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Type: IOCR

  • India, Japan sign maritime security pact to deepen defence cooperation

    Why in the News

    India and Japan signed a Memorandum of Arrangement on Maritime Security Cooperation on 20 August 2026, after bilateral talks between the two Defence Ministers in New Delhi. The arrangement converts a relationship built on periodic exercises into a standing operational framework covering maritime domain awareness, logistics access and ship repair. It also opens naval shipbuilding and design to joint development, moving the partnership from equipment transfer towards co-production.

    What is the Memorandum of Arrangement on Maritime Security Cooperation?

    1. Nature of the instrument: A Memorandum of Arrangement is a signed framework document recording the agreed areas of cooperation between two defence establishments. It creates a standing basis for activity without the binding force of a treaty.
    2. Parties it links: The arrangement connects the Indian Navy with the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force.

    What is Maritime Domain Awareness?

    1. Definition: Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) is the effective understanding of everything in the maritime space that affects security, safety, economy or the environment. It rests on tracking, identifying and sharing information on vessel movements.
    2. Why it is built with partners: No single navy can watch an entire ocean, so MDA depends on pooling radar, satellite and automatic identification system feeds across countries.

    What are Sea Lines of Communication?

    1. Definition: Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) are the primary maritime routes along which trade, energy and naval forces move between ports. Disruption of a SLOC affects supply rather than territory.
    2. Why they are defended jointly: A SLOC crosses several jurisdictions and the high seas, so its protection depends on coordinated patrolling and port access rather than any one state’s territorial control.

    What is the UNICORN antenna system?

    1. What it is: UNICORN is a Japanese shipborne integrated communications antenna system that houses multiple antennas inside a single composite mast. It lowers a warship’s radar cross section by removing external antenna clutter.

    What is ATLA?

    1. Full form and role: The Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency (ATLA) is Japan’s defence procurement and technology development body under its Ministry of Defense. It is the counterpart to India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) for joint technology work.

    What is the Japan India Special Strategic and Global Partnership?

    1. The label: It is the highest tier of India’s bilateral relationships, adopted in 2014, under which defence, economic and technology cooperation between the two countries is organised.

    What does the arrangement operationally commit the two navies to?

    1. Information sharing: The two sides agreed to deepen operational cooperation through information sharing, naval exercises, ship repair and logistics support.
    2. Maritime domain awareness and rescue: The framework covers maritime domain awareness, search and rescue, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief between the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force and the Indian Navy.
    3. Protection of sea lanes: The Ministers agreed to strengthen coordination for the protection of Sea Lines of Communications through reciprocal naval visits, joint exercises, and personnel and subject matter expert exchanges.
    4. Logistics and port access: Logistical support was extended to include access to ports and maintenance and repair facilities.
    5. Mine countermeasures: The two countries will move towards greater cooperation in mine countermeasures.

    How does the partnership move beyond equipment transfer into co-development?

    1. Naval shipbuilding and design: The two sides will explore joint development in naval shipbuilding and design, leveraging Japan’s technological expertise and India’s production capabilities.
    2. Make in India framework: They will discuss greater use of India’s shipbuilding capabilities under the Make in India framework.
    3. Reciprocal ship repair: Both countries will work towards reciprocal provision of ship repair facilities.
    4. First equipment marker: The shipborne UNICORN integrated communications antenna system was identified as the symbol of the growing defence equipment partnership, with a commitment to its early realisation.
    5. Research and industry channels: DRDO and ATLA will deepen cooperation in advanced defence technologies, and a Defence Industry Forum will be convened.

    What does the expansion of joint exercises signal about interoperability?

    1. Existing exercise set: The Ministers welcomed the expansion of bilateral military exercises, including Dharma Guardian and the Japan India Maritime Exercise (JIMEX), the two navies’ bilateral maritime exercise.
    2. Veer Guardian 26: The planned Veer Guardian 26 air exercise will see Japanese fighter aircraft participate in an exercise in India for the first time.
    3. Greater complexity: The two sides agreed to enhance the complexity of bilateral exercises rather than repeat existing formats.
    4. Unmanned systems and short notice drills: They agreed to integrate unmanned systems and to explore short notice joint exercises, which test readiness rather than choreography.
    5. Special forces and theatre commands: The two countries will promote exchanges between their Special Operations Forces and pursue cooperation with India’s integrated theatre commands after their establishment.

    What institutional machinery will carry the cooperation forward?

    1. A standing Working Group: The two sides agreed to establish a Working Group headed at the Director General and Joint Secretary level.
    2. Domains it coordinates: The Working Group spans operational, intelligence, equipment, technology and industrial domains.
    3. Industry channel: A Defence Industry Forum will be convened alongside the research level cooperation.
    4. Ministerial channel: The two sides agreed to accelerate discussions for the fourth India Japan 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministerial Dialogue, to be held in Tokyo this year.
    5. Political framing: Both reaffirmed their commitment to deepen defence cooperation under the Japan India Special Strategic and Global Partnership and to work towards a free and open Indo Pacific amid heightened global tensions.

    Challenges to the India Japan maritime security arrangement

    1. Japan’s own legal constraints on transfers: Article 9 of Japan’s 1947 Constitution and the Three Principles on Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology limit what Tokyo can sell or co-develop abroad. Eg. The US 2 amphibious aircraft deal, negotiated with India for over a decade, lapsed without an order.
    2. Cost and schedule risk in Japanese technology tie ups: High specification Japanese systems carry costs that Indian procurement budgets absorb poorly. Eg. The Mumbai Ahmedabad High Speed Rail Project, built on Japanese technology and a Japanese loan, slipped from its 2022 target to 2027 or later.
    3. Thin use of the existing logistics pact: Reciprocal access agreements deliver value only when used outside exercise windows. Eg. The Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement signed in September 2020 has been used largely around scheduled exercises rather than for continuous deployments.
    4. Naval balance shifting faster than the partnership: The regional force ratio is moving against both partners while the arrangement is still being institutionalised. Eg. The People’s Liberation Army Navy crossed 340 battle force ships by 2021, overtaking the United States fleet in numbers.
    5. Indian yard capacity limits co-production: Joint naval shipbuilding assumes yard capacity India has not yet built. Eg. India’s share of global shipbuilding is under 1 percent, in a sector dominated by China, South Korea and Japan.
    6. Incomplete theatre command reform: Cooperation with India’s integrated theatre commands is conditional on those commands existing. Eg. The Inter Services Organisation (Command, Control and Discipline) Act, 2023 created the legal basis for joint commands, but no theatre command had been stood up when the arrangement was signed.
    7. Chokepoint risks a bilateral pact cannot fix: Sea lane disruption often originates from non state actors outside either navy’s operating area. Eg. Houthi attacks in the Red Sea forced shipping to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope, adding weeks to voyages.

    Conclusion

    India and Japan have moved from periodic exercises to a signed operational framework covering maritime domain awareness, logistics access and ship repair, with naval shipbuilding and design opened to joint development. The arrangement’s institutional carrier is a Working Group at Director General and Joint Secretary level spanning operational, intelligence, equipment, technology and industrial domains. The next milestone is the fourth India Japan 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministerial Dialogue, to be held in Tokyo this year, with the Veer Guardian 26 air exercise bringing Japanese fighter aircraft to India for the first time.

