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GS Paper: GS2

  • Prevention of Insults to National Honour (Amendment) Bill, 2026

    Why in News?

    The Union Government introduced the Prevention of Insults to National Honour (Amendment) Bill, 2026 in the Rajya Sabha to extend statutory protection to the National Song (Vande Mataram).

    Key Highlights

    • Introduced by Minister of State for Home Nityanand Rai.
    • Seeks to amend the Prevention of Insults to National Honour Act, 1971.
    • Extends penalties for insulting the National Flag, Constitution, and National Anthem to the National Song.
    • Opposition members argued that the Constituent Assembly intentionally did not accord the National Song the same constitutional status as the National Anthem.
    • The government cited Dr. Rajendra Prasad’s statement (24 January 1950) that both should enjoy equal respect.

    National Anthem

    • Jana Gana Mana, composed by Rabindranath Tagore.
    • Adopted by the Constituent Assembly on 24 January 1950.
    • Full rendition duration: 52 seconds.

    National Song

    • Vande Mataram, composed by Bankim Chandra Chattopadhyay.
    • Taken from the novel Anandamath (1882).
    • Only the first two stanzas enjoy official status as the National Song.

    Prevention of Insults to National Honour Act, 1971

    • Prohibits insults to the National Flag, Constitution, and National Anthem.
    • Prescribes imprisonment up to 3 years, or fine, or both.
    • The 2026 Amendment Bill seeks to include the National Song within its ambit.

    [2023] Consider the following statements in respect of the National Flag of India according to the Flag Code of India, 2002:
    Statement-I: One of the standard sizes of the National Flag of India is 600 mm x 400 mm.
    Statement-II: The ratio of the length to the height (width) of the Flag shall be 3:2.
    Which one of the following is correcti in respect of the above statements?

    [A] Both Statement-I and Statement-II are correct and Statement-II is the correct explanation for Statement-l.

    [B] Both Statement-I and Statement-II are correct and Statement-II is not the correct explanation for Statement-I.

    [C] Statement-l is correct but Statement-II is incorrect is incorrect.

    [D] Statement-l is incorrect Statement-II is correct.

  • Zomato’s platform fee, delivery levy no abuse of dominance: CCI

    Why in News?

    The Competition Commission of India (CCI) ruled that Zomato’s platform fee, delivery charges, and commissions do not amount to abuse of dominant position or anti-competitive conduct.

    Key Highlights

    • CCI dismissed a consumer complaint against Zomato/Eternal over platform fees and price differences.
    • The higher online price was attributed to delivery charges, platform fee, and GST.
    • Restaurants stated that Zomato charges around 33% commission, leading some to increase online menu prices.
    • CCI held that online food delivery and in-person dining are distinct markets, making price differences commercially justifiable.
    • Mere price variation does not constitute an abuse of dominant position under competition law.

    Abuse of Dominant Position (Competition Act, 2002)

    • Dominance itself is not prohibited; only its abuse is.
    • Examples include:
      • Imposing unfair or discriminatory prices.
      • Limiting production or technical development.
      • Denying market access.
      • Leveraging dominance in one market to enter another.

    Competition Commission of India (CCI)

    • Statutory body established under the Competition Act, 2002.
    • Came into effect in 2009.
    • Objective: Prevent anti-competitive practices, prohibit abuse of dominant position, regulate combinations (mergers and acquisitions), and promote fair competition.

    PYQ (2023, GS2, 10 Marks) Discuss the role of the Competition Commission of India in containing the abuse of dominant position by the Multi-National Corporations in India. Refer to the recent decisions.

    [2022] With reference to foreign-owned e-commerce firms operating in India, which of the following statements is/are correct?
    1. They can sell their own goods in addition to offering their platforms as market-places.
    2. The degree to which they can own big sellers on their platforms is limited.
    Select the correct answer using the code given below:

    [A] 1 only

    [B] 2 only

    [C] Both 1 and 2

    [D] Neither 1 nor 2

    [D] 1, 2, 3 and 4

  • Warning signals for India from NATO’s Ankara Summit

    PYQ Relevance
    [UPSC 2023] The expansion and strengthening of NATO and a stronger US-Europe strategic partnership works well in India.” What is your opinion about this statement? Give reasons and examples to support your answer.
    Linkage: Examines the strategic implications of NATO’s evolving role and the US-Europe security partnership for India’s foreign and security policy. The article analyses the Ankara Summit’s defence commitments, Europe’s defence-industrial constraints, and how NATO’s expansion and military spending directly affect India’s defence preparedness and strategic autonomy.

