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Type: SC Judgements

SC Judgements are very important for Mains Paper

  • SC pushes for raising retirement age in district judiciary as backlog tops 5 cr

    SC pushes for raising retirement age in district judiciary as backlog tops 5 cr

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court has directed States to raise the retirement age of judicial officers in the district judiciary from 60 to 62 years. A three judge Bench headed by the Chief Justice of India passed the order on 1 September, and the text was published on Friday. The Court recorded that 5.18 crore cases lie pending in district courts across the country. It described stopping the attrition of experienced judicial talent as the “crying need of the hour”, warning that access to justice would otherwise remain “a mere chimera” because of unfilled posts. Only seven States have agreed so far. The rest have resisted on the ground of financial burden, which the Court has held to be arithmetically misconceived.

    What has the Court directed, and to whom?

    1. The seven States that agreed: Chhattisgarh, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Sikkim, Tamil Nadu and West Bengal have agreed to enhance the retirement age of their judicial officers.
    2. The deadline for them: These State governments have been directed to amend their service rules within two months.
    3. The condition attached: The High Court concerned will enhance superannuation to 62 years for an officer on attaining 60, subject to an assessment of that officer’s suitability.
    4. The States and Union Territories yet to agree: Andhra Pradesh, Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Goa, Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Jharkhand, Keralam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Odisha, Punjab, Rajasthan, Telangana, Tripura, Uttarakhand, Uttar Pradesh, the National Capital Territory of Delhi, Jammu and Kashmir and Puducherry have responded with a direct refusal or have taken no position at all.
    5. The deadline for them: They have been directed to take a decision on enhancement to 62 years within two weeks.

    Why does the Court treat attrition rather than recruitment as the binding constraint?

    1. Recruitment has not filled the cadre: Most recruitment drives undertaken in the various States have not produced optimum recruitment or filled the sanctioned cadre strength.
    2. The gap is universal: A yawning gap between sanctioned strength and working strength persists across the board.
    3. Recruitment is slow by design: Selecting independent and competent judicial officers is an arduous task, so a post is not refilled at the speed at which it falls vacant.
    4. What that leaves as the available lever: Retaining an officer already in service is the only step that adds working strength without waiting for a recruitment cycle.

    Why does the Court reject the financial burden objection?

    1. What the States fear: States cite the cost of paying the maximum salary in the pay scale for a further two or five years, and a higher outlay on retiral benefits.
    2. The parity fear: States also apprehend that employees in other State services would demand the same extension for themselves.
    3. Why the Court calls that misconceived: Judicial officers render a specialised service, so an extension confined to them does not found a claim by other cadres.
    4. The 1992 precedent quoted: The alleged burden on the State exchequer is negligible against the enormous advantage the administration of justice and society at large derive from a higher retirement age.
    5. The double spend: A State that retains retirement at 60 pays post retiral dues to the officer who has left and salary to the officer newly appointed, in the same period.
    6. What continuation does to that cost: Allowing an experienced officer to serve to 62 postpones the post retiral outlay rather than adding to it.

    What safeguard have the High Courts proposed?

    1. Why most High Courts agreed: Most State High Courts consented to the enhancement because they are face to face with the crisis in the dispensation of justice.
    2. The rider: Some High Courts, including Madras, have recommended a thorough assessment of judicial work as a condition precedent to continuation in service.
    3. What the rider is for: Only competent officers of proven integrity would be permitted to continue in the cadre.
    4. The Court’s view of it: The suggestion preserves experienced officers while removing what the Court called the “clog of deadwood” that blocks the entrance of young blood into the system.

    Challenges to raising the retirement age in the district judiciary

    1. The sanctioned strength is itself inadequate: Extending tenure fills posts within an existing cadre, and the cadre was fixed against a judge to population ratio far below what has been recommended for India. Eg. The Law Commission’s 120th report of 1987 recommended 50 judges per million population, against a sanctioned figure that has stayed close to 21.
      The Fix: Revise sanctioned cadre strength against a stated case load norm, and attach a dedicated State budget line to the additional posts.
    2. A suitability assessment can become an informal removal power: Continuation to 62 will turn on a High Court’s assessment, which inserts a discretionary stage into a service that otherwise holds tenure until superannuation. Eg. Compulsory retirement of judicial officers on the administrative side has repeatedly been challenged before the Supreme Court.
      The Fix: Publish the assessment criteria in advance and require a written reasoned order with an internal review, so a refusal to extend can be tested.
    3. Court infrastructure does not expand with tenure: A retained officer needs a courtroom, support staff and record space, and district court infrastructure is funded through a centrally sponsored scheme that depends on State matching contributions. Eg. The Centrally Sponsored Scheme for Development of Infrastructure Facilities for the Judiciary has run since 1993-94 with persistent shortfalls in court halls and residential units.
      The Fix: Link the release of infrastructure funds to the number of judicial officers actually working in a district rather than to sanctioned posts.
    4. The promotion chain below is frozen: Officers waiting for elevation to the District Judge cadre and for High Court appointment from the service quota face a two year delay in every vacancy. Eg. Appointments to High Courts from the district judiciary already move slowly through the collegium process.
      The Fix: Expand the number of posts in the higher judicial service in step with the extension, so the vacancy chain continues to move.
    5. Pendency has drivers that bench strength does not reach: Adjournments, failure of service of summons and the volume of government litigation extend case life independently of how many judges sit. Eg. Government departments and their agencies remain the largest single class of litigant before Indian courts.
      The Fix: Enforce the three adjournment limit already written into Order XVII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and screen government appeals before they are filed.

    Conclusion

    The Court has converted a suggestion into a directed timeline, and the decision now sits with State governments rather than with the judiciary. Its reasoning treats the age of superannuation as the one lever that can be pulled without waiting for a recruitment cycle to conclude. The case is listed again on 1 October, by which time the States that have not responded are required to have taken a position.

    Back2Basics: The District Judiciary under the Constitution

    1. Article 233: The Governor appoints district judges in consultation with the High Court exercising jurisdiction in that State.
    2. Article 234: Persons other than district judges are appointed to the State judicial service by the Governor, under rules made after consulting the State Public Service Commission and the High Court.
    3. Article 235: Control over district courts and subordinate courts, including posting, promotion and leave of judicial officers, vests in the High Court.
    4. Why a State government must act: Conditions of service, including the age of superannuation, are fixed by rules the State government frames, so a High Court’s consent by itself does not change a retirement age.

    [2017, GS2, 10 marks] Critically examine the Supreme Court’s judgement on ‘National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014’ with reference to appointment of judges of higher judiciary in India.

  • Quality elementary teachers are vital to lives of children, nation-building: top court

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court has added teacher education institutions and the National Council for Teacher Education (NCTE) as the sixth and seventh duty bearers of the right to free and compulsory elementary education. A Division Bench held that free and compulsory education for children aged six to fourteen has attained the status of an enforceable fundamental right, and that teacher education has not been given the attention it deserves. The ruling came on an appeal against a Delhi High Court order of 13 March 2023, which had held the NCTE’s Public Notice of 22 September 2019 to be arbitrary and illegal. That notice requires every teacher education institution to file an annual Performance Appraisal Report. The contest was over the source of the power: the notice was challenged on the ground that only the Council itself, and not its Executive Committee, could issue and implement it.

    What is the National Council for Teacher Education?

    1. A statutory regulator of the teacher supply chain: It is constituted under the National Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993 to achieve the planned and coordinated development of the teacher education system in the country.
    2. It regulates the institutions that train teachers: A teacher education institution is defined in Section 2(e) of that Act as an institution offering a course or training in teacher education.
    3. It sets the qualifications a teacher must hold: Section 23 of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 makes it the academic authority for laying down the minimum qualifications for appointment as a teacher.

    Who are the duty bearers of the right to elementary education?

    1. Five were already recognised: Judicial precedent had identified the government, the local authority, the neighbourhood school, the parents or guardians, and the teacher.
    2. Teacher education institutions become the sixth: The institutions defined in Section 2(e) now carry a duty toward the right, rather than only a licensing relationship with their regulator.
    3. The Council becomes the seventh: It is required to ensure that those institutions function effectively and efficiently and conduct their affairs with integrity.
    4. The addition changes what is justiciable: A duty bearer’s failure is actionable, so a lapse in the training of teachers is now capable of being pleaded as a failure of the right itself.

