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Type: SC Judgements

SC Judgements are very important for Mains Paper

  • SC refuses extension for Aravalli panel to submit final report

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court has refused a six month extension sought by the high powered committee it appointed to define the Aravalli hills and range, and has directed the panel to submit its final report by 30 November. The committee was constituted to evolve a uniform definition of the ecologically fragile Aravalli hills and range and to recommend measures to regulate future mining. A three judge Bench headed by the Chief Justice of India observed that the panel appeared to be waiting for the Chief Justice’s retirement, which falls on 9 February 2027, and made clear that no further extension would be granted. The Bench also directed the panel to work continuously, to file interim reports on urgent issues, and to hear all stakeholders including tribal communities in Rajasthan and Gujarat. The tension is that a definition still unsettled after repeated extensions is the same definition that determines where mining may lawfully continue in the meantime.

    What is the high powered committee tasked with?

    1. Composition: It is a five member panel constituted by the Supreme Court and headed by the Director General of the Indian Council of Forestry Research and Education (ICFRE), the Union government’s forestry research body.
    2. First task, the definition: It must evolve a single uniform definition of what counts as the Aravalli hills and the Aravalli range, applicable across the States the range runs through.
    3. Second task, mining regulation: It must recommend the measures by which future mining in the defined area is to be regulated.

    Why does a definition decide what can be mined?

    1. Protection follows the boundary: Restrictions on mining and construction attach to land identified as Aravalli, so the extent of the definition is the extent of the protection.
    2. State practice has diverged: The range runs across Delhi, Haryana, Rajasthan and Gujarat, and in the absence of one national test each State has applied its own criteria to identify protected hills.
    3. The dispute is about elevation and landform: The competing tests turn on how much a landform must rise above the surrounding ground before it qualifies as an Aravalli hill, and a stricter threshold removes large stretches from protection.
    4. The interim period is the live cost: Mining approvals continue to be processed while the definition is pending, so delay is not neutral between the parties.

    What has the Court directed the panel to do?

    1. A hard deadline: The final report is due by 30 November, with the matter listed for hearing on 2 December, by which time the report is expected to have been filed.
    2. Interim reporting: The panel must submit interim reports on specific issues that require immediate consideration rather than holding everything back until the full exercise is complete.
    3. Stakeholder hearings: The panel must hear all stakeholders before finalising its recommendations, including tribal communities in Rajasthan and Gujarat whose land and livelihood the definition affects.
    4. No further extension: The Bench recorded that the six month request would not be entertained and that no further extension would follow.

    Challenges to regulating mining in the Aravallis

    1. Illegal mining outruns enforcement: Leases are policed by State mining departments with small field staff, so extraction continues outside sanctioned boundaries and at night. Eg. The Supreme Court has repeatedly had to intervene in Aravalli mining in Haryana, including through orders restraining mining in the range’s Haryana stretch.
      The Fix: Mandate satellite based volumetric monitoring of every lease, with quarterly comparison of extracted volume against the approved mining plan.
    2. Definitional ambiguity is exploited at the margin: Where a landform’s status is arguable, the developer’s classification prevails until challenged, which converts a mapping question into a licensing loophole. Eg. Construction has advanced on Aravalli land in Faridabad on the basis that the plots were not classified as forest.
      The Fix: Publish the finalised boundary as a single geo referenced map notified in the gazette, so classification is not decided plot by plot.
    3. Land use change destroys the hill even without mining: Real estate and quarry backfilling flatten the same ridges that mining regulation is meant to protect, and neither is governed by mining law. Eg. Farmhouse and residential development has expanded steadily on the Aravalli fringes around the National Capital Region.
      The Fix: Attach the mining definition to the State land use plans as well, so the same boundary governs building permissions.
    4. The ecological function is not priced into any clearance: The range checks the eastward spread of the Thar desert and recharges groundwater, services that no mining lease valuation accounts for. Eg. Groundwater levels in the districts flanking the range have fallen faster than the State averages.
      The Fix: Require a hydrological and dust dispersion impact assessment specific to the range before a lease is granted, not a generic mining environmental clearance.
    5. Restoration obligations are rarely enforced after closure: Reclamation of a mined pit is a lease condition that lapses once the operator exits, leaving abandoned pits and unstable slopes. Eg. Disused quarries across the range have filled with water and remain unrehabilitated.
      The Fix: Hold a restoration bond sized to the assessed reclamation cost, released only after independent certification that the site has been restored.

    Conclusion

    The Court has converted an open ended technical exercise into a dated one, which is the only lever available to it while the substantive question remains with the committee. The unresolved position is that protection of the range currently depends on a definition that does not yet exist, so every month of delay is a month in which the weakest interpretation operates by default. The concrete things to watch are the interim reports the panel now owes, and the hearing on 2 December at which the recommendations on regulating mining will first be tested.

    Back2Basics: The Aravalli Range

    1. What it is: One of the world’s oldest fold mountain ranges, formed in the Proterozoic era and heavily eroded, so it survives as broken ridges rather than a continuous chain.
    2. Extent: It runs roughly 690 km from Delhi in the northeast through Haryana and Rajasthan to Gujarat in the southwest.
    3. Highest point: Guru Shikhar on the Mount Abu massif in Rajasthan, at about 1,722 metres, is the highest peak of the range.
    4. Ecological role: It acts as a barrier to the eastward advance of the Thar desert and as a groundwater recharge zone for the plains on either side.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025, GS3, 15 marks] Mineral resources are fundamental to the country economy and these are exploited by mining. Why is mining considered an environmental hazard? Explain the remedial measures required to reduce the environmental hazard due to mining.”

  • Failing at ABC

    Why in the News

    An investigation across Tamil Nadu and Puducherry into the outsourced Animal Birth Control (ABC) programme, under which local bodies contract organisations to sterilise and vaccinate community dogs, records starved animals, botched mass surgeries, broken vaccine cold chains and fabricated organ counts.

    What do the Animal Birth Control Rules, 2023 require?

    1. Humane capture and return to the same place: Capture with nets, feeder outreach before capture, and geotagging of both capture and release at the same location.
    2. Surgical and shelter standards: Closed circuit cameras in the operation theatre, pre-operative and post-operative care, clean and spacious kennels, food twice a day and water at all times.
    3. Verification tied to billing: Organ inspection committees are to be constituted to count organs against billing claims.
    4. Disposal after the count: Organs are to be destroyed immediately by deep burial or incineration.

    What did the investigation find at the centres?

    1. Oulgaret, Puducherry: An internal municipal dossier recorded 50 emaciated dogs released from an ABC centre in late 2025, 20 dog deaths and 50 complaints against the veterinarian. The animals were released hastily just before an inspection, with sutures falling apart.
    2. Velankanni, Nagapattinam district: On 23 July dogs were found alive with loose sutures and no post-operative care, and carcasses were found in garbage with bloody sutures and with wires and ropes around their necks, both banned in the catching process. The District Animal Welfare Officer’s report recorded 70 dogs, 64 males and six females, sterilised in three days by two veterinarians.
    3. Mannargudi, Tiruvarur district: On 2 September a female dog was found alive with its intestines spilling out after sterilisation at the centre there.
    4. Pollachi: At a board-run centre the post-operative care unit sits 2 km away from the surgery centre, and a female dog died of evisceration after surgery.
    5. Relocation instead of return: Dogs picked up for sterilisation are extensively relocated in violation of the Rules, and a healthy dog returned to its own locality is the community’s only real-time audit of the money spent.

    Why do the surgeries fail?

    1. Suturing is rushed: The distance between two suture bites should be under half a centimetre, which takes time. Centres press young veterinarians to complete more surgeries instead.
    2. Pain relief is skipped to cut cost: Multi-modal analgesia is omitted, so the animal licks the surgical site and opens the sutures.
    3. Suture material is reused: Leftover material causes surgical site infections.
    4. The faster male technique is the unsuitable one: The on-scrotal method leaves gaps between sutures for fluid drainage and raises infection risk on unhygienic shelter floors. A veterinarian left an organisation that insisted on more on-scrotal procedures.

    How does the payment design create the incentive?

    1. The rate is fixed per dog: Rs 1,650 is allocated per dog, including Rs 450 for sterilisation and vaccination and Rs 200 for catching and release.
    2. Payment follows projected numbers, not outcomes: Local bodies reward claimed counts rather than verified results, which turns sterilisation into assembly-line work at scale.
    3. Catchers are paid per catch: Pups, lactating dogs, pregnant dogs and already sterilised dogs are picked up to raise the count.
    4. Ethical care is affordable and skipped anyway: Factoring in economies of scale, a centre can make about Rs 66,000 in profit while still meeting ethical standards of care.

    What is the state of verification?

