Author: Gurleen Kaur

Naxalism has been identified as India’s most serious internal security challenge. In this series we begin by understanding what Naxalism means and how it has evolved in India.

What is Naxalism or Left Wing Extremism (LWE):

The term ‘Naxal’ derives its name from the village Naxalbari of district Darjeeling in West Bengal, where the movement originated in 1967 under the leadership of Charu Majumdar and Kanu Sanyal.

It refers to the use of violence to destabilize the state through various communist guerrilla groups.

Philosophical background of Naxalism:

Naxalism in India, like any other leftist movement around the globe draws its ideological basis from the Russian revolution wherein Lenin successfully fought against the Czar through a combination of peasant movement and an armed struggle. The prime intent was to bestow power in the hands of the exploited and marginalized and enforce societal control over governance and nation building.

After the success of the Lenin-led revolution in Russia, the intellectual class in many countries started thinking of ushering in a change in their respective nations. Prominent amongst them were Fidel Castro and Mao Zedong.

In China, Mao Zedong used this philosophy successfully which led to the origin of ‘Maoism’. Maoism is a doctrine that teaches to capture State power through a combination of armed insurgency, mass mobilisation and strategic alliances. Mao called this process, the ‘Protracted People’s War’. ‘Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun’ is the key slogan of the Maoists.

Naxalites are far-left radical communists who derive their political ideology from the teachings of Mao Zedong.

History and evolution of Naxalism in India:

Background (The run-up to the Naxalbari uprising):

 Tebhaga movement: It was the first communist movement which started in West Bengal in 1946 with the intention of getting the land revenue reduced from ½ to 1/3^rd. This movement turned violent as the farmers started an armed fight against the landlords.

 Telangana Movement: Telangana movement which was led by the people of Telangana in the period of 1946-51 against the atrocities of the Nizam rule also acquired radical dimensions as it progressed.

1959: Kisan Sabhas were started by CPI (Communist Party of India) as an informal peasant movement with the intention of finding a political solution to the problems faced by farmers.

1962: When Indo-China war broke out, majority of CPI leaders viewed it as struggle of a socialist country against Capitalist India. Consequently, they supported China’s cause, and faced mass arrests.

1964: Further, there was growing dissent in party for party’s diversion toward democratic state which was contrary to Communist principle of armed struggle to overthrow the state. This finally led to a split in the party in 1964 which resulted in new party called Communist Party of India (Marxist).

1967: CPI (Marxist) participated in polls and formed a coalition United Front government in West Bengal. This leads to schism in the party with younger cadres, including the “visionary” Charu Majumdar, accusing CPM of betraying the revolution.

Naxalbari Uprising (25th May,1967): The rebel cadres led by Charu Majumdar launched a peasants’ uprising at Naxalbari in Darjeeling district of West Bengal.

The CPI (M)-led United Front government cracked down on the uprising and in 72 days of the rebellion, a police sub-inspector and nine tribals were killed. The incident echoed throughout India and naxalism was born.

The spread and growth of Naxalism in India can be broadly divided into three phases or stages as described below:

The first phase of Naxalism:

In response to the crackdown by the Government, revolutionary leaders fled the area and declared armed struggle against state of India. Under the leadership of Charu Majumdar, they formed a new party Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) in 1969 which was motivated and influenced deeply by Communist Party of China.

After Charu Majumdar’s death, the CPI (M-L) was deprived of any credible central leadership and the party withered away to be finally reborn as CPI (M-L) Liberation in 1974.

The movement faced a severe blow during emergency when around 40,000 cadres were imprisoned in 1975.

The Second Phase of Naxalism [Steady growth of the Naxal movement across different parts of the country]:

The movement arose again in a more violent form after the emergency. It continued to widen its base as per the strategy of ‘protracted war’. Their base grew from West Bengal to Bihar to Odisha and also to Andhra Pradesh and Chhattisgarh.

CPI(ML) was converted into People’s War Group (PWG) in 1980 which had its base in Andhra Pradesh and struck heavy casualities among police personnel.

Simultaneously, Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCCI) grew in strength in Bihar and carried out large scale attacks on landlords and other upper caste outfits.

The Third Phase of Naxalism:

2004: Andhra Pradesh’s PWG and Bihar’s MCCI merged to form CPI(Maoist). CPI (Maoist) is the major Left Wing Extremist outfit responsible for most incidents of violence and killing of civilians and security forces. It has been included in the Schedule of Terrorist organisations under the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act, 1967.Over 13 LWE groups are currently operating in the country.

The movement’s capacity to challenge the state has increased enormously considering the incidents of violence and casualities resulting from them. E.g. the 2010 Dantewada ambush in which 76 CRPF armed personnel were killed.

2013: The LWE movement made international headlines when naxalists killed 27 people, including some high level politicians, in Sukma district of Chhattisgarh.