    What did the Court hold on the power to demand appraisal reports?

    1. The Public Notice is legal and valid: The Court upheld the requirement that institutions upload an annual Performance Appraisal Report, and set aside the High Court order that had quashed it.
    2. The Executive Committee acted within jurisdiction: The Court found ample empowerment in both the Council and its Executive Committee to call for the report.
    3. The power is incidental and ancillary: A regulatory measure of this kind flows from the duties and functions of a regulator even without a specific empowerment in the statute.
    4. The regulator is itself appraised: The NCTE undergoes a performance audit by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG), so requiring the same discipline from institutions it regulates follows from its own position.

    Why does the Court place teacher training at the centre of the right?

    1. No resource ranks higher than a student’s mind and character: The Court held that elementary school teachers carry the most important role in nation-building and are to be treated with respect and care.
    2. The entitlement is only as good as the person delivering it: A right to education delivered by an untrained teacher is formally satisfied and substantively empty, which is why the regulator of training is being read into the right.
    3. Accountability of institutions is the stated purpose: The Court recorded that it is necessary for the Council and its bodies to ensure accountability of educational institutions.

    Challenges to the National Council for Teacher Education

    1. Recognition ran ahead of capacity: Approval was granted to private institutions at a pace that outstripped any ability to verify what they actually taught. Eg. The Justice J.S. Verma Commission on Teacher Education reported in 2012 that a large number of private institutions were commercial rather than academic in character.
      The Fix: Tie continued recognition to a published appraisal score reviewed on a fixed cycle, so approval becomes renewable rather than permanent.
    2. Retrospective validation weakens the standard: Recognition granted after the fact rewards institutions that ran courses without approval. Eg. The National Council for Teacher Education (Amendment) Act, 2019 conferred retrospective recognition and permission on specified institutions.
      The Fix: Bar retrospective recognition outright and require approval to be in place before an academic session opens.
    3. Quality is measured only at the exit, and only by the State: The regulator holds no outcome data on the graduates its recognised institutions produce. Eg. Pass rates in teacher eligibility tests have generally stayed under a fifth of the candidates appearing.
      The Fix: Publish institution wise eligibility test pass rates, so the appraisal report carries an outcome measure rather than a compliance declaration.
    4. Enforcement rests on self reported filings: A report filed by the institution about itself carries no independent verification. Eg. The Council reaches institutions across every State through four regional committees.
      The Fix: Sample audit a fixed share of filed reports each year through State education departments, with recognition suspended on a false filing.

    Conclusion

    The Court has widened the set of actors who owe a duty under the right to elementary education. It has not created the instrument that measures whether that duty is being met. The appraisal report is now the only candidate for that role. Whether it becomes a published, comparable record of what an institution produces, or settles into an annual compliance filing, is what will decide whether the two new duty bearers carry a duty in substance.

    Back2Basics

    1. The Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 gives statutory effect to Article 21A, which was inserted by the Constitution (Eighty-sixth Amendment) Act, 2002.
    2. Section 12(1)(c) requires private unaided schools to reserve 25 percent of entry level seats for children from disadvantaged groups and weaker sections.
    3. It bars screening procedures and capitation fees at the point of admission.
    4. It requires a School Management Committee in every government and aided school, with three fourths of its members drawn from parents and guardians.

    “[2018] Consider the following statements:

    1. As per the Right to Education (RTE) Act, to be eligible for appointment as a teacher in a State, a person would be required to possess the minimum qualification laid down by the concerned State Council of Teacher Education.

    2. As per the RTE Act, for teaching primary classes, a candidate is required to pass a Teacher Eligibility Test conducted in accordance with the National Council of Teacher Education guidelines.

    3. In India, more than 90% of teacher education institutions are directly under the State Governments

    Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

    (a) 1 and 2

    (b) 2 only

    (c) 1 and 3

    (d) 3 only

  • Bar Council has no power to punish students: SC

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court has held that the Advocates Act, 1961 confers no power, expressly or impliedly, on the Bar Council of India (BCI) or the State Bar Councils to take disciplinary or punitive action against law students. A three judge Bench headed by the Chief Justice of India recorded that only the parent university or the competent authority under law holds disciplinary power over students. The holding answers the BCI’s letters of 13 August, which asked NALSAR, the National Academy of Legal Studies and Research, to open an inquiry against students who had protested at their convocation, and asked the State Bar Councils to block their professional enrolment. The regulator withdrew those letters and argued that no cause of action survived. The Court fixed the boundary of the regulator’s jurisdiction anyway, to protect university space and the right to dissent against a repetition.

    What is the Bar Council of India and where does its authority begin?

    1. It is a statutory regulator of the legal profession: The BCI is constituted under the Advocates Act, 1961, and the State Bar Councils are constituted under the same Act for each State.
    2. Its core functions are professional: It lays down standards of professional conduct and etiquette for advocates, safeguards their rights and privileges, and exercises disciplinary control over the profession.
    3. It also recognises law degrees: The Act gives it a role in promoting legal education and in recognising universities whose law degrees qualify a person for enrolment as an advocate.
    4. The roll of advocates is maintained by the States: A State Bar Council enrols an advocate and maintains the roll on which that advocate’s name appears.

    What did the Court actually hold?

    1. The statute contains no power over students: The Advocates Act, 1961 confers no express or implied power on the BCI or the State Bar Councils to discipline or punish law students.
    2. Jurisdiction begins at enrolment: The regulator’s disciplinary powers under the Act are limited to registered advocates, so it does not enter the picture before a student is enrolled.
    3. Disciplinary power over students is exclusive to the institution: Only the parent university or the competent authority under law can take action against a student.
    4. The letters were extinguished: The 13 August letters were declared obsolete, and the Indian Express account records them as being without authority of law and bad in law.
    5. The chairperson’s position was covered too: The BCI’s chairperson was held to lack jurisdiction over students in the same terms as the body itself.

    Why did the Court rule after the letters were withdrawn?

    1. The regulator sought closure: The BCI said the letters to NALSAR and the State Bar Councils had been withdrawn within an hour, and argued that the controversy should be given a quietus.
    2. A withdrawal leaves the power claim intact: A letter recalled without a finding on jurisdiction leaves the same body free to issue another one, which is what the Court’s boundary setting order forecloses.
    3. The petition alleged a chilling effect: Two former NALSAR graduates argued that the letters had created a chilling effect on freedom of speech and freedom of association among students.
    4. The order is framed prospectively: It was designed to safeguard university space and students’ right to express dissent freely against future attempts to breach it.
    5. A parallel grievance was routed elsewhere: The same Bench allowed young lawyers to approach the Delhi High Court over an alleged mob assault at the BCI premises during a sit in demanding the chairperson’s resignation.

    What was the underlying dispute?

    1. The protest was over a convocation invitation: Students objected to the Chief Justice of India being chief guest at their convocation, following oral comments in court comparing youth to “cockroaches” and “parasites”.
    2. The regulator’s response targeted enrolment: Its letters sought an inquiry against the protesting students and moved to block the entry of the 2026 batch into the profession.
    3. Enrolment is the leverage point: A threat to withhold enrolment reaches a student’s entire career rather than a single academic year, which is why the Court treated it as more than an internal disciplinary question.