    Mentor’s Comment

    The 32 heads of state or government of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) met at the Ankara Summit on July 7-8, 2026, to review progress since the 2025 Hague Summit and set out a roadmap for implementation. The summit locked in a fivefold rise in the defence-spending pledge and a commitment to build a Europe-wide Defence Industrial Base (DIB), even as Europe’s existing industry struggles to meet current demand.

    What four commitments came out of the Ankara Summit?

    1. Collective defence reaffirmed: All 32 allies affirmed an “ironclad commitment” to collective defence under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and to the transatlantic bond.
    2. Five per cent spending pledge: Allies unanimously endorsed “The Hague defence commitment,” under which every NATO member undertook to allocate at least five per cent of GDP to defence by 2035, up from the earlier two per cent pledge.
    3. Support for Ukraine: NATO declared “unwavering support” for Ukraine’s freedom, sovereignty and territorial integrity.
    4. European defence industrial base: Members committed to building a high-technology, high-capacity, Europe-wide Defence Industrial Base (DIB), the network of firms, factories, laboratories and skilled workers needed to build and sustain military power.
    5. Focus on implementation: Discussions at Ankara centred on converting these political commitments into military capability through investment, industrial capacity and innovation.

    Can Europe’s defence industry deliver on the pledge?

    1. Pre-existing shortages: European defence giants MBDA and Rheinmetall had warned of ammunition production shortages even before The Hague’s five per cent pledge.
    2. Evidence from the Iran campaign: Operation Epic Fury, the U.S.-Israel bombing campaign against Iran, saw the U.S. fire more than 850 Tomahawk cruise missiles; at the current production rate of 85 a year, replacing them would take a decade.
    3. Coordination gap: Many NATO members have capable Defence Industrial Bases (DIBs) individually, but there is little coordination of alliance-wide priorities.
    4. Concentrated mismatch: The resulting strategic mismatch found during the Ukraine war has clustered in air defence missiles and interceptors, precision-guided munitions, and artillery rockets.
    5. Deepening dependency, not reducing it: The U.S. supplied half of Europe’s defence spending between 2022-2024, up from 28% in 2019-2021, and without a major revitalisation of Europe’s own industry, the five per cent pledge will only deepen dependence on the U.S.
    6. Rising U.S. sales to Europe: Foreign Military Sales (FMS) notifications to the U.S. Congress for European customers have quadrupled since 2008, to $76 billion in 2024.

    How does NATO’s spending surge affect global arms buyers like India?

    1. Buyer’s market turning seller’s market: As NATO spends more, the international arms market is shifting from a buyers’ market to a sellers’ market for the world’s big arms buyers, including India.
    2. First warning sign: U.S. firm General Electric Aerospace has delayed supplying F-404 fighter jet engines, critically needed for the Indian Air Force’s (IAF) Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) programme.
    3. Competing demand: Asian allies’ rising demand for U.S. weaponry is competing directly with ongoing European needs for the same suppliers.

    What must India do in response?

    1. Growing reliance on new-age technology: India’s defence increasingly depends on drones, artificial intelligence (AI), cyber warfare, electronic warfare, and resilient networks.
    2. Self-reliance as the necessary response: India’s defence industry must achieve self-reliance in these technology areas rather than depend on suppliers who are themselves overstretched fighting their own battles.
    3. Mitigating Supply Chain Vulnerabilities: Avoid over-reliance on single-source western suppliers like General Electric who face competing allied demands. Push local aerospace and defense firms (such as HAL and private sector partners) to prioritize delayed components like fighter jet engines.
    4. Giving a big push to the private sector: Funding and orders should be increased for domestic defense startups working in the fields of drones, artificial intelligence (AI), and cybersecurity.
    5. Further expansion of the ‘Negative Import List’: The scope of the existing ‘Positive Indigenisation List‘ should be further expanded. There should be further expansion of the ‘Negative Import List‘. India’s Positive Indigenisation Lists (PIL) ban military imports, forcing procurement strictly from domestic makers. Managed via the Srijan Portal, key tracks include the Department of Military Affairs (DMA) lists for major platforms and the Department of Defence Production (DDP) lists for components.

    Conclusion

    NATO’s Ankara Summit converted last year’s spending pledge into a five per cent-of-GDP commitment and a mandate to build a European Defence Industrial Base (DIB), but ammunition and missile shortages already visible in the Ukraine war show capacity, not political will, is now the binding constraint. Because higher NATO spending is shifting the global arms market from a buyers’ to a sellers’ market, without a rapid European industrial build-out the pledge will deepen dependence on the U.S. rather than reduce it, and it is squeezing supply for outside buyers like India, making self-reliance in new-age defence technologies the necessary Indian response.

