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  • An institution in freefall: Parliament is all dressed up with nowhere to go

    Why in the News

    The recently concluded session of Parliament ended in sustained disruption rather than debate, with sitting time, public money and scrutiny all lost. The deadlock has exposed a single conflict: disruption is now the Opposition’s only means of being heard, and it is also what is emptying the institution of purpose.

    Which parliamentary instruments does disruption trade away, and what replaces them?

    1. Question Hour: The first hour of a sitting is set aside for members to question ministers on the working of their departments. Supplementary questions asked on the floor are the point of pressure, since the minister cannot prepare for them in advance.
    2. Zero Hour: The period immediately after Question Hour allows a member to raise a constituency or local matter without prior notice. It is an Indian innovation and finds no mention in the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha.
    3. Rule 377: Rule 377 lets a member place on record a matter of public importance that no other procedural device covers. The member reads a short submission, no discussion follows, and the concerned ministry responds separately.
    4. Debate on a bill: Members place their views on a bill on record before the House votes on it. A bill passed amid noise goes through without that record ever being created.
    5. Calling attention motion: Under Rule 197 a member draws a minister’s attention to a matter of urgent public importance, and the minister must make a statement in reply. It is a one member device and needs no supporting members.
    6. Adjournment motion: Under Rule 56 a member seeks to set aside the entire day’s listed business to discuss a definite matter of urgent public importance. Fifty members must rise when the Chair reads the notice, and the motion ends in a vote.
    7. Short duration discussion: Under Rule 193 a member with two supporters seeks a discussion on an urgent matter of public importance, running to no more than two and a half hours. It concludes without a vote.
    8. No confidence motion: Under Rule 198 a member of the Lok Sabha moves against the entire Council of Ministers, and fifty members must rise for leave to be granted. It states no reasons and is decided by a simple majority of members present and voting.
    9. Rule 373 and Rule 374: Under Rule 373 the Speaker directs a grossly disorderly member to withdraw for the remainder of the day’s sitting. Under Rule 374 the Speaker names a member who persistently obstructs business, and the House then votes on suspension.
    10. Rule 374A: Inserted in 2001, it suspends a member automatically for five consecutive sittings or the remainder of the session, whichever is less, for entering the well or persisting in disorder after a warning. No motion is moved and no vote is taken.

    Why has the working relationship between government and Opposition broken down?

    1. Courtesy across the benches: Atal Bihari Vajpayee recounted the courtesy shown to him by the first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, when he sat as a young Opposition backbencher. That civility operated independently of political disagreement.
    2. Care extended to a political rival: Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi arranged for the same Opposition member to receive medical treatment in the United States.
    3. An Opposition member sent to represent India: Prime Minister P V Narasimha Rao despatched that Opposition member to Geneva to represent India at a critical United Nations (UN) summit on Kashmir.
    4. Mutual demonisation: Each side now claims sole possession of virtue and writes the other off as beyond redemption. Dissent is branded anti national by the ruling side.
    5. The Opposition’s self image: The Opposition presents itself as an outnumbered force fighting a ruthless and better resourced establishment, using the Mahabharata’s image of the Pandavas ranged against the Kauravas.
    6. The presumption of good faith: Democratic functioning rests on the belief that a rival cares about national welfare even where it disagrees profoundly on method. Treating adversaries as existential enemies removes the common ground that governance requires.

    Is disruption the Opposition’s last instrument of accountability or the thing destroying Parliament?

    1. Disruption as the only remaining lever: An Opposition refused a hearing on the issues it names has no procedural route left, so it withholds the House’s ability to function at all. The tactic is defended as the enforcement of executive accountability.
    2. The same tactic as the injury: Every sitting lost to organised shouting removes the scrutiny the Opposition claims to be defending. The instrument and the damage are the same act.
    3. The case argued from the Opposition benches: The charge that disruption is hollowing out Parliament is pressed by a fourth term Opposition member of the Lok Sabha, not from the treasury benches. It places the Opposition’s own tactic under scrutiny by someone who depends on it.
    4. Reciprocal hypocrisy: Leaders who championed parliamentary obstruction as a vital accountability tool in Opposition treated it as an unpardonable sin once in office. The Opposition, having suffered those tactics for years, rejects the argument now made against them.
    5. The operating code: The reciprocity of the traditional golden rule has been replaced by a rule of retaliation, doing to the other side what was done to one’s own.
    6. A collective failure: The breakdown of democratic trust cannot be assigned to one side. Both have used the same instrument and both have condemned it from the opposite bench.

    Why does poor parliamentary performance carry no electoral cost?

    1. Re-election turns on other things: Members are elected and re-elected for reasons that have almost nothing to do with their performance in the House. Voters judge them on constituency services rendered and on raw local political strength.
    2. Debating skill has no electoral value: The ability to press a minister during Question Hour or to take apart a flawed bill does not convert into votes. That removes any incentive to acquire the skill.
    3. Talent has moved to the studio: The debating ability that would once have been displayed on the floor of the House is now displayed in television studios. The audience that rewards it is not in the chamber.
    4. Party whips direct the disruption: Members are corralled into the well of the House to disrupt proceedings through organised shouting rather than reasoned debate. The instruction comes from the party, not from the individual member.
    5. Parties reward aggression over excellence: By issuing that instruction, party leaderships signal that partisan aggression is valued far above parliamentary skill. The signal then shapes who rises within the party.

    What is lost when the politics of the street occupies the space of parliamentary politics?

    1. Two distinct political skills: Parties once valued mass mobilisation, the politics of the street, and debating prowess, the politics of Parliament, as separate competences. Leaders were assessed on both.
    2. One has displaced the other: The politics of the street has moved inside the chamber, leaving the politics of Parliament with no place to operate.
    3. Consequence for national consensus: Democratic discourse is impoverished and agreement across parties on any question of national progress becomes unattainable.
    4. Committees still function: Substantive work continues in parliamentary committees, which meet away from the media glare and without cameras. The absence of cameras removes the premium that disruptive grandstanding otherwise carries.
    5. What the public actually sees: The visible record is disruption, the absence of dialogue and a complete breakdown in communication. Disillusionment with the functioning of Parliament is rife across the country.

    How has the executive reduced Parliament’s place in the constitutional scheme?

    1. Contempt for the legislature: The government prefers to ride roughshod over the Opposition rather than engage it, and treats accommodation of even some of its demands as unnecessary.
    2. Attendance of the head of government: The first Prime Minister attended Parliament daily and treated it as the beating heart of Indian democracy. The current Prime Minister is rarely present in the House.
    3. From consultative chamber to noticeboard: Parliament’s function has shifted from deliberation to the announcement of decisions the executive has already taken.
    4. From scrutiny to legalisation: The House is used to give legal form to those decisions rather than to test them. That converts the vote into a formality.
    5. Custodians permitting the hollowing out: The institution is being emptied of purpose by the very people responsible for protecting it. The end point is a public that no longer misses it once it is rendered meaningless.

    Do other parliamentary democracies show that guaranteed Opposition time is workable?

    1. The comparative reference is general: The proposal of dedicated Opposition time is described only as successfully used elsewhere, with no country named and no design detail supplied. The comparative case therefore rests on the standing practice of other Westminster legislatures.
    2. United Kingdom, Opposition Days: Standing Order No. 14 of the House of Commons reserves twenty days in each session for Opposition business. Seventeen are at the disposal of the Leader of the Opposition and three at the disposal of the second largest Opposition party.
    3. Canada, allotted days: The House of Commons sets aside a fixed number of allotted days in each supply period on which an Opposition party chooses the subject of debate. A motion moved on such a day may be made votable.
    4. Australia, Matter of Public Importance: The House of Representatives sets aside time on sitting days for a Matter of Public Importance proposed in writing to the Speaker. The discussion is time limited and ends without a vote.
    5. The common design feature: In each case the time is fixed by standing order rather than negotiated session by session. The Opposition’s access does not depend on the government’s willingness in a given week.

    What would restore the balance between contestation and cooperation?

    1. Conviction during elections, cooperation after: Democratic functioning requires fierce ideological conviction at the time of an election and active cooperation once the ballots are cast.
    2. National interest above partisan rivalry: Where both sides concur that national interests outrank party rivalries, governance shifts from zero sum obstructionism to constructive collaboration.
    3. Not an abandonment of ideology: The approach requires no party to give up its ideology or its principles. Parties offer different routes to the same destination of national welfare, safety and prosperity.
    4. A fixed slot for the Opposition: Granting the Opposition one day a week, or two hours a day, to raise any issue it deems essential would let the rest of Parliament’s business proceed undisturbed.
    5. The missing ingredient is willingness: The compromise needs no constitutional amendment and no new institution. It needs a government prepared to imagine and concede the time.

    Conclusion

    Parliament’s decline is a failure of the presumption of good faith between government and Opposition, not a failure of procedure, and disruption has become both the Opposition’s only instrument and the agent of the institution’s hollowing out. The remedy identified is small and does not require a constitutional change. It requires guaranteed time in which the Opposition can be heard, and a government willing to concede it. Without that concession the House will continue to meet, pass bills and adjourn, and the deliberative function that gives it authority will not survive.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2017] The Parliament of India exercises control over the functions of the Council of Ministers through 1. Adjournment motion 2. Question hour 3. Supplementary questions Select the correct answer using the code given below: (a) 1 only (b) 2 and 3 only (c) 1 and 3 only (d) 1, 2 and 3 Answer: (d)”

    “[2020] Consider the following statements: 1. The President of India can summon a session of the Parliament at such place as he/she thinks fit. 2. The Constitution of India provides for three sessions of the Parliament in a year, but it is not mandatory to conduct all three sessions. 3. There is no minimum number of days of that the Parliament is required to meet in a year. Which of the statements given above is/are correct? (a) 1 only (b) 2 only (c) 1 and 3 only (d) 2 and 3 only Answer: (c)”

    “[2014] Consider the following statements regarding a No-Confidence Motion in India: 1. There is no mention of a No-Confidence Motion in the Constitution of India. 2. A motion of No-Confidence can be introduced in the Lok Sabha only. Which of the statements given above is/are correct? (a) 1 only (b) 2 only (c) Both 1 and 2 (d) Neither 1 nor 2 Answer: (c)”

    “[2021, GS2, 10 marks] To what extent, in your view, the Parliament is able to ensure accountability of the executive in India?”

    “[2019, GS2, 15 marks] Individual Parliamentarian’s role as the national lawmaker is on a decline, which in turn, has adversely impacted the quality of debates and their outcome. Discuss.”

    “[2024, GS2, 10 marks] “The growth of cabinet system has practically resulted in the marginalisation of the parliamentary supremacy.” Elucidate.”

    “[2013, GS2, 10 marks] The role of individual MPs (Members of Parliament) has diminished over the years and as a result healthy constructive debates on policy issues are not usually witnessed. How far can this be attributed to the anti-defection law, which was legislated but with a different intention?”

  • [20th August 2026] The Hindu OpED: A Palestinian state is the foundation for regional peace

    Question (2018, GS2): “India’s relations with Israel have, of late, acquired a depth and diversity, which cannot be rolled back. Discuss.”
    Linkage: This question directly evaluates India’s strategic partnership with Israel. Historically, India’s West Asia policy was heavily anchored in support for the Palestinian cause and the two-state solution. This question asks candidates to analyze how India’s relations with Israel have de-hyphenated from its stance on Palestine, expanding into robust defense, agricultural, and technological cooperation.

    Mentor Comment:

    United Nations Security Council Resolution 2803, adopted in November 2025, established a Board of Peace for Gaza, and its annex acknowledges a credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood once Gaza redevelopment advances and Palestinian Authority reform is carried out. The tension this exposes is that every subsidiary conflict in West Asia turns on a Palestinian state that the war since October 2023 has pushed further out of reach.

    What is the two-state solution, and what does it actually require?

    1. Core formula: The two-state solution proposes two sovereign states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side in defined borders with mutual recognition.
    2. The asymmetry inside the phrase: One of the two states already exists, so the operative task is not maintaining a balance but creating a second state that does not yet exist.
    3. The three qualifying tests: A Palestinian state must be sovereign, independent and viable, meaning it must control its own territory, conduct its own external relations and possess an economic base capable of sustaining a state.
    4. The claimed consequence: Peace and stability in the region are treated as unattainable until this second state comes into being.

    What is Resolution 2803 and the Board of Peace?

    1. Instrument: United Nations Security Council Resolution 2803, adopted in November 2025, set up a Board of Peace (BoP) as the transitional oversight mechanism for the Gaza Strip.
    2. The statehood clause: Its annex states that while Gaza redevelopment advances and the Palestinian Authority (PA) reform programme is faithfully carried out, conditions may finally be in place for a credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood.

    Why are the region’s separate conflicts treated as one unresolved question?

    1. Gaza: Israel’s war on Gaza is framed not as a discrete security operation but as the most violent expression of an unsettled sovereignty question.
    2. Hezbollah: Hezbollah began launching rockets and missiles at Israel immediately after Israel’s Gaza campaign opened following 7 October 2023, tying the northern front directly to the Palestinian question.
    3. Iran: The Iran war, Iranian arms supply to Hezbollah and Iranian hostility to Israel are held to rest on the denial of Palestinian self-determination rather than on theological difference.
    4. The Houthi factor: The Houthi phenomenon in the Red Sea is treated as a further derivative of the same unresolved dispute.
    5. Arab normalisation: Israel’s relations with its Arab neighbours will remain strained until it accepts the reality of a Palestinian state, in the same way Arab states have reconciled to the reality of Israel.
    6. The secondary issues: Once an irreversible road map to Palestinian statehood is accepted by all parties, disputes such as freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz become far easier to resolve.

    What are the historical roots of regional hostility towards Israel?

    1. The Balfour Declaration, 1917: British support for a Jewish homeland in Palestine expressly limited the indigenous Arab population to civil and religious rights, converting a holy land claim into a homeland project.
    2. The founding grievance: Hostility rests on the fact that Israel was created and imposed on the region at the expense of the indigenous Arab population.
    3. The 1947 partition offer: Palestinians were offered a state under the United Nations resolution of 1947 and on later occasions and rejected each offer, a record an Israeli Foreign Minister summarised as the Arabs never missing an opportunity to miss an opportunity.
    4. The counter-reading of that rejection: Rejection of a partial offer by a party that holds the underlying title is treated as a defensible refusal rather than as proof of intransigence, since the Zionist slogan itself described the territory as land without people for a people without land.
    5. The Holocaust and western guilt: Israel’s creation is attributed substantially to the Holocaust and to the sense of guilt felt by western countries, most of which, including the United States, had barred the entry of Jews fleeing Nazi Germany.
    6. No inherited religious enmity: Islam and Judaism carry no record of perpetual enmity, since the Koran names prophets and patriarchs from the Hebrew bible including Moses and Abraham, the Crusades were fought between Muslims and Christians with Jews not party to them, Jews were persecuted in countries professing Christianity, and the Arabs bore no responsibility for the Holocaust carried out by Nazi Germany and its collaborators.

    Why does a Shia axis support a Sunni movement?

    1. The alignment: Hezbollah, a Shia movement, and Iran, a Shia-majority country, both support Hamas, a Sunni movement.
    2. The explanation: The alignment rests on a shared commitment to the right of self-determination for the Palestinian people rather than on sectarian affinity.
    3. Where Israel sits in that logic: Israel attracts hostility as the only power standing in the way of an independent Palestine, not as a religious adversary.
    4. Iran was not always hostile: Under the Shah, Iran’s relations with Israel were cordial and a sizeable Jewish community lived in Iran.
    5. The residual community: About 15,000 Jews remain in Iran, and Iran’s Constitution reserves a seat for the Jewish community in Parliament.
    6. The conditional off-ramp: If Israel accepts a Palestinian state, Hezbollah loses its stated reason to disrupt life in northern Israel and Iran loses its reason to supply Hezbollah with weapons.

    Why has the war since October 2023 pushed statehood further away rather than closer?

    1. Collapse of domestic support: Whatever limited support existed within Israel for the concept of a Palestinian state has evaporated since the Hamas terrorist attack on Israeli civilians in October 2023.
    2. The cost of the response: Israel’s disproportionate and ruthless strikes on Gaza after 7 October have almost isolated Israel internationally.
    3. The physical precondition destroyed: The Gaza Strip has been devastated, and with it the territorial and administrative base on which a Palestinian state would have to be built.
    4. The time horizon pushed out: The possibility of Palestine emerging has receded by many years and possibly decades.
    5. The resulting deadlock: Peace and stability in the region have become an illusion precisely because the instrument that was to deliver security has removed the conditions for a settlement.
    6. The development cost: Without peace and stability, the region’s people cannot realise the development potential that new technologies offer.

    Why is external mediation, not bilateral negotiation, the only viable route?

    1. The bargaining asymmetry: The stronger side normally insists on a bilateral approach and the weaker side prefers an outside agency, which is why Israel has insisted on bilateral talks while simultaneously saying there is no one on the other side to negotiate with.
    2. The only power with leverage: The United States is the only external power with the required influence and residual goodwill with both sides.
    3. The honest broker objection answered: No broker is genuinely honest, but even a non-honest broker can sell a transaction to the satisfaction, or the equal dissatisfaction, of both parties.
    4. The single precedent that worked: The only period of real progress came with the Oslo Accord of 1993, negotiated through the mediation and good offices of Norway.
    5. What Oslo produced: Under Oslo the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) formally recognised Israel and the Palestinian Authority was created, and it is a reformed version of that Authority that is now proposed as a caretaker government of Palestine.
    6. Oslo’s downstream effects: The Accords paved the way for Jordan’s recognition of Israel and eventually for the Abraham Accords.
    7. The second broker: The United Nations remains the other viable mediator, and although Israel has declared the United Nations Secretary-General persona non grata, Israel owes its existence to the United Nations, and positions in international relations evolve with situations.
    8. The leadership obstacle: The current Israeli Prime Minister voted against the Oslo Accords and remains opposed to the idea of a Palestinian state.

