Why in the News?
The tragic aircraft accident in Ahmedabad on June 12, 2025, has once again thrown a spotlight on India’s deeply flawed aviation accident investigation system.
Why is the AAIB’s independence in question despite being a statutory body?
- Operational Control by MoCA: Although the AAIB is technically autonomous, it functions under the Ministry of Civil Aviation (MoCA), which also regulates airlines through the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA). Eg: In the Air India AI171 crash (2025), both the investigation and regulation were under MoCA’s control, raising concerns of bias and lack of transparency.
- Leadership Appointments by the Same Authority: The MoCA appoints the heads of both the DGCA and the AAIB, undermining the bureau’s credibility as an independent investigative body. Eg: This centralized appointment structure is unlike the railway sector, where investigations are done by the Commissioner of Railway Safety, independent of the Railway Ministry.
- Suppression of Uncomfortable Findings: Independent reviews and reports exposing deeper faults are often buried or ignored. Eg: The Air Marshal J.K. Seth Committee Report (1997) identified serious aviation safety issues, but it was never implemented because it told inconvenient truths.
What systemic flaws affect India’s aviation safety framework?
- Lack of Functional Independence in Investigations: The Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB) operates under the same ministry (MoCA) that regulates the aviation sector, compromising neutrality. Eg: After the Air India AI171 crash in June 2025, concerns were raised that the investigation might not be impartial due to overlapping roles of MoCA and AAIB.
- Fragmented Oversight and Regulatory Capture: Aviation oversight in India suffers from poor coordination, limited resources, and influence by the very entities it is supposed to regulate. Eg: The J.K. Seth Committee Report (1997) pointed out such flaws, including regulatory capture, yet its recommendations remain largely unimplemented.
- Reactive Rather Than Preventive Safety Culture: India’s aviation safety system often responds after accidents occur, rather than identifying and mitigating risks in advance.Eg: Multiple helicopter and flying school crashes in 2024–25 were not adequately investigated for systemic lapses, highlighting the absence of a proactive safety mechanism.
How does MoCA’s control lead to conflict of interest in aviation oversight?
- MoCA Controls Both Regulation and Investigation: MoCA oversees the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) and also controls the Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB), creating an inherent conflict between promoting aviation and investigating its failures. Eg: In the Air India AI171 crash (2025), MoCA was in charge of both regulating the airline and investigating the crash, raising doubts about impartiality.
- Lack of Independent Appointments: Senior officials in both DGCA and AAIB are appointed by MoCA, making it difficult for these bodies to act independently or challenge government or airline lapses. Eg: The J.K. Seth Committee (1997) warned about lack of independence due to MoCA’s direct control over top appointments, yet no structural change followed.
- Investigative Findings May Be Influenced or Suppressed: When the regulator and investigator are under the same authority, reports may be watered down or delayed to avoid political or bureaucratic accountability. Eg: The Kozhikode crash (2020) report’s recommendations were not fully implemented, with experts citing MoCA’s influence in diluting critical findings.
Why is pilot error often blamed in aviation accident reports?
- Legally Convenient: Blaming the pilot simplifies legal liability and expedites insurance claims, avoiding lengthy investigations or broader accountability. Eg: In many crash reports, including Aurangabad crash (1993), pilot error was highlighted while structural or operational flaws were downplayed.
- Shields Other Stakeholders: It protects airlines, maintenance agencies, air traffic control, and the regulator from scrutiny or punishment. Eg: In the Air India Express IX611 case (2018), suspected overloading was ignored while responsibility was pushed toward the flight crew.
- Systemic Culture of Scapegoating: There’s a lack of a genuine no-blame culture in India’s aviation safety framework. Pilots, even posthumously, become convenient scapegoats. Eg: After the Kozhikode crash (2020), the pilot was quickly blamed, although systemic issues like runway design and poor weather protocols were also contributing factors.
Way forward:
- Ensure Structural Independence of Investigative Bodies: Transfer the AAIB and DGCA out of the Ministry of Civil Aviation’s direct control and make them statutory authorities reporting to Parliament. This will eliminate conflict of interest and promote credible, impartial investigations.
- Promote a No-Blame Safety Culture: Need to amend existing rules to prevent automatic criminal liability for pilots unless gross negligence is proven (e.g., Rule 19(3) of Aircraft Rules, 1937).
Mains PYQ:
[UPSC 2018] Describe various measures taken in India for Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) before and after signing ‘Sendai Framework for DRR (2015-2030)’. How is this framework different from ‘Hyogo Framework for Action, 2005?
Linkage: The article explicitly frames an aircraft accident as a “wake-up call” and argues that India needs a system that “prevents failures, and not just manages the damage.” It states, “We cannot keep firefighting. We need a system that prevents failures”. This directly relates to the concept of Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR), which emphasises proactive measures and preparedness over reactive response.
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