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GS Paper: GS2-09.Appointment to various Constitutional posts; Constitutional Bodies(powers, functions and responsibilities); Statutory, Regulatory and Quasi-judicial bodies

  • The Election Commission — autonomy in the crosshairs

    What’s the news?

    • In recent times, the Election Commission of India (ECI) has emerged as a battleground where conflicts between the government and the judiciary come to the fore. The current divergence of opinions centers around the process of appointing officials within the ECI.

    Central idea

    • The Supreme Court’s unanimous verdict, issued on March 2, directed the President to appoint the Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) and Election Commissioners (ECs) based on a committee’s recommendation. This decision aimed to bolster the ECI’s constitutional stature and curtail political influence. However, the government introduced a bill in the Rajya Sabha on August 10 that, if passed, will overturn this verdict.

    The CEC and Other ECs Bill, 2023

    • The bill aims to bring about significant changes in the process of appointing the Chief Election Commissioner and other Election Commissioners, as well as in defining the conditions of their service and their terms of office.
    • The bill intends to repeal the Election Commission (Conditions of Service of Election Commissioners and Transaction of Business) Act, 1991, which currently governs the appointment, conditions of service, and term of office of the Election Commissioners.

    The significance of the Supreme Court’s judgment

    • Broadening the Selection Process: The judgment introduces a selection committee comprising the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha or leader of the largest Opposition party, and the Chief Justice of India (CJI). This broadens the decision-making process beyond the central government.
    • Enhanced Constitutional Status: The judgment elevates the constitutional status of the Election Commission by involving key figures such as the CJI in the selection committee. This underscores the importance of the institution in India’s democratic framework.
    • Dilution of Government Control: The involvement of the CJI and opposition leaders reduces the potential for appointments to be influenced solely by the ruling government. This ensures a more balanced and impartial selection process.
    • Transparency and Representation: The judgment promotes transparency and accountability by including multiple stakeholders in the selection process. This prevents appointments from occurring behind closed doors and enhances public trust.
    • Mitigating Bias and Partisanship: The inclusion of the CJI adds a judicial perspective to appointments, preventing potential biases or affiliations towards any political party. This safeguards the Election Commission’s credibility and neutrality.
    • Safeguarding Democratic Processes: By reinforcing the principles of fairness, inclusivity, and autonomy in the appointment process, the judgment ensures that the Election Commission continues to uphold the integrity of democratic elections.

    Legislative concerns associated with the bill

    • Alteration of Committee Composition: The Bill aims to replace the Chief Justice of India (CJI) with a Union Cabinet Minister in the selection committee. This change would shift the balance of the committee’s decision-making dynamics.
    • Potential for Government Influence: By replacing the CJI with a Union Cabinet Minister, the government could gain greater influence over the appointment process, raising concerns about the potential for political bias and government control.
    • Diminished Judicial Perspective: The removal of the CJI from the selection committee might lead to a reduced judicial perspective in the appointments, potentially undermining the objective of preventing political bias.
    • Government’s Priorities: The introduction of this bill could be seen as an attempt by the government to assert more authority over the Election Commission’s top appointments, potentially impacting the institution’s autonomy.
    • Shift in Democratic Safeguards: The alteration of the committee’s composition could potentially weaken the system of checks and balances established by the Supreme Court’s judgment, shifting the balance of power in favor of the ruling government.
    • Public Perception and Trust: The legislative challenge posed by the bill could raise concerns about the government’s intentions regarding the Election Commission’s autonomy and the transparency of appointments.
    • Political Dynamics: The bill’s introduction might impact the ongoing political dynamics between the government and opposition parties, potentially leading to debates and negotiations around the selection committee’s composition.
    • Potential Legal Debates: The proposed changes might lead to legal debates about the compatibility of the bill with the Supreme Court’s judgment and the broader constitutional principles it aims to uphold.
    • Future Institutional Reforms: The outcome of this legislative challenge could have broader implications for the appointment processes of other constitutional and statutory bodies, potentially setting a precedent for changes in their selection procedures.

    Historical debates and recommendations related to the appointment process of the CEC and ECs

