💥Join UPSC 2027,2028 Mentorship (July Batch) + XFactor Notes & Microthemes PDF
Talk to Mentor

Civilsdaily

Login

GS Paper: GS2

  • Discuss the ‘corrupt practices’ for the purpose of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Analyze whether the increase in the assets of the legislators and/or their associates, disproportionate to their known sources of income, would constitute ‘undue influence’ and consequently a corrupt practice.

    The Representation of the People Act, 1951 defines a set of “corrupt practices” (Section 123), violation of which can lead to disqualification of a candidate (Section 8).

    Corrupt Practices under RPA, 1951

    Bribery – Offering or accepting gratification (money, jobs, gifts, entertainment) to induce candidature, withdrawal, or voting/refraining from voting. Eg- Distribution of cash or liquor during elections.

    Undue Influence – Interference (direct or indirect) with the free exercise of electoral rights through threats, inducements, or pressure. Eg- Threats of social boycott or misuse of official authority.

    Appeal on Identity Grounds – Seeking votes based on religion, caste, community, race, or language, or using religious/national symbols.

    Promotion of Enmity – Spreading hatred between groups for electoral gains.

    False Statements – Publishing knowingly false information about a candidate’s personal character or conduct to prejudice election prospects.

    SC in 2023 held that providing false information about electoral Candidates Qualification is not a Corrupt Practice under RPA, 1951.

    Free Conveyance of Voters – Hiring vehicles/vessels for voters’ free transport to polling stations.

    Excessive Expenditure – Spending beyond limits prescribed under Section 77.

    Misuse of Official Machinery – Seeking help from government servants such as gazetted officers, judges, police, armed forces.

    Booth Capturing – Seizing polling stations or ballot boxes by force.

    Glorification of Sati or Regressive Practices – Using such appeals for electoral advantage.

    Assets of Legislators and the Question of Undue Influence

    Since 2004, under the Representation of the People Act, 1951, MPs must declare their assets and liabilities to the Speaker (Lok Sabha) or Chairman (Rajya Sabha) within 90 days of taking their seat.

    The Supreme Court, in Lok Prahari case, mandated that candidates disclose not only their assets but also the sources of income of themselves, their spouses, and dependents.

    It directed the Centre to amend election rules and nomination forms, and sought a permanent mechanism to probe disproportionate asset growth of legislators.

    The Court held that non-disclosure of assets or income sources amounts to a corrupt practice under Section 123, RPA 1951.

    A legislator’s or associate’s increase in assets disproportionate to known income is also a matter of corruption under Prevention of Corruption Act (1988) or criminal misconduct under IPC/Prevention of Money Laundering Act. Section 8 (3) of the Act states that if an MP or MLA is convicted for any other crime and is sent to jail for 2 years or more, he/ she will be disqualified for 6 years from the time of release.

    Thus, the disqualification provisions ensure the trinity of Ethics, Accountability and Fairness of electoral process.

  • [22nd June 2026] The Hindu OpED: End the free rein of junk food advertising in India

    Mentor’s Comment

    India committed in 2017 to restrict the advertising of ultra-processed foods (UPFs) and foods high in fat, sugar and sodium (HFSS) foods under the National Multisectoral Action Plan, but that commitment remains unimplemented. In February 2026, the Supreme Court of India weighed in on the issue through a PIL on front-of-pack warning labels, and the Economic Survey 2025-26 called for stronger regulation of UPF advertising, bringing the policy gap into sharp focus.

    What has made UPF and HFSS advertising a public health concern?

    1. Rising exposure: Children and adolescents encounter UPF advertisements across television, social media, sports broadcasts and influencers.
    2. Misleading health claims: Advertisements highlight selective attributes such as “baked”, “multigrain” or “12-grain” and conceal high sugar, salt and fat content.
    3. Targeted marketing: Celebrity endorsements and child actors increase product appeal among vulnerable consumers.
    4. Demand creation: Advertising does not merely reflect demand. It actively shapes consumer preferences and consumption patterns.
    5. Scale of advertising expenditure: In 2024, three major transnational corporations spent USD 13.2 billion on UPF advertising globally. In India alone, more than two lakh junk food advertisements appeared in a single month, backed by an advertising expenditure of approximately ₹170 crore.

    Why are UPFs increasingly linked to adverse health outcomes?

    1. Industrial formulation: UPFs contain additives, flavour enhancers, emulsifiers and refined ingredients designed for high palatability.
    2. Overconsumption effect: Their design encourages repeated consumption and reduces satiety.
    3. Diet displacement: UPFs replace traditional and minimally processed foods.
    4. Disease burden: Scientific evidence links high UPF consumption to obesity, hypertension, diabetes and cardiovascular diseases.
    5. Rising NCD challenge: Growing UPF consumption coincides with increasing obesity rates globally and in India.