  • The right to protest and the limits of police power

    Why in the News

    The Cockroach Janta Party’s (CJP) “Chalo Sansad” march at Jantar Mantar on July 20, demanding reforms in the National Testing Agency (NTA) and the Union Education Minister’s resignation, ended in tear gas and lathi charges after protesters attempted to march towards Parliament. The clashes reopened the question of how a democracy polices protest, testing where a constitutionally protected right to assemble ends and lawful police power to disperse begins.

    Is the right to protest absolute?

    1. Constitutional guarantee: Article 19(1)(b) of the Indian Constitution guarantees all citizens the Fundamental Right to assemble peaceably and without arms. This includes the right to hold public meetings, demonstrations, and take out processions, forming the constitutional basis for peaceful protests.
    2. Reasonable restrictions permitted: Article 19(3) allows reasonable restrictions on this right in the interests of public order and the sovereignty and integrity of India.
    3. Restrictions implemented through statute: These restrictions operate through laws governing public order and policing rather than through Article 19 directly.
    4. No single governing law: The legal authority to regulate protests is drawn from a range of statutes, not one dedicated law.

    Was the CJP march unlawful?

    1. Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) test for unlawful assembly: Under the Section 189 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023, an assembly of five or more persons becomes unlawful only if its common object involves using criminal force, resisting the execution of law, committing an offence, or compelling a person by force or threat.
    2. Lawful assemblies can turn unlawful: A gathering that begins lawfully can become unlawful if its conduct changes during the event.
    3. No permission sought: Delhi Police said the CJP had not sought permission for a procession to Parliament.
    4. Prohibitory order in force: Section 163 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) barred protests, marches and demonstrations in the New Delhi district, except at the designated Jantar Mantar site with prior permission.
    5. Judicial scrutiny followed: The Delhi High Court has sought responses from the Centre and Delhi Police on petitions alleging police brutality and excessive force.

    What standards and limits govern police use of force?

    1. Democratic policing standard: The National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) Manual on Human Rights for Police Officers states that democratic policing treats police as protectors of citizens’ rights and the rule of law, while ensuring safety and security equally for all.
    2. Cost of violations: The manual notes that human rights violations by police erode public confidence, bring institutions into disrepute, and can escalate civil unrest.
    3. Global standard on force: These principles align with the United Nations (UN) Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms, which require force to be lawful, necessary and proportionate.
    4. Statutory dispersal power: Under the BNSS, an Executive Magistrate or an authorised police officer may order an unlawful assembly, or one likely to disturb public peace, to disperse, and may use force if it does not comply.
    5. Minimum force standard: The Code of Conduct for the Police in India requires persuasion, advice and warning first, and only the irreducible minimum force once force becomes inevitable.
    6. Identification gap: The BNSS requires an arresting officer to bear accurate, visible identification but imposes no corresponding requirement on officers engaged in crowd control or dispersal, even as videos from the march showed personnel without name tags or with faces covered.

    How has the judiciary drawn the line, then and now?

    1. Anita Thakur v. State of Jammu & Kashmir (2016): The Supreme Court held that excessive force violates Fundamental Rights and awarded compensation to injured protesters, holding that police action must remain reasonable and accountable.
    2. Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan v. Union of India (2018): The Court held that authorities may regulate demonstrations to maintain public order but cannot extinguish the right to protest altogether.
    3. Amit Sahni v. Commissioner of Police (2020): Arising from the Shaheen Bagh protests, the Court affirmed that dissent is a constitutional right but cannot justify the indefinite occupation of public spaces.
    4. Present reluctance: Chief Justice of India Surya Kant orally declined a plea for suo motu cognisance of the alleged police excesses, saying the Court was “not interested in videos” and should not have its time wasted.

    Conclusion

    The right to assemble under Article 19(1)(b) is not absolute, and police may lawfully disperse an assembly that turns unlawful or defies a prohibitory order, but the force used must remain the minimum necessary and be accountable. The CJP crackdown exposed a specific accountability gap: the BNSS requires arresting officers to display identification but imposes no such requirement on personnel engaged in crowd control, a gap the courts’ existing case law on excessive force does not close, even as the Supreme Court itself declined to examine video evidence of the incident.

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2022] Right of movement and residence throughout the territory of India are freely available to the Indian citizens, but these rights are not absolute. Comment.