    • Constituent Assembly Debates (1949): During the Constituent Assembly debates, there was a suggestion to subject the appointment of the CEC to confirmation by a two-thirds majority in a joint session of Parliament. However, the final decision was to empower Parliament to make appropriate laws on this matter.
    • V.M. Tarkunde Committee (1975): This committee appointed by Jayaprakash Narayan recommended that the appointments of ECs should be more broad-based, involving a collegium-like approach, rather than relying solely on the government’s advice.
    • Dinesh Goswami Committee (1990s): Set up by Prime Minister V.P. Singh, this committee on electoral reforms suggested a collegium-based approach for appointing ECs to enhance credibility and impartiality.
    • Second Administrative Reforms Commission (2009): The commission’s fourth report recommended a comprehensive collegium-based appointment process to ensure the independence and neutrality of the Election Commission.
    • B.B. Tandon’s Suggestion (2006): Former CEC B.B. Tandon proposed a committee, headed by the Prime Minister, for appointing the CEC and ECs. The committee should include the Lok Sabha Speaker, the Leaders of the Opposition, the Law Minister, the Deputy Chairperson of the Rajya Sabha, and a judge nominated by the Chief Justice of India.
    • Arun Jaitley’s Statement (2006): BJP General Secretary Arun Jaitley supported a representative collegium, including the Chief Justice of India, to appoint apex electoral officials. He emphasized that government monitoring would undermine the commission’s independence.
    • L.K. Advani’s Proposal (2012): BJP leader L.K. Advani suggested a collegium with the Prime Minister as chairman, including the CJI, the Minister of Law and Justice, and the Leaders of the Opposition from both Houses.

    Way forward

    • Engage Stakeholders: Collaborate with legal experts, opposition parties, and civil society to incorporate diverse perspectives for a balanced and effective appointment process.
    • Public Understanding: Emphasize transparent communication to articulate the rationale behind any changes in the appointment process, fostering public understanding and trust.
    • Learn from History: Draw guidance from historical recommendations such as the Dinesh Goswami Committee and Second Administrative Reforms Commission to shape a more transparent and inclusive appointment process.
    • Judicial Involvement: Consider the significance of judicial involvement in the selection committee to maintain checks and balances and prevent undue political influence.
    • Legislative Scrutiny: Ensure comprehensive examination and scrutiny of the proposed changes through parliamentary debates and discussions during the legislative process.
    • Constitutional Alignment: Ensure that any modifications adhere to constitutional principles, upholding the democratic foundations of the country’s governance.

    Conclusion

    • The current debate underscores the intricate interplay between democratic integrity and political maneuvering. The forthcoming decisions will shape the ECI’s trajectory, determining whether it maintains its unbiased autonomy or inches closer to political control. To safeguard democracy and uphold the integrity of elections, maintaining the ECI’s independence remains paramount.

  • Independence of Constitutional Authorities Is An Important Issue

    Central Idea

    • The recent comments made by the Supreme Court regarding the independence of constitutional authorities in India is an important issue. The need for independent institutions and a system of checks and balances is essential to prevent the arbitrary use of power by the government. The appointment process of key constitutional positions needs to be safeguarded from the whims of the executive.

    Need for Independent Institutions

    • Executive interference: The Constituent Assembly of India had recognized the need for independent institutions to regulate sectors of national importance without any executive interference.
    • Constitutional bodies: Various constitutional authorities such as the Public Service Commission, the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG), the Election Commission of India (ECI), the Finance Commission, and the National Commissions for Scheduled Castes (SC), Scheduled Tribes (ST) and Backward Classes (BC) have been set up for this purpose.
    • Need complete independence: Such constitutional bodies must be provided complete independence to enable them to function without fear or favor and in the larger interests of the nation.

    Appointment Process for Constitutional Authorities

    • Appointments are critical for independence: The appointment of individuals heading these institutions is critical to ensuring their independence.
    • Safeguarded from the whims of the executive: While empowering the President of India to appoint all constitutional authorities, the Constitution-makers had kept in mind those institutions whose independence is of paramount importance to the country and the manner in which the independence of these authorities could be safeguarded from the whims of the executive

    Appointment of Judges and Other Constitutional Positions

    • The Constitution provides for certain conditions to be fulfilled by those who may be considered for such appointments.
    • Role of governors: The appointment of Judges of the Supreme Court and the High Court, the CAG of India, and Governors are to be kept free from political or executive pressure.
    • For instance, appointment of the CAG:
    • In the draft Constitution, the article for the appointment of the CAG had provided that, there shall be an Auditor General who shall be appointed by the President. The Constituent Assembly further discussed that The Auditor-General should be always independent of either the legislature or the executive.
    • The process of selecting a person to be appointed as the CAG of India should begin by appointing a committee consisting of the Speaker of the Lok Sabha, the Chief Justice of India, and the Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee to shortlist names to be considered for appointment as the CAG of India; and a panel of three names should be forwarded to the President for him to make the final selection as in Article 148 of the Constitution of India.

    Supreme court on appointment of CEC, EC’s and Governor

    • Appointment of CEC and EC’s: The Supreme Court has taken an important step in ensuring the independence of the Election Commission of India by divesting the executive of its sole discretion in appointing the Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) and Election Commissioners (ECs) by forming a committee to suggest suitable names to man these constitutional posts.
    • Appointment of Governors: The Court expressed serious concern over the active role being played by Governors in State politics, observing that Governors becoming part of political processes is disconcerting. The appointment process for Governors needs to be unrestricted and unfettered to ensure that the President is free from the influence of the Legislature.

