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Type: Op-ed

  • Challenges in India’s net-zero emission target

    Context

    Even though New Delhi has invested in renewable energy and announced a net-zero target, there is a gap between the announcements and the ground reality, as is evident from the promotion of coal.

    India’s commitments

    •  AT the COP 26 in Glasgow, Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced that India has set a target of net-zero carbon emissions by 2070.
    • India also updated its Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) that have to be met by 2030.
    • Its new pledge includes increasing the country’s installed renewable capacity to 500 GW, meeting 50 per cent of its energy requirements from non-fossil fuel sources.

    India’s achievements on past commitments

    • At the COP 21 in Paris, India, made similar ambitious announcements and aimed to reduce the economy-wide emissions intensity by 33-35 per cent from 2005 levels by 2030.
    • In August, the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy announced that the country has installed 100 GW of renewable energy capacity.
    • The majority of this 100 GW, about 78 per cent, is due to large-scale wind and solar power projects.
    • While this is a milestone, India is on track to accomplishing only about two-thirds of its planned renewable target of 175 GW installation by 2022.
    •  To achieve its new goals, India will need to do more in different directions.
    • For instance, it has a target of achieving 40 GW of green energy from the rooftop solar sector by 2022, but it has not been able to achieve even 20 per cent of that so far.
    • In the transport sector, India has targeted a 30 per cent share of electric vehicles (EV) in new sales for 2030.

    India’s climate actions against the Paris Agreement targets

    •  The Climate Action Tracker, an independent scientific analysis that tracks government climate action against the Paris Agreement targets, deems India’s performance as “highly insufficient” simply because coal represents about 70 per cent of the country’s energy supply. 
    • India also needs to cut down subsidies to the fossil fuel industry drastically — not the case currently.
    • While in the past seven years, the country has invested Rs 5.2 trillion in renewable energy, the investment in fossil fuel industry, though down by (only) 4 per cent from 2015-19, was Rs 245 trillion.
    • Coal production is estimated to increase to one billion tonnes by 2024 from 716 million tonnes in 2020-21.
    • According to the Central Electricity Authority, coal capacity is projected to increase from 202GW in 2021 to 266GW by 2029-30.
    • The Government of India is not actively discouraging such investments.
    • On the contrary, coal subsidies are still 35 per cent higher than the subsidies for renewables and coal-fired power generation receives indirect financial support from the government through income tax exemptions and land acquisition at a preferential rate.

    Conclusion

    It is also true that India’s energy transition would be in its own interest because, otherwise, economic growth will not be sustainable and human security will be at stake if dozens of millions of climate refugees are created due to the devastating consequences of climate change.

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  • Does India have a right to burn fossil fuels?

    Context

    There has been quite a lot of debate on India’s dependence on coal against the backdrop of the Conference of the Parties (COP26) meeting. The crux of the theoretical argument is that India needs to develop, and development requires energy.

    Carbon budget framework

    • India has neither historically emitted nor currently emits carbon anywhere close to what the global North has, or does, in per capita terms.
    • If anything, the argument goes, it should ask for a higher and fairer share in the global carbon budget.
    • There is no doubt that this carbon budget framework is an excellent tool to understand global injustice but to move from there to our ‘right to burn’ is a big leap.
    • However, the question is do the countries in the global South necessarily need to increase their share in the global carbon budget?

    Why should developing countries aim for development without increasing carbon emission

    1) Reducing the cost of renewable energy

    • Normally the argument in favour of coal is on account of its cost, reliability and domestic availability.
    • Recent data show that the levelised cost of electricity from renewable energy sources like solar (photovoltaic), hydro and onshore wind has been declining sharply over the last decade and is already less than fossil fuel-based electricity generation.
    •  On reliability, frontier renewable energy technologies have managed to address the question of variability of such sources to a large extent and, with technological progress, it seems to be changing for the better.
    • As for the easy domestic availability of coal, it is a myth.
    • India is among the largest importers of coal in the world, whereas it has no dearth of solar energy.