    1. Bills clear on the contractor’s own evidence: Payment rests on the organisation’s claims, photographs of surgery, photographs of dogs and occasional organ counts by municipal sanitation officers.
    2. The organ count is gamed: A bucket of organs stored at the Oulgaret centre was transported to Neyveli township in Cuddalore district in 2025 to supply an organ counting committee inspection, with the same veterinarian performing surgeries at Neyveli.
    3. The committees arrive after the money: In Tiruppur the organ counting committee was constituted only after more than 9,000 surgeries had been billed.
    4. The audit questions went unanswered: The Director of Municipal Administration did not answer whether time-tagged photographs, videos of the organ count and destruction of organs were audited for each batch of sterilisation bills, or what the targets were.
    5. The corrective is administrative and recent: Corporations have withheld payment on bills raised over the last three months, and a member of the State Monitoring Committee has written to the Municipal Administration Department to withhold bills and constitute panels. Activists have asked instead that community animals be brought under an animal management framework of the Animal Husbandry Department.

    Why does blacklisting fail to remove a contractor?

    1. Recognition is scarce and contracting is not: Only six organisations hold recognition for ABC procedures in the State, against about 15 contractor organisations operating in the space.
    2. A blacklisted operator is re-engaged elsewhere: Pranimitran’s contract was terminated by the Hosur Corporation over animal mutilation, botched surgeries and non-disclosure, and it was blacklisted by the Animal Welfare Board of India. The Tiruppur Corporation engaged it anyway, stating that no replacement contractor could be found.
    3. Others continue in place: Jeeva Karunyam of Nagercoil and Rajeshwari Goshala of Tirunelveli continue to work for their local bodies, and two First Information Reports were filed against International Peace Trust at Avadi in Chennai.
    4. A criminal case does not interrupt a contract: A First Information Report was filed against Pranimitran over the death of two pups in Tiruppur, and in April 2026 an already sterilised six-year-old dog with a notched ear was found anaesthetised at its centre.

    What does the broken cold chain mean for rabies control?

    1. Refrigeration is missing: A large majority of centres lack refrigerators capable of holding anti-rabies vaccine at 2 degrees Celsius.
    2. Vaccination is simply skipped: A doctor who worked at the Hosur centre states that no vaccines were administered across an average of 650 surgeries a month, with power cuts, no generator and no fresh vaccine batches supplied.
    3. Responsibility is contested: The organisation’s position is that the cold chain is supplied and inspected by the Corporation, and that ineffective vaccines would have produced a rabies outbreak.
    4. Half the programme then disappears: Sterilisation without a viable vaccine delivers population control alone, and leaves the rabies control purpose of the programme unmet.

    Conclusion

    The programme’s failure is not a supervision gap that better inspection would close. Payment attaches to a number the contractor supplies, the committee that would verify the number is constituted late or supplied with borrowed evidence, and the certificate that would screen the contractor has been made optional. Blacklisting is therefore a label rather than a disqualification, and a contractor removed in one district is hired in the next. Until money moves against a verified sterilisation and a verified vaccination rather than against a claimed count, no participant in the chain carries a cost for the outcome.

    Back2Basics: Animal Welfare Board of India

    1. Statutory origin: Established in 1962 under Section 4 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960, as the first national animal welfare body of its kind.
    2. Function: It advises the Government of India on animal welfare laws and on measures to prevent unnecessary pain to animals, and its recommendations are advisory.
    3. Role in this programme: It issues Project Recognition Certificates to organisations conducting Animal Birth Control work, and can blacklist an organisation for violations.
    4. Administrative location: It works under the Department of Animal Husbandry and Dairying, and its headquarters moved from Chennai to Ballabhgarh in Haryana.

    [2014] Consider the following statements:

    1. Animal Welfare Board of India is established under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986.

    2. National Tiger Conservation Authority is a statutory body.

    3. National Ganga River Basin Authority is chaired by the Prime Minister.

    Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

    (a) 1 only

    (b) 2 and 3 only

    (c) 2 only

    (d) 1, 2 and 3

  • Judicial integrity – a case the Court cannot ignore

    Why in the News

    A sitting judge of the Supreme Court of India, Justice Sandeep Mehta, wrote three letters to the Chief Justice of India (CJI) on 2, 10 and 17 August seeking the immediate transfer of the Acting Chief Justice of the Rajasthan High Court, Justice Sanjeev Prakash Sharma. The letters allege victimisation of judges, maladministration, improper shifting of cases to his own Bench, and nepotism in appointments to the Permanent Lok Adalat. The last of the three records concern at the CJI’s inaction, with Justice Sharma due to retire on 26 September. The stated response is that allegations cannot be treated as findings and must be dealt with strictly through the established institutional mechanism. The tension is that the established mechanism is precisely what has not worked, since the appointment system carries no published criteria and the removal machinery has never removed a judge.

    What is the “master of the roster” power?

    1. What the power is: The Chief Justice of a court holds the exclusive administrative authority to constitute Benches and to assign cases among them.
    2. Where it comes from: It rests on convention and on the Supreme Court’s own rulings treating the Chief Justice as first among equals for administrative purposes, not on any statutory provision.
    3. Its reach in this case: The power covers roster allocation for the whole court, and it is exercised by the Acting Chief Justice wherever the office of Chief Justice is vacant.

    What do the letters allege?

    1. Interference with the roster: Cases were allegedly shifted improperly to the Acting Chief Justice’s own Bench, in misuse of the master of the roster power.
    2. Pressure on colleagues: Judges were allegedly intimidated with the threat of retributive measures including transfers, on the basis of claimed proximity to the CJI.
    3. Favouritism at the Bar: The letters refer to specific instances of alleged favouritism towards a chosen few among the lawyers.
    4. Appointments outside the court: Nepotism is alleged in appointments to the Permanent Lok Adalat, the statutory body that decides disputes relating to public utility services and whose award is final and binding.
    5. The state of the record: There has been no official denial of the reports concerning the contents of the letters, and Justice Sharma has publicly denied the accusations as baseless.

    What is the record behind the appointment itself?

    1. A long acting tenure: The High Court functioned under an Acting Chief Justice for about 11 months, which is not a sound institutional arrangement for a court of that size.
    2. An earlier transfer out: Justice Sharma was transferred to the Patna High Court in 2022.
    3. A rejected repatriation: His request to return to the Rajasthan High Court was rejected by the Collegium in 2023, which instead proposed his transfer to the Punjab and Haryana High Court.
    4. A reversal without a stated reason: He was nonetheless retransferred to the Rajasthan High Court in 2025 and then allowed to function as Acting Chief Justice with wide administrative and judicial powers.

    How did the institution respond?

    1. The Bar acted first: Lawyers staged a sit-in protest on the High Court premises, following which Justice Sharma opted out from hearing cases.
    2. The Collegium moved on the vacancy: On 31 August the Supreme Court Collegium recommended the appointment of Justice Sanjay Agrawal as the new Chief Justice of the Rajasthan High Court, and that appointment has since been made.
    3. The complaint itself drew no step: For several weeks no cogent step was initiated on the letters, with the retirement date approaching.
    4. The trust cost is measurable: Transparency International’s 2002 report, based on a household survey, identified the judiciary as the second-most corrupt institution in certain South Asian countries including India.

    Why does the appointment system produce this?

    1. There are no criteria at all: The selection of judges proceeds without published standards against which a candidate can be assessed or a rejection explained.
    2. The Collegium and the Executive must collaborate: The unavoidable joint working of the Collegium and the Union Executive under the present system makes appointments partisan, opaque and often arbitrary.
    3. The filter cannot do the job asked of it: A process built this way is incapable of identifying the cleanest and most meritorious candidates.
    4. The link to corruption is direct: Corruption in the judiciary is inseparable from the method of selecting candidates for judicial office, so the accountability problem starts at entry rather than at removal.

    Why does the removal machinery not work?

    1. The inquiry statute is dormant: The Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 is inadequate to tackle judicial corruption and has for all practical purposes become defunct.
    2. A criminal investigation cannot begin: In K. Veeraswami vs Union of India (1991) the Supreme Court held that the permission of the CJI is a necessary precondition for registering a First Information Report against a judge of the higher judiciary. The requirement is circular in practice, because the police will not seek permission without clinching evidence and cannot obtain that evidence without investigating.
    3. Impeachment has failed as a route: Removal on the ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity, as provided by Articles 124(4) and 217(1)(b) of the Constitution, has not worked in practice.
    4. The internal route has no teeth: The in-house mechanism adopted by the Supreme Court in 1999 has not proved fault-free or effective.
    5. The legislative fix lapsed: The Judicial Standards and Accountability Bill passed the Lok Sabha in 2012 and lapsed with the dissolution of the 15th Lok Sabha in 2014, and the later effort to revive it with changes remained a non-starter.

    What do other systems do differently?