    Conclusion

    • It is necessary to ensure the independence of constitutional authorities to enable them to function without fear or favor and in the larger interests of the nation. The appointment process for key constitutional positions must be safeguarded from the whims of the executive. The recent comments of the Supreme Court regarding the independence of constitutional authorities in India are a reminder of the need to ensure that the appointment process for such positions is free from political or executive pressure.

    Mains Question

    Q. The issues over the independence of constitutional authorities in India is often in the headlines. In this light discuss why is it necessary to ensure the independence of constitutional authorities, and what are the implications of failing to do so?

  • Reforming the Election Commission

    Election Commission

    Context

    • A five-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court is examining a bunch of petitions recommending reforms in the process of appointment of members of the Election Commission.

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    Electoral reforms and reluctant Governments

    • Long pending reforms: A list of over 20 reform proposals was compiled in 2004. More proposals were added to the list over time and are pending with government.
    • Ineffective model code of conduct: These range from strengthening the Commission’s inherent structure to handling the misuse of muscle and money power during elections, which violate the Model Code of Conduct.
    • Judicial intervention because of reluctant Government: It is hoped that the Bench will also examine electoral reforms suggested to governments by successive Election Commissions over the last two decades or so.

    Issue of appointment of election commissioners

    • The Dinesh Goswami Committee in 1990: It is suggested that the Chief Election Commissioner be appointed by the President (read: executive) in consultation with the Chief Justice of India and the Leader of the Opposition (and in case the Leader of the Opposition was not available, then consultation be held with the leader the largest opposition group in the Lok Sabha).
    • Statutory backing for collegium led appointment: It said this process should have statutory backing. Importantly, it applied the same criteria to the appointments of Election Commissioners, along with consultation with the Chief Election Commissioner.
    • The National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution: The commission under Justice M.N. Venkatachalam, said that the Chief Election Commissioner and other Election Commissioners should be appointed on the recommendation of a body comprising the Prime Minister, the Leaders of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha, the Speaker of the Lok Sabha and the Deputy Chairman of the Rajya Sabha.
    • The 255th Report of the Law Commission: Chaired by Justice A.P. Shah, said the appointment of all the Election Commissioners should be made by the President in consultation with a three-member collegium consisting of the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition of the Lok Sabha (or the leader of the largest opposition party in the Lok Sabha), and the Chief Justice of India.

    Election Commission

    What is T.N.Seshan case?

    • Conferred equal power on election commissioners: The T.N.Seshan case conferred equal powers on the Election Commissioners as those enjoyed by the Chief Election Commissioner (referring to the Chief Election Commissioner as primus inter pares, or first among equals).
    • Equal protection was not conferred: Supreme court offered majority power, whereby any two can overrule even the Chief Election Commissioner. Yet, it did not accord the Election Commissioners the same constitutional protection (of removal by impeachment) as is accorded to the Chief Election Commissioner.

    Election Commission

    Why security of tenure is important for Election Commissioners?

    • Hesitancy to act: Without security of tenure, they may hesitate to act independently, which they otherwise might if they were truly secure.
    • Junior to chief election commission: In the absence of full constitutional security, an Election Commissioner could feel they must keep on the right side of the Chief Election Commissioner.
    • Remain loyal to government: They might also feel they should remain within the ambit favoured by the government.
    • Fear of non-elevation: An Election Commissioner can never be sure whether they will automatically be elevated to the top post because nowhere has elevation been statutorily decreed.

    What are the suggested reforms?

    • Same procedure for removal of judge: It is suggested measures to safeguard Election Commissioners from arbitrary removal, in a manner similar to what is accorded to the Chief Election Commissioner, who can only be removed by impeachment, which is by no means easy.
    • Appointment by collegium: While the Chief Election Commissioner should be appointed by a collegium, this must apply equally to the Election Commissioners.
    • Reform by constitutional amendments: The Election Commissioners must now equally be protected from arbitrary removal by a constitutional amendment that would ensure a removal process that currently applies only to the Chief Election Commissioner.

    Election Commission

    Conclusion

    • Reforms in election commission is absolutely necessary but manner of reforms is debatable. Judiciary’s role is not to reform the institution but to deliver the justice. This might be another case of judicial overreach in legislative domain any reform. Any reform in election commission has to come from legislature.

    Mains Question

    Q. What are the necessary reforms in Election commission of India? Why security of tenure is important for election commissioners?

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  • Election Commission can not breach Fundamental Rights

    Election

    Context

    • Preparations are going on in full swing for the upcoming Assembly elections in Gujarat. Election Commission had signed MoUs with over 1,000 corporate houses undertaking to monitor electoral participation of their workforce and publish on their websites and notice boards those who do not vote.