    Why are existing regulatory safeguards proving inadequate?

    1. Policy implementation gap: The National Multisectoral Action Plan (2017-2022) envisaged restrictions on HFSS advertising, but implementation remains incomplete.
    2. Weak disclosure norms: Advertisements can omit critical nutritional information and still remain legally compliant.
    3. Limited consumer protection: Existing rules focus more on product safety than marketing practices.
    4. Judicial concern: The Supreme Court has highlighted the need for stronger consumer information measures such as front-of-pack labelling.
    5. Reliance on self-regulation: Industry-led safeguards have not substantially reduced child-targeted advertising.

    What Is the Constitutional and Legal Basis for Restricting UPF and HFSS Advertising?

    1. State duty to protect vulnerable groups: Children are especially vulnerable to food marketing, requiring state intervention to safeguard public health.
    2. Existing policy commitment: The NMAP (2017-22) envisaged restrictions on HFSS food advertising, but implementation remains pending.
    3. Advertising law as the key instrument: The proposed solution is amendment of advertising laws, a measure already contemplated by the government.
    4. Supporting legal measures: The Supreme Court (2026) endorsed front-of-pack labelling, while MPs have advocated warning labels and taxation of UPFs.
    5. Right to health framework: Regulation of unhealthy food advertising flows from the constitutional right to health and is supported by the Economic Survey 2025-26.

    Does nutrition education alone solve the problem?

    1. Information asymmetry: Consumers receive nutrition advice but are simultaneously exposed to aggressive food marketing.
    2. Behavioural influence: Marketing exploits emotional triggers that often outweigh rational dietary choices.
    3. Children’s vulnerability: Children lack the capacity to critically assess persuasive advertising.
    4. Environmental constraint: Food choices are shaped by the surrounding commercial environment, not only by awareness levels.
    5. Public health limitation: Education programmes cannot fully offset continuous exposure to unhealthy food promotion.

    What do international experiences demonstrate about food advertising regulation?

    1. City of San Francisco lawsuit against UPF manufacturers: In 2024, San Francisco filed a lawsuit against 10 major UPF manufacturers alleging child-targeted marketing, highly compelling product formulations, and inadequate health risk disclosure. The suit sought prevention of deceptive marketing and corrective measures for past false advertising.
    2. Chile: Strong statutory restrictions on unhealthy food advertising reduced reliance on voluntary industry commitments.
    3. Mexico: Regulatory interventions demonstrated greater effectiveness than self-regulation mechanisms.
    4. Global evidence: International experience shows enforceable legal measures outperform voluntary compliance frameworks.
    5. Lancet Series evidence (November 2025): Three papers published in The Lancet in November 2025 presented scientific evidence linking UPF consumption to poorer diet quality, displacement of real foods, hypertension, cardiovascular disease, type 2 diabetes, obesity, and other non-communicable diseases. The series argued that policymaking should not wait for further evidence.

    Why is this ultimately a state responsibility rather than a market choice?

    1. Right to Health: The state has a constitutional duty to protect public health when harms are foreseeable.
    2. Child protection principle: Children constitute a vulnerable group requiring enhanced regulatory safeguards.
    3. Market failure: Consumers often lack complete information about nutritional risks.
    4. Externalities: Rising obesity and NCDs impose social and healthcare costs beyond individual consumers.
    5. Public interest regulation: Restrictions on harmful advertising are comparable to other public health interventions.

    What policy changes are required?

    1. Advertising restrictions: Prohibit or significantly restrict child-targeted advertising of UPFs and HFSS foods.
    2. Front-of-pack labelling: Introduce clear warning labels to improve informed choice.
    3. Digital platform regulation: Extend restrictions to social media, influencers and online advertising.
    4. Stronger enforcement: Replace voluntary compliance with statutory obligations and penalties.
    5. Healthy food promotion: Incentivise marketing of minimally processed and nutritious foods.

    Conclusion

    The central issue is not consumer ignorance but the commercial environment that shapes food choices. Nutrition education cannot succeed when aggressive marketing continuously promotes unhealthy foods. India’s public health response must move beyond awareness campaigns and regulate the advertising ecosystem that drives UPF consumption, especially among children.

  • Guardrails in AI growth to protect developing nations

    Why in the News?