    2) Following different development model

    •  During the debates of post-colonial development in the Third World, there were two significant issues under discussion — control over technology and choice of techniques to address the issue of surplus labour.
    • India didn’t quite resolve the two issues in its attempts of import-substituting industrialisation which worsened during the post-reform period.
    • But it can address both today.
    • The abundance of renewable natural resources in the tropical climate can give India a head start in this competitive world of technology.
    • South-South collaborations can help India avoid the usual patterns of trade between the North and the South, where the former controls technology and the latter merely provides inputs.
    • And the high-employment trajectory that the green path entails vis-à-vis the fossil fuel sector may help address the issue of surplus labour, even if partially.
    • Such a path could additionally provide decentralised access to clean energy to the poor and the marginalised, including in remote regions of India.

    3) Limitation of addressing global injustice in terms of a carbon budget

    •  The framework of addressing global injustice in terms of a carbon budget is quite limiting in its scope in more ways than one.
    • Such an injustice is not at the level of the nation-states alone; there is such injustice between the rich and the poor within nations and between humans and non-human species.
    • A progressive position on justice would take these injustices into account instead of narrowly focusing on the framework of nation-states.
    • Moreover, it’s a double whammy of injustice for the global South when it comes to climate change.
    • Not only is it not primarily responsible, but the global South, especially its poor, will unduly bear the effect of climate change because of its tropical climate and high population density along the coastal lines.
    • So, arguing for more coal is like shooting oneself in the foot.

    Way forward

    • One of the ways in which this can be done is by making the global North pay for the energy transition in the South.
    • Chalking out an independent, greener path to development may create conditions for such negotiations and give the South the moral high ground to force the North to come to the table, like South Africa did at Glasgow.

    Conclusion

    Even if one is pessimistic about this path of righting the wrongs of the past, at the very least, it is better than the status quo.

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  • There are shades of equality

    Context

    On October 29, the Supreme Court issued notice on an appeal of the Kerala government against a High Court order directing it to award the scholarships by the proportion of minorities in the overall population of the State. This case will be significant for constitutional law.

    Background

    • The Kerala government passed an executive order in 2015 prescribing that minority communities will be entitled to scholarships.
    •  Of the scholarships, 80% were distributed to Muslim students.
    •  In Justine Pallivathukkal v. State of Kerala (2021), the Kerala High Court set aside this order holding that all minorities must be treated alike. 
    • The government argued that its policy was based on the findings of the Sachar Committee report and the Kerala Padana report on the disadvantages faced by Muslims.
    •  It pointed out that Muslims were far behind Christians, Dalits and Adivasis in college enrolment, just as they are in employment and land ownership.

    Justification

    • The different kinds of backwardness of a community must be considered while awarding scholarship schemes.
    • Any other scheme defeats the purpose of offering scholarships to students from minority communities.
    • The High Court prohibited an allocation sensitive to social realities by adopting a form of blind equality approach.
    • It is important, therefore, that the Supreme Court corrects the error of the High Court.
    • The High Court’s reasoning suggests that access to the benefits of affirmative action must follow an approach which is blind to the relative backwardness of different communities.

    Conclusion

    Even when we identify disadvantaged castes or communities, we need to remember the forms of inequality and hierarchy among them. The logic of the High Court’s judgment forbids this.

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  • Net-zero presents many opportunities for India — and challenges

    Context

    India joined the other G20 countries in making a “net-zero” commitment, setting 2070 as its target year.

    Why was it important to sign up for net-zero?

    • India’s topography — its 7,000 km-long coastline, the Himalayan glaciers in the north, and its rich forest areas which house natural resources like coal and iron ore — make the country uniquely vulnerable to climate change.
    • An IMF study suggests that if emissions continue to rise this century, India’s real GDP per capita could fall by 10 per cent by 2100.
    • India’s traditional position has been that since its per capita energy use is only a third of the global average, and it needs to continue to grow to fight poverty, costly energy reduction targets should not be applied to it.

