Author: Gurleen Kaur

What is black money?

There is no uniform definition of black money in the literature or economic theory. According to the White Paper on Black money by the Finance Ministry, it is defined as:

“assets or resources that have neither been reported to the public authorities at the time of their generation nor disclosed at any point of time during their possession.”

How is black money generated?

Black money can be generated through

1. Illegal activities like crime, drug trade and corruption, or
2. Failing to pay dues to the public exchequer in one form or another.

In the second case, activities might be legal but the perpetrator may simply have failed to report the income generated to avoid paying tax.

It should be noted that not all the unaccounted money is black. It is only that money which was legally required to be disclosed, but was not disclosed. Income tax provisions permit income below a certain threshold without disclosure.

Certain sectors are more vulnerable to black money issues. These include real estate, bullion and jewellery, financial markets, public procurement, the non-profit sector, informal sector and cash economy.

 The extent of black money generation in India:

India has been ranked the fourth-biggest source of black money in the world, with $510 billion worth of illicit financial flows during 2004-2013, or $51 billion annually, on average. This was stated in a report which was released recently by Global Financial Integrity (GFI), a research and advisory group based in Washington.

China tops the list for 2004-2013, with $139 billion average illicit financial flow per annum, followed by Russia and Mexico.

Effects of Black Money on economy:-

1.  Government loses tax revenue as tax on this money is not paid.
2. It is hard for RBI to frame effective monetary policy: Black money floating in economy is impossible to estimate and remains out of preview of government. RBI increases interest rates, CRR, SLR etc. to regulate money supply but more the black money, more the ineffectiveness of these measures.
3. Corruption – Black money is both a cause and effect of corruption.
4. National Security – Black money can be used to support a wide range of illegal activities.
5. Overpriced real estate prices – as immovable property is perceived as safest avenue for black money, most of the black money moves in to this. This has resulted in unrealistic real estate prices.
6. Capital Flight – In order to escape domestic rules and regulation scarce capital in India moves out to Tax havens and stalls the process of capital formation in the economy.

Institutions currently in place responsible for dealing with black money issues:

• Central Board of Direct taxes (CBDT)
• The enforcement Directorate (ED)
• The Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU-IND)
• The Central Board of Excise and Customs (CBEC)

The Central Economic Intelligence Bureau (CEIB), the National Investigating Agency (NIA), and the High Level Committee (HLC) act as coordinating agencies.

Government Strategy to tackle black money:

The government has employed a five pronged strategy which involves:

• Joining the global crusade against black money
• Creating an appropriate legislative framework
• Setting up institutions for dealing with illicit money
• Developing systems for implementation
• Imparting skills to personnel for effective action

Recent steps taken by the government to curb black money generation in India:

1. Reducing disincentives against voluntary compliance: The planned roll-out of Goods and Services Tax (GST) in April 2017 will help in reducing disincentives against voluntary compliance by measures like rationalization of tax rates and reduction of transaction costs etc. [Click here to read more about GST]

2. Reforms in sectors vulnerable to generate black money:

• Cash economy: The opening of a large number of payment gateways, Internet banking, and payment banks will prompt the use of banking transactions and plastic money to rise significantly.
• Real Estate Sector: Real Estate (Regulation and Development Act, 2016) aims to bring in much needed transparency in the sector. [Click here to read more about the act]

3. Creation of effective credible deterrence:

Recent initiatives by the government in this regard include:

• The benami transactions bill has been recently passed by Lok Sabha. The bill provides for confiscation of benami properties, or assets held in the name of another person or under a fictitious name to avoid taxation.
• Project Insight, the income-tax (I-T) department’s ambitious project to effectively utilize the vast amount of information at its disposal more effectively to track tax evaders, will roll out from May 2017. [For more information click here.]
• The monitoring regime of the income tax department has been strengthened. The department can detect large cash withdrawals, or large cash transactions which enter the system.
• Setting up institutions like Directorate of Income Tax and strengthening existing institutions like Central Board of Direct Taxes

4. Income Disclosure Scheme, 2016 provided a one-time opportunity to all persons who have not declared income correctly in earlier years to come forward and declare their undisclosed Incomes. These declarations would be taxed@45% and would enjoy immunity from prosecution under the IT Act and Wealth Tax Act and also the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988. Record collections have been made under the scheme. [For more information about the income declaration scheme, click here.]

5. A Special Investigation Team was constituted in 2014 which is chaired by ex-Supreme Court Judge Justice M.B. Shah. Many recommendations of SIT have been implemented. The recent proposals of SIT presently being considered by the government are:

• A 3-Lakh cap on cash transactions.
• An upper limit of Rs. 15 Lakhs on cash holding.

Steps taken by the Government to tackle the menace of black money stashed abroad:

• Black Money (Undisclosed Foreign Income and Assets) and Imposition of Tax Act, 2015. It was enacted to penalize those with unaccounted wealth abroad and has strict penalty provisions.
• India has joined the Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement (MCAA) on Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information (AEOI). These standards will enable India to receive information from almost every country in the world including offshore financial centres. It will directly help the Government to curb tax evasion and deal with the menace of black money stashed abroad.
•  Strengthening DTAAs (Double taxation avoidance agreements): India recently revised DTAA with Mauritius and Cyprus & is in the process of revising its treaty with Singapore. These are aimed at preventing “round tripping” of funds i.e. the return to India of wealth that has not been accounted for by routing it through countries that provide easy channelling of funds without too many questions.

• Amendments made in Prevention of Money-laundering Act, 2002 to strengthen the legal framework for effective action against those holding unaccounted income.

• Amendments to Foreign Exchange Management Act (FEMA): The amendments provide for seizure and confiscation of value equivalent, situated in India, in case any person is found to have acquired any foreign exchange, foreign security or immovable property, situated outside India, in contravention of Section 4 of FEMA.