    Linkage: The PYQ highlights that Fundamental Rights are subject to reasonable restrictions. This is conceptually very close because the article explains that the right to assemble peacefully is also not absolute and may be reasonably restricted under Article 19(3) for public order.

  • How should cities reclaim footpaths?

    Why in the News?

    Following the Supreme Court’s recognition of the right to walk on safe, obstruction-free footpaths as a Fundamental Right, Bengaluru Development Minister directed a 10-day “Safe Footpath” drive across the five corporations under the Greater Bengaluru Authority, removing thousands of street vendors from pavements. The drive enforced the pedestrian right the court recognised but bypassed the process the Street Vendors Act, 2014 requires before vendors can be removed, exposing a gap between enforcing one right and protecting another.

    Why was the Street Vendors Act, 2014 enacted?

    1. Vending recognised as legitimate occupation: The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that street vending is a legitimate occupation protected under Article 19 of the Constitution, regulable in the public interest but not prohibitable outright.
    2. Response to arbitrary evictions: Municipal bodies and police had a recurring pattern of evicting vendors without notice, reducing years of livelihood to rubble overnight, which the Street Vendors (Protection of Livelihood and Regulation of Street Vending) Act, 2014 was enacted to end.
    3. Not an anti-encroachment law: The Act does not give vendors an unrestricted right over public space, nor does it function as an anti-encroachment statute.
    4. Balancing two rights: It balances the public’s right to safe, obstruction-free footpaths against a vendor’s right to livelihood, laying down who can vend, where they can vend, and when they can be removed or relocated.

    What process must cities follow before removing vendors?

    1. Town Vending Committee (TVC): Every city must constitute a TVC comprising officials, police, planning authorities, resident representatives and street vendors, who must hold at least 40% of the seats, with representation for women and other marginalised communities.
    2. Survey requirement: Once constituted, the TVC must survey all existing vendors before authorities decide who can continue vending and under what conditions.
    3. Protection during the process: No vendor can be evicted or relocated until the survey is completed and Certificates of Vending are issued.
    4. Certificate of Vending: The certificate gives official permission to vend at a specified location under specified conditions and confers no ownership over public land.
    5. Removal remains conditional, not barred: The Act does not prohibit the removal of vendors; it only requires that removal follow this sequence.

    Why has Bengaluru’s drive come under scrutiny?

    1. No Town Vending Committee in place: Bengaluru’s corporations began removing vendors before constituting a TVC, the body the Act requires to identify vending and no-vending zones.
    2. Relocation promised only after the fact: Karnataka Chief Minister promised relocation only after the drive had already removed vendors.
    3. Sequence reversed: The government acted on the Supreme Court’s recognition of the pedestrian’s right to walk without first completing the survey and certification process the Street Vendors Act requires.
    4. Foundation of the law is balance: The Act’s foundation is the balance between the two rights, not the primacy of one over the other.

    Conclusion

    The Street Vendors Act, 2014, requires cities to constitute a Town Vending Committee, survey existing vendors and issue Certificates of Vending before removal or relocation, precisely to prevent the arbitrary evictions that predate the law. Bengaluru’s drive enforced the Supreme Court’s recognition of the pedestrian’s right to walk without first completing this sequence, showing that reclaiming footpaths lawfully requires following the Act’s process rather than invoking one right to bypass the other.

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2023] “The states in India seem reluctant to empower urban local bodies both functionally as well as financially.” Comment.

    Linkage: The PYQ examines the effectiveness of Urban Local Bodies (ULBs) in urban governance, particularly their institutional capacity, devolution of powers, and ability to manage public spaces and civic services. The article highlights that effective implementation of the Street Vendors Act, 2014 depends on empowered municipal institutions such as Town Vending Committees (TVCs). Bengaluru’s failure to constitute a TVC before undertaking evictions reflects the governance and institutional weaknesses of ULBs

  • Fast-track courts: When they can be established, where they lag

    Why in the News

    Indian Prime Minister assured to set up fast-track courts (FTCs) to try exam paper-leak cases, announced after protests by the Cockroach Janta Party (CJP) at Jantar Mantar. A draft Bill on paper leaks was taken to Cabinet on Friday, but existing fast-track courts show that speed depends on constitutional limits, infrastructure and investigation quality.

    What are fast-track courts, and what legal basis funds them?