    Opportunities presented by India’s net-zero approach

    •  It could give a clear signal of India’s intentions and provide better access to international technology, funding and markets.
    • We estimate that 60 per cent of India’s capital stock — factories and buildings that will exist in 2040 — is yet to be built.
    • The country can potentially leapfrog into new green technology, rather than being overburdened with “re-fitting” obligations.
    • If India can now transition to green growth, it could create a more responsible and sustainable economy.
    • If India’s exports achieve a “green stamp”, they may find better market access, especially if the world imposes a carbon tax on exports.
    • Around 2-2.5 million additional jobs can be created in the renewables sector by 2050, taking the total number of people employed there to over 3 million.

    Challenges

    • The finances of power distribution companies need to be improved to fund the grid upgrades necessary for scaling up renewables.
    • India needs a coordinated institutional framework that can help overcome multiple levels of complexity like federalism, fiscal constraints and bureaucracy.
    • The energy investment requirement will be high, rising from about $70-80 billion per year now to $160 billion per year.
    •  While the private sector will be required to fund much of this, the government can play a pivotal role, especially in the early days.
    • The transition years will be bumpy.
    • Inflation could be volatile till renewables reached their full potential.

    Conclusion

    India is on the right track but needs to redouble its efforts to remove the obstacles.

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  • International law as a means to advance national security interests

    Context

    Military experts, international relations academics, and practitioners like retired diplomats dominate the debates on global security in India. International lawyers are largely absent in these debates despite security issues being placed within the framework of international law.

    Using international law to further security interests

    In recent times, several examples demonstrate India’s failure to use an international law-friendly vocabulary to articulate its security interests.

    • First, India struck the terror camps in Pakistan in February 2019, after the Pulwama attack India did not invoke the right to self-defence; rather, it relied on a contested doctrine of ‘non-military pre-emptive action’.
    • Second, after the Pulwama attack, India decided to suspend the most favoured nation (MFN) status of Pakistan.
    • Under international law contained in the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade, countries can deviate from their MFN obligations on grounds of national security.
    • Instead of suspending the MFN obligation towards Pakistan along these lines, India used Section 8A(1) of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975, to increase customs duties on all Pakistani products to 200%.
    • The notification on this decision did not even mention ‘national security’.
    • Third, India wishes to deport the Rohingya refugees who, it argues, pose a security threat.
    • India’s argument to justify this deportation is that it is not a signatory to the Refugee Convention.
    • This is a weak argument since India is bound by the principle of non-refoulment.
    • National security is one of the exceptions to the non-refoulment principle in international refugee law.
    • If India wishes to deport the Rohingya, it should develop a case on these lines showing how they constitute a national security threat.
    • Fourth, to put pressure on the Taliban regime to serve India’s interest, India has rarely used international law.
    •  India could have made a case for the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) using its implied powers under international law to temporarily suspend Afghanistan from SAARC’s membership.

    Reasons for international law remaining at the margins

    • First, there is marginal involvement of international lawyers in foreign policymaking.
    • The Legal and Treaties Division of the Ministry of External Affairs, which advises the government on international law matters, is both understaffed and largely ignored on policy matters.
    • Second, apart from the External Affairs Ministry, there are several other Ministries like Commerce and Finance that also deal with different facets of international law.
    • They have negligible expertise in international law.
    • Third, there has been systemic neglect of the study of international law.
    • Fourth, many of the outstanding international law scholars that India has produced prefer to converse with domain experts only.

    Way forward

    • If India wishes to emerge as a global power, it has to make use of ‘lawfare’ i.e., use law as a weapon of national security.
    • To mainstream international law in foreign policymaking, India should invest massively in building its capacity on international law.

    Conclusion

    Notwithstanding the central role that international law plays in security matters, India has failed to fully appreciate the usage of international law to advance its national security interests.

     

    Back2Basics: Non-refoulement principle

    • The principle of non-refoulement constitutes the cornerstone of international refugee protection.
    • It is enshrined in Article 33 of the 1951 Convention, which is also binding on States Party to the 1967 Protocol.
    • Article 33(1) of the 1951 Convention provides:

    “No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his [or her] life or freedom would be threatened on account of his [or her] race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”

  • India-Eurasia Relations

    Context

    Delhi’s Indo-Pacific strategy has acquired political and institutional traction, thanks to intensive Indian diplomacy in recent years. It must now devote similar energy to the development of a “Eurasian” policy.