The way ahead:

• The tax department must spruce up its data-mining methods to expand the country’s shallow tax base.
• The introduction of these stringent laws against defaulters will help the Government widen the tax base but implementation of these proposals is the key as they may be rendered ineffective if not supported by advanced information gathering systems.
• The new laws should not offer unrestrained powers to the tax investigators as such a move may dampen the investment climate of the country.
• Also, the Government should ensure that an honest taxpayer is not caught in the web of these stringent laws.
• The government needs to attack the root cause of the problem of black money generation by making electoral funding transparent, curbing the misuse by the wealthy of tax-free income sops for farmers, and encouraging cashless transactions. [Related Reading: Cashless Society: Can India be one?]

That’s it for now. Please keep following the news story here to stay updated with the latest developments!

In the third part of the series, we analyse Government’s response to the NE insurgency and the way ahead . (The part one of the series is here part two is here)

Government’s response    

The Central Government is pursuing a policy for talks/negotiation with such groups which categorically abjure violence, lay down arms and seek solutions for their problems peacefully within the framework of the Constitution of India. As a result, number of outfits have come forward for talks with Government and have entered into Suspension of Operation (SoO) agreement, and some of them have signed Memorandum of Settlement (MoS) and yet others have dissolved themselves.

Those who are not in talks are being dealt with by the Central Armed Police Forces and the State Police through Counter-Insurgency Operations.

The Central Government is supplementing efforts of the State Governments in dealing with the insurgency through various measures. These include:

• Deployment of Central Armed Police Forces to aid the State authorities for carrying out counter insurgency operations and providing security for vulnerable institutions and installations
• Reimbursement of security related expenditure to the State Governments under SRE Scheme. The scheme is being implemented in all States of the region except Mizoram and Sikkim.
• Central assistance to the State Governments for modernization of State Police Forces
• Sanction of India Reserve Battalions for augmenting and upgrading the states’ police forces to deal with insurgency /militancy
• Banning the Unlawful Associations operating in NE Region under UAPA (Unlawful Activities(Prevention) Act, 1967)
• Declaring specific areas/states as ‘disturbed areas’ for the purpose of AFSPA and issuing notifications for Unified command Structure etc.
• Scheme for Surrender-cum Rehabilitation of militants in North East to wean away the mis-guided youth and hard-core militants who have strayed into the fold of militancy and later find themselves trapped into that net.
• Civic Action Programme in the North Eastern States in order to take the local populace in confidence and boost the image of armed forces amongst the common people. Under this Programme, various welfare/developmental activities are undertaken like holding of medical camps, sanitation drives, sports meets, distribution of study material to children, minor repairs of school buildings, roads, bridges, etc. and running adult education centres etc.
• Advertisement and publicity to highlight the activities being undertaken by the Government for peace in the region and also with a view to convey that “Peace pays”.

Recent Initiatives by the Government for development of the North-East

 1. From Look East Policy(LEP) to Act East Policy(AEP):

A greater focus on:

• External Angle : Essentially, concerning relations of India as a whole with ASEAN & East Asia
• Internal Angle : Development of North East India that makes it a viable gate way for the rest of India to ASEAN & East Asia

2. The Kaladan Multi Modal Transit project:

The project will connect Sittwe Port in Myanmar to the India-Myanmar border via roadway. It will provide alternative cost effective shortcut to landlocked north eastern states. Originally, the project was scheduled to be completed by 2014, but work on it is still underway.

Once operational, it will provide an alternate access route to India’s north east region and contribute towards the regional economic development and reduce pressure on the Siliguri Corridor.

3. The India-Myanmar-Thailand trilateral highway

The India-Myanmar-Thailand (IMT) trilateral highway is expected to become operational by 2018-19. Also, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) is planning to extend the proposed India-Myanmar-Thailand highway to the CLMV (Cambodia, Lao PDR and Vietnam) countries in the second phase. This will then give India direct access to the South-East and East Asian markets

4. Development of Moreh (Manipur) as a smart city:

Manipur is the most critical state in India’s connectivity to Myanmar and South East Asia. 99% of overland formal trade goes through Moreh.

5. North East in Hydrocarbon Vision 2030 aims to double oil and gas output in the next 15 years.

6. North East Rural Livelihood Project

It is being implemented in 2 districts in each of 4 North Eastern States of Mizoram, Nagaland, Sikkim and Tripura. The objective is to create sustainable community institutions around women Self Help Groups (SHG), Community development groups (CDG) and the youth of the select districts. It was launched in 2013 for a period of 5 years and is aided by the World Bank.

[Related reading: Can Northeast become economic hub of India? What factors promote or prevent from that happening?]

The way ahead: “Acting East through North East”

Although varying in their demands and methods, there is a common thread running through the insurgency infested north-east, that is of identity and development. Hence, some solutions that are common need to be explored with specifics derived from them for specific regions and groups. Following are some suggestions:

1. Decentralisation with alertness: Meeting the political aspirations of groups by giving them autonomy. Implementing sixth schedule provisions in these areas will help them to preserve their identity and culture while giving them greater autonomy.

2. Need to pursue a developmental approach: If institutions of development are created in the region, the problems of politics, society, ethnic strife, militant assertion and of integration will get minimised. E.g.

• Improving road and railway connectivity within the North-East
• Modernization of the primary sector and a vigorous programme of rural development
• Stress on processing industries connected with agriculture, animal husbandry, horticulture and forestry and also service industries related to the rural infrastructure like irrigation, rural electrification, transport and communication, marketing etc.
• Modernization of border trading framework
• Improving infrastructure

Also, the developmental approach must ensure the participation of the masses of all groups in the development process with reasonable equity in the distribution of costs and benefits. Another point to be stressed is that development in the North East must be ecologically sustainable and must not be eco-degrading.