    “[2019, GS2, 10] ‘The time has come for India and Japan to build a strong contemporary relationship, one involving global and strategic partnership that will have a great significance for Asia and the world as a whole.’ Comment.”

  • BNP’s Alamgir elected new President of Bangladesh

    Why in the News

    Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir, long time secretary general of the ruling Bangladesh Nationalist Party, was elected President of Bangladesh on 20 August 2026 in the first contested poll for the office in 35 years. He secured 255 of the 343 votes cast in Parliament against 88 for the nominee of the Jamaat-e-Islami led opposition alliance. The contest itself is the significant fact, since the office has been filled by consensus and uncontested polls for decades.

    How is the President of Bangladesh elected?

    1. Who votes: The President is elected indirectly by the members of Parliament, so the outcome reflects the composition of the House rather than a popular vote.
    2. Who conducts it: The Chief Election Commissioner acts as the Election Returning Officer and declares the result after counting.
    3. The vacancy rule: Under the Constitution, a new President is required to be elected within 90 days of the office falling vacant.
    4. What the office holds: The presidency is largely ceremonial, with executive authority resting with the Prime Minister and the Cabinet.

    What is the Jatiya Sangsad?

    1. What it is: The Jatiya Sangsad is Bangladesh’s unicameral Parliament, which both elects the President and provides the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Its composition therefore determines the presidential outcome in advance of the vote.

    What is Bangabhaban?

    1. What it is: Bangabhaban in Dhaka is the official residence and workplace of the President of Bangladesh. Its Darbar Hall is the venue at which the President takes the oath of office.

    What did the vote actually show about the balance in Parliament?

    1. The electorate: Of the total 349 registered voters, 343 voted in the election, and six lawmakers did not vote.
    2. The result: Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir secured 255 votes and Oli Ahmed secured 88 votes.
    3. The losing candidate: Oli Ahmed, aged 84, is a retired Colonel and chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party, and was the nominee of the Jamaat-e-Islami led eleven party opposition alliance.
    4. The winning candidate’s standing: Alamgir, aged 78, is a long time secretary general of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and a close ally of former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia.
    5. What the margin reflects: The ruling party and its allies hold a two thirds majority in Parliament following the general election that returned them to power.
    6. The break with recent practice: It was the first contested presidential election in Bangladesh since 1991, the office having largely been filled through consensus and uncontested polls in recent decades.

    Why did the presidency fall vacant?

    1. The resignation: Mohammed Shahabuddin resigned last month on health grounds before completing his five year tenure.
    2. His political association: He was a close aide of the deposed Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, whose government fell in 2024.
    3. The constitutional consequence: The vacancy triggered the 90 day requirement for electing a successor.
    4. Why it became contested: With a changed parliamentary composition following the transition, the consensus mechanism that had filled the office in recent decades no longer held.

    What does a ceremonial presidency mean in Bangladesh’s system?

    1. Head of state, not head of government: The President is the head of state, while executive authority is exercised by the Prime Minister and the Cabinet.
    2. The formal military role: The President is designated supreme commander of the defence services, a title exercised on the advice of the government.
    3. Where discretion survives: The President’s independent discretion is confined to the appointment of the Prime Minister and the Chief Justice, and otherwise the office acts on advice.
    4. The order of succession: The Speaker of Parliament acts as President when the office falls vacant, until a successor is elected.
    5. The oath: The President elect will take the oath as Bangladesh’s 23rd President on Friday evening at the Darbar Hall of Bangabhaban.

    Why does the return of contested presidential politics matter?

    1. What consensus polls concealed: Uncontested elections meant the office was allocated by the ruling party rather than won, which removed any parliamentary test of the nominee.
    2. What a contest introduces: A recorded vote of 255 to 88 registers the size and composition of the opposition bloc inside Parliament.
    3. The opposition’s new configuration: The Jamaat-e-Islami led eleven party alliance fielded a joint candidate, which formalises an opposition grouping that had previously been fragmented.
    4. The signal of the abstentions: Six lawmakers declined to vote, which records dissent that a consensus procedure would have absorbed silently.
    5. The continuity of the office: The presidency remains ceremonial, so the contest changes the politics of the office without changing its powers.

    What does the change in Dhaka alter for India’s neighbourhood policy?

    1. A new majority to work with: The Bangladesh Nationalist Party and its allies hold a two thirds majority, which gives India a single interlocutor with the parliamentary strength to conclude agreements.
    2. A pending water file: The India Bangladesh Ganga Water Treaty of 1996 expires on 31 December, and its renewal must be negotiated with the new dispensation.
    3. The unresolved Teesta question: The Teesta water sharing agreement drafted in 2011 remains unsigned and has been Dhaka’s standing demand across governments.
    4. Connectivity projects in progress: Rail, road and port links built over the previous decade, including the Akhaura Agartala rail link and the Maitri Setu bridge, require continuity of commitment on both sides.
    5. The security file: Border management, insurgent sanctuaries in the northeast and the safety of minority communities are the standing items on which India seeks assurances from any government in Dhaka.

    Challenges to Bangladesh’s political transition

    1. A ceremonial head of state elected on party lines: A partisan presidency strains the office’s role as a neutral arbiter in disputes over government formation. Eg. The outgoing President was a close aide of the deposed Prime Minister and resigned before completing his tenure.
    2. Consolidation of power under a two thirds majority: A supermajority removes the parliamentary check on constitutional amendment. Eg. The ruling party and its allies hold a two thirds majority in the Jatiya Sangsad after the general election.
    3. An opposition organised around a religious party alliance: The main opposition bloc is led by a party with a contested constitutional history. Eg. The eleven party opposition alliance that fielded the losing presidential candidate is led by Jamaat-e-Islami.
    4. Institutional damage from the previous transition: Administrative and judicial appointments made under the earlier government remain politically contested. Eg. The presidency itself fell vacant through the resignation of an appointee of the deposed government.
    5. Economic pressure on a garment dependent economy: External demand shocks translate directly into employment and foreign exchange stress. Eg. Bangladesh’s export earnings are concentrated in ready made garments, which leaves the current account exposed to a single sector.
    6. Security of minority communities: Political transitions in Bangladesh have historically been followed by attacks on minorities. Eg. The period following the fall of the previous government in 2024 saw reported attacks on Hindu households and temples.
    7. Restoring routine electoral practice: A single contested election does not by itself re-establish competitive norms. Eg. It took 35 years for a contested presidential poll to recur after 1991.

    Conclusion

    Bangladesh has elected a new head of state through its first contested presidential poll in 35 years, with the ruling party’s nominee securing 255 votes against 88 for the opposition alliance’s candidate, from 343 of 349 registered voters. The office remains ceremonial, so the outcome registers the parliamentary balance after the political transition rather than shifting executive power. The next milestone is the oath of office as Bangladesh’s 23rd President on Friday evening at the Darbar Hall of Bangabhaban.

    About India Bangladesh Relations

    1. The border: India and Bangladesh share a land boundary of 4,096.7 km, India’s longest with any neighbour, running along West Bengal, Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram.
    2. The rivers: The two countries share 54 common rivers, and water sharing is the most persistent item on the bilateral agenda.
    3. Trade: Bangladesh is India’s largest trade partner in South Asia, and India is among the largest sources of Bangladesh’s imports.
    4. Connectivity: Rail links, inland waterway protocol routes, bus services and port access arrangements have been progressively restored since 2015 after decades of disuse.
    5. Energy: India supplies electricity to Bangladesh across the interconnection at Bheramara and through cross border transmission links, and the two countries operate a diesel pipeline between them.
    6. Development partnership: India has extended three Lines of Credit to Bangladesh totalling about $7.862 billion, its largest such commitment to any single country.