    1. Canada invites applications: Candidates apply for judicial office rather than being identified privately, so the pool and the criteria are both visible before a selection is made.
    2. The United Kingdom uses an independent body: Judicial selection is conducted by a body separate from both the judiciary and the executive, which breaks the circularity of judges choosing judges.
    3. Neither is currently available in India: Both arrangements remain unthinkable in the Indian setting, which is why the accountability argument keeps returning to the removal stage rather than the entry stage.

    How have earlier Chief Justices responded to comparable situations?

    1. The 1990 precedent, advice to step back: When an inquiry was underway against Justice V. Ramaswami for alleged misconduct, the then CJI advised him to take leave and keep away from judicial work.
    2. The 1993 precedent, work withheld after a failed motion: The impeachment motion against him failed in Parliament following the Congress party’s strategic abstention. He attempted to resume judicial work with about nine months of tenure remaining, and the then CJI refused to allocate any cases to him for hearing.
    3. The recent precedent, immediate transfer: After partly burnt currency notes were reportedly found at the Delhi residence of Justice Yashwant Varma, the then CJI quickly transferred him to the Allahabad High Court, where he was practically not allocated judicial work.
    4. The Court’s own statement of the duty: In XXX vs Union of India (2025) the Supreme Court emphasised the responsibility of the CJI in matters relating to judicial integrity and allegations of corrupt practices.

    Challenges to judicial accountability in India

    1. Asset declaration rests on resolution rather than statute: Judges of the higher judiciary declare their assets under an internal resolution, so a failure to declare carries no legal consequence. Eg. Publication of the declarations on the Supreme Court’s website began only in 2025.
      The Fix: Place the declaration requirement in statute, with an annual filing deadline and a public register maintained by an authority outside the court.
    2. The selection record stays outside disclosure: The reasons recorded for an elevation, a rejection or a transfer are not published, so a questionable appointment cannot be traced to a reasoning. Eg. The 2023 rejection of a repatriation and the 2025 reversal of that position were never explained on the record.
      The Fix: Publish the Collegium’s recorded reasons for every recommendation and every transfer at the time the decision is communicated.
    3. The in-house procedure runs to no timeline: An internal inquiry proceeds at the discretion of the CJI, with no fixed stage limits and no published outcome. Eg. The procedure can end in advice to resign, leaving no finding on the record at all.
      The Fix: Fix statutory timelines for each stage of the inquiry and require publication of the finding, with reasons, on completion.
    4. Removal depends on parliamentary arithmetic: The final step turns on the numbers in both Houses rather than on the inquiry’s finding, so a party decision can defeat a proved case. Eg. No judge of the higher judiciary has ever been removed under the constitutional procedure.
      The Fix: Make an adverse inquiry finding trigger the automatic withdrawal of judicial work, so the consequence does not wait on a vote.

    Conclusion

    Two failures are operating at once and neither can substitute for the other. Entry into the higher judiciary is decided without published criteria, and exit from it is governed by a statute that has never produced a removal, which leaves everything in between resting on how quickly one officeholder chooses to act. That is not accountability but discretion, and discretion is what the present controversy has tested. The measure of what follows is whether a complaint carrying verifiable material now generates a recorded step with a date attached to it, rather than a retirement that closes the file.

    Back2Basics: The Collegium system

    1. What it is: The mechanism through which the higher judiciary selects its own judges, evolved through the Supreme Court’s judgments rather than from the text of the Constitution.
    2. Its origin: The Second Judges Case (1993) and the Third Judges Case (1998) read the word “consultation” in Articles 124 and 217 as requiring the concurrence of the CJI, and fixed the collegium’s composition.
    3. Its composition: The CJI and the four senior most judges of the Supreme Court decide Supreme Court appointments; the CJI and the two senior most judges decide High Court appointments and transfers.
    4. The failed replacement: The National Judicial Appointments Commission, created by the 99th Constitutional Amendment, was struck down by the Supreme Court in 2015 as violating judicial independence, leaving the collegium in place.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2019] Consider the following statements: 1. The- motion to impeach a Judge of the Supreme Court of India cannot be rejected by the Speaker of the Lok Sabha as per the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968. 2. The Constitution of India defines and gives details of what Constitutes ‘incapacity and proved misbehaviour’ of the Judges of the Supreme Court of India. 3. The details of the process of impeachment of the Judges of the Supreme Court of India are given in the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968. 4. If the motion for the impeachment of a Judge is taken up for voting, the law requires the motion to be backed by each House of the Parliament and supported by a majority of total membership of that House and by not less than two-thirds of total members of that House present and voting. Which of the statements given above is/are correct? (a) 1 and 2 (b) 3 only (c) 3 and 4 only (d) 1, 3 and 4 (c)”

  • Why is the Centre opposed to totalisers?

    Why in the News

    A three judge Bench of the Supreme Court headed by the Chief Justice of India has asked the Central government to examine introducing totaliser machines for counting votes recorded in Electronic Voting Machines (EVM), in order to protect the secrecy of booth-wise voting patterns and prevent electors at individual booths from being identified and victimised. The direction was given on September 1, 2026, on a public interest petition filed in 2014 by Yogesh Gupta and Imran Khan seeking that votes cast at the various polling stations in a constituency be mixed before counting. The Election Commission of India has supported the measure since 2008 and has recommended it to the Union government. The Centre has opposed it throughout, arguing at different points that booth-wise disclosure causes no intimidation and that a totaliser could leak data before counting begins. The tension is between the secrecy of the ballot at the level of a locality and the granular booth data that campaigns and the administration both now rely on.

    What is a totaliser?

    1. What it does: A totaliser allows the votes cast in about 14 polling booths to be counted together, against the present practice of tallying votes booth by booth.
    2. How it connects: It is an interface connected to the main control unit of a cluster of 14 EVMs.
    3. What it outputs: Pressing the result button gives the consolidated votes polled by each candidate across the 14 machines, without revealing the voting pattern of any individual polling area.
    4. Who built it: It was developed by Bharat Electronics Limited, Bengaluru and Electronics Corporation of India Limited, Hyderabad.

    Why was the petition filed?

    1. The stated purpose: The petitioners sought a direction to the poll panel to mix the votes cast at various polling stations in a constituency, on the ground that this was necessary to stop candidates intimidating voters in areas that had rebuffed them.
    2. The illustration offered: The petitioners cited alleged intimidation by a late former Deputy Chief Minister of Maharashtra in the Baramati constituency during the last general election, where voters were allegedly threatened that his party would detect voting patterns from the EVM readings and cut off their water supply.
    3. Booths map onto communities: Polling booths in India are marked geographically, so where social groups live in segregated clusters, which is the case across much of rural India and increasingly in urban slums, a booth result roughly identifies how a numerically large community voted.
    4. The risk has grown since 2014: Advanced geospatial tools now allow booth trends to be correlated with social settings and causal inferences to be drawn from that correlation, which goes beyond what the petitioners feared when they filed.

    What has been the Centre’s position?

    1. The 2017 argument, that there is no harm: The Centre told the apex court that identifying booth-wise voting patterns did not lead to voter intimidation and that there was no need to stop the disclosure of booth-wise results.
    2. The 2017 argument, that there is a benefit: It contended that knowledge of booth-wise vote shares allowed candidates to work harder in areas where support for them was low, producing better results for everyone involved.
    3. The 2018 argument, that the machine is the risk: The Additional Solicitor General told the Bench, then led by the Chief Justice of India, that installing a totaliser could lead to a data breach even before vote counting began.
    4. The ministerial decision on record: A Law Ministry affidavit told the Court that a group of ministers headed by the then Union Home Minister had decided that intimidation or victimisation of voters as apprehended may not occur on a larger scale in this era of media activism.

    What is the Election Commission’s stand?

    1. Consistent support since 2008: The poll body first suggested the measure to the United Progressive Alliance government in 2008 and has recommended the totaliser system to the Union government since.
    2. The 2018 submission: It told the Supreme Court that a time has come for introduction of the totaliser for counting of the votes.
    3. The position in the current hearings: Counsel for the Commission backed the goal of protecting voter anonymity, and that support has carried into the present round.
    4. The caveats it has entered: It flagged practical and legal difficulties in implementing the proposal, including how booth-wise verification would work and how the exercise interacts with the Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT), the printer attached to a voting unit that shows the elector a paper slip of the vote cast before it drops into a sealed box.

    What has the Court now directed?

    1. The direction to the Centre: The Court asked the Central government to state its position on introducing a totaliser system for counting votes recorded through EVMs.
    2. The specific questions: It sought to know whether there are any impediments to introducing such a mechanism and whether there would be any negative impact from it.
    3. The deadline on the data breach point: The Centre’s repetition of the data breach apprehension prompted the Court to give the Election Commission two weeks to respond to that fear.
    4. The parallel instruction: The Commission has also been asked to submit its proposal to the government, which moves the question from litigation into an executive decision.

