Revenue the Union raises as a cess or surcharge does not enter the divisible pool the Finance Commission distributes, so a nominal 41 percent devolution understates the Union’s discretionary control over shared revenue.
    2. State taxation autonomy under GST: States gave up the power to independently tax goods and services on joining GST, leaving royalty and mineral levies among the few remaining independent State taxation instruments, which is precisely what this amendment now narrows.
    3. Weak third-tier finances: Local bodies devolved under the 73rd and 74th Amendments remain financially dependent on State and Union transfers, compounding the same imbalance one tier further down.

    Challenges in Fiscal Federalism

    1. No binding consultation requirement before a rate change: Neither the GST Council’s structure nor the MMDR Act requires the Union to secure State consent before altering a shared levy, only consultation. Eg. The GST Council’s voting structure gives the Union a one-third weightage sufficient to block any change it opposes. Fix. Amend Article 279A to require a demonstrated State revenue-neutral transition before a Council decision that narrows State taxation power takes effect.
    2. No compensation mechanism for a narrowed State tax base: Unlike the GST transition, which carried a five-year compensation guarantee for States, the MMDR Amendment Act, 2026 carries no equivalent revenue protection for States losing mineral levy autonomy. Eg. The GST Compensation Cess mechanism lapsed in 2022, and States have separately argued its withdrawal alone widened the same imbalance this amendment now adds to. Fix. Extend a time-bound compensation formula, indexed to each State’s historical mineral revenue, for a fixed transition period.

    Government Initiatives for Fiscal Federalism

    1. Finance Commission: A constitutional body appointed every five years to recommend Union-State and inter-State devolution of tax proceeds and grants-in-aid.
    2. GST Council: The joint Union-State body under Article 279A that recommends GST rates, exemptions and administrative rules.
    3. District Mineral Foundation: A statutory trust under the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 that channels a share of mineral royalty into welfare of mining-affected areas, funded from the same royalty base this dispute concerns.

    Back2Basics: Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957

    1. The Act is the principal central law governing mineral concessions and mineral development in India, most recently amended in 2026.
    2. It empowers the Union to prescribe rates of royalty and dead rent on minerals, which States then collect.
    3. A 2015 amendment introduced auction as the mandatory mode of allocating mineral concessions, replacing the earlier discretionary allotment system.

    Conclusion

    The mineral taxation dispute is presented as further evidence that fiscal federalism in India increasingly follows a pattern of after-the-fact State objection to Union-set rules, rather than genuine ex ante bargaining. What remains unresolved is whether States will pursue a legal challenge or extract a compensation formula through political negotiation.

    “[2025, GS2, 15 marks] Examine the evolving pattern of Centre-State financial relations in the context of planned development in India. How far have the recent reforms impacted the fiscal federalism in India?”