    Background

    • In June, the EC had asked central and state government departments, public sector units and corporate entities with over 500 employees to appoint nodal officers to identify employees who take leave on polling day but do not vote, The Indian Express reported.
    • The Chief Electoral Officer of Gujarat has said that the employees of state public sector units and government departments who don’t vote will also be tracked.
    • The report also mentioned that on a recent visit to Gujarat, the CEC himself had said that though the commission cannot enforce compulsory voting, it “wanted to identify workers in big industries who don’t vote despite availing the holiday”.

    All you need to know about Election Commission of India

    • The ECI is a constitutional authority whose responsibilities and powers are prescribed in the Constitution of India under Article 324.
    • In the performance of its functions, the Election Commission is insulated from executive interference.
    • It is the Commission that decides the election schedules for the conduct of elections, whether general elections or by-elections.
    • ECI decides on the location of polling stations, assignment of voters to the polling stations, location of counting centers, arrangements to be made in and around polling stations and counting centers and all allied matters.

    Importance of Election Commission of India

    • Conduction of Election: The ECI has been successfully conducting national as well as state elections since 1952.
    • Electoral participation: In recent years, however, the Commission has started to play a more active role to ensure greater participation of people.
    • Discipline of political parties: It had gone to the extent of disciplining the political parties with a threat of derecognizing if the parties failed in maintaining inner-party democracy.
    • Upholds federalism: It upholds the values enshrined in the Constitution viz, equality,
      equity, impartiality, independence; and rule of law in superintendence, direction, and control over electoral governance.
    • Free and fair elections: It conducts elections with the highest standard of credibility, freeness, fairness, transparency, integrity, accountability, autonomy and professionalism.

    What is the criticism over the EC’s move to track who do not vote?

    • Unethical and against the democracy: Any coercion particularly coercion of the kind being proposed by the EC in this case betrays an authoritarian approach that is not only antithetical to democracy but is directly violative of the Constitution and the laws of the land.
    • Against the freedom of Expression: Constitution provides a fundamental right of freedom of expression. (Article 19). It is individual’s choice to cast their Right to vote or not to vote.
    • Revealing Identity would be violative of Article 14: Protection of elector’s identity and affording secrecy is therefore integral to free and fair elections and an arbitrary distinction between a voter who casts and a voter who does not cast his vote is violative of Article 14. Thus, secrecy is to be maintained for both categories of persons.” the list of non-voters be put up on a company’s notice board or website? It will clearly be contempt of court.
    • Supreme Court’s judgement on NOTA and mandatory voting: The Supreme Court, in PUCL vs Union of India, 2013, (popularly known as the NOTA judgment) has held that abstention from voting and negative voting are protected as freedom of expression a fundamental right. Earlier, in April 2009, the Court had taken the same view while dismissing a plea that sought to make voting mandatory on grounds of governments not representing the majority because of low turnouts.
    • No of circumstances that one can’t vote on the day: In every election, there will be those who do not vote out of conviction or for ideological reasons. More importantly, there are millions of daily wage workers, and many homeless and ill.

    Election

    What are the legal and constitutional provisions for a citizen?

    • Section 79 D of RPA Act: Section 79 of the Representation of People Act, 1951 defines “electoral right” to mean the right of a person to vote or refrain from vote at an election”. The law completely enables, but does not force, citizens to vote. The same provision exists in the Indian Penal Code, vide Section 171A (b).
    • Section135B of the RPA Act: Section135B of the Representation of People Act, 1951, grants a paid holiday to every person employed in any business, trade, industrial undertaking or any other establishment.
    • A compulsory paid Holiday: Even a daily wage worker shall be paid for the day.The only exception is essential services Contravention of the law carries a fine for the employer which may extend to Rs 500, which was fixed over 25 years ago.

    Rulings of the supreme court on the matter of voting rights

    • Free and fair election is a basic structure: In PUCL vs Union of India, the Court said: “free and fair election is a basic structure of the Constitution and necessarily includes within its ambit the right of an elector to cast his vote without fear of reprisal, duress or coercion.

    Election

    What does the Election Commission say over this new development?

    • Clarification by Chief Electoral Officer of Gujarat: MoU’s are signed in the form of appeal for increasing registration and voter turnout, establish voter awareness forum in their organizations.
    • To track electoral participation: Election Commission said that it will help to track electoral participation of their workforce.
    • Less voting percentage: Out of seven least voting percentage districts during 2019 general elections, four were metropolitan cities. Voting percentage in urban areas is generally less, pulling down the overall voting percentage.
    • Purpose is to educate voters: CEC clarified MoU’s are only for voter education and facilitation and not for compelling them to vote.

