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Subject: WTO

  • ‘India has no excess capacity, bans forced-labour imports’

    Why in the News

    Both US charges behind its tariffs on India, structural excess capacity and weak curbs on forced-labour imports, are now contested by India. At the G20 Trade Ministers’ Meeting, the Commerce Minister said India has no excess capacity in the flagged sectors and already bans forced-labour imports. The US already levies a 10% “forced labour” tariff on India, and a US Trade Representative (USTR) probe of 60 countries could add more.

    What is structural excess capacity, and what is India’s position?

    1. What it is: Structural excess capacity means an economy produces far more than its market absorbs and exports the surplus cheaply, like a factory dumping unsold goods on a neighbouring town.
    2. India’s growth model: India called itself the fastest-growing large economy, driven by local demand. It is building manufacturing “from design to finished goods” for domestic and global needs.
    3. Where distortion lies: Capacity itself is not the problem. Distortion arises when production concentrates in one place because of hidden subsidies.
    4. Shared worry: India shares concern that trade-distorting support in some economies leads to “dumping and predatory pricing“, meaning selling below cost to kill rivals.
    5. The takeaway: India argues the target should be subsidy-driven distortion, not countries that simply produce a lot.

    How does India want capacity concerns handled?

    1. Trade remedies: Concerns should be met with anti-dumping duties, which offset below-cost imports, and countervailing duties, which offset foreign subsidies. Both need evidence and face judicial review.
    2. No pretext: Supply-chain diversification is legitimate, but cannot justify measures outside World Trade Organization (WTO) rules.
    3. Policy space: The burden of adjustment must not shift to developing countries, which need room to industrialise.
    4. No unilateralism: On both excess capacity and forced labour, India said any step must be multilateral and WTO-compliant.

    What has India done on forced labour?

    1. US tariff route: In July the USTR imposed extra tariffs on 60 countries, including India, after probing whether they did enough to stop forced-labour imports.
    2. Constitutional bar: Article 23 prohibits forced labour as a fundamental right, enforceable by the Supreme Court.
    3. ILO commitments: India has ratified International Labour Organization (ILO) Conventions 29 and 105, the core treaties against forced labour.
    4. Import ban: In July India amended its Foreign Trade Policy to prohibit imports of goods made with forced labour.
    5. Firm commitment: India called its commitment to eliminating forced labour “absolute and unconditional“.

    Where does India draw the line at the G20?

    1. Evidence, not presumption: Border measures must rest on “specific and verifiable evidence“, not presumptions about whole countries, regions or sectors, and must respect due process.
    2. Right forum: The ILO, as the universal tripartite body of governments, employers and workers, is the competent forum for labour standards.
    3. Conditional cooperation: India backs G20 cooperation only with no monitoring of members, no new obligations and no use for unilateral trade action.
    4. US-set agenda: The US holds the 2026 G20 Presidency, with sessions on excess capacity, forced labour and updating the Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) principle, under which a WTO member gives all members its best tariff terms.

    Challenges

    1. Broken WTO appeals: The WTO Appellate Body has been non-functional since December 2019, so unilateral tariffs face no final ruling.
    2. Region-wide presumptions: Some forced-labour laws presume whole regions guilty without specific evidence. Eg. The US Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, 2021 presumes goods from Xinjiang are tainted.
    3. Domestic enforcement gaps: The Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976 bans bonded labour, yet it persists in brick kilns and farms.
    4. MFN under review: Reopening the MFN principle could erode equal tariff treatment that developing countries rely on.

    Way Forward

    1. Supply-chain traceability: The Ministry of Labour and Employment should certify forced-labour-free supply chains for exporters.
    2. Bilateral settlement: The Commerce Ministry should press to remove the 10% tariff in ongoing India-US trade talks.
    3. Appellate revival: India should lead a developing country coalition to restore WTO appellate review.
    4. Evidence-based remedies: The Directorate General of Trade Remedies (DGTR) should keep India’s own duties strictly evidence-based.

