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Type: Indigenous/Made in India

  • Atmanirbharta in defence: It’s not as simple as it seems

    Why in the News

    The Defence Minister has set out a vision to “design in India, develop in India, manufacture in India” for military equipment. Yet full indigenisation is the costliest way to acquire a weapon, so real atmanirbharta lies in controlling the few technologies that decide a platform’s edge.

    What is atmanirbharta in defence, and why does India pursue it?

    1. What it is: Atmanirbharta (self-reliance) means designing, developing, testing and building weapons at home. It is like a household growing all its own food instead of buying any.
    2. Import dependence: India was the world’s fifth largest defence spender last year and the second largest arms importer, behind only war hit Ukraine.
    3. Strategic autonomy argument: A rising power must build its own arsenal to escape pressure from foreign governments and original equipment manufacturers (OEMs), the firms that design and sell weapons.
    4. The takeaway: A nationalistic public backs self-reliance and brands critics as arms industry agents, so its cost is rarely questioned.

    What has the self-reliance push delivered so far?

    1. Slogans: “Make in India” was coined in 2014, followed by “Vocal for Local” and Atmanirbhar Bharat (self-reliant India) in 2020.
    2. Production: Ministry of Defence figures show indigenous defence and aerospace production roughly quadrupled since 2014.
    3. Exports: Defence exports reached a record Rs 38,434 crore last year.
    4. Hidden import content: The Tejas fighter, Navy warships and many Army missiles are not fully Indian, since much of their cost buys foreign subsystems.

    Why is full self-reliance the costliest route?

    1. Cost hierarchy in defence acquisition: Acquisition methods rise in cost and time in a fixed order:
      • Lease, for only as long as needed, is cheapest and fastest;
      • Buy off the shelf costs more;
      • Licensed production, buying the technology and building a factory at home, costs more still;
      • Atmanirbharta, designing from scratch, costs the most.
    2. High cost of autarky: Developing every element raises cost unacceptably, so even leading defence economies avoid total autarky (complete self-sufficiency).
    3. Control the core, buy the rest: Top weapon makers keep key technologies in house and source other subsystems from established leaders.
    4. Ejection seats: Even top makers buy ejection seats from British firm Martin-Baker, which supplies over half the world’s combat aircraft. Eg. Lockheed Martin’s F-35 Lightning II.

    What should India control, and how?

    1. Flight control software: The Tejas is built inherently unstable, which makes it agile. Quadruplex fly-by-wire software steers it by electronic signals over four backup channels.
    2. Indigenous flight software: That software, built for the first Tejas, is being upgraded to control the Tejas Mark 2 and the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA), India’s planned fifth generation fighter.
    3. Project management: The key skill is deciding which systems a platform needs, where to source them, what to build and when to close a project.
    4. Supply chain leverage: Buying abroad gives foreign suppliers leverage. If Indian firms become key subcontractors in global supply chains, an embargo on India hurts OEMs too.

    Challenges

    1. Induction delays: Indigenous platforms slip for years before reaching the forces, leaving capability gaps. Eg. The Arjun tank and INS Vishal.
    2. Weak programme management: Projects lack a process to identify core technologies early and close failing lines of work.
    3. Commodity dependence: Home built weapons do not remove leverage over a middle power that imports critical commodities such as oil.

    Way Forward

    1. Core technology list: Name each platform’s essential technologies at the start of development and buy mature subsystems globally.
    2. Programme management cadre: Build project skills in the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and the services, with authority to close failing projects.
    3. Supplier integration: Make Indian firms suppliers to global weapon makers, so an embargo also costs the supplier.

    Conclusion

    India’s self-reliance drive has succeeded on volume, but volume is not control of critical technology. Whether future programmes name and own their core technologies from the start will decide if atmanirbharta buys capability or only cost.

    Key numbers

    1. Indigenous production base: Rs 46,000 crore (2014).
    2. Defence exports base: Rs 600 crore (2014).
    3. Export target: Rs 50,000 crore by 2028-29 (Defence Minister).
    4. Martin-Baker share: 50 to 55 percent of world combat aircraft.
    5. GE F414 technology transfer: about 80 percent.

    Government initiatives for defence indigenisation

    1. Positive indigenisation lists: Ministry of Defence lists of items to be bought only from Indian sources after set timelines; they crossed 5,500 items by early 2025.
    2. GE F414 engine co-production: Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) will build this engine in India with most technology transferred, to power the Tejas Mark 2.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026] Consider the following statements about Mission Sudarshan Chakra of India: 1. It aims to enhance India’s air defence, ballistic missile defence and aerial offensive capabilities. 2. Designed to enhance rapid, precise, and powerful defence responses, reinforcing India’s strategic autonomy. 3. One of the aims is to cover all public places of India by an expanded nationwide security shield by 2035. (a) 1, 2 and 3 (b) 1 and 2 only (c) 2 and 3 only (d) 1 only Answer: A”

  • IIT-Delhi researchers build homegrown graphics chip for low-cost devices

    Why in the News

    Researchers at the Indian Institute of Technology Delhi (IIT Delhi) have built a programmable micro graphics processing unit (GPU) designed in India. The team describes it as the first working, demonstrable indigenously designed micro GPU from a university in India. All GPUs in use in the country are currently imported. The processor is built for graphics and display work rather than for high end artificial intelligence computing, and it runs on a Spartan 7 Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) board rather than as a standalone silicon chip. What has been closed is the design gap, and the manufacturing gap is a separate one.

    What is a micro GPU on a Field Programmable Gate Array?