    The United Nations General Assembly established a Global Dialogue on AI and an Independent International Scientific Panel on AI, marking the first attempt to create a global scientific body dedicated to this technology. This development has exposed a core tension: AI governance is simultaneously moving toward global coordination and fragmenting into competing national regulatory frameworks. The asymmetry between AI-capable and AI-dependent nations determines who controls both the risks and the benefits of this transition.

    What is the current global AI governance landscape and why is it structurally insufficient?

    1. Parallel and voluntary structures: Most existing frameworks have voluntary participation, varying legal force, and focus on specific aspects, safety, ethics, or standards, with no common binding floor.
    2. EU AI Act 2024: The most comprehensive binding framework to date. It prioritises safe, transparent, non-discriminatory, and environmentally friendly AI. Its extraterritorial reach is limited to EU-market participants.
    3. UN Global Dialogue on AI: UNGA invited every country to participate. An Independent Scientific Panel makes periodic assessments to inform the Dialogue. It lacks enforcement authority.
    4. Annual global AI summits: The most recent edition was held in New Delhi in February 2025. Outcomes remain consultative and have not produced enforceable international agreements.
    5. Regulatory fragmentation: Each country developing its own framework forces companies to satisfy differing requirements across geographies, creating pressure to favour permissive jurisdictions.
    6. Innovation slowdown risk: Companies may roll out services only in regulatory-friendly markets, deepening access inequality for developing nations.

    What makes global AI governance necessary?

    1. Cross-border technology: AI systems operate across jurisdictions and affect multiple countries simultaneously.
    2. Regulatory fragmentation: Different national regulations increase compliance costs and slow innovation.
    3. Unequal regulatory capacity: Many developing countries lack the expertise and institutions needed to regulate AI effectively.
    4. Global public impact: AI influences economic growth, governance, healthcare, education, and security.
    5. Need for common standards: Shared principles can improve safety, interoperability, and trust.

    How does regulatory fragmentation produce asymmetric harm for developing nations?

    1. Infrastructure concentration: A few countries already possess the computing, talent, and financial resources to support the entire AI ecosystem, before global rules are set.
    2. Regulatory capacity deficit: Many countries in Asia and Africa lack institutions to frame robust domestic AI regulations or protect their national interests in international negotiations.
    3. Data sovereignty trap: Insisting that all AI development remain within national boundaries accelerates power concentration rather than distributing it.
    4. Digital colonisation risk: Developing countries become consumers of AI systems designed elsewhere, with no input into their values, benchmarks, or constraints.
    5. Denial of transformative benefits: AI is a technology of the order of the steam engine. Excluding developing nations from its benefits is a disservice to humanity, not merely to affected countries.
    6. Minimum regulatory floor: A globally agreed set of minimum standards is the only mechanism that ensures developing countries benefit from AI advances without surrendering domestic policy space.

    Does global AI regulation resolve the equity problem or does it risk replicating the nuclear non-proliferation trap?

    The equity problem refers to the structural exclusion of predominantly the Global South from the economic benefits, decision-making processes, and capacity building surrounding artificial intelligence.

    1. Non-proliferation analogy: Global AI regulation could restrict unrestricted AI development to only certain countries or companies, creating a permanent hierarchy between technology producers and users.
    2. Nuclear regime parallel: This outcome embeds existing power differentials into binding international law, replicating a governance structure that legitimises asymmetry rather than correcting it.
    3. Biological and chemical weapons treaties: Existing international agreements already control dangerous dual-use technologies. Proposals may extend this logic to AI models and to the infrastructure required to build them.
    4. Logic of restriction: The case for restricting AI capable of enabling next-generation biological or chemical weapons is logically defensible. The risk is who draws the boundary and in whose interest.
    5. Political capture risk: “Responsible AI” defined by incumbent powers locks in first-mover advantage and treats developing nations as permanent recipients rather than co-producers of governance norms.

    What do international governance models demonstrate about the feasibility of a globally agreed AI floor?

    1. EU AI Act: binding regulatory precedent: Demonstrates that comprehensive, legally enforceable AI governance is achievable at supranational scale. Sets de facto global standards through market leverage.
    2. UN Global Dialogue: universalist participation model: Universal country invitation distinguishes it from club-based governance. Participatory architecture is its most relevant design feature for developing nations.
    3. Google AI Commons: private open-access precedent: Demonstrates that large AI actors can adopt open-access norms voluntarily. Lacks enforceable accountability.
    4. Trusted AI Commons: India-hosted hybrid model: A one-stop repository of tools, benchmarks, datasets, and protocols for testing AI deployment, with liberal licensing. Significant as a Global South-led governance mechanism.
    5. Limits of existing models: None produces a binding universal minimum floor. The EU Act covers only its market; the UN Dialogue lacks enforcement; Commons models are voluntary. The gap between architecture and enforceable standards remains open.