    1. No single governing law: There is no central legislation that governs fast-track courts as a category.
    2. 14th Finance Commission origin: The 14th Finance Commission (2015-2020) recommended FTCs to expedite trials of heinous crimes such as murder, kidnapping and property disputes pending over five years, and for cases involving vulnerable groups such as women and children.
    3. 2019 fast-track special courts (FTSCs) scheme: In 2019, following a Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2018 and a Supreme Court directive, the Union Government launched a centrally sponsored scheme for fast-track special courts (FTSCs), funded partly by the Nirbhaya Fund, exclusively for rape cases and offences under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012. (Nirbhaya Fund: Following the Nirbhaya case of 16th December, 2012, the Government has set up a dedicated fund , Nirbhaya Fund, which can be utilized for projects specifically designed to improve the safety and security of women. It is a non-lapsable corpus fund, being administered by Department of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finance. The Ministry of Women and Child Development (M/o WCD) is the nodal Ministry to appraise/recommend proposals and Schemes to be funded under Nirbhaya Fund.)

    Can a Special Court be created for a single case?

    1. Article 14: Creation of special courts must satisfy the Right to Equality under Article 14.
    2. Anwar Ali Sarkar precedent: In State of West Bengal vs Anwar Ali Sarkar (1952), the Supreme Court struck down a law letting the government arbitrarily pick cases for special courts for the “object of speedier trial” alone, calling “speed” too vague a criterion.
    3. Reasonable Classification: Cases assigned to special courts must be based on an objective and rational classification, such as the nature of the offence or vulnerability of victims.
    4. A precedent for public-demand cases: The Supreme Court directed the Centre to establish a special court for the 2G case to ensure a day-to-day trial, even amid public demand.
    5. NEET’s uncertain path: It remains to be seen whether the NEET case, being heard in a Delhi court, will be sent to a special court by the government or through a court order.

    How quickly are Fast-Track Courts expected to dispose of cases?

    1. No statutory deadline: There is no fixed legal time limit for completing trials.
    2. Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) recommended timelines: Recommends completing criminal trials within two years and sexual offence trials within two months.
    3. FTSC Performance Target: Each Fast-Track Special Court (FTSC) is expected to dispose of 41-42 cases per quarter or at least 165 cases annually.
    4. No judicially prescribed outer limit: In P. Rama Chandra Rao vs State of Karnataka (2002), a seven-judge Constitution Bench ruled it is “neither advisable or feasible, nor judicially permissible” to prescribe an outer limit for concluding all criminal proceedings.

    What do current Fast-Track Court statistics show?

    1. Current strength: As of January, 862 regular FTCs were functioning across 21 states and Union Territories, alongside 774 FTSCs, including 398 exclusive POCSO courts, across 29 states and UTs.
    2. Disposal rates: The disposal rate for special courts stands around 96%, with an FTSC disposing of about 9.5 cases a month compared with 3.3 cases by a regular trial court of similar jurisdiction.
    3. Persistent pendency: More than 2.4 lakh cases remained pending in FTSCs by the end of 2023.
    4. Government’s own explanation: A 2026 Lok Sabha reply from the Ministry of Law and Justice attributed disposal delays to factors including physical infrastructure availability, quality of investigation, and cooperation of the bar, investigation agencies and forensic support.

    Will Fast-Track Courts solve the paper leak problem?

    1. Poor Conviction Record: Out of 45 major exam paper leaks (2002-2025) involving at least one lakh candidates, only two cases resulted in convictions.
    2. Investigation is the Real Bottleneck: Weak investigations and the absence of stringent bail provisions remain the major challenges.
    3. Limited Impact: Experts argue that FTCs alone cannot solve issues such as judicial vacancies, heavy case pendency, and procedural delays.
    4. Mixed Performance: FTSCs have shown limited success in POCSO and Indian Penal Code (IPC) cases because of heavy caseloads, while performing relatively better in cases under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

    Conclusion

    Fast-track courts can expedite trials only within the constitutional limits set in Anwar Ali Sarkar case(1952) and cases must rest on a rational classification, not speed or public demand alone. Even then, the FTSC record shows disposal depends on infrastructure and investigative quality that a court’s “fast-track” label does not create. With 2.4 lakh cases still pending in FTSCs and only two convictions among 45 major exam leaks since 2002, the paper-leak Bill will resolve little unless it also addresses investigation quality and bail conditions.

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2024] What are the aims and objects of the recently passed and enforced, The Public Examination (Prevention of Unfair Means) Act, 2024? Whether University/State Education Board examinations, too, are covered under the Act?

    Linkage: The PYQ examines the legal and institutional framework for ensuring the integrity of public examinations. The article builds directly on this theme by evaluating whether fast-track courts can effectively enforce accountability under the proposed paper-leak framework.