    1. What a graphics processing unit does: A GPU is a processor built for rendering graphics and driving displays, as distinct from a general purpose processor or from the accelerators used for artificial intelligence workloads.
    2. What a Field Programmable Gate Array is: An FPGA is reconfigurable hardware on which a processor design is implemented and run, rather than a chip manufactured for that one design.
    3. How the design is written: The hardware is described in Register Transfer Language (RTL), a hardware description notation, and that description is then implemented on the FPGA platform.
    4. What a fabricated chip would be: An Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) is the same processor design manufactured as a dedicated silicon chip. Moving from an FPGA demonstration to an ASIC is a manufacturing step, not a design step.

    What has the team actually built?

    1. A programmable architecture, not a fixed function block: The team developed a programmable graphics processor architecture capable of graphics rendering, described in Register Transfer Language and implemented on the FPGA platform.
    2. The claim being made: Researchers from the Department of Electrical Engineering state that, to the best of their knowledge, this is the first working, demonstrable indigenously designed micro GPU from a university in India.
    3. The current form of the system: It runs on a Spartan 7 FPGA board rather than as a standalone silicon chip.
    4. The stated objective: The stated aim was a compact but genuinely programmable graphics processing architecture suitable for FPGA implementation and future ASIC realisation.

    Where would such a processor be used?

    1. Industrial and interface displays: Industrial control displays and low cost human machine interfaces are the primary target.
    2. Mobility and navigation: Uses named include e rickshaw dashboard navigators and inland water navigation terminals for small fishing boats.
    3. Education and reading: Educational devices and e book readers are a further target, alongside other affordable embedded visualisation systems.
    4. The form the design takes: The architecture is offered as a scalable, reusable graphics processor design rather than as a finished product, so it can be dropped into different embedded systems.

    Why target low cost embedded uses rather than artificial intelligence computing?

    1. The import position: All GPUs used in India are currently imported, so a domestic design of any class changes a total dependence.
    2. The deliberate scope: The processor is designed for graphics and display applications rather than high end artificial intelligence computing, which is where global GPU competition and cost are concentrated.
    3. The stated purpose: The researchers state that indigenous hardware systems of this kind can support affordable digital access platforms and contribute towards bridging the digital divide.

    What remains between the demonstration and a chip?

    1. Two possible paths: The design can be implemented on programmable hardware such as FPGAs, or converted into an Application Specific Integrated Circuit.
    2. What conversion involves: An ASIC would mean manufacturing the processor design as a dedicated silicon chip. The current work remains at the FPGA demonstration stage.
    3. The next architectural step: The team is exploring an eight to 16 core vector style graphics processor architecture, along with an optimised compiler and a graphics software toolchain.
    4. The fabrication milestone: The longer term plan includes a proof of concept using a 65 nanometre ASIC process.

    Conclusion

    India now holds a graphics processor design it did not hold before. It does not yet hold a graphics processor. The step that would change that is fabrication, and the team’s own roadmap places a silicon proof of concept in the longer term rather than the near one. What to watch is whether the design attracts a foundry commitment, since a demonstration that stays on a reconfigurable board displaces no import.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026] Which of the following statements about DHRUV64 is/are correct? 1. It is the third chip fabricated under the DIR-V Programme to enable creation of microprocessors for India. 2. It is India’s first homegrown 1.0 GHz, 64-bit dual-core microprocessor. (a) 1 only (b) 2 only (c) Both 1 and 2 (d) Neither 1 nor 2 Answer: (c)”

  • NPCIL begins fuel loading at RAPP-8, unit nears operation

    Why in the News

    The Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL) has begun initial fuel loading (IFL) at Unit 8 of the Rajasthan Atomic Power Project (RAPP) at Rawatbhata, the step that starts the commissioning of a 700 megawatt electric (MWe) indigenous pressurised heavy water reactor (PHWR). The loading followed permission from the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB), granted after safety evaluations, major system integrity audits and site readiness reviews. Unit 8 is the fourth reactor in the series of sixteen indigenous 700 MWe PHWRs being built in the country, after Units 3 and 4 at the Kakrapar Atomic Power Station (KAPS) and RAPP Unit 7. The unit is expected to enter commercial operation during the current financial year, which would place four units of the standardised design in operation and move the series from individual project execution towards fleet mode deployment.

    What is a pressurised heavy water reactor (PHWR)?

    1. The design: A PHWR uses heavy water as both moderator and coolant, with the coolant kept under pressure so that it carries heat to the steam generators without boiling.
    2. The fuel it accepts: Heavy water absorbs far fewer neutrons than ordinary water, which allows the reactor to run on natural uranium rather than on enriched uranium.
    3. Why that matters for India: Running on natural uranium removes dependence on enrichment capacity, which is the reason the design was chosen as the mainstay of the domestic programme.
    4. The Indian series: Indian PHWRs progressed from 220 MWe units to 540 MWe units and then to the 700 MWe design now being built in series.

    What does initial fuel loading commit the unit to?

    1. The regulatory gate: Fuel loading could begin only after the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board granted permission and the prescribed prerequisites were completed, so the step certifies that the unit passed its pre operational safety review.
    2. What the review covered: The permission followed rigorous safety evaluations, major system integrity audits and site readiness reviews conducted as part of the regulatory process.
    3. The timeline it starts: The process from initial fuel loading to commercial operation typically takes about six to eight months, and loading commenced on 19 September.
    4. The next milestone: The unit must next reach First Approach to Criticality (FAC), which marks the start of a controlled fission chain reaction, before power generation can begin.

    Where does Unit 8 sit in the 700 MWe series?

    1. Its position: RAPP Unit 8 is the fourth reactor in the series of sixteen indigenous 700 MWe PHWRs planned in the country.
    2. The units already operating: Units 3 and 4 at the Kakrapar Atomic Power Station in Gujarat entered commercial operation in 2023 to 2024, and RAPP Unit 7 followed in April 2025.
    3. What the fourth unit establishes: Each completed unit strengthens the standardisation of the 700 MWe design, which is the precondition for building the remaining units to a repeated template.
    4. Why standardisation is the objective: Fleet mode deployment means building several units to one settled design, so engineering, licensing and procurement are done once rather than project by project.