    Challenges to introducing the totaliser

    1. Booth level data has administrative uses beyond campaigning: Turnout and result data at the polling station is what flags a station for scrutiny or a re-poll. Eg. An implausibly high turnout at a single station is the standard trigger for ordering a re-poll there.
      The Fix: Retain booth-wise data with the Election Commission for audit and re-poll decisions, and publish only the aggregated cluster result.
    2. A re-poll cannot be isolated once votes are mixed: If the machines of 14 booths have been aggregated, a re-poll ordered at one of them cannot be separated from the counted total. Eg. Re-polls after booth capturing or machine failure are ordered station by station, not cluster by cluster.
      The Fix: Run the totaliser only after every re-poll in the constituency is complete and the machines are back in the strongroom.
    3. Slip verification is anchored to the polling station: The mandatory VVPAT count is done for randomly selected polling stations and compared against that station’s electronic count, which presumes station-wise totals exist. Eg. The Supreme Court’s direction requires slip counting in five randomly selected polling stations in each assembly segment.
      The Fix: Complete the station-wise slip verification first and aggregate through the totaliser only after the match is recorded.
    4. Clustering does not conceal a pattern in a homogeneous area: Where one community occupies most of a 14 booth cluster, the aggregate reveals its voting pattern as clearly as a single booth would. Eg. Reserved constituencies with geographically concentrated settlements would gain little anonymity from aggregation.
      The Fix: Form clusters across socially mixed areas rather than across contiguous ones, so no single cluster maps onto a single community.
    5. The Commission cannot act alone: Counting procedure is governed by the Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961, and the mixing provision presently covers ballot papers rather than voting machines. Eg. Rule 59A permits mixing of ballot papers before counting in specified elections and does not extend to EVMs.
      The Fix: Amend Rule 59A to extend the existing mixing provision to electronic voting machines, which is the single step that converts the recommendation into a usable power.

    Conclusion

    The Election Commission has backed this measure across successive governments and it has still not been introduced, because the decision sits with the Centre and not with the poll body. The objection now on record has shifted from denying that booth-level victimisation happens to warning that the counting device itself is insecure, which is a question about design and custody rather than about whether ballot secrecy is worth extending to a locality. The Centre’s reply to the Court and the Commission’s fresh proposal to the government are the two documents that decide whether the proposal moves this time.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “In the light of recent controversy regarding the use of Electronic Voting Machines (EVM), what are the challenges before the Election Commission of India to ensure the trustworthiness of elections in India?”

  • CJP cases scrapped: Supreme Court’s much-debated powers under Article 142

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court has used Article 142 of the Constitution to quash first information reports filed across several States against participants in the nationwide examination protests led by the Cockroach Janta Party (CJP). The order gives legal force to an assurance the Union government had already given to CJP members. A negotiated settlement between the Centre and a protest group therefore takes effect as a judicial decree. Article 142 allows the Court to pass any decree or order necessary for doing “complete justice” in a matter pending before it, and it neither defines that phrase nor states when the power may be used. The Court has itself held that this power may fill a gap in a statute but may not override a statutory scheme. What is contested is whether quashing thousands of pending cases in a single order, without examining any of them on its own facts, fills such a gap or replaces one.

    What is Article 142?

    1. The text of the power: Article 142 lets the Supreme Court pass such decree or order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it.
    2. What the provision leaves open: It does not define “complete justice” and it does not specify the circumstances in which the power may be used.
    3. Its statutory ancestor: The provision traces to Section 210 of the Government of India Act, 1935, and behind that to the colonial practice of deciding disputes on “justice, equity and good conscience” where the written law was silent.

    How did a power this wide enter the Constitution without debate?

    1. Adopted as Draft Article 118: The provision appeared in the Draft Constitution as Article 118 and was adopted by the Constituent Assembly on 27 May 1949 without a debate.
    2. Two amendments were dropped: Two amendments to it were moved and then withdrawn.
    3. The nearest the Assembly came to discussing it: During an earlier debate on a related Article granting the court special leave to hear appeals, the member Krishna Chandra Sharma compared the proposed powers to the Privy Council’s own power to step in wherever justice demanded, appeal or no appeal.
    4. The scope was left to the Court: The content of the Court’s widest power was worked out case by case over the following seven decades rather than settled at the drafting stage.

    How has the Court used this power?

    1. The Bhopal gas tragedy settlement: Article 142 was used to secure a payout of 470 million dollars from Union Carbide and to quash the criminal cases against the company.
    2. The Ayodhya title dispute: The power was used to settle the dispute on a “preponderance of probability” and to direct that five acres of land be given to the Muslim side.
    3. A convict’s release: The Court ordered the release of A G Perarivalan, a convict in the Rajiv Gandhi assassination case.
    4. Routine civil use: The provision is also used to grant divorce where a marriage has irretrievably broken down, and in public interest litigation.
    5. The measured scale of its use: An empirical study by researchers at the Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad examined every case between 1950 and 2023 citing “Article 142” or “complete justice”, and found 1,579 references and 791 direct invocations, mostly in civil matters.

    Has the Court fenced its own power?

    1. Consistency with law and rights: In Prem Chand Garg versus State of Uttar Pradesh (1962) the Court held that orders under Article 142 must still be consistent with fundamental rights and with the law.
    2. Supplement, not supplant: In Supreme Court Bar Association versus Union of India (1998) the Court held that Article 142 can supplement a statute by filling a gap the law leaves open. The same ruling held that it cannot supplant a statute or override an existing statutory scheme.
    3. The limits are not self enforcing: The Court has often disregarded its own caution, and no institution outside the Court can hold it to these two rulings.
    4. Discretion multiplies across benches: The effect of an undefined discretion is magnified in a court of 38 judges sitting mostly in benches of two.

    How does the CJP order test that limit?

    1. The ordinary statutory route: A first information report is examined on its own facts before being quashed under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, with the court asking whether an offence is made out or whether the case is plainly malicious.
    2. What the order did instead: Thousands of first information reports across several States were clubbed together and quashed without that scrutiny, as part of a negotiated settlement.
    3. The statutory scheme is displaced, not supplemented: The order substitutes the Court’s view of how the law ought to operate for the procedure the statute lays down for quashing.
    4. The Court also decides who is excluded: The same discretion under Article 142 determines which protesters are left out of the relief.
    5. The scholarly objection: Legal scholar Gautam Bhatia argues that criminal law provisions cannot be overridden through a blanket judicial decree.

    Why had Article 142 already drawn criticism?

    1. The Tamil Nadu Bills order: The Court used the same provision last year to deem long withheld Bills of the Tamil Nadu legislature as assented to.
    2. The response from the Vice President: The Vice President described that use of the power as a “nuclear missile” against democratic institutions.
    3. A former law officer’s warning: A former Attorney General of India wrote in 2017 that the provision had done “tremendous good” for deprived sections of society, and that it was time to build in checks and balances.
    4. A proposal to restrict who may invoke it: After the Sabarimala judgment the same former Attorney General described Article 142 as a “Kamdhenu from which unlimited powers flowed”, and proposed that only Constitution Benches of five judges be allowed to invoke it, so that its use does not turn on the reading of a single smaller Bench.

    Challenges to Article 142

    1. No stated standard for “complete justice”: The Constitution attaches no test to the power, so its width is settled afresh in each case by the Bench exercising it. Eg. In Delhi Development Authority versus Skipper Construction Company (1996) the power was used to reach the personal assets of persons who were not parties to the proceeding before the Court.
      The Fix: Require every order made under the provision to record on the face of the order the specific statutory gap it is filling and the limits of the relief granted.
    2. Bench strength does not scale with the consequence: No minimum Bench is prescribed, so an order altering an outcome for an entire class can issue from a small Bench. Eg. A three judge Bench in 2024 set aside the declared result of the Chandigarh mayoral election and declared the defeated candidate elected.
      The Fix: Maintain a published, reasoned compilation of orders made under the provision, so a body of standards accumulates instead of scattered discretion.
    3. The relief creates no right for the next litigant: An order for complete justice is granted on the facts of one case, so a similarly placed person cannot claim the same relief from a lower court. Eg. Divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown, allowed in Shilpa Sailesh versus Varun Sreenivasan (2023), is available only from the Supreme Court, since that ground does not exist in the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
      The Fix: Where the power is repeatedly used to fill the same statutory gap, refer that gap to the Union government with a reasoned recommendation to amend the statute.
    4. Only the same court can correct such an order: An order issues from the highest court, so the sole remedy is a review or a curative petition before that court. Eg. The curative petition route created in Rupa Ashok Hurra versus Ashok Hurra (2002) is itself a judge made remedy and succeeds in very few cases.
      The Fix: List every order that departs from a statutory scheme for a compliance hearing before the same Bench, so an order that misfires is corrected on the record.

    Conclusion

    The Court’s limits on its own widest power are self imposed, and nothing outside the Court enforces them. The unresolved question is whether a power designed to fill silences in the law may be used to set aside a procedure the law expressly provides, on terms agreed between a litigant and the government. What to watch is whether the Court itself frames a standard for when the power may be exercised, because no other institution can.

