The Supreme Court has agreed to examine whether the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 is being used to defeat the Right to Information Act, 2005. The conflict is between the right to informational privacy and the right of citizens to access public information.
What is Section 44(3) of the DPDP Act, 2023?
Amending provision: Section 44(3) amended Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act, which governs exemption of personal information.
Effect: It removed the earlier public interest override, allowing any personal information to be withheld.
Why does this threaten the Right to Information?
Blanket exemption: Officials can now deny information by labelling it ‘personal data’ without a public interest test.
Journalism risk: Investigative reporting that relies on named records could be gagged.
Accountability loss: Asset disclosures and beneficiary lists that expose wrongdoing may fall outside access.
What is the case for the privacy safeguard?
Fundamental right: Privacy was recognised as a fundamental right under Article 21 in the K.S. Puttaswamy judgment.
Data misuse: Uncontrolled disclosure of personal data can enable profiling and harm.
What must be resolved for the two laws to coexist?
Public interest test: A restored balancing standard is the missing precondition for reconciling access and privacy.
Conclusion
The central question is whether privacy protection can be read so widely that it nullifies transparency. The next milestone is the Court’s substantive hearing on the challenge to Section 44(3).
Back2Basics: Right to Information Act, 2005
Objective: Empowers citizens to seek information from public authorities to promote transparency and accountability.
Key body: Central and State Information Commissions adjudicate appeals and complaints.
Section 8: Lists exemptions from disclosure, including the personal information clause now amended.
“[2020, GS2, 10 marks] ‘Recent amendments to the Right to Information Act will have profound impact on the autonomy and independence of the Information Commission’. Discuss.”
The Supreme Court has clarified that its earlier direction restricting mining within a 10 km radius of the Asan Wetland Conservation Reserve now applies to all Wetland Conservation Reserves across India. Mining in such areas will require prior approval from the competent authority.
What did the Supreme Court clarify?
Nationwide Application: The 10 km mining safeguard around the Asan Wetland Conservation Reserve will now apply to all Wetland Conservation Reserves.
Uniform Principle: The Court held that the protection should apply uniformly across the country.
Case Background: The clarification came while hearing an application filed by the Himachal Pradesh Government.
State’s Argument: Himachal Pradesh contended that Wetland Conservation Reserves do not have a statutory buffer zone unlike national parks.
Further Direction: The Court asked the National Board for Wildlife (NBWL) or the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MoEFCC) to examine whether the Asan Wetland extends into Himachal Pradesh.
What is the Asan Wetland Conservation Reserve?
Location: Situated at the confluence of the Asan and Yamuna rivers in Uttarakhand.
Ramsar Status: Declared a Ramsar Site in 2020.
Ecological Importance: Supports migratory waterbirds and rich aquatic biodiversity.
Judicial Protection: Mining within a 10 km radius requires prior clearance from the NBWL or MoEFCC.
What are Ramsar Sites?
Definition: Wetlands designated under the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands (1971) for their international ecological importance.
India’s Membership: India became a party to the Convention in 1982.
Current Status: India has 101 Ramsar Sites, the highest in Asia.
Significance: Ramsar designation commits countries to maintain the ecological character of wetlands but does not itself create a separate statutory protection regime.
What is the legal position on mining near wetlands?
No Statutory Buffer: The Ramsar Convention and the Wetlands (Conservation and Management) Rules, 2017 do not prescribe a fixed buffer zone around wetlands.
2010 Rules: Earlier rules listed prohibited activities and required prior approval for activities within the wetland’s zone of influence.
2017 Rules: Replaced the earlier framework with a decentralised system led by State Wetland Authorities.
Judicial Safeguard: The Supreme Court’s ruling fills this regulatory gap by requiring prior clearance for mining near Wetland Conservation Reserves.
[2022] Consider the following pairs: Wetland/Lake — Location 1. Hokera Wetland — Punjab 2. Renuka Wetland — Himachal Pradesh 3. Rudrasagar Lake — Tripura 4. Sasthamkotta Lake — Tamil Nadu How many pairs given above are correctly matched? (a) Only one pair
The Supreme Court clarified that its ban on mining within a 10 km radius of the Asan Conservation Reserve (a Ramsar Site) applies to all Wetland Conservation Reserves across India unless approved by the Standing Committee of the National Board for Wildlife (NBWL) and the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MoEFCC).
What is a Conservation Reserve?
A protected area category created under the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972 (through the 2002 Amendment).
Covers government-owned land adjacent to National Parks and Wildlife Sanctuaries.