  • Is corruption the biggest threat to India’s future?

    Why in the News?

    Thousands of students have been protesting since the National Eligibility cum Entrance Test (NEET) paper leak earlier this year, reviving memories of the India Against Corruption (IAC) movement. The question arises whether the Right to Information (RTI) Act, 2005 has delivered on its promise of accountability or whether institutions meant to enforce it have been weakened.

    Has digitalisation reduced petty corruption?

    1. No reduction on the ground: Digitalisation has been pushed as a “magic wand” but has not prevented corruption; bribery remains an “open secret” in government offices.
    2. A new barrier for the marginalised: Digitalisation has added a layer excluding the poor, the marginalised, and the unlettered, who cannot fill forms online and must pay private cafes “obnoxious amounts” for government services.
    3. No grievance redressal law: Parliament discussed a grievance redressal law in detail in 2014, but it has still not been enacted.

    How has the Digital Personal Data Protection (DPDP) Act, 2023 weakened the RTI Act?

    1. Original balance in the RTI Act: The Act’s original 87-word definition of personal information allowed such information to be denied to citizens, but not to Parliament or state legislatures.
    2. Judicial reinterpretation: The Girish Ramchandra Deshpande Supreme Court judgment was misread to mean all personal information could be exempted from disclosure.
    3. Privacy without balance: The K.S. Puttaswamy judgment recognised a fundamental right to privacy without a balancing test against the right to information.
    4. Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988: The Prevention of Corruption Act’s Section 19, which required sanction for prosecution, was joined in 2018 by Section 17A, which requires government permission even to investigate corruption charges against a public servant. (Section 17A bars police from conducting any inquiry or investigation into corruption allegations against a public servant without prior government approval. This applies specifically to decisions or recommendations made in their official capacity)

    Why does corruption remain low-risk despite these laws?

    1. Historical conviction data: A 2008 study of the CBI’s anti-corruption branch performance from 1980 to 1984 found 280 people accused in courts, of whom 144 were convicted, with investigations averaging 13.4 months but the first trial averaging 88 months.
    2. Near-zero incarceration: The same 2008 study found only four people had been in prison for more than 20 days.
    3. Heavy Right To Information (RTI) use, weak enforcement: About six million RTI requests are filed annually in India, the highest of any country, and the Act has played a role in exposing the Vyapam scam, the Adarsh Housing Society scam and the electoral bond scheme.
    4. Captured agencies: Certain analysts distate that the CBI, the Enforcement Directorate (ED) and the Lokpal have been “compromised” and are not tackling big-ticket corruption cases.
    5. Lokpal’s cost without output: Public evaluations point out that while the anti-corruption body has historically consumed ₹50-60 crore annually (with a revised budget allocation of ₹30 crore for the fiscal year 2026-27), it has struggled to deliver major, high-profile convictions.

    Is institutional weakness a cause or consequence of corruption?

    1. Vacant appointments: The government delayed filling key posts, leaving the transparency watchdog short-staffed or non-functional for long periods.
    2. Non-transparent appointments even after court orders: Courts repeatedly directed the administration to make timely appointments to prevent the Right to Information (RTI) framework from becoming ineffective. Post-intervention selections often proceeded without fully disclosing applicant vetting details or selection criteria to the public.
    3. India’s rule of law ranking: India’s 79th rank in the World Justice Project Rule of Law Index highlights foundational weaknesses in fundamental rights, civil justice, and institutional checks on executive power. ( According to the World Justice Project (WJP) Rule of Law Index 2025 report,India has slipped to 86th position out of 143 countries globally. India has slipped six places compared to last year (79th rank).)

    Conclusion

    Corruption remains India’s biggest governance risk not for lack of transparency law. But this is because the institutions meant to enforce it, Information Commissions, the Lokpal, the CBI and the ED, have been weakened through non-transparent appointments, the DPDP Act’s rollback of RTI disclosures, and Section 17A’s added layer of protection for public servants. The remedy lies in enforcement: judicial delays cut to under a year, transparent Information Commissioner appointments, and withdrawal of the DPDP Act’s amendments to the RTI Act, 2005.

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2020] Recent amendments to the Right to Information Act will have profound impact on the autonomy and independence of the Information Commission”. Discuss.

    Linkage: Examines the impact of legal and institutional changes on the effectiveness of the RTI framework and transparency in governance. The article directly analyses how the DPDP Act, 2023 has diluted the RTI Act, weakened Information Commissions, and reduced transparency, thereby increasing the accountability deficit in combating corruption.