    Conclusion

    The West Asian conflict system is not a set of separate wars but one unresolved sovereignty question, and every subsidiary conflict persists because a sovereign, independent and viable Palestinian state has not been created. Resolution 2803 has restored a conditional pathway to statehood in Security Council language, but the material base for that state in Gaza has been destroyed. What remains unaddressed is the absence of leadership on any side willing to accept mediation and convert a conditional pathway into an irreversible road map.

    What is the Right of Self-Determination in International Law?

    1. About: Self-determination is the right of a people to freely determine their political status and pursue their economic, social and cultural development.
    2. Rationale: It exists to convert the political fact of a distinct people under external or alien rule into a legal claim, so that statehood does not depend solely on the consent of the controlling power.
    3. Charter basis: It is recorded in Article 1(2) and Article 55 of the United Nations Charter and in Common Article 1 of the two 1966 International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
    4. External self-determination: The right of a people to determine its international status, including independence, association or integration with another state.
    5. Internal self-determination: The right of a people to choose its own government and to pursue development within an existing state, without a claim to secession.
    6. Uti possidetis juris: The principle that new states inherit the administrative boundaries existing at the moment of independence, which limits the redrawing of borders by force.

    Key Concerns Regarding the Right of Self-Determination

    1. Conflict with territorial integrity: The right runs directly against the principle of territorial integrity of existing states, and international law provides no settled test for which prevails.
    2. No agreed definition of a people: There is no accepted legal test for what constitutes a people entitled to the right, which allows both over-claiming and denial.
    3. Selective recognition: Recognition of statehood is a political act by individual states, so identical factual situations attract different outcomes depending on great power alignment.
    4. Enforcement gap: A recognised right of self-determination carries no enforcement mechanism where the controlling power is protected by a Security Council veto.
    5. Viability threshold: A territory may satisfy the legal criteria for statehood yet lack contiguous territory, revenue base or control over borders, leaving nominal sovereignty without effective sovereignty.

    Key Milestones in the Palestine Question

    1. 1917: The Balfour Declaration records British support for a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine.
    2. 1947: United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181 proposes partition of Mandate Palestine into an Arab and a Jewish state with Jerusalem under international administration.
    3. 1948: The State of Israel is declared, followed by the first Arab-Israeli war.
    4. 1967: The Six Day War brings the West Bank, Gaza, East Jerusalem, the Golan Heights and Sinai under Israeli control, and Security Council Resolution 242 sets out the land for peace principle.
    5. 1993: The Oslo Accord, mediated by Norway, brings mutual recognition between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization and creates the Palestinian Authority.
    6. 1994: Jordan recognises Israel, following Egypt’s earlier recognition under the 1979 peace treaty.
    7. 2012: The United Nations General Assembly upgrades Palestine to a non-member observer State.
    8. 2020: The Abraham Accords normalise Israel’s relations with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, later extended to further states.
    9. 2025: Security Council Resolution 2803 creates the Board of Peace for Gaza and records a conditional pathway to Palestinian statehood.

    India’s Position on Palestine and the Two-State Solution

    Source: Backgrounder, India-Israel Relations Backgrounder.docx

    1. Long-standing principled support: India maintains a long-standing principled support for the Palestinian cause and for a negotiated two-state solution.
    2. De-hyphenation: India separates its Israel policy from its Palestine policy, engaging each on its own terms rather than treating support for one as opposition to the other.
    3. Recognition timeline: India recognised the State of Israel in 1950 but withheld full diplomatic relations for four decades, shaped by its support for the Palestinian cause, its ties with Arab states and its energy dependence on West Asia.
    4. Normalisation in 1992: Full diplomatic relations were established in January 1992, in the post-Cold War context and alongside India’s economic liberalisation.
    5. The 2017 signal: The first visit by an Indian Prime Minister to Israel, in July 2017, elevated the relationship to a Strategic Partnership and notably did not include Ramallah, which signalled de-hyphenation.
    6. Voting record: India has continued to vote for Palestinian causes at the United Nations even while deepening its ties with Israel.
    7. The Gulf balance: India’s energy imports, remittance inflows and a large diaspora in Gulf states require its Israel ties to be balanced against Arab partners.
    8. Strategic autonomy: India frames the Israel relationship as issue-based cooperation and not as alignment against any third party.

    Back2Basics: The Palestinian Authority

    1. Origin: The Palestinian Authority was created under the 1993 Oslo Accord as an interim self-governing body for parts of the West Bank and Gaza.
    2. Parent body: It was established by the Palestine Liberation Organization, which formally recognised Israel under the same Accord.
    3. Mandate: It exercises civil and, in designated areas, security administration, with the Oslo framework dividing the West Bank into Areas A, B and C by degree of Palestinian and Israeli control.
    4. Interim design: It was designed as a transitional arrangement pending a final status agreement covering borders, Jerusalem, refugees and settlements, which was never concluded.
    5. Current relevance: A reformed Palestinian Authority is the body named in Resolution 2803 as the vehicle through which a pathway to statehood would run.
    6. Territorial split: Its writ has not extended to Gaza since the 2007 split with Hamas, which is itself a constraint on any single Palestinian government.

    Challenges to a Two-State Settlement

    1. Absence of contiguous territory: A viable Palestinian state requires territorial contiguity that settlement expansion has progressively removed, e.g. the West Bank’s division into Areas A, B and C leaves Palestinian-administered zones as separated enclaves.
    2. Physical destruction of the state base: Reconstruction must precede governance, since the administrative and economic base has been destroyed, e.g. the devastation of the Gaza Strip after the campaign that followed 7 October 2023.
    3. Divided Palestinian leadership: No single Palestinian authority commands both territories, e.g. the Palestinian Authority governs parts of the West Bank while Gaza has been under Hamas control since 2007.
    4. Collapse of political constituencies: Domestic support for a Palestinian state has evaporated inside Israel, e.g. the shift in Israeli opinion after the Hamas attack on Israeli civilians in October 2023.
    5. Leadership opposition at the top: The settlement requires assent from leaders personally committed against it, e.g. the current Israeli Prime Minister voted against the Oslo Accords and remains opposed to Palestinian statehood.
    6. Veto-protected deadlock: Security Council action is constrained by permanent member vetoes, e.g. repeated vetoes of ceasefire and membership resolutions have prevented enforceable outcomes.
    7. Spoiler incentives on both flanks: Armed actors gain standing from continued conflict and lose it from a settlement, e.g. Hezbollah’s rocket campaign against northern Israel began only after the Gaza war opened.
    8. Refugee and Jerusalem questions unresolved: Final status issues deferred at Oslo remain untouched, e.g. the right of return and the status of East Jerusalem were left to a final agreement that was never negotiated.

    Way Forward

    1. Convert the conditional clause into a road map: Translate the Resolution 2803 annex language on a credible pathway into a sequenced, dated and irreversible road map accepted by all parties.
    2. Restore a single Palestinian administration: Complete the Palestinian Authority reform programme so that one reformed administration can serve as a caretaker government across both territories.
    3. Anchor mediation in an external broker: Retain United States mediation, supplemented by United Nations involvement, rather than allowing a return to bilateral talks that the bargaining asymmetry makes unproductive.
    4. Sequence reconstruction with governance: Tie Gaza reconstruction financing to the standing up of civil administration, policing and revenue functions, so that physical rebuilding creates state capacity rather than only shelter.
    5. Use regional normalisation as leverage: Make further Arab normalisation with Israel conditional on measurable progress on the statehood pathway, so the Abraham Accords framework reinforces rather than bypasses the Palestinian question.
    6. Sustain India’s dual-track engagement: Maintain principled support for a negotiated two-state solution alongside development assistance to Palestine and cooperation with Israel, which protects India’s standing across West Asia.

    “[2018] The term “two-state solution” is sometimes mentioned in the news in the context of the affairs of (a) China (b) Israel (c) Iraq (d) Yemen Answer: (b)”

  • Count caste by all means, but abandon the belief that counting settles anything

    Why in the News

    Survey evidence shows the recorded Other Backward Class share of India's population rising at a rate no human fertility can produce, which points to reclassification rather than births. The finding shifts the caste census debate from the design of the question to the incentives the question creates, since a self declared category that carries an entitlement will be answered strategically.

    What is the fertility test for auditing a group's growth?

    1. The logic: A group's population can rise only through births exceeding deaths, through migration, or through people newly identifying with it, so an implausible growth rate isolates reclassification as the cause.
    2. The demographic fingerprint: Fertility leaves a mark on the age structure, because a group growing through births must be over represented among children relative to adults.
    3. The diagnostic that follows: Where a group's share rises among adults as fast as among children, the growth is not coming from births, since adults are not born.
    4. Why it is decisive: The test needs no assumption about honesty, only the arithmetic relationship between fertility, age structure and growth.

    What is the Hutterite fertility benchmark?

    1. Who they are: The Hutterites are an Anabaptist community of the North American plains who married early, used no contraception, and had good nutrition and medical care.
    2. Why they are the benchmark: Their total fertility rate of 10.9 children per woman is treated as the outer limit of human fertility, and their population growth from 443 in 1880 to 8,542 by 1950, a rate of 4.32 percent a year, is the ceiling against which any other group's growth is indexed.

    What is the NSS and PLFS caste share series?

    1. What the surveys are: The National Sample Survey (NSS) and its successor, the Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS), are the government's large sample household surveys, which record the social group each household reports itself as belonging to.
    2. Why the series matters: These surveys are the only continuous national record of self reported caste category shares between censuses, so the trend in the OBC share is read from them.

    Why do the recorded OBC numbers imply impossible growth?

    1. The starting point: In 1999-2000, 35.7 percent of Indians said they were Other Backward Class.
    2. Five years on: By 2004-05, 40.9 percent did, while India's population grew at 1.8 percent a year.
    3. The implied rate: The OBC population moved from 357 million to 447 million in five years, a growth rate of 4.6 percent a year.
    4. The mirror movement: The General category, meaning those who are neither OBC nor Scheduled Caste nor Scheduled Tribe, fell from 359 million to 342 million, shrinking at 0.95 percent a year.
    5. Above the human ceiling: A rate of 4.6 percent a year exceeds the Hutterite rate of 4.32 percent, so on the survey evidence India's OBCs out reproduced the outer limit of human fertility.
    6. Not a five year aberration: Between 1999 and 2025 the OBC population nearly doubled, from 357 million to 674 million, while the General category shrank from 359 million to 350 million.
    7. The share of all growth: India added 456 million people over those 26 years, so a group that was 36 percent of the country in 1999 accounted for 70 percent of every person added since.

    What does the age structure show?

    1. The 2004 gap: The OBC share among children under 15 exceeded the OBC share among adults by just 2.0 percentage points.
    2. The 2025 gap: That gap had narrowed to 1.2 percentage points, even as the OBC share climbed a further five points.
    3. What real growth would look like: At Hutterite fertility, OBCs would account for three quarters of all births and be over represented among children by more than 30 percentage points.
    4. Even at a lower fertility: A total fertility rate of six would still require an over representation of 20 percentage points.
    5. A genuine differential for comparison: Muslims, who do have higher fertility, were over represented among children by 3.2 points in 2004, widening to 4.3 by 2025.
    6. The conclusion the data force: The OBC share is rising almost as fast among adults as among children, which is the signature of reclassification, not of births.

    Why would households reclassify?

    1. The entitlement attached to the answer: India allocates reserved places in education and public employment on the basis of caste category, so the category recorded carries a measurable benefit.
    2. The answer is self chosen: A survey or census question that asks for the category invites the respondent to select her own entitlement rather than state a fact about herself.
    3. No dishonesty is required: The claim is not about the honesty of Indians, it is the standard proposition that people respond to incentives.
    4. The response is invisible to the rule maker: Those who design the classification rarely observe the behavioural response the classification produces.
    5. The result for the data: The recorded category becomes a measure of the incentive structure rather than a measure of the population.

    What does the Christian and Sikh comparison show?

    1. The fertility baseline: Christians have the highest female education in India and among the lowest fertility, at 2.4 children per woman, against 2.8 for Hindus and 3.6 for Muslims on the 1998-99 National Family Health Survey.
    2. The only lower group: Sikhs were lower still, at 2.3 children per woman.
    3. What Sikhs did: Between 1991 and 2011 Sikhs grew at 1.2 percent a year, exactly as their fertility predicts.
    4. What Christians did: With virtually the same fertility, Christians grew at 1.9 percent a year, faster than Hindus and matching the national average.
    5. The arithmetic mismatch: Achieving that growth demographically would need a fertility rate near 3.3, not the recorded 2.4.
    6. The incentive behind it: A Christian of backward caste origin can sit on State and central OBC lists and claim reservation while simultaneously holding notified minority status with the institutional protections of Article 30, under which minority institutions set their own admissions and are exempt from quota obligations.
    7. The limit on that position: What such a person cannot claim is Scheduled Caste status, which is why the incentive runs towards the OBC and minority combination.
    8. The separate question: Whether that double classification is an anomaly or a form of justice is a distinct argument, but that it creates an incentive is not arguable.

    Where else does the same incentive logic appear?

    1. Capital leaving: Indian promoters sent a record 33.3 billion dollars abroad last year while domestic private investment stagnated.
    2. Investment falling: Net foreign direct investment has fallen to 0.18 percent of gross domestic product.
    3. The usual explanation rejected: The outcome is attributed to a failure of animal spirits, with appeals to industrialists to invest at home, though no participant is behaving badly.
    4. The dispute resolution cost: A firm choosing between a factory in India and one abroad faces a bilateral investment treaty requiring 60 months in Indian courts before arbitration can begin.
    5. The compliance cost: It faces 765 Quality Control Orders, against 14 in 2014.
    6. The market access cost: It faces no trade agreement with the United States, the market that absorbs 42 billion dollars of Indian exports.
    7. The common explanation: The firm responds exactly as the incentives instruct, and so do the households that discovered they were OBC in 2004.

    Does counting caste settle what it is meant to settle?

    1. The case for counting: India allocates education and employment on caste, so the state must know the distribution it is allocating against.
    2. What counting cannot do: A count of a self declared category measures the response to an entitlement, not the underlying social structure.
    3. The prior diagnosis it revises: An earlier commentary held that the caste census had been killed by the technical choice of an open ended question, which in 2011 produced 4.7 million caste names, and proposed a dropdown menu in its place.
    4. Why a dropdown is not the fix: Confusion about caste names is not the binding problem, the incentive attached to the category is, and a cleaner menu does not remove it.
    5. The tension stated plainly: The exercise must be conducted and its result must not be treated as settling the question of who is backward.

    How should the caste question be designed instead?

    1. Ask for the fact, not the entitlement: Ask for caste, sub caste and surname, and never for the category, so the respondent is not invited to choose her own entitlement.
    2. Move the classification downstream: Let the statistical office, with professional sociologists rather than commentators, map the responses to categories after enumeration.
    3. Publish the microdata: Release the unit level records so the mapping and its consequences can be independently checked.
    4. Audit every count against fertility: Test each group's recorded growth against the fertility its own surveys report, since a group whose growth requires Hutterite fertility has not grown.
    5. Treat the result as evidence, not verdict: Use the count as one input into allocation decisions rather than as a settlement of the claim to backwardness.

    Challenges to relying on self reported caste data

    1. The category is self selected: A question that offers the reservation category records the choice, not the identity. e.g. the OBC share rose 5.2 percentage points between 1999-2000 and 2004-05 with no corresponding change in the age structure.
    2. The age structure test is not applied: Statistical offices publish category shares without checking them against the fertility those shares would require. e.g. an OBC growth rate of 4.6 percent a year exceeds the Hutterite ceiling of 4.32 percent and was published unremarked.
    3. Multiple classifications can be held at once: A person can hold benefits flowing from two separate classifications simultaneously. e.g. a Christian of backward caste origin can hold OBC listing along with minority status protected by Article 30.
    4. State lists differ from the central list: The same community may be backward in one jurisdiction and not in another, so a national count is not additive. e.g. the 105th Constitutional Amendment, 2021 was enacted to restore the States' power to maintain their own backward class lists.
    5. Microdata is withheld: Without unit level records, no independent check on the classification is possible. e.g. the raw caste data of the 2011 Socio Economic and Caste Census were never released.
    6. Counting raises the stakes of the count: Publication of group shares immediately becomes an argument for revising quota percentages. e.g. State caste surveys have been followed by demands to raise reservation beyond the 50 percent ceiling.
    7. Survey and census definitions diverge: Survey social group codes and census caste entries are not the same instrument, so the two series cannot be spliced. e.g. the NSS records four social group codes while the Census will record open ended caste names.

    Conclusion

    The recorded growth of India's Other Backward Classes is arithmetically impossible as a demographic event and is explicable only as reclassification in response to entitlement. The same logic explains the Christian growth rate that fertility cannot support and the investment that leaves a jurisdiction charging 60 months of litigation and 765 Quality Control Orders. Counting caste is still necessary, because the state allocates on caste and must know what it is allocating against. What must be abandoned is the belief that the count settles the question, since a self declared count measures the incentive as much as the population.

    What are the Other Backward Classes?