    Constitutional Framework Governing the Presidency in Bangladesh

    1. Article 48: Provides for a President elected by the members of Parliament, and requires the President to act on the advice of the Prime Minister except in appointing the Prime Minister and the Chief Justice.
    2. Article 50: Fixes the President’s term at five years from the date of entering office, and bars any person from holding the office for more than two terms.
    3. Article 54: Provides that the Speaker of Parliament shall act as President when the office is vacant or the President is unable to discharge functions.
    4. Article 55: Vests the executive power of the Republic in the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, which is the provision that makes the presidency ceremonial.
    5. Article 123: Governs the timing of elections to the office, including the requirement that a vacancy be filled within a fixed period of its occurrence.
    6. Presidential Election Act, 1991: Provides the procedure for nomination, polling and declaration of the result, with the Chief Election Commissioner acting as Returning Officer.

    India Bangladesh Cooperation Initiatives

    1. Maitri Setu: A bridge over the Feni river connecting Sabroom in Tripura with Ramgarh in Bangladesh, inaugurated in March 2021, giving the northeast access to Chattogram port.
    2. Akhaura Agartala rail link: A cross border rail connection commissioned in November 2023 that shortens the route between Agartala and Kolkata through Bangladeshi territory.
    3. Port access agreement: An arrangement permitting the use of Chattogram and Mongla ports for the movement of Indian goods to and from the northeastern States.
    4. India Bangladesh Friendship Pipeline: A cross border diesel pipeline from Siliguri to Parbatipur, inaugurated in March 2023, supplying high speed diesel to northern Bangladesh.
    5. Maitree Super Thermal Power Project: A joint venture coal fired power project at Rampal in Bangladesh, developed by an Indian and Bangladeshi partnership.
    6. Border Haats: Designated markets along the boundary allowing residents of nearby villages on both sides to trade specified local goods without formal customs procedures.

    Key Facts about Bangladesh and its Relations with India

    1. Independence: Bangladesh became independent in 1971, and India was among the first countries to recognise it.
    2. Land Boundary Agreement: The 1974 agreement was operationalised through the 100th Constitutional Amendment Act, 2015, under which India transferred 111 enclaves to Bangladesh and received 51.
    3. Maritime boundary: A Permanent Court of Arbitration tribunal delivered its award on the maritime boundary between the two countries in July 2014, which both accepted.
    4. Kushiyara agreement: The withdrawal of water from the Kushiyara river was agreed in September 2022, the second water sharing instrument after the Ganga treaty.
    5. Population: Bangladesh has a population of about 173 million people.
    6. Presidential history: The office being filled on 21 August 2026 is that of Bangladesh’s 23rd President.
    7. Joint river institution: The Joint Rivers Commission has functioned since 1972 as the standing bilateral mechanism on shared rivers.

    Back2Basics: Bangladesh Nationalist Party

    1. Founded: The party was founded in 1978 by Ziaur Rahman, then the country’s military ruler and later President.
    2. Ideology: It is built around Bangladeshi nationalism, which defines national identity by territory and religion rather than by the language based Bengali nationalism of its principal rival.
    3. Leadership: It has been led since 1984 by Khaleda Zia, widow of the founder, who served as Prime Minister on three occasions.
    4. Principal rival: Its long standing opponent is the Awami League, and the two parties have alternated in power for most of the country’s competitive electoral history.
    5. Electoral boycotts: The party boycotted the general elections of 2014 and 2024, which kept it out of Parliament for extended periods.
    6. Current position: It returned to power in the general election held in February 2026, and holds a two thirds majority in Parliament with its allies.

    Challenges in India Bangladesh Relations

    1. The unresolved Teesta agreement: The most contested river sharing file has remained unsigned for over a decade. Eg. The Teesta draft agreed in 2011 was not signed after West Bengal withheld support.
    2. Border killings: Fatalities along the boundary remain the most publicly damaging irritant in the relationship. Eg. Incidents involving the Border Security Force and Bangladeshi nationals along the fenced boundary recur and draw formal protests from Dhaka.
    3. Illegal migration and its domestic politics: Migration questions feed into Indian State level politics and produce friction with Dhaka. Eg. The National Register of Citizens exercise in Assam produced sustained diplomatic concern in Bangladesh.
    4. Trade imbalance: Bangladesh runs a large deficit with India, which sustains a domestic constituency against closer economic integration. Eg. Indian exports to Bangladesh far exceed Bangladeshi exports to India despite duty free access under the South Asian Free Trade Area.
    5. Competition from external partners: Infrastructure and defence offers from other powers reduce India’s relative weight. Eg. Chinese financing has funded major Bangladeshi infrastructure including bridges, power plants and port projects.
    6. The Rohingya caseload: More than a million refugees in Cox’s Bazar constrain Bangladesh’s policy space and create a shared security concern. Eg. Repatriation attempts to Myanmar have repeatedly failed since the influx of 2017.
    7. Security of minority communities: Attacks on minorities during political transitions generate pressure on Indian policy. Eg. The 2024 transition was followed by reported attacks on Hindu households and places of worship.
    8. Insurgent sanctuaries and connectivity security: Northeast Indian connectivity through Bangladesh depends on continued cooperation against insurgent groups. Eg. Transit corridors through Bangladeshi territory to the northeast require sustained security cooperation to remain viable.

    Way Forward

    1. Open the Ganga treaty renewal early: Begin the final round of renewal talks well before the 31 December expiry so that the instrument does not lapse during a political transition.
    2. Separate the Teesta from the Ganga negotiation: Handle the two rivers on independent tracks so that a stalled file does not hold a functioning one hostage.
    3. Institutionalise engagement beyond the ruling party: Maintain contact across the political spectrum in Dhaka so that the relationship does not have to be rebuilt at each change of government.
    4. Correct the trade asymmetry: Expand duty free access, remove non tariff barriers and complete the proposed comprehensive economic partnership so that the deficit ceases to be a political argument.
    5. Complete connectivity projects on schedule: Deliver the remaining rail, road and inland waterway links so that the economic case for cooperation is visible to the Bangladeshi public.
    6. Reduce border fatalities to zero: Shift to non lethal means and joint patrolling protocols along the boundary, since this single issue does the most reputational damage.
    7. Coordinate on the Rohingya question: Support repatriation diplomacy with Myanmar and continue humanitarian assistance to Cox’s Bazar, which addresses a Bangladeshi priority at limited cost.

  • Why Sergio Gor’s words in Srinagar are noteworthy

    Why in the News

    The United States Ambassador to India visited Srinagar on 19 August 2026 and described Jammu and Kashmir as an important part of India, on his first visit to the Valley and immediately after meeting the elected Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir. Seventy three years earlier American emissaries had come to the same Valley to raise the possibility of independence with Sheikh Abdullah, whose grandson now stood beside the ambassador. The distance between those two moments is the measure of how far the American position on Jammu and Kashmir has travelled since 1947.

    What is the Instrument of Accession?