3. Improving Governance and delivery mechanisms of the government and administration.

4. The pre-condition of complete abjuring of violence for holding peace talks is a flawed notion. If violence is discarded and peace is established then the need of peace talks become futile. Dialogue should be an ongoing process to reach concrete solutions by involving all the stakeholders and not a single group.

5. Coordinating operations with the neighboring countries and use of force only when needed.

6. The report by 2^nd ARC recommends that even in dealing with the purely ‘law and order aspects’ of insurgency and violence in the region, much greater reliance needs to be placed on the local police than has been the case so far. While deployment of the Armed Forces of the Union may be required, there is a strong case for minimising their use for operational purposes in a region which still continues to harbour a sense of alienation.

7. State police and central forces should cooperate on intelligence sharing, investigation and operations against militants. It has been alleged by the army that the June 2015 ambush of the army became possible because state police did not share the intelligence about the attack with it. It is unfortunate and counter-productive.

8. Also, there is important spill-over effect of insurgency in one State on the contiguous States. Therefore, the problem has to be viewed and tackled in an integrated manner considering its regional external effects, uniformity in its basic nature and also the linkage between the insurgent outfits of different States.

9. Civil-military relations are a critical ingredient for a successful political strategy to counter insurgencies in areas like the North East. Better civil-military relations in states like Mizoram ensured that a twenty year old Mizo insurgency (1961-1986) was rooted out through joint civil-military strategies like the grouping of villages, which had relocated nearly 80 per cent of Mizoram’s population to 102 new villages known as ‘protected and progressive’ villages.

10. Speedy implementation of the North East Vision 2020 and speedy completion of the projects already underway like The Kaladan Multi Modal Transit project, The India-Myanmar-Thailand trilateral highway etc.

11. The need for Sub-State diplomacy: States in border areas have a natural cultural and economic interest in our foreign policy orientation towards our neighbours. There is a need for all the States in North East to be more involved in diplomacy with neighbouring countries. Inclusion of Chief Ministers of Border States of North East in Prime Ministerial visits to neighbouring countries is a welcome step.

[Related Reading: Role of border states in India’s Foreign policy]

12. There is a need to promote a ‘pan-India fraternity’ that bridges the psychological and emotional gap between the North-East and the rest of India.

13. A recognition that the security and territorial integrity of India in the North East can be best fortified by the combined economic strength of the States in the North East and their economic integration with ASEAN , BIMSTEC and East Asia.

In the second part of the series on the Northeast insurgency, we analyse the factors responsible for the insurgency, the challenges being faced and  the impact of insurgency on the region’s economy. (The first part of the series is here)

Factors responsible for insurgency in the Northeast

• Lack of development and basic amenities coupled with corruption and diversion of funds, often to the coffers of insurgents e.g. siphoning of food-grains meant for the public distribution system, a large proportion of which falls in the hands of the militants
• Unemployment problem in the region stands as a major cause for sustained insurgency.
• Feeling of alienation and deprivation among the tribal population
• Demography: In spite of several political permutations and combinations, the political boundaries in most cases do not coincide with the existing social boundaries. It has lead to the demands of various ethnic categories for recognition of their distinctive identity.
• Similar ethnicity across the border on Myanmar side
• Porosity of the border with Myanmar due to difficult terrain
• Change in demographic pattern due to infiltration from across the border
• Disconnect with the other parts of India and fellow Indians
• Widespread corruption among the ruling elite
• Lack of visionary leadership among the tribal communities
• Easy availability of arms and ammunition
• Political support from various factions
• Instability in Myanmar
• Factional in-Fighting among the insurgent groups.
• Military reasons – AFSPA (Armed Forces Special Power Act).
• External support – China and Myanmar.

Challenges and concerns:

1. The linkage with organised crime

The biggest challenge to the North East is extortion carried out by various insurgent groups. Extortion has become meticulously organised activity in the region and is one of the major sources of funds for the militants. Other sources of their funding include arms and drugs smuggling.

2. Maoist Consolidation in North East:

The Maoists have been able to extend the red corridor to the Northeast. The arrests of various top Maoist leaders in this region during 2013 revealed the extent of Maoist infiltration in Northeast India.

The Maoist rebellion in Northeast India is at present in its ‘latent phase’ which involves mobilization of the masses, political awakening, visiting villages, engaging in small struggles on local issues, picking up students’ issues, fighting corruption, short–listing shelter and arms dumps and identification of local militant elements.

3. Spread of Islamist Militancy:

Northeast India, shares an 1880 km long porous border with Bangladesh, a country that is a hotbed of Islamist militancy. Though radical Islam has not yet seeped into the Muslim population in the region, the arrests of twelve persons in Assam during November‐December 2014 with links with the Islamist terror outfit Jamaat‐ul‐Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) shows that radicalization of a section of Muslim population has begun in the region.

4. Trans-national linkages

India’s Northeast is one of South Asia’s hottest trouble spots, not simply because the region has as many as 30 armed insurgent organizations operating and fighting the Indian state, but because trans-border linkages that these groups have, and strategic alliances among them, have acted as force multipliers and have made the conflict dynamics all the more intricate.

The impact of insurgency on economy:

 The persistent insurgency atmosphere has been the most important contributor to economic stagnation of the region.

1. Connectivity:

The gateway to the North Eastern Region is the chicken’s neck of Siliguri area in North Bengal and all flows to and from the Region on the surface routes have to pass through this neck and the Brahmaputra Valley of Assam, Guwahati being the grand nodal point. Therefore, any disturbance in the Brahmaputra Valley and/or its adjoining hills brings the activities in the whole of the Region to a stand-still position.