    What else is moving at the site and across the programme?

    1. The next two units at Rawatbhata: Geotechnical investigations for Units 9 and 10 at the RAPP site commenced on the same day as the fuel loading, which is the foundational step in project development.
    2. The construction pipeline: Apart from RAPP Unit 8, eight other reactors are under construction, two each at Gorakhpur in Haryana and Kaiga in Karnataka and four at Kudankulam in Tamil Nadu.
    3. The two technology streams: The Kudankulam units are light water reactors built with Russian collaboration, while the Gorakhpur and Kaiga units are indigenous 700 MWe PHWRs, so the pipeline advances both streams in parallel.

    Challenges to the 700 MWe PHWR fleet programme

    1. Domestic uranium is low grade: The fuel requirement rises with every unit commissioned, and Indian ore carries a far lower uranium content than the deposits mined elsewhere. Eg. The Jaduguda belt in Jharkhand works ore of well under one percent uranium oxide, against several percent in Canadian and Australian deposits.
      The Fix: Tie each new unit’s sanction to a matching fuel supply commitment, combining domestic mine expansion with long term import contracts before first concrete is poured.
    2. The supplier liability regime deters vendors: The right of recourse against equipment suppliers has kept private and foreign vendors cautious about entering the nuclear supply chain. Eg. Section 17(b) of the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010 allows the operator to recover from a supplier where the accident results from defective equipment or substandard services.
      The Fix: Issue binding contractual guidance capping supplier recourse by value and by period, so a vendor can price the risk rather than avoid it.
    3. Heavy component manufacture is a narrow bottleneck: Calandria vessels, end shields and steam generators for the 700 MWe design are fabricated by a small set of qualified domestic vendors, so fleet mode depends on a supply base that fleet mode itself has not yet widened. Eg. Large forgings and reactor internals for Indian PHWRs come from a handful of heavy engineering suppliers.
      The Fix: Qualify additional fabricators against the standardised 700 MWe drawings in advance of the order, so capacity exists before the schedule needs it.
    4. Spent fuel and waste management stays unresolved at scale: Each additional unit adds spent fuel to storage, and the reprocessing and disposal capacity has to grow with the fleet rather than after it. Eg. Spent fuel from Indian PHWRs is stored at station pools pending reprocessing under the closed fuel cycle.
      The Fix: Sanction reprocessing and away from reactor storage capacity on the same schedule as the reactor units it will serve.
    5. Grid absorption limits the value of new base load: A 700 MWe unit delivers steady output into grids that are increasingly balancing variable solar generation, so the benefit depends on transmission and scheduling rather than on generation alone. Eg. High solar generation in the middle of the day has already compressed the space for inflexible base load in several state grids.
      The Fix: Plan evacuation and flexible scheduling arrangements for each unit at the sanction stage rather than at the commissioning stage.

    Conclusion

    Fuel loading at RAPP Unit 8 moves the indigenous 700 MWe programme from three operating units to four, and the significance is in the repetition rather than in the capacity added. A design built four times to the same specification is what allows the remaining twelve units of the series to be executed as a fleet rather than as separate projects. The near milestone to watch is First Approach to Criticality at Unit 8, followed by commercial operation within the current financial year, with geotechnical work at Units 9 and 10 marking where the same site goes next.

    Back2Basics: Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB)

    1. What it is: The AERB is the national regulatory authority for nuclear and radiation safety in India.
    2. Its legal basis: It was constituted in 1983 under Section 27 of the Atomic Energy Act, 1962, which allows the Central Government to delegate its regulatory powers to a designated authority.
    3. What it does: It frames safety codes and standards, issues consents at each stage of a nuclear facility’s life from siting through construction and commissioning to decommissioning, and enforces compliance through inspection.
    4. Its structural limitation: It reports to the Atomic Energy Commission rather than to Parliament through independent statute, which is the basis of the standing criticism that its independence from the operator it regulates is administrative rather than legal.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “Give an account of the growth and development of nuclear science and technology in India. What is the advantage of fast breeder reactor programme in India?”

  • GRSE launches indigenous vessel for deep-sea research

    Why in the News

    Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers (GRSE) has launched Sagar Manthan, an indigenously built ocean research vessel for the National Centre for Polar and Ocean Research (NCPOR). The Rs 840 crore vessel is being built for the Ministry of Earth Sciences and is expected to be ready for use by early 2028. India’s existing ocean research ships were built abroad, and its polar voyages have run on chartered vessels. The capability being added is therefore the domestic construction of the platform itself, not a new branch of ocean science.

    What has actually been launched?

    1. The vessel and the builder: Sagar Manthan is an ocean research vessel built at GRSE, the Kolkata based defence shipyard under the Ministry of Defence.
    2. The cost and the date: The vessel costs Rs 840 crore and is expected to be ready for use by early 2028.
    3. What a launch is: Launch is the stage at which the completed hull enters the water, and outfitting, sea trials and delivery to the user follow it.

    Why does an indigenously built research vessel matter?

    1. The existing fleet came from abroad: The oceanographic research vessel Sagar Kanya was built in Germany and delivered in 1983, and Sagar Nidhi was built in Italy and delivered in 2008.
    2. Polar voyages run on hired ships: Indian Antarctic expeditions have been carried on chartered ice class vessels rather than on an Indian owned polar research ship.
    3. The capability stays onshore: Building a scientific platform domestically keeps design, repair and refit capacity inside the country, which shortens the turnaround between expeditions.

    Where does the vessel fit in India’s ocean programme?

    1. The Deep Ocean Mission: Approved in 2021, the mission is developing the crewed submersible Matsya-6000 under the Samudrayaan project to carry three people to a depth of 6,000 metres.
    2. India’s seabed exploration rights: India holds an exploration contract with the International Seabed Authority for polymetallic nodules in the Central Indian Ocean Basin, and a second contract for polymetallic sulphides on the Indian Ocean Ridge, both of which require sustained survey and sampling at sea.