    1. What it was: The legal document by which the ruler of a princely state acceded to either India or Pakistan at the end of British paramountcy in 1947, ceding defence, external affairs and communications to the acceding dominion.
    2. Its statutory basis: It was executed under the Government of India Act, 1935 as adapted by the Indian Independence Act, 1947, which gave rulers the choice of accession.
    3. In the case of Jammu and Kashmir: The Maharaja signed it on 26 October 1947 following the tribal invasion, which brought Indian forces into the state.
    4. Why it is contested in this story: American assessments questioned whether the Instrument by itself finally settled the state’s future, which is the legal proposition the ambassador’s statement now cuts against.

    What is Sadr-i-Riyasat?

    1. What it was: The title of the constitutional head of Jammu and Kashmir between 1952 and 1965, elected by the state legislature in place of a hereditary ruler. The office was replaced by a Governor appointed by the President through the Constitution (Sixth Amendment) to the Jammu and Kashmir Constitution in 1965.

    What is a demarche?

    1. What it is: A formal diplomatic representation made by one government to another, delivered in writing or in a scheduled meeting, recording a position or a protest. It ranks above an ordinary statement of protest because it is placed on the record between foreign ministries.

    What was the Kashmir Conspiracy Case?

    1. What it was: The prosecution launched against Sheikh Abdullah and his associates after his dismissal in 1953, alleging a conspiracy against the state and dealings aimed at detaching Jammu and Kashmir from India. It ran for years before being withdrawn, and it framed the political atmosphere around his contacts with foreign interlocutors.

    What exactly did the United States envoy say, and why does the venue matter?

    1. The statement: Visiting Srinagar, the ambassador declared that this is an important part of India.
    2. The setting: It was his first visit to the Valley, and he had just finished meeting the Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir, who is Sheikh Abdullah’s grandson.
    3. The follow up: He suggested that the United States travel advisory could be reviewed by Washington because of improvements in the security situation.
    4. The date: The statement was made on 19 August 2026.
    5. Why the location carries weight: The venue mattered as much as the words, since the same Valley was where American interlocutors had once raised the prospect of independence.
    6. The reaction: Pakistan did not merely protest, but lodged a formal demarche.

    Why is an ambassador’s sentence not the same as a change in policy?

    1. What it is not: A statement by an ambassador is not a treaty, a presidential proclamation, or a formal repudiation by the State Department of every position Washington has espoused since 1947.
    2. Why it still counts: Diplomacy operates through vocabulary, and a shift in the words a mission uses in public registers a shift in position even without a formal instrument.
    3. The measure applied: No objective student of Kashmir can fail to notice how far America has come between the language of the early 1950s and the language used in Srinagar.
    4. What remains open: Nothing in the statement withdraws or replaces the underlying documentary record of American legal assessments.

    How did American diplomacy engage the idea of an independent Kashmir in the early 1950s?

    1. The 1950 meetings: Loy Henderson, the American ambassador to India, secretly met Sheikh Abdullah in Kashmir twice in 1950.
    2. What the record shows: Henderson’s secret telegram records the Sheikh making a strong case for Kashmiri independence from both India and Pakistan.
    3. The condition Abdullah attached: He told Henderson that an independent Kashmir could survive only if it had the friendship of both India and Pakistan and economic assistance from the United States, directly or through the United Nations.
    4. How it entered Indian politics: American interest in Kashmir took on such political overtones that even Henderson’s wife entered Indian political mythology, and Indian leaders suspected that Americans were holding out the prospect of independence to Abdullah.
    5. The Stevenson visit: Adlai Stevenson, twice the Democratic Party’s candidate for the presidency and one of the most influential American internationalists of his era, visited Kashmir in May 1953 and talked to Abdullah.
    6. The effect in New Delhi: Those meetings sent shockwaves of suspicion through New Delhi, and American diplomatic records show that the then Prime Minister believed Stevenson’s conversations had encouraged Abdullah’s growing intransigence.
    7. What the episode establishes: An independent Kashmir was then conceivable enough in American diplomatic parlance for the Indian Prime Minister to worry that Washington might act to encourage it.

    What did those contacts cost Sheikh Abdullah inside Jammu and Kashmir?

    1. The dismissal: On 9 August 1953, Sheikh Abdullah was dismissed as prime minister of Jammu and Kashmir by the Sadr-i-Riyasat.
    2. The stated grounds: The dismissal came amid mounting suspicions in New Delhi about his commitment to the accession and his growing interest in an independent Kashmir.
    3. The role of the American contacts: His contacts with prominent Americans fed those suspicions directly.
    4. The legal aftermath: Those contacts later became part of the political atmosphere surrounding what came to be known as the Kashmir Conspiracy Case.
    5. The symmetry with 2026: Almost exactly seventy three years separate that dismissal from the ambassador’s statement in Srinagar.

    How did United Nations Security Council Resolution 47 shape the international framing of the dispute?

    1. American support: The United States supported Resolution 47 in 1948, which was adopted on 21 April that year.
    2. What it did: It placed the dispute in an international context and anticipated a plebiscite after a process of demilitarisation.
    3. The prescribed sequence: The sequence required Pakistan first to secure the withdrawal of the tribal invaders from the territory under its occupation.
    4. What happened to it: That prescribed sequence was never implemented.
    5. What it gave Pakistan: For years afterwards the resolution provided Pakistan with the diplomatic scaffolding it wanted, namely that Jammu and Kashmir was not an Indian question alone but an international dispute to be settled.
    6. America’s place in it: America was at the centre of that scaffolding.

    How far did the American legal position on the accession go?

    1. The document: A State Department memorandum of February 1950 set out the American legal assessment of the accession.
    2. Its characterisation: The memorandum described Jammu and Kashmir’s accession to India as contested.
    3. Its conclusion: It concluded that in the American legal assessment at the time, the Maharaja’s Instrument of Accession could not by itself have finally settled the state’s future.
    4. Why this matters: The position was not confined to the plebiscite procedure but went to the legal sufficiency of the accession instrument itself.

    Why did the position persist after the Cold War?

    1. The 1993 statement: In October 1993, Robin Raphel, freshly appointed assistant secretary of state for South Asian affairs in the Clinton administration, called Kashmir a disputed territory.
    2. The legal claim made: She said Washington did not recognise the legal validity of the Instrument of Accession as meaning that Kashmir was forever part of India.
    3. India’s reaction: India was aghast, and the then Prime Minister described such efforts at diplomatic suasion as pinpricks and minor mischief.
    4. The larger fact it revealed: Nearly five decades after 1947, the United States remained unwilling to couch its discussion of Jammu and Kashmir in terms that accepted India’s political description of the state without qualification.
    5. Why 2026 stands out against it: Measured against that record, the ambassador’s description in Srinagar marks the closing of an ambiguity that had survived the end of the Cold War.

    Why should a favourable American statement not produce triumphalism in New Delhi?

    1. Where the case was actually made: India’s case in Kashmir has ultimately been made most strongly by the people of Jammu and Kashmir themselves, not by shifts in foreign vocabulary.
    2. The standing test: The test has always been India’s ability to deepen constitutionalism, expand democracy and political reconciliation, deliver development, and ensure civil liberties for all citizens.
    3. Why the elected government matters: Srinagar’s elected government is what gives the Indian position its domestic foundation, which is why the ambassador’s meeting with the Chief Minister carried weight.
    4. What remains outstanding: A return to normal democratic politics and the restoration of statehood is essential, and no external statement substitutes for it.
    5. What has genuinely changed: The historical arc reflects India’s own transformation and the gradual exhaustion of the idea that Jammu and Kashmir is best handled through international mechanisms conceived in the bloodshed of Partition.
    6. The precise nature of the shift: America has not overwritten history but has accepted reality, having for decades dealt with Kashmir as a problem in search of a permanent political resting place, and having now implicitly acknowledged that history had already made a choice.