    1. About: Other Backward Classes are communities identified by the state as socially and educationally backward, distinct from the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, and entitled to reservation in education and public employment.
    2. Rationale: The category exists to extend substantive equality to groups whose backwardness arises from social and educational disadvantage rather than from untouchability or geographical isolation.
    3. The identification test: Backwardness is determined on social, educational and economic indicators, with caste permitted as a starting point but not as the sole criterion.
    4. The named typology in use:
    5. Central List: Maintained by the Union government for reservation in central government posts and central educational institutions, now referenced by Article 342A.
    6. State Lists: Maintained by each State for its own posts and institutions, with membership frequently differing from the Central List.
    7. Creamy layer: The economically advanced section within an OBC household, excluded from reservation, with the income and status criteria revised periodically.
    8. The reservation quantum: 27 percent of central government posts and central educational institution seats are reserved for non creamy layer OBCs.

    Key Concerns Regarding the Other Backward Classes Framework

    1. Absence of an authoritative count: No caste wise population figure for OBCs has been published since 1931, so the 27 percent quantum rests on an estimate rather than a count.
    2. Unequal distribution within the category: A small number of dominant communities capture a disproportionate share of reserved places, which is the basis of the sub categorisation demand.
    3. Self declaration and the creamy layer: Creamy layer exclusion relies on income and status certificates whose verification is weak, so the exclusion is imperfectly enforced.
    4. Pressure on the 50 percent ceiling: Successive State enactments raising total reservation above the ceiling laid down in Indra Sawhney have been struck down, leaving the demand unresolved.
    5. Confusion between category and caste: Administrative records capture the reservation category rather than the community, which prevents any assessment of which communities the benefit actually reaches.
    6. Federal friction over list making: The power to identify backward classes moved between the Union and the States through the 102nd and 105th Constitutional Amendments, leaving two parallel lists in operation.

    Constitutional Provisions Related to Caste Based Classification

    1. Article 15(4): Enables the State to make special provision for socially and educationally backward classes and for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.
    2. Article 15(5): Enables reservation in admission to private educational institutions, aided or unaided, excluding minority institutions.
    3. Article 15(6) and Article 16(6): Inserted by the 103rd Constitutional Amendment, 2019, providing 10 percent reservation for economically weaker sections.
    4. Article 16(4): Enables reservation in appointments for any backward class not adequately represented in State services.
    5. Article 16(4A) and 16(4B): Provide for reservation in promotion with consequential seniority for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, and for carrying forward unfilled reserved vacancies.
    6. Article 30: Guarantees minorities the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice, the provision that exempts minority institutions from quota obligations.
    7. Article 335: Requires that claims of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes be considered consistently with the maintenance of efficiency of administration.
    8. Article 338B: Establishes the National Commission for Backward Classes as a constitutional body, inserted by the 102nd Constitutional Amendment, 2018.
    9. Article 340: Empowers the President to appoint a Commission to investigate the conditions of socially and educationally backward classes.
    10. Article 342A: Provides for the Central List of socially and educationally backward classes, with the 105th Constitutional Amendment, 2021 restoring the States' power to maintain their own lists.

    Commissions and Official Initiatives on Backward Classes

    1. Kalelkar Commission, 1953: The first Backward Classes Commission appointed under Article 340, whose report was not acted upon by the Union government.
    2. Mandal Commission, 1979: The second Backward Classes Commission, which reported in 1980 and recommended 27 percent reservation for OBCs, implemented from 1990.
    3. National Commission for Backward Classes: Set up in 1993 following the Indra Sawhney judgment, given constitutional status in 2018 by the 102nd Constitutional Amendment.
    4. Rohini Commission, 2017: Appointed under Article 340 to examine sub categorisation of OBCs within the 27 percent quota, so that benefits are distributed more evenly across communities.
    5. Creamy layer income ceiling revisions: Periodic revisions by the Department of Personnel and Training of the income and status criteria that exclude the advanced section within OBCs.
    6. National Family Health Survey and Periodic Labour Force Survey: The two national survey instruments that carry social group identifiers and are the source of the caste category share series between censuses.

    Key Facts about Caste, Reservation and Fertility Data

    1. The 50 percent ceiling on total reservation was laid down in Indra Sawhney v Union of India (1992), which also introduced the creamy layer exclusion for OBCs.
    2. 27 percent is the OBC reservation in central government posts and central educational institutions, and 10 percent is the economically weaker sections quota introduced in 2019.
    3. 1931 was the last Census whose caste data were released, recording 4,147 castes.
    4. Replacement level fertility is a total fertility rate of about 2.1 children per woman, the level at which a generation exactly replaces itself once child mortality is accounted for.
    5. India's total fertility rate fell to 2.0 in the fifth National Family Health Survey, 2019-21, below replacement level.
    6. Total fertility rate is the average number of children a woman would bear over her lifetime at prevailing age specific fertility rates, which is why it is comparable across groups of different age structures.

    Challenges in Caste Based Affirmative Action

    1. No current population base: Quotas are fixed against estimates rather than an enumerated caste population. e.g. the 27 percent OBC quota rests on the Mandal Commission's estimate derived from the 1931 Census.
    2. Unequal capture within categories: A few communities within a category take most of the reserved places. e.g. the Rohini Commission was appointed in 2017 precisely because benefits within the OBC quota were found to be concentrated.
    3. Creamy layer enforcement: Income and status certificates are issued without effective verification, so the excluded section is not consistently excluded. e.g. repeated departmental instructions have been issued on the correct computation of the creamy layer income ceiling.
    4. Litigation over the ceiling: State laws raising reservation above 50 percent are struck down, leaving political demands unmet and entitlements unstable. e.g. the Maratha reservation enactment was set aside by the Supreme Court in 2021 for breaching the ceiling.
    5. Reservation without expansion of opportunity: The quota redistributes a shrinking pool of public sector posts rather than creating new ones. e.g. government employment has grown far more slowly than the number of aspirants competing in public examinations.
    6. Category based data collection: Administrative systems record the reservation category rather than the community, so outcomes by community cannot be measured. e.g. no published dataset shows which OBC communities occupy the reserved posts filled each year.
    7. Minority institution exemption: Institutions covered by Article 30 stand outside the quota framework, which creates unequal obligations across comparable institutions. e.g. minority educational institutions set their own admissions and are exempt from the reservation applied to other aided institutions.

    Back2Basics: Mandal Commission

    1. Formal name: The Second Backward Classes Commission, appointed in 1979 under Article 340 of the Constitution.
    2. Chairperson: Headed by B. P. Mandal, from whom the Commission takes its name.
    3. Report submitted: Reported in 1980, recommending 27 percent reservation for Other Backward Classes in central government services and public sector undertakings.
    4. Basis of its estimate: Estimated the OBC share of the population at about 52 percent, extrapolating from the 1931 Census, since no later caste count existed.
    5. Method of identification: Used eleven indicators grouped under social, educational and economic heads to identify backwardness, with social indicators weighted highest.
    6. Implementation: Recommendations were implemented for central government posts from 1990 and extended to central educational institutions by the 93rd Constitutional Amendment, 2005.
    7. Judicial outcome: Upheld in Indra Sawhney v Union of India (1992), which fixed the 50 percent ceiling, excluded the creamy layer, and barred reservation in promotions for OBCs.

    Way Forward

    1. Record community, not category: Design the schedule to ask for caste, sub caste and surname and leave category mapping to the statistical office.
    2. Publish unit level microdata: Release anonymised records so the classification and its consequences can be independently verified.
    3. Institutionalise the fertility audit: Require the statistical office to publish, alongside every group share, the fertility rate that the recorded growth would require.
    4. Reconcile survey and census series: Align social group codes in the National Sample Survey and the Periodic Labour Force Survey with the Census code frame so the two series are comparable.
    5. Complete sub categorisation: Act on the sub categorisation exercise so the benefit is distributed within the OBC category rather than captured by dominant communities.
    6. Verify creamy layer certification: Link income and status certificates to tax and employment records so the exclusion is enforced rather than declared.
    7. Separate the count from the quota decision: Treat the enumeration as an evidence gathering exercise, with quota revision decided through the constitutional process rather than triggered automatically by the count.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2023, GS1, 15 marks] Why is caste identity in India both fluid and static?”

  • [20th August 2026] The Hindu OpED: The IISERs have a leadership problem

    Question (2014, GS2): “Should the premier institutes like IITs/IIMs be allowed to retain premier status, allowed more academic independence in designing courses and also decide mode/criteria of selection of students? Discuss in light of the growing challenges.
    Linkage: This question directly addresses the central conflict in your prompt: the struggle of premier national science and technology institutes to maintain their academic independence and elite status when confronted with structural and administrative constraints.

    Mentor Comment

    Several of the seven Indian Institutes of Science Education and Research are operating under temporary, divided or incomplete leadership, with chairpersons holding simultaneous charge of two or three other institutions and nominated positions for eminent scientists lying vacant. The institutions were created to give students an intellectually vibrant research environment and prize autonomy as an essential ingredient of good science, which sits against a statutory Board structure dominated by government officials and nominees.

    What are the Indian Institutes of Science Education and Research?

    1. Why they were created: The Indian government created the Indian Institutes of Science Education and Research (IISERs) to offer students an intellectually vibrant research environment and to bring them into research at a relatively early stage by the standards of the Indian system.
    2. What they prize: They treat autonomy as an essential ingredient of good science, specifically the ability of scientists to decide which questions are worth pursuing and with what resources, and top down control is inimical to that vision.
    3. Their statutory basis: They were brought within the framework of the National Institutes of Technology, Science Education and Research Act, 2007.
    4. How many there are: Seven IISERs are in operation, each with its own Board of Governors.

    How are IISER Boards of Governors constituted?

    1. The statutory requirement: The 2007 Act requires each IISER to have a Board of Governors that includes senior government officials and other government nominees.
    2. Named ex officio positions: The IISER statutes specify, among others, the secretary of higher education and the director of the Indian Institute of Science (IISc), Bengaluru.
    3. The accountability rationale: Publicly funded science should be publicly accountable, which is the justification for the government presence on the Boards.
    4. Where the rationale runs out: Suboptimal appointments or outright vacancies are objectionable because they lead to policy paralysis at best, which is a failure of accountability rather than an exercise of it.

    What does the current composition of the seven Boards show?

    1. The IISc director’s spread: The director of the Indian Institute of Science is an ex officio member of most IISERs.
    2. IISER Pune: The chair of its Board is also the chairperson of the Visvesvaraya National Institute of Technology, Nagpur.
    3. IISER Berhampur: Its Board chair was given additional charge while also chairing the Board of the Indian Institute of Information Technology, Guwahati. Nominated positions on the same Board lie vacant, including one for an Indian Institute of Technology director and two for eminent scientists.
    4. IISER Bhopal: Its current director is listed as director in charge, after the previous director left to join NITI Aayog in June.
    5. IISER Thiruvananthapuram: Its chairperson simultaneously chairs the Boards of the Indian Institute of Information Technology, Kottayam and the Indian Institute of Information Technology, Design and Manufacturing, Kurnool.
    6. The cumulative position: Interim appointments are routine and vacancies arise during transitions, and ex officio positions change when officials move between posts, but taken together several IISERs are operating under temporary or incomplete leadership.

    Who is leading India’s basic science institutions?

    1. IISER Pune’s chairperson: A retired Indian Administrative Service officer whose educational background is in commerce and journalism.
    2. IISER Pune’s director: A chemical engineer by training, whereas the IISERs have little focus on engineering.
    3. IISER Thiruvananthapuram’s chairperson: A surgeon.
    4. IISER Tirupati’s chairperson: A chemical engineer and the co founder of an industrial group.
    5. IISER Berhampur’s chairperson: An executive in the footwear industry.
    6. The measurable outcome: Going by awards, fellowships or global achievement and recognition, there are few outstanding scientists in positions of authority on the IISER Boards today.

    Why does the professional background of a chairperson matter for a basic science institution?

    1. There is no legal bar: No rule requires that the chairperson of a scientific institution must be a scientist.
    2. Why it matters regardless: It bears on each institution’s credibility and on its vision, both of which rest on who is seen to be setting the research direction.
    3. What the Boards do gain from outsiders: Expertise in administration, industry, finance and public policy is genuinely useful to a Board.
    4. What the case for scientists rests on: Institutions focused on basic science should draw their leadership from the scientific community, where many people combine distinguished research careers with substantial experience in running academic and research organisations.
    5. The practice that was dropped: The government had earlier appointed the finest scientists to the IISERs’ helm before discontinuing the practice.
    6. The question that actually arises: It is not whether the current leaders are competent, it is why India’s many accomplished scientists are not being asked to lead institutions whose central purpose is basic science.

    How does divided and interim leadership weaken institutional autonomy?

    1. Attention divided across institutions: Leaders whose attention is already split between two or three institutions cannot supply sustained direction to any one of them.
    2. Control shifting away from scientists: With outsiders and divided attention at the top, scientists have less control over decisions that affect their own work.
    3. Rotation instead of recruitment: The availability of a research cadre calls into question the practice of moving the same people between institutions rather than recruiting from the scientific community.
    4. Administration falling behind: People familiar with the IISERs’ functioning describe an administration losing its ability to keep up with students’ needs in respect of a good education in basic science.
    5. The internal assessment: A senior scientist at one of the IISERs described the position as one in which there is no vision or imagination and no sense of leadership propelling the institution towards its core goals of carrying out high quality frontier research in and teaching basic science at an international level.
    6. The powers that go unused: By design, the directors and the Board hold the power to institute positive changes, so the deficit is one of direction rather than of authority.

    Challenges to institutional autonomy in India’s basic science institutions

    1. Lagging decline masked by reputation: An institution whose governance has begun to decline can remain scientifically productive for years as long as the people who built its reputation remain and the institutional label is still valuable, which delays any corrective response. e.g. the IISERs continue to attract strong entrants through the joint admission route while several Boards run without full leadership.
    2. Concentration of authority: Weak collegial governance shifts decisions towards a small group at the top, reducing faculty participation in academic direction. e.g. the flagging of a risk of concentration of authority as a consequence of the IISERs’ present leadership arrangements.
    3. Risk averse research culture: Where leadership lacks a research background, funding and hiring decisions favour safe incremental work over frontier problems. e.g. the expectation of an increasingly risk averse institutional culture as the cumulative effect of the IISERs’ governance decline.
    4. Vacancies in nominated positions: Seats reserved for eminent scientists and institute directors go unfilled, removing the very expertise the statute intended the Board to carry. e.g. the IISER Berhampur Board, with one Indian Institute of Technology director position and two eminent scientist positions vacant.
    5. Interim leadership without a mandate: A director in charge cannot commit an institution to long horizon research investments. e.g. IISER Bhopal, run by a director in charge after the previous director left for NITI Aayog in June.
    6. Government nominee dominance: The statutory requirement of senior officials and nominees on the Board makes institutional direction dependent on the postings cycle of the civil service. e.g. the ex officio membership of the secretary of higher education on IISER Boards under the 2007 Act statutes.
    7. Underfunding of basic research: India’s gross expenditure on research and development remains below one per cent of gross domestic product, so institutional autonomy is further constrained by dependence on annual government grants. e.g. the persistent share of roughly 0.64 per cent of gross domestic product against the two per cent and above spent by comparable research economies.
    8. Faculty attrition to better resourced systems: Weak governance and uncertain research support push early career scientists towards positions abroad or in the private sector. e.g. the reliance of schemes such as Ramanujan and Ramalingaswami fellowships on reversing exactly this outflow.

    Conclusion

    The IISERs were created on the premise that scientists deciding their own research questions produces better science than top down direction, and the statutory Board structure was the accountability counterweight to that autonomy. The counterweight has become the whole of it, with chairpersons drawn from outside the scientific community, ex officio members spread across several institutions, and seats reserved for eminent scientists left vacant. Restoring the earlier practice of appointing distinguished scientists to the helm, and filling the nominated positions the statutes already provide, requires no change in the law.

    Basic Scientific Research in India

    1. What it covers: Basic research is investigation directed at understanding fundamental phenomena without a specified application, distinguished from applied research and from experimental development.
    2. Institutional spread: It is conducted through the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research laboratories, the Department of Atomic Energy and Department of Space institutions, the Indian Institutes of Science Education and Research, the Indian Institute of Science, the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research and the central universities.
    3. Scale of national spending: India’s gross expenditure on research and development stands at roughly 0.64 per cent of gross domestic product, against about two per cent or more in most comparable research economies.
    4. Composition of that spending: The government accounts for the larger share of research spending in India, whereas in most leading research economies the private sector accounts for the bulk of it.
    5. Global standing on output: India ranks among the top three countries in the world by annual volume of scientific publications, and its citation impact remains below that publication rank.
    6. The IISER model: The IISERs were designed as a distinct category from the Indian Institutes of Technology, combining a five year integrated science programme with a research faculty, so that undergraduates enter laboratories early.
    7. The funding reform: The Anusandhan National Research Foundation, established under the Anusandhan National Research Foundation Act, 2023, is intended to fund research across universities and colleges, with a substantial share of its corpus expected from non government sources.

    Government Initiatives for Science Education and Research

    1. Anusandhan National Research Foundation: Established under the Anusandhan National Research Foundation Act, 2023 as the apex body for seeding, growing and promoting research across the natural sciences, engineering, mathematics, environmental and earth sciences, health and agriculture, with a mandate to fund university and college research.
    2. INSPIRE: The Innovation in Science Pursuit for Inspired Research programme of the Department of Science and Technology offers scholarships to school students, undergraduate and postgraduate scholarships in the basic and natural sciences, and faculty fellowships.
    3. Kishore Vaigyanik Protsahan Yojana: A fellowship programme to identify and support students with an aptitude for research careers in the basic sciences, since merged into the INSPIRE stream.
    4. Ramanujan and Ramalingaswami Re entry Fellowships: Offered by the Science and Engineering Research Board and the Department of Biotechnology respectively to bring Indian scientists working abroad back into Indian institutions.
    5. PM Research Fellowship: Provides doctoral fellowships at institutions of national importance with an enhanced stipend and a research grant, to retain top undergraduates within the domestic research system.
    6. National Research Professorship and J.C. Bose Fellowship: Recognise and support distinguished scientists to continue active research beyond conventional retirement.
    7. Vigyan Jyoti and Women in Science and Engineering KIRAN: Target the participation of girls and women in science, technology, engineering and mathematics education and research careers.