2. Infrastructure:

The subversive activities of the insurgents’ damage rail tracks, cause accidents leading to loss of life and property, create terror among the travelers and throw the entire system out of gear. Similarly, vehicles in the State and National highways are often attacked, passengers and transport workers are killed or wounded and sometimes abducted for ransom; and goods are looted.

3. Industry including petroleum and tea:

As the articulated economic grievance hovers around the idea of so called regional colonialism based on the alleged drain of rich resources of the region, any violent political movement makes petroleum and tea as its target.

4. Environment:

On the one hand, insurgents damage forests by taking shelter there and on the other, anti insurgency operations also lead to denudation of forests. This not only means that conservation activities and other forestry operations are hampered thus resulting in the loss of valuable natural resources but also that a grave threat is posed to the fragile ecology of the region.

5. Development of the interior areas

The insurgency has aggravated the problem to such an extent that development workers of both the Government and NGOs are utterly discouraged from going to the hilly and rural areas as they face constant extortion and threats of abduction or death.The insurgents by breeding a cult of hatred against the supposed or real outsiders are blocking all inflows of resources, ideas, expertise and initiative to the societies of the North East.

In the next part, we will analyse Government’s response to the NE insurgency and the way ahead . (Click here for part 3). This is supposed to be one of the most comprehensive series in Internal Security related Issues. Your feedback is welcome ?

In this article series we focus on understanding the insurgency in North-East India.

The North-East region:

The Northeast region of India comprises eight states – the Himalayan state of Sikkim and the contiguous seven Sister States (Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, and Tripura).

North East India is connected to the Indian mainland by a small corridor – Silghuri Corridor (also known as Chicken Neck – with a narrow width of only 23 kilometers.)

Strategic Importance of the region: About 99% of the 6387 km border of this Region is international border along Bangladesh, Myanmar, China and Bhutan. It makes up close to 40% of India’s land borders with its neighbours. It thus has an extraordinarily important international strategic dimension and is a vital part of the nation’s defence architecture.

Bridge to South East Asia: The region is a bridgehead between India and the vibrant economies of Southeast Asia, including southern China.

Economic Significance: North East is endowed with huge natural resources (oil, gas, coal, hydro, fertile land, etc) which can be harnessed for nation development.

A historical background of the North-East

Pre-independence era: During the British era, the tribal groups constituted an overwhelming majority of the population in most of the areas they inhabited. Outsiders were not allowed to acquire land in the tribal areas. At the same time, the British government supported the Christian missionaries to move in and establish schools, hospitals and churches.

There was a virtual absence of any political, cultural, social, geographical, religious or business contact of the tribals in the North-East with the rest of the India. So India’s freedom struggle had very little impact on the tribals.

Post-independence era: The sixth schedule of the Indian Constitution provided for self rule, autonomy and decentralisation in the region. Thus district and regional councils were created.

Initially, there was only one state of Assam and one Union Territory NEFA (North East Frontier Agency) covering the whole of north-east.

While NEFA was developing comfortably and in harmony with the rest of the country, problems developed in other tribal areas which were a part of Assam administratively. The tribals were afraid of losing their identity and being assimilated by the policy of Assamization in government jobs and other professions.

There were demonstrations and a major agitation developed. In 1969, Meghalaya was carved out of Assam as a ‘state within a state’. Finally, Meghalaya, Manipur, and Tripura were granted statehood in 1972.

Meanwhile, secessionist movements developed in Nagaland and Mizoram. Nagaland was granted statehood in 1963 itself, while Mizoram became a state in 1987. Also, NEFA was renamed as Arunachal Pradesh and granted the status of a separate state in 1987.

Difference between insurgency, terrorism, militancy and extremism

Before we move further, it is important to understand the difference between the terms ‘insurgency’, ‘terrorism’, ‘militancy’ and ‘extremism’. [Recall the previous article series on Cross Border Terrorism, Left wing Extremism (Naxalism)]

Militancy is a condition which experiences the use of violence, being combative or predisposed to fight. Militants can include any individual or group which takes to violence. This need not only include terrorists and insurgents, but also religious groups which take to violence to further their beliefs.

Extremism is a state wherein a person or an organisation holds extreme political or religious views.

If one were to compare these terms, an extremist may not necessarily be committing a crime under the law. A number of groups, political and religious, fall under this category, for instance, the separatists in Kashmir and Maoist supporters.

Insurgency: The Indian Sub Conventional Doctrine defines insurgency as “an organised armed struggle by a section of the population against the state, usually with foreign support. Possible causes of an insurgency including ideological, ethnic or linguistic differences; or politico-socio-economic reasons and/or fundamentalism and extremism.”

An insurgency may have within its fold both militant groups supporting it as also extremists who propagate its ideology. But, insurgents are our own citizens, whereas terrorists may not always be our own citizens.

Present Situation of insurgency in the North-East

The security situation in some of the north-eastern states has remained complex for a long time because of a number of militant outfits and their diverse demands. Assam, Manipur and Nagaland have continuously been a point of worry.

The Government has steadily followed a policy of dialogue and negotiations with any outfit which agrees to forego the path of violence and come forward for peace talks within the constitutional framework of India. In general, the security situation in most of the north-eastern states has shown considerable improvement during the last 5 years.

State wise status and reasons behind the insurgency:

 Nagaland:

The Nagas believe that they were not part of India, whether through conquest or consent. The Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) is a Naga nationalist group operating in North-east India. The main aim of the organisation is to establish a soverign state, “Nagalim” unifying all the areas inhabited by the Naga people in Northeast India and Burma. (See the backgrounder section here for a brief history of the Naga movement)

Issues:

• Clashes among different tribal groups and factions
• Presence of underground groups that deal in extortion, arms, drugs, smuggling etc.
• Parallel government

Recent developments:

The govt of India and Naga insurgent group NSCN (IM) signed a peace accord on 3 August 2016. However, this is only a framework agreement. The details of the accord are yet to be fleshed out. It is likely to be followed by more detailed agreements and negotiations.