But violence cannot be the only yardstick to measure Maoist expansion. Maoists are also expanding in terms of indoctrination and consolidation. They are also trying to spread their ideology in the Bhil and Gond tribes dominated area, the ‘golden corridor’ stretching from Pune to Ahmedabad.

As of February 2016, 106 districts in 10 States have been identified by the Government of India as Left Wing Extremism (LWE) affected districts in the country. More details regarding the same can be found here.

Estimated to be 40,000 strong, the Naxalites have been a strain on the country’s security forces and a barrier to development in the vast mineral rich region in Eastern India known as the ‘red corridor’. It is a narrow but contiguous strip passing through Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh and Odisha.

July 2016: The Union government plans to reduce the number of Maoist-affected districts by about a fifth. This decision has been taken on the basis of the districts’ violence profile, an assessment of the kind of logistical and other support provided to armed Maoist cadres by their sympathisers and “over ground workers”, and the kind of positive changes brought about by development work that these districts have seen.

Most of the worst affected districts fall in the Dandarkaranya region which includes areas of Chhattisgarh, Odisha, Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh. Maoists have been running a parallel government and a parallel judiciary in these regions.

The next part in this series will analyse the ideology of Naxalites and the factors responsible for its rise in India (click here for Part 2). This is supposed to be one of the most comprehensive series in Internal Security related Issues. Your feedback is welcome ?

In the third part of the Kashmir issue series, we focus on the the steps being taken by the Government to address the issue and the way ahead. (The first part of the series analysing historical causes behind the Kashmir unrest can be found here. The second part of the series which explains the contemporary issues can be found here.)

Steps being taken by the Government to address the issue:

1. Special Industry Initiative (SII J&K) ‘UDAAN’

The Government of India has launched the Scheme Special Industry Initiative for Jammu & Kashmir “Udaan” in the nature of a partnership between the corporates of India and the Ministry of Home Affairs. The Scheme is being implemented by the National Skill Development Corporation (NSDC).

The Programme aims at providing skills and enhancing employability of unemployed youths of J&K who are graduates, post graduates or three year engineering diploma holders.

2. Schemes like ‘Nai Manzil’ and ‘USTAAD’

Nai Manzil Scheme is an integrated Education and Livelihood Initiative for the Minority Communities. The scheme aims to benefit the minority youths who are school-dropouts or educated in the community education institutions like Madrasas, by providing them an integral input of formal education (up till Class VIII or X) and skill training along with certification. The scheme covers the entire country and was launched in Jammu and Kashmir on 20th January 2016.

The USTAAD (Upgrading the Skills and Training in Traditional Arts/Crafts for Development) scheme aims to preserve rich heritage of traditional arts and crafts of minorities and build capacity of traditional artisans and craftsmen.

3. People to People Contact Across LoC (Confidence Building Measures)

•  Cross LoC Travel

A fortnightly bus service was started across LoC in 2005. Taking into account the good response to these Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) from both sides of the LoC, the fortnightly bus services on both the routes were converted into a weekly service in 2008.

• Cross LoC Trade between J&K and PoJK
• Upgradation of Trade Facilitation Centre (TFC) Sites at Salamabad and Chakan-da-Bagh

4. Protection of Human Rights in J&K

The Security Forces are under instructions to respect the human rights of all people and work steadfastly with a humane face while performing their day-to-day operational duties. Every reported case of alleged human rights violations is taken serious note of, and investigation is done promptly in a transparent manner.

 The way ahead:

The problem with our handling of the Kashmir issue is that we look for solutions only when there is trouble. But once the trouble subsides, the issues are kept on a backburner. There is therefore a need to look for sustainable political solutions some of which could be:

1. Repeal or at least amend AFSPA

Even a symbolic and geographically limited revocation of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) would signal the right intention of the Indian state to the Kashmiri people. A token beginning, at the least, should be made to set the stage for a gradual process of AFSPA revocation

2. Release political prisoners.

3. Institute a broad based inquiry into extrajudicial killings in Kashmir.

4. Open a result oriented dialogue with the Valley’s dissidents to discuss the larger political questions. If the Indian state could strike a peace deal with the Naga insurgents, why not Kashmir?

5. Kashmir needs political engagement along with economic uplift.

6. While it is necessary to take stern action against terrorism and insurgency, such action should not adversely affect civil liberties and human rights of people.

7. Public awareness and involvement is critical. Integral to any move towards betterment is better educating the public and creating more opportunities for people from either side of the border to interact so as to decrease the rift that has emerged between civilians in India and Pakistan.

8. The world today is far more concerned about Pakistan’s role as an incubator of terror. The world knows that if Pakistan has its way in Kashmir, it will give a huge boost to terror. Therefore all that remains to be done is addressing the grievances of Kashmiris and winning back their confidence.