    Challenges to India’s deep-sea research capability

    1. Programme timelines slip: Deep sea hardware moves from design to sea trials over years, and the science schedule is rebuilt each time a date moves. Eg. The crewed dive under the Samudrayaan project has slipped repeatedly from its original 2022 target.
      The Fix: Publish dated milestones for each mission element and release funding tranches against those milestones rather than against annual budget cycles.
    2. Exploration rights do not convert into extraction: A seabed contract permits survey and testing, and commercial recovery waits on an international mining code that has not been adopted. Eg. Negotiations on the seabed mining code at the International Seabed Authority have run for over a decade without a final text.
      The Fix: Use the contract period to build a domestic metallurgical route for processing nodule metals, so capability exists before the code opens extraction.
    3. The polar operating window is narrow: A hull without ice strengthening cannot work in polar waters for most of the year, so polar science is compressed into a short season. Eg. Resupply of India’s Antarctic research stations is confined to the austral summer.
      The Fix: Commission a dedicated ice class polar research vessel alongside this platform, rather than treating one research hull as cover for both tropical and polar work.

    Conclusion

    The hull is in the water and the science is still two years away, since launch is the start of outfitting rather than the end of construction. What the milestone settles is that India can build this class of ship for itself. What it does not settle is the shortage of sea time against a mandate that runs from the Arctic to the Antarctic and across the Indian Ocean seabed. The marker to watch is whether a dedicated ice class polar vessel is sanctioned to sit alongside it, or whether polar expeditions continue on chartered ships after this one is delivered.

    Back2Basics

    1. What NCPOR is: Set up in 1998 as the National Centre for Antarctic and Ocean Research, and renamed the National Centre for Polar and Ocean Research in 2018.
    2. Status and location: An autonomous institute of the Ministry of Earth Sciences, based at Vasco da Gama in Goa.
    3. Mandate: The nodal agency for India’s polar and Southern Ocean research, which plans and executes the annual Antarctic and Arctic expeditions.
    4. Stations it runs: Maitri and Bharati in Antarctica, and Himadri at Ny-Alesund in Svalbard in the Arctic.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026] Which of the following statements with regard to India’s Deep Ocean Mission is/are correct? 1. It was launched by the Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways, Government of India. 2. Matsya-6000 has been designed to carry 3 people for deep sea exploration. 3. Samudrayaan is a project under this mission. (a) 1 only (b) 2 and 3 only (c) 1 and 2 only (d) 1, 2 and 3 ANSWER: (b)”

  • Defence Acquisition Council clears capital acquisition proposals worth about ₹1.10 lakh crore

    Defence Acquisition Council clears capital acquisition proposals worth about ₹1.10 lakh crore

    Why in the News

    The Defence Acquisition Council (DAC), chaired by Defence Minister Rajnath Singh, has accorded Acceptance of Necessity (AoN) for defence acquisition proposals worth around ₹1.10 lakh crore.

    • About 98% of the approved procurements are planned from Indian industry, reinforcing the government’s focus on defence indigenisation and self reliance.

    What is the DAC?

    • Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) is the highest decision-making body in the Ministry of Defence for defence procurement.
    • It was constituted in 2001 following the recommendations of the Group of Ministers after the Kargil War.
    • Chairperson: Union Defence Minister.
    • It deals with major decisions related to acquisition of capital assets for the Armed Forces.

    What has the DAC approved?

    Indian Army

    • CBRN reconnaissance vehicles: Detect, identify, monitor and mark areas contaminated by chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear agents.
    • High Mobility Vehicles (HMVs): Improve operational mobility and logistics in difficult terrain.
    • Self Propelled Mechanical Mine Layers (MMLs): Provide faster mine laying capability.
    • Advanced Light Helicopters (ALHs): Support operations across diverse terrains.
    • Trawl tanks: Facilitate movement through mine contaminated areas.
    • Sarvatra Bridge System: Provides rapid bridging and crossing capability during military operations.

    Indian Navy

    • Arudhra radars: To replace existing air route surveillance radars at naval air stations.
    • Marine Gas Turbines (MGTs): Indigenous design, development and procurement for warship propulsion, reducing dependence on foreign vendors.

    Indian Air Force and Defence Forces

    • Proposals to enhance capabilities of fighter aircraft, transport aircraft and helicopters.
    • Ground Based Multi Purpose Jammers (GBMPJ): Provide jamming capability against adversary radars.
    • Defence Forces Secure Access Card (DEFSAC): Replace paper based identity cards, passes and permits with interoperable RFID based smart cards.

    Why is Defence Indigenisation Important?

    • Strategic autonomy: Reduces dependence on foreign suppliers for critical military systems.
    • Operational security: Minimises vulnerabilities arising from dependence on external vendors.
    • Domestic manufacturing: Creates demand for Indian defence companies and strengthens the defence industrial base.
    • Technology development: Encourages indigenous R&D and advanced defence technologies.
    • Economic benefits: Generates skilled employment and strengthens domestic supply chains.

    Prelims Pointers

    • Total value: Around ₹1.10 lakh crore.
    • DAC: Defence Acquisition Council, chaired by the Defence Minister.
    • AoN: Acceptance of Necessity, the initial approval for a defence procurement proposal.
    • CBRN: Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear.
    • ALH: Advanced Light Helicopter.
    • MGT: Marine Gas Turbine.
    • DEFSAC: Defence Forces Secure Access Card.
    • 98%: Approximately 98% of the approved procurement value is planned to be sourced from Indian industry.