Assam:

The perceived threat to the political identity of the Assamese people from the illegal migrants from Bangladesh lies at the core of the Assam problem. The indigenous people of Assam feel that in future the illegal migrants will become the majority population and they will lose political power.

Statehood demands in Assam:

1. Bodoland
2. Karbi Anglong
3. Dimaraji
4. Kamtapur

Recent developments:

In July 2012, violence broke out with riots between indigenous Bodos and Bengali-speaking Muslims (who were suspected to be illegal Bangladeshi muslims). Violence in Assam later had its repercussions in other parts of India, Azad maidan riots in Mumbai, Rumour mongering (via sinisterSMSs) triggered exodus of NE Indians.

[Related reading: Assam Riots and Demand of Bodoland]

 Manipur

The people of Manipur include the Meitei tribe, the Kuki tribe and the Naga tribe. Meitei tribe forms about 60% of the total population and lives in the plains while Nagas and Kukis live in the hill districts.

Issues:

• There are more militant groups in the states than anywhere else and the rivalry between these outfits often leads to greater violence.
• The situation is further complicated because insurgent groups are not united for the same cause. The Nagas wish to annex a part of Manipur and merge with a greater Nagaland or Nagalim, which is in conflict with Meitei insurgents’ demands for an independent state.
• Unlike other conflict theatres of the Northeast, not many ‘surrenders’ have been reported from Manipur, thus indicating the tight control that the outfits have maintained over their cadres.
• Also, non-Manipuris are being targeted increasingly in Manipur.

Recent developments:

In June 2015, 18 Indian Army jawans were killed and several others were injured when suspected militants ambushed their convoy in Manipur’s Chandel district. In response to the killing of 18 of its troops by militants in Manipur, the Indian Army in one of its biggest covert missions sent troops into Myanmar to strike at two camps and, according to official estimates, killed over 20 suspected militants.

For more details on the Manipur insurgency read the backgrounder section here.

Related reading: Inner Line Permit controversy in Manipur

Meghalaya

Meghalaya is perhaps the least affected by insurgency in the north-east region.

Problems in Meghalaya arise from the divide among various tribes as well as the divide between tribal and non tribal settlers, identity issues and growing corruption, besides the sharp changes in demography due to Bangladeshi infiltrators. Also, criminal activities like extortion and drugs smuggling are a major concern in the region. The state lies in a major smuggling route between Bangladesh and India.

Mizoram and Tripura have shown remarkable success in controlling insurgency and now they are largely peaceful.

Arunachal Pradesh

The people of three eastern districts of Arunachal Pradesh, namely Tirap, Changlang and Longding live in perpetual fear due to presence of cadres of two NSCN factions in the area, who resort to kidnapping, extortion and factional feuds. These three districts are a part of NSCN-IM’s  projected state of Nagalim (Greater Nagaland).

Arunachal Pradesh has also been used as atransit rout by the ULFA (United Liberation Front of Asom).

The next part in this series will analyse the factors responsible for the insurgency, the challenges being faced and  the impact of insurgency on the region’s economy (click here for Part 2). This is supposed to be one of the most comprehensive series in Internal Security related Issues. Your feedback is welcome ?

In the fourth part of the Naxalism series, we focus on the Government’s strategy in tackling Naxalism and the way ahead. (The first part of the series on the history and evolution of Naxalismis is here. The second part on the factors responsible for the rise of Naxalism is here. The third part on the security threats posed by Naxalism is here.)

The Government’s strategy to address Left Wing Extremism (LWE)

1. Ban on CPI Maoist, along with all its formations and front organizations under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.

2. Assistance to LWE States: ‘Police’ and ‘Public order’ being State subjects, action with respect to maintenance of law and order lies primarily in the domain of the concerned State Governments. However, the Central Government closely monitors the situation and coordinates and supplements their efforts in several ways to deal with the LWE problem. These include:

• providing Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) and Commando Battalions for Resolute Action (CoBRA),
• setting up of Counter Insurgency and Anti Terrorism (CIAT) schools;
• modernization of the State Police and their Intelligence apparatus etc.

Assistance is also provided by the central government under the following schemes:

• Security Related Expenditure Scheme (SRE)
• Special Infrastructure Scheme (SIS)
• Central Scheme for assistance to civilian victims/family of victims of terrorist, communal and naxal violence
• Civic Action Programme (CAPs)

3. Action Plan: The Government has formulated National Policy and Action Plan adopting four pronged strategy in the areas of security, development, ensuring rights & entitlement of local communities and management of public perception.

4. Strengthening the intelligence mechanism: This includes intelligence sharing through Multi-Agency Centre (MAC) at the central level and State Multi Agency Centre (SMAC) at the subsidiary level on 24×7 basis.

5. Better inter-state coordination by way of frequent meetings and interaction between the bordering districts of LWE affected states.

6. Media plan: The media has proved to be a potent instrument in creating awareness among the target population about the socio-economic developmental schemes of the Government and their rights & entitlements. The media has also helped to highlight LWE activities to make people aware as to how LWE violence is preventing implementation of the welfare and development schemes, policies and initiatives of the Government.

7. A Surrender and Rehabilitation Policy for LWE cadre surrenderees.

8. Roshani Scheme (Ministry of Rural Development): It is a placement linked skill development scheme for rural and tribal population, in worst affected districts. It emphasizes on special efforts to proactively cover the particularly vulnerable tribal groups (PVTGs) on a priority basis.