Conclusion:

No democracy would easily permit secession of any of its parts, and no democracy can afford to ignore for long the wishes of any of its people. With terrorism engulfing the region and the Islamic State waiting at the gates for an opening, India can ill afford not to pacify its domestic insurgencies.

Addressing the true elements of the conflict involves striving for justice, truth, peace, mercy and ultimately reconciliation.

Truth relates to acknowledging the past, the rights and the wrongs, the decisions made, actions taken and their consequences on all involved. Justice and mercy are then integral to providing closure to grievances that arise from these truths, in the form of legal retribution, simple acknowledgment of wrongdoing, mercy for Kashmiris who joined the militancy by recognizing the concerns and circumstances that led them to turn violent and assistance to the people to help them rebuild their lives and livelihoods and move forward. Peace is related not only to a ceasefire but also to the re-establishing of relationships across the various borders that this conflict entails and provide the integral basis for long term reconciliation.

Quotable Quotes

“When a state resorts to violence against its own citizens, it is confessing that it no longer has the strength and power of legitimate authority to command the compliance without coercion”

“The problem with violence is that the end to which it is directed is always in danger of being overwhelmed by the means it justifies”

 

In the second part of the Kashmir issue series, we focus on the recent developments in Kashmir and the surrounding issues, e.g. the 2014 Assembly Elections, the recent curfew and the pellet guns issue, the issue of article 370, the issue of return of Kashmiri Pandits and some positive developments. (The first part of the series is here.)

 The 2014 Assembly Elections and a hope for change:

Jammu & Kashmir held Assembly elections in November-December 2014, the results of which are significant for two reasons:

• The elections witnessed the highest voters’ turnout in the last 25 years (more than 65%) despite repeated boycott calls by separatist Hurriyat leaders.
• The coming together of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) and Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) presents a historic opportunity to bridge two divides. The first is the divide between the Jammu and Kashmir regions of the state. The second is the divide between the Kashmir Valley and the Indian Union.

The recent turmoil and the pellet guns issue:

In early July a young Kashmiri Burhan Wani was killed by the Indian security forces in an encounter. He was commander of the military outfit Hizbul Mujahideen.

Burhan Wani was projected as a hero and a victim of state atrocities by the local Hurriyat leaders, Pakistani media and certain sections of Kashmiri media and population.

Consequently, his death was followed by violent protests from Kashmiris who defied curfews with attacks on security forces and public properties. At least 68 civilians and two security officials died and more than 9,000 people were injured in over 50 days of violence according to official tallies.

The use of pallet guns by the army and police to control the mob and restore law and order was also put under lot of criticism as it led to injuries and blinding of many people.

The crisis is projected as the worst since 1990s.

Concerns:

• The Indian state has been subjected to a lot of criticism in the wake of dying civilians. But a simple comparison from other conflict zones in the world would show that a casualty figure of 70 in 45 days of controlling very violent crowds shows exemplary restraint by the Indian forces.
• The use of pellet guns which have led to more than 100 eye surgeries and numerous blindings are an area of concern. Pellet guns have been used to break up protests in Egypt, Bahrain and Tunisia, but most countries do not use them on unarmed civilians, as the pellets spray widely and cannot be aimed. The MHA has now decided that while a total suspension of pellet guns would not be possible, given the imperative of the security of the personnel of the CRPF and J&K police but a greater reliance would be placed on PAVA shells which contain Pelargonic Acid Vanillyl Amide, an organic compound found in chilli pepper.
• The profile of the protesters—a large number of them barely out of their teens—also raises important questions. Do these young men know what they are doing? Or are they being used by separatist and Islamist forces in the Valley and outside for their political objectives? The death of young men is an effective way of evoking horror from across the world, in the process painting the Indian state as a brutal regime.

Other Issues:

The issues regarding Article 370

What is Article 370?

• Article 370 of the Indian Constitution is a ‘temporary provision’ which grants special autonomous status to Jammu and Kashmir.
• Except for defence, foreign affairs, finance and communications, the Parliament needs the state government’s concurrence for applying all other laws.

Is Article 370 still intact in its original form?

1. No, the “autonomy” has been diluted:

• A series of Presidential Orders have eroded Article 370 substantially.
• In fact today the autonomy enjoyed by the State is a shadow of its former self, and there is virtually no institution of the Republic of India that does not include J&K within its scope and jurisdiction.

2. The only substantial differences from many other States relate to:

• Permanent residents and their rights;
• The non-applicability of Emergency provisions on the grounds of “internal disturbance” without the concurrence of the State;
• The name and boundaries of the State, which cannot be altered without the consent of its legislature.

 Can Article 370 be Revoked Unilaterally?

Article 370 can be revoked only if a new Constituent Assembly of Kashmir recommends revocation. Since the last Constituent Assembly was dissolved in January 1957 after it completed the task of framing the state’s Constitution, so if the parliament agrees to scrap Article 370, a fresh constituent Assembly will have to be formed.