    What is the Trusted AI Commons and does it constitute an adequate institutional response to the governance deficit?

    1. Definition: A repository of tools, benchmarks, datasets, and protocols needed to develop and deploy AI systems safely and responsibly. Functions as a one-stop shop for AI testing and deployment support.
    2. Institutional origin: Main outcome of the New Delhi AI Impact Summit, February 2026. Hosted and managed by India through India’s AI Mission.
    3. Licensing design: Open, accessible, with liberal licensing. Aggregates tools already developed worldwide, including by IIT Madras, rather than commissioning new ones.
    4. Practical function (example): A country testing an AI system for agriculture can use the Commons to locate available tools, benchmarks, datasets, and protocols in one place, without needing domestic AI infrastructure to find or validate them.
    5. Adequacy gap: Addresses the access and deployment deficit. Does not create a binding minimum floor. Does not build regulatory capacity in developing nations. Necessary but insufficient.
    6. India’s strategic significance: Hosting the Commons positions India as a norm-setter rather than a norm-follower, consistent with its broader foreign policy of strategic autonomy: the ability to act independently of major power blocs in international affairs. 

    The Trusted AI Commons

    1. It is an open, federated, and voluntary global platform designed to serve as a consolidated repository for AI safety benchmarks, evaluation tools, standards, and deployment frameworks.
    2. The initiative was integrated into the New Delhi Declaration on AI Impact.

    Core Objectives & Utility: The platform is designed to act as a “one-stop shop” for developers, researchers, and regulators to access non-proprietary resources.

    1. Open Accessibility: Provides tools under liberal, open-source licensing to prevent safety mechanisms from being locked behind big-tech barriers.
    2. Standardised Evaluation: Hosts cross-jurisdictional benchmarks to test AI behavior against bias, misalignment, and operational errors before deployment.
    3. Global Interoperability: Fosters cross-border collaboration by mapping technical safety frameworks across different international standards.

    Hosting and Management

    1. Initial Leadership: The Trusted AI Commons is initially hosted and managed by India under the auspices of the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY) and the IndiaAI Mission.
    2. Collaborative Network: Rather than building every mechanism from scratch, it aggregates tools from leading global research bodies, such as the Centre for Responsible AI (IIT Madras), the UK AI Security Institute, and Mozilla

    Conclusion

    Fragmented national AI regulation concentrates power in AI-capable nations and denies developing countries both protection and access. A globally agreed minimum regulatory floor is the necessary condition for equity but if framed through non-proliferation logic, it encodes existing power hierarchies into international law. The Trusted AI Commons addresses the access deficit but does not substitute for binding global governance. The central unresolved precondition is universal participation in the design of global AI rules, not merely in their implementation.

  • The key hurdle to climate targets: Electrification

    Why in the News?

    At the Bonn climate talks, Turkey proposed raising the global electrification target to 35% by 2035, ahead of hosting COP31 in Antalya with Australia in November. Electricity meets only a small fraction of the world’s energy needs, and most of that electricity is itself generated from fossil fuels. This exposes a gap between rising clean electricity generation and the much slower pace at which economies actually switch their energy consumption to electricity.

    Where does electrification fit among existing global climate goals?

    1. Paris Agreement temperature targets: The 2015 Paris Agreement commits the world to limiting the rise in global temperatures within 2 degrees Celsius, preferably 1.5 degrees Celsius, from pre-industrial times.
    2. Renewable capacity target: Annual COP meetings have produced the goal of increasing the installed capacity of renewable energy.
    3. Net-zero target: COP meetings have also produced the goal of achieving a global net-zero emissions target.
    4. Climate finance target: Mobilising climate finance is a further goal that has emerged from COP meetings.
    5. Electrification as a new addition: The 35% electrification target, if agreed upon, would be one more addition to this existing set of climate-related global goals, all aimed at reducing the world’s dependence on fossil fuels and speeding up the energy transition.

    How is the progress of the energy transition measured?

    1. Total Primary Energy Supply (TPES): A measure of all energy available for use in an economy, including energy consumed in producing, transforming and transporting energy itself.
    2. Final Energy Consumption (FEC): A measure of energy ultimately used by end-consumers. It excludes energy burnt to produce electricity, energy used in refining petroleum, diesel burnt in transporting fuel, and transmission and distribution losses.
    3. Structural difference between fossil fuels and renewables: Fossil fuels are direct sources of energy and only require to be burnt to produce energy, whereas renewable sources such as solar, wind, nuclear or hydropower have to be converted into electricity before they can be put to use.
    4. Why electrification rate is the relevant metric: Because renewable sources require conversion into electricity before use, every final use of energy would have to be electrified for a complete transition away from fossil fuels to be possible.