    Conclusion

    India accepts the goals of fair trade and free labour but rejects their use as grounds for unilateral US tariffs. The outcome of the USTR’s excess capacity probe will show whether WTO process or unilateral pressure governs this dispute.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2017] Consider the following statements: 1. India has ratified the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) of WTO. 2. TFA is a part of WTO’s Bali Ministerial Package of 2013. 3. TFA came into force in January 2016. Which of the statements given above is/are correct? (a) 1 and 2 only (b) 1 and 3 only (c) 2 and 3 only (d) 1, 2 and 3 Answer: A”

  • Why India’s stance on WTO plurilateral deals may be shifting

    Why in the News

    The BRICS Delhi Declaration 2026 has asked members to identify appropriate pathways for plurilateral initiatives into the World Trade Organization (WTO) legal framework, including on development oriented issues. India opposed exactly that route at the WTO’s 14th Ministerial Conference (MC14) in Cameroon in March, where it alone blocked incorporation of the China backed Investment Facilitation for Development (IFD) agreement. India pressed there for guardrails, meaning agreed legal safeguards applying to plurilateral pacts as a class before any single one is brought into the rule book. That term does not appear in the Delhi text, which India chaired. The contested point is whether a member that treats plurilateral deals as a systemic threat to the WTO can simultaneously help design their entry into it.

    What is a plurilateral agreement in the WTO?

    1. Plurilateral agreement: It is negotiated and implemented by an exclusive group of members rather than by the full membership.
    2. Binding on signatories only: Its obligations apply to the members that sign it, and the rest of the membership takes on nothing.
    3. Consensus is the gate: A plurilateral agreement enters the WTO family of agreements exclusively by consensus, so a single member can keep it out indefinitely.
    4. Why they are in demand now: Plurilaterals feature prominently in proposals for WTO reform, as a route around the difficulty of agreeing anything among the full membership.

    What is the Investment Facilitation for Development agreement?

    1. Investment Facilitation for Development: It is a plurilateral initiative launched at the WTO in 2017 with the stated aim of increasing foreign direct investment flows.
    2. What it covers: It addresses the administrative side of investment, such as transparency of rules and the speed of approvals, rather than market access or investor protection.
    3. Its legal status: It is not a WTO agreement. It enters the WTO system only if the full membership agrees to incorporate it.

    What did India argue against the pact at MC14?

    1. The systemic objection: India’s stated position was that incorporating the IFD risks eroding the foundational principles and the functional limits of the WTO.
    2. Investment is not a trade issue: India argued that investment does not belong in an organisation built to negotiate trade rules.
    3. India stood alone: It was the only member opposing incorporation.
    4. What it refused specifically: India did not agree to incorporation of the IFD as an Annex 4 agreement, Annex 4 being the schedule of the agreement establishing the WTO that lists plurilateral agreements binding on their signatories alone.
    5. What it offered instead: The Union Ministry of Commerce and Industry recorded in March an openness to comprehensive good faith discussion under the WTO Reform Agenda first.
    6. The general demand behind the specific refusal: India sought safeguards for plurilaterals as a class before any specific plurilateral outcome was integrated, which is a rule about method rather than an objection to one pact.

    What has changed in the BRICS Delhi Declaration 2026?

    1. The operative sentence: The declaration records that it is important to identify appropriate pathways for plurilateral initiatives into the WTO legal framework, including on development oriented issues.
    2. The wider commitment: It also commits members to implement the MC14 outcomes and to engage in WTO reform to enhance the organisation’s authority, effectiveness, inclusiveness and relevance.
    3. The missing word: The guardrails formulation India pressed in March does not appear anywhere in the text, and India held the chair at the summit that adopted it.
    4. Forward looking rules: The text additionally asks members to explore the formulation of forward looking rules in the WTO.
    5. The direct implication: Identifying pathways for plurilaterals points towards India lifting its reservation on the IFD, which would be a significant change in a position it has held alone.

    Why is the plurilateral route contested for development issues?

    1. The carve out is the problem: The declaration applies the plurilateral route to development oriented issues, which are precisely the issues on which developing members need the developed membership to be bound.
    2. Food security: A permanent solution on public stockholding delivers nothing if it is negotiated among members who were never the ones objecting to it.
    3. Farm subsidies: A reduction in developed country farm support cannot be obtained inside a group those countries decline to join.
    4. The structural point: An agreement binding only its signatories cannot change the conduct of a member that stays outside it, so development demands run through the multilateral route or they do not run at all.