The constituent Assembly will consist of the same MLAs elected to the State Assembly. Simply put, the Centre cannot repeal Article 370 without the nod of J&K State.

 Should Article 370 be revoked?

• Arguments in favour:
  1. It has created certain psychological barriers and it is the root cause of all the problems in J&K.
  2. This article encourages secessionist activities within J&K and other parts of the country.
  3. At the time of enactment, it was a temporary arrangement which was supposed to be repealed gradually.
  4. It acts as a constant reminder to the Muslims of J&K that they have still to merge with the country.
• Arguments Against:

1. Abrogation of the article 370 will have serious consequences. It will encourage secessionists to demand plebiscite which will lead to internationalization of the issue of J&K.
2. The contention of Article giving rise to secessionist activities is baseless as states like Assam and Punjab, which do not have any special status have experienced such problems too. Also, separatism grows when people feel disconnected from the structures of power and the process of policy formulation; in contrast, article 370 is synonymous with decentralisation and devolution of power which ensures popular participation in the running of the polity.
3. It would not only constitute a violation of the solemn understanding given by India through the instrument of accession, but would also create unnecessary misgivings in the minds of people of J&K, making the issue more sensitive.

Conclusion:

It can be argued that abrogation of the Article is avoidable as it will certainly be raised internationally by Pakistan and will give a chance to the international community to intervene in J&K. So, maintaining the status-quo would be the best possible strategy as of now.

The question of Kashmiri pundits

The exodus of the Kashmiri Pandits from the Kashmiri valley in the early 1990s and the question of their home coming ever since has been both a political and emotional issue.

Efforts for their return to Kashmir would essentially face the following issues:

• An assurance of security of life and property for all people who return.
• Townships in the absence of livelihood opportunities are meaningless. Recreating that environment will be a very tough challenge.

The question of separate townships: The community in which one lives is a big source of security. Given the history and their concerns for security, pundits would want to live together but the idea of separate townships also poses the following concerns:

1. Security implications : It is possible that a Pandit township may seem like a more attractive, high-profile target for terrorist groups than dispersed dwellings, and this threat perception is likely to turn these settlements into not just ghettos but heavily militarized compounds, further compromising the prospect for normal life as far its resettled residents are concerned.
2. Separate townships may be a barrier to unity and intermingling of cultures.

At the same time, the question of moving the returning pundits to their original homes needs detailed deliberation as many may have been destroyed while others have changed hands. The central as well as state governments need to formulate back-up plans for new permanent houses for those whose property cannot be retrieved for various reasons.

 Previous efforts to resettle Kashmiri pundits:

An effort was made to resettle Kashmiri Pandits in 2007 under a government job scheme but many people who returned say that they are not happy. They live in migrant colonies and do not have basic amenities like a ration card or even a voter ID card. Some Pandit families in exile remain fearful about continuing threats, and wonder about the wisdom of relocating themselves for a second time when the outcome is uncertain, and their children have developed roots elsewhere in India.

The way ahead:

The Kashmiri Pandit community has the right to go back to its state and live peacefully without feeling threatened. But this problem can only be solved if the issue of separatism is addressed. That needs a rethink on political, economic and cultural policies.

A Silver lining:

But Kashmir’s story has positives to look at as well.

• If there is a Burhan Wani, there is also a Shah Faesal who topped the Union Public Service Commission exams in 2009. Since then, scores of Kashmiris have cracked the exams. As many as 10 candidates from the Valley have cleared the exams this year itself including the second rank holder Athar Aamir-ul-Shafi Khan.
• Around 20,000 aspirants turned up last year to fill 55 vacancies in the Indian army.
• Despite Hurriyat hardliner Syed Ali Shah Geelani’ s call to Kashmiris against joining police service last month, more than 5000 youth filed applications and appeared for fitness tests for the post of special police officers in various districts.
• A budding entrepreneurship narrative has already taken root in the state.

Thats it for this part!

The next part in this series will analyse the steps being taken by the Government to address the issue and the way ahead (Click here for part 3). This is supposed to be one of the most comprehensive series in Internal Security related Issues. Your feedback is welcome! 🙂

The ongoing Kashmir Valley unrest needs to be correctly understood and appreciated as a national security issue and challenge. But before we delve into the contemporary issues surrounding Kashmir, it is necessary to briefly revisit history:

source

A brief timeline:

August 1947:  Partition of the Indian subcontinent along religious lines lead to the formation of India and Pakistan.

October 1947 – The Maharaja of Kashmir signed a treaty of accession with India after attacks by a Pakistani tribal army. Under the Instrument of Accession, a temporary special status was granted to the State under article 370 of the Indian Constitution.

1947-48: War broke out between India and Pakistan over the region.

January 1948: India referred the dispute to the United Nations.