    Election

    How to address the issue of less participation of voters?

    • Systematic voter education programme: The noble objective of enhanced voter participation can be best achieved through systematic voter education, amply demonstrated by the ECI in elections in all the states and Union territories since 2010 when a voter education division was set up. This soon evolved into its SVEEP programme. This has led to all elections ever since seeing the highest-ever turnouts.
    • Through Motivation and facilitation: The EC’s consistent efforts should be towards motivation and facilitation, rather than compulsion, are the best ways to address the issue.
    • The voter education programme: The voter education programme has sought to motivate the youth to participate in democracy by registering as voters, voting in every election and voting ethically that is, without inducement. It has involved schools and colleges to take the registration facility to the doorstep by introducing voter clubs, and youth icons and placing drop boxes in the public locations and online drop boxes.
    • Awareness in the corporate setup: Employers have been encouraged to create similar facilities in their offices. They are legally obliged to close their establishments on poll day, but this is seldom enforced.

    Conclusion

    • The noble objective of enhanced voter participation can be best achieved through systematic voter education, and awareness programs and not the cost of fundamental rights of the citizen which is enshrined the fundamental law of the land. Motivation and awareness could be the way for enhancing voter participation.

    Mains Question

    Q. What is the role of Election Commission of India? How do you see the compulsory voting in the light of the Constitution of India under the EC’s mandate of free and fair election? Discuss

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  • Parliamentary Standing Committees

    Parliamentary CommitteesContext

    • In the recent monsoon session of Parliament (July-August) the Competition (Amendment) Bill, 2022 and the Electricity (Amendment) Bill, 2022 sent to the Parliamentary Committees for detailed examination and a report thereon.

    Background

    • Parliament had only limited legislative time this session and could pass only five pieces of legislation
    • Oppositions stand: opposition alleging that the Government has been trying to steamroll various pieces of legislation in the last few sessions.
    • Governments stand: Government worries that so much time is lost in disruptions in Parliament that the legislative process, as it is, becomes unduly delayed and therefore, referring the bills to the Standing Committees.

    Parliamentary CommitteesParliamentary Committees

    • Need of parliamentary committees: The functions of the Parliament are varied, complex and voluminous. Moreover, it has neither the adequate time nor necessary expertise to make a detailed scrutiny of all legislative measures.
    • Function: To assist parliament to discharge of its duties.
    • Mandate: To examine various legislations referred to it, the budget proposals of different Ministries, and also to do policy thinking on the vision, mission and future direction of the Ministries concerned.
    • Composition: Members of the Parliament of both the LokSabha and the RajyaSabha in the ratio 2:1,
    • Authority: constituted by the Speaker of the LokSabha and the Chairman of the RajyaSabha, jointly.
    • Classification: Broadly, two kinds–Standing Committees and Ad Hoc Standing Committees are permanent (constituted every year or periodically) and work on a continuous basis, while Ad Hoc Committees are temporary and cease to exist on completion of the task assigned to them.
    • Parliament has 24 Department Related Parliamentary Standing Committees (DRSC).

    Relevance of parliamentary committees

    • Withdrawal of farm law bills shows that if bills are not discussed thoroughly, these laws are just bizarre pieces of legislation from point of view consumers and stakeholders.
    • Parliamentary committee’s discussions are held closed door. Members can express their opinion freely.
    • Members of DRSC always try reach to consensus despite political differences. Such practices are essential for healthy democracy.
    • To strengthen the relevance of parliamentarians the parliamentary committees are crucial tools.

    Parliamentary CommitteesHow to improve Efficacy of committees?

    • Compulsory process: The Speaker of the Lok Sabha and the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha have powers to refer Bills to a DRSC of Parliament. Making the process of reference of Bills to these committees compulsory/an automatic process will be useful. An exemption could be made with the specific approval of the Speaker/ Chairman after detailed reasons for the same.
    • No whip: All discussions in the Parliamentary Standing Committee should be frank and free. No whip of the party would apply to them during the discussion.
    • Time bound: fixed timeline to come up with the recommendation and present its report which can be decided by the Speaker/Chairman. In case the committee if fails to give its recommendation within the approved/extended time, the Bill may be put up before the House concerned directly.
    • Inviting filed Expertise: To ensure quality work in the committees, experts in the field may be invited who could bring with them the necessary domain knowledge and also help introduce the latest developments and trends in that field from Some subject matter experts/young researchers could be associated with the committee for a short period would be fruitful.
    • Authority: The Speaker/Chairman should have the right to fix a time limit, sometimes even stringent, if the government of the day asks for it and the demand is found to be reasonable by the Speaker/Chairman.
    • Organized work in the gap: Between two sessions, there is generally enough time to organise committee meetings for discussions on Bills in the parliamentary committees. It is important for the Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs in collaboration with the committee chairmen to get these parliamentary works organized during the intersessional period, in advance.
    • Other than Budget Proposals: The committees should not limit themselves to discussing just the budget proposals and endorsing them with a few qualifications here or amendments there. They should also come up with suggestions for the Ministry to take up new initiatives and people friendly measures.