  • US to announce nuclear agreement with Saudi Arabia

    Why in the News?

    The Trump administration is preparing to announce a civil nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia that could include a uranium enrichment facility, drawing bipartisan US Congressional and Israeli non-proliferation concerns.

    Key Highlights

    1. The proposed 30-year agreement could include uranium enrichment capability for Saudi Arabia.
    2. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has stated that Saudi Arabia would pursue nuclear weapons if Iran acquires them.
    3. The agreement requires review by the US Congress before it can be finalised.

    International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

    1. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is an autonomous international organization established in 1957.
    2. It promotes the peaceful use of nuclear energy while preventing its use for military purposes through safeguards and inspections.
    3. It is headquartered in Vienna, Austria.
    4. India is one of the 180+ member states of the IAEA.
    5. In 2025, the IAEA Board of Governors declared Iran in breach of its nuclear non-proliferation obligations, the first such finding since 2006.

    New START Treaty

    1. New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) was the last remaining bilateral nuclear arms control treaty between the United States and Russia.
    2. It placed legally binding limits on deployed strategic nuclear warheads and delivery systems and provided for mutual inspections.
    3. The treaty officially expired on 5 February 2026, ending more than five decades of legally binding limits on the world’s two largest nuclear arsenals.

    (2018) In the Indian context, what is the implication of ratifying the ‘Additional Protocol’ with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)?

    (a) The civilian nuclear reactors come under IAEA safeguards.
    (b) The military nuclear installations come under the inspection of IAEA.
    (c) The country will have the privilege to buy uranium from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).
    (d) The country automatically becomes a member of the NSG.

  • Convergent perils: luminaries against human ethics being outsourced to AI

    Why in the News:

    A group of Nobel laureates, Artificial Intelligence (AI) scientists, and religious leaders signed the “Rome Declaration for an Unarmed and Disarming Peace” on 16 July, calling for a treaty banning autonomous systems from nuclear launch decisions. The Declaration argues that introducing AI into nuclear command structures does not merely speed up decision-making, it removes the human hesitation that has so far prevented nuclear war.

    What has historically prevented nuclear escalation, and why is it fragile?

    1. Human hesitation as the real safeguard: Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), the doctrine that a first nuclear strike triggers devastating retaliation, relied on human hesitation, diplomatic backchannels, and moral pause, not technical safeguards alone.
    2. Historical near misses: During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and the 1983 Soviet false alarm incident involving officer Stanislav Petrov, disaster was averted because human operators exercised caution and scepticism.
    3. Compressed decision windows: AI-driven predictive logistics and battle management systems compress decision windows from hours to seconds, removing the time needed for human verification.

    What technical failure modes make AI unsuitable for this role?

    1. Documented failure modes: Large Language Models (LLMs) and neural networks are prone to hallucinations and data poisoning, where training data is maliciously corrupted to manipulate outputs.
    2. Automatic escalation risk: In a crisis, an algorithm misreading a routine signal as an imminent threat could automatically trigger a retaliatory sequence within a compressed decision window.
    3. Unauditable reasoning: Most AI models operate as “black boxes,” making their conclusions impossible to verify at the moment a launch decision would be required.

    What five operational principles does the Declaration propose?

    1. Mandatory meaningful human control: Prohibiting any AI-driven system from making the final decision on the use or deployment of nuclear weapons.
    2. The digital commons model: Expanding data access so experts beyond major powers can better assess AI-related existential risks.
    3. Responsible development: Requiring AI developers to publish the ethical frameworks guiding their models and forbidding fully autonomous, self-improving systems that cannot be monitored or halted by human operators.
    4. Internal arsenal vulnerability audits: Requiring nuclear states to conduct rigorous reviews of their command-and-control systems against AI-driven cyber tampering.
    5. Time-bound, verifiable disarmament: Renewing good faith international negotiations toward completely and verifiably eliminating nuclear weapons.

    Why is the current Iran nuclear crisis treated as a live test of these risks?

    1. Broken arms control architecture: Iran’s breaches of its non-proliferation obligations, followed by joint United States-Israel military strikes, have exposed the existing arms control architecture as broken.
    2. AI in contested monitoring: States increasingly use AI for target characterisation and predictive intelligence tracking of nuclear facilities under contested conditions.
    3. Automated misjudgment risk: An AI system defending an enrichment facility could misinterpret a routine network probe or a physical strike as the start of an attack, triggering a disproportionate automated response before any human decision is made.

    What obstacle remains to acting on the Declaration’s warning?