August 1948: UN directed Pakistan to remove its troops, after which India was also to withdraw the bulk of its forces. Once this happened, a “free and fair” plebiscite was to be held to allow the Kashmiri people to decide their future. But a plebiscite could not be held, partly because Pakistan would not withdraw its forces from Pakistan-held Kashmir, and partly because Indo-Pak relations got enmeshed in the Cold War.

January 1, 1949: A ceasefire was agreed, with 65% of the territory under Indian control and the remainder with Pakistan. The ceasefire was intended to be temporary but the Line of Control remains the de facto border between the two countries.

1956: The Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir ratified the accession of the state to India.

1965-66 – A brief war between Indian and Pakistan over Kashmir ends in a ceasefire and signing of the Tashkent agreement.

1971-72 – Another Indo-Pakistani war ended in defeat for Pakistan and the formation of the independent nation of Bangladesh (formerly known as East Pakistan) which lead to the 1972 Simla Agreement. This turned the Kashmir ceasefire line into the Line of Control, and both sides pledged to settle their differences through negotiations.

Start of insurgency

1987 – Disputed state elections in Jammu and Kashmir gave impetus to a pro-independence insurgency. India accused Pakistan of fomenting the insurgency by dispatching fighters across the Line of Control, which Pakistan denied.

1990 – India imposed Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) in Jammu and Kashmir following escalation of insurgency.

1990s – Violence intensified in Kashmir. Islamic militants carried out ethnic cleansing in the Kashmir Valley, terrorizing non-Muslims, mainly Kashmiri pundits, causing large numbers of people to flee, mainly to Jammu. The Indian military responded with repression to the terrorism, foreign infiltration, and the domestic insurgency, which are now all mixed up. There are allegations of serious human rights abuses on all sides.

Recent events:

March 2015 – India’s ruling BJP party was sworn into government in Kashmir for the first time in coalition with the local People’s Democratic Party.

September 2015 – Muslim separatist leaders in Kashmir closed shops, businesses and government departments in protest at the enforcement of a ban on eating beef.

July 2016 – The killing of Burhan Wani, a popular militant and top commander of the Hizbul Mujahideen group by the security forces sparked violent protests. Subsequently, a curfew was imposed in most parts of Kashmir.

August 2016– Curfew lifted from most parts of Kashmir. At least 68 civilians and two security officials died and more than 9,000 people were injured in over 50 days of violence according to official tallies.

Kashmir: Indian and Pakistani narratives:

 The Indian view:

• Maharaja Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession in October 1947, handing control of the Kingdom of Jammu and Kashmir over to India.
• Also, the UN Resolution in 1948 accepted India’s stand regarding all outstanding issues between India and Pakistan.
• Pakistan has not removed its military forces from the region, which India views as one of the first steps in implementing a resolution.
• India accuses Pakistan of funding military groups in the region to create instability, and accuses Pakistan of waging a proxy war.
• According to India, most regions of PoK, especially northern areas, continue to suffer from lack of political recognition, economic development and basic fundamental rights.

The Pakistani view:

• Pakistan claims that according to the two-nation theory Kashmir should have been with Pakistan, because it has a Muslim majority.
• Pakistan argues that India has shown disregard to the resolutions of the UN Security Council, and the United Nations Commission in India and Pakistan, by failing to hold a plebiscite.
• Pakistan rejects Indian claims to Kashmir, centering around the Instrument of Accession. Pakistan insists that the Maharaja did not have the support of most Kashmiris. Pakistan also claims that the Maharaja handed over control of Jammu and Kashmir under duress, thus invalidating the legitimacy of the claims.
• Pakistan claims that India violated the Standstill Agreement and that Indian troops were already in Kashmir before the Instrument of Accession was signed.

Root causes behind the Kashmir unrest

1. A confrontation between two nationalisms:

•  For India, the question of Kashmir, is not merely one of retaining a small part of its territory; it impinges on the very basic character of the Indian state and society. If Kashmir seceded from India on grounds of religion, the two-nation theory would seem to have been vindicated. It would strengthen the Hindu communal forces and pose a serious threat to millions of Muslims, whose number in India is larger than even that in Pakistan, making their position in India quite untenable.
• Since Kashmir is predominantly Muslim, Pakistan believes it should belong to them. Moreover, Kashmir has to be won to justify the religious moral significance of Pakistan’s nationhood.

2. Political causes

India and Pakistan both believe that they have a rightful claim to Kashmir. (See the previous section)

3. Economic Causes

• Even while militancy was in decline and a free and fair electoral system in place since 2002, the governance deficit remained large. Economic growth in the state almost consistently lagged behind the national growth figures.
• Widespread unemployment and lack of new job avenues
• Disintegration of traditional handicrafts
• Poor industrial setup
• Declining tourism due to terror attacks
• Loss of crops due to floods, cloudburst etc.
• Issues in rehabilitation of flood victims etc

4. Social causes: Poor education and health system, allegations of penetration of radical Islam in the majorly Sufi Islam region, wounds of 1980’s insurgency and indoctrination of youth by radical leaders has further contributed to their despair.