    Back2Basics: Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023

    1. What it is: The statute governing criminal procedure in India, covering investigation, arrest, trial and the powers of criminal courts.
    2. What it replaced: It came into force on 1 July 2024 in place of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
    3. Its companion statutes: It was enacted alongside the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 and the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023.
    4. The quashing power it carries: Section 528 preserves the inherent powers of a High Court, which include quashing proceedings to prevent abuse of the process of a court.

    [2019, GS2, 10 marks] Do you think that constitution of India does not accept principle of strict separation of powers rather it is based on the principle of ‘checks and balance’? Explain.”

  • Courtroom dramas, clipped and shared

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court has barred the use and circulation of audio and video clips of judicial proceedings on social media and other digital platforms without prior permission from court registrars.

    What does the interim order leave unsettled?

    1. The stated reason: A Bench led by the Chief Justice of India said “isolated excerpts” risked “trivialising” the administration of justice.
    2. The carve out: The Court later clarified that “recognised news outlets” may continue reporting on proceedings, but may not “utilise” audio or video clips.
    3. The undefined term: The Court did not define “recognised news outlets”, which leaves independent journalists unable to tell whether they are covered.
    4. Who has been added to the case: High Courts and social media intermediaries, including Meta, LinkedIn and X Corp, have been brought into the proceedings while the Court considers a broader protocol.

    How was live streaming established as a right?

    1. The barrier that prompted the petition: Interns were allowed inside Supreme Court courtrooms only on certain days to prevent overcrowding, and litigants travelling from remote parts of the country often could not enter the courtroom hearing their own case.
    2. The ruling: In September 2018 the petition in Swapnil Tripathi v. Supreme Court of India culminated in a ruling recognising live streaming as part of the right to access justice under Article 21 of the Constitution.
    3. The reasoning: The public’s right to know how justice is administered is integral to a functioning democracy, on the principle that sunlight is the best disinfectant.
    4. The direction to High Courts: The Court urged High Courts to introduce live streaming gradually while framing rules to govern its use.
    5. The safeguards built in from the start: Matrimonial cases, sexual assault cases and proceedings involving children and juveniles were excluded from live streaming.

    How far has live streaming actually spread?

    1. The Supreme Court’s start: The Court began live streaming proceedings before its Constitution Benches in 2022. These Benches comprise five or more judges deciding substantial questions concerning the interpretation of the Constitution.
    2. The limit on coverage: The Court has 17 functioning courtrooms and largely streams only Constitution Bench hearings, which sit intermittently.
    3. The audience: The Court’s official YouTube channel has amassed over 2.67 lakh subscribers.
    4. A rare exception: A video of the suo motu hearing in the R.G. Kar rape and murder case, uploaded in September 2024, has been viewed nearly 48,000 times, and is one of the few instances of a rape case streamed on the channel.
    5. The High Courts: Live streaming was operational in 11 High Courts as of March 2026, per a statement to the Lok Sabha. Gujarat, Karnataka and Calcutta stream daily from a majority of their courtrooms.
    6. The first mover: The Gujarat High Court became the first to formally go live on YouTube in July 2021, and its channel now has nearly 1.97 lakh subscribers.

    Where does unauthorised courtroom footage actually come from?

    1. Virtual hearing access: The Supreme Court and the High Courts allow lawyers and litigants to join hearings virtually through platforms such as Cisco Webex, with links often published in the daily cause lists.
    2. How the links spread: Links are shared indiscriminately beyond litigants and lawyers, so anyone logged in can record the proceeding.
    3. Why the exclusion list does not hold: A High Court can pause streaming for a sensitive case while the virtual hearing continues, so footage from sexual offence, matrimonial and child custody matters has reached social media.
    4. The rule that already covers this: The Supreme Court e-Committee’s Model Rules of 2021 prohibit unauthorised dissemination of courtroom footage and its use for commercial, promotional or advertising purposes.

    Why is a permission regime contested?

    1. The shift it marks: Requiring an ordinary citizen to seek a registrar’s permission to share a proceeding that is already being live streamed converts open access into a permission regime.
    2. The procedural gap: There is no stated method for seeking permission, no ground on which it is to be granted or refused, and no recourse where it is refused.
    3. Who the exemption favours: An exemption confined to “recognised news outlets” advantages established media organisations over citizen journalists and smaller newsrooms.
    4. The inconsistency: A written account of a courtroom exchange remains permitted while a video clip faithfully reproducing the same exchange does not.
    5. The alternative safeguard proposed: Expanding live streaming and archiving on authorised platforms would let a complete official record expose a manipulated clip, which a circulation ban does not.
    6. Where a line is accepted: Artificially generated or doctored video should be prohibited, and faithful reporting permitted whatever the medium.

    What does the case for reporting oral remarks rest on?

    1. What an oral remark is: Judges use oral observations to test arguments, and a prima facie view expressed at the outset can change as arguments unfold. Such remarks do not necessarily reflect the reasoning recorded in the final order.
    2. Why they are still reported: Oral observations offer insight into judicial thinking and hold a mirror to the institution, which is the ground on which they are treated as reportable despite carrying no binding value.
    3. The precedent: Chief Election Commissioner vs M.R. Vijayabhaskar (2021) protected the reporting of oral remarks. The Supreme Court there stressed the role of public scrutiny in ensuring institutional accountability.
    4. The cost feared on the Bench: The prospect of being quoted out of context could make judges more circumspect and less willing to engage freely with counsel, and the litigant bears the consequence.
    5. The risk predates the medium: Oral remarks were misquoted in print long before social media, which locates the problem in reporting quality rather than in the format.
    6. What that implies for reporting: Court proceedings are technical, so an accurate account depends on journalists trained to follow what is happening.

    What has clipping already exposed about judicial conduct?

    1. The Karnataka episode: In September 2024 videos of a Karnataka High Court judge circulated online. He was seen referring to a Muslim dominated locality in west Bengaluru as “Pakistan” in one video, and making a sexist remark to a woman lawyer in another.
    2. The response to it: A Supreme Court Bench took suo motu cognisance within days and cautioned judges against “casual observations” reflecting communal bias or misogyny. The judge apologised and the proceedings were closed.
    3. A more recent instance: A reported reference to “cockroaches” by the Chief Justice of India during a hearing on fake law degrees drew widespread criticism and gave rise to the Cockroach Janta Party, which went on to lead protests against examination paper leaks. The remark was later said to have been misquoted.
    4. What draws an audience: Matrimonial and custody cases attract the most attention, with controversial matters drawing over one lakh views.
    5. The effect on the Bar: Lawyers use a judge’s remark to build a social media following, and a client who can watch the hearing is less willing to accept an unnecessary adjournment.

    How have the Bar and legal media responded?

    1. The Bar Council circular: In July 2026 the Bar Council of India prohibited reels and promotional content from court premises.
    2. The enforcement machinery it created: State Bar Councils were directed to designate social media ethics nodal officers to handle complaints. Lawyers were directed to submit a signed undertaking on professional social media conduct at the time of enrolment.
    3. The change in legal media: A legal news portal has largely shifted to explanatory videos without courtroom footage since the interim order, having earlier limited its edits to trimming pauses and removing litigants’ personal details.
    4. The editorial line already being drawn: Heated exchanges between the Bench and the Bar were withheld where, viewed in isolation, they could misrepresent what actually happened in court.

    What should a permanent protocol take into account?

    1. How news is consumed: People aged 18 to 24 citing social media as their main source of news rose from 21 per cent in 2015 to 39 per cent in 2025, overtaking news websites and apps, per a March 2026 Reuters Institute report.
    2. The nature of that consumption: Young audiences are increasingly “social first”, with much of their news reaching them incidentally rather than through a deliberate search.
    3. What that means for a video bar: Permitting an oral exchange to be reported in print while restricting its circulation as video sits at odds with how that audience actually receives news.
    4. The process objection: An institutional reform of this kind should involve all High Courts and other stakeholders rather than proceed as a unilateral decision.