    [2026] Which of the following items of defence hardware is/are manufactured in India?
    1.Su-30 MKT Fighter Jects
    2.T-90 MKI-III Tanks
    3.Akula Class Submarine
    Select the answer using the code given below:

    [A] 1 and 2

    [B] 1 and 3

    [C] 1 only

    [D] 2 only

  • ISRO: EOS-05 to be placed in elliptical geosynchronous orbit

    ISRO: EOS-05 to be placed in elliptical geosynchronous orbit

    Why in the News

    EOS-05, India’s Earth observation satellite, is being placed in a slightly elliptical geosynchronous orbit. It is the first Indian Earth observation satellite to use a geosynchronous orbit. It was launched by GSLV-F17 and is undergoing successive orbit-raising manoeuvres.

    Geosynchronous Orbit

    • Satellite’s orbital period equals Earth’s rotational period.
    • It moves in synchrony with Earth’s rotation.
    • Geostationary orbit is a special type of geosynchronous orbit.
    • Geostationary orbit is:
      • Circular
      • Equatorial
      • At about 35,786 km altitude
    • Geosynchronous orbits can also be inclined or elliptical.

    EOS-05: Significance

    • Uses a slightly elliptical geosynchronous orbit for persistent observation.
    • Can provide continuous monitoring of a specific region.
    • Potential applications include:
      • Weather monitoring
      • Maritime surveillance
      • Strategic applications, including use by the Indian Navy.

    Limitations

    • Lower spatial resolution: Greater distance from Earth compared with LEO satellites.
    • Limited coverage: Persistent observation of one region comes at the cost of wider coverage.
    • Cloud and night limitations: Optical imaging is affected by clouds and darkness.
    • Radar complement: Satellites such as RISAT and NISAR can overcome some optical limitations.
    • Orbital congestion: Requires effective space situational awareness and collision avoidance.

    GSLV: Back to Basics

    • Full form: Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle.
    • Three-stage launch vehicle developed by ISRO.
    • Uses an indigenous cryogenic upper stage using liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen.
    • Primarily designed for placing satellites into geosynchronous transfer orbit (GTO).
    • Lies between PSLV and LVM3 in the launch vehicle family.

    Prelims Pointers

    • Geosynchronous → Orbital period equal to Earth’s rotation.
    • Geostationary → Circular + equatorial + geosynchronous.
    • Geostationary altitude → ~35,786 km.
    • EOS-05 → Geosynchronous Earth observation mission.
    • GSLV → Geosynchronous transfer orbit.
    • PSLV → Polar/sun-synchronous missions.
    • LVM3 → Higher lift capability than GSLV.
    • IS4OM → Safe and sustainable space operations management.

    “[2018] With reference to India’s satellite launch vehicles, consider the following statements :

    1.PSLVs launch the satellites useful for Earth resources monitoring whereas GSLVs are designed mainly to launch communication satellites.

    2.Satellites launched by PSLV appear to remain permanently fixed in the same position in the sky, as viewed from a particular location on Earth.

    3.GSLV Mk III is a four-stage launch vehicle with the first and third stages using solid rocket motors, and the second and fourth stages using liquid rocket engines.

    Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

    (a) 1 only

    (b) 2 and 3

    (c) 1 and 2

    (d) 3 only

  • Navy Chief: INS Nipun will enhance our critical underwater capabilities

    Navy Chief: INS Nipun will enhance our critical underwater capabilities

    Why in the News

    The Indian Navy has commissioned INS Nipun at Mumbai, a dedicated Diving Support and Submarine Rescue Vessel built for work beneath the surface.

    What capability does INS Nipun add?

    1. It is a specialist platform for underwater work: The vessel is built for deep sea diving, underwater intervention and submarine rescue.
    2. It can carry the rescue submersible: Its ability to embark and operate the Indian Navy’s Deep Submergence Rescue Vessel is what converts it into a rescue platform.
    3. The rescue role extends beyond Indian submarines: It can respond to a distressed submarine of the Indian Navy or of a partner navy, which is the basis of the claim that India can emerge as the region’s preferred submarine rescue partner.
    4. Its diving capability supports relief work: The specialised diving capability can assist partner nations in underwater salvage and in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) missions.
    5. Few navies hold the combination: The vessel brings together a range of capabilities possessed by only a handful of navies.

    Why does the Navy frame this as a strategic requirement?

    1. The maritime environment is described as contested: The Chief of the Naval Staff assessed that threat perceptions are constantly evolving and morphing into newer forms.
    2. Preparedness is the stated response: The exact nature of future threats cannot be predicted, so robust capability has to be built against anticipated threats in advance.
    3. The Western Naval Command gains a full column capability: The addition allows the command to operate above, on and beneath the waves.
    4. Integration is the immediate task: The command is to fold the vessel into operational plans, exercise her capabilities rigorously and develop proficiency around her systems.

    What does the vessel mean for indigenous shipbuilding?

    1. The builder is an Indian yard: Hindustan Shipyard Limited at Visakhapatnam designed and built the vessel indigenously.
    2. The class is new to the fleet: INS Nipun is the second ship of the Nistar class of diving support vessels.
    3. The Ministry of Defence frames it as self-reliance: The induction is presented as a further step towards self-reliance in defence shipbuilding.
    4. The platform type is rarely built domestically: A diving and rescue vessel is a niche design, so building it in India establishes a capability that cannot be sourced quickly from imports.