Protects habitats and wildlife corridors with community participation.
What is an Eco-Sensitive Zone (ESZ)?
A buffer area notified under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 around National Parks and Wildlife Sanctuaries.
Restricts activities such as mining, industries, and large-scale construction to reduce ecological impacts.
Supreme Court Ruling
Extended the 10 km mining restriction to all Wetland Conservation Reserves.
Recognized wetlands as a distinct ecologically sensitive category.
Mining within the buffer requires approval from the NBWL Standing Committee and MoEFCC.
Why is the Ruling Significant?
Protects wetlands from mining and habitat degradation.
Recognizes the importance of catchment areas for wetland health.
Ensures uniform protection for wetland conservation reserves across India.
Challenges
Incomplete mapping and notification of wetlands.
Encroachment and land-use change.
Pollution and eutrophication.
Weak enforcement by State Wetland Authorities.
Development pressures from mining and infrastructure projects.
Value Addition
Ramsar Convention
International treaty for the conservation and wise use of wetlands.
Adopted in 1971 at Ramsar, Iran.
India became a Contracting Party in 1982.
Wetlands (Conservation and Management) Rules, 2017
Regulate conservation and management of notified wetlands.
Implemented through State Wetland Authorities.
Back2Basics
National Board for Wildlife (NBWL)
Statutory body under the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972.
Ramsar Site: Since 2020 (Uttarakhand’s first Ramsar Site).
Formed by the Asan Barrage at the confluence of the Asan and Yamuna rivers.
Important wintering habitat for migratory birds.
“[2019] Consider the following statements: 1. Under Ramsar Convention, it is mandatory on the part of the Government of India to protect and conserve all the wetlands in the territory of India. 2. The Wetlands (Conservation and Management) Rules, 2010 were framed by the Government of India based on the recommendations of Ramsar Convention. 3. The Wetlands (Conservation and Management) Rules, 2010 also encompass the drainage area or catchment regions of the wetlands as determined by the authority. (a) 1 and 2 only (b) 2 and 3 only (c) 3 only (d) 1, 2 and 3
The Supreme Court directed the Centre, States, and Union Territories to implement Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) within four weeks to curb digital arrest cyber fraud, including freezing mule accounts, strengthening grievance redressal, and improving cybercrime coordination.
What is a Digital Arrest Scam?
A cyber fraud where scammers impersonate police or enforcement agencies through video/audio calls.
Victims are falsely told they are under “digital arrest” and coerced into transferring money.
What is a Mule Account?
A bank account used to receive and transfer proceeds of cyber fraud.
Often opened by unsuspecting or paid individuals.
Banks can impose temporary debit holds to prevent fraudulent withdrawals.
What is the Indian Cyber Crime Coordination Centre (I4C)?
A nodal agency under the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) for coordinating India’s response to cybercrime.
Operates the National Cyber Crime Reporting Portal (NCRP) and the 1930 Cyber Helpline.
Supreme Court Directions
Reserve Bank of India (RBI) to issue SOPs for temporary debit holds on mule accounts.
States/UTs to operationalise:
State Cyber Crime Coordination Centres.
e-Zero FIR mechanism.
Strengthen grievance redressal, money restoration, and public awareness.
Challenges
Cross-border cybercrime networks.
Rapid movement of funds through mule accounts and cryptocurrencies.
Weak inter-agency coordination.
SIM spoofing and fake identities.
Low public awareness, especially among the elderly.
Value Addition
e-Zero FIR
Enables registration of a cybercrime complaint without jurisdictional barriers.
The complaint is later transferred to the appropriate police station.
Citizen Response to Financial Cyber Fraud
Call 1930 immediately.
Report the incident on the National Cyber Crime Reporting Portal (NCRP).
Early reporting increases the chances of freezing fraudulent transactions.
Back2Basics: Indian Cyber Crime Coordination Centre (I4C)
Parent Ministry: Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA).
Established: 2020.
Key Components:
National Cyber Crime Reporting Portal (NCRP).
1930 Financial Cyber Fraud Helpline.
Mandate: Coordinate law enforcement, banks, telecom operators, and other stakeholders to prevent and investigate cybercrime.
“[2017] In India, it is legally mandatory for which of the following to report on cyber security incidents? 1. Service providers 2. Data Centres 3. Body corporate (a) 1 only (b) 1 and 2 only (c) 3 only (d) 1, 2 and 3
The Supreme Court held that protection against cruelty under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860 extends to women in live-in relationships, provided the partners share a genuine intent to marry. The ruling is based on Article 14 (Right to Equality).