 5. General disenchantment with constitutional measures

A general absence of good and sound administration with allegations of corruption and nepotism coupled with allegations of electoral frauds in the initial years lead to a loss of faith in the legitimacy of the constitutional measures.

Laws like AFSPA, regular curfews, presence of armed forces, allegations of human right violations etc have contributed in increasing anger of the people against the state.

6. A large role for the army in Kashmir has been a necessity in view of Pakistani military threat and subversion; but this has also meant a high cost in terms of the functioning of a civil libertarian polity.

7. A demand for greater political autonomy for the region

8. An atmosphere of mistrust:

Fear and mistrust are central to this conflict. Fear of people belonging to another religion having a different value system that threatens one’s own, as well as fear concerning the loss of control or the loss of power. This fear has paralyzed progress towards peace as it works against the one ingredient which is essential for positive change: trust.

9. Stereotyping

Elites from both India and Pakistan stereotype the opposite country. This is the result of misappropriation of information in the education system as well as in the media. History textbooks, for example, distort history to reinforce a particular image, providing an enduring basis for hatred; children are thus socialized at a young age by what are often blatant factual errors. Similarly, mass media present few programs that humanize the other by reflecting true realities and similarities, focusing instead on stark differences and problems.

10. External factors:

• Pakistan incites the sentiments of Kashmiri people especially youth, carries on cross-border infiltration to spread the unrest and uses terrorism as a diplomatic tool to worsen the situation.
• Chinese support to Pakistan in an attempt to balance against India.
• Islamist fighters from various countries have declared the conflict a Muslim cause.

Factors which have fuelled unrest in the region in recent times:

• Use of social media for false rumours to instigate youth to lead violent mobs
• Stone pelting on security forces by radicalised and incited youth
• Armed militants mixing with stone-pelting mobs and addressing rallies
• Militants using cover of “agitating mobs” firing at security forces and lobbing grenades, provoking security forces to retaliate
• Attacks/threats on government officers, political representatives and policemen
• No identifiable leadership of protests
• The challenge of radicalization of youth.

 

Thats it for this part!

The next part in this series will analyse the recent issues surrounding Kashmir (Click here for part 2).

Your feedback is welcome. 🙂

In the second part of the Cross Border terrorism series, we focus on Indian institutions, e.g. the police, intelligence agencies, dealing with the issue,  the problems with the present set-up and possible solutions and reforms. (The first part of the series is here.)

India’s counter terrorism set-up:

1. The state police and its intelligence set-up: Under India’s federal Constitution, the responsibility for policing and maintenance of law and order is that of the individual states. The central government can only give them advice, financial help, training and other assistance to strengthen their professional capabilities and share with them the intelligence collected by it.

2. The national intelligence community: This consists of the internal intelligence agency (Intelligence Bureau), the external intelligence agency (Research and Analysis Wing), the Defence Intelligence Agency, and the intelligence directorates general of the armed forces and the National Investigation Agency.

• The IB collects terrorism-related intelligence inside the country and RAW does it outside.
• The DIA and the intelligence directorates general of the armed forces essentially collect tactical intelligence during their counter-terrorism operations in areas such as Jammu and Kashmir, Nagaland, etc, where they are deployed.
• The NIA is the Central Counter Terrorism Law Enforcement Agency which collects, collates and analyses counter terrorism investigation.

3. Central Armed Police Forces: These include:

• Central Reserve Police Force, responsible for maintaining law and order and containing insurgency.
• Central Industrial Security Force, responsible for physical security at airports and sensitive establishments;
• The National Security Guards, a specially trained intervention force to terminate terrorist situations such as hijacking, hostage-taking, etc; and
• The Special Protection Group, responsible for the security of the prime minister and former prime ministers.
• The Border Security Force, responsible for  guarding India’s land border during peace time and preventing transnational crime.

4. Paramilitary forces: These include the Assam Rifles, Special Frontier Force, and the Indian Coast Guard,which assist the police in counter-terrorism operations when called upon to do so.

5. The Army: Their assistance is sought as a last resort when the police and paramilitary forces are not able to cope with a terrorist situation. But in view of Pakistan’s large-scale infiltration in Jammu and Kashmir and the presence and activities of a large number of Pakistani mercenaries, many of them ex-servicemen, the army has a more active, permanent and leadership role in counter-terrorism operations here.

6. Recent initiatives like NATGRID and CMS to aid security agencies: The National Intelligence Grid or NATGRID is the integrated intelligence grid connecting databases of core security agencies of the Government of India to collect comprehensive patterns of intelligence that can be readily accessed by intelligence agencies.