    Need for Eurasian strategy and challenges

    • This week’s consultations in Delhi on the crisis in Afghanistan among the region’s top security policymakers is part of developing a Eurasian strategy.
    • National Security Advisor Ajit Doval has invited his counterparts from Pakistan, Iran, Central Asia, Russia, and China to join this discussion on Wednesday.
    • Pakistan has declined to join.
    • Pakistan’s reluctance to engage with India on Afghanistan reveals Delhi’s persisting problem with Islamabad in shaping a new Eurasian strategy.
    • But it also reinforces the urgency of an Indian strategy to deal with Eurasia.

    Factors shaping India’s Eurasian policy

    • The most important development in Eurasia today is the dramatic rise of China and its growing strategic assertiveness, expanding economic power and rising political influence.
    • Beijing’s muscular approach to the long and disputed border with Bhutan and India, its quest for a security presence in Tajikistan, the active search for a larger role in Afghanistan, and a greater say in the affairs of the broader sub-Himalayan region are only one part of the story.
    • Physical proximity multiplies China’s economic impact on the inner Asian regions.
    •  These leverages, in turn, were reinforced by a deepening alliance with Russia that straddles the Eurasian heartland. Russia’s intractable disputes with Europe and America have increased Moscow’s reliance on Beijing.
    • Amidst mounting challenges from China in the Indo-Pacific maritime domain, Washington has begun to rethink its strategic commitments to Eurasia. 
    • Whether defined as “burden-sharing” in Washington or “strategic autonomy” in Brussels, Europe must necessarily take on a larger regional Eurasian security role.
    • More broadly, regional powers are going to reshape Eurasia.

    What should be India’s approach to Eurasia

    • Like the Indo-Pacific, Eurasia is new to India’s strategic discourse.
    • To be sure, there are references to India’s ancient civilisational links with Eurasia.
    • While there are many elements to an Indian strategy towards Eurasia, three of them stand out.
    • Put Europe back into India’s continental calculus: As India now steps up its engagement with Europe, the time has come for it to begin a strategic conversation with Brussels on Eurasian security.
    • This will be a natural complement to the fledgling engagement between India and Europe on the Indo-Pacific.
    • India’s Eurasian policy must necessarily involve greater engagement with both the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.
    • Intensify the dialogue on Eurasian security with Russia: While Indo-Russian differences on the Indo-Pacific, the Quad, China, and the Taliban are real, Delhi and Moscow have good reasons to narrow their differences on Afghanistan and widen cooperation on continental Eurasian security.
    • Indian collaboration with both Persia and Arabia: If Persia’s location makes it critical for the future of Afghanistan and Central Asia, the religious influence of Arabia and the weight of the Gulf capital are quite consequential in the region.
    • India’s partnerships with Persia and Arabia are also critical in overcoming Turkey’s alliance with Pakistan that is hostile to Delhi.

    Challenges

    • Contradictions: India will surely encounter many contradictions in each of the three areas — between and among America, Europe, Russia, China, Iran, and the Arab Gulf.
    • As in the Indo-Pacific, so in Eurasia, Delhi should not let these contradictions hold India back.

    Consider the question ” Eurasia involves the recalibration of India’s continental strategy. India has certainly dealt with Eurasia’s constituent spaces separately over the decades. What Delhi now needs is an integrated approach to Eurasia. In the context of this, examine the challenges in India’s engagement with Eurasia and suggest the elements that should form part of India’s strategy towards Eurasia.”

    Conclusion

    The current flux in Eurasian geopolitics will lessen some of the current contradictions and generate some new antinomies in the days ahead. The key for India lies in greater strategic activism that opens opportunities in all directions in Eurasia.