    Challenges to India’s position on Jammu and Kashmir

    1. Statehood has not been restored: The state’s downgrade to Union Territory status remains unreversed, which weakens the constitutionalism argument India rests on. Eg. Jammu and Kashmir became a Union Territory on 31 October 2019 under the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019.
    2. Diplomatic language can reverse with an administration: Positions expressed by an envoy carry no continuity guarantee across governments. Eg. The assistant secretary of state’s 1993 characterisation of Kashmir as disputed territory came four decades after the 1950 State Department memorandum and repeated its underlying reasoning.
    3. The plebiscite framing survives in the record: Resolutions never formally rescinded remain available for citation. Eg. Resolution 47 of 1948 remains on the Security Council record even though its prescribed sequence was never implemented.
    4. Pakistan retains a formal diplomatic channel: Every Indian gain in framing is met with a counter representation. Eg. Pakistan lodged a formal demarche after the ambassador’s statement in Srinagar.
    5. Security perception governs external normalisation: Third country advisories track incidents rather than political statements. Eg. The ambassador tied any review of the United States travel advisory to improvements in the security situation, not to political developments.
    6. Political reconciliation remains incomplete: Electoral revival does not by itself settle questions of autonomy and representation. Eg. The elected Chief Minister heads a government whose legislative competence is that of a Union Territory rather than a State.
    7. Third country hyphenation persists in crises: External powers revert to treating India and Pakistan as a pair during military escalation. Eg. External calls for restraint are directed at both countries simultaneously during every India Pakistan military exchange.

    Conclusion

    The American position on Jammu and Kashmir has moved from a February 1950 State Department memorandum calling the accession contested, through the plebiscite framing of Resolution 47 and the 1993 refusal to accept the Instrument of Accession as final, to an ambassador standing in Srinagar in August 2026 and calling it an important part of India. That arc closes an ambiguity but settles nothing that India itself must settle, since the case in Kashmir has been carried by the people of the region and by the quality of Indian constitutional practice there. The unfinished work is the return to normal democratic politics and the restoration of statehood, which no shift in foreign vocabulary can supply.

    “[2019, GS2, 15] “What introduces friction into the ties between India and the United States is that Washington is still unable to find for India a position in its global strategy, which would satisfy India’s National self-esteem and ambitions” Explain with suitable examples.”

  • Five years after Taliban takeover, life in Afghanistan marred by many struggles

    Why in the News

    Five years have passed since the Taliban entered Kabul on 15 August 2021, ending the United States led military presence and the Islamic Republic that had governed Afghanistan for two decades. The Taliban have converted military victory into durable control of institutions, borders and revenue, without converting it into recognition, economic recovery or rights for women. That gap defines the position every state now has to work around, including India.

    What is a de facto government?

    1. Definition: A de facto government is an authority that exercises effective control over a territory and its population without being formally recognised as its lawful government by other states. Control is a question of fact, recognition a question of law.
    2. What recognition does: Recognising a government endorses its authority to represent the state internationally, while withholding recognition does not deny that the state itself exists.
    3. Why states still transact: Border management, humanitarian delivery and consular work require dealing with whoever controls territory, which produces engagement without recognition.
    4. What non recognition costs the authority: It blocks the state’s seat at international organisations, access to central bank reserves held abroad and formal sovereign borrowing.

    What is the Islamic State-Khorasan Province?

    1. What it is: The Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP) is the regional branch of the Islamic State operating in Afghanistan, Pakistan and parts of Central Asia, formed in 2015.
    2. Its relationship with the Taliban: It rejects the Taliban’s authority as insufficiently doctrinaire and is an armed rival rather than an ally, which is why the Taliban conduct operations against it.

    What has actually changed in Afghanistan’s security situation since 2021?

    1. The war ended: The most immediate change was the end of the war between the Taliban and the then Afghan government.
    2. The withdrawal and the collapse: The United States and NATO completed their military withdrawal in August 2021, and Afghan security forces collapsed soon afterwards.
    3. Consolidation of control: The Taliban control Afghanistan’s major government institutions, security forces and borders, and armed opposition groups have not been able to mount a significant nationwide challenge.
    4. No comparable conflict: There is now no nationwide armed conflict comparable to the fighting that took place before 2021.
    5. What it means on the ground: Roads previously affected by battles and checkpoints are generally more accessible, and the risk of being caught in clashes between the Taliban and government forces has fallen.

    Why has the end of the war not meant the end of violence?

    1. A surviving armed rival: The Islamic State-Khorasan Province remains active and has carried out attacks against civilians, Taliban officials and foreign nationals.
    2. Counter operations: The Taliban have carried out operations against the group, which makes the conflict internal rather than against a foreign force.
    3. Deteriorating relations with Pakistan: The two countries have repeatedly accused each other of allowing militant groups to operate from their territory.
    4. Frequency of border clashes: Clashes along the border have become more frequent since 2021.
    5. A reversal of the earlier relationship: Pakistan had been an important supporter of the Taliban for years, but since 2021 Islamabad’s concerns over militant attacks and border security have increasingly complicated relations with Kabul.

    How far have restrictions on women gone, and what do they cost in the long run?

    1. The initial assurance: When the Taliban took control in 2021 they said they would respect women’s rights under their interpretation of Islamic law.
    2. What followed: Restrictions on women have steadily increased rather than stabilised at the level announced.
    3. Education: Girls remain barred from secondary education and higher education.
    4. Employment and movement: Women have been excluded from many areas of employment and face restrictions on movement and on access to public spaces, affecting almost every aspect of participation in public life.
    5. The pipeline effect: Girls unable to complete school cannot move on to university or professional training, which means fewer women will enter professions such as medicine, teaching, journalism and public administration.

    Why is economic stability not the same as economic recovery?

    1. The pre 2021 base: International aid accounted for a significant part of government spending and economic activity before the takeover.
    2. The shock: The withdrawal of foreign troops and the sudden reduction in aid created a major economic shock, and there were fears that the Afghan economy could collapse.
    3. What the Taliban did instead: The administration increased domestic revenue collection, tried to expand trade with neighbouring countries, invested in infrastructure and attempted to raise economic activity within the country.
    4. The result: Afghanistan has achieved a degree of economic stability since the severe crisis that followed the takeover, but stability is not recovery.
    5. What stability leaves untouched: Poverty remains widespread, unemployment remains a major problem, and humanitarian assistance continues to be important for millions of Afghans.
    6. A new pressure: The country is dealing with the return of large numbers of Afghans from Pakistan and Iran, whose arrival has created additional pressure on housing, employment and public services.

    What do other countries’ positions show about the limits of non-recognition?