    Conclusion

    • Discussion is not a stumbling block but an indispensable preliminary of any wise actions.
    • Discussion is soul of democracy.
    • Parliamentary committees are truly democratic institutions in India due to its consensus and bonhomie while functioning.
    • Government of the day should take step to strengthen DRSC and refer more bills to committees. 

    Other related information

    Parliamentary sessions

    • The president from time to time summons each House of Parliament to meet.
    • The maximum gap between two sessions of Parliament cannot be more than six months.
    • In other words, the Parliament should meet at least twice a year.
    • There are usually three sessions in a year: 1. The Budget Session (February to May); 2. The Monsoon Session (July to September); and 3. The Winter Session (November to December).

    Competition Commission of India (CCI)

    • CCI is the chief national competition regulatorin India.
    • The commission was established on 14 October 2003. It became fully functional in May 2009
    • It is a statutory body within the Ministry of Corporate Affairs
    • Responsibility: To enforce the Competition Act, 2002 to promote competition and to prevent activities that effects negatively on competition in India.
    • The CCI looks into cases and investigates them if the same has a negative impact on competition.
    • CCI also approves combination under the act so that two merging entities do not overtake the market.

    Mains Question Q.

    Evaluate the significance of parliamentary standing committee in parliamentary democracy. Suggest the steps to strengthen the parliamentary committees.

     

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  • Why EC can’t delay upcoming polls

    Context

    Ever since the Allahabad High Court urged the Election Commission of India to consider banning all political rallies or postponing the upcoming Assembly elections due to the increasing threat of Omicron, the focus of debate has shifted to the EC.

    Why and when does the Election Commission clubs the elections?

    • To avoid the influence of result: As per practice, the EC clubs all elections that are so close to each other to ensure that the results in one state do not influence the voters in the state going to the polls soon after.
    • Earliest date: The earliest due date of a state determines the poll dates for all the clubbed states.
    • No delay allowed: The EC cannot delay an election even by a day, although it can advance it by up to six months.
    • The Assembly elections of five states are due in the early months of 2022, four of these in March itself — Goa (by March 15), Manipur (March 19), Uttarakhand (March 23) and Punjab (March 27).
    • The fifth — UP — is due by May 14.
    • Goa being the earliest, we must have all five elections completed before March 15.

    Why EC cannot postpone the elections?

    • Violation of Constitution: Postponing elections is not in the Election Commission’s hands at all and would be a violation of the constitutional mandate that gives every Vidhan Sabha a fixed term.
    • As soon as the term is over, the House stands dissolved automatically.
    • The term of the House cannot be extended except in an emergency declared by Parliament, which the Constitution restricts to only two situations — war and breakdown of law and order.
    • In the seven decades of our electoral history, this has happened only three times — in Assam, Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir — in insurgency situations.

    Way forward: Strict enforcement of guidelines

    • Before the Bihar elections of 2020, the EC had issued detailed guidelines based on its observation of other countries that conducted elections that year, like South Korea and Sri Lanka.
    • Reduction of the number of electors: These guidelines included the reduction of the number of electors per polling booth from 1,500 to 1,000, to prevent over-crowding, which required the addition of 33,797 auxiliary polling stations.
    • Covid-sensitive capacity building: The guidelines also included Covid-sensitive capacity-building of election officials.
    • Postal ballot option: The ECI also extended the postal ballot option to senior citizens over the age of 80, Covid-positive patients, persons with disabilities and voters in essential services.
    • Virtual campaigning: Virtual campaigning was also encouraged to stop election rallies contributing to Covid.
    • Besides the standard social distancing and sanitising norms, voters were provided with gloves to touch the EVMs.
    • To avoid crowding at the counting centres, the counting tables were reduced from 14 to seven per assembly constituency.

    Consider the question “What are the challenges in postponing the Assembly elections beyond the fixed terms of the Assembly? Suggest the way forward.”

    Conclusion

    This election is an opportunity for the EC to redeem its image. More importantly, it must guard itself against the trap of postponing the polls under any persuasion.

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  • Lokpal

    More than two years after the Lokpal came into being, the Centre is yet to appoint a director of inquiry for conducting a preliminary inquiry into graft complaints sent by the anti-corruption ombudsman.

    Who is ‘Director of Inquiry’?

    • According to the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013, there shall be a director of inquiry, not below the rank of Joint Secretary to the GoI.
    • He/ She shall be appointed by the Central government for conducting preliminary inquiries referred to the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) by the Lokpal.