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  • How India’s Gati Shakti Plan can have an impact beyond its borders

    Context

    The Gati Shakti National Master Plan will have an important economic multiplier effect at home, it must also be leveraged to have an external impact by aligning it with India’s regional and global connectivity efforts.

    Main components of the Gati Shakti National Master Plan

    • The Gati Shakti plan has three main components, all focused on domestic coordination.
    • Increase information sharing: The plan seeks to increase information sharing with a new technology platform between various ministries at the Union and state levels.
    • Reduce logistics’ costs: It focuses on giving impetus to multi-modal transportation to reduce logistics’ costs and strengthen last-mile connectivity in India’s hinterland or border regions.
    • Analytical tool: The third component includes an analytical decision-making tool to disseminate project-related information and prioritise key infrastructure projects.
    • This aims to ensure transparency and time-bound commitments to investors.

    How Gati Shakti Plan can strengthen India’s economic ties with its neighbours

    • The plan will automatically generate positive effects to deepen India’s economic ties with Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Myanmar and Sri Lanka, as well as with Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean region.
    • India’s investment in roads, ports, inland waterways or new customs procedures generate positive externalities for these neighbours, who are keen to access the growing Indian consumer market.
    • Any reduction in India’s domestic logistics costs brings immediate benefits to the northern neighbour, given that 98 per cent of Nepal’s total trade transits through India and about 65 per cent of Nepal’s trade is with India.
    • In 2019, trade between Bhutan and Bangladesh was eased through a new multimodal road and waterway link via Assam.
    • The new cargo ferry service with the Maldives, launched last year, has lowered the costs of trade for the island state.
    • And under the South Asia Subregional Economic Cooperation Programme, India’s investments in multimodal connectivity on the eastern coast is reconnecting India with the Bay of Bengal and Southeast Asia through integrated rail, port and shipping systems.
    • Whether it is the alignment of a cross-border railway, the location of a border check post, or the digital system chosen for customs and immigration processes, India’s connectivity investments at home will have limited effects unless they are coordinated with those of its neighbours and other regional partners.
    • While India recently joined the Transports Internationaux Routiers (TIR) convention, which facilitates cross-border customs procedures, none of its neighbouring countries in the east has signed on to it.

    Suggestions for Gati Shakti Plan to have maximum external effect

    • First, India will have to deepen bilateral consultations with its neighbours to gauge their connectivity strategies and priorities.
    • Given political and security sensitivities, India will require diplomatic skills to reassure its neighbours and adapt to their pace and political economy context.
    • A second way is for India to work through regional institutions and platforms. SAARC’s ambitious regional integration plans of the 2000s are now defunct, so Delhi has shifted its geo-economic orientation eastwards.
    • The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) has got new momentum, but there is also progress on the Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal (BBIN) Initiative.
    • Finally, India can also boost the Gati Shakti plan’s external impact by cooperating more closely with global players who are keen to support its strategic imperative to give the Indo-Pacific an economic connectivity dimension.
    • This includes the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank, but also Japan, the US, Australia, EU and ASEAN.

    Conclusion

    Gati Shakti plan must also leveraged to have an external impact by aligning it with India’s regional and global connectivity efforts.

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  • AUKUS could rock China’s boat in the Indo-Pacific

    Context

    The trilateral security agreement between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States (AUKUS) continues to be in the news.

    Implications for ASEAN

    • There is also the matter of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) disunity over the emergence of AUKUS.
    •  While AUKUS is clearly an attempt by the U.S. to bolster regional security, including securing Australia’s seaborne trade, any sudden accretion in Australia’s naval capabilities is bound to cause unease in the region.
    • Even though Australia has denied that AUKUS is a defence alliance, this hardly prevents China from exploiting ASEAN’s concerns at having to face a Hobson’s choice amidst worsening U.S.-China regional rivalry.
    •  AUKUS is based on a shared commitment of its three members to deepening diplomatic, security and defence cooperation in the Indo-Pacific to meet the challenges of the 21st century.
    • Even though this has not been stated explicitly, the rise of China, particularly its rapid militarisation and aggressive behaviour, is undoubtedly the trigger.