    1. The general position: The Taliban regime has not received widespread international recognition, and most countries continue to avoid formally recognising it as Afghanistan’s legitimate government.
    2. The stated grounds: The main concerns are restrictions on women, the absence of an inclusive political system, and questions about terrorism and human rights.
    3. Russia: Russia has formally recognised the Taliban regime, making it the outlier among major powers.
    4. China and the United Arab Emirates: Both have accepted Taliban appointed ambassadors, which is operational acceptance short of formal recognition.
    5. Western governments: Several Western governments have maintained contact with Taliban officials without extending recognition.
    6. The common driver: Countries have increasingly had to deal with the Taliban because they control Afghanistan, which shows that control eventually compels engagement even where it does not compel recognition.

    What explains India’s shift from distance to pragmatic engagement?

    1. The posture: India has followed a cautious but increasingly pragmatic approach towards the Taliban since they returned to power in August 2021.
    2. The line held: New Delhi did not recognise the Taliban regime, and has expanded diplomatic engagement without altering that position.
    3. Return of presence: India reopened its diplomatic mission in Kabul in 2022.
    4. Continuing assistance: India continued providing humanitarian assistance, including food, medicines and other supplies.
    5. The turning point: The engagement became more significant in 2025 with the visit of the Taliban Foreign Minister.
    6. Why Afghanistan matters: Security is one of India’s biggest concerns in relation to Afghanistan, and Pakistan is the other factor shaping the calculation.

    Challenges to India’s Afghanistan policy

    1. Engagement without recognition has no legal footing: Agreements reached with an unrecognised authority cannot be enforced or registered internationally. Eg. India’s diplomatic mission in Kabul, reopened in 2022, operates as a technical mission rather than a full embassy.
    2. Overland access runs through a hostile neighbour: India has no land route to Afghanistan that does not cross Pakistan. Eg. India’s wheat consignments to Afghanistan required specific Pakistani transit permission in 2022 for movement through the Wagah crossing.
    3. Dependence on a sanctioned transit route: The alternative sea and land corridor runs through Iran, which carries its own sanctions exposure. Eg. India’s ten year contract of May 2024 to operate the Shahid Beheshti terminal at Chabahar depends on a project specific sanctions exemption.
    4. Stranded development assets: India built infrastructure whose upkeep now depends on an authority it does not recognise. Eg. The Afghan Parliament building inaugurated in 2015 and the Afghan India Friendship Dam at Salma completed in 2016 both sit under Taliban administration.
    5. Reputational cost of engaging a rights violating authority: Expanded contact runs against India’s own stated positions on women’s rights. Eg. Girls in Afghanistan remain barred from secondary and higher education while diplomatic engagement expands.
    6. Competition from states willing to recognise: Recognition buys influence that engagement alone does not. Eg. Russia formally recognised the Taliban regime, and China and the United Arab Emirates accepted Taliban appointed ambassadors.
    7. Terrorism risk that engagement cannot eliminate: Groups hostile to India retain sanctuary regardless of the state of India Kabul relations. Eg. The Islamic State-Khorasan Province has attacked foreign nationals in Afghanistan, including a Sikh gurdwara in Kabul in June 2022.

    Conclusion

    Five years after the takeover, the Taliban hold Afghanistan’s institutions, borders and security forces, have arrested the economic collapse that was predicted, and face no nationwide armed challenge. They have not obtained recognition, have not converted stability into recovery, and have deepened rather than relaxed the restrictions that keep recognition out of reach. The unresolved question is whether states that must deal with a de facto authority can extract any change in its conduct through engagement alone, since Russia’s recognition and India’s non recognition have so far produced the same behaviour from Kabul.

    “[2013, GS2, 10] The proposed withdrawal of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) from Afghanistan in 2014 is fraught with major security implications for the countries of the region. Examine in light of the fact that India is faced with a plethora of challenges and needs to safeguard its own strategic interests.”

  • Ganga treaty not in Bihar’s interests, says JD(U) leader

    Why in the News

    The national working president of the Janata Dal (United), who was Bihar’s Minister for Water Resources between 2021 and 2024, has advocated against renewal of the 1996 India Bangladesh Ganga Water Treaty on the ground that renewal would hurt Bihar’s interests. The treaty expires on 31 December and the two sides are yet to hold the last round of talks on its renewal. A federal objection has therefore entered a bilateral negotiation that the Union alone has the power to conclude.

    What is the India Bangladesh Ganga Water Treaty, 1996?

    1. What it is: A bilateral treaty signed on 12 December 1996 for a term of 30 years, governing the sharing of Ganga waters between India and Bangladesh at the Farakka Barrage.
    2. What it covers: It applies only to the dry season, from 1 January to 31 May, when flow at Farakka is lowest and competition between the two uses is sharpest.
    3. How sharing is measured: Availability is measured in ten day periods at Farakka, and shares are calculated separately for each period rather than as an annual total.
    4. How disputes are handled: A Joint Committee observes and records flows at Farakka and at the Hardinge Bridge in Bangladesh, and the treaty provides for review of the arrangement at five yearly intervals or earlier by mutual agreement.

    What is a cusec?

    1. What it means: A cusec is one cubic foot of water flowing per second, the standard unit in which river discharge and canal capacity are stated in South Asia. All the sharing thresholds in the Ganga treaty are expressed in this unit.

    What does the sharing formula actually do at Farakka?

    1. When availability is 70,000 cusecs or less: The flow is divided equally, with India and Bangladesh receiving 50 percent each.
    2. When availability is between 70,000 and 75,000 cusecs: Bangladesh receives 35,000 cusecs and the balance of the flow goes to India.
    3. When availability is 75,000 cusecs or more: India receives 40,000 cusecs and the balance of the flow goes to Bangladesh.
    4. The guarantee clause: Between 1 March and 10 May, India and Bangladesh each receive a guaranteed 35,000 cusecs in alternate blocks of three ten day periods.
    5. The fallback provision: Where the two sides cannot agree at review, India is to release not less than 90 percent of Bangladesh’s share until an understanding is reached.

    Why does Bihar say the treaty has hurt its interests?

    1. The claim made: Thirty years of data under the treaty show that the interests of Bihar have been negatively impacted.
    2. The separation of interests asserted: Diplomatic issues between the two countries must be sorted out, but Bihar’s interests too must be kept in mind while doing so.
    3. The trade off named: The treaty may have checked a few boxes in terms of international messaging, but it has hurt the State’s interests.
    4. The physical mechanism behind the grievance: Maintaining pond level at Farakka raises the water surface upstream, which slows the river and deposits silt in the Ganga bed across Bihar, reducing channel capacity.
    5. The flood consequence: Reduced channel capacity aggravates flooding and drainage congestion in the Bihar districts along the Ganga, including Bhagalpur, Katihar and Munger.
    6. The State’s standing demand: Bihar has for years sought large scale desilting of the Ganga, a national silt management policy, and at one point the decommissioning of the Farakka Barrage.

    Why does the renewal decision sit with the Union alone?

    1. Treaty making power: Article 253 empowers Parliament to make any law for implementing an international treaty or agreement, and the executive power to conclude treaties rests with the Union.
    2. Water as a State subject: Water, including water supplies, irrigation and canals, drainage and embankments, is Entry 17 of the State List, which is why States claim a stake in any water sharing arrangement.
    3. The Union’s own entry: Entry 56 of the Union List gives Parliament power over the regulation and development of inter State rivers and river valleys where declared expedient in the public interest.
    4. Consultation is practice, not obligation: Riparian States are consulted as a matter of convention in transboundary water negotiations, but the Constitution does not require their concurrence.
    5. The precedent of exclusion: West Bengal objected in 2024 to being left out of the committee constituted for the Ganga treaty renewal and the Teesta discussions, which shows the grievance is not confined to Bihar.