What is Section 498A?
Penalized cruelty by a husband or his relatives against a woman.
Now corresponds to Section 85 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023.
Traditionally applied only to legally valid marriages.
Supreme Court Ruling
Adopted a purposive interpretation to address changing social realities.
Extended protection to women in live-in relationships where there is: A relationship in the nature of marriage, and A genuine intent to marry.
Held that denying such protection violates Article 14.
Why is the Domestic Violence Act Not Enough?
The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence (PWDV) Act, 2005 covers women in relationships in the nature of marriage.
However, it provides civil remedies such as: Protection orders, Residence orders, and Maintenance
The Supreme Court extended mandatory Third-Party Motor Insurance to 4 years for new cars and 6 years for new two-wheelers. It also proposed a “No Insurance, No Fuel” pilot to improve compliance.
What is Third-Party Motor Insurance?
Mandatory under Section 146 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.
Covers compensation for injury, death, or property damage caused to a third party.
Does not cover damage to the insured vehicle or owner.
Supreme Court Directions
Mandatory third-party cover:
4 years for new cars.
6 years for new two-wheelers.
Link Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) cameras with:
Insurance Information Bureau of India (IIB)
VAHAN portal.
Enable police to verify insurance in real time through mobile applications.
Explore a “No Insurance, No Fuel” pilot.
Why is Enforcement Needed?
Around 56% of vehicles reportedly operate without valid third-party insurance.
Victims face delays in compensation.
Insurance often lapses after the initial mandatory period.
Challenges
Lack of integration among IIB, VAHAN, and police databases.
Low renewal rates, especially for two-wheelers.
Concerns over denying fuel as an essential service.
The Noida Police registered a Zero FIR against a 25 year old protester over remarks about the Prime Minister during the July youth protests, invoking sections covering insult, public mischief and defamation rather than obscenity. The case surfaces a legal distinction courts have sharpened over six decades: crude or profane language is not automatically the same offence as obscenity, and each carries its own, narrower evidentiary bar.
How has India’s legal test for obscenity evolved?
Ranjit D. Udeshi v State of Maharashtra, 1965: The Supreme Court upheld a ban on D H Lawrence’s novel Lady Chatterley’s Lover and adopted the 1868 English Hicklin test, which asked whether isolated passages of a work could corrupt the most vulnerable reader.
Doordarshan v Anand Patwardhan, 2006: The Supreme Court cleared the broadcast of a documentary that had been denied airtime over its adult certificate, holding that obscenity must be judged by viewing a work as a whole, not by isolating individual scenes.
Aveek Sarkar v State of West Bengal, 2014: The Supreme Court discarded the Hicklin test in favour of a community standards test, holding that material is obscene only if it tends to arouse sexual feelings when judged by an average person applying contemporary standards.
What is Section 296 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita?
Section 296, Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS): The successor to Section 294 of the Indian Penal Code, this is the default charge for loud, obscene public behaviour, punishing obscene acts or words uttered in or near a public place to the annoyance of others, with up to three months in jail.
Why is profanity not the same as obscenity?
College Romance ruling, 2024: The Supreme Court quashed an FIR against a web series over an expletive-heavy episode, holding that vulgarity and profanity are not, by themselves, the same as obscenity, since crude words in common usage reflect emotions such as anger or frustration rather than arousing sexual feelings.
Sivakumar v State, April 2026: The Supreme Court acquitted a man under Section 294 for calling someone a slur during a heated argument, holding it did not meet the threshold for obscenity.
Mani v State, July 2026: The Supreme Court held that swear words, profanities and vulgar expletives, however distasteful, cannot be equated with obscenity, since obscenity requires a showing that the utterance was lascivious.
What does the Noida FIR actually need to prove?
Section 352, insult: This requires proof that the accused intended, or knew it was likely, that the insult would provoke an actual breach of public peace, not merely that someone felt insulted.
Section 353(1), public mischief: This section targets incitement, such as inciting mutiny, fear likely to push people toward offences against the state, or enmity between communities, a considerably higher bar than sharp criticism of a leader.
Section 356(1), defamation: Defamation carries long standing exceptions for good faith comment on a public figure’s conduct in their public role.
Conclusion
Six decades of Supreme Court rulings have progressively narrowed what counts as obscenity while explicitly separating it from mere vulgarity or profanity. The Noida case will test whether remarks about the Prime Minister meet the considerably higher evidentiary bar the insult, public mischief and defamation provisions actually require.