    About the Lokpal

    • The Lokpal, the apex body to inquire and investigate graft complaints against public functionaries, came into being with the appointment of its chairperson and members in March 2019.
    • In March 2019, former SC judge Justice Pinaki Chandra Ghose was selected as the first head of the Lokpal.

    Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013

    • The Lokpal Act 2013 is anti-corruption legislation that seeks to provide for the establishment of the institution of Lokpal.
    • It seeks to inquire into allegations of corruption against certain important public functionaries including the PM, cabinet ministers, MPs, Group A officials of the Central Government etc.
    • The Bill was introduced in the parliament following massive public protests led by anti-corruption crusader Anna Hazare and his associates.
    • The Bill is one of the most widely discussed and debated Bills in India in recent times.

    Its history

    • The term Lokpal was coined in 1963 by Laxmi Mall Singhvi, a member of parliament during a parliamentary debate about grievance mechanisms.
    • The Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC) headed by Morarji Desai submitted an interim report on “Problems of Redressal of Citizen’s Grievances” in 1966.
    • In this report, ARC recommended the creation of two special authorities designated as ‘Lokpal’ and ‘Lokayukta’ for redress of citizens’ grievances.
    • Maharashtra was the first state to introduce Lokayukta through The Maharashtra Lokayukta and Upa-Lokayuktas Act in 1971.

    Also read:

    https://www.civilsdaily.com/news/explained-how-lokpal-will-form-function/

  • Independent panel to appoint EC members

    A petition was filed in the Supreme Court seeking the constitution of an independent collegium to appoint members of the Election Commission.

    Election Commission of India (ECI)

    • The ECI is a constitutional body responsible for administering elections in India according to the rules and regulations mentioned in the Constitution of India.
    • It was established on January 25, 1950.
    • The major aim of the election commission of India is to define and control the process for elections conducted at various levels, Parliament, State Legislatures, and the offices of the President and Vice President of India.
    • It can be said that the Election Commission of India ensures the smooth and successful operation of the democracy.

    Functions

    According to Article 324 of the Indian Constitution:

    • the ECI has superintendence, direction, and control of the entire process for conduct of elections to Parliament and Legislature (state legislative assembly & state legislative council) of every State and to
    • the offices of President and Vice-President of India

    Answer this PYQ in the comment box:

    Q.Consider the following statements:

    1. The Election Commission of India is a five-member body.
    2. Union Ministry of Home Affairs decides the election schedule for the conduct of both general elections and bye-elections.
    3. Election Commission resolves the disputes relating to splits/mergers of recognized political parties.

    Which of the statements given above is/are correct? (CSP 2017)

    (a) 1 and 2 only

    (b) 2 only

    (c) 2 and 3 only

    (d) 3 only

    Its composition

    • Initially, the commission had only a Chief Election Commissioner. Presently, it consists of a Chief Election Commissioner and two Election Commissioners.
    • For the first time, two additional Commissioners were appointed on 16th October 1989 but they had a very short term till 1st January 1990.
    • Afterwards, on 1st October 1993, two additional Election Commissioners were appointed.
    • The concept of a multi-member Commission has been in operation since then, with decision-making power by majority vote.

    Appointment & Tenure of Commissioners

    • The President has the power to select Chief Election Commissioner and Election Commissioners.
    • They have a tenure of six years, or up to the age of 65 years, whichever is earlier.
    • They have the same status and receive pay and perks as available to Judges of the Supreme Court of India.
    • The CEC can be removed from office only through accusation by Parliament.
    • The election commissioner or a regional commissioner shall not be removed from office except on the recommendation of the CEC.

    Why such demand for independent collegium?

    • The plea filed has said that the practice of government making the appointments is a violation of the Basic Structure of the Constitution and creates a dent in free and fair elections in a democracy.
    • The petition said the recommendation to have a neutral collegium to fill up vacancies in the Election Commission has been given by several expert committees, commissions from 1975.
    • The recommendation was also part of the Law Commission in its 255th report in March 2015.

    Basis for such demand

    • The EC is not only responsible for conducting free and fair elections, but it also renders a quasi-judicial function between the various political parties including the ruling government and other parties.
    • In such circumstances, the Executive cannot be the sole participant in the appointment of members of the Election Commission as it gives unfettered discretion to the ruling party.
    • Therefore it could appoint someone whose loyalty is ensured and thereby renders the selection process vulnerable to manipulation.

  • Enforcing COVID-19 rules is State’s responsibility: ECI

    What prompted ECI to give clarification

    • In its oral observations, the Madras High Court blamed the ECI for the second wave of COVID-19 in Tamil Nadu and Puducherry.
    • The Madras High Court said the ECI was unable to ensure political parties followed the rules while campaigning for the Assembly elections.