    Why is the renewal a test of the wider India Bangladesh relationship?

    1. The deadline: The treaty expires on 31 December, which fixes the outer limit of the negotiation.
    2. The pending step: The two sides are yet to hold the last round of talks on renewal.
    3. The linked file: The Teesta water sharing arrangement has remained unconcluded since 2011, and the Ganga renewal is the only functioning template the two sides have.
    4. The upstream downstream asymmetry: India is the upper riparian on the Ganga, so the treaty is the principal instrument through which Bangladesh secures a predictable dry season flow.
    5. The domestic politics on both sides: A renewal that satisfies Dhaka must also survive objections from Bihar and West Bengal, which makes the negotiation a two level one.

    Challenges to the renewal of the Ganga Water Treaty

    1. No mechanism to compensate an affected upstream State: The treaty allocates water between countries and is silent on internal distribution of costs. Eg. Bihar’s siltation and flood costs from Farakka pondage have no route to redress inside the treaty text.
    2. Declining lean season flow: The volume the formula divides has itself been shrinking, which sharpens the distributional fight. Eg. The guaranteed 35,000 cusecs blocks between 1 March and 10 May become harder to honour when total availability falls below 70,000 cusecs.
    3. Absence of a State role in the negotiating machinery: Riparian States have no formal seat, which produces objection after the fact rather than input before it. Eg. West Bengal objected in 2024 to exclusion from the renewal committee.
    4. Silt management remains unfunded and unassigned: No agency has both the mandate and the budget for basin scale desilting. Eg. Bihar’s demand for a national silt management policy has been pending across successive Union budgets.
    5. Political transition in Dhaka: A renewal negotiated with one government may be reopened by its successor. Eg. Bangladesh has undergone a change of government since the fall of the Awami League administration in 2024, with the Bangladesh Nationalist Party returning to power in February 2026.
    6. Linkage risk with other rivers: Dhaka has consistently sought to tie the Ganga arrangement to progress on the Teesta. Eg. The Teesta sharing draft agreed in 2011 was not signed because of West Bengal’s objection, and remains unresolved.
    7. No basin wide framework with upper riparians: The Ganga basin extends beyond the two signatories, so a bilateral treaty cannot govern total flow. Eg. Nepal controls the headwaters of the Kosi, Gandak and Ghaghara, which contribute a large share of the Ganga’s dry season flow.

    Conclusion

    The India Bangladesh Ganga Water Treaty, 1996 expires on 31 December, the last round of renewal talks has not yet been held, and a party in Bihar’s ruling coalition has now publicly opposed renewal on the ground that thirty years of the arrangement have damaged the State’s interests. The dispute is not about the sharing ratio alone but about whether an upstream State’s siltation and flood costs can be recognised inside an instrument the Union alone concludes. The next milestone is the final round of renewal talks between the two sides before the treaty lapses.

  • Trump’s new forced labour tariffs face global pushback and legal questions

    Why in News?

    The United States’ new forced labour tariffs under Section 301, covering more than 60 countries, face legal pushback from Brazil and Australia over WTO compliance.

    Key Highlights

    • Tariffs are imposed under a Section 301 forced labour enforcement investigation, covering over 60 trading partners.
    • Brazil and Australia are contesting the tariffs’ compliance with WTO rules.
    • The dispute remains open, legally and diplomatically.

    Section 301 (U.S. Trade Act, 1974)

    • Empowers the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) to investigate and respond to unfair foreign trade practices.
    • Authorises the U.S. to impose tariffs or other trade restrictions if another country’s actions are found to burden or restrict U.S. commerce.
    • Frequently used in disputes involving intellectual property, market access, subsidies, and labour practices.

    World Trade Organization (WTO)

    • Established in 1995, succeeding the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 1947.
    • Headquarters: Geneva, Switzerland.
    • Objective: Ensure rules-based, predictable, and non-discriminatory international trade.
    • Functions include administering trade agreements, resolving disputes, monitoring trade policies, and providing technical assistance.

    Value Addition

    • Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) Principle (Article I, GATT): WTO members must treat all trading partners equally unless an exception applies.
    • Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU): Discourages unilateral trade retaliation and requires members to resolve disputes through the WTO mechanism.
    • Relevance for India: Increasing use of unilateral tariffs by major economies can affect export competitiveness and test the credibility of the multilateral trading system.

    [2018, GS2, 15 marks] What are the key areas of reform if the WTO has to survive in the present context of ‘Trade War’, especially keeping in mind the interest of India?”

  • NSA hosts 7th meeting of Colombo Security Conclave in Delhi

    Why In The News?

    At the 7th NSA-level Colombo Security Conclave meeting, member states prioritised cooperation on five pillars: maritime security, counterterrorism and radicalisation, trafficking and transnational crime, cybersecurity and critical infrastructure protection, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, aiming to strengthen regional security coordination.

    About Colombo Security Conclave (CSC):

    • Regional Grouping: A security platform comprising India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives, and Mauritius; Seychelles is an observer.
    • Objective: To enhance regional security and address transnational threats of common concern.
    • Origin: Began in 2011 as the Trilateral Maritime Security Cooperation between India, Maldives, Sri Lanka.
    • Hiatus: Became inactive after 2014 due to India-Maldives tensions.
    • Revival: Rebranded as CSC in 2020; Mauritius and later Bangladesh joined.
    • Participation: Involves NSAs and Deputy NSAs of member states.
    • Key Areas of Cooperation:
      • Maritime safety and security
      • Counterterrorism and radicalisation
      • Combating trafficking and transnational organised crime
      • Cybersecurity and protection of critical infrastructure
      • Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
    [UPSC 2017] Consider the following in respect of Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS)

    1. Inaugural IONS was held in India in 2015 under the chairmanship of the Indian Navy.

    2. IONS is a voluntary initiative that seeks to increase maritime co-operation among navies of the littoral states of the Indian Ocean Region.

    Which of the above statements is/are correct ? (a) 1 only (b) 2 only* (c) Both 1 and 2 (d) Neither 1 nor 2

     

  • India recorded the highest GHGs emissions for 2024

    Why in the News?

    The United Nations Environment Programme’s (UNEP) 2024 Emission Gap Report (“Off Target”) released before COP30, says India saw the world’s largest rise in greenhouse gas emissions in 2024, adding 165 MtCO₂e.

    India recorded the highest GHGs emissions for 2024

    About the Emission Gap Report:

    • Overview: It is an annual flagship publication by UNEP that measures the gap between current national emission pledges (NDCs) and the cuts required to meet the Paris Agreement goals of limiting global warming to 1.5°C or 2°C.
    • Purpose: Evaluates global progress, national commitments, and policy effectiveness, recommending actions to close the “emissions gap.”
    • Scope: Assesses emissions from energy, land use, and industry, comparing policy trajectories with required emission reduction pathways.