    Challenges to the Bar Council of India’s regulatory role

    1. Its powers over legal education overlap with those of universities: The regulator prescribes curriculum and inspects institutions that are already regulated by the University Grants Commission and by their own statutes, which produces conflicting requirements. Eg. National Law Universities established by State Acts answer to their own governing bodies and to the BCI at the same time.
      The Fix: Confine the regulator to prescribing the outcomes a degree must meet for enrolment, and leave institutional governance to the university and its parent statute.
    2. Entry costs have been set beyond the statute: State Bar Councils charged enrolment fees far above the statutory ceiling, which priced first generation entrants out of the profession. Eg. In Gaurav Kumar v. Union of India (2024), the Supreme Court held enrolment fees above the Rs 750 and Rs 125 limits in Section 24(1)(f) of the Advocates Act, 1961 to be illegal.
      The Fix: Route enrolment collections through a published statutory account audited annually, so any charge beyond the ceiling is visible at source.
    3. Disciplinary complaints against advocates stall: Complaints against advocates routinely outrun the one year period in which a State Bar Council must decide them, after which the case is transferred to the national body and slows further. Eg. Section 36B of the Advocates Act, 1961 was inserted precisely because State level proceedings were not being completed.
      The Fix: Publish a disciplinary docket with case age for every State Bar Council, and make transfer automatic and reported rather than discretionary.
    4. The regulator is elected by those it regulates: Members are chosen by advocates on the rolls, which makes strong action against the profession’s own interests unlikely. Eg. Bar strikes have continued after the Supreme Court held in Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India (2002) that lawyers have no right to strike.
      The Fix: Add non advocate members drawn from academia and the judiciary to the disciplinary committees, so professional discipline is not decided by peers alone.
    5. Its rulemaking has repeatedly been struck down for exceeding the Act: The body has issued rules on matters the statute does not cover, and courts have then had to read them down. Eg. Bar Council rules requiring a certification examination and restricting practice have been litigated repeatedly on the ground of statutory competence.
      The Fix: Require every new rule to cite the section of the Advocates Act, 1961 that authorises it, and to be laid before the Centre before it takes effect.

    Conclusion

    A regulator that cannot reach students has to be told so before it acts, not after it withdraws. The order converts an ad hoc retreat into a settled limit, which is the difference between a grievance resolved and a power denied. What remains unreconciled is the regulator’s continuing authority over legal education alongside a complete absence of authority over the people receiving it. The next test of that line will be whether the body confines itself to prescribing what a law degree must contain, or returns to acting on how students behave during the degree.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2022] With reference to India, consider the following statements : 1. Government law officers and legal firms are recognised as advocates, but corporate lawyers and patent attorneys are excluded from recognition as advocates. 2. Bar Councils have the power to lay down the rules relating to legal education and recognition of law colleges. Which of the statements given above is/are correct ? (a) 1 only (b) 2 only (c) Both 1 and 2 (d) Neither 1 nor 2 ANSWER: (b)”

  • SC seeks govt. explanation on IPS deputation in CAPFs

    SC seeks govt. explanation on IPS deputation in CAPFs

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court has sought an explanation from the Union Home Secretary on the implementation of its judgment of 23 May 2025, which directed the Centre to progressively reduce the deputation of Indian Police Service (IPS) officers to senior posts in the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs).

    What did the 2025 judgment direct?

    1. The direction: Deputation posts held by IPS officers in the Senior Administrative Grade (SAG), the level up to the rank of Inspector General, in the CAPFs were to be progressively reduced over a period of time, within an outer limit of two years.
    2. The Bench: The ruling was delivered by a two judge Bench, one of whose members has since retired.
    3. The direction has been tested once already: The Union Home Ministry’s review petition against the judgment was dismissed on 28 October 2025.

    What has the Centre reported as compliance?

    1. A cadre review across every force: Following the dismissal of the review petition, all CAPFs were directed to submit detailed cadre review proposals, which the Ministry examined and forwarded to the Department of Personnel and Training (DoPT) with the Home Minister’s approval.
    2. The proposals are in the pipeline, dated: Cadre review proposals for the CRPF, BSF, CISF, ITBP and SSB were sent between 27 July and 3 August 2026, and were forwarded to the Department of Expenditure with the DoPT’s observations and recommendations on 17 August.
    3. The remaining steps have not been taken: After the Department of Expenditure comments, the proposals go to the Cadre Review Committee headed by the Cabinet Secretary, whose recommendations are then to be considered for approval by the competent authority.
    4. Other measures claimed: The Ministry stated that it had also examined the issue of IPS deputation and undertaken statutory changes.

    Why does the Court read the compliance record differently?

    1. Deputations continued after the judgment: An affidavit informed the Court that 46 IPS officers have been brought on deputation to the CAPFs up to the SAG level since the 2025 ruling.
    2. The Bench questioned the premise of the practice: It asked whether there are no competent officers within the CAPFs to hold responsible positions, and described the position as totally wrong.
    3. The service record cited against the practice: Officers with over 25 years of service defend the borders and have made supreme sacrifices, and the Bench held that a strong lobby leaves those cadre officers completely stifled.

    How does the CAPFs (General Administration) Act, 2026 change the dispute?

    1. A statute now occupies the ground the judgment covered: The Central Armed Police Forces (General Administration) Act, 2026 was published in the Gazette on 9 April, and the stated effect is to circumvent the 2025 judgment.
    2. The Act is itself under challenge: Five writ petitions challenging the legislation have been filed and are listed for hearing on 18 November.
    3. The affected constituency is organised: Members of the All Ex-Paramilitary Forces Welfare Association staged protests against the Bill before its enactment.
    4. The next date on the compliance track: The contempt matter is listed for hearing on 22 September.

    Challenges to reducing IPS deputation in the CAPFs

    1. The forces were designed around an officer shortfall they never closed: Direct entry recruitment into CAPF cadres has not kept pace with sanctioned strength at senior levels, which is the stated justification for deputation in the first place. Eg. Vacancies across CAPF officer ranks have been reported repeatedly to Parliament by the Ministry of Home Affairs.
      The Fix: Fix a dated recruitment and promotion calendar in each cadre review, so the shortfall that justifies deputation is closed rather than carried forward.
    2. Cadre review is an executive process with no judicial deadline attached: Every stage between a force’s proposal and the competent authority’s approval is discretionary in timing. Eg. The proposals here moved between three departments over several months without reaching the Cadre Review Committee.
      The Fix: Attach an outer time limit to each stage of the cadre review chain, reported to the Court as a compliance schedule rather than as a status update.
    3. Command experience is concentrated where promotion is blocked: Officers who spend a full career in one force acquire the operational knowledge that senior posts need, and are then passed over at exactly that level. Eg. Border guarding, counter insurgency and industrial security each demand force specific expertise that a short deputation tenure cannot build.
      The Fix: Reserve a fixed proportion of Inspector General level posts in each force for cadre officers, notified in the recruitment rules rather than settled case by case.
    4. A statute can displace a judicial direction unless the underlying defect is cured: New legislation on the same subject shifts the dispute from contempt to constitutional validity and restarts the litigation clock. Eg. The five writ petitions against the 2026 Act put the question back at the beginning after a judgment and a dismissed review.
      The Fix: Amend the recruitment rules of each force to give effect to the direction, so compliance rests on subordinate legislation the Court has already read rather than on a fresh statute.
    5. Organisational identity is unresolved in law: The forces are described as paramilitary in public and as police organisations in service rules, and the ambiguity drives the parity claims on pay, pension and command. Eg. The demand for organised group A service status for CAPF cadres was itself settled only through litigation.
      The Fix: Settle the service classification of each force explicitly in the rules framed under the governing statute, so command structure follows from a stated status.

    Conclusion

    The question before the Court has changed shape since it was first answered. It began as a service dispute about who commands a force, moved to whether a direction on that dispute was being implemented, and now turns on whether a statute passed after the judgment can occupy the same ground. That last question is the one that decides the other two, and it is the pending challenge to the new Act, not the contempt proceeding, that will settle it. What to watch is whether the recruitment rules of the individual forces are amended at all, because a direction that never reaches the rules governing promotion has not been implemented whatever the affidavits record.

    Back2Basics: Central Armed Police Forces

    1. What they are: Seven armed forces of the Union under the Ministry of Home Affairs, distinct from the armed forces under the Ministry of Defence and from the State police, raised for internal security and border guarding duties.
    2. The seven forces: Assam Rifles, Border Security Force, Central Industrial Security Force, Central Reserve Police Force, Indo-Tibetan Border Police, National Security Guard and Sashastra Seema Bal.
    3. Command structure: Each force has its own directly recruited cadre, and senior posts are filled by a combination of that cadre and IPS officers on deputation from State cadres.
    4. Constitutional basis: They are raised under Entry 2A of the Union List, which covers deployment of any armed force of the Union in a State in aid of the civil power.

    [2023, GS3, 15 marks] What are the internal security challenges being faced by India? Give out the role of Central Intelligence and Investigative Agencies tasked to counter such threats.”