    Challenges to regulating the circulation of courtroom footage

    1. A registrar is not a speech regulator: Prior permission to publish places a restriction on speech in the hands of an administrative officer, while Article 19(2) permits restriction only on stated grounds and by a law that is clear. Eg. In Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015) the Supreme Court struck down Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 for vagueness about what speech it punished.
      The Fix: Specify the classes of proceeding from which clips may not be circulated at all, so the restriction operates by defined category rather than by case by case permission.
    2. Enforcement begins only after publication: A clip that has circulated cannot be recalled, and removal depends on intermediaries acting on a notice. Eg. Blocking and takedown under Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 and the Information Technology Rules, 2021 operate after the content is already public.
      The Fix: Route the registry’s removal requests through the intermediary grievance officer channel with a fixed response time, and record each outcome on the case file.
    3. There is no authoritative record to check a disputed clip against: Most hearings are neither streamed nor archived, so a viewer cannot compare an excerpt with the full proceeding it came from. Eg. Transcripts of Supreme Court hearings were introduced only as a pilot for Constitution Bench matters in 2023.
      The Fix: Publish an official transcript and full recording for every streamed hearing, and treat that record as the reference against which a disputed clip is judged.
    4. Contempt is an uncertain remedy: Action against a distorted clip would rest on criminal contempt, which is discretionary and slow, and using it against reportage carries its own cost to free speech. Eg. The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 makes fair and accurate reporting of proceedings a defence, so a distortion case turns entirely on interpretation.
      The Fix: Handle distortion through a fast correction and right of reply mechanism at the registry, and reserve contempt for deliberate fabrication.
    5. An exclusion list does not protect identity: A case outside the excluded categories can still identify a vulnerable party, since names, addresses and medical details are read out in open court. Eg. Bail and quashing matters routinely disclose a complainant’s identity in offences whose reporting is otherwise restricted by law.
      The Fix: Mask party identifiers in the streamed audio and in the published record, as judgments in sexual offence cases already do.

    Conclusion

    The order changes the default rather than the rules on any single case. The Court has not yet drawn the line between publishers who may use footage and those who may not, and the reach of the restriction turns entirely on where that line falls. The case returns to the Bench on 18 September, with the High Courts and the platforms now on record. The test of whatever protocol emerges is whether it separates a distorted clip from a faithful one, or merely separates one publisher from another.

    Back2Basics: The Supreme Court e-Committee

    1. What it is: A body of the Supreme Court that oversees the computerisation of the Indian judiciary.
    2. When it was set up: It was constituted in 2004 to advise on a national policy for information and communication technology in the courts.
    3. What it runs: It steers the eCourts Mission Mode Project, covering case information systems, electronic filing and virtual hearing infrastructure across district courts and High Courts.
    4. What it issues: It frames model rules on court technology for adoption by individual High Courts, which are free to modify them.

    [2014, GS2, 12 marks] What do you understand by the concept “freedom of speech and expression”? Does it cover hate speech also? Why do the films in India stand on a slightly different plane from other forms of expression? Discuss.

  • SC pushes for raising retirement age in district judiciary as backlog tops 5 cr

    SC pushes for raising retirement age in district judiciary as backlog tops 5 cr

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court has directed States to raise the retirement age of judicial officers in the district judiciary from 60 to 62 years. A three judge Bench headed by the Chief Justice of India passed the order on 1 September, and the text was published on Friday. The Court recorded that 5.18 crore cases lie pending in district courts across the country. It described stopping the attrition of experienced judicial talent as the “crying need of the hour”, warning that access to justice would otherwise remain “a mere chimera” because of unfilled posts. Only seven States have agreed so far. The rest have resisted on the ground of financial burden, which the Court has held to be arithmetically misconceived.

    What has the Court directed, and to whom?

    1. The seven States that agreed: Chhattisgarh, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Sikkim, Tamil Nadu and West Bengal have agreed to enhance the retirement age of their judicial officers.
    2. The deadline for them: These State governments have been directed to amend their service rules within two months.
    3. The condition attached: The High Court concerned will enhance superannuation to 62 years for an officer on attaining 60, subject to an assessment of that officer’s suitability.
    4. The States and Union Territories yet to agree: Andhra Pradesh, Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Goa, Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Jharkhand, Keralam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Odisha, Punjab, Rajasthan, Telangana, Tripura, Uttarakhand, Uttar Pradesh, the National Capital Territory of Delhi, Jammu and Kashmir and Puducherry have responded with a direct refusal or have taken no position at all.
    5. The deadline for them: They have been directed to take a decision on enhancement to 62 years within two weeks.

    Why does the Court treat attrition rather than recruitment as the binding constraint?

    1. Recruitment has not filled the cadre: Most recruitment drives undertaken in the various States have not produced optimum recruitment or filled the sanctioned cadre strength.
    2. The gap is universal: A yawning gap between sanctioned strength and working strength persists across the board.
    3. Recruitment is slow by design: Selecting independent and competent judicial officers is an arduous task, so a post is not refilled at the speed at which it falls vacant.
    4. What that leaves as the available lever: Retaining an officer already in service is the only step that adds working strength without waiting for a recruitment cycle.

    Why does the Court reject the financial burden objection?

    1. What the States fear: States cite the cost of paying the maximum salary in the pay scale for a further two or five years, and a higher outlay on retiral benefits.
    2. The parity fear: States also apprehend that employees in other State services would demand the same extension for themselves.
    3. Why the Court calls that misconceived: Judicial officers render a specialised service, so an extension confined to them does not found a claim by other cadres.
    4. The 1992 precedent quoted: The alleged burden on the State exchequer is negligible against the enormous advantage the administration of justice and society at large derive from a higher retirement age.
    5. The double spend: A State that retains retirement at 60 pays post retiral dues to the officer who has left and salary to the officer newly appointed, in the same period.
    6. What continuation does to that cost: Allowing an experienced officer to serve to 62 postpones the post retiral outlay rather than adding to it.

    What safeguard have the High Courts proposed?

    1. Why most High Courts agreed: Most State High Courts consented to the enhancement because they are face to face with the crisis in the dispensation of justice.
    2. The rider: Some High Courts, including Madras, have recommended a thorough assessment of judicial work as a condition precedent to continuation in service.
    3. What the rider is for: Only competent officers of proven integrity would be permitted to continue in the cadre.
    4. The Court’s view of it: The suggestion preserves experienced officers while removing what the Court called the “clog of deadwood” that blocks the entrance of young blood into the system.

    Challenges to raising the retirement age in the district judiciary

    1. The sanctioned strength is itself inadequate: Extending tenure fills posts within an existing cadre, and the cadre was fixed against a judge to population ratio far below what has been recommended for India. Eg. The Law Commission’s 120th report of 1987 recommended 50 judges per million population, against a sanctioned figure that has stayed close to 21.
      The Fix: Revise sanctioned cadre strength against a stated case load norm, and attach a dedicated State budget line to the additional posts.
    2. A suitability assessment can become an informal removal power: Continuation to 62 will turn on a High Court’s assessment, which inserts a discretionary stage into a service that otherwise holds tenure until superannuation. Eg. Compulsory retirement of judicial officers on the administrative side has repeatedly been challenged before the Supreme Court.
      The Fix: Publish the assessment criteria in advance and require a written reasoned order with an internal review, so a refusal to extend can be tested.
    3. Court infrastructure does not expand with tenure: A retained officer needs a courtroom, support staff and record space, and district court infrastructure is funded through a centrally sponsored scheme that depends on State matching contributions. Eg. The Centrally Sponsored Scheme for Development of Infrastructure Facilities for the Judiciary has run since 1993-94 with persistent shortfalls in court halls and residential units.
      The Fix: Link the release of infrastructure funds to the number of judicial officers actually working in a district rather than to sanctioned posts.
    4. The promotion chain below is frozen: Officers waiting for elevation to the District Judge cadre and for High Court appointment from the service quota face a two year delay in every vacancy. Eg. Appointments to High Courts from the district judiciary already move slowly through the collegium process.
      The Fix: Expand the number of posts in the higher judicial service in step with the extension, so the vacancy chain continues to move.
    5. Pendency has drivers that bench strength does not reach: Adjournments, failure of service of summons and the volume of government litigation extend case life independently of how many judges sit. Eg. Government departments and their agencies remain the largest single class of litigant before Indian courts.
      The Fix: Enforce the three adjournment limit already written into Order XVII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and screen government appeals before they are filed.

    Conclusion

    The Court has converted a suggestion into a directed timeline, and the decision now sits with State governments rather than with the judiciary. Its reasoning treats the age of superannuation as the one lever that can be pulled without waiting for a recruitment cycle to conclude. The case is listed again on 1 October, by which time the States that have not responded are required to have taken a position.

    Back2Basics: The District Judiciary under the Constitution

    1. Article 233: The Governor appoints district judges in consultation with the High Court exercising jurisdiction in that State.
    2. Article 234: Persons other than district judges are appointed to the State judicial service by the Governor, under rules made after consulting the State Public Service Commission and the High Court.
    3. Article 235: Control over district courts and subordinate courts, including posting, promotion and leave of judicial officers, vests in the High Court.
    4. Why a State government must act: Conditions of service, including the age of superannuation, are fixed by rules the State government frames, so a High Court’s consent by itself does not change a retirement age.

    [2017, GS2, 10 marks] Critically examine the Supreme Court’s judgement on ‘National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014’ with reference to appointment of judges of higher judiciary in India.