Back2Basics
International Examples
United States: Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969): Speech can be punished only if it is intended and likely to incite imminent lawless action, not merely because it is offensive.
United Kingdom: Handyside v. UK (ECHR, 1976): Freedom of expression protects ideas that “offend, shock or disturb” the State or any section of society.
United States: Cohen v. California (1971): The US Supreme Court held that “one man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric,” protecting the use of profanity as free speech.
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR): Political speech enjoys the highest level of protection, and public officials are expected to tolerate greater criticism than private individuals.
PYQ Relevance
[UPSC 2013] Discuss Section 66A of IT Act, with reference to its alleged violation of Article 19 of the Constitution.
Linkage: The PYQ tests the balance between freedom of speech under Article 19(1)(a) and reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2). The article examines the legal limits of criminalising speech, highlighting judicial safeguards against misuse of obscenity and other speech-related offences.
The Supreme Court dismissed the Competition Commission of India’s appeal against an NCLAT order that set aside a Rs 301.6 crore penalty on Grasim Industries, holding that the regulator breached natural justice by not giving the company a hearing after departing from its own investigative findings. The ruling exposes the boundary between a regulator’s power to penalise dominant firms and the procedural fairness it owes them before doing so.
What did the CCI originally rule and why was it set aside?
Original penalty: The Competition Commission of India imposed the Rs 301.6 crore penalty on Grasim Industries in March 2020 for allegedly abusing its dominant position in the supply of viscose staple fibre to spinners.
Departure from the Director General’s findings: The National Company Law Appellate Tribunal found that the CCI had departed from the findings of its own Director General, the regulator’s investigative arm, without giving Grasim a chance to respond to that departure.
NCLAT’s order: The NCLAT set aside the CCI’s order and remanded the matter back to the Commission for a fresh hearing that accounts for this procedural gap.
Why did the Supreme Court agree with the natural justice finding?
Hearing before departure: A bench of the Supreme Court held that once the CCI decided to differ from the Director General’s conclusions, natural justice required that Grasim be given an opportunity to present its arguments against that specific departure.
Procedural fairness as a substantive check: The ruling confirms that a regulator’s substantive finding of market dominance abuse can be undone purely on procedural grounds, regardless of the underlying merits of the dominance allegation.
What are the challenges this ruling poses for competition regulation?
Delay in enforcement: The case now returns to the CCI for a fresh hearing, meaning a matter that began with a 2020 penalty order will take years longer to resolve, weakening the deterrent effect of competition enforcement.
Procedural burden on the regulator: The CCI will need to build an additional hearing step into its process whenever it departs from Director General findings, adding to its administrative workload in future dominance cases.
Precedent for future appeals: Companies facing CCI penalties now have a clearer procedural ground to challenge orders that diverge from investigative findings without an intervening hearing.
Market conduct still unresolved: Whether Grasim actually abused its dominant position in the viscose staple fibre market remains unresolved and will only be settled after the CCI re-examines the case.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s ruling turns on procedure, not on whether Grasim actually abused its market position. The Competition Commission of India must now rehear the case with Grasim given the opportunity it was earlier denied, leaving the substantive dominance question open until that fresh hearing concludes.
Back2Basics:
Competition Commission of India (CCI)
The CCI is India’s cross-sectoral competition regulator, governed by the Competition Act, 2002, covering anti-competitive agreements, mergers and combinations, and abuse of dominance across all sectors.
It is not a price control body; it intervenes only where conduct is anti-competitive, a distinction commonly tested since CCI does not regulate prices directly.
The CCI acts as the first-instance adjudicator across all sectors, since there is no separate technical regulator performing a parallel function within its domain.
Appeals against CCI orders lie with the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT), as in the Grasim case, with further appeal lying with the Supreme Court.
The National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT):
It serves as the direct appellate authority for orders, directions, and decisions passed by the Competition Commission of India (CCI). When the CCI rules on anti-competitive agreements, cartels, or abuse of dominant market positions, aggrieved parties challenge those decisions before the NCLAT
Key Aspects of the Relationship
Appellate Jurisdiction: Empowered under Section 410 of the Companies Act, 2013, NCLAT hears and disposes of all appeals arising from CCI rulings (replacing the erstwhile Competition Appellate Tribunal or COMPAT).
Judicial Review: NCLAT evaluates whether CCI orders follow principles of natural justice, properly weigh market evidence, or stay within regulatory jurisdiction
PYQ Relevance
[UPSC 2023] Discuss the role of the Competition Commission of India in containing the abuse of dominant position by the Multi-National Corporations in India. Refer to the recent decisions.