    Key Facts about the IISERs

    1. Number and locations: Seven institutes, at Kolkata, Pune, Mohali, Bhopal, Thiruvananthapuram, Tirupati and Berhampur.
    2. Year of first establishment: The first two, at Kolkata and Pune, were established in 2006, followed by Mohali in 2007, Bhopal and Thiruvananthapuram in 2008, Tirupati in 2015 and Berhampur in 2016.
    3. Statutory status: They are Institutes of National Importance under the National Institutes of Technology, Science Education and Research Act, 2007.
    4. Administering ministry: The Department of Higher Education in the Ministry of Education.
    5. Flagship programme: A five year BS-MS dual degree in the basic sciences, with admission through the IISER Aptitude Test and other channels.
    6. Governance structure: A Board of Governors chaired by a chairperson, with a director as the chief executive, and a Senate for academic matters.
    7. Named ex officio Board members: The secretary of higher education and the director of the Indian Institute of Science, Bengaluru, among others.

    Back2Basics: National Institutes of Technology, Science Education and Research Act, 2007

    1. What it is: A central Act that declares certain institutions to be Institutes of National Importance and provides for their incorporation, governance and funding.
    2. Enacted: 2007, originally covering the National Institutes of Technology, and later extended to the IISERs and to the Indian Institutes of Engineering Science and Technology.
    3. What Institute of National Importance status confers: Autonomy to award its own degrees, direct central funding, and exclusion from the University Grants Commission’s affiliation framework.
    4. Governance it prescribes: Each institute has a Board of Governors as the principal executive body, a Senate for academic decisions, a chairperson, a director and a registrar.
    5. Composition requirement: The Board must include senior government officials and other government nominees, which is the provision that places the secretary of higher education and the Indian Institute of Science director on IISER Boards through the institute statutes.
    6. The Council: The Act also creates a Council for the institutes it covers, chaired by the Union Minister in charge, to coordinate across them.
    7. Why it governs this item: It is the statutory source of both the IISERs’ autonomy and the government dominated Board structure that the present appointments have made the operative feature.

    Way Forward

    1. Restore scientist leadership at the helm: Reviving the earlier practice of appointing distinguished scientists as chairpersons and directors requires no amendment to the 2007 Act, only a change in the selection practice.
    2. Fill the vacant nominated seats: Appointing to the eminent scientist and institute director positions already provided in the statutes restores the scientific expertise the Board structure was designed to carry.
    3. Bar simultaneous multiple chairmanships: A rule against holding the chair of more than one Institute of National Importance would end the divided attention that leaves several IISERs without sustained direction.
    4. Time bound filling of directorships: A fixed outer limit on how long an institute may run under a director in charge would prevent interim leadership becoming the standing arrangement.
    5. Publish selection criteria and search process: A transparent search committee process, with published criteria for research standing and institution building experience, would make appointments contestable on merit.
    6. Build a leadership pipeline from the research cadre: Structured administrative training for mid career scientists would widen the pool beyond the same individuals rotated between institutions.
    7. Strengthen Senate authority over academic direction: Vesting curriculum, faculty recruitment and research priorities firmly with the Senate would insulate scientific decisions from Board level turnover.
    8. Raise and stabilise research funding: Multi year block grants through the Anusandhan National Research Foundation would reduce the dependence on annual allocations that constrains long horizon research.
  • Due diligence: curbs on surrogate advertising must avoid regulatory overreach

    Why in the News

    The Maharashtra Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Commissioner has begun summoning celebrity endorsers of a pan masala brand, treating the endorsement as a surrogate promotion of tobacco. The action moves enforcement from the manufacturer to the person who supplies the brand recall, and it tests whether the state can discharge the burden of proof that the courts have already placed on it.

    What is surrogate advertising?

    1. Definition: Surrogate advertising is the promotion of a banned product through a legally saleable substitute that carries the same brand name, packaging and visual identity.
    2. How it operates: A tobacco or liquor manufacturer registers an extension product such as elaichi, soda or music CDs, then advertises that extension so the parent brand stays visible where direct advertising is prohibited.
    3. The legal test: An advertisement becomes surrogate when the substitute product has no market identity independent of its association with the prohibited product.
    4. The case at hand: The FDA holds that the pan masala brand endorsed by three leading film actors has no identity independent of tobacco, so endorsing it amounts to endorsing tobacco.

    What is endorser liability?

    1. Meaning: Endorser liability is the statutory responsibility placed on a celebrity or influencer for a false or misleading claim made in an advertisement they lend their name to.
    2. Source of the duty: The Consumer Protection Act, 2019 created this liability along with monetary penalties, which removes ignorance of the manufacturer’s intent as a defence.

    Why has enforcement shifted from the manufacturer to the endorser?

    1. The asymmetry named: The person carrying the persuasive power bears almost none of the health or economic cost of the product being consumed.
    2. Where the cost lands: The consumer absorbs that cost, and an underfunded public health system absorbs the treatment burden that follows.
    3. Why the manufacturer route stalls: Brand extension is legal on its face, so acting only against the manufacturer leaves the advertisement itself untouched.
    4. Why the endorser route bites: Requiring endorsers to explain their decision making applies the endorser liability principle at the enforcement stage rather than only after a complaint.
    5. The wider field: The same asymmetry runs through advertisements making unsubstantiated health claims such as “boosts immunity”, and through educational and financial products.

    What must the state prove before it can call an advertisement surrogate?

    1. The governing ruling: The Delhi High Court in DGHS vs Som Pan Product Pvt. Ltd. (2024) held that the state carries the responsibility of proving a case of surrogate advertising.
    2. Brand registration is not proof: The mere registration of an extension brand does not by itself establish that the advertisement is surrogate.
    3. Legality is not a shield either: The existence of a technically legal product does not automatically permit the particular advertisement built around it.
    4. What follows for the FDA: Suspicion must be converted into inquiries under the Cigarettes and Other Tobacco Products Act (COTPA), 2003 and its Rules and under the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 that survive judicial scrutiny.

    Why does the existing regulatory regime struggle with such advertisements?

    1. Fragmentation: Regulation is scattered across a series of Acts and Rules with no single authority owning the surrogate advertising question end to end.
    2. Forum shopping: Advertisers use the multiplicity of legal and administrative instruments to draw the judiciary into the dispute and stall enforcement.
    3. Definitional gap: No statute defines the threshold at which an extension product’s independent market identity becomes real rather than nominal.
    4. Health stakes: India carries the world’s largest burden of oral cancer, which is what makes treatment of these advertisements as unfair trade practices a consumer health question rather than a marketing dispute.

    Does tougher enforcement strengthen the rule or invite regulatory overreach?

    1. The case for acting: Penalties or prohibitions in this case would materially narrow the space that surrogate advertising currently exploits.
    2. The case for restraint: An action that fails the evidentiary standard set in 2024 becomes a precedent that advertisers cite in every later proceeding.
    3. The self defeating outcome: Enforcement seen as arbitrary strengthens the very practice it was meant to end, by converting a public health question into a dispute about administrative excess.
    4. The distinction that matters: Targeting the marketing chain is legitimate, targeting individuals without completing the statutory inquiry is not.

    Challenges to regulating surrogate advertising

    1. Proving the negative: The state must establish that a lawfully sold product has no independent market, which requires sales and distribution evidence that regulators rarely collect. e.g. brand extensions in elaichi and mouth freshener categories report genuine retail sales, which manufacturers cite as proof of independent identity.
    2. Split jurisdiction: Tobacco control sits with the health administration, food safety with the FDA and unfair trade practices with consumer authorities, so no single body carries the case through. e.g. the present action begins with a state FDA whose primary statute is the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006, not COTPA.
    3. Digital advertising escapes the frame: Influencer posts and platform advertisements are transient and geo targeted, so they leave little evidence for a later inquiry. e.g. short video endorsements of betting and fantasy gaming platforms circulate widely without the disclosure labels print and television carry.
    4. Weak deterrence in practice: Penalties are small relative to advertising budgets and are contested for years. e.g. tobacco control prosecutions under COTPA are typically compounded at low fines rather than pursued to conviction.
    5. Sponsorship and event routes: Prohibited categories reach audiences through sports and cultural sponsorship where the brand appears without any product claim. e.g. surrogate liquor branding through music, soda and sporting event sponsorship has continued despite the advertising prohibition.
    6. Enforcement capacity: State drug and food administrations are staffed for sampling and licensing work, not for evidentiary media investigations. e.g. food safety officer vacancies in several States leave routine sampling targets unmet, before any advertising inquiry is added.

    Conclusion

    The action against celebrity endorsers is a defensible extension of endorser liability into the enforcement stage, and it addresses a real asymmetry between who persuades and who pays the health cost. Its survival depends entirely on whether the inquiry under COTPA, 2003 and the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 meets the evidentiary standard the Delhi High Court fixed in 2024. A well grounded order would narrow the space for surrogate advertising across tobacco, health claims, education and finance. An unsupported one would leave the practice stronger than it found it.

    Advertising Regulation in India

    1. What it covers: Advertising regulation governs the content, placement and truthfulness of commercial communication, and reaches the advertiser, the agency, the publisher and the endorser.
    2. Mixed model: India uses statutory control for specific product categories alongside self regulation by the Advertising Standards Council of India (ASCI), a voluntary industry body whose code is not itself law.
    3. Statutory anchor since 2019: The Central Consumer Protection Authority (CCPA), constituted under the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, can order the discontinuation of a misleading advertisement and impose penalties on the advertiser and the endorser.
    4. Prohibited categories: Direct advertising of tobacco products is banned, and liquor advertising is restricted, which is precisely what creates the incentive for brand extension.
    5. Scale: India is among the world’s largest advertising markets by volume of impressions, with digital and influencer marketing now the fastest growing segment and the least documented.

    Laws and Rules Governing Advertising and Surrogate Promotion

    1. Cigarettes and Other Tobacco Products Act (COTPA), 2003: Prohibits direct and indirect advertisement, promotion and sponsorship of tobacco products and regulates sale to and around minors.
    2. Section 5: Bars advertisement of cigarettes and other tobacco products, including indirect advertisement, which is the provision surrogate advertising is tested against.
    3. Consumer Protection Act, 2019: Defines misleading advertisement, creates the CCPA, and imposes liability and penalties on manufacturers and endorsers.
    4. Endorser penalty: Provides monetary penalty on an endorser for a false or misleading advertisement, with a prohibition on further endorsements for a stated period on repetition.
    5. Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006: Regulates food product claims and advertising, and prohibits misleading claims about the nature, quality or health effect of a food.
    6. Cable Television Networks (Regulation) Act, 1995: Bars advertisement of prohibited products on cable television through the Advertisement Code framed under it.
    7. Drugs and Magic Remedies (Objectionable Advertisements) Act, 1954: Prohibits advertisements claiming cure for listed diseases and conditions.
    8. Central Consumer Protection Authority (Prevention of Misleading Advertisements and Endorsements) Guidelines, 2022: Set conditions for a non misleading advertisement, regulate bait and surrogate advertisements, and fix due diligence duties for endorsers.
    9. Endorsement Know hows for digital advertising, 2023: Require celebrities, influencers and virtual influencers to disclose a material connection with the advertiser in a clear and prominent manner.

    Government Initiatives in Advertising and Consumer Protection

    1. National Tobacco Control Programme (NTCP): Implemented by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare to enforce COTPA, run awareness campaigns and support cessation, targeted at tobacco users and youth.
    2. National Tobacco Quitline and mCessation: Provide telephone and mobile based cessation support to tobacco users seeking to quit.
    3. Jago Grahak Jago: Consumer awareness campaign of the Department of Consumer Affairs, aimed at informing consumers about misleading advertisements and grievance routes.
    4. National Consumer Helpline and the INGRAM portal: Give consumers a single point to lodge complaints against misleading advertisements and unfair trade practices.
    5. Eat Right India: Food Safety and Standards Authority of India (FSSAI) campaign to curb misleading food claims and promote safe and healthy food, aimed at consumers and food businesses.

    Key Facts about Tobacco Control and Advertising Regulation

    1. World No Tobacco Day is observed on 31 May each year.
    2. India has the world’s largest burden of oral cancer, which is the health basis for the strict treatment of tobacco surrogate advertising.
    3. India is a party to the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (WHO FCTC), the first international public health treaty, which India ratified in 2004.
    4. Pictorial health warnings must cover 85 percent of the principal display area on both sides of a tobacco product package in India, among the largest such requirements globally.
    5. The Advertising Standards Council of India (ASCI) was set up in 1985 as a voluntary self regulatory body and its code has no statutory force of its own.

    Challenges in Advertising and Consumer Protection Regulation

    1. Self regulation without teeth: ASCI rulings bind only members and carry no penalty, so a non member advertiser faces no consequence. e.g. several offshore betting and crypto platforms advertising into India are outside ASCI’s membership entirely.
    2. Influencer economy outpaces disclosure rules: Paid endorsements are presented as personal opinion, and disclosure labels are omitted or hidden. e.g. financial influencers recommending securities without registration led the Securities and Exchange Board of India to restrict regulated entities from associating with unregistered advice givers.
    3. Dark patterns in digital interfaces: Design choices such as false urgency and forced action steer consumers without any express claim to test. e.g. the Department of Consumer Affairs notified guidelines in 2023 listing thirteen specified dark patterns on e commerce platforms.
    4. Regulatory capacity gap: The CCPA and State food and drug administrations have small investigation teams against a very large advertising volume. e.g. misleading claims in the coaching and edtech sector produced a separate CCPA advisory only after repeated complaints.
    5. Cross border advertising: Advertisements served from outside India for products banned within India are hard to reach through domestic statutes. e.g. offshore betting platforms advertise through surrogate news and sports content channels aimed at Indian audiences.
    6. Health claims without evidence: Immunity, weight loss and fortification claims sit between food law and drug law and are contested at the margin. e.g. claims on health supplements and nutraceuticals repeatedly draw FSSAI action for lacking substantiation.

    Back2Basics: Food Safety and Standards Authority of India (FSSAI)

    1. Governing Act: Established under the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006.
    2. Year established: Constituted in 2008, with the Act’s substantive provisions brought into force from 2011.
    3. Parent ministry: Functions under the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare.
    4. Mandate: Lays down science based standards for articles of food and regulates their manufacture, storage, distribution, sale, import and advertising.
    5. Composition: Headed by a Chairperson of the rank of Secretary to the Government of India, with a Chief Executive Officer and members drawn from States, industry, consumer groups and food technology.
    6. Enforcement structure: Implemented on the ground by State Food Safety Commissioners, Designated Officers and Food Safety Officers, which is why a State FDA leads the present action.

    Way Forward

    1. Complete the statutory inquiry: Convert the summons into a documented proceeding under COTPA, 2003 and the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 that records evidence of the extension product’s dependent market identity.
    2. Define independent market identity: Notify an objective test combining sales volume, distribution reach and advertising spend of the extension product relative to the parent brand.
    3. Single window coordination: Create a joint mechanism between the CCPA, the health administration and State food and drug administrations so one authority carries a surrogate advertising case to conclusion.
    4. Raise the penalty to advertising spend: Link penalties to the advertising outlay of the campaign so the fine is not absorbed as a cost of business.
    5. Mandatory pre certification for prohibited categories: Require prior vetting of advertisements for brand names shared with tobacco and liquor products before release.
    6. Extend disclosure enforcement to digital: Audit influencer endorsements for the material connection disclosure and publish enforcement outcomes so the rule becomes visible.
    7. Consumer side remedy: Publicise the CCPA and National Consumer Helpline routes so complaints against misleading endorsements do not depend on regulator initiative alone.

    “[2014, GS2, 12.5 marks] The setting up of a Rail Tariff Authority to regulate fares will subject the cash strapped Indian Railways to demand subsidy for obligation to operate non-profitable routes and services. Taking into account the experience in the power sector, discuss if the proposed reform is expected to benefit the consumers, the Indian Railways or the private container operators.”

  • BRICS is working for a future that puts the planet first

    Why in the News

    India hosted the 12th BRICS Environment Ministers' Meeting on 18 August 2026 in New Delhi under its chairship of the grouping. The tension it exposes is that a bloc holding roughly 40 percent of global gross domestic product continues to argue for differentiated responsibility in climate action, while the outcomes it produces are principles and knowledge platforms rather than binding obligations.

    What is BRICS and what weight does it carry?

    1. What it is: BRICS is an intergovernmental grouping of major emerging economies, founded around Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, that coordinates positions on economic governance, development and multilateral reform.
    2. Demographic weight: BRICS countries account for 49.5 percent of the world's population.
    3. Economic weight: They account for approximately 40 percent of global gross domestic product.
    4. Trade weight: They account for 26 percent of international trade, which together with the population and output figures underscores their growing influence on the global economy, the development agenda and the future direction of international cooperation.

    What is the BRICS Environment Working Group?

    1. What it is: The BRICS Environment Working Group is the technical body under which member countries negotiate environmental cooperation and prepare the outcomes adopted at the Environment Ministers' Meeting.
    2. Its function this cycle: Under India's chairship it organised its work around four interconnected priorities, which formed the substantive agenda of the 12th Environment Ministers' Meeting.

    What is Mission LiFE?

    1. What it is: Mission LiFE (Lifestyle for Environment) is an Indian initiative that seeks to shift climate action from state and market levers to individual and community behaviour, treating consumption choices as a mitigation instrument.
    2. Its role at BRICS: The BRICS priority on Promoting Sustainable Lifestyles builds directly on the principles of Mission LiFE.