Related: What is Salwa Judum? Read here for details.

A few success stories in the fight against Naxalism

Sandesh( Bihar)

Sandesh block in Bihar has seen a gradual elimination of Naxalites. The most important factor which proved instrumental in dismantling naxal dominance was the panchayat elections initiated in Bihar. It created a significant distance between the Naxal leaders and the local community. Social pressure forced many naxalites to switch over to farming and shed off their association with naxal outfits.

Aasdwar project in Jehanabad (Bihar)

Under this project, 5 Naxalite affected panchayats (Jehanabad district of Bihar) are witnessing a flurry of development activities on a war footing e.g. construction of cement lanes, link roads, drains, buildings for schools and anganwadis, individual toilets etc. The people, at large, seem to have embraced the programme in a big way. So, as this case study amplifies, Naxalism can be defeated and eliminated by the process of development and a new social order but the change has to come from within.

AP greyhounds model

Andhra Pradesh’s Greyhound naxal fighting force along with infrastructure development and effective surrender and rehabilitation policy has also proved effective.  Other elements in the Andhra Pradesh model include:

• Culture of police leadership
• Sound knowledge of local terrain
• Incentives to police for good work
• Operations based on local intelligence
• Grass roots involvement in anti-Naxal operations

The way forward:

Naxalism is not merely a law and order issue. To truly eliminate naxalism, we must undercut its raison d’être, its reason for existence. While the methods of Naxalites may be abhorrent, most of their goals (apart from overthrowing the government) are not. The government must fulfill these goals for them so that they have nothing to fight for.

The government must adopt a multipronged composite strategy. We can broadly divide the strategy as follows:

1. Development strategy:

• Better infrastructure in core naxal areas
• Special forcus on political security and accelerated socio economic development in a holistic manner
• Political parties must strengthen their cadre base in naxal areas
• Decentralisation and participative democracy
• Better implementation of government schemes

2. Security strategy

• Promote local resistance groups on lines on ‘village defence committees’ in J&K
• Formation of specially trained special task forces on the pattern of Greyhounds in affected states
• Professional dominance by security forces with primacy of state police at all levels
• Modernisation and upgradation of state police infrastructure, weapons and technical equipment
• Strengthening local intelligence units
• Tightening control on availability of explosives
• Posting of competent and motivated police officers in LWE affected areas

3. Psychological Operations

• Administration should engage with public at large, civil society, NGOs to restore people’s faith and confidence in the government machinery
• Media and public perception management

4. Other measures

• The doors for peace talks should always be open
• There should be genuine attempts to win the hearts and minds of people
• Time-bound conviction of arrested cadre must be ensured through vital reforms in criminal justice system
• Effective surrender and rehabilitation policy ensuring proper safety and care of their families
• Better adherence to law legislated for protection and development of tribals

5. Understanding the tribal psychology and addressing their concerns:

Efforts should be made to better understand the tribal psychology e.g. the tribals having been left out of the development process are also oblivious to the potential enhancement in the quality of life if the growth process were to touch them. If they knew the potential benefits of growth, they would realize the futility of violence and see reason to participate in the growth process and become part of the mainstream without losing their identity and culture.

Another example:The tribals’ opposition to part away with their land is not only due to livelihood concerns, but also their shield against a system they are unfamiliar with. The fear of not being fit enough to participate in a system alien to them also adds as a disincentive to give up their land. This, in the end, results in a conflict as there is a clash of ideas that ultimately drives the tribals further away from the mainstream and the reach of the Indian State.

Efforts should therefore be made to better understand the tribal psychology and address their concerns.

Related example: A tradition that lands tribal youth in jail.

6. Need for policy changes:

Nanadan Nilekani in his book ‘Imagining India’ argues that empowering local tribal communities to take decisions on forest resources and environment through PESA and the Forest Rights Act can enable them to leverage their lands for economic gains. Nilekani argues that the challenges posed by climate change have actually opened up the possibility of integrating the unorganized economic activity of the tribals. He adds that once resource rights are established, rural and tribal communities can earn incomes by participating in carbon cap and trading schemes with businesses and industries. Connecting these tribal groups (in the same way NCDEX has connected India’s farmers to commodity markets) would bring these communities into our markets in big way.

But, measures such as these require drastic policy shifts at the very top. An environment policy for the future could indirectly bring the historically marginalized citizens of India i.e. the tribals into the mainstream facilitating participation in the larger growth process of an economically resurgent India.

Relevant: The example of the Apatani tribe of Arunachal Pradesh.

Better still : Read up our stories on tribal issues and tribal development in 2015.

In the third part of the Naxalism series, we focus on the security threats posed by Naxalism and the challenges faced in dealing with it. (The first part of the series on the history and evolution of Naxalismis is here. The second part on the factors responsible for the rise of Naxalism is here.)

Security dangers are aptly described by a former Pakistani Director General of the Inter-Services Intelligence and his description of India’s foreign affairs. He equated India being busy with internal security problems to having two extra divisions in the Pakistani army for free.

Naxalite movement: the biggest internal security threat to India:

Former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh described Naxalism as the most significant threat to internal security being faced by the country. This proposition is true as it highlights India’s interior weaknesses, which make India vulnerable to external threats. It affects several areas including the economy, security and foreign affairs, its citizens and the rule of law:

1. Impact on security and foreign affairs: Links with other terrorist organisations and foreign countries:

The CPI(Maoist) has frequently expressed solidarity with the Jammu and Kashmir terrorist groups and north-east insurgent groups. The CPI(Maoist) has also had close links with foreign Maoist organisations like Turkey, Phillipines,South asian countries     etc.