  • SC orders oversight of Bar Council decisions

    SC orders oversight of Bar Council decisions

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court has held that the Bar Council of India (BCI) chairperson is serving only as a pro tem office holder whose term ends with the next election.

    What is the Bar Council of India?

    1. Statutory regulator of the legal profession: The BCI is constituted under the Advocates Act, 1961 to regulate advocates, legal education and professional conduct across India.
    2. Its legitimacy runs through bar elections: Its members are elected by the State Bar Councils from among their own members, so a lapsed election cycle at the State level freezes the central body too.
    3. The two law officers sit on it by office: The Attorney General and the Solicitor General are permanent ex officio members of the Council.
    4. A continuity provision guards against a vacuum: The proviso to Section 4(3) of the Advocates Act, 1961 allows the last chairperson or vice chairperson to continue until a new Council is in place.

    Why is the chairperson’s continuance in question?

    1. The Rules cap the term at two years: Rule 12(2), Chapter I, Part II of the Bar Council of India Rules fixes the maximum tenure of the BCI chairperson at two years, and the current term began on 17 April 2025.
    2. A notification stretched it to 2030: A gazette notification of 21 April 2025 notified the tenure of the chairperson and vice chairperson until 16 April 2030.
    3. A notification cannot override the parent statute: The Bench observed that a notification cannot go beyond the Rules or empower a body to grant itself additional tenure.
    4. Continuity has run for over a decade: Petitioners questioned an uninterrupted term as BCI chairperson of more than 12 years since November 2014.
    5. The anti vacuum proviso has been used to postpone elections: Petitioners argued that a provision meant to prevent an administrative vacuum has instead been used to avoid holding fresh elections and to perpetuate the existing office holders.

    What allegations were placed before the Court?

    1. A trust holding the Council’s assets: Petitioners questioned the formation of the BCI Pearl First Trust in 2020, in which the chairperson and other BCI office bearers are described as “permanent managing trustees”.
    2. The earlier trust’s finances were moved into it: The financial assets and incomes of the earlier BCI Trust were transferred to the new Trust.
    3. Trusteeship outlasts elected office: The office bearers would continue as permanent managing trustees even after their Council tenures expire, which the Bench questioned as elected members becoming permanent trustees beyond their capacity.
    4. A land arrangement with a State government: A tie up between the Trust and the Goa government proposes a university on 56 acres of land in that State.
    5. Expenditure on felicitations: Counsel described the financial expenditures pulled from BCI records on felicitations, running into crores, as “jolting”.
    6. Concentration of power over successive terms: Counsel for the petitioners argued that what the record shows over the years is a concentration of powers in the same office bearers.

    What did the NALSAR episode expose?

    1. An enrolment ban aimed at one graduating batch: The BCI made an aborted attempt to bar the professional enrolment of the National Academy of Legal Studies and Research (NALSAR) batch of 2026.
    2. The trigger was student dissent: The students had objected to the Chief Justice of India attending their convocation, dissenting against oral remarks that termed youths “cockroaches” and “parasites”.
    3. The reaction spread across national law universities: Students of the National Law Universities at Delhi and Bengaluru expressed solidarity with their NALSAR counterparts.
    4. The Court itself backed the protest: The Chief Justice of India supported the students’ right to protest, and questions arose over whether the chairperson had acted on his own.
    5. The measure was withdrawn: An apology was eventually issued and the enrolment bar did not take effect.

    Why has the Court chosen supervision over removal?

    1. The Bench declined to adjudicate the allegations now: The Court said it did not want to encourage “shadow boxing” around the allegations at this stage.
    2. The stated ground is institutional: It said it would intervene to maintain the “institutional integrity and credibility” of the BCI until the next bar body elections.
    3. Routine functioning is left undisturbed: The incumbent office bearers continue pro tem so that the Council’s day to day functioning is not interrupted.
    4. The check is prior and external, not appellate: Policy decisions now require prior notice to the two law officers and an invitation to them to participate, rather than review after a decision is taken.
    5. The regulator did not resist: Counsel for the BCI told the Court they welcomed the direction to take the concurrence of the highest law officers in policy matters.

    What does the election timetable require?

    1. Women members are co opted first: The Chief Justices of the High Courts must complete the co option of two women members to the State Bar Councils within a fortnight.
    2. Composition is notified next: Each State Bar Council must then notify its new composition within a week.
    3. Office bearers and BCI representatives follow: The newly constituted State Bar Councils must elect their chairperson, vice chairperson, other office bearers and one representative to the BCI within three weeks of notification of their composition.
    4. The central body is reconstituted last: The BCI is formed from those State representatives, so the pro tem arrangement ends only once the State level cycle finishes.

    Challenges to the Bar Council of India

    1. Elections are not self executing: Nothing in the statutory scheme compels the Council to go to the polls on schedule, so a continuity proviso can substitute for a mandate indefinitely. Eg. The present dispute reached the Supreme Court only because petitioners moved it, not because any internal trigger fired.
      The Fix: Write a fixed election calendar into the Advocates Act, 1961, with the continuity proviso lapsing automatically on a stated date.
    2. The regulator writes the rules it is bound by: The BCI frames the Rules governing tenure, enrolment and legal education, and no external body vets them before they take effect. Eg. The instrument extending the chairperson’s tenure was issued by the Council itself.
      The Fix: Require prior publication and a stated objection window for any Rule affecting tenure, enrolment or recognition.
    3. Legal education answers to two regulators: BCI control over law school recognition sits alongside the University Grants Commission’s authority over degree granting universities, so institutions face two sets of standards. Eg. National Law Universities are created by State Acts and funded as universities, yet their graduates’ right to practise depends on BCI enrolment.
      The Fix: Constitute a single joint standard setting body for legal education, with the BCI confined to professional entry.
    4. Discipline moves slowly by design: Complaints against advocates go to State Bar Council disciplinary committees, and a case not decided within a year transfers to the BCI, which lengthens the process rather than shortening it. Eg. Section 36B of the Advocates Act, 1961 provides for that transfer on the expiry of one year.
      The Fix: Publish disposal timelines and pendency data for every disciplinary committee, State and central.
    5. Entry testing does not feed back into approval: The All India Bar Examination tests an individual’s eligibility to practise, and it does not evaluate the law college that produced the candidate. Eg. Colleges retain BCI approval regardless of how their graduates perform in that examination.
      The Fix: Link a law college’s continued approval to the disclosed performance of its graduates in the Bar examination.

    Conclusion

    The Court has not removed the incumbent. It has bounded him. A regulator whose elections had lapsed is now supervised by the two law officers who already sat on it by office, and its bar elections have been put on a calendar the Court set. The unresolved part is structural. Judicial supervision arrived because the profession’s own rules carried no consequence for a Council that simply did not go to the polls. The marker to watch is whether the fresh Councils are constituted on that timetable, or the interim arrangement outlasts it.

    [2022] With reference to India, consider the following statements :

    1. Government law officers and legal firms are recognised as advocates, but corporate lawyers and patent attorneys are excluded from recognition as advocates.

    2. Bar Councils have the power to lay down the rules relating to legal education and recognition of law colleges.

    Which of the statements given above is/are correct ?

    (a) 1 only

    (b) 2 only

    (c) Both 1 and 2

    (d) Neither 1 nor 2

  • CJP condition, Govt request: SC quashes student protest FIRs

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court has quashed every FIR registered across the country against students who took part in the Jantar Mantar protests over exam paper leaks, invoking its power under Article 142 of the Constitution to pass any order needed for “complete justice” in a matter before it.

    How far does the quashing reach?

    1. Five applicants, one order: A three judge Bench headed by the Chief Justice of India allowed applications by the Delhi Police and the States of Maharashtra, Bihar, Assam and West Bengal.
    2. States that never asked are covered too: The Bench was told that Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh had registered FIRs without approaching the court. It directed that any FIR on the protests of July 20 to 25, 2026 in any State or Union Territory not brought to its notice shall not be pursued or investigated and is to be treated as closed.
    3. No fresh FIRs anywhere: No State or Union Territory may register a new FIR over those protest incidents.
    4. The reason given is the protesters’ future: The Bench said it invoked Article 142 keeping in view the future of young protesters who came to protest in good faith.