    What is Ek Ped Maa Ke Naam?

    1. What it is: Ek Ped Maa Ke Naam, meaning a tree in the name of mother, is a national tree plantation campaign that ties ecological restoration to individual participation.
    2. What it demonstrates: Together with Mission LiFE it demonstrates the value of combining ecological restoration, public participation and community ownership.

    What were the four priorities of the BRICS Environment Working Group under India's chairship?

    1. Promoting Sustainable Lifestyles: Builds on the principles of Mission LiFE and encourages responsible and sustainable consumption and production, behavioural change, awareness among citizens and communities, and knowledge-sharing.
    2. Afforestation, Forest Fire Management and Disaster Resilience: Addresses growing pressures on forests, land and natural ecosystems through integrated landscape restoration, combating land degradation, wildfire preparedness and response, early-warning systems and ecosystem resilience, using scientific advances such as remote sensing and artificial intelligence.
    3. Circular Economy: Reflects the recognition that the traditional take, make and dispose model is no longer sustainable, and treats the circular economy as a key enabler of sustainable development and inclusive growth that reduces environmental pressures while creating economic opportunities and green employment through cooperation in research, innovation, technology transfer and capacity building.
    4. Adaptation: Responds to intensifying climate impacts and the disproportionate vulnerabilities of developing countries, and recognises that traditional, indigenous and local knowledge systems offer valuable insights for building resilience.

    What are the BRICS Principles for Advancing Climate Resilience through People-Centric and Community-Based Adaptation?

    1. What they are: A set of principles adopted under the BRICS adaptation priority that place communities rather than agencies at the centre of adaptation planning.
    2. The core method: They emphasise integrating traditional, indigenous and local knowledge with modern science and technology.
    3. The stated objective: The integration is intended to create context-specific, evidence-based and culturally appropriate adaptation solutions.
    4. Why the framing matters: Adaptation has become an urgent necessity particularly for developing countries facing disproportionate vulnerabilities, which is the constituency these principles are written for.

    What outcomes did India's chairship produce beyond declarations?

    1. Practical principles: The outcomes include the development of practical principles on sustainable lifestyles, integrated landscape management, forest fire preparedness and community-based adaptation.
    2. Technical products: They include technical reports, platforms, dialogues and knowledge-sharing networks rather than declaratory text alone.
    3. The process behind them: These outcomes reflect months of collaboration, negotiation and consensus-building among member countries.
    4. The claimed significance: They are presented as demonstrating the value of multilateral cooperation in addressing common environmental challenges at a time when multilateral processes are under strain.
    5. The stated guiding vision: India's chairship was guided by the stated aim of advancing the forum with a people-centric approach and the spirit of Humanity First, extending the inclusivity and Global South focus of India's G20 presidency.

    What does India's own record contribute to the BRICS position?

    1. Emissions intensity: India reduced the emissions intensity of its economy by 37.38 percent between 2005 and 2022.
    2. Non-fossil capacity: Non-fossil sources accounted for 54.18 percent of installed electricity capacity as of 30 June 2026.
    3. The forward commitment: India's new Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) for 2031 to 2035, the national climate pledge submitted under the Paris Agreement, reflects a commitment to advancing climate action while supporting inclusive development and energy security.
    4. The argument these figures serve: India's efforts to reduce emissions intensity while expanding non-fossil energy capacity reinforce the position that development and environmental responsibility can advance together.
    5. The domestic template exported: Mission LiFE and Ek Ped Maa Ke Naam illustrate how climate action, biodiversity conservation, resilience-building and livelihood enhancement can reinforce one another when pursued through integrated approaches.

    Why does a bloc of this economic weight still argue for differentiated responsibility?

    1. The principle asserted: The principles of equity and Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC) resonated across the meeting and remain fundamental to an effective and balanced global response to climate change.
    2. The basis of the claim: The principle rests on historical contribution to the accumulated stock of emissions and on current capability, not on present output share alone.
    3. The vulnerability argument: Adaptation is an urgent necessity particularly for developing countries facing disproportionate vulnerabilities, which is a burden the bloc's economic weight does not offset.
    4. The counter-pressure implicit in the figures: A grouping holding about 40 percent of global gross domestic product and 26 percent of international trade is difficult to present as a category requiring differentiated treatment on capability grounds.
    5. The bloc's own answer: Environmental action must be people-centric, implementation-oriented and responsive to the realities of developing countries, which shifts the test from aggregate output to conditions on the ground.
    6. The concession in the argument: Success will ultimately be measured not by the adoption of principles alone but by their ability to strengthen ecosystems, support livelihoods and build a more resilient future, which acknowledges that principles alone settle nothing.

    Conclusion

    The 12th BRICS Environment Ministers' Meeting in New Delhi on 18 August 2026 organised the bloc's environmental agenda around sustainable lifestyles, afforestation and disaster resilience, the circular economy and community-based adaptation, and adopted principles on people-centric adaptation grounded in equity and Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities. India brought to that table an emissions intensity reduction of 37.38 percent between 2005 and 2022, non-fossil sources at 54.18 percent of installed electricity capacity as of 30 June 2026, and a new Nationally Determined Contribution for 2031 to 2035. What remains unresolved is the conversion of adopted principles into strengthened ecosystems and supported livelihoods, which is the test the chairship has itself named.

    What is Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities?

    Source: Backgrounder, CoP UNFCCC.docx

    1. About: Common but Differentiated Responsibilities holds that all countries share the climate problem but that their obligations differ based on historical contributions to emissions and on current capability to act.
    2. Rationale: It exists to reconcile the universal character of the climate problem with the unequal responsibility for causing it and the unequal means available to address it.
    3. Where it was codified: It was embedded at the Rio Earth Summit of 1992 as the legal foundation of the climate regime and appears among the 27 principles of the Rio Declaration alongside the precautionary and polluter-pays principles.
    4. Annex I: Members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development as of 1992 plus economies in transition, required to adopt national policies to limit greenhouse gas emissions and protect sinks.
    5. Annex II: A subset of Annex I comprising only the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development members, required to provide financial resources to developing countries and facilitate technology transfer.
    6. Non-Annex I: Developing countries, carrying no binding emission targets under the original architecture.
    7. Least Developed Countries: A separate category given special consideration in view of limited capacity to respond to climate change.
    8. How Paris altered it: The Paris Agreement of 2015 replaced the firewall with a universal Nationally Determined Contribution system, common in framework but flexible in commitment, so differentiation survives through national determination rather than through separate annexes.

    Key Concerns Regarding Common but Differentiated Responsibilities

    1. The firewall's eroding legitimacy: As emerging economies became major annual emitters, the moral case for zero binding obligations on the non-Annex I side became the central contested question in climate diplomacy.
    2. Unmet finance obligations: The differentiated bargain rests on developed country finance that has repeatedly fallen short, and the 100 billion dollar per year pledge made at Copenhagen in 2009 became the most discussed unmet promise in the regime.
    3. Counting private finance as public obligation: Developed countries have sought to count private flows towards the finance goal, which India has objected to on the ground that private finance does not reach the most vulnerable countries and comes at commercial rather than concessional rates.
    4. Asymmetric transparency demands: Verification pressure has historically been applied to developing country mitigation rather than to developed country finance and technology transfer, which was the core of the standoff at Bali in 2007.
    5. No substantive obligation under the Paris system: Nationally Determined Contributions carry no international legal obligation on the substance of the target, so differentiation coexists with collectively insufficient ambition.
    6. Trade measures bypassing the principle: Unilateral trade instruments applied at the border shift the burden regardless of differentiated status, and India has treated the European Union's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism as incompatible with the principle.

    The Global Climate Governance Architecture

    Source: Backgrounder, CoP UNFCCC.docx

    1. Stockholm, 1972: The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment established the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the first global intergovernmental platform for the environment, headquartered in Nairobi, and adopted the Stockholm Declaration of 26 non-binding principles.
    2. Rio Earth Summit, 1992: Produced three legally binding treaties in one conference, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD), together called the Rio Trio, and codified Common but Differentiated Responsibilities as the foundational legal principle.
    3. Kyoto Protocol, 1997: The first legally binding instrument under the Framework Convention, requiring Annex I countries to cut emissions by an average of about 5 percent during 2008 to 2012, and creating three market mechanisms, the Clean Development Mechanism, Joint Implementation and Emissions Trading.
    4. Copenhagen, 2009: Recognised the 2 degrees Celsius limit for the first time and produced the first quantified climate finance goal of 100 billion dollars per year by 2020, negotiated by the BASIC group of Brazil, South Africa, India and China with the United States outside the formal process.
    5. Paris Agreement, 2015: Established the universal Nationally Determined Contribution system with submissions every five years and a no-backsliding progression rule, alongside Article 6 carbon markets, Article 9 finance obligations, the Enhanced Transparency Framework and the five-yearly Global Stocktake.
    6. Glasgow, 2021: Locked in the Article 6.2 and 6.4 rulebook including corresponding adjustments, and was where India announced its Panchamrit targets.
    7. Baku, 2024: Agreed the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) of at least 300 billion dollars per year by 2035 from developed countries, with a broader aspirational goal of 1.3 trillion dollars per year from all sources.
    8. Belem, 2025: Adopted the Belem Political Package and the Global Mutirao declaration, agreed 59 Belem Adaptation Indicators under the United Arab Emirates Framework for Global Climate Resilience, established a Just Transition Mechanism, and was the deadline for third-generation Nationally Determined Contributions to 2035.
    9. The forward calendar: COP31 is to be held in Antalya, Turkiye in November 2026 and COP32 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in 2027.

    India's Standing Climate Targets

    Source: Backgrounder, CoP UNFCCC.docx

    1. Panchamrit, announced at Glasgow in 2021: Five commitments, namely 500 GW non-fossil energy capacity by 2030, 50 percent of energy requirements from renewable energy by 2030, reduction of projected carbon emissions by 1 billion tonnes by 2030, reduction of the carbon intensity of the economy by 45 percent by 2030 over 2005 levels, and net zero emissions by 2070.
    2. The 2022 Nationally Determined Contribution update: India upgraded its emissions intensity target to 45 percent by 2030 from the 33 to 35 percent pledged at Paris, and its non-fossil installed capacity target to 50 percent by 2030 from 40 percent.
    3. Ratification record: India signed the Paris Agreement on 22 April 2016 and ratified it on 2 October 2016, among the earliest major economies to do so.
    4. Long-Term Low Emission Development Strategy: A qualitative roadmap reaffirming net zero by 2070, grounded in climate justice and Common but Differentiated Responsibilities, spanning seven transitions across electricity, transport, industry, urban planning, forests, carbon removal and finance.
    5. Greenhouse Gases Emission Intensity Target Rules, 2025: Legally binding emission intensity targets notified for over 400 industrial units, covering aluminium, cement, chlor-alkali and pulp and paper initially, with iron and steel, fertiliser, petroleum refining, petrochemicals and textiles to follow, enforced through the Carbon Credit Trading Scheme, 2023.
    6. Article 6 National Designated Authority: A 21-member committee headed by the Secretary, Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, authorises projects under Article 6.4, with renewable energy, green hydrogen, green ammonia and carbon capture, utilisation and storage as eligible activities.

    Key Facts about BRICS

    1. The name: The acronym originated as BRIC for Brazil, Russia, India and China, with South Africa joining in 2010 to make BRICS.
    2. First summit: The first BRIC leaders' summit was held at Yekaterinburg in Russia in 2009.
    3. Expansion: Membership was expanded from 2024 to include Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates, with Indonesia joining in 2025.
    4. New Development Bank: Established under the 2014 Fortaleza Agreement and headquartered in Shanghai, it finances infrastructure and sustainable development projects in member and other developing countries.
    5. Contingent Reserve Arrangement: A currency swap framework agreed at Fortaleza in 2014 to provide members with short-term liquidity support against balance of payments pressure.
    6. Chairship: The chairship rotates annually among members, and India chairs the grouping for the current cycle.
    7. The environment track: The Environment Ministers' Meeting is the sectoral ministerial under which the BRICS Environment Working Group's outcomes are adopted, and the 12th meeting was held in New Delhi on 18 August 2026.

    Back2Basics: The New Development Bank

    1. What it is: The New Development Bank is a multilateral development bank established by the BRICS countries to mobilise resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects.
    2. Founding instrument: It was established under the Agreement on the New Development Bank signed at the Fortaleza Summit in Brazil in 2014 and began operations in 2015.
    3. Headquarters: Shanghai, China, with regional offices including one in Johannesburg, South Africa.
    4. Capital structure: It was founded with equal shareholding among the five founding members, which distinguishes it from the weighted voting of the Bretton Woods institutions.
    5. Membership expansion: It has admitted non-founding members including Bangladesh, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Algeria.
    6. Mandate: It lends for infrastructure and sustainable development, with a significant share of its portfolio in clean energy, transport, water and sanitation, and urban development.
    7. India's position: India is a founding member and among the largest recipients of New Development Bank lending.

    Challenges to BRICS Environmental Cooperation

    1. Outcomes without binding force: The chairship's outputs are principles, technical reports and knowledge networks rather than enforceable commitments, e.g. the BRICS Principles on people-centric adaptation carry no compliance mechanism.
    2. Divergent member emission profiles: The bloc contains both the world's largest annual emitter and states with very low per capita emissions, which makes a single position difficult, e.g. China's annual emissions are several times India's while both invoke the same differentiated status.
    3. Fossil fuel dependence within the bloc: Several members are major hydrocarbon producers or exporters, which limits how far the grouping can go on transition language, e.g. Russia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates are among the world's leading oil and gas exporters.
    4. Finance gap unaddressed: The bloc restates the equity claim without an internal financing instrument for adaptation, e.g. adaptation finance for vulnerable members still depends on the contested developed country pledges under the Framework Convention.
    5. Unilateral trade measures bypassing the framework: Border carbon measures shift the burden regardless of differentiated status, e.g. the European Union's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism covers steel, aluminium, cement, fertilisers, electricity and hydrogen, and India has raised it as a trade barrier at the World Trade Organization.
    6. Bilateral frictions inside the grouping: Political disputes between members limit the depth of cooperation, e.g. unresolved boundary questions between two of the founding members constrain joint implementation.
    7. Institutional thinness: The grouping has no permanent secretariat, so continuity depends on the annual chair, e.g. priorities set under one chairship are not guaranteed carry-forward under the next.
    8. Weak measurement of implementation: Success is asserted through outputs rather than measured through outcomes, e.g. sustainable lifestyle and afforestation priorities carry no agreed indicator set comparable to the Belem Adaptation Indicators.

    Way Forward

    1. Convert principles into indicator sets: Attach measurable indicators and reporting timelines to each of the four priorities, so that the sustainable lifestyles, afforestation, circular economy and adaptation tracks can be assessed rather than asserted.
    2. Create a BRICS adaptation finance window: Use the New Development Bank to establish a dedicated adaptation and resilience lending facility, so the equity argument is backed by an internal instrument and not only by claims on developed country finance.
    3. Institutionalise the Environment Working Group: Give the working group a standing technical secretariat function, so priorities survive the annual rotation of the chairship.
    4. Build a shared technology transfer platform: Operationalise cooperation in research, innovation, technology transfer and capacity building for the circular economy through a common platform rather than through bilateral arrangements.
    5. Coordinate a joint response to border carbon measures: Present a common BRICS position at the World Trade Organization on unilateral trade instruments that bypass Common but Differentiated Responsibilities.
    6. Scale the community-based adaptation model: Convert the BRICS Principles on people-centric adaptation into pilot programmes with member country funding, integrating traditional and indigenous knowledge with remote sensing and artificial intelligence tools.
    7. Sustain the domestic template: Continue Mission LiFE and Ek Ped Maa Ke Naam as demonstrable models of behaviour-led and participation-led action that other members can adapt, so the chairship leaves a replicable method behind.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2021, GS3, 10 marks] Explain the purpose of the Green Grid Initiative launched at the World Leaders Summit of the COP26 UN Climate Change Conference in Glasgow in November 2021. When was this idea first floated in the International Solar Alliance (ISA)?”

    # Compiled Articles, 20 August 2026 (Part 6, Items 31 to 36)

  • Clean electoral rolls are a necessary condition, and their selective use is the risk

    Why in the News

    The United States President’s appreciation of India’s election mechanism, and his social media post citing India’s Chief Election Commissioner on how the United States conducts elections without a valid photo identity, has put election integrity in both democracies under simultaneous scrutiny. Both political systems agree that rolls should be clean and voting should be verified, and disagree completely on who the requirement is meant to exclude.

    What is the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls?

    Source: Backgrounder, Elections Lifecycle Approach.docx

    1. Definition: Special Intensive Revision (SIR) is a comprehensive, time bound house to house verification drive involving fresh enumeration forms for all voters, door to door verification by Booth Level Officers, document verification of citizenship, deletion of ineligible entries and inclusion of omitted voters.
    2. How it differs from the routine exercise: Summary Revision is the routine annual update of additions, deletions and corrections carried out before general, Assembly and bye elections, with a qualifying date typically of 1 January.
    3. When it is triggered: SIR is exceptional and is triggered only when rolls have remained largely unchanged for years or when large scale irregularities are suspected.
    4. Statutory basis: Electoral rolls are prepared and maintained by the Election Commission of India under Article 324 of the Constitution and Section 21 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950, with intensive revision mandated under Sections 22 and 23 of that Act.

    What is the current status of electoral roll revision in India?