    Challenges to India’s submarine rescue and underwater capability

    1. Rescue is a race against the air supply: A disabled submarine’s crew survives on limited oxygen, so a rescue system has to be transported and mated within hours. Eg. All 118 crew aboard the Russian submarine Kursk died in the Barents Sea in 2000 before foreign rescue assistance was accepted.
      The Fix: Keep rescue systems prepositioned on both seaboards with standing mating certification against partner navy hatch designs.
    2. The fleet operates on two seaboards with few rescue platforms: Indian submarines patrol the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal, and dedicated rescue assets are limited in number. Eg. India inducted its first Deep Submergence Rescue Vehicle system only in 2018, with the second following the next year.
      The Fix: Retain air transportable rescue systems that can be flown to the nearest usable port instead of sailed from a home base.
    3. Rescue only works where the hatch fits: A rescue vehicle can dock only with a submarine whose escape hatch matches its mating skirt, so cross navy rescue depends on standardisation. Eg. The International Submarine Escape and Rescue Liaison Office exists to run exercises that test exactly this compatibility.
      The Fix: Certify Indian rescue systems against partner navy hatch standards and publish the compatibility list to regional navies.
    4. Naval shipbuilding timelines stretch: Indian yards have delivered warships and submarines behind their original schedules, which delays the capability rather than the contract. Eg. Deliveries under the Scorpene class submarine programme ran years behind the timeline set at signing.
      The Fix: Link yard payments to certified milestone completion rather than to calendar tranches.
    5. Saturation diving is a scarce skill: Deep diving support needs trained saturation divers and chamber operators, and that trained pool is small worldwide. Eg. Offshore energy operators and navies draw saturation divers from the same limited global workforce.
      The Fix: Run a joint naval and commercial diving training school whose certification is recognised for offshore industry work, so the pool grows beyond service requirements.

    Back2Basics: Hindustan Shipyard Limited

    1. Status: A shipyard at Visakhapatnam that was transferred to the Ministry of Defence in 2010 from the Ministry of Shipping.
    2. Origin: It was founded in 1941 as Scindia Shipyard and built India’s first indigenous merchant ship, Jala Usha, in 1948.
    3. Work: It builds and repairs merchant and naval vessels and carries out submarine refits for the Indian Navy.
    4. Current orders: It is building the Nistar class diving support vessels and the fleet support ships ordered for the Navy.

    [2026] Which of the following items of defence hardware is/are manufactured in India?

    1. Su-30 MKI Fighter Jets

    2. T-90 MK-III Tanks

    3. Akula Class Submarine

    (a) 1 and 2

    (b) 1 and 3

    (c) 1 only

    (d) 2 only

  • Rajnath approves transfer of missile technology to domestic defence industry

    Rajnath approves transfer of missile technology to domestic defence industry

    Why in the News

    Defence Minister Rajnath Singh has approved the transfer of technology (ToT) for all conventional missile systems developed by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) to the Indian defence industry, opening the way for domestic private production of these systems for the first time. Until now, production had rested with Defence PSU Bharat Dynamics Limited, DRDO’s own in-house facilities, and the India-Russia joint venture that builds the BrahMos cruise missile. This is a One development, one row item; both The Hindu and The Indian Express carried the decision, and this entry is filed from the Indian Express account, which names the specific missile systems and the strategic systems excluded from transfer.

    What does the transfer of technology actually change?

    1. A closed production model opens to private industry: Production of DRDO-developed conventional missile systems was previously confined to a defence PSU and DRDO’s own facilities; the ToT decision allows private companies, MSMEs, and other technology partners to manufacture these systems, subject to qualifications, certifications, and regulatory requirements.
    2. An initial set of named systems anchors the rollout: Officials cited the beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile ASTRA, the anti-radiation missile RUDRAM, the short-range air defence system VSHORADS, the anti-tank guided missile NAG, and the Naval Anti-Ship Missile (NASM) as the systems the initiative could begin with, though the stated goal is to extend private production to all conventional missile systems.
    3. Strategic systems are explicitly carved out: The Agni series and the K-series missiles will not be part of this technology transfer, since they are classified as strategic missiles rather than conventional ones.
    4. The stated objective is industrial-scale transition: The Ministry of Defence framed the decision as enabling the transition of missile projects from the development stage to industrial-scale production, reducing import dependence and increasing indigenous value addition.

    Conclusion

    The decision restructures who is permitted to manufacture India’s conventional missile systems, shifting DRDO’s role from developer-cum-producer to developer-cum-technology-provider, and is intended to widen the industrial base, including private firms and MSMEs, that can supply the country’s expanding conventional missile requirements.

  • Indigenous N-reactors top pick for companies in nuclear power expansion

    Why in the News

    The indigenous Pressurised Heavy Water Reactor (PHWR) is emerging as the preferred technology for new entrants into India’s civil nuclear power sector, as the tightly regulated strategic sector opens to private players. Representatives of the National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC), Adani Atomic Energy and Jindal Steel said at a panel discussion at the BloombergNEF Summit in New Delhi that the existing 700 megawatt electric (MWe) PHWR is the right starting point, given established design standards, a mature domestic supply chain and an existing ecosystem of vendors. The discussion followed the release of the draft rules under the Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement of Nuclear Energy for Transforming India Act, 2025 (SHANTI Act, 2025), about a week earlier. The choice is revealing: entrants are picking the reactor with the least regulatory and supply risk rather than the one that scales fastest, and that reactor alone cannot deliver the 100 gigawatt electric target set for 2047.

    What is a Pressurised Heavy Water Reactor?

    1. Design: A pressurised heavy water reactor uses heavy water as both moderator and coolant, which lets it run on natural uranium without any enrichment step.
    2. Why it suited India: Natural uranium fuelling matched a country with limited enrichment capacity that long stood outside international fuel supply arrangements.
    3. Place in the programme: It is Stage 1 of the three stage nuclear programme designed by Homi Bhabha, producing plutonium 239 as a by product for the fast breeder stage that follows.
    4. The Indian standard unit: The 700 MWe variant is the largest indigenous design in the series.

    What is a Small Modular Reactor?

    1. Definition: A small modular reactor (SMR) is an advanced reactor of up to 300 MWe, built as factory made modules and transported to site for assembly.
    2. Use case: The smaller unit size suits captive industrial power and the replacement of retiring coal units on existing sites.