    Who stays outside the protection?

    1. A fresh FIR against 2,873 named individuals: The Centre and the Delhi Police may register a new FIR in respect of 2,873 people with criminal records who were allegedly present at the protest sites.
    2. The charges the police cited: The Delhi Police had told the court those individuals faced serious charges including murder, attempt to murder, dacoity, rape and offences under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012.
    3. Rights are preserved on both sides: The fresh FIR is to be registered without prejudice to the rights of the parties to take lawful recourse.

    What did each side commit to in exchange?

    1. The Centre asked for the widest quashing: The Solicitor General recalled the discussions that ended the July protests and the assurances given to the protesters. He urged the court to quash FIRs even in States and Union Territories that had not approached it, since the protesters doubted the assurances would be honoured.
    2. The Centre asked for time on compensation: The Solicitor General sought time to work out the modalities for compensating the families of students who took their lives after the paper leak, and said the government remained committed to its assurances.
    3. The CJP withdrew its march: Its spokesperson told the Bench that the positive assurances of the Government and the judicial sanctity now given to them made the march unnecessary, and that the party looks forward to compliance with the order.
    4. The order is conditional on both sides: The Bench recorded that both sides shall abide by the statements and commitments made before it, and made the Article 142 order subject to that understanding.
    5. It is not a precedent: The directions were issued in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and shall not be treated as a precedent.
    6. The Chief Justice framed it as mutual gesture: The CJI said that if both sides show a good gesture every issue can be resolved one by one, and credited both sides for creating a constructive environment for youngsters.

    What compensation framework did the Court direct?

    1. A pan India model policy: The Central government is to formulate the modalities and a policy for compensation on a pan India basis. The model policy is to be circulated to all States and Union Territories in consultation with them and adopted as a regular mechanism of compensatory measures.
    2. NEET 2026 families are paid first: For students who died by suicide in connection with NEET 2026, the Centre is to pay compensation to the affected families within three months of framing the policy.

    Challenges to settling protest FIRs through Article 142

    1. Article 142 bypasses the statutory quashing route: Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 vests the power to quash an FIR in the High Court of the State concerned, and a single Supreme Court order displaces that forum for every State at once. Eg. In Supreme Court Bar Association v Union of India (1998) a Constitution Bench held that Article 142 cannot be used to supplant substantive law or ignore a statute’s express provisions.
      The Fix: Have non-applicant States file compromise petitions in their own High Courts with the settlement terms annexed, so each quashing rests on a statutory order.
    2. Executive withdrawal was available and unused: The prosecution can withdraw a case with the court’s consent under Section 360 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, and that route keeps the accountability for dropping cases on the government that registered them. Eg. After the farm laws were repealed in December 2021, cases against protesting farmers were withdrawn by the Union and State governments through executive decisions, not a court order.
      The Fix: Record in the order that the Centre and the States remain responsible for withdrawing any residual proceedings, so the government’s assurance is enforceable against it rather than delegated to the court.
    3. A pending charge is treated as a record: The carve out uses pendency of serious charges, not conviction, as the ground for a fresh FIR, so presence at a protest becomes an offence for one class of citizens. Eg. In Amanatullah Khan v Commissioner of Police, Delhi (2024) the Supreme Court directed the Delhi Police to revisit its rules on history sheets after finding that persons were being listed mechanically.
      The Fix: Register any fresh FIR only on individual evidence of an overt act at the site, not on a police list of those present.
    4. Court directed compensation has no statutory anchor: A model policy the Centre drafts and States adopt by consultation binds no State that declines, so relief becomes uneven across the country. Eg. Victim compensation under Section 357A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, inserted in 2009, produced uneven State schemes until the Supreme Court in Nipun Saxena v Union of India (2018) had the National Legal Services Authority frame a uniform scheme.
      The Fix: Add a victim relief chapter to the Public Examinations (Prevention of Unfair Means) Act, 2024 so compensation for leak affected candidates binds every State by statute.

    Conclusion

    The order closes the confrontation between the government and the protesters, not the paper leak problem that produced it. Its force rests on a promise from each side rather than on any finding of law. The marker to watch is the Centre’s model compensation policy and whether the States that never came to court treat their FIRs as closed.

    Back2Basics: Article 142 of the Constitution

    1. Text: Article 142(1) lets the Supreme Court pass any decree or order necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it, enforceable throughout India.
    2. Supporting power: Article 142(2) lets the Court secure the attendance of any person, order the discovery of documents, and punish for contempt of itself.
    3. Nature: The power is discretionary and curative, used to fill gaps where no statutory remedy fits the case before the Court.
    4. Landmark uses: The Bhopal gas settlement of 1989 and the allotment of land to the Sunni Waqf Board in M Siddiq v Mahant Suresh Das (2019), the Ayodhya title case, both rested on Article 142.

    “[2022] Consider the following statements :

    1. Pursuant to the report of H.N. Sanyal Committee, the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 was passed.

    2. The Constitution of India empowers the Supreme Court and the High Courts to punish for contempt of themselves.

    3. The Constitution of India defines Civil Contempt and Criminal Contempt.

    4. In India, the Parliament is vested with the powers to make laws on Contempt of Court.

    Which of the statements given above is/are correct ?

    (a) 1 and 2 only

    (b) 1, 2 and 4

    (c) 3 and 4 only

    (d) 3 only

  • OBC creamy layer and the income test

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court will consider setting up a Bench to hear the Centre’s application seeking clarification on its judgment on the income test used to identify the creamy layer among the Other Backward Classes (OBC). The judgment, Union of India vs Rohith Nathan, was delivered by a Division Bench on 11 March. It held that salary income cannot be used to exclude OBC candidates whose parents work in public sector undertakings or in private employment where the equivalence of those posts with government service has not been established. The Centre says implementing that reading retrospectively is “extremely difficult” and would have a “cascading effect” on services settled from 2012 onwards, with the impact extending to all categories including the Unreserved category. The contest has therefore moved from what the income test means to how far back the corrected meaning reaches.

    What is the creamy layer income and wealth test?

    1. Origin: The creamy layer concept among OBCs emerged from the Supreme Court’s 1992 ruling in the Indra Sawhney case, which paved the way for OBC reservations, and was meant to exclude families that had accumulated social and economic privilege.
    2. The governing instrument: The Department of Personnel and Training (DoPT) issued an Office Memorandum in September 1993 laying down the exclusion categories, including children of senior constitutional, judicial, government and armed forces officers.
    3. The test itself: A candidate falls in the creamy layer if the parents’ gross family income exceeds the prescribed limit for three consecutive years, or if the family holds wealth above the exemption limit under the Wealth Tax Act, 1957.
    4. What the 1993 Memorandum left out: Income from salaries and from agricultural land was consciously excluded from the calculation, with income from property, business or capital gains counted instead. The income limit was Rs 1 lakh in 1993 and now stands at Rs 8 lakh, last revised in 2017.

    What did the Court hold in Union of India vs Rohith Nathan?

    1. Parity across employment categories: OBC candidates whose parents work in public sector undertakings or the private sector, where post equivalence with government service is not established, cannot be treated differently from OBC candidates in other categories.
    2. The income test is a residual filter: The income and wealth component of the exclusion exercise must be seen and operated as a “residual filter”, not as the primary basis for exclusion.
    3. The test applies equally until equivalence exists: Until the government establishes equivalence between public sector undertaking posts and government service posts, the income and wealth test must continue to apply equally to both.
    4. A specific remedy was ordered: The Centre was directed to implement this reading within six months by creating supernumerary posts for the petitioners and allotting them services according to their ranks in their respective Civil Services Examination years.

    How did the discrimination arise between the 1993 Memorandum and the 2004 letter?