    Challenges to bringing plurilateral agreements into the WTO

    1. Consensus is absolute and cuts both ways: A single objecting member keeps a plurilateral out however many support it, and the same veto blocks the reform of the system itself. Eg. The WTO’s Appellate Body has been unable to hear appeals since 2019 because one member has blocked appointments to it.
      The Fix: Agree a standing procedure for admitting plurilaterals, with published criteria, so each proposal is judged against a rule instead of renegotiated from scratch.
    2. Free riding on most favoured nation treatment: Benefits conceded inside a plurilateral often have to be extended to the whole membership, so signatories carry obligations that non signatories enjoy without cost. Eg. Tariff concessions under the Information Technology Agreement are made by its participants and extended to all members.
      The Fix: Require every plurilateral to state at the outset whether its benefits extend on a most favoured nation basis, so the question is settled before signature rather than after.
    3. Erosion of the single undertaking: The WTO’s founding bargain was that members accepted the agreements as one package, and a shift to opt in deals lets the strongest members choose what they take on. Eg. The Doha Round stalled precisely because members would not accept its package as a whole.
      The Fix: Tie any plurilateral admission to a parallel deliverable on an outstanding multilateral issue, so the package logic survives in practice.
    4. Negotiating capacity decides participation: Small delegations cannot staff several simultaneous negotiations, so the members with the largest missions in Geneva shape the text. Eg. A number of least developed country members maintain no permanent mission in Geneva at all.
      The Fix: Fund shared negotiating support for members without a Geneva mission, so a seat at a plurilateral does not depend on delegation size.
    5. Scope creep into subjects outside the mandate: Admitting investment facilitation brings a subject the membership once removed from the negotiating agenda back in, and with it the organisation’s dispute settlement machinery. Eg. Investment was among the Singapore issues dropped from the Doha agenda in 2004 after developing members objected.
      The Fix: Settle the scope question inside the WTO Reform Agenda first, so the mandate is defined before any specific pact is admitted under it.

    Conclusion

    India’s objection was never confined to one investment pact. It was to a method of making rules that lets willing members legislate around unwilling ones, inside an organisation whose authority rests on the full membership carrying the same obligations. That objection is unresolved, and the declaration India chaired now records an interest in finding a route for exactly that method. The marker to watch is whether India moves its reservation when incorporation next comes before the WTO General Council, or holds out for safeguards that apply to plurilaterals as a class.

    Back2Basics: WTO Ministerial Conference

    1. Nature: It is the highest decision making body of the World Trade Organization.
    2. Composition and frequency: It brings together all members and is required to meet at least once every two years.
    3. Powers: It can take decisions on all matters arising under any of the multilateral trade agreements.
    4. Recent editions: MC12 was held in Geneva in 2022, MC13 in Abu Dhabi in 2024, and MC14 in Cameroon in 2026.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “What are the key areas of reform if the WTO has to survive in the present context of ‘Trade War’, especially keeping in mind the interest of India?”

  • BRICS Finance Ministers, bank heads flag ‘unilateral imposition’ of tariffs

    Why in the News

    The Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (FMCBG) of the BRICS countries have issued a joint statement recording “serious concerns with the unilateral imposition” of tariffs and non-tariff measures, on the ground that they distort trade and are inconsistent with World Trade Organization (WTO) rules. The statement holds that these pressures weigh most heavily on Emerging Markets and Developing Economies (EMDEs), meaning economies outside the advanced group that depend on external capital and on open export markets. It names no country, and the United States is the only country currently levying extraordinary tariffs on its trade partners. The statement also calls for practical solutions on cross-border payments in local currencies, while recording that national priorities come first and that there is no “one-size-fits-all approach”. The bloc’s diagnosis is therefore collective and its remedy is left to each member to adopt at its own pace.

    What is the FMCBG track within BRICS?

    1. Who it brings together: The FMCBG is the channel through which BRICS members’ finance ministries and central banks meet, separately from the leaders’ summit and from the foreign ministers’ track.
    2. When it met this year: The first FMCBG meeting under India’s chairmanship of BRICS was held on 12 August in Jaipur. The second was held on 9 and 10 September in Mumbai.
    3. What it produces: Its output is a joint statement agreed by every member, issued ahead of the leaders’ summit.