    Why are private entrants choosing the 700 MWe PHWR?

    1. Design certainty: The 700 MWe design is standard, approved, operational and already carries regulatory clearance, in the assessment of the business head of Adani Atomic Energy.
    2. Supply chain depth: The supply chain for that design in India is almost fully indigenised, at 90 per cent to 95 per cent.
    3. What the sector is short of: The two major constraints named for the sector are the availability of a robust supply chain and the lack of standardised reactor designs, and the 700 MWe unit is the one design that resolves both.
    4. A second entrant agrees: Jindal Steel plans to go with 700 MWe PHWRs in its initial phase for the same reason, moving to other technologies in later phases as clarity emerges on supply chains, regulatory approvals and standardisation.

    What capacity are the new entrants targeting?

    1. The national target: India aims to scale domestic civil nuclear capacity to 100 gigawatt electric (GWe) by 2047.
    2. Corporate targets: NTPC’s capacity target is 30 GWe, the Adani group’s is 10 GWe, and Jindal Steel’s is 18 GWe in the coming years.

    What has opened the sector to private entrants?

    1. Statutory replacement: The SHANTI Act, 2025 supersedes the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 and the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010.
    2. End of the state monopoly: It permits private and foreign firms to build, own and operate reactors, which no earlier law allowed.
    3. Regulator strengthened: It gives the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board independent statutory status for safety oversight.
    4. Liability rewritten: It removes statutory supplier liability and sets tiered damage caps, with a Nuclear Damage Claims Commission to adjudicate compensation after an incident.
    5. What the Centre keeps: Enrichment, reprocessing and uranium and thorium exploration remain with the Union government.
    6. What the draft rules cover: The rules released in August 2026 set out the framework for private participation, captive generation, licensing, safety oversight and nuclear liability.

    Why will the PHWR alone not deliver 100 GWe?

    1. The stated limit: PHWRs alone will not be sufficient to reach 100 GWe by 2047, in the assessment of the Adani Atomic Energy business head.
    2. The intended sequence: Deploy 700 MWe PHWRs in fleet mode first, follow with pressurised water reactors (PWRs), and bring in small modular reactors at a later point.
    3. Where foreign designs fit: Foreign reactor technologies and SMRs are expected to play a role only at a later stage, once the sector matures.
    4. The phasing is deliberate: Later phases are contingent on clarity around supply chains, regulatory approvals and design standardisation, not on a fixed date.

    What will decide whether imported designs work in India?

    1. Localisation is the condition: Global reactor technologies, including PWRs and SMRs, would need to maximise localisation in India to stay commercially viable.
    2. Cost sets the ceiling: Cost matters a great deal in the Indian market, and any technology has to reach a price the buyer of the electricity will commit to.
    3. The buyer decides: For a project to make commercial sense the consumer has to accept the tariff, which puts affordability ahead of technology preference in the selection.

    Challenges to India’s 100 GWe nuclear target

    1. The heavy component vendor base is shallow: Only a handful of Indian firms can forge and supply large reactor components, so a fleet order queues behind them. Eg. Larsen and Toubro and Bharat Heavy Electricals supply most large forgings and steam generators for the domestic programme. Fix. Qualify a second tier of suppliers through advance purchase commitments tied to the sanctioned fleet order book.
    2. No certified standard design outside the heavy water line: A project without a frozen design spends years in negotiation before construction. Eg. The Jaitapur project with the European Pressurised Reactor has been under negotiation since 2010 without first pour of concrete. Fix. Certify one design per technology class through the regulator before any commercial order is placed.
    3. Tariff acceptance by distribution utilities: Nuclear power has to clear the price a distribution company will sign a purchase agreement at. Eg. Around 42 gigawatts of renewable capacity currently sits without a power purchase agreement on price grounds. Fix. Create a separate payment for firm, dispatchable low carbon power so the grid pays for reliability rather than for energy alone.
    4. Insurance capacity is thin: Liability caps do not create the underwriting capacity a reactor needs. Eg. The India Nuclear Insurance Pool formed in 2015 carries a capacity of ₹1,500 crore. Fix. Expand the pool with reinsurance from global nuclear insurance pools, now that supplier liability has been removed.
    5. Licensed operator manpower: A fleet of reactors needs certified control room staff that only one training system currently produces. Eg. Operator training runs almost entirely through the Department of Atomic Energy’s own training schools. Fix. Accredit private and university training programmes against a regulator certified curriculum and examination.

    Conclusion

    Private entry into nuclear power has reached the point where entrants are naming capacity targets and choosing a reactor, and all three have chosen the indigenous 700 MWe pressurised heavy water reactor over imported designs. The regulatory framework is at the draft rules stage under the SHANTI Act, 2025, released by the Department of Atomic Energy, with comments closing on 4 September 2026. Whether the 100 GWe target is reachable turns on the technologies after the first fleet, and on whether foreign designs localise enough to reach a tariff a distribution utility will sign.

    “[2018, GS3, 15 marks] With growing energy needs should India keep on expanding its nuclear energy programme? Discuss the facts and fears associated with nuclear energy.”

  • ₹3,070 Crore Defence Boost: 405 Items to Go Indigenous

    Why in the News

    The Department of Defence Production notified the sixth Positive Indigenisation List, covering 405 strategically important defence items with an estimated business potential of Rs 3,070 crore. The list moves the import ban from whole platforms down to the spares, sub-assemblies and raw materials layer that keeps imported fleets flying and floating.

    What is the Positive Indigenisation List?