    What the ECI said

    • The ECI said that the enforcement under the 2005 Act has to be ensured by the SDMA [State Disaster Management Authority] concerned and notified authorities under the Act.
    • The Commission has always emphasised that the State authorities shall ensure COVID-19 compliance in the matter of public gatherings, etc. for campaign purposes.
    • At no occasion, the Commission takes over the task of SDMA for enforcement of COVID-19 instructions.

  • Still no recognition of the third tier

    The article highlights the issues with the Fifteenth Finance Commission recommendations with regard to the third tier of the local governments.

    Significance of Finance Commission recommendations for local government

    • The primary task of the Union Finance Commission is to rectify the vertical and horizontal imbalances in resources and expenditure responsibilities between Union and States including the third tier of local governments.
    • Part IX and Part IX-A were incorporated into the Constitution by the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendment.
    • Part IX and Part IX-A mandate the Union Finance Commission to supplement the resources of panchayats and municipalities on the basis of the recommendations of the State Finance Commission.
    • Now, nearly 2.5 lakh local governments and over 3.4 million elected representatives form the real democratic base of the Indian federal polity.

    Increase in vertical devolution

    • The Fifteenth Finance Commission has raised the vertical devolution recommended to local governments to 4.23% with a reasonably estimated amount of ₹4,36,361 crore.
    • Compared with the Fourteenth Finance Commission there is a 52% increase in the vertical share.
    • Even if we deduct the grant of ₹70,051 crore earmarked for improving primary health centres, the share is still an all-time high of 4.19%.
    • All the Commissions since the Eleventh Commission have tied specific items of expenditure to local grants and the Fifteenth Finance Commission has raised this share to 60% and linked them to drinking water, rainwater harvesting, sanitation and other national priorities in the spirit of cooperative federalism.

    Reduction in performance-based  grants

    • The Fifteenth Finance Commission has reduced the performance-based grant to just ₹8,000 crore — and that too for building new cities, leaving out the Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) altogether.
    • The performance-linked grants were introduced by the Thirteenth Finance Commission and covered a wide range of reforms.
    • The transformative potential in designing performance-linked conditionalities for improving the quality of decentralised governance in the context of indifferent states is missed.

    Encouraging standardisation of accounting system

    • An important recommendation of the Fifteenth Finance Commission is the entry-level criterion to avail the union local grant (except health grant) by local governments.
    • For panchayats, the condition is the online submission of annual accounts for the previous year and audited accounts for the year before.
    • For urban local governments, two more conditions are specified: fixation of the minimum floor for property tax and improvement in its collection.
    •  It is not clear why gram panchayats are left out from this.
    • Although Finance Commissions, from the Eleventh to the Fourteenth, have recommended measures to standardise the accounting system and update the auditing of accounts, the progress made has been halting.
    • Therefore, the entry-level criteria of the Fifteenth Finance Commission are timely.

    Missed opportunity to ensure minimum public services

    • The Fifteenth Finance Commission failed to carry policy choices forward systematically.
    • Articles 243G, 243W and 243ZD read along with the functional decentralisation of basic services like drinking water, public health care, etc., mandated in the Eleventh and Twelfth schedules demand better public services and delivery of ‘economic development and social justice’ at the local level.
    • A good opportunity to ensure comparable minimum public services to every citizen irrespective of her choice of residential location has not been taken forward in an integrated manner.

    Missing equalisation principle for the local government

    • The Fifteenth Finance Commission claims that it seeks to achieve the “desirable objective of evenly balancing the union and the states”.
    • It is not clear why there is no recognition of the third tier in this balancing act.
    • It may be relevant to recall that the Alma-Ata declaration of the World Health Organization (1978) which outlined an integrated, local government-centric approach with a simultaneous focus on access to water, sanitation, shelter and the like.
    • There is no integrated approach in the recommendations of the Fifteenth Finance Commission about the local governments (in contrast to the recommendations of the Thirteenth Finance Commission).
    • Although the Fifteenth Finance Commission stresses the need to implement the equalisation principle, it is virtually silent when it comes to the local governments.

    Equity and efficiency sidelined

    • The Fifteenth Finance Commission employed population (2011 Census) with 90% and area 10% weightage for determining the distribution of grant to States for local governments.
    • The same criteria were followed by the Fourteenth Finance Commission.
    • While this ensures continuity, equity and efficiency criteria are sidelined.
    • Abandoning tax effort criterion incentivises dependency, inefficiency and non-accountability.

    Consider the question “Discuss the various aspects of the Fifteenth Finance Commission’s recommendations with regard to local governments.”

    Conclusion

    In sum, if decentralisation is meant to empower local people, the primary task is to fiscally empower local governments to deliver territorial equity. We are far from this goal.