    Why does electrification remain limited despite rising electricity demand?

    1. Slow movement in FEC share: Electricity’s share in FEC rose only from 17.7% in 2015 to 21% in 2025, a modest increase over a decade.
      1. Global electricity share in FEC: Electricity accounted for only 21% of total final energy consumption (TFEC) in 2025, according to the IEA.
      2. India’s electricity share in FEC: The corresponding figure for India is about 23%, according to government data.
    2. Rising generation volumes: Global electricity generation increased from about 24 terawatt-hours (TWh) in 2015 to over 32 TWh in 2025, a rise of nearly 33%.
    3. Generation growth has outpaced consumption-side electrification: Electricity output rose by a third over the decade while its share of final consumption rose by only about 3 percentage points.
    4. Hard-to-electrify sectors persist: Shipping, aviation, heavy-duty and long-haul trucks, high-temperature industrial processes in iron, steel, cement and ceramics, and many residential needs like heating remain largely unelectrified and cannot run on renewables.

    Which sectors remain difficult to electrify?

    1. Aviation: Long-distance air travel lacks commercially viable large-scale electric alternatives.
    2. Shipping: Heavy maritime transport depends on high-energy-density fuels.
    3. Heavy Industry: Steel, cement and chemicals require high-temperature industrial processes.
    4. Long-Haul Freight: Heavy trucks face battery and charging limitations.
    5. Energy-Intensive Manufacturing: Several production processes remain dependent on fossil fuels.

    Why does renewable energy success not automatically translate into climate success?

    1. Steady rise in clean generation share: The share of non-fossil sources (renewables, hydro and nuclear) in electricity generation rose from 33.6% in 2015 to 42.6% in 2025, according to the IEA.
    2. Electricity itself is still the majority fossil: In 2025, only about 42% of all electricity generated worldwide came from non-fossil sources, meaning most electricity generated is still fossil-based.
    3. Compounding effect on total energy use: Only 21% of total final energy consumption is met through electricity, and only about 42% of that electricity is clean.
    4. The reality-check figure: This means just over 8% of total energy consumed in the world is currently clean.
    5. Three decades of policy effort, limited consumption-side result: Nearly three decades of favourable policies, financial incentives and technology innovation to promote cleaner fuels have left more than 90% of current global energy use still dependent on fossil fuels.

    How ambitious is the proposed 35% electrification target?

    1. IRENA’s threshold for 1.5°C: The International Renewable Energy Agency states that a 35% electrification rate by 2035 is the minimum needed to keep any realistic hope of staying on the 1.5-degrees Celsius pathway.
    2. Investment requirement: Achieving that level of electrification requires about $1.2 trillion to be pumped into electricity systems every year.
    3. Accompanying requirements: Rapid expansion in renewables and battery storage systems must also happen alongside this investment.
    4. Scale of the gap from current trajectory: The IEA projects electricity’s share of global FEC will rise to only about 24% by 2030, against a target of 35% by 2035, even as non-fossil sources (renewables plus hydro and nuclear) are projected to supply nearly half of global electricity by 2030.

    What risks could derail even this limited trajectory?

    1. Geopolitical uncertainty: It is unclear how wars and geopolitical tensions will affect the pace of energy transition.
    2. Two opposing pressures: Greater uncertainty in fossil fuel supplies and rising oil prices may push some countries toward renewables, while the economic fallout of conflicts may squeeze budgets available for new technologies and infrastructure.
    3. Risk of reverting to convenient fuels: Countries may be tempted to use whatever energy source is easily available, regardless of its climate impact.

    What do international targets indicate about the future direction of climate policy?

    1. COP28 Consensus: Countries agreed to accelerate the global energy transition.
    2. IRENA Roadmap: The agency proposes raising electrification to 35% by 2035.
    3. Net-Zero Pathways: Most credible decarbonisation scenarios require major electrification gains.
    4. Renewables-Electrification Link: Renewable expansion and electrification must progress together.
    5. Long-Term Transition: Climate targets increasingly depend on transforming energy consumption patterns, not merely energy production.

    Conclusion

    Clean electricity generation has scaled steadily, but the constraint on climate targets has shifted to how much of total energy consumption is electrified, not how clean the electricity supply is. Only about 8% of global energy consumption is currently clean, and electricity’s FEC share is projected to reach just 24% by 2030 against a 35% by 2035 target. Hence, climate progress will remain limited unless transport