    1. Definition: A Positive Indigenisation List (PIL) is a notified list of defence items that can be procured only from Indian industry after a stated deadline passes.
    2. Legal effect: The listed item stays importable until its deadline. After that date, procurement is exclusively domestic.
    3. Issuing authority: The Department of Defence Production (DDP) under the Ministry of Defence notifies the list.
    4. Two families of lists: One family covers capital acquisition platforms for the armed forces. The second family covers line replaceable units, sub-systems, sub-assemblies, spares, components and raw materials of Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs), which is the family the sixth list belongs to.
    5. Policy anchor: The Ministry placed the sixth list within the Aatmanirbhar Bharat initiative for self reliance in defence manufacturing.

    What is a Line Replaceable Unit?

    1. Definition: A Line Replaceable Unit (LRU) is a self contained module on a platform that a technician can swap out at the operating unit itself, without sending the platform to a depot.
    2. Why it matters: LRU import dependence decides fleet availability, since an aircraft grounded for one imported module is as unusable as an aircraft never bought.

    What is the SRIJAN Defence Portal?

    1. Definition: The SRIJAN Defence Portal is the Ministry of Defence’s online indigenisation platform on which DPSUs and the Services publish items they currently import and invite Indian vendors to develop them.
    2. Use in this case: The detailed sixth list has been uploaded on the portal, so vendors can see item level specifications rather than only the headline count.

    Components of the sixth list, by lifecycle stage

    The release’s own categorisation phrase is “line replaceable units, sub-systems, sub-assemblies, spares, components and raw materials”. The table below keeps that official grouping and maps each element to the stage of the platform lifecycle it sits at.

    Official category (lifecycle stage)Platforms and systems coveredOfficial figuresPrimary stakeholder
    Raw materials (input stage)Feedstock for the listed platforms and systemsNo separate figure given in the releaseIndian industry, particularly MSMEs
    Components and spares (production stage)Armoured platforms T-72, T-90 and BMP-II, and warshipsNo separate figure given in the releaseDPSUs with MSME participation
    Sub-assemblies and sub-systems (assembly stage)Advanced Light Helicopter, Light Utility Helicopter, Chetak and Cheetah helicopters, Su-30MKI, Jaguar, MiG-29, the Light Combat Aircraft and the AL-31FP engineNo separate figure given in the releaseDPSUs, in house development route
    Line replaceable units (sustainment stage)Missile systems Konkurs-M, Invar and MRSAM, defence electronics covering radars, sonars, fire control systems and satellite communication systems, and High Explosive Anti-Tank ammunitionPart of the 405 items worth Rs 3,070 crore16 items for the Indian Coast Guard, 389 items for DPSUs
    Exclusive domestic procurement (offtake stage)All 405 listed itemsDeadlines running up to December 2031Indian industry as the sole permitted source

    Why does the list target spares and sub-systems rather than whole platforms?

    1. Sustainment is where imports survive: A platform built in India under licence still draws imported modules through its service life, so a platform level ban leaves the recurring import bill untouched.
    2. Legacy Russian and Western fleets stay in service: The Su-30MKI, MiG-29, Jaguar, T-72, T-90, BMP-II, Konkurs-M and Invar are all of foreign origin and remain in front line use, so their spares are the standing demand.
    3. MSMEs can enter at this scale: The Ministry stated that DPSUs and the Indian Coast Guard will indigenise through several routes including in house development, with participation from industry and particularly MSMEs.
    4. Deadlines create assured demand: Once an item is developed locally, it will be procured exclusively from Indian industry, which converts a technical goal into a guaranteed order.
    5. Stated economic objective: The Ministry expects the list to expand opportunities for Indian industry, strengthen the domestic defence manufacturing ecosystem, promote investment and innovation, and reduce import dependence.

    What does the record of the previous five lists show?

    1. Cumulative coverage: The last five positive indigenisation lists together comprised 5,012 critical items of DPSUs.
    2. Delivery so far: 3,200 of those items have already been indigenised.
    3. Value realised: The indigenised items carry an import substitution value of over Rs 3,900 crore.
    4. Completion gap: 1,812 items from the earlier five lists remain to be indigenised even before the sixth list’s 405 are added.
    5. Scale of the new tranche: The sixth list’s Rs 3,070 crore business potential is close to the entire import substitution value the previous five lists have delivered so far.

    Challenges to the Positive Indigenisation List

    1. Design authority remains abroad: Reverse engineering a spare does not transfer the original equipment manufacturer’s design data, so upgrades and configuration changes still need foreign clearance, e.g. Su-30MKI serviceability fell sharply when Russian spares supply was disrupted after February 2022.
    2. Certification is the real bottleneck: A developed item still needs airworthiness or seaworthiness clearance before induction, and that queue is longer than the development itself, e.g. clearances from the Centre for Military Airworthiness and Certification for a single aviation grade module routinely run into years.
    3. An import ban does not create capability: Prohibiting an import without a working domestic alternative simply postpones the requirement, e.g. the Kaveri engine programme began in 1989 and the Light Combat Aircraft still flies on the imported GE F404.
    4. Working capital stress for small vendors: An MSME must fund development, tooling and inventory ahead of an order it may receive years later, e.g. procurement cycles under the Defence Acquisition Procedure, 2020 routinely run beyond 100 weeks from acceptance of necessity to contract.
    5. Quality escapes damage the case for domestic sourcing: A defective indigenous item costs more credibility than an imported one, e.g. the Comptroller and Auditor General’s 2019 report on ammunition management flagged defective ammunition from Ordnance Factory Board units causing accidents and monetary loss.
    6. Import substitution is not export competitiveness: Substituting an import for the home market does not make the product globally saleable, e.g. India stayed among the world’s largest arms importers through 2020 to 2024 even after five lists had been notified.

    Conclusion

    The sixth Positive Indigenisation List stands notified, with 405 items worth Rs 3,070 crore, split as 16 Indian Coast Guard items and 389 DPSU items, and uploaded on the SRIJAN Defence Portal. The next milestone is item wise indigenisation within the notified timeframes, with the outer deadlines running to December 2031, after which the listed items may be procured only from Indian industry.