    Relations of AUKUS members with China

    • The AUKUS joint statement clearly acknowledges that trilateral defence ties are decades old, and that AUKUS aims to further joint capabilities and interoperability.
    • For three nations, their relations with China have recently been marked by contretemps.
    • Australia, especially, had for years subordinated its strategic assessment of China to transactional commercial interests.
    • Much to China’s chagrin, its policy of deliberately targeting Australian exports has not yielded the desired results.
    • Instead of kow-towing, the plucky Australian character has led Canberra to favour a fundamental overhaul of its China policy.
    • The transfer of sensitive submarine technology by the U.S. to the U.K. is a sui generis arrangement based on their long-standing Mutual Defence Agreement of 1958.
    • Elements in the broader agenda provide opportunities to the U.S., the U.K. and Australia to engage the regional countries.

    AUKUS engagement with regional countries

    • All three nations will also play a major role in U.S.-led programmes such as Build Back Better World, Blue Dot Network and Clean Network, to meet the challenge of China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
    • The Quad and AUKUS are distinct, yet complementary. Neither diminishes the other.
    • Whereas the Quad initiatives straddle the Indian and the Pacific Oceans, a Pacific-centric orientation for AUKUS has advantages.
    • Such a strategy could potentially strengthen Japan’s security as well as that of Taiwan in the face of China’s mounting bellicosity.
    • Shifting AUKUS’s fulcrum to the Pacific Ocean could reassure ASEAN nations.
    • It could also inure AUKUS to any insidious insinuation that accretion in the number of nuclear submarines plying the Indo-Pacific might upset the balance of power in the Indian Ocean.

    Conclusion

    There are limited options in the economic arena with China already having emerged as a global economic powerhouse. AUKUS, though, provides an opportunity to the U.S. to place proxy submarine forces to limit China’s forays, especially in the Pacific Ocean.

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  • A new jurisprudence for political prisoners

    Context

    In Thwaha Fasal vs Union of India, the Court has acted in its introspective jurisdiction and deconstructed the provisions of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) with a great sense of legal realism. This paves the way for a formidable judicial authority against blatant misuse of this law.

    Background of the case

    • In this case from Kerala, there are three accused.
    • The police registered the case and later the investigation was handed over to the National Investigation Agency (NIA).
    • During the investigation, some materials containing radical literature were found, which included a book on caste issues in India and a translation of the dissent notes written by Rosa Luxemburg to Lenin.
    • Thus, the provisions of the UAPA were invoked.
    • After initial rejection of the pleas, the trial judge granted bail to both the accused in September 2020.
    • The Supreme Court was emphatic and liberal when it said that mere association with a terrorist organisation is not sufficient to attract the offences alleged.
    • Unless and until the association and the support were “with intention of furthering the activities of a terrorist organisation”, offence under Section 38 or Section 39 is not made out, said the Court.

    Issues with UAPA

    • Section 43D(5) of the UAPA says that for many of the offences under the Act, bail should not be granted, if “on perusal of the case diary or the report (of the investigation), there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation is prima facie true”.
    • Thus, the Act prompts the Court to consider the version of the prosecution alone while deciding the question of bail.
    • Unlike the Criminal Procedure Code, the UAPA, by virtue of the proviso to Section 43D(2), permits keeping a person in prison for up to 180 days, without even filing a charge sheet.
    • Prevents examination of the facts: The statute prevents a comprehensive examination of the facts of the case on the one hand, and prolongs the trial indefinitely by keeping the accused in prison on the other.
    • Instead of presumption of innocence, the UAPA holds presumption of guilt of the accused.
    • In Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali, the Court said that by virtue of Section 43D(5) of UAPA, the burden is on the accused to show that the prosecution case is not prima facie true.
    • The proposition in Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali is that the bail court should not even investigate deeply into the materials and evidence and should consider the bail plea, primarily based on the nature of allegations, for, according to the Court, Section 43D(5) prohibits a thorough and deeper examination.
    • The top court has now altered this terrible legal landscape.