    What did the statement say on tariffs and the trading system?

    1. Two grounds are given, not one: The measures are objected to because they distort trade, and separately because they are inconsistent with WTO rules. The second is a legal claim rather than an economic one.
    2. Non-tariff measures carry equal weight: The objection covers non-tariff measures alongside tariffs, meaning licensing requirements, standards and quotas that restrict imports without a duty being levied.
    3. The remedy sought is the existing system: The ministers reiterated their support for an “open, transparent, inclusive, non-discriminatory, and rules-based” multilateral trading system with the WTO at its core.
    4. The unnamed target limits what the statement can do: A finding that a measure breaks WTO rules carries no consequence until a member brings a dispute against a named respondent.

    What was agreed on cross-border payments and local currencies?

    1. The task force behind it: The statement acknowledges the work of the BRICS Payment Task Force (BPTF) in exploring “pragmatic solutions” for efficient cross-border payment mechanisms.
    2. The specific work acknowledged: The task force has studied the cross-border interoperability of payment and messaging channels, meaning whether one member’s payment system can instruct and settle against another’s.
    3. What local currency settlement covers: The discussions extend to promoting trade settlements and investments using BRICS local currencies, not only retail payments.
    4. The standard the ministers set for it: The task force was encouraged to continue work toward cross-border payments that are “fast, low-cost, more accessible, efficient, transparent, and safe”.

    What else did the ministers take up?

    1. A new task force under India’s chairship: India used its chairship to establish a BRICS Task Force on Growth and Development, as a dedicated platform for the growth and development challenges shared by BRICS and other emerging market and developing economies.
    2. How it is organised: The task force is structured into two workstreams. One covers the Resilience, Innovation and Cooperation pillars, and the other the Sustainability pillar.
    3. What it is meant to do: The ministers recognised it as a space to discuss growth models suited to members’ own national contexts and development priorities, aligned with the workstreams of finance ministries and central banks.
    4. Reform of the lending institutions: The statement also covered the reform of multilateral lending institutions, naming the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

    Challenges to BRICS local currency settlement

    1. Trade imbalances leave one side holding a currency it cannot spend: Settlement in national currencies works where trade between two members is roughly balanced, and a surplus partner otherwise accumulates a currency with no use. Eg. The special rupee vostro accounts opened for Russian oil payments built up rupee balances Russian sellers had limited use for.
      The Fix: Pair each local currency arrangement with an agreed list of goods and assets the surplus balance may be invested in, so the balance has a stated exit.
    2. Convertibility limits sit outside the payment system: A currency that is not fully convertible on the capital account cannot be held freely by a foreign exporter, whatever messaging channel carries the instruction. Eg. The rupee remains subject to capital account restrictions, so a non resident holder needs a specific permitted route for each use of its balance.
      The Fix: Convert the bilateral vostro approvals into a standing settlement facility with defined investment windows, rather than clearing arrangements bank by bank.
    3. Interoperability is a legal problem before it is a technical one: Linking two fast payment systems requires each regulator to accept the other’s customer identification and sanctions screening, which no task force can decide for them. Eg. Each link of the Unified Payments Interface (UPI) with a foreign system has needed its own bilateral arrangement, as with Singapore’s PayNow.
      The Fix: Agree one BRICS standard for customer identification and transaction messaging, so each bilateral link implements a common rulebook instead of negotiating a new one.
    4. Secondary sanctions reach the members’ own banks: A bank settling a transaction for a sanctioned counterparty risks its own dollar clearing access, which is a larger loss than the trade being settled. Eg. Indian banks and refiners curtailed dealings with sanctioned Russian entities even where a rupee route was available.
      The Fix: Route sanctioned trade through designated institutions carrying no dollar clearing exposure, so the risk sits with an entity that has nothing to lose in dollars.
    5. A payment rail does not remove exchange rate risk: Interoperable payments cut transaction cost and leave the currency risk with the trading parties, which is the problem a single unit of account would address. Eg. The task force’s own mandate covers settlement and messaging, and stops short of any common unit of account.
      The Fix: Publish reference rates for the major BRICS currency pairs through a shared platform, so a smaller exporter can price and hedge without routing through the dollar.