Linkage: The PYQ tests the role of the CCI in preventing abuse of dominant position and promoting fair competition. The article highlights the CCI’s enforcement powers and the need to uphold natural justice while regulating dominant firms.
The Supreme Court, in a ruling delivered on 29 July, quashed the Centre’s 2021 Office Memorandum (OM) that had allowed projects built without prior approval to seek regularisation. It also held that a narrowly tailored amnesty scheme may still be permitted through a statutory notification if justified by public interest. This reopens the question of whether this closes the door on regularising environmental violations or gives them a narrower but still real legal opening.
What is a post facto environmental clearance?
Definition: A post facto, or ex post facto, environmental clearance (EC) is an approval granted after a project has already commenced construction or operations, reversing the sequence the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) regime otherwise requires.
Underlying principle: India’s EIA regime rests on the precautionary principle, which requires ecological appraisal before construction begins rather than after damage may already be irreversible.
What is the difference between an Office Memorandum and a statutory notification?
Office Memorandum: An OM is an administrative instruction issued by a ministry or department. It does not carry the force of law.
Statutory notification: A notification is issued under authority granted by a statute, in this case the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, and is published in the official Gazette, giving it legal force an OM lacks.
How has the Supreme Court’s position on retrospective clearances evolved?
Common Cause v. Union of India (2017): The Court held that mining projects requiring clearance could not commence before appraisal, calling retrospective clearances completely alien to environmental jurisprudence.
Alembic Pharmaceuticals Ltd v. Rohit Prajapati (2020): The Court reiterated that ex post facto clearance undermines the precautionary principle by letting proponents commence activity first and seek approval later, though it imposed penalties instead of ordering closure for long operating units.
Electrosteel Steels Ltd v. Union of India (2021): The Court held that ex post facto clearances could be granted in exceptional circumstances to protect livelihoods and the economy, opening space for the OM that followed the same year.
Pahwa Plastics v. Dastak (2022): The Court took a more pragmatic approach, holding that closure is not always the right remedy where regulatory uncertainty existed and compliance remained achievable.
Vanashakti v. Union of India (May 2025 and November 2025): A Bench struck down both the 2017 notification and the 2021 OM, ruling ex post facto clearances impermissible in any form. Following review petitions by the Centre and industry bodies, a three judge Bench recalled this ruling by a two to one majority six months later, holding it needed fresh adjudication.
29 July 2026 ruling: A Bench led by the Chief Justice of India quashed the 2021 OM but upheld the 2017 notification, holding that any future post facto clearance can only be granted through a statutory notification, not an administrative order.
What does the 29 July ruling establish?
Quashed instrument: The Court set aside the 2021 OM that had created a standing procedure for regularising violation cases, calling it a continuing or perpetual regime rather than a one time exception.
Retained instrument: The March 2017 notification, offering a one time six month disclosure window, was not invalidated.
Legal basis required: Any future post facto clearance mechanism must be issued as a statutory notification under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, not as an OM.
Public interest test: The government must show that the public interest served is sufficiently compelling, that any relaxation is strictly necessary, and that environmental costs have been weighed against anticipated benefits, converting open ended discretion into a narrowly circumscribed exception.
Does the ruling protect the precautionary principle or launder violations into a fee?
Fig leaf reading: One reading holds that the distinction between an OM and a statutory notification is a procedural label rather than a substantive safeguard. This is because the government can still notify the same regularisation scheme through the correct instrument.
Amnesty analogy rejected: The Court reasoned that governments may frame environmental amnesty schemes the way they frame tax or building default amnesties. This is a comparison critics say cannot be transposed onto projects that cut into forests and floodplains. This is because ecological damage propagates through interconnected plant, animal, human and microbial systems rather than resetting to zero on payment of a fee.
Decriminalisation overlap: The Jan Vishwas (Amendment of Provisions) Act, 2023, and its 2026 amendments removed imprisonment for environmental violations. This leaves only monetary penalties. So, now a regularised violation now costs a well capitalised developer a budgeted fine rather than a criminal risk.
Counter view: The opposing reading holds that the ruling is consistent with two decades of jurisprudence reading a healthy environment into the right to life, and that the recognised flexibility could legitimately apply to national defence projects, healthcare facilities in underserved areas, or connectivity in remote regions.
Scale of existing exceptions: More than 100 projects, including coal, iron and bauxite mines, a greenfield airport, distilleries, steel and cement plants, and hospitals, had already received ex post facto clearance under the 2017 to 2021 regime. This shows how large scale the exception has become in practice.