2. Impact on economy: More the Maoists concentrate in the poor and marginalised regions of India, the more the economic development (which is imperative to improving these regions) will be hampered. The Naxalite activities are using up scarce resources on defence and internal security when it should be spent on areas such as social development.

3. Impact on citizens and the rule of law: Not only has there been a great loss of life since the conflict between the guerrillas and the military, but addressing the problem through violence risks polarizing people further and driving them to subservience.

Guerrilla warfare is a threat not only to citizens’ lives but also to their property. Too impatient and desperate to wait for government intervention, civilians such as landlords are taking matters into their own hands.

As writer Navlakha noted , by portraying the Maoists as a ‘menace’ and separating the movement from socio-economic causes, it “allows the rich and poor divide to impose itself on a formal democratic structure”. Navlakha gives the example of Bihar where Naxalite groups are banned under the Prevention of Terrorist Activities Act, yet a majority of the massacre were committed by landlord armies which were not considered an act of terror under the law. Such treatment for the upper class only serves to threaten the rule of law, state legitimacy and democracy as the political norm.

Challenges in dealing with Naxalites:

 1. Expansion in adjoining areas due to hard combat:

Hard combat against the Naxals pushes them out temporarily but they use other states to regroup and rearm. This can be associated with the Andhra Pradesh model, where the intensive use of Greyhounds had led to a lot of spillover to other states.

2. Expansion due to increasing association with Anti-state forces:

New territory in new states may result in a corridor for Naxals to collaborate with other insurgent groups who are essentially ideologically different but are anti-state. There has been increasing collaboration between the naxals and the pro-Azadi leaders in J&K and ULFA training  the naxal cadres.

3. Expansion of Naxal activities due to international collaboration:

The likely collaboration with international maoist movements, may give it a much more dangerous dimension, to tackle which India seems to be unprepared. There is also an increasing threat of rising terror outfits’ support to the naxal operations in India.

 4. Administrative hurdles in dealing with LWE:

• Poor infrastructure, lack of communication and shortage of manpower
• A virtual parallel government run by Maoists in Dandakaranya region
• Poor coordination among various state police forces
• Lack of proper understanding between the central and state forces

5. Intellectual support to naxalism:

Top intellectuals like Arundhati Roy and Binayak Sen regularly support naxalism, advocating an egalitarian society, human rights and tribal rights. But use of violent means cannot be supported to achieve a noble cause in a democratic setup. Rather than a blind support, the intellectuals should also encourage Naxals to eschew violence, fight elections, join mainstream society and learn the art of give and take of democratic bargaining without aggression.

Thats it for this part! The next part in this series will analyse the Government’s strategy in tackling Naxalism and the way ahead.(Click here for part 4). This is supposed to be one of the most comprehensive series in Internal Security related Issues. Your feedback is welcome ?

In the second part of the series on Naxalism, we analyse the ideology and objectives of Naxalites and the factors responsible for the rise and spread of Naxalism in India. (The first part of the series is here.)

Ideology and objectives of Naxalites:

From their ideology, it appears that naxalites are fighting for the rights of the poor and want to establish a people’s government, but the facts are quite contrary. Social uplifting of the downtrodden is not their real aim, rather it is political power.

They study the local problems and issues and use them as fodder to foster their end game which is clearly the seizure of power through violent means.

Maoists have vested interest in keeping poverty alive because it enables them to expand their territory. They don’t allow district administration to do any development work like building roads, improving electricity and water supply in these areas etc.

Modus Operandi

• Frontal Organisations of LWE

The Maoists use their front organisations like Revolutionary Democratic Front, Democratic Student Union etc to generate people’s sympathy through persistent pursuance of propaganda on issues like human rights violations by the security forces.

• Guerrilla warfare tactics

• Powerful propaganda machinery which is active in all major towns as well as in the national capital. They even have their supporters in the media.

• Tactical Counter Offensive Campaign (TCOC):

Maoists carry out violent activities called TCOC which run from March to early Monsoon in July. The Maoists usually resort to TCOC every year to put the security forces in disarray so that they can go on a recruitment drive.

• Fresh strategy of Maoists is to expand outside forests into the urban areas to win over non peasant classes and other social groups.

• The Maoists have also maimed and murdered those they suspect of being ‘informers’.

Sources of funding and linkages with organized crime:

The main source of funding of the LWE movements is extortion from government projects as well as from corporate companies working in their areas of influence. Most of the time, it is in the form of protection money. LWE is most intense precisely in areas which are rich in mineral resources. It therefore provides them enough scope for extortion.

Sometimes, they also resort to kidnapping and killings to terrorise and extort money.

Factors responsible for the rise and spread of LWE:

1. India’s Land Reform Policy

 Post independence, the land reform policy of India could not be successful in some parts of the nation, leading to the birth and growth of naxal movement in India.

2. Development Projects and Tribal Alienation

The tribals are driven by grievances with the Indian Government over decades long resource mismanagement and systematic marginalisation beginning with a series of development projects in the 1980s that removed tribals from their lands in the name of public good. The conflict between economic progress and aboriginal land rights continues to fuel the Naxalite’s activities.

Arundhati Roy, a Naxalite sympathiser said that the tribal forestlands should be called a “MoUist Corridor” instead of the “Maoist Corridor” as the people of these tribal forest lands have been wrestling with “memorandum of Understanding” (MoUs) of the mining companies.

The sociologist Walter Fernandes estimates that about 40% of all those displaced by government projects are of tribal origin.

3. Forest Protection Act of 1980

Although the legislation was an attempt to protect country’s natural resources from exploitation, the law essentially outlawed the existence of many tribal villages that had been in place for centuries. As areas were delineated as reserve forests, traditional occupations of even gathering twigs were forbidden. People who earned their livelihood through access to forest resources in a sustainable manner suddenly found themselves outside the law.