  • Quality elementary teachers are vital to lives of children, nation-building: top court

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court has added teacher education institutions and the National Council for Teacher Education (NCTE) as the sixth and seventh duty bearers of the right to free and compulsory elementary education. A Division Bench held that free and compulsory education for children aged six to fourteen has attained the status of an enforceable fundamental right, and that teacher education has not been given the attention it deserves. The ruling came on an appeal against a Delhi High Court order of 13 March 2023, which had held the NCTE’s Public Notice of 22 September 2019 to be arbitrary and illegal. That notice requires every teacher education institution to file an annual Performance Appraisal Report. The contest was over the source of the power: the notice was challenged on the ground that only the Council itself, and not its Executive Committee, could issue and implement it.

    What is the National Council for Teacher Education?

    1. A statutory regulator of the teacher supply chain: It is constituted under the National Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993 to achieve the planned and coordinated development of the teacher education system in the country.
    2. It regulates the institutions that train teachers: A teacher education institution is defined in Section 2(e) of that Act as an institution offering a course or training in teacher education.
    3. It sets the qualifications a teacher must hold: Section 23 of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 makes it the academic authority for laying down the minimum qualifications for appointment as a teacher.

    Who are the duty bearers of the right to elementary education?

    1. Five were already recognised: Judicial precedent had identified the government, the local authority, the neighbourhood school, the parents or guardians, and the teacher.
    2. Teacher education institutions become the sixth: The institutions defined in Section 2(e) now carry a duty toward the right, rather than only a licensing relationship with their regulator.
    3. The Council becomes the seventh: It is required to ensure that those institutions function effectively and efficiently and conduct their affairs with integrity.
    4. The addition changes what is justiciable: A duty bearer’s failure is actionable, so a lapse in the training of teachers is now capable of being pleaded as a failure of the right itself.

    What did the Court hold on the power to demand appraisal reports?

    1. The Public Notice is legal and valid: The Court upheld the requirement that institutions upload an annual Performance Appraisal Report, and set aside the High Court order that had quashed it.
    2. The Executive Committee acted within jurisdiction: The Court found ample empowerment in both the Council and its Executive Committee to call for the report.
    3. The power is incidental and ancillary: A regulatory measure of this kind flows from the duties and functions of a regulator even without a specific empowerment in the statute.
    4. The regulator is itself appraised: The NCTE undergoes a performance audit by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG), so requiring the same discipline from institutions it regulates follows from its own position.

    Why does the Court place teacher training at the centre of the right?

    1. No resource ranks higher than a student’s mind and character: The Court held that elementary school teachers carry the most important role in nation-building and are to be treated with respect and care.
    2. The entitlement is only as good as the person delivering it: A right to education delivered by an untrained teacher is formally satisfied and substantively empty, which is why the regulator of training is being read into the right.
    3. Accountability of institutions is the stated purpose: The Court recorded that it is necessary for the Council and its bodies to ensure accountability of educational institutions.

    Challenges to the National Council for Teacher Education

    1. Recognition ran ahead of capacity: Approval was granted to private institutions at a pace that outstripped any ability to verify what they actually taught. Eg. The Justice J.S. Verma Commission on Teacher Education reported in 2012 that a large number of private institutions were commercial rather than academic in character.
      The Fix: Tie continued recognition to a published appraisal score reviewed on a fixed cycle, so approval becomes renewable rather than permanent.
    2. Retrospective validation weakens the standard: Recognition granted after the fact rewards institutions that ran courses without approval. Eg. The National Council for Teacher Education (Amendment) Act, 2019 conferred retrospective recognition and permission on specified institutions.
      The Fix: Bar retrospective recognition outright and require approval to be in place before an academic session opens.
    3. Quality is measured only at the exit, and only by the State: The regulator holds no outcome data on the graduates its recognised institutions produce. Eg. Pass rates in teacher eligibility tests have generally stayed under a fifth of the candidates appearing.
      The Fix: Publish institution wise eligibility test pass rates, so the appraisal report carries an outcome measure rather than a compliance declaration.
    4. Enforcement rests on self reported filings: A report filed by the institution about itself carries no independent verification. Eg. The Council reaches institutions across every State through four regional committees.
      The Fix: Sample audit a fixed share of filed reports each year through State education departments, with recognition suspended on a false filing.

    Conclusion

    The Court has widened the set of actors who owe a duty under the right to elementary education. It has not created the instrument that measures whether that duty is being met. The appraisal report is now the only candidate for that role. Whether it becomes a published, comparable record of what an institution produces, or settles into an annual compliance filing, is what will decide whether the two new duty bearers carry a duty in substance.

    Back2Basics

    1. The Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 gives statutory effect to Article 21A, which was inserted by the Constitution (Eighty-sixth Amendment) Act, 2002.
    2. Section 12(1)(c) requires private unaided schools to reserve 25 percent of entry level seats for children from disadvantaged groups and weaker sections.
    3. It bars screening procedures and capitation fees at the point of admission.
    4. It requires a School Management Committee in every government and aided school, with three fourths of its members drawn from parents and guardians.

    “[2018] Consider the following statements:

    1. As per the Right to Education (RTE) Act, to be eligible for appointment as a teacher in a State, a person would be required to possess the minimum qualification laid down by the concerned State Council of Teacher Education.

    2. As per the RTE Act, for teaching primary classes, a candidate is required to pass a Teacher Eligibility Test conducted in accordance with the National Council of Teacher Education guidelines.

    3. In India, more than 90% of teacher education institutions are directly under the State Governments

    Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

    (a) 1 and 2

    (b) 2 only

    (c) 1 and 3

    (d) 3 only

  • Bar Council has no power to punish students: SC

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court has held that the Advocates Act, 1961 confers no power, expressly or impliedly, on the Bar Council of India (BCI) or the State Bar Councils to take disciplinary or punitive action against law students. A three judge Bench headed by the Chief Justice of India recorded that only the parent university or the competent authority under law holds disciplinary power over students. The holding answers the BCI’s letters of 13 August, which asked NALSAR, the National Academy of Legal Studies and Research, to open an inquiry against students who had protested at their convocation, and asked the State Bar Councils to block their professional enrolment. The regulator withdrew those letters and argued that no cause of action survived. The Court fixed the boundary of the regulator’s jurisdiction anyway, to protect university space and the right to dissent against a repetition.

    What is the Bar Council of India and where does its authority begin?

    1. It is a statutory regulator of the legal profession: The BCI is constituted under the Advocates Act, 1961, and the State Bar Councils are constituted under the same Act for each State.
    2. Its core functions are professional: It lays down standards of professional conduct and etiquette for advocates, safeguards their rights and privileges, and exercises disciplinary control over the profession.
    3. It also recognises law degrees: The Act gives it a role in promoting legal education and in recognising universities whose law degrees qualify a person for enrolment as an advocate.
    4. The roll of advocates is maintained by the States: A State Bar Council enrols an advocate and maintains the roll on which that advocate’s name appears.

    What did the Court actually hold?

    1. The statute contains no power over students: The Advocates Act, 1961 confers no express or implied power on the BCI or the State Bar Councils to discipline or punish law students.
    2. Jurisdiction begins at enrolment: The regulator’s disciplinary powers under the Act are limited to registered advocates, so it does not enter the picture before a student is enrolled.
    3. Disciplinary power over students is exclusive to the institution: Only the parent university or the competent authority under law can take action against a student.
    4. The letters were extinguished: The 13 August letters were declared obsolete, and the Indian Express account records them as being without authority of law and bad in law.
    5. The chairperson’s position was covered too: The BCI’s chairperson was held to lack jurisdiction over students in the same terms as the body itself.

    Why did the Court rule after the letters were withdrawn?

    1. The regulator sought closure: The BCI said the letters to NALSAR and the State Bar Councils had been withdrawn within an hour, and argued that the controversy should be given a quietus.
    2. A withdrawal leaves the power claim intact: A letter recalled without a finding on jurisdiction leaves the same body free to issue another one, which is what the Court’s boundary setting order forecloses.
    3. The petition alleged a chilling effect: Two former NALSAR graduates argued that the letters had created a chilling effect on freedom of speech and freedom of association among students.
    4. The order is framed prospectively: It was designed to safeguard university space and students’ right to express dissent freely against future attempts to breach it.
    5. A parallel grievance was routed elsewhere: The same Bench allowed young lawyers to approach the Delhi High Court over an alleged mob assault at the BCI premises during a sit in demanding the chairperson’s resignation.

    What was the underlying dispute?

    1. The protest was over a convocation invitation: Students objected to the Chief Justice of India being chief guest at their convocation, following oral comments in court comparing youth to “cockroaches” and “parasites”.
    2. The regulator’s response targeted enrolment: Its letters sought an inquiry against the protesting students and moved to block the entry of the 2026 batch into the profession.
    3. Enrolment is the leverage point: A threat to withhold enrolment reaches a student’s entire career rather than a single academic year, which is why the Court treated it as more than an internal disciplinary question.