    Source: Backgrounder, Elections Lifecycle Approach.docx

    1. Frequency in history: Intensive revisions have been carried out only 13 times in India’s history, in 1952, 1957, 1961, 1965, 1966, 1983-84, 1987-89, 1992, 1993, 1995, 2002, 2003 and 2004.
    2. The current exercise: The Election Commission launched a nationwide SIR 2.0 from 4 November 2025, the first in 21 years, covering 9 States and 3 Union Territories and targeting approximately 51 crore voter records.
    3. Method used: The exercise uses artificial intelligence driven duplicate detection and facial and identity match algorithms alongside field verification.
    4. The officer chain: The Chief Electoral Officer at State level, the District Election Officer at district level, the Electoral Registration Officer at constituency level and Booth Level Officers at polling booth level carry out the work.
    5. The immediately preceding exercise: The January 2025 Special Summary Revision was completed with no issues raised before the Bihar SIR was announced.
    6. The presumption cutoff: The exercise uses 2003 as the citizenship presumption cutoff, which effectively re verifies every voter added between 2003 and 2025.

    Constitutional Provisions Related to Elections and Electoral Rolls

    Source: Backgrounder, Elections Lifecycle Approach.docx

    1. Article 324: Establishes the Election Commission of India and vests in it the superintendence, direction and control of elections to Parliament, State Legislatures and the offices of President and Vice President.
    2. Article 325: Guarantees that no person shall be ineligible for inclusion in, or claim to be included in, a special electoral roll on grounds of religion, race, caste or sex.
    3. Article 326: Provides that elections to the House of the People and State Legislative Assemblies shall be on the basis of adult suffrage, so every citizen not disqualified by a specific legal exception may vote.
    4. Articles 327 and 328: Authorise Parliament and State Legislatures respectively to make laws on all election related matters, including electoral rolls and delimitation of constituencies.
    5. Article 329: Bars courts from questioning laws relating to delimitation of constituencies, making Delimitation Commission orders final and non justiciable.
    6. Part XV: Articles 324 to 329 together constitute the electoral provisions of the Constitution, and they are the source of the Election Commission’s status as a constitutional body.

    Why has election integrity become contested in both democracies at the same time?

    1. Partisan mistrust as the common driver: Partisan politics in both countries has fostered political mistrust, which leads election losers to repeatedly question electoral integrity.
    2. Both sides want purification, in opposite directions: The liberal and progressive strands and the conservative and nativist strands in both countries want to purify and streamline electoral rolls and processes, in different and often contradictory ways.
    3. The ruling side’s claim: Ruling dispensations in both countries hold that the election process is too permissive and allows foreigners to obtain voting rights.
    4. The opposition’s claim: Their opponents point to systematic and premeditated efforts to target social groups in the name of election integrity.
    5. The point of agreement is narrow: No one disagrees that the process should be fair and transparent, and the agreement ends there.
    6. The shared opportunity: India and the United States could lead a shared democratic agenda on election rules, but only after restoring trust and integrity in their own electoral processes.

    How do the American and Indian election administration systems differ?

    1. United States, a decentralised and federalised process: The American electoral process is highly federalised and governed by fragmented rules and politics that resist the idea of a nationwide SIR type exercise.
    2. United States, the constitutional allocation: The Constitution grants each State its own methods, subject to the qualification that Congress may at any time by law make or alter such regulations.
    3. United States, the pending federal law: The expanded Safeguard American Voter Eligibility (SAVE) Act was passed in February and is pending in the Senate, and would require proof of citizenship for voter registration and photo identity for voting.
    4. United States, the gap identified: The decentralised system leaves too many loopholes in the process of enrolment and voting, and could benefit from a more robust national framework of the kind the Election Commission of India provides.
    5. India, a constitutional election authority: The Indian Constitution establishes the Election Commission as a constitutional body, unlike the American arrangement of State by State methods.
    6. India, a nationalised administration under strain: India’s nationalised election administration system has largely worked well and now faces a crisis of legitimacy.
    7. The common legal position: There is no ambiguity in existing law in either country that only citizens may register and vote, and the controversy is entirely about the process of ensuring this.

    Why can a legitimate requirement of clean rolls still damage trust?

    1. The requirement itself is elementary: Clean electoral rolls of citizens, and voting with photo identity, are elementary requirements of a fair process, and neither is objectionable in principle.
    2. The manner of introduction is the objection: In India the SIR is introducing the citizenship proof requirement without transparency, adequate consultation or sufficient time.
    3. Frequency argues for care, not speed: SIR is meant to be conducted only once in 20 years, which is precisely why it should be carried out carefully and inclusively.
    4. The same rule can serve two purposes: A requirement designed to exclude non citizens can equally be used to exclude citizens who lack the documents, and the two outcomes are indistinguishable in the roll.
    5. The standard both countries must meet: In both countries the state must not selectively weaponise these requirements against those not in power.

    Major debates surrounding electoral roll revision in India

    Source: Backgrounder, Elections Lifecycle Approach.docx

    1. Bihar, the scale of deletion: A 47 lakh net reduction in the final roll, with 3.66 lakh removed in the last phase after draft publication, and allegations of large scale deletions in four border districts ahead of State elections.
    2. Bihar, the process failure: Booth Level Officers collected forms without acknowledgement slips, and contradictory deadlines of 25 July and 31 August caused mass confusion.
    3. West Bengal, the notice requirement: Large scale deletions were alleged, with Rule 18 of the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960, which requires individual notice before deletion, alleged to have been violated, and petitions filed in the Calcutta High Court against a contesting Commission affidavit.
    4. Uttar Pradesh, the quality of verification: Concerns were raised over disproportionate deletions in minority heavy constituencies, with field verification by Booth Level Officers reported as cursory and forms collected in bulk.
    5. Migrant voters: Multiple States including Jharkhand, Rajasthan and Assam reported that migrant workers away from their registered constituencies were deleted without notice.
    6. Timing without a stated trigger: The SIR was announced within six months of a clean January 2025 summary revision with no new justification offered.
    7. Feasibility of the timeline: The Commission’s own Assam National Register of Citizens experience shows that verification of this kind cannot be completed within the 90 days allotted.

    Challenges to a credible electoral roll revision

    1. Burden of proof falls on the voter: An intensive revision requires the voter to establish eligibility rather than requiring the state to establish ineligibility. e.g. the 2003 presumption cutoff placing the documentary burden on everyone enrolled between 2003 and 2025.
    2. Migrant and mobile populations are structurally exposed: Voters absent from their registered address during door to door verification are recorded as untraceable and deleted. e.g. migrant workers in Jharkhand, Rajasthan and Assam reported as deleted without notice.
    3. Notice requirements are unevenly observed: Deletion without individual notice removes the only opportunity to contest an error before publication. e.g. the alleged violation of Rule 18 of the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960 in West Bengal.
    4. Field capacity does not match the timeline: Booth Level Officers carry the entire verification load within a compressed window, and shortcuts follow. e.g. forms collected in bulk without acknowledgement slips in Bihar and cursory verification reported in Uttar Pradesh.
    5. Algorithmic deduplication carries error: Facial and identity match algorithms produce false positives that are removed before any human confirms the match. e.g. SIR 2.0 applying artificial intelligence driven duplicate detection across approximately 51 crore records.
    6. Contradictory administrative communication: Multiple deadlines and changing instructions destroy the voter’s ability to comply. e.g. the 25 July and 31 August deadlines issued in Bihar.
    7. Verification errors survive to the draft roll: Voters who submitted forms still appear in the deleted category, which shifts the burden to a post publication correction process. e.g. voters in Telangana finding their names listed under permanently shifted or dead in the recently released draft roll despite having filed forms.

    Conclusion

    Clean electoral rolls of citizens and voting with photo identity are elementary requirements of a fair process, and the disagreement in both India and the United States is about who the requirement is applied to and how. India’s nationalised system offers the national framework the American process lacks, and it is that system that now faces a crisis of legitimacy. An exercise conducted once in 20 years, over approximately 51 crore records, has to be carried out carefully and inclusively or it converts a legitimate purification into a selective exclusion. The obligation on the state in both countries is the same, not to weaponise these requirements against those not in power.

    What is Election Integrity?

    Source: Backgrounder, Elections Lifecycle Approach.docx

    1. About: Election integrity is the condition in which every stage of an election, from enrolment to the declaration of results, is conducted according to law and is accepted as such by winners and losers alike.
    2. Rationale: Democratic legitimacy rests on the losing side accepting the result, so integrity is measured by trust in the process rather than by the accuracy of the count alone.
    3. Pre poll phase: Covers electoral roll preparation and revision, delimitation and representation, candidate scrutiny and disqualification, and the registration and recognition of political parties.
    4. During poll phase: Covers the Model Code of Conduct, the voting mechanism including electronic voting machines and the Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail, and corrupt practices under Section 123 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.
    5. Post poll phase: Covers exit and opinion poll regulation under Sections 126A and 126(1)(b) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, and election disputes through election petitions before High Courts.
    6. The statutory division: The Representation of the People Act, 1950 governs the preparatory side including rolls and delimitation, and the Representation of the People Act, 1951 governs the conduct of elections including candidates, offences and disputes.

    Laws and Rules Governing Electoral Rolls and Elections

    Source: Backgrounder, Elections Lifecycle Approach.docx, supplemented

    1. Representation of the People Act, 1950: Provides for allocation of seats in Parliament and State Legislatures, delimitation of constituencies, and the preparation and maintenance of electoral rolls, and defines the machinery of electoral officers.
    2. Section 21: The provision under which electoral rolls are prepared and maintained.
    3. Sections 22 and 23: The provisions mandating correction, deletion and inclusion of entries, under which intensive revision is conducted.
    4. Representation of the People Act, 1951: Governs the conduct of elections, qualifications and disqualifications of candidates, nomination and scrutiny, corrupt practices, election offences, expenditure limits and election petitions.
    5. Section 8: Provides for disqualification on conviction, with immediate disqualification of a sitting legislator convicted and sentenced to two years or more, continuing for six years after release.
    6. Section 29A: Provides for registration of political parties with the Election Commission.
    7. Section 29C: Requires parties to disclose all donations above twenty thousand rupees annually to the Commission.
    8. Section 100: Sets out the grounds on which an election may be declared void.
    9. Registration of Electors Rules, 1960: Prescribe the procedure for preparation and revision of rolls, with Rule 18 requiring individual notice before deletion of an entry.
    10. Election Symbols (Reservation and Allotment) Order, 1968: Governs recognition of parties as State or National parties and the allotment of reserved and free symbols.
    11. Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners (Service Conditions) Act, 2023: Governs the appointment and service conditions of the Chief Election Commissioner and Election Commissioners.
    12. Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961 (supplemented, not drawn from the Backgrounder): Prescribe the detailed procedure for nomination, polling, counting and declaration of results under the Representation of the People Act, 1951.

    Election Commission Initiatives to Strengthen the Electoral Process

    Source: Backgrounder, Elections Lifecycle Approach.docx

    1. Electronic Voting Machines: Deployed across India since 2004, replacing the ballot box system used from 1952.
    2. Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail: Deployed at all polling stations from the 2019 elections, printing a slip visible to the voter for seven seconds before it falls into a sealed compartment.
    3. National Voters Services Portal: Allows voters to register, modify and confirm their electoral details online.
    4. cVIGIL mobile application: Introduced for the 2019 elections, enabling over 20,000 complaints of electoral malpractice to be reported directly to the Commission, with complaints attended within 100 minutes in Bihar.
    5. Systematic Voters Education and Electoral Participation: Targeted voter education campaigns that contributed to a turnout of approximately 67 percent in 2019, among the highest in Indian electoral history.
    6. Photo electoral rolls: All voter lists carried photographs by the 2019 elections, reducing impersonation risk.
    7. Election Seizure Management System: Provides real time reporting of interceptions of cash, liquor and other inducements, alongside 824 flying squads deployed in Bihar and static surveillance teams.
    8. Biometric identification: Piloted in select constituencies during State elections to verify voter identity more accurately.

    Key Facts about Elections and Electoral Rolls in India

    Source: Backgrounder, Elections Lifecycle Approach.docx

    1. Voter access commitments: No polling station is to have more than 1,200 voters, and polling stations are to be located within 2 km of voters’ residences.
    2. Urban apathy measures: Polling stations are set up inside high rise buildings and residential colonies, with basic amenities guaranteed at every polling station.
    3. Seat freeze: The Lok Sabha seat count has been frozen at 543 on the basis of 1971 Census figures, and average voters per constituency has grown from roughly 10 lakh in 1971 to 18 lakh today.
    4. Delimitation Commissions: Four have been constituted so far, in 1952, 1963, 1973 and 2002.
    5. Expenditure ceiling: The official Lok Sabha election expenditure limit is now 95 lakh rupees, up from 25,000 rupees in 1951-52.
    6. Verification record of the machines: Over 4 crore Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail slips have been tallied with the electronic counts of their control units without a single mismatch recorded.

    Challenges in India’s Electoral System

    Source: Backgrounder, Elections Lifecycle Approach.docx

    1. Criminalisation of politics: A record 251 of the 543 members elected to the 18th Lok Sabha in 2024, or 46 percent, have criminal cases registered against them, and the proportion with serious charges rose from 24 percent in 2004. e.g. the conviction rate for politicians involved in crimes standing at only 6 percent, so most accused legislators complete full terms.
    2. Money power and unaccounted funding: Over 60 percent of party income often comes from unknown sources, and registered political parties now exceed 2,800. e.g. cash, liquor and drugs worth over 100 crore rupees seized in Bihar in 2025 and 733.43 crore rupees in Karnataka in 2023.
    3. Seizures that do not convert into convictions: The burden of proving that seized cash was meant to influence votes defeats most cases. e.g. 303.86 crore rupees seized in the 2014 Lok Sabha election released after income assessment, with criminal cases filed in only three of hundreds of instances.
    4. Frozen representation: Seats fixed on 1971 population data leave voters in high growth States under represented, and any correction risks penalising States that reduced fertility. e.g. five southern States together standing to lose approximately 24 seats under a straight redistribution of the existing 543.
    5. Women’s under representation: Women form 49 percent of the population and held approximately 11 percent of Lok Sabha seats as of 2021. e.g. the Women’s Reservation Bill, first introduced in 1996, having failed multiple times, and state laws eroding the grassroots gains secured by the 73rd and 74th Amendments through retrograde eligibility criteria.
    6. Model Code of Conduct without statutory backing: The Code lacks statutory force and is enforced indirectly through existing law. e.g. the Supreme Court in Union of India versus Harbans Singh Jalal (2001) holding that the Code comes into force on the day the election date is announced, and opining that legalising the Code may not be suitable.
    7. Trust deficit in the Commission: Repeated controversies over electronic voting machines, SIR and turnout data have eroded the Commission’s moral authority. e.g. the demand that the Commission release detailed verification data and establish mechanisms for public scrutiny.
    8. Exit and opinion poll regulation gaps: Parliament limited only exit poll publication until the final phase, leaving opinion polls comparatively unrestricted. e.g. exit polls after the 2024 general elections significantly missing the actual result.

    Back2Basics: Election Commission of India (ECI)

    Source: Backgrounder, Elections Lifecycle Approach.docx

    1. Constitutional status: A constitutional body established on 25 January 1950 under Article 324, governed by Articles 324 to 329 in Part XV of the Constitution.
    2. Jurisdiction: Conducts and supervises elections to Parliament, State Legislatures and the offices of President and Vice President.
    3. Composition: A multi member body comprising one Chief Election Commissioner and up to two Election Commissioners.
    4. Status of the Chief Election Commissioner: Holds the same status, salary and perquisites as a judge of the Supreme Court, and can be removed only by a parliamentary address in the manner of a Supreme Court judge.
    5. Removal of Election Commissioners: An Election Commissioner can be removed by the President only on the recommendation of the Chief Election Commissioner.
    6. Appointment: Governed by the Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners (Service Conditions) Act, 2023, under which a Selection Committee comprising the Prime Minister, a Union Cabinet Minister nominated by the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha recommends candidates.
    7. The appointment dispute: The Supreme Court in Anoop Baranwal versus Union of India (2023) had directed that the selection panel include the Chief Justice of India until Parliament enacted a law, and the 2023 Act omitted the Chief Justice, which is under challenge.
    8. Administrative functions: Preparation and revision of electoral rolls, notification of election dates, scrutiny of nomination papers, recognition of political parties and allotment of symbols.
    9. Advisory and quasi judicial functions: Advises the President on disqualification of members of Parliament and Governors on State legislature disqualifications, cancels and reschedules polls for rigging or violence, and acts as a court for disputes on party recognition and symbols.

    Way Forward

    1. Publish the verification trail: Release booth level data on forms received, entries deleted and the reason recorded for each deletion, so that a claimed clean up is auditable rather than asserted.
    2. Enforce the individual notice requirement: Make compliance with Rule 18 of the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960 a precondition for deletion, with a recorded acknowledgement for every form collected.
    3. Match the timeline to the task: Set the revision period from the verification workload of the largest States rather than a uniform 90 day window, given the Assam experience.
    4. Provide a portable enrolment route for migrants: Enable remote or transferable enrolment so that absence from the registered address during verification does not by itself trigger deletion.
    5. Require human confirmation of algorithmic matches: Treat artificial intelligence generated duplicate and identity matches as flags for field verification rather than as grounds for deletion.
    6. Publish a single calendar: Issue one set of deadlines for each State at the outset, so that contradictory dates of the kind issued in Bihar do not recur.
    7. Restore the appointment safeguard: Settle the composition of the Selection Committee for Election Commissioners, since the Commission’s perceived independence is the foundation of any acceptance of its roll revision.
    8. Build a bilateral democratic agenda on rules, not on claims: Convert the shared interest of India and the United States in citizen only rolls and verified voting into a technical exchange on enrolment standards, after each restores trust in its own process.

    “[2018, GS2, 10 marks] In the light of recent controversy regarding the use of Electronic Voting Machines (EVM), what are the challenges before the Election Commission of India to ensure the trustworthiness of elections in India?”