    1. The 2004 letter reopened a settled exclusion: The DoPT issued a letter in October 2004 to clarify interpretive issues, and paragraph 9 of it dealt with OBCs whose parents held posts in Central or State public sector undertakings without established equivalence.
    2. It appeared to reverse the salary exclusion: The letter suggested that salary income was to be counted in testing whether the family crossed the threshold for three consecutive years, in circumstances the letter did not clearly specify.
    3. Two identically placed groups were tested differently: Children of government servants were tested without salary income. Children of public sector and private employees were tested with it, which the Court called “hostile discrimination”.
    4. The Court stated the equality failure directly: Excluding children of public sector or private employees on the basis of salary income alone, without reference to whether the post was Group A or B or Group C or D, amounted to equals being treated unequally.

    Who was affected by the old reading?

    1. The petitioners were serving aspirants: At least 50 OBC candidates who had appeared in the Civil Services Examination since 2015 were excluded from consideration for OBC reserved posts.
    2. The exclusion turned on one variable: They were classified as creamy layer solely on the basis of their parents’ income, with the parents working in public sector undertakings or the private sector.
    3. The dispute is not recent: The batch of cases had been pending for close to a decade before judgment.

    Why does the Centre call retrospective implementation extremely difficult?

    1. The reach extends beyond the reserved category: Reopening allocations settled from 2012 onwards would affect all categories, including the Unreserved category.
    2. Adjustment generates its own claims: The DoPT reports an increasing number of claims for adjustment and consequent disputes over seniority.
    3. The remedy could produce fresh unfairness: The Centre argues the supernumerary posts exercise could itself be unfair to a different category of OBC candidates.
    4. The precedent has already multiplied: 22 other judgments have applied the principles laid down in the ruling, and 12 new cases have been filed by candidates who had not previously approached the courts, seeking reconsideration of their non creamy layer status.

    What has the government actually done since the ruling?

    1. The file moved between ministries: The Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions wrote to the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment on 3 June seeking advice on implementing the directions.
    2. The referral rested on a rules point: The Personnel Ministry cited the Allocation of Business Rules, under which the Social Justice Ministry formulates policy on reservations, and sought advice on the instructions the DoPT should notify.
    3. The stated position changed within days: As of 19 August the Centre told the Central Administrative Tribunal, in an identical matter, that it was in the process of implementing the judgment. The DoPT then filed an application setting out why the directions were not workable retrospectively.
    4. A parallel application seeks an interim carve out: The Centre has asked to continue allotting services on the old reading of the income test for Civil Services Examination 2025 candidates, since more than 950 of them were recommended on that basis and were about to begin their Foundation Course.

    What is contested about the Centre’s position?

    1. The timing of the objection is questioned: The affected candidates ask why the DoPT did not raise these implementation difficulties earlier in a litigation that ran for close to a decade.
    2. The scope of the old practice is disputed: The candidates say the reading the Court found discriminatory was applied only by the DoPT, and applied arbitrarily at that.
    3. The Centre defends salary as a distinguishing factor: It argues that salary income may in some cases be the “sole intelligible differentia” between two OBC candidates from similar social backgrounds.
    4. It raises an outer limit case: Without salary consideration, candidates whose parents earn up to Rs 1 crore could be treated as non creamy layer.

    Challenges to the creamy layer exclusion

    1. Post equivalence has never been completed: The entire dispute exists because the government has not established which public sector undertaking posts correspond to which government service grades, decades after the requirement was written in. Eg. The 1993 Office Memorandum itself made the income test conditional on equivalence, and the 2004 letter was issued precisely because equivalence was still absent. Fix. Set a statutory deadline for the Department of Public Enterprises to notify a grade to grade equivalence table, after which the income test lapses for unequated posts.
    2. The income ceiling is revised by discretion, not by rule: With no indexation formula, the threshold stays static through years of inflation and then jumps, so the excluded population changes for reasons unrelated to backwardness. Eg. The ceiling moved from Rs 1 lakh in 1993 to Rs 8 lakh in 2017 through irregular administrative revisions. Fix. Link the ceiling to a published price or income index with automatic annual revision.
    3. Verification of income claims is weak: Certificates rest on self declaration and local revenue verification, which produces both wrongful exclusion and wrongful inclusion. Eg. Recruitment bodies routinely cancel candidatures years after selection on the ground of a defective non creamy layer certificate. Fix. Validate income declarations against the income tax database at the certificate issuing stage rather than at the appointment stage.
    4. There is no data on who captures the benefit: Without caste and sub caste wise data on selections, the argument that a small set of OBC families corners reserved posts cannot be tested either way. Eg. The Rohini Commission on sub categorisation of OBCs worked without a comprehensive survey of the actual distribution of benefits across OBC communities. Fix. Publish anonymised, sub caste wise selection data for central services on a fixed annual cycle.
    5. Central and State lists diverge: A community treated as OBC by a State may not be on the central list, and the income test is administered differently across the two. Eg. Candidates have been denied central reservation benefits despite holding a State issued OBC certificate. Fix. Publish a reconciled concordance between the central list and each State list, updated whenever either changes.

    Conclusion

    An equality finding that identifies discrimination and then applies only prospectively leaves the identified wrong unremedied for everyone it already hit, and that is the contradiction the clarification application asks the Court to resolve. What to watch is whether a Bench is constituted, and whether it permits the interim carve out for the 2025 examination cohort until the wider question of reach is decided.

    Back2Basics

    1. Constitutional basis: It was established under Article 323A, which permits Parliament to provide for adjudication of service disputes of public servants by tribunals.
    2. Governing statute: It functions under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, and began working in 1985.
    3. Jurisdiction: It hears recruitment and service matters of persons appointed to All India Services, central civil services and posts under the Union.
    4. Appeals: Its orders are challengeable before the High Court, following the Supreme Court’s ruling in L. Chandra Kumar vs Union of India (1997).

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2023] Consider the following statements : Statement-I: The Supreme Court of India has held in some judgements that the reservation policies made under Article 16(4) of the Constitution of India would be limited by Article 335 for maintenance of efficiency of administration. Statement-II : Article 335 of the Constitution of India defines the term ‘efficiency of administration’. Which one of the following is correct in respect of the above statements? (a) Both Statement-I and Statement-II are correct and Statement-II is the correct explanation for Statement-I (b) Both Statement-I and Statement-II are correct and Statement-II is not the correct explanation for Statement-I (c) Statement-I is correct but Statement-II is incorrect (d) Statement-I is incorrect but Statement-II is correct ANSWER: (c)”

  • How the Supreme Court ruling redefined ‘industry’

    Why in the News

    A nine-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court revisited the definition of “industry” laid down in Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa (1978), examining how that definition interacts with the term “industry” as newly defined under the Industrial Relations Code, 2020. The 1978 ruling had given “industry” a wide, functional definition covering any organised activity involving cooperation between employer and employee for producing goods or services, regardless of profit motive. The Industrial Relations Code, 2020 narrows this definition by carving out specific exclusions. The Bench’s majority and minority opinions diverge on whether Parliament’s narrower statutory definition can override the Bangalore Water Supply test for constitutional purposes.

    What did the Bangalore Water Supply test originally hold?

    1. Triple test for “industry”: The 1978 ruling held that any activity involving systematic cooperation between an employer and workers to produce or distribute goods or services qualifies as an industry, irrespective of whether the entity is charitable, religious, sovereign, or run by the government.
    2. Sovereign function exception, narrowly read: The 1978 Bench exempted only inalienable sovereign functions of the State, such as legislation, defence, and the administration of justice, from the definition.
    3. Wide coverage of welfare and professional bodies: The test brought hospitals, educational institutions, and clubs employing staff within the definition of “industry,” extending industrial-dispute protections to their employees.
    4. Persistent legislative attempts to narrow it: Parliament had earlier attempted to codify a narrower definition through an amendment that was never brought into force, leaving the 1978 test operative for over four decades.

    What does the Industrial Relations Code, 2020 change?

    1. Statutory definition narrows the exclusions: The Industrial Relations Code, 2020 (the law consolidating the Trade Unions Act 1926, the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act 1946 and the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 into a single code) defines “industry” with specific carve-outs for institutions engaged in charitable, social, or philanthropic services not for profit.
    2. Government departments performing sovereign functions excluded: The Code writes into statute an exclusion for departments discharging sovereign functions, aligning more closely with a narrower reading than the 1978 test.
    3. Domestic and hospital work carved out selectively: The Code excludes certain categories, such as purely domestic service, while leaving other categories, including some hospitals, to be decided case by case.