Issues with India’s counter terrorism set-up:

1. India lacks a coherent strategic response to terrorism; there is no doctrine, and most of our responses are kneejerk.

2. Unintelligent Intelligence Infrastructure: India has a multitude of intelligence agencies. Coordination between them on the ground is not up to the mark. Experts also opine that there is competition among intelligence agencies which prevents information sharing.

3. A crucial weakness that most intelligence agencies suffer from is the lack of resources. They most often fall short of trained officers and finances.

The way ahead for India:

1. India needs to formulate a comprehensive national anti-terror strategy which must address many issues – defence, law enforcement, intelligence, diplomacy, economic development, education, promotion of socio-political justice – within the context of policies promoting national security.

2. Reforming domestic anti terror apparatus: India needs to:

a) immediately beef up NIA

b) create a strong NCTC (National Counter Terrorism Center)

c) ensure that terrorism fighting organizations are equipped with adequate physical infrastructure, manned with suitably trained manpower and do not face a cash crunch;Most importantly, the agencies must be least in number and have a mechanism to seamlessly communicate and strike whenever needed, without jurisdictional conflicts.

3. Military Options: A strong state with the ability to give as good as it gets is a pre-requisite for peace. Military options like the recent surgical strikes across LoC not only enhance the deterrence in place against such attacks, but also ensure that the state-jihadi nexus is constricted.

4. Diplomatic Dialogue- Henry Kissinger, an American political scientist has written that “nations cooperate for long periods only when they share common political goals and that… policy must focus on these goals rather than on the mechanisms used to reach them.” Thus, India must diplomatically engage not only Pakistan, but also Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh and Myanmar, so as to formulate policies for cooperation in economic, military, cultural and terrorism fields and ensure mutual quest for regional peace, prosperity and stability.

5. International Support– to further a policy of non-violent “compellence”.

a) India must designate Pakistan as a state sponsor of terrorism and continue its efforts to isolate Pakistan internationally as it has successfully done in South Asia( SAARC). To impose further political isolation, India could convince its partners to postpone bilateral meetings with Pakistan or delay visa processing.

b) In more tangible economic terms, India and its partners could seek to raise the prominence of anti-terrorism issues at the IMF to condition further financing for Pakistan on cracking down on terrorist groups that attack other states.

c) Furthermore, India could seek an advance commitment from the United States and other major powers to cut security assistance to Pakistan in case of a future terrorist attack in India. Such agreements would raise the costs for any authorities that would subsequently violate them. China and U.S. both have great interests in stability between Pakistan and India. Both could be expected to press India and Pakistan to uphold any agreements and to contribute to fact-finding if there are disputes over compliance.

6. Internal Stability– India needs to understand the importance of maintaining peace and harmony amongst all religions and communities in India, with special reference to Muslim and people belonging to NE states and the RED CORRIDOR (Maoism). Pakistan has for decades exploited the dissatisfaction and given covert and overt assistance in fuelling insurgency in these regions. The intelligence agencies have an important role to play as the eyes and ears of the government in different communities to detect feelings of anger and alienation which need immediate attention.

7. Solving border issues with wider consultation, initiating confidence building measures and more and more people to people contact along with improved trade across the border would help.

8. Use of the latest surveillance technologies available such drones, unmanned Arial vehicle such as Nishant, Rustam-1 etc to detect the presence of unwarranted activities across the border whether land or maritime.

Conclusion

source

Only a combination of Indian coercive and non-violent capabilities, paired with a willingness to bargain, can motivate Pakistan to remove the threat of violence. And just as threat of force alone will not work for India, neither will support or tolerance of anti-India terrorism enable Pakistan to get what it wants from India. Both have to demonstrate willingness to compromise through bargaining, which is only possible if both reassure each other that they are eschewing violence. It is up to Indian and Pakistani leaders and societies, with encouragement from the international community, to find a combination that will work for them.

Here’s an interesting case study analysis done – Dealing with Pakistan – Are you a Hawk or a Dove?

Quotable quotes (useful for essay)

“Good fences make good neighbors”

– Robert Frost in “Mending Wall”

“To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.”

– China’s ancient strategist Sun Tzu.

“Worse than war is fear of war”

-Lucius Annaeus Seneca, a Roman ancient statesman.

India has suffered tremendously from terrorism and violence within its borders due to various reasons. This Internal Security and Related Issues series will analyse what are the various factors involved. We begin with cross border terrorism.

What does cross-border terrorism mean?

Terrorism is the organized use of violence for political ends and is directed primarily at innocent people, or soft targets.

Terrorism that has its roots in one country and it operates with the support of the country of its origin, but uses violence to create terror in another country, is described as cross-border terrorism.