    Key takeaways from the judgement

    • The text of the laws sometimes poses immense challenge to the courts by limiting the space for judicial discretion and adjudication.
    • The courts usually adopt two mutually contradictory methods in dealing with such tough provisions.
    • One is to read and apply the provision literally and mechanically which has the effect of curtailing the individual freedom as intended by the makers of the law.
    • In contrast to this approach, there could be a constitutional reading of the statute, which perceives the issues in a human rights angle and tries to mitigate the rigour of the content of the law.

    Conclusion

    The judgment should be invoked to release other political prisoners in the country who have been denied bail either due to the harshness of the law or due to the follies in understanding the law or both.

  • We need greater global cooperation

    Context

    Our thinking about the international system is focussed on a new era of great power competition. An assertive China is seeking to refashion the international order and exercise greater regional hegemony.

    Refashioning the international order

    • Recently, Secretary Antony Blinken outlined the US approach to China: “Competitive when it should be, collaborative when it can be, and adversarial when it must be.”
    • This pretty much describes the approach of every country in the world to this geopolitical moment.
    • The big question is whether the competitive and adversarial dynamics are now so deep that the space for “collaboration” is diminishing fast.
    • There is now bipartisan consensus in the US that China needs to be contained; just as China is convinced that the US will not only not tolerate China’s further rise.

    Great power competition between the US and China

    • Two dynamics were supposed to counteract the risks of great power competition.
    • Global economic interdependence: The first was global economic interdependence.
    • Global trade has rebounded to its pre-pandemic levels.
    • The logic of interdependence is now under severe ideological stress.
    • Interdependence has not led to greater convergence on political values or a more open global political order.
    • Common challenges fostering global cooperation: The second dynamic counteracting competition was the idea that common challenges like climate change, the pandemic and the risks posed by technology will foster greater global cooperation.
    •  All the global crises that should have been occasions for global cooperation have become the sites for intensifying global competition.

    Climate and global health: Indicator of lack of global cooperation

    • It is hard to convince anyone that most countries of the world were willing to treat the pandemic as a global public health crisis.
    • The shift in the climate change discourse is about intensifying technological competition and maintaining national economic supremacy, rather than solving a global problem.
    •  It is not entirely clear that all the innovations induced by this competitive dynamic will, in fact, limit global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius.
    • It also leaves the question of a modicum of justice in the international order entirely unresolved.
    • We have also learnt over the last couple of decades that the international system, and all global public goods, including security, can be made extremely vulnerable even by small groups carrying a sense of grievance.
    • So, the distribution of technology, finance, and developmental space will matter.
    • India, in the context of what other countries are doing, takes a very well-judged stance at the international level.
    • But it is difficult not to wonder whether a country that lets its citizens breathe the foulest air, and cannot get its head around a solvable problem of stubble burning, can project seriousness.
    • So, climate and global public health, rather than acting as a spur to global cooperation are going to be symptoms of a deep pathology.

    Global risks and declining multilateral institutions

    • Areas where global risks are increasing include-Cyber threats, the possible risks of unregulated technology, whether in artificial intelligence or biological research, competition in space, a renewed competition in nuclear weapons and an intensifying arms race.
    •  In not a single one of these areas is there a serious prospect of any country thinking outside of an adversarial nationalist frame.
    • The old multilateral system was undergirded by, and partially an instrument for, US power.
    • The term multilateral has also been deeply damaged by a cynical use, where it simply refers to a group of countries rather than a single or a couple of countries acting together.
    • It is high time the term be used only in a context where there is agreement on global rules or an architecture to genuinely solve a global public goods problem.
    • These may still reflect power differentials, but at least they are oriented to problem-solving at a global level.
    • In this sense, one would be hard-pressed to find any genuinely multilateral institutions left.

    Consider the question “What are the challenge facing global order in the present context? Suggest the measures to preserve the global order aimed towards greater global cooperation.”

    Conclusion

    The real choice for the world is not just navigating between China and the United States. It is fundamentally between an orientation that is committed to global problem-solving rather than just preserving national supremacy.