    Where do the majority and minority views diverge?

    1. Majority view on legislative competence: The majority holds that Parliament may legislatively define “industry” for the purposes of a labour statute, and that a narrower statutory definition prevails over the judicially evolved 1978 test within the Code’s own field of operation.
    2. Minority view on protective intent: The minority holds that a legislative narrowing of “industry” risks excluding workers in charitable, educational, and welfare institutions from industrial-dispute protections that the 1978 Bench extended to them.
    3. Divergence on precedent’s continuing force: The majority treats Bangalore Water Supply as persuasive but non-binding once Parliament legislates a definition, while the minority treats it as continuing to bind interpretation of undefined terms outside the Code’s specific carve-outs.

    Conclusion

    The ruling settles, for now, that Parliament’s statutory definition of “industry” under the Industrial Relations Code, 2020 governs disputes falling within the Code, narrowing the wide protective sweep the Bangalore Water Supply test had given workers across charitable, educational and welfare institutions for over four decades. Litigation over which specific institutions fall inside or outside the Code’s carve-outs is expected to continue as the Code is implemented.

    Back2Basics: Industrial Relations Code, 2020

    1. One of the four labour codes consolidating 29 central labour laws, this one merging the Trade Unions Act, 1926, the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, and the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
    2. Raises the threshold for prior government permission before layoffs, retrenchment or closure from 100 to 300 workers in an establishment.
    3. Introduces a statutory recognition mechanism for trade unions and a two-member negotiating council where no single union has majority membership.
    4. Notified but implemented in phases, with States framing their own rules under it.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2024, GS3, 15 marks] Discuss the merits and demerits of the four ‘Labour Codes’ in the context of labour market reforms in India. What has been the progress so far in this regard?”

  • Triple test, adrift

    Why in the News

    On 20 August 2026, a nine judge Bench of the Supreme Court of India delivered a judgment on the correctness of the ruling in Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board vs A. Rajappa (1978). That 1978 judgment laid down the “Triple Test” for what counts as an “industry” under Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The present Bench left the Triple Test standing for all pending disputes under the older Act. A majority of the same Bench also ruled that the 1978 judgment will not be a “sheet anchor” for interpreting Section 2(p) of the Industrial Relations Code, 2020. The tension is that Section 2(p) itself reproduces much of the Triple Test’s essence, so an interpretive framework has been severed from a provision that continues to embody it.

    What is the “Triple Test” on what counts as an “industry”?

    1. The three conditions: An activity qualifies as an industry where three conditions are met together: a systematic activity, employer-employee cooperation, and production or distribution of goods and services to satisfy human wants other than those that are purely religious or spiritual.
    2. Profit is irrelevant: Profit motive plays no part in the determination. What matters is the nature of the activity itself, so a loss making or non-commercial body can still be an industry.
    3. The single exclusion: Only “sovereign functions” stand outside the definition, which is a narrow carve out rather than a general exemption for the State.

    How did the reference reach a nine judge Bench?

    1. The origin: The Triple Test was laid down in the 1978 judgment, which read Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 expansively.
    2. The doubt: A five judge Bench in State of U.P. vs Jai Bir Singh (2005) raised a doubt about that definition.
    3. The escalation: A seven judge Bench then sent the question to the current nine judge Bench.
    4. The statute changed while the reference was pending: The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was repealed on 21 November 2025, when the Industrial Relations Code, 2020 came into force.
    5. The Bench therefore faced two statutes: It had to decide the status of the Triple Test both for disputes still pending under the repealed Act and for interpretation of the successor provision, which is why the ruling splits along those two lines.

    What did the majority and the dissent hold?

    1. Pending disputes are unaffected: The Bench, led by the Chief Justice of India, left the Triple Test standing for all pending disputes under the older Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
    2. The anchor was removed for the new Code: A majority of the nine judge Bench ruled that the 1978 judgment will not be a “sheet anchor” for interpreting Section 2(p) of the Industrial Relations Code, 2020.
    3. The dissent went further than disagreement: The dissenting opinion held that the reference itself was unnecessary and that the Triple Test requires no interference at all.
    4. The dissent was not isolated: That view was shared by three other judges on the Bench, so the split on the reference question was narrow rather than lopsided.

    Why does an expansive definition of “industry” matter more now than in 1978?

    1. The workforce has moved: Since 1978, and particularly after the liberalisation and privatisation reforms of 1991, a far higher number of workers have moved to the private sector, out of the security of public employment.
    2. Security no longer comes from the employer: For a worker outside public employment, statutory coverage rather than employment status is what provides protection.
    3. Definition decides access: Whether an establishment is an “industry” determines whether its workers can raise an industrial dispute at all, so the definition is the gateway to every protection that follows.
    4. Most of the workforce is outside formal protection: About 90 per cent of India’s workforce is informal, and nearly 58 per cent of salaried workers still lack a written contract.
    5. The expansive reading is therefore a bulwark: An expansive definition of industry is more necessary now than it was in 1978, precisely because the cushion of public employment has shrunk.

    Was the Triple Test a pro-labour device or a framework for industrial peace?

    1. It was not merely pro-labour: The Triple Test was not only a device for extending worker protection, though it is usually described that way.
    2. It brought restrictions with it: An expansive definition of industry brought with it not just the protections of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 but also its restrictions.
    3. The employer gained a defined route: It gave employers a regulated route to retrenchment and closure, rather than leaving those decisions to be contested without a framework.
    4. Workers accepted a limit in return: It carried a bar on workers striking at will, so the coverage came with a procedural discipline on industrial action.
    5. The net effect was industrial peace: In essence the Triple Test allowed for industrial peace rather than worker welfare alone, which is what makes its removal a loss to both sides rather than to one.

    Why is setting the 1978 judgment aside difficult to justify?

    1. The successor provision did not change the test: Section 2(p) of the Industrial Relations Code, 2020 does not move away from the Triple Test formula and reproduces much of its essence.
    2. The reasoning does not follow: It is therefore difficult to understand why the 1978 judgment has to be set aside when Section 2(p) itself comes up for interpretation.
    3. A framework, not just a precedent, was cut away: Severing that principle from the Code cuts away the interpretive framework that allowed such disputes to be resolved at all.
    4. Two footings now coexist: Pending disputes under the repealed Act will be decided on the Triple Test, and disputes under the Code will be decided without it as an anchor, on a definition that says much the same thing.
    5. The burden shifts to the lower courts: It is now incumbent upon courts and tribunals to ensure that a change of statute is not read as a change of intent, and they must do so with the anchor removed.

    Challenges to the definition of “industry” under the Industrial Relations Code, 2020

    1. Litigation will restart from zero: With the 1978 judgment displaced as the anchor, every category of establishment settled over four decades becomes arguable again. Eg. Hospitals, educational institutions and charitable bodies were brought within the definition on the strength of that judgment. Fix. Insert a statutory explanation to Section 2(p) listing the categories expressly included and excluded, so the question is settled by text rather than by fresh litigation.
    2. The “sovereign functions” exclusion has no statutory boundary: The carve out is judicially defined, so its width expands or contracts with each ruling rather than by legislative choice. Eg. Municipal and public utility bodies performing statutory duties have repeatedly contested their status as industries. Fix. Define sovereign functions in the Code by reference to a listed set of constitutional functions.
    3. Threshold changes shrink the protected group: Raising the retrenchment and closure approval threshold reduces how many workers the framework covers regardless of how “industry” is defined. Eg. The Industrial Relations Code, 2020 raises the closure and retrenchment threshold from 100 to 300 workers. Fix. Pair the higher threshold with a statutory retrenchment compensation escalator and a funded reskilling entitlement.
    4. Platform and contract work sits outside the frame: The employer-employee cooperation limb assumes an identifiable employer, which app-mediated and multi-layered contract work does not supply. Eg. Aggregator platforms classify workers as partners rather than employees, which places them outside the industrial dispute route. Fix. Deem an aggregator to be the principal employer for the purpose of dispute resolution where it controls pricing and task allocation.
    5. Two parallel regimes will run for years: Pending disputes under the repealed Act and new disputes under the Code will be decided on different interpretive footings for as long as the backlog lasts. Eg. Industrial disputes routinely take a decade or more to reach final decision. Fix. Issue a transitional provision directing that Section 2(p) be construed consistently with the settled position under Section 2(j) for a stated period.
    6. Tribunal capacity has not been strengthened: A framework that shifts interpretive burden to tribunals fails where those tribunals are understaffed and slow. Eg. Industrial tribunals and labour courts carry long standing vacancies alongside a large pending case load. Fix. Fill sanctioned tribunal posts on a fixed calendar and publish disposal timelines for industrial dispute references.