It was only in 2008 that amendment to forest rights act recognised the tribals’ rights over forest land and forest produce but animosity towards the government had already grown substantially exacerbated by the lack of basic development support to tribal villages.

4. Developmental Deficit and economic inequality

Tribal poverty today is worse than that of Scheduled castes and on par with those of sub-Saharan African countries.The districts that comprise the red corridor are among the poorest in the country.

A key characteristic of this region is non diversified economic activity solely dependent on primary sector. The region has significant natural resources, including mineral, forestry and potential hydroelectric generation capacity E.g. Chhattisgarh, Andhra Pradesh, Odisha, and Jharkhand account for approximately 85% of India’s coal resources. Exploitation of the natural resources for the economic progress of the country, ironically, has led to displacement and deprivation of the tribals, further leading to a feeling of alienation.

5. Social Conditions:

The area encompassed by the red corridor tends to have stratified societies, with caste and feudal divisions and violence associated with friction between different social groups.

6. The governance deficit:

• Lack of education facilities and basic sustainable employment
• Lack of basic healthcare facilities
• Infrastructure deficit
• Issues related to law and order, grievance redressal
• Lack of routine administration and poorly motivated public personnel
• Mismanagement and corruption in government schemes like Public Distribution System.
• Poor implementation of special laws
• High handedness of the local administration

7. Geographical factors:

The terrain in these areas is suitable for guerrilla tactics.

It is also because of the terrain that the reach and spread of governmental programmes has been slower in these areas.  In these remote upland areas, public officials are unwilling to work hard, and often unwilling to work at all and these postings are often termed as ‘punishment postings’. On the other hand, the Maoists are prepared to walk miles to hold a village meeting, and listen sympathetically to tribal grievances.

The Maoists live among, and in the same state of penury as, the tribals. Also, some of their actions have sometimes helped the adivasis. This is especially the case with rates for the collection of non-timber forest produce, such as tendu patta, which have gone up by as much 200% in areas where the Naxalites are active and the contractors fearful of their wrath.

8. Inability of the tribal leaders to get their grievances addressed by the formal political system. [The reasons behind this have been separately analysed here.]

Thats it for this part!

In the next part, we will analyse the security threats posed by Naxalism and the challenges faced in dealing with it. (Click here for part 3). This is supposed to be one of the most comprehensive series in Internal Security related Issues. Your feedback is welcome ?

It is commonly acknowledged that Dalits and Tribals are the two most disadvantaged sections of Indian society. Then, why is it that the former have been more effective in making their claims heard by the formal political system?

1. Weak literacy rates among tribals accompanied by a weak ‘articulation ratio’:

The literacy rate of tribals is 23.8%, considerably lower than that of the Dalits, which stands at 30.1%.

Tribals do not have national leaders; while such men as do represent them are not conversant enough with the languages and discourses of modern democratic politics.

On the other hand, in the case of the Dalits the presence of Ambedkar, in the past, and of Mayawati, in the present, has been complemented by an articulate second rung of activists, who know how to build political networks and lobby within and across parties.

2. Inability of tribals to project themselves on the national stage:

Dalits have been able to constitute themselves as an interest group on the national stage—they are treated in popular discourse as communities that are pan-Indian.

On the other hand, tribal claims remain confined to the states and districts in which they live. Unlike the Dalits, the adivasis continue to be seen only in discrete, broken-up, fragments.

3. Aspects of geography and demography:

The tribals of central India usually live in tribal villages, in hills and valleys where they outnumber the non tribals among them. However, in no single state of peninsular India are they in a majority. In Andhra Pradesh, for example, adivasis constitute 6% of the state’s population. In Maharashtra, the proportion is 9%; in Rajasthan, 12%. Even in states professedly formed to protect the tribal interest, such as Jharkhand and Chattisgarh, roughly two-thirds of the population is non tribal.

The Dalits too are a minority in every state, but unlike tribals, they live in mixed villages, alongside other castes and communities. This means that when election time comes, they can have a decisive impact even on constituencies not reserved for them. In most states of the Union, and in most districts in these states, they command between 10% and 20% of the vote. Therefore, political parties have to address the Dalit interest in a majority of Lok Sabha and Assembly constituencies.

Tribals, on the other hand, can influence elections only in the few, isolated districts where they are concentrated.

4. Lack of mobilization

Dalit mobilization on a provincial and national scale is also enabled by the structural similarities in the ways they experience oppression. For the caste system operates in much the same manner across India. It is therefore possible for them to build links and forge solidarities horizontally, across villages and districts and states.

On the other hand, there are many variations in the forms in which tribals experience oppression. In one place, their main persecutors are forest officials; in another place, moneylenders; in a third, development projects conducted under the aegis of the state; in a fourth, a mining project promoted by a private firm. In the circumstances, it is much harder to build a broad coalition of tribals fighting for a common goal under a single banner.

5. Role of intellectuals:

The Dalits have also been helped by the posthumous presence of Dr B. R. Ambedkar. He has been for them both example and inspiration, a man of towering intellect who successfully breached the uppercaste citadel and who, long after he is gone, encourages his fellows to do likewise.

The tribals, on the other hand, have never had a leader who could inspire admiration, or even affection, across the boundaries of state and language. Birsa Munda, for example, is revered in parts of Jharkhand; but he is scarcely known or remembered in the adivasi areas of Andhra Pradesh or Maharashtra.

6. Role of media:

The contrast between a relative Dalit visibility on the one hand, and tribal invisibility on the other, can also be illustrated with reference to the mainstream media. Both newspapers and television give a fair amount of coverage to the continuing victimization of Dalits. The tribals on the other hand, rarely have their concerns discussed or highlighted in talk shows, editorials, reports, or feature articles.