    1. No treaty consensus: No consensus currently exists among states on what a treaty banning AI in nuclear command should cover, or even on banning autonomous AI in warfare more broadly.
    2. Moral instrument, not binding law: The Declaration functions as a moral and philosophical lexicon rather than a binding legal instrument at this stage.
    3. Dependence on public pressure: Its success depends on generating public awareness that then creates grassroots pressure for states to negotiate a binding treaty.

    Conclusion:

    The Declaration’s central claim is that no technical safeguard can substitute for the human doubt that has twice averted nuclear war, and that compressing decision windows to seconds through AI removes exactly that safeguard. No binding treaty yet exists to prevent this, and the current Iran nuclear crisis shows the danger is not hypothetical. Ethical responsibility for nuclear launch decisions cannot be delegated to a machine.

  • Science thrives on a global outlook, an inclusive culture. FCRA makes it difficult

    Why in the News:

    The Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act (FCRA), 1976, was designed to prevent foreign funds from covertly influencing India’s political and civil society space. Applied without distinction to research institutions registered as NGOs (Non-Governmental Organisations), the Act now blocks the international collaboration Indian science needs to compete globally.

    Why was the FCRA created, and what has changed in its scope since?

    1. Origins in 1969: The government suspected foreign agencies, such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), of funding trade unions, student bodies, and political organisations to undermine India’s democracy, prompting the Home Minister to raise the issue in Parliament.
    2. Enactment in 1976: The FCRA came into force on 5 August 1976, aiming to ensure voluntary organisations functioned in a manner consistent with the values of a sovereign democratic republic.
    3. Progressive tightening: Successive amendments have expanded regulatory compliance requirements and the state’s power to terminate an organisation’s FCRA registration and seize its assets.

    How does FCRA treat scientific research institutions the same as advocacy NGOs?

    1. Research institutions classified as NGOs: Globally renowned institutions such as the Public Health Foundation of India, Christian Medical College (Vellore), St John’s Medical College, and Ashoka and KREA universities are legally categorised as NGOs and fall under FCRA.
    2. No distinction by activity type: FCRA rules do not distinguish a scientific research NGO from one engaged in political or rights-based advocacy, the category governments treat as most sensitive.
    3. Wide reach: The affected ecosystem spans mental health (Sangath, Schizophrenia Research Foundation), non-communicable disease (Centre for Chronic Disease Control, Dr Mohan’s Diabetes Centre), and biodiversity research (MS Swaminathan Research Foundation, Ashoka Trust for Research in Ecology and the Environment).

    What specific FCRA provisions actively obstruct scientific collaboration?

    1. Repatriation bar: Foreign funds received by an Indian NGO can never be sent back out of the country, conflicting with international funders’ standard requirement that unspent project funds be returned on completion.
    2. Lead institution lockout: Because of the repatriation bar, no Indian NGO can act as the lead institution in an international collaboration, since a lead institution must be able to transfer funds to foreign partners.
    3. 2020 sub-granting ban: A 2020 amendment stopped FCRA-registered NGOs from sharing foreign donations with any other Indian NGO, even one also legally registered to receive foreign funds, shutting down domestic collaboration.
    4. Effect on grassroots and community research: The sub-granting ban has hurt smaller, grassroots NGOs that relied on larger NGOs re-granting foreign funds, and has hindered research that requires direct community engagement.

    What does this cost India’s scientific standing?

    1. Suspicion instead of prestige: Grants from bodies such as the Wellcome Trust and the National Institutes of Health are won through globally competitive, peer-reviewed processes and are prized internationally as marks of research quality. In India, the same grants are treated with regulatory suspicion.
    2. Global ranking gap: No Indian institution features in the top 100 of any global research ranking.
    3. Continued brain drain: Many of India’s most talented researchers continue to seek opportunities abroad, strengthening the rankings of their adopted institutions instead.

    What would a workable fix look like?

    1. Nuanced classification: FCRA rules should distinguish between categories of NGOs rather than treating all foreign contribution risk as uniform.
    2. Existing verification mechanism: A genuine scientific research NGO can already be identified through existing recognition procedures, such as registration with the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR).
    3. Preserving the regulatory objective: Tailoring FCRA compliance for the research sector would preserve the government’s oversight of political and advocacy funding without collateral damage to scientific collaboration.

    Conclusion:

    FCRA’s core problem is not its security objective but its refusal to distinguish a scientific research NGO from a political advocacy one. A tailored classification for research institutions, verified through mechanisms like Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR) recognition, would let India tighten oversight of foreign funds without continuing to cut off its own scientists from global collaboration.