    Challenges to the Bar Council of India’s regulatory role

    1. Its powers over legal education overlap with those of universities: The regulator prescribes curriculum and inspects institutions that are already regulated by the University Grants Commission and by their own statutes, which produces conflicting requirements. Eg. National Law Universities established by State Acts answer to their own governing bodies and to the BCI at the same time.
      The Fix: Confine the regulator to prescribing the outcomes a degree must meet for enrolment, and leave institutional governance to the university and its parent statute.
    2. Entry costs have been set beyond the statute: State Bar Councils charged enrolment fees far above the statutory ceiling, which priced first generation entrants out of the profession. Eg. In Gaurav Kumar v. Union of India (2024), the Supreme Court held enrolment fees above the Rs 750 and Rs 125 limits in Section 24(1)(f) of the Advocates Act, 1961 to be illegal.
      The Fix: Route enrolment collections through a published statutory account audited annually, so any charge beyond the ceiling is visible at source.
    3. Disciplinary complaints against advocates stall: Complaints against advocates routinely outrun the one year period in which a State Bar Council must decide them, after which the case is transferred to the national body and slows further. Eg. Section 36B of the Advocates Act, 1961 was inserted precisely because State level proceedings were not being completed.
      The Fix: Publish a disciplinary docket with case age for every State Bar Council, and make transfer automatic and reported rather than discretionary.
    4. The regulator is elected by those it regulates: Members are chosen by advocates on the rolls, which makes strong action against the profession’s own interests unlikely. Eg. Bar strikes have continued after the Supreme Court held in Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India (2002) that lawyers have no right to strike.
      The Fix: Add non advocate members drawn from academia and the judiciary to the disciplinary committees, so professional discipline is not decided by peers alone.
    5. Its rulemaking has repeatedly been struck down for exceeding the Act: The body has issued rules on matters the statute does not cover, and courts have then had to read them down. Eg. Bar Council rules requiring a certification examination and restricting practice have been litigated repeatedly on the ground of statutory competence.
      The Fix: Require every new rule to cite the section of the Advocates Act, 1961 that authorises it, and to be laid before the Centre before it takes effect.

    Conclusion

    A regulator that cannot reach students has to be told so before it acts, not after it withdraws. The order converts an ad hoc retreat into a settled limit, which is the difference between a grievance resolved and a power denied. What remains unreconciled is the regulator’s continuing authority over legal education alongside a complete absence of authority over the people receiving it. The next test of that line will be whether the body confines itself to prescribing what a law degree must contain, or returns to acting on how students behave during the degree.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2022] With reference to India, consider the following statements : 1. Government law officers and legal firms are recognised as advocates, but corporate lawyers and patent attorneys are excluded from recognition as advocates. 2. Bar Councils have the power to lay down the rules relating to legal education and recognition of law colleges. Which of the statements given above is/are correct ? (a) 1 only (b) 2 only (c) Both 1 and 2 (d) Neither 1 nor 2 ANSWER: (b)”

  • SC seeks govt. explanation on IPS deputation in CAPFs

    SC seeks govt. explanation on IPS deputation in CAPFs

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court has sought an explanation from the Union Home Secretary on the implementation of its judgment of 23 May 2025, which directed the Centre to progressively reduce the deputation of Indian Police Service (IPS) officers to senior posts in the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs).

    What did the 2025 judgment direct?

    1. The direction: Deputation posts held by IPS officers in the Senior Administrative Grade (SAG), the level up to the rank of Inspector General, in the CAPFs were to be progressively reduced over a period of time, within an outer limit of two years.
    2. The Bench: The ruling was delivered by a two judge Bench, one of whose members has since retired.
    3. The direction has been tested once already: The Union Home Ministry’s review petition against the judgment was dismissed on 28 October 2025.

    What has the Centre reported as compliance?

    1. A cadre review across every force: Following the dismissal of the review petition, all CAPFs were directed to submit detailed cadre review proposals, which the Ministry examined and forwarded to the Department of Personnel and Training (DoPT) with the Home Minister’s approval.
    2. The proposals are in the pipeline, dated: Cadre review proposals for the CRPF, BSF, CISF, ITBP and SSB were sent between 27 July and 3 August 2026, and were forwarded to the Department of Expenditure with the DoPT’s observations and recommendations on 17 August.
    3. The remaining steps have not been taken: After the Department of Expenditure comments, the proposals go to the Cadre Review Committee headed by the Cabinet Secretary, whose recommendations are then to be considered for approval by the competent authority.
    4. Other measures claimed: The Ministry stated that it had also examined the issue of IPS deputation and undertaken statutory changes.

    Why does the Court read the compliance record differently?

    1. Deputations continued after the judgment: An affidavit informed the Court that 46 IPS officers have been brought on deputation to the CAPFs up to the SAG level since the 2025 ruling.
    2. The Bench questioned the premise of the practice: It asked whether there are no competent officers within the CAPFs to hold responsible positions, and described the position as totally wrong.
    3. The service record cited against the practice: Officers with over 25 years of service defend the borders and have made supreme sacrifices, and the Bench held that a strong lobby leaves those cadre officers completely stifled.

    How does the CAPFs (General Administration) Act, 2026 change the dispute?

    1. A statute now occupies the ground the judgment covered: The Central Armed Police Forces (General Administration) Act, 2026 was published in the Gazette on 9 April, and the stated effect is to circumvent the 2025 judgment.
    2. The Act is itself under challenge: Five writ petitions challenging the legislation have been filed and are listed for hearing on 18 November.
    3. The affected constituency is organised: Members of the All Ex-Paramilitary Forces Welfare Association staged protests against the Bill before its enactment.
    4. The next date on the compliance track: The contempt matter is listed for hearing on 22 September.

    Challenges to reducing IPS deputation in the CAPFs

    1. The forces were designed around an officer shortfall they never closed: Direct entry recruitment into CAPF cadres has not kept pace with sanctioned strength at senior levels, which is the stated justification for deputation in the first place. Eg. Vacancies across CAPF officer ranks have been reported repeatedly to Parliament by the Ministry of Home Affairs.
      The Fix: Fix a dated recruitment and promotion calendar in each cadre review, so the shortfall that justifies deputation is closed rather than carried forward.
    2. Cadre review is an executive process with no judicial deadline attached: Every stage between a force’s proposal and the competent authority’s approval is discretionary in timing. Eg. The proposals here moved between three departments over several months without reaching the Cadre Review Committee.
      The Fix: Attach an outer time limit to each stage of the cadre review chain, reported to the Court as a compliance schedule rather than as a status update.
    3. Command experience is concentrated where promotion is blocked: Officers who spend a full career in one force acquire the operational knowledge that senior posts need, and are then passed over at exactly that level. Eg. Border guarding, counter insurgency and industrial security each demand force specific expertise that a short deputation tenure cannot build.
      The Fix: Reserve a fixed proportion of Inspector General level posts in each force for cadre officers, notified in the recruitment rules rather than settled case by case.
    4. A statute can displace a judicial direction unless the underlying defect is cured: New legislation on the same subject shifts the dispute from contempt to constitutional validity and restarts the litigation clock. Eg. The five writ petitions against the 2026 Act put the question back at the beginning after a judgment and a dismissed review.
      The Fix: Amend the recruitment rules of each force to give effect to the direction, so compliance rests on subordinate legislation the Court has already read rather than on a fresh statute.
    5. Organisational identity is unresolved in law: The forces are described as paramilitary in public and as police organisations in service rules, and the ambiguity drives the parity claims on pay, pension and command. Eg. The demand for organised group A service status for CAPF cadres was itself settled only through litigation.
      The Fix: Settle the service classification of each force explicitly in the rules framed under the governing statute, so command structure follows from a stated status.

    Conclusion

    The question before the Court has changed shape since it was first answered. It began as a service dispute about who commands a force, moved to whether a direction on that dispute was being implemented, and now turns on whether a statute passed after the judgment can occupy the same ground. That last question is the one that decides the other two, and it is the pending challenge to the new Act, not the contempt proceeding, that will settle it. What to watch is whether the recruitment rules of the individual forces are amended at all, because a direction that never reaches the rules governing promotion has not been implemented whatever the affidavits record.

    Back2Basics: Central Armed Police Forces

    1. What they are: Seven armed forces of the Union under the Ministry of Home Affairs, distinct from the armed forces under the Ministry of Defence and from the State police, raised for internal security and border guarding duties.
    2. The seven forces: Assam Rifles, Border Security Force, Central Industrial Security Force, Central Reserve Police Force, Indo-Tibetan Border Police, National Security Guard and Sashastra Seema Bal.
    3. Command structure: Each force has its own directly recruited cadre, and senior posts are filled by a combination of that cadre and IPS officers on deputation from State cadres.
    4. Constitutional basis: They are raised under Entry 2A of the Union List, which covers deployment of any armed force of the Union in a State in aid of the civil power.

    [2023, GS3, 15 marks] What are the internal security challenges being faced by India? Give out the role of Central Intelligence and Investigative Agencies tasked to counter such threats.”