    Key highlights of the 2024 Edition- “Off Target”:

    • Core Message: Warns that the world remains far off track to achieve the 1.5°C limit.
    • Global Emissions: Hit a record 57.7 gigatonnes CO₂ equivalent (GtCO₂e) in 2024, a 2.3% rise from 2023.
    • Warming Projections:
      • Current policies → ~2.8°C by 2100.
      • Full NDC implementation → only 2.3–2.5°C limit.
    • G20 Role: Account for 77% of global emissions, led by China, USA, India, EU, Russia, and Indonesia.
    • NDC Submission: Only 64 countries (63% of global emissions) updated their NDCs by 2024; most G20 nations off-track for 2030–2035 goals.
    • Sectoral Breakdown:
      • Fossil fuels – 69% of total emissions.
      • Methane – 16%.
      • Land-use change – significant share of increase.
    • Temperature Outlook: Predicts a temporary overshoot of 1.5°C by the early 2030s without rapid global action.

    India-Specific Findings:

    • Emission Growth: India saw the largest absolute rise in 2024, +165 MtCO₂e, the world’s highest single-country increase.
    • Growth Rate: 3.6%, second only to Indonesia (4.6%).
    • Per Capita Emissions: 3 tCO₂e, less than half the global average (6.4 tCO₂e).
    • Global Ranking: 3rd-largest emitter, after China and the USA.
    • NDC Commitments: Aims to reduce emission intensity by 45% (2005–2030) and achieve 50% non-fossil energy capacity by 2030.
    • Progress: Overachieved by 15% on emission intensity but has not submitted an updated 2025 NDC.
    • COP30 Outlook: India’s rapid emission rise and missed NDC update may invite scrutiny, though low per capita emissions and developmental equity support its climate position.
    [UPSC 2024] Consider the following statements:
    I. Carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions in India are less than 0.5 t CO2/capita.
    II. In terms of CO2 emissions from fuel combustion, India ranks second in Asia-Pacific region.
    III. Electricity and heat producers are the largest sources of CO2 emissions in India.
    Which of the statements given above is/are correct?
    (a) I and III only (b) II only (c) II and III only * (d) I, II and III

     

  • Financial Sector Assessment (FSA) Report by World Bank

    Why in the News?

    The World Bank’s November 2025 Financial Sector Assessment (FSA) Report says India must deepen financial reforms and boost private capital to reach its $30 trillion economy goal by 2047.

    What is the Financial Sector Assessment (FSA) Report?

    • Overview: It is a joint evaluation by the IMF and World Bank under the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP), launched in 1999 to review a country’s financial stability and institutional soundness.
    • Objective: Assesses the resilience, inclusiveness, and stability of the financial system, analysing how well it supports sustainable and equitable growth.
    • Scope: Covers banks, NBFCs, insurance, capital markets, and payment systems, along with regulation, supervision, and crisis management frameworks.
    • Methodology: Uses stress tests, policy diagnostics, and supervisory assessments to evaluate financial soundness and regulatory effectiveness.
    • Frequency: Conducted every 5–7 years, tracking policy reforms and emerging risks in both advanced and emerging economies.

    Key Highlights: India’s FSA Report 2025

    • Improved Stability: Found India’s financial system more diversified, inclusive, and resilient than in 2017, aided by regulatory reforms.
    • Reform Success: Credited India for recovering from the 2010s banking crisis and COVID-19 shocks through RBI’s tighter supervision of banks and NBFCs.
    • Regulatory Strengthening: Praised the extension of RBI’s authority over cooperative banks and scale-based regulation for NBFCs.
    • Digital Financial Inclusion: Highlighted India’s UPI, Aadhaar, and Jan Dhan ecosystem as global benchmarks for financial access and gender inclusion.
    • Capital Market Expansion: Reported capital markets’ size rising from 144% to 175% of GDP since 2017, driven by investor confidence and strong infrastructure.
    • Policy Recommendations: Advised improving credit-risk management, developing conduct-risk oversight for mutual funds, and empowering self-regulatory bodies.
    • Private Capital Mobilization: Urged creation of credit-enhancement and securitization platforms to attract global long-term investors.
    • Strategic Vision: Emphasized that continued reforms, deeper markets, and financial integration are essential to achieving India’s $30 trillion economy goal by 2047.
    [UPSC 2015] Which one of the following issues the ‘Global Economic Prospects’ report periodically?
    Options:
    (a) The Asian Development Bank
    (b) The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
    (c) The US Federal Reserve Bank
    (d) The World Bank*

     

  • Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO)

    Why in the News?

    China has rejected President Trump’s claim of secret nuclear tests, reaffirming its commitment to the CTBT amid renewed U.S. calls for nuclear testing and revived Cold War–style tensions.

    About Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO):

    • Establishment: Formed in 1996 under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) to build and operate a verification regime ensuring compliance with the global ban on nuclear explosions.
    • Headquarters: Vienna, Austria.
    • Mandate: To monitor adherence to the CTBT through a global verification system capable of detecting any nuclear test anywhere in the world.
    • Verification System: Operates the International Monitoring System (IMS) with 337 facilities, including seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound, and radionuclide stations to detect underground, underwater, or atmospheric nuclear tests.
    • Data Centre: The International Data Centre (IDC) analyses and distributes real-time data to member states, providing early warning of suspicious activities.
    • Preparatory Commission: Functions until the CTBT formally enters into force, maintaining operational readiness and supporting states’ verification capabilities.
    • Scientific Applications: The IMS also contributes to tsunami warning systems, atmospheric research, and disaster response, reinforcing the CTBTO’s global utility beyond disarmament.

    Back2Basics: How are CTBT and NPT related?

    • Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) are closely linked pillars of the global nuclear arms control regime:
      1. Shared Goal: Both aim to prevent nuclear proliferation and promote disarmament.
      2. Scope Difference: The NPT focuses on stopping the spread of nuclear weapons and promoting peaceful nuclear use; the CTBT bans all nuclear explosions for any purpose.
      3. Chronological Link: The NPT (1970) came first, creating the legal framework for non-proliferation; the CTBT (1996) built on it by prohibiting testing, reinforcing the NPT’s disarmament pillar.
      4. Verification and Compliance: The CTBT adds technical verification through the International Monitoring System, complementing NPT’s safeguards under the IAEA.
      5. Disarmament Pathway: Ratification of the CTBT is often viewed as a key step toward fulfilling Article VI of the NPT, which obliges nuclear powers to pursue disarmament.

    Status of the Treaty and Ratification Gap:

    • Adoption: It was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1996 and opened for signature on September 24, 1996.
    • Membership: As of 2025, 187 states have signed and 178 have ratified the treaty.
    • Enforcement: It will become legally binding only after 44 specific “Annex 2” states, those with nuclear technology at the time ratify it.
    • Pending Ratifications: Eight critical states have not ratified the treaty- China, Egypt, Iran, Israel, and the United States (signatories but unratified), and India, Pakistan, and North Korea (non-signatories).
    • Recent Setback: In 2023, Russia revoked its ratification, though it continues to observe a testing moratorium, weakening the treaty’s political momentum.
    • Global Compliance: Despite legal limbo, a de facto moratorium on nuclear testing has largely held since the 1990s; only North Korea has violated it with tests since 2006.
    • Significance: The CTBT remains a cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime, its verification network providing both deterrence and transparency even without formal legal enforcement.
    [UPSC 2015] Consider the following countries:

    1.  China 2. France 3. India 4. Israel 5. Pakistan

    Which among the above are Nuclear Weapons States as recognized by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, commonly known as Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)?

    (a) 1 and 2 only * (b) 1, 3, 4 and 5 only  (c) 2, 4 and 5 only  (d) 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5