    Conclusion

    The bloc has agreed a common description of the problem and has not agreed a common instrument to answer it. On tariffs it asks for the WTO to work as designed, which depends on members it has declined to name. On payments it has commissioned study rather than commitment, and the qualifier protecting national priorities leaves each member to decide how far to go. The leaders meet at the Bharat Mandapam over Saturday and Sunday, and the test of this statement is whether their declaration converts the task force’s study of interoperability into a dated commitment or carries it forward again.

    Back2Basics: the WTO’s Most Favoured Nation rule

    1. What Most Favoured Nation means: Article I of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) requires a member to extend any trade advantage it gives one member to every other member, so it cannot charge different tariffs to different WTO members on the same product.
    2. Bound rates are the second constraint: Article II binds each member’s tariffs to a ceiling recorded in its schedule of concessions, so a duty raised above that ceiling breaches the commitment whether or not it discriminates.
    3. The permitted exceptions: Article XXIV allows a free trade area or a customs union to give its own parties better terms than Most Favoured Nation, and the Enabling Clause allows preferences in favour of developing countries.
    4. Why the rule is hard to enforce now: A breach is established through the WTO’s dispute settlement system, whose Appellate Body has been unable to hear appeals since 2019 because appointments to it have been blocked.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2018, GS2, 15 marks] What are the key areas of reform if the WTO has to survive in the present context of ‘Trade War’, especially keeping in mind the interest of India?”

  • Trump’s new forced labour tariffs face global pushback and legal questions

    Why in News?

    The United States’ new forced labour tariffs under Section 301, covering more than 60 countries, face legal pushback from Brazil and Australia over WTO compliance.

    Key Highlights

    • Tariffs are imposed under a Section 301 forced labour enforcement investigation, covering over 60 trading partners.
    • Brazil and Australia are contesting the tariffs’ compliance with WTO rules.
    • The dispute remains open, legally and diplomatically.

    Section 301 (U.S. Trade Act, 1974)

    • Empowers the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) to investigate and respond to unfair foreign trade practices.
    • Authorises the U.S. to impose tariffs or other trade restrictions if another country’s actions are found to burden or restrict U.S. commerce.
    • Frequently used in disputes involving intellectual property, market access, subsidies, and labour practices.

    World Trade Organization (WTO)

    • Established in 1995, succeeding the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 1947.
    • Headquarters: Geneva, Switzerland.
    • Objective: Ensure rules-based, predictable, and non-discriminatory international trade.
    • Functions include administering trade agreements, resolving disputes, monitoring trade policies, and providing technical assistance.

    Value Addition

    • Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) Principle (Article I, GATT): WTO members must treat all trading partners equally unless an exception applies.
    • Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU): Discourages unilateral trade retaliation and requires members to resolve disputes through the WTO mechanism.
    • Relevance for India: Increasing use of unilateral tariffs by major economies can affect export competitiveness and test the credibility of the multilateral trading system.

    [2018, GS2, 15 marks] What are the key areas of reform if the WTO has to survive in the present context of ‘Trade War’, especially keeping in mind the interest of India?”

  • WTO Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies (AFS)

    Why in News?

    India has deposited its Instrument of Acceptance for the WTO Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies (AFS), becoming the 123rd WTO Member to join the Agreement.

    Key Highlights

    • Adopted: At the 12th WTO Ministerial Conference (MC12), Geneva, June 2022.
    • Entered into Force: 15 September 2025, after acceptance by two-thirds of WTO Members.
    • Nature: First WTO multilateral agreement with an environmental sustainability objective.
    • Objective: Promote sustainable use and conservation of marine fisheries resources while ensuring fair global trade.

    Major Provisions

    • Prohibits subsidies for:
      • Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing.
      • Fishing of overfished stocks.
      • Harmful fishing practices leading to overexploitation of marine resources.
    • Provides special and differential treatment (S&DT) for developing and least-developed countries.

    What is Outside its Scope?

    • Aquaculture (fish farming).
    • Inland fisheries (rivers, lakes, reservoirs).