Cross-border terrorism in the world:

With the rise of radical organisations such as ISIS and Al Qaeda, other countries besides India are also now suffering from cross-border terrorism. In total, more than 1,200 people outside of Iraq and Syria have been killed in attacks inspired or coordinated by the Islamic State, according to a New York Times analysis. Nearly half of the victims were killed in attacks that targeted Westerners. The others have been civilians in Arab and other non-western countries, killed in mosques, government offices and other targets. See other details here.

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Source of image: New York Times

 

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Source of image: New York Times

The extent of cross border terrorism being fueled by ISIS can be gauged from the following picture:

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Source of image: New York Times

Cross-border terrorism in India:

The problem of cross border terrorism over the last fifty years in India has occurred in three regions – Punjab, Kashmir and the North–East, where people are on the social and physical fringes of India.

Language, religion and the feeling of alienation set these people apart from the people of the heartland of the country.

All the three are concentrated at the outer limits of India adjoining a neighbouring country that has the desire and the ability to create problems in India’s internal security.

Factors responsible for Cross-border terrorism in India:

1. Geographical factors:

a) Length of borders: India has 14818 kilometers of land borders and a coast line of 7516.6 kilometers. All states except Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Telangana, Delhi and Haryana have an international border or a coast line.

b) Extreme geography: Also, borders are quite complex and almost every type of extreme geography is present at different borders viz. Mountains, deserts, fertile lands, swampy marshes or tropical evergreen jungles. Lack of proper security in inhospitable areas further aids cross border terrorism.

c) Shifting courses of rivers located near boundaries further compound the problem of border management e.g. Padma and Brahmaputra in the east and Ravi in the north.

2. India’s economic and military rise:

India is emerging as an economically and military strong nation in both continental Asia as well as the Indian Ocean region. Pakistan views India’s rise as a threat to its own ambitions. It is thus resorting to cross border terrorism tactics to keep India engaged in proxy wars and divert its resources from other developmental issues. It aims to degrade India’s conventional superiority through a process of strategic fatigue.

3. India’s neighbourhood challenge:

India is like island of democracy between seas of anarchical or instable states. Probably, no other neighbouring country has experienced uninterrupted democratic regime for more than 15 years.

Additionally, in some countries there is cultural radicalism targeted at India, and terrorists and mafia groups are patronized by some of India’s neighbouring states.

4. Territorial Ambitions of Pakistan

Pakistan having failed to grab Kashmir despite fighting conventional wars has resorted to the strategy of terrorism. Conventional wars are expensive and the chances of achieving political objectives through wars have diminished due to the development of nuclear weapons and the possible international reaction.

In such a case, proxy war is a low- cost and no- case option but best suited to promote Pakistan’s geo political, diplomatic and military interest, not only to wrest Kashmir but also to gain forward strategic depth.

5. Boundary disputes

Unsolved border disputed with Pakistan in the area of Sir Creek in Gujarat, the LOC in J&K, AGPL portion in Siachin and with China in Aksai Chin, Arunachal Pradesh and Transk-Karakoram tract further compound the problem.

Indian Concerns:

1. State sponsored terrorism: The links between top army personnel, bureaucrats and political leaders, on the one hand, and terrorists and drug barons, on the other, have acquired a measure of legitimacy under the banner of Islam and jihad in Pakistan.

2. Pakistan’s failure to act against terror outfits: Despite being handed over evidence of Pakistan based terrorists’ involvement in Pathankot terror attacks, and the Pakistan JIT team being allowed access to the terror site, Pakistan has not taken any steps that indicate its intent to act tough on terror.

3. The China-Pakistan nexus has given rise to external concerns such as covert assistance in Pakistan’s nuclear and missile program. Also, China continues to block India’s bid to get Pakistan-based Jaish-e-Mohammad chief Masood Azhar (accused in the Parliament terror attack case and, more recently, the Pathankot attack) listed as a terrorist by the United Nations. China has also previously blocked India’s demand for taking action under the Security Council’s anti-terrorism resolutions against Pakistan for releasing Lashkar-e-Taiba commander Zaki-ur Lakhvi—the mastermind of the 2008 Mumbai attacks.

3. Recent joint military exercises between Pakistan and Russia (traditionally seen as India’s close ally) despite ongoing India-Pakistan hostilities also paint a picture of concern.

4. India has also become the target in the global jihadi plan of outfits such as ISIS and Al Qaeda which are not only instigating violence through sleeping modules, but also attract educated urban youths to spread terror agenda on social media and to fight in alien lands. There are over hundred Indian youths who are estimated to be fighting for ISIS in Iraq and Syria. Also, the radicalization and recruitment of youth for such terror organisations has become more sophisticated, thanks to the internet.

5. Pakistan’s funding, arming, training and diplomatic support to varied terrorist groups active in Kashmir has emboldened the terrorists all over the world.

Thats it for this part!

The next part in this series will analyse India’s counter-terrorism set-up and the issues with it (click here for Part 2). This is supposed to be one of the most comprehensive series in Internal Security related Issues. Your feedback is welcome 🙂