  • After Naxalism, a development corridor

    Why in the News

    The Centre declared the country free from Naxalism on 31 March 2026, closing a security campaign that ran for decades across the forests of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and the rest of the former Red Corridor. The tension this exposes is that the military defeat of an insurgency does not by itself produce the economic activity that must occupy the space the guns have vacated.

    What is Left Wing Extremism and what was the Red Corridor?

    1. The movement: Left Wing Extremism (LWE), commonly called Naxalism, is an armed insurgency pursuing the capture of state power through protracted rural armed struggle, drawing on Maoist doctrine.
    2. The territory: The Red Corridor was the contiguous belt of forested and mineral-rich districts across central and eastern India where Maoist cadres exercised effective control and the state's writ was contested.
    3. What that control looked like: For decades the region was associated with ambushes, armed cadres and Maoist control rather than with routine administration.
    4. The declared end point: The Centre declared the country free from Naxalism on 31 March 2026, which is treated as a turning point rather than as the end of the task.

    What are CoBRA units?

    1. What they are: Commando Battalion for Resolute Action (CoBRA) is the specialised jungle warfare and guerrilla warfare force raised within the Central Reserve Police Force for anti-Naxal operations.
    2. Their role here: CoBRA units, deployed alongside state police forces, carried out the operations that dismantled strongholds which had remained difficult to penetrate for years.

    What was the strategy that dismantled the insurgency?

    1. Intelligence-led operations: Operations were driven by actionable intelligence on cadre location and movement rather than by area domination alone.
    2. Centre and state coordination: Greater coordination between central and state forces removed the seams across state borders that cadres had used to evade pursuit.
    3. Disruption of Maoist financing: Agencies targeted the financial networks that sustained the insurgency, cutting the flow that paid, armed and supplied cadres.
    4. Rehabilitation: A surrender policy sought to bring former cadres back into civilian life through financial assistance, training and support for reintegration.
    5. Sustained expansion of the security grid: The security presence was expanded continuously rather than surged and withdrawn, so that recovered territory was held.
    6. Political direction from the top: Repeated engagement by the Union Home Minister, including visits to Bastar and security review meetings on the ground, kept the Centre involved in an operational challenge requiring coordination between Delhi, state governments and personnel deployed deep inside difficult terrain.

    Which operations broke the strongholds?

    1. Black Forest: One of the named operations conducted by CoBRA units alongside state police forces.
    2. Octopus: A second named operation in the same series.
    3. Double Bull: A third named operation in the same series.
    4. Chakrabandha: A fourth named operation in the same series.
    5. The common outcome: Together these operations helped dismantle strongholds that had remained difficult to penetrate for years, which is what allowed a more permanent state presence to be established.

    What has the development push delivered since 2014?

    1. Security infrastructure: 408 new security camps and 597 fortified police stations have been established in LWE-affected areas since 2014.
    2. Road connectivity: More than 12,000 km of roads have been constructed in the affected regions.
    3. Formal finance: 1,804 bank branches and 1,321 ATMs have been added.
    4. Postal reach: 6,025 post offices have been added.
    5. Telecommunications: Mobile connectivity has expanded across most villages in the affected regions.
    6. Education and skills: Eklavya Model Residential Schools, Industrial Training Institutes and skill development centres have been established alongside the physical infrastructure.

    Why does a road, a bank branch or a tower change more than the statistic suggests?

    1. Roads change access, not distance: A road changes access to a market and to a hospital, converting a physical distance into a usable one.
    2. Bank branches change the terms of credit: A bank branch connects households to formal finance and displaces the informal lender who set the terms in its absence.
    3. Towers change the relationship to the state: A telecom tower brings a remote village closer to the rest of the country, which affects everything from grievance redress to remittances.
    4. Schools change the option set: A school or a skill centre expands the choices available to young people, which is the mechanism by which recruitment into an insurgency loses its appeal.
    5. The sequencing that made it possible: These interventions became feasible only once security forces could establish a more permanent presence in areas where the state had previously struggled to maintain one.

    Why is the end of armed conflict the easier half of the task?

    1. The achievement is a milestone, not an outcome: The guns going silent is an important milestone, and the harder task is ensuring that the space they leave behind is filled with roads, schools, businesses, livelihoods and functioning institutions.
    2. The nature of the state's presence must change: The objective now is a state presence defined by institutions and opportunity rather than by the security challenge that once dominated the landscape.
    3. Infrastructure is an input, not a result: Roads, branches and towers must begin to generate sustained economic activity, better education and greater integration with the rest of India, which is not automatic.
    4. The next phase is less visible: The coming phase will be less dramatic than the operations that made the headlines, and could be more important in determining the legacy of the campaign.
    5. Reversibility is the risk: Rehabilitation must hold, since the surrender policy's purpose is to prevent former cadres from returning to the movement and to prevent the movement from replenishing its ranks.
    6. The test stated: The former Red Corridor becomes a development corridor only when the infrastructure now reaching these regions begins to generate sustained economic activity, which is where the larger test begins.

    Conclusion

    The military campaign against Left Wing Extremism succeeded through intelligence-led operations, central and state coordination, disruption of financing, rehabilitation and a sustained security grid, and the Centre declared the country free from Naxalism on 31 March 2026. The infrastructure that followed, 408 camps, 597 fortified police stations, over 12,000 km of roads, 1,804 bank branches, 1,321 ATMs and 6,025 post offices, has changed the physical reach of the state. What remains unresolved is whether that reach converts into sustained economic activity and institutions, since the durability of the achievement will be judged on that conversion and not on the operations.

    Left Wing Extremism in India

    1. What it is: Left Wing Extremism is an armed movement seeking to overthrow the state through protracted people's war, organised around rural base areas, guerrilla zones and armed squads.
    2. Origin: The movement takes its popular name from the 1967 peasant uprising at Naxalbari in West Bengal.
    3. Present organisation: The Communist Party of India (Maoist) was formed in 2004 through the merger of the People's War Group and the Maoist Communist Centre of India, and is proscribed as a terrorist organisation.
    4. Geographic concentration: Activity was concentrated in a forested, mineral-rich and tribal-majority belt spanning Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Odisha, Bihar, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, Madhya Pradesh and West Bengal.
    5. Structural drivers: The movement drew on land alienation, displacement by mining and infrastructure projects, denial of forest rights, absence of administration and the weakness of local grievance redress in Fifth Schedule areas.
    6. The doctrinal frame: The Union government's approach has been organised around the SAMADHAN doctrine, which sets out the components of the counter-insurgency response.
    7. Institutional lead: The Ministry of Home Affairs coordinates the response through the Left Wing Extremism Division, with the Central Reserve Police Force as the principal central force deployed.

    Laws Governing the Response to Left Wing Extremism

    1. Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967: The principal central law used to proscribe the Communist Party of India (Maoist) and its front organisations and to prosecute membership and support.
    2. The 2019 amendment allows the designation of individuals, not only organisations, as terrorists.
    3. Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002: The instrument used to trace and attach the financial networks that sustained the insurgency.
    4. Chhattisgarh Special Public Security Act, 2005: A state law empowering the declaration of organisations as unlawful and criminalising membership and assistance in the most affected state.
    5. Andhra Pradesh Public Security Act, 1992: The corresponding state instrument in the southern part of the former corridor.
    6. Arms Act, 1959 and Explosive Substances Act, 1908: Govern possession and use of weapons and explosives, which are the principal charges alongside the terrorism statutes.
    7. Provisions of the Panchayats (Extension to the Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996 (PESA): Extends panchayat provisions to Fifth Schedule areas and vests the Gram Sabha with powers over land, minor minerals and local plans, addressing a grievance the insurgency mobilised.
    8. Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006: Recognises individual and community forest rights, addressing the land and forest alienation that underpinned recruitment.
    9. Fifth Schedule to the Constitution: Governs the administration of Scheduled Areas through the Governor and the Tribes Advisory Council, and is the constitutional frame within which most affected districts sit.

    Government Initiatives for Left Wing Extremism Affected Areas

    1. National Policy and Action Plan, 2015: The overarching framework combining security measures, development interventions, rights and entitlements of local communities, and public perception management.
    2. Security Related Expenditure (SRE) Scheme: Reimburses state governments for security-related expenditure including training, operational costs, ex gratia payments and the surrender and rehabilitation of former cadres.
    3. Special Central Assistance (SCA) for the most affected districts: Funds public infrastructure and services in the districts of highest concern, filling critical gaps identified by district administrations.
    4. Special Infrastructure Scheme (SIS): Strengthens state police infrastructure, including special forces and fortified police stations, in affected states.
    5. Road Connectivity Project for LWE Affected Areas (RCPLWEA): Successor to the Road Requirement Plan, it constructs and upgrades roads and bridges to open isolated blocks to administration and markets.
    6. LWE Mobile Tower Project: Installs mobile towers in affected districts to extend telecommunications where commercial operators would not otherwise invest.
    7. Eklavya Model Residential Schools: Provide residential schooling for tribal children in blocks with high Scheduled Tribe population, extending secondary education in the affected belt.
    8. Aspirational Districts Programme: Targets the least developed districts, a large share of which fall in the former corridor, on health, nutrition, education, agriculture, financial inclusion and infrastructure indicators.
    9. Civic Action Programme: Funds central armed police forces to conduct welfare activities that build confidence between security forces and local communities.

    Back2Basics: The SAMADHAN Doctrine

    1. What it is: SAMADHAN is the Union government's stated doctrine for countering Left Wing Extremism, articulated as an eight-point formulation.
    2. S, Smart leadership: Leadership capable of directing an operation that spans police, intelligence and administration.
    3. A, Aggressive strategy: A posture of sustained offensive operations rather than defensive holding.
    4. M, Motivation and training: Continuous training and morale management for deployed forces.
    5. A, Actionable intelligence: Intelligence specific enough to act on, which is the input the campaign was built around.
    6. D, Dashboard-based key result areas and key performance indicators: Measured performance targets for units and districts.
    7. H, Harnessing technology: Use of surveillance, communications and data tools in operations.
    8. A, Action plan for each theatre: A theatre-specific plan rather than a uniform national approach.
    9. N, No access to financing: Cutting the financial networks that sustain cadres, weapons and logistics.

    Key Facts about the Left Wing Extremism Campaign

    1. The declaration: The Centre declared the country free from Naxalism on 31 March 2026.
    2. Central Reserve Police Force: The largest central armed police force, it marked its Raising Day on 27 July and has been the principal force deployed in the campaign.
    3. CoBRA: The Commando Battalion for Resolute Action is the Central Reserve Police Force's specialised jungle and guerrilla warfare unit for anti-Naxal operations.
    4. Named operations: Black Forest, Octopus, Double Bull and Chakrabandha are the operations named as having dismantled entrenched strongholds.
    5. Bastar: The Bastar division of Chhattisgarh was the operational centre of the campaign and the site of repeated ministerial review visits.
    6. Infrastructure since 2014: 408 new security camps, 597 fortified police stations, over 12,000 km of roads, 1,804 bank branches, 1,321 ATMs and 6,025 post offices in affected areas.
    7. The origin marker: The movement is named after Naxalbari in West Bengal, the site of the 1967 uprising.

    Challenges in Consolidating the Post-Insurgency Transition

    1. Infrastructure without economic activity: Physical assets do not automatically generate livelihoods, e.g. more than 12,000 km of roads open access to markets only where there is production to move.
    2. Reversibility of surrender: Rehabilitation fails where former cadres find no economic footing, e.g. surrendered cadres receiving one-time financial assistance without sustained employment remain vulnerable to re-recruitment.
    3. Unsettled land and forest rights: The grievance that fed recruitment persists where titles remain unrecognised, e.g. pending individual and community claims under the Forest Rights Act, 2006 in Fifth Schedule districts.
    4. Displacement from mining and industry: Development in a mineral-rich belt can reproduce the alienation the insurgency mobilised, e.g. resettlement disputes around iron ore and coal projects in Bastar and Jharkhand.
    5. Thin administrative capacity: Newly opened blocks lack the staffing to run the institutions now built, e.g. teacher and health worker vacancies in interior blocks leave schools and health centres nominally functional.
    6. Security-first institutional habits: Areas administered through a security grid do not convert automatically to civil administration, e.g. 408 security camps and 597 fortified police stations remain the most visible state presence in many blocks.
    7. Justice system backlog: Cases registered during the campaign remain unresolved and undercut confidence, e.g. long undertrial detention of tribal accused under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.
    8. Residual and displaced cadres: Movement remnants may relocate rather than dissolve, e.g. cadre movement across inter-state boundaries has historically shifted the problem rather than ended it.
    9. Fragile fiscal continuity: Development spending contingent on the insurgency's salience declines once the emergency is declared over, e.g. schemes framed as LWE-specific lose their justification the moment the region is declared free.

    Way Forward

    1. Shift funding from security-tagged to development-tagged windows: Convert LWE-specific central assistance into sustained district development funding, so financing does not lapse with the security declaration.
    2. Complete forest rights recognition: Clear the backlog of individual and community forest rights claims in the former corridor, which addresses the grievance the movement recruited on.
    3. Staff the institutions already built: Fill teacher, health worker and revenue staff vacancies in the newly connected blocks, since a building without staff does not constitute a functioning institution.
    4. Link infrastructure to production: Tie the road, banking and connectivity network to minor forest produce value chains, agro-processing and local enterprise credit, so that access converts into income.
    5. Make rehabilitation employment-linked: Extend the surrender policy beyond financial assistance into guaranteed placement in skill centres, Industrial Training Institutes and public works, so reintegration is durable.
    6. Strengthen PESA implementation: Operationalise Gram Sabha powers over land, minor minerals and local plans under the Provisions of the Panchayats (Extension to the Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996, so local consent governs the next phase of development.
    7. Fast-track pending cases: Establish dedicated courts to clear the backlog of insurgency-era cases, since prolonged undertrial detention undermines the legitimacy the campaign gained.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025, GS3, 10 marks] The Government of India recently stated that Left Wing Extremism (LWE) will be eliminated by 2026. What do you understand by LWE and how are the people affected by it? What measures have been taken by the government to eliminate LWE?”

  • [19th August 2026] The Hindu OpED: Beyond America: Gulf states must build a regional order past the US security umbrella

    Question (2022, GS2): “How will I2U2 (India, Israel, UAE and USA) grouping transform India’s position in global politics?” 
    Linkage: This question explores how India integrates into new regional frameworks that include Gulf states (UAE) and Israel, illustrating the evolving security and economic partnerships in West Asia.

    Mentor Comment

    The United States President has threatened, for the second time, to bomb Oman, a long standing American ally that hosted talks between Washington and Tehran before the war was launched on 28 February. The threat against an ally exposes a conflict between an American security architecture built on bases across the Persian Gulf and a war in which those bases have become the principal liability of the states that host them.

    What is the American security umbrella in the Persian Gulf?

    1. What it is: The American security umbrella is the arrangement under which the United States guarantees the external security of the Persian Gulf monarchies through forward deployed forces, basing agreements and arms sales, in exchange for regional access and stable energy flows.
    2. Physical form: Over the years the United States built military bases across the Persian Gulf, hosting naval, air and command elements on the territory of partner states.
    3. Strategic premise: The arrangement rested on the assumption that an American presence deters Iran and that hosting American forces raises rather than lowers a host state’s security.
    4. Companion policy: It was paired with a decades old policy of containing Iran through sanctions, isolation and force posture.
    5. What the war has done to it: The foundations of this security architecture have been shaken, since American bases have turned out to be a liability in the hour of need.

    What is the Strait of Hormuz?

    1. What it is: The Strait of Hormuz is the narrow waterway connecting the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea, bordered by Iran to the north and Oman and the United Arab Emirates to the south.
    2. Why it matters: One fifth of the world’s seaborne oil passed through the Strait before the war, which makes its closure a global energy event rather than a regional one.

    What is the Fifth Fleet?

    1. What it is: The United States Fifth Fleet is the naval formation responsible for the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, the Arabian Sea and parts of the Indian Ocean, headquartered in Bahrain.
    2. Why its damage matters: Its headquarters is the command node of the American naval presence in the region, so damage to it is a loss of command capacity and not only of infrastructure.

    What is a cold peace?

    1. What it is: A cold peace is a settlement in which former adversaries stop fighting and maintain functional diplomatic and economic contact without reconciling their underlying political differences or building trust.
    2. Why it is proposed here: It is the achievable objective between the Arab states and Iran, since containment has failed and full normalisation is not available.

    What triggered the threat against Oman?

    1. Oman’s original role: Oman hosted the talks between Washington and Tehran before the war was launched on 28 February, making it the diplomatic venue rather than a party to the conflict.
    2. Oman’s continuing role: Since the failed escalation, Oman, under American influence, has been talking to Iran seeking a settlement.
    3. Why the effort stalled: Iran, having survived two rounds of American bombings, refused to offer major concessions.
    4. The consequence for Oman: American frustration deepened with Oman precisely because Muscat could not deliver an Iranian concession it never had the power to extract.
    5. The nature of the threat: This is the second time the American leader has threatened to attack Oman, and the threat now falls on an ally for failing to produce a face saving deal.
    6. What the threat reveals: Instead of reassuring allies whose territory has been struck, Washington is threatening them, which is the clearest signal of declining influence in the region.

    Why has the Strait of Hormuz not reopened?

    1. Who closed it: Iran closed the Strait after it was attacked, making closure a retaliatory instrument rather than a negotiating opening position.
    2. The claimed breakthrough: When the American leader backed down from a threatened escalation after 13 days of bombing on Iran in July, he said the two sides were close to a deal on reopening the Strait.
    3. Iran’s position: Iran never said that it had agreed to any deal with the United States over the Strait.
    4. Iran’s stated preconditions: Iran issued several demands as preconditions for any agreement, including releasing frozen funds and issuing sanctions relief.
    5. The claim against the traffic data: The American President has repeatedly claimed the Strait was open, while traffic through the waterway is nowhere near pre war levels.
    6. Scale of what is blocked: The waterway carried one fifth of the world’s seaborne oil before the war, so the gap between claimed and actual traffic is a measurable global supply loss.