What are the challenges to enforcing the public interest test for post facto clearance?
Definition creep: Public interest is not statutorily defined for this purpose, leaving room for the term to be stretched to cover commercially driven projects as much as genuinely urgent public needs.
Monitoring capacity: State environmental authorities, expert appraisal committees and pollution boards have historically detected violations only after construction is complete, showing weak upfront monitoring that a narrower legal test alone will not fix.
Litigation burden: Every future statutory amnesty scheme will likely face fresh litigation testing whether it is genuinely narrowly tailored, adding years of uncertainty for project proponents and affected communities alike.
Weakened deterrence: With imprisonment removed under the Jan Vishwas amendments, monetary penalties alone may not deter developers who can treat the fine as a routine cost of doing business.
Climate exposure: Infrastructure regularised without adequate ecological assessment faces greater exposure to extreme weather events, as seen in monsoon damage to projects built without proper environmental safeguards.
Conclusion
The ruling ends open ended administrative regularisation under the 2021 OM, restoring the requirement that any future post facto clearance carry the force of a statutory notification tested against public interest, necessity and proportionality. It does not resolve whether that test can hold against a decriminalised penalty regime in which environmental violation carries only a monetary cost. The government’s next statutory amnesty scheme, if it frames one, will show whether this order narrows the exception in practice or simply relabels the same regularisation regime in more careful legal language.
Back2Basics:
EIA Notification, 2006
Issuing authority: Notified in 2006 by the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986.
Core requirement: Mandates prior environmental clearance before construction or expansion begins for listed categories of projects such as mining, thermal power and infrastructure.
Categorisation: Projects fall into Category A, needing central level clearance, and Category B, needing state level clearance through State Environment Impact Assessment Authorities.
Process stages: Screening, scoping, public consultation and appraisal precede the grant of clearance.
Subsequent dilution: A March 2017 notification and a July 2021 OM introduced routes for post facto clearance, which the Supreme Court has since narrowed.
The precautionary principle:
It is a core rule in environmental law requiring authorities to take preventive action against serious or irreversible environmental harm, even when there is no full scientific certainty.
Key aspects include shifting the burden of proof to project developers, prioritizing safety over delay, and focusing on proactive governance.
Vellore Citizens’ Welfare Forum v. Union of India (1996): The landmark ruling where the Supreme Court formally integrated the precautionary principle and the polluter-pays principle into Indian jurisprudence.
PYQ Relevance
[UPSC 2020] How does the draft Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) Notification, 2020 differ from the existing EIA Notification, 2006?
Linkage: The PYQ tests understanding of the Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) framework in India. The article examines EIA implementation in light of the precautionary principle established in Vellore Citizens’ Welfare Forum (1996).
The Supreme Court is examining the constitutional validity of the Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023, which gives the executive a majority in the CEC selection committee. The Court has reserved its decision on whether to refer the matter to a Constitution Bench.
What is the CEC Selection Committee under the 2023 Act?
The Act provides for a three-member selection committee comprising:
Prime Minister (Chairperson)
Union Cabinet Minister nominated by the Prime Minister
Leader of the Opposition (LoP) in the Lok Sabha
What changed?
The Act replaced the Chief Justice of India (CJI) with a Cabinet Minister.
This gives the executive two out of three votes, with the Opposition holding one.
What is the Anoop Baranwal Judgment (2023)?
Delivered by a five-judge Constitution Bench.
Held that until Parliament enacted a law, the CEC and Election Commissioners should be appointed by a committee comprising:
Prime Minister
Leader of the Opposition
Chief Justice of India
The Court stressed that the Election Commission must be independent, neutral, and free from executive control.
Centre’s Arguments
Parliament is competent to decide the appointment process.
The Prime Minister’s office carries constitutional trust.
Courts should not presume bad faith by constitutional authorities.
Replacing the CJI with a Cabinet Minister is within Parliament’s legislative powers.
Supreme Court’s Concerns
The committee lacks a neutral member.
A 2:1 executive majority may affect the perception of independence.
Appointments should not only be fair but also appear to be fair.
[2017] Consider the following statements regarding the Election Commission of India: 1.The ECI is currently a five-member body consisting of the Chief Election Commissioner and four Election Commissioners. 2.The Union Ministry of Home Affairs is the final authority that decides the election schedule for general elections. 3.The ECI is the designated authority to resolve disputes relating to splits or mergers of recognized political parties. Which of the statements given above is/are correct?