    Conclusion

    The nine judge Bench preserved the Triple Test where it no longer decides much and removed it where it would have decided most. The relationship between the successor provision and the test, set out above, is what makes that split hard to defend. The dissenting view, that the reference was unnecessary and the test required no interference, is the more coherent reading of a workforce that has moved into private employment since 1978 and needs an expansive definition more, not less. It now falls to courts and tribunals to ensure that a change of statute is not read as a change of intent, without the anchor that would have made that straightforward.

    “[2024, GS3, 15 marks] Discuss the merits and demerits of the four ‘Labour Codes’ in the context of labour market reforms in India. What has been the progress so far in this regard?”

  • SC lauds repealed MGNREGA as ‘neither freebie nor exploitation’

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court has described the repealed Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, 2005 (MGNREGA) as a “salutary scheme” that was neither a freebie nor an exploitation of rural workers. A three judge Bench made the observation. It was hearing a petition seeking directions to the government to pay delayed wages under that Act along with compensation. Civil rights groups have meanwhile claimed that the successor law has produced a 50 per cent fall in employment generation. What is now contested is whether a guarantee of work rests on an enforceable right or on a Directive Principle that Parliament may redesign at will.

    What did the Court say about the repealed employment guarantee law?

    1. The Bench recorded an unqualified endorsement: The Chief Justice of India, heading a three judge Bench, orally observed that the repealed Act was a good and effective scheme.
    2. The reach was part of the praise: The observation noted that the scheme did a wonderful job in rural areas and was implemented across the whole country.
    3. It rejected both political labels attached to the scheme: The Bench held that the scheme was neither a freebie nor exploitation, which answers the charge that guaranteed public work is a handout and the charge that it is underpaid labour.
    4. The endorsement carries no operative effect: These were oral observations in a hearing, not a finding recorded in a judgment, so they bind nothing.

    What has changed under the successor law?

    1. A new statute has replaced the 2005 Act: The Viksit Bharat Guarantee for Rozgar and Ajeevika Mission (Gramin) Act, 2025, or VB-G RAM G Act, is now the governing law for rural employment guarantee.
    2. Guaranteed days have gone up: The entitlement rises from 100 days to 125 days of work per household each year.
    3. Employment generated has gone down: Civil rights groups claim a 50 per cent decline in employment generation under the new law, despite the higher entitlement.
    4. The design has moved from demand to allocation: The new law reflects a shift from a demand driven, rights based framework to a centrally controlled model.
    5. The funding split has been rewritten: The Centre to State ratio moves from 90:10 to 60:40, which raises the funding burden on States threefold.

    What did the petition ask the Court to do?

    1. Payment of arrears with compensation: The petition sought directions for the government to pay wages already delayed under the repealed Act, together with compensation for the delay.
    2. A test of the wage floor: The Court was urged to examine whether a law may prescribe minimum wages lower than the threshold determined by the State concerned.
    3. Elevation of the work guarantee: The petition asked that the statutory guarantee of rural work be raised to the status of a fundamental right under Article 21.
    4. The fiscal claim behind the numbers: It was submitted that States must now find nearly half the funds under the new law, that employment has halved, and that States do not have the money.

    Can a statutory guarantee of work be raised to a fundamental right?

    1. The Bench located the right in Part IV: A judge on the Bench observed that the Constitution does not make the right to work a fundamental right, and that it is more a democratic aspiration under the Directive Principles of State Policy.
    2. The consequence of that placement: To achieve that aspiration the state formulates a policy providing work at a graded, compensatory level. That is a matter of legislative choice rather than of enforceable entitlement.
    3. The petitioner’s route runs through dignity: It was argued that the right to lead a dignified life is part of Article 21, that a dignified life requires employment at minimum wages, and that anything below minimum wages amounts to forced labour.
    4. The question the Bench put remains open: Whether a Directive Principle worked out through a statute should be treated on par with Article 21 was posed from the Bench and not answered.

    Why did the Bench doubt a judicially fixed wage floor?

    1. A floor can shrink the work available: A judge on the Bench noted that mandating a minimum wage threshold might risk reducing the number of employment opportunities offered.
    2. Wages track local conditions: The Chief Justice of India observed that wages are usually linked to prevailing local conditions rather than to a single national figure.
    3. The two positions are not reconcilable within the scheme: A wage set by dignity produces one number, a wage set by local labour market conditions produces another, and only a legislature can choose between them.
    4. The judicial instrument is blunt here: A court can strike down a wage as unconstitutional, but it cannot fund the difference, which is why the Bench treated the question as a fiscal one.

    How did the Court dispose of the matter?

    1. The old law is no longer the right frame: A judge on the Bench stated that the issues raised must be examined afresh in the light of the new law rather than under the repealed Act.
    2. The petition was disposed of: The Court disposed of the present petition rather than deciding the questions it raised.
    3. Liberty was granted to start again: The petitioner was asked to file a fresh petition, which resets the challenge against the successor statute.
    4. The practical effect is delay: Both questions the petition raised survive, but only in a proceeding that has yet to be filed.

    Challenges to the rural employment guarantee framework

    1. A demand driven scheme collapses if funds are capped: Where the budget is fixed in advance, field staff suppress the registration of work demand rather than record an unmet entitlement. Eg. Work demand under the earlier scheme was routinely recorded only after funds were released for the block. Fix. Make the budget line for the guarantee an open ended charge that is revised at the supplementary stage against recorded demand.
    2. Delayed wages convert a guarantee into a loan from the worker: Payment beyond the statutory window pushes households into informal borrowing at the exact moment the scheme is meant to protect them. Eg. A large share of wage payments under the earlier scheme was released beyond the fifteen day statutory window in successive financial years. Fix. Automate the delay compensation payment through the same payment system that releases the wage, without requiring a claim.
    3. A higher State share transfers the risk to the weakest States: Poorer States with the largest demand for guaranteed work are least able to fund a 40 per cent share. Eg. States facing the highest rural distress also carry the highest ratio of committed expenditure to revenue. Fix. Apply a differentiated matching ratio linked to a State’s own revenue capacity rather than a uniform national split.
    4. Asset quality is weakly monitored: Works are selected for their ability to absorb labour rather than for durable value, so the assets created decay within seasons. Eg. Earthen works taken up before the monsoon are frequently washed out before they are measured. Fix. Require every work above a threshold cost to carry a technical sanction and a geotagged completion audit.
    5. Social audit is the design safeguard and the weakest link: The Gram Sabha audit is meant to catch fake muster rolls, but audit units are staffed and funded by the same administration they examine. Eg. Social audit units in several States operate with a fraction of their sanctioned staff. Fix. Fund social audit units directly from the central share and place their reporting line under the State Accountant General.
    6. Women’s participation depends on facilities that are rarely provided: Creche facilities and worksite shade are statutory entitlements that are treated as optional. Eg. Worksites routinely operate without the creche required where more than five children under six are present. Fix. Make release of the next tranche of administrative expenditure conditional on verified worksite facility compliance.

    Conclusion

    The Court’s endorsement of the repealed Act is a comment on record and nothing more, and the Bench made clear that the live questions must now be argued against the successor statute rather than the one it replaced. The petition was accordingly disposed of with liberty to file afresh, so both questions it raised remain undecided. The next milestone is the filing of that fresh petition. That petition will test the constitutional status of the work guarantee and the legality of a wage below a State determined minimum against the VB-G RAM G Act for the first time.

    “[2011] Among the following who are eligible to benefit from the “Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act”?

    (a) Adult members of only the scheduled caste and scheduled tribe households

    (b) Adult members of below poverty line (BPL) households

    (c) Adult members of households of all backward communities

    (d) Adult members of any household