    What has the war done to America’s regional military position?

    1. Bases damaged or destroyed: At least 15 American bases are either damaged or destroyed.
    2. The command node hit: The damaged facilities include the Fifth Fleet Headquarters in Bahrain.
    3. Net effect on presence: The damage has substantially reduced America’s strategic presence in the region.
    4. How Iran achieved it: Tehran turned the American basing network into a liability by repeatedly striking the bases and their host countries.
    5. Iran’s own survival: Iran survived two rounds of American bombings and remained able to refuse major concessions afterwards.
    6. Failure of coercive signalling: From day one of the war, American threats and rhetoric did little to advance Washington’s strategic goals or to deter Iran.

    Why has the presence meant to protect Gulf states become the source of their danger?

    1. Both propositions held simultaneously: The bases were the guarantee of Gulf security and the reason Gulf territory was struck, and the war has resolved that ambiguity against the hosts.
    2. Iran’s targeting logic: By striking the bases and the host countries together, Tehran converted the guarantee into a cost borne by the host rather than by the guarantor.
    3. The guarantor’s response: Washington neither restored deterrence nor reassured the hosts, and has instead threatened one of them with bombing.
    4. The asymmetry of exposure: The host state’s territory, population and economy absorb the retaliation while the guarantor’s homeland does not.
    5. Why the old bargain cannot simply be repaired: Reassurance would require a demonstrated capacity to deter Iranian strikes, which two rounds of bombing failed to establish.
    6. The unresolved dependence: Gulf states have no alternative security provider of comparable capability, so recognising the failure of the arrangement does not by itself produce a substitute.

    Why has the containment of Iran failed?

    1. The record of the war: Iran absorbed two rounds of American bombing and emerged able to hold the Strait closed and to set preconditions for talks.
    2. Coercion produced no concession: Threats and rhetoric from the first day of the war neither advanced American goals nor deterred Iranian action.
    3. The cost fell on third parties: Containment’s enforcement damaged the host states of American bases rather than the target of the policy.
    4. Diplomacy was subordinated to pressure: Oman’s mediation was conducted under American influence rather than as an independent regional initiative, which limited what it could offer Tehran.
    5. The policy’s own premise collapsed: A decades old policy of isolating Iran cannot be sustained when the isolating power’s regional presence has been substantially reduced.

    What would a new regional order require?

    1. Recognition of the strategic reality: Countries in the region confront a new strategic reality in which the foundations of the old security architecture have been shaken.
    2. Abandoning containment: Gulf states must recognise that the decades old policy of containing Iran has failed.
    3. Looking past the umbrella: To ensure their own security and regional stability, the Persian Gulf countries need to look beyond the American security umbrella.
    4. The organising principle: The new order must be founded on a cold peace between the Arab states and Iran, not on reconciliation or on alliance.
    5. Regional rather than external authorship: The foundations have to be laid by the regional states themselves, since the external guarantor has demonstrated both limited capability and limited commitment.

    How does the Gulf’s shifting security order affect India’s interests?

    1. Energy dependence: India imports over 85 percent of its crude oil, and a large share of West Asian supply transits the Strait of Hormuz, so a closed Strait raises both price and freight and insurance costs.
    2. Diaspora exposure: About 90 lakh Indians live and work in the Gulf Cooperation Council states, the largest concentration of Indians anywhere outside India.
    3. Remittance dependence: The Gulf accounts for a substantial share of India’s annual remittance inflows, which exceeded $125 billion in recent years and are the country’s most stable external receipt.
    4. Trade and connectivity stakes: The India Middle East Europe Economic Corridor and India’s trade agreement with the United Arab Emirates both assume a stable and navigable Gulf.
    5. Balancing act with Iran: India’s Chabahar port investment and its connectivity route to Central Asia through Iran sit alongside its deepening partnerships with the Gulf monarchies and Israel.
    6. Strategic preference: A cold peace between the Arab states and Iran serves India better than either containment or open conflict, since India maintains working relationships across all three blocs.

    Challenges to building a new Persian Gulf regional order

    1. Absence of a regional security institution: The Gulf has no inclusive security organisation covering both the Arab states and Iran, e.g. the Gulf Cooperation Council formed in 1981 explicitly excludes Iran and Iraq.
    2. Sectarian and dynastic rivalry: Competition between Riyadh and Tehran runs through proxy conflicts that outlast any bilateral thaw, e.g. the Yemen conflict continued despite the Saudi Iran normalisation agreement brokered in Beijing in March 2023.
    3. Capability dependence on external suppliers: Gulf militaries are built on American platforms, training and sustainment, so autonomy is limited by the equipment they already own, e.g. Patriot and THAAD air defence systems in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates depend on American logistics chains.
    4. Intra Gulf divergence: The Gulf Cooperation Council states do not share a single position toward Iran, e.g. the blockade of Qatar between 2017 and 2021 was driven partly by differing approaches to Tehran.
    5. Nuclear file unresolved: No verification framework governs Iran’s nuclear programme after the collapse of the earlier agreement, e.g. the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action of 2015 ceased to constrain enrichment after the American withdrawal in 2018.
    6. Energy chokepoint vulnerability: Any settlement leaves the Strait of Hormuz physically controllable by one party, e.g. one fifth of the world’s seaborne oil transited the Strait before Iran closed it.
    7. External power competition: China and Russia have expanding interests in the region and no shared framework with the United States, e.g. China brokered the Saudi Iran agreement of 2023 without American involvement.
    8. Domestic legitimacy constraints: Gulf rulers face internal opposition to accommodation with Iran and to visible dependence on foreign forces, e.g. Bahrain’s own political fault lines were exposed during the unrest of 2011.

    Conclusion

    The war has produced a result the Gulf states cannot reverse: at least 15 American bases damaged or destroyed including the Fifth Fleet Headquarters in Bahrain, the Strait of Hormuz still functionally closed, and an American guarantor now threatening an ally rather than reassuring it. The decades old policy of containing Iran has failed, and no external power is positioned to replace the security architecture that failure has hollowed out. What remains unresolved is whether the Persian Gulf states can construct a regional order on a cold peace with Iran while their own militaries, economies and rivalries still run through the arrangement they must replace.

  • [19th August 2026] The Hindu OpED: A changing Asia demands more from Delhi and Tokyo, together

    Question (2019, GS2): “‘The time has come for India and Japan to build a strong contemporary relationship, one involving global and strategic partnership that will have a great significance for Asia and the world as a whole.’ Comment.”
    Linkage: This question directly mirrors the article, asking for an evaluation of how a strengthened partnership between Delhi and Tokyo can influence the broader Asian and global landscape.

    Mentor Comment

    The Japanese Defence Minister’s visit to India this week comes as Tokyo abandons its self imposed military restraint and adopts an active regional military diplomacy. The visit exposes a gap between an India Japan defence relationship that carries the full institutional architecture of a Special Strategic and Global Partnership and a level of operational and industrial cooperation that has stayed slow and incremental.

    What is the India Japan Special Strategic and Global Partnership?

    1. What it is: The Special Strategic and Global Partnership is the highest tier of India’s bilateral partnership framework with Japan, elevated to that designation in 2014 from the Strategic and Global Partnership established in 2006.
    2. Political apparatus: It rests on an Annual Summit between the two Prime Ministers, which India holds with very few countries.
    3. Security apparatus: It carries a 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministerial Dialogue, a defence ministerial dialogue, a defence policy dialogue and service level staff talks.
    4. Operational apparatus: It includes regular exercises across the three services and a mutual logistics arrangement.
    5. Where it falls short: Defence industrial cooperation and operational coordination remain well behind the political rhetoric that the designation carries.

    What is the Official Security Assistance programme?

    1. What it is: Official Security Assistance is Japan’s grant mechanism, launched in 2023, for providing defence equipment and infrastructure to the armed forces of friendly countries, kept separate from its Official Development Assistance which cannot fund military use.
    2. What it signals: It marks the first time Japan has used military assistance as an instrument of statecraft, with early recipients including the Philippines, Malaysia, Bangladesh and Fiji.

    What is a counterstrike capability?

    1. What it is: A counterstrike capability is the ability to strike missile launch sites and related targets in an adversary’s territory after an attack has begun or is imminent, which Japan had previously renounced as inconsistent with an exclusively defensive posture.
    2. How Japan is acquiring it: Through purchase of American Tomahawk cruise missiles and simultaneous development of longer range indigenous weapons.

    What is the UNICORN naval communications antenna?

    1. What it is: UNICORN, the Unified Complex Radio Antenna, is an integrated composite mast that houses multiple communication and electronic warfare antennas inside a single stealth shaped structure, reducing a warship’s radar signature.
    2. Significance for the relationship: Its co development is the first bilateral defence co development project between India and Japan, announced during the Japanese Prime Minister’s Delhi visit last month.

    What is a Mogami class frigate?

    1. What it is: The Mogami class is a Japanese designed multi mission stealth frigate built for a small crew, combining anti submarine, mine countermeasure and surface warfare roles in a single hull.
    2. Why it matters here: Australia’s decision to acquire Japanese designed Mogami class frigates is the largest defence export Japan has secured since it eased its arms export restrictions.

    What is a logistics agreement?

    1. What it is: A logistics agreement, in this case the Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement, allows the armed forces of two countries to use each other’s bases and facilities for supplies, refuelling, spares and services on a reimbursable basis.
    2. Operational effect: It extends the reach of each navy without new basing, which is the practical foundation for sustained joint operations in the Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific.

    What is driving Japan’s shift away from military restraint?

    1. The primary driver: The rise of China as a great military power and Beijing’s growing political will to translate that power into concrete outcomes.
    2. The economic turning point: China overtook Japan as the world’s second largest economy in 2010, and its growing economic resources supported a massive expansion of military capabilities.
    3. The shared method of pressure: The People’s Liberation Army applies the same methods on Japan’s maritime frontier and along India’s contested Himalayan land border, namely persistent probing and the slow but definitive alteration of the territorial status quo.
    4. The compounding variable: The challenge from China is magnified for both capitals by the volatility of American policy, with the second American presidency reinforcing questions about the predictability of Washington’s regional commitments.
    5. What neither capital wants: Neither Tokyo nor Delhi seeks an Asia without America, since Japan remains deeply invested in its alliance with Washington and India sees a continuing American military presence as essential to a stable Asian balance.
    6. The policy turn: Japan’s prime minister who returned to office in 2012 accelerated the effort to adapt security policy to these circumstances.

    What did Japan’s old post war bargain look like?

    1. The basic trade: For much of the post war era Tokyo concentrated on economic reconstruction while relying on the United States for its security.
    2. Spending ceiling: Defence expenditure remained around 1 percent of gross domestic product.
    3. Export restriction: Arms exports were tightly restricted, effectively closing Japan’s defence industry to foreign customers.
    4. Force constraints: The Self Defence Forces operated within narrow political constraints on role, deployment and equipment.
    5. When it began to break: Those conditions began to change as the China challenge unfolded through the 2000s.

    What do Japan’s 2022 defence reforms actually contain?

    1. Spending target: Tokyo set the goal of raising defence related spending to around 2 percent of gross domestic product by 2027, and brought that target forward through additional spending last year.
    2. Counterstrike doctrine: Japan is acquiring long range counterstrike capabilities, including American Tomahawk missiles, alongside longer range indigenous weapons.
    3. Defensive layers: It is strengthening air and missile defence and building cyber and space capabilities.
    4. Unmanned systems and reach: It is investing in unmanned systems and in the capacity to operate farther from the Japanese islands.
    5. Industrial base: Tokyo is revitalising its defence industrial base and breaking down the old barriers between civilian technology and national security.
    6. Export liberalisation: It has eased restrictions on arms exports, which is what made a foreign frigate order possible.
    7. Security assistance: It has begun providing military equipment to friendly countries through the new Official Security Assistance programme.
    8. What the package amounts to: Taken together these changes are larger than a rearmament, because Tokyo is treating military power, defence technology, arms exports and security assistance as normal instruments of statecraft.

    What do Japan’s other partnerships demonstrate about the pace India Japan ties could reach?

    1. Australia, the frigate order: Australia’s decision to acquire Japanese designed Mogami class frigates is a breakthrough for a country that until recently imposed extraordinary restrictions on exporting weapons, and it shows that Japanese defence industry can now deliver a major platform to a partner.
    2. Australia, the access architecture: Canberra and Tokyo have expanded military exercises, reciprocal access, logistics and defence industrial cooperation, which is a deeper package than the logistics arrangement India and Japan currently hold.
    3. New Zealand: Japan is deepening defence ties with Wellington, and the Japanese Defence Minister came to Delhi after consultations in Canberra with his Australian and New Zealand counterparts, signalling a coordinated Indo Pacific circuit rather than a series of bilaterals.
    4. South Korea: Tokyo is reaching out to Seoul and other regional neighbours, which matters because it means Japan is willing to build security ties across historically difficult relationships.
    5. Europe: Japan is strengthening security engagement with European partners, extending the same instruments of exercises, access and industrial cooperation beyond Asia.

    What does the existing India Japan defence architecture already provide?

    1. Ministerial mechanism: A 2+2 dialogue bringing foreign and defence ministers of both countries into a single format.
    2. Sustainment mechanism: A logistics agreement giving each side reciprocal access to the other’s facilities for supplies and services.
    3. Exercise programme: Regular exercises across the three services, alongside participation in the trilateral and multilateral formats both countries belong to.
    4. The most recent political push: The Japanese Prime Minister’s Delhi visit last month called for more sophisticated exercises, stronger maritime domain awareness and deeper defence industrial cooperation.
    5. The first industrial output: That visit announced the first bilateral defence co development project, the UNICORN naval communications antenna.

    Why has the institutional architecture not translated into operational weight?

    1. The stated gap: India Japan defence cooperation has expanded and remains well behind the political rhetoric attached to the Special Strategic and Global Partnership.
    2. The slow node: Defence industrial cooperation has been painfully slow, which is why a single antenna counts as the first co development project after two decades of partnership.
    3. Exercises are not coordination: The armed forces exercise together without moving to operational coordination, so joint activity does not accumulate into joint capability.
    4. Asymmetric urgency: Japan is demonstrating greater purpose and urgency in responding to the changing balance of power, which places the burden of matching commitment on Delhi.
    5. The reassurance that removes the excuse: Unlike China, India has long welcomed the prospect of a stronger Japan, so there is no political obstacle on the Indian side to a larger partnership.
    6. Why a review agenda is insufficient: Treating the visit as an occasion to review bilateral exercises and exchanges repeats the incrementalism that produced the gap.

    Where should the partnership go next?

    1. Industrial ambition: Delhi and Tokyo need much greater ambition in joint research, development and coproduction of weapons and military technologies.
    2. Anti submarine warfare: Operational coordination should extend to anti submarine warfare, the domain where Japanese capability and Indian Ocean geography combine most directly.
    3. Maritime surveillance: Coordination in maritime surveillance would convert two separate domain awareness pictures into one.
    4. Air defence: Air defence cooperation follows from Japan’s investment in layered air and missile defence.
    5. Logistics: Logistics coordination would turn the existing agreement from an access arrangement into a sustained operating capability.
    6. Why now: The unfolding transformation of the Asian security environment is the reason the pace has to change, not the specific content of any one visit.

    Challenges to India Japan defence cooperation

    1. Slow defence industrial delivery: Joint projects take years to move from announcement to contract on both sides, e.g. the first bilateral co development project, the UNICORN antenna, was announced only last month after two decades of partnership.
    2. Technology transfer caution: Japan’s defence industry remains new to export and is protective of sensitive technology, e.g. the long negotiation over the US-2 amphibious aircraft never converted into an Indian order.
    3. Procurement process mismatch: India’s defence acquisition procedure and offset requirements do not align with Japanese corporate practice, e.g. Japanese firms have limited experience bidding into competitive Indian tenders with local content conditions.
    4. Cost sensitivity: Japanese platforms carry high unit costs relative to Indian budget norms, e.g. the US-2 aircraft’s price was a principal reason the proposal stalled.
    5. Divergence on Russia: India’s continued defence and energy relationship with Russia limits the sensitivity of technology Japan is willing to share, e.g. India’s Russian origin air defence and submarine fleet complicates interoperability planning.
    6. Dependence on American policy: Both partners calibrate against Washington’s commitments, so volatility in American policy slows their own planning, e.g. questions about the predictability of the second American presidency have reopened alliance debates in Tokyo.
    7. Domestic legal limits in Japan: Constitutional and legislative constraints on the Self Defence Forces still bound what Japan can commit to jointly, e.g. Article 9 of Japan’s Constitution continues to shape the scope of collective self defence.
    8. Chinese economic leverage: Both economies remain deeply linked to China, which raises the cost of visible security alignment, e.g. China’s rare earth export restrictions have exposed the vulnerability of both countries’ defence electronics supply chains.

    Conclusion

    Japan has changed the terms of its own security policy through the 2022 reforms, a spending target of around 2 percent of gross domestic product by 2027, counterstrike capabilities, eased arms exports and the Official Security Assistance programme, and has already converted that change into a frigate order from Australia. India and Japan possess the full institutional architecture of a security partnership, a 2+2 dialogue, a logistics agreement and tri service exercises, and have produced a single co development project in the UNICORN antenna. The gap is one of ambition rather than of instruments, and closing it means moving from exercises to operational coordination in anti submarine warfare, maritime surveillance, air defence and logistics.