    Significance for India

    • Protects the interests of traditional and small-scale fishers.
    • Disciplines subsidies provided to large industrial distant-water fishing fleets, creating a more level playing field.
    • Enhances India’s image as a responsible and sustainable seafood exporter.
    • India’s aquaculture-based shrimp exports, which form a major share of seafood exports, remain outside the Agreement’s scope.

    India’s Fisheries Management Framework

    • Sustainable Harnessing of Fisheries in the EEZ Rules, 2025.
    • Guidelines for Sustainable Harnessing of Fisheries in the High Seas by Indian-Flagged Fishing Vessels, 2025.
    • Pradhan Mantri Matsya Sampada Yojana (PMMSY) for fisheries infrastructure, conservation and capacity building.

    About the WTO Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies

    • Negotiated under Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 14.6, which calls for eliminating harmful fisheries subsidies.
    • Applies mainly to marine wild capture fisheries and fishing-related activities at sea.
    • Seeks to balance marine conservation, livelihood protection, and rules-based international trade.

    [2017] Consider the following statements:

    1. India has ratified the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) of WTO.
    2. TFA is a part of WTO’s Bali Ministerial Package of 2013.
    3. TFA came into force in January 2016.

    Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

    [A] 1 and 2 only

    [B] 1 and 3 only

    [C] 2 and 3 only

    [D] 1, 2 and 3

  • WTO is an important international institution where decisions taken affect countries in profound manner. What is the mandate of WTO and how binding are their decisions? Critically analyse India’s stand on the latest round of talks on Food security.

  • The aim of Information Technology Agreements (ITAs) is to lower all taxes and tariffs on information technology products by signatories to zero. What impact should such agreements have on India’s interests?

  • The broader aims and objectives of WTO are to manage and promote international trade in the era of globalization. But the Doha round of negotiations seem doomed due to differences between the developed and the developing countries. Discuss in the Indian perspective.

  • What are the key areas of reform if the WTO has to survive in the present context of ‘Trade War’, especially keeping in mind the interest of India?

    The WTO, established in 1995 under Uruguay Round of the GATT, was designed to promote rules-based multilateral trade and ensure that global trade flows as smoothly, predictably and freely.

    Major Challenges Facing the WTO

    Since 2019, WTO’s dispute settlement system has been defunct due to US blocking judge appointments.

    Deadlock over Doha Development Agenda and Agreement on Agriculture

    Opposition of developing countries for ‘New Issues’

    WTO rules lag behind in Digital Trade & E-commerce

    Dispute over “Developing Country” Status – The US opposes self-declared developing status at WTO, arguing that countries like India and China should be treated as developed.

    Mega-regional trade pacts like the TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership), bypassing WTO norms.

    Proposals by India in the High-Level Mini-Ministerial Meeting

    Revival of the WTO Dispute Settlement System to maintain WTO’s credibility and rule-based order.

    Institutional & Negotiation Reforms

    Move from consensus-only decision-making to hybrid or majority-based models for efficiency.

    Enhance voice of developing nations in agenda-setting and committee representation

    Reform of Special and Differential Treatment – Retain S&DT as a core principle ensuring policy space for developing countries.

    Agricultural Trade Reform

    Rationalize domestic support and export subsidies in developed nations (EU, US).

    Permanent solutions for public food grain stockholding programs

    Ensure food security exemptions are protected under Article 18.4 of AoA.

    Tackling Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs) by ensuring transparency, science-based standards, and non-discriminatory application of NTBs.

    Addressing Distortions by Non-Market Economies – Eg- China’s export quotas on rare earths

    Develop balanced rules on data localization, digital taxation, and cross-border flows to prevent dominance of Big Tech

    Prevent misuse of green trade barriers as disguised protectionism. Eg- EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism

    Permanent WTO Reform Council to propose systemic reforms every five years.

    India must lead the Global South coalition to ensure reforms are inclusive, equitable, and development-centric.

  • Consider the following statements

    Consider the following statements:
    1. India has ratified the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) of WTO.
    2. TFA is a part of WTO’s Bali Ministerial Package of 2013.
    3. TFA came into force in January 2016.
    Which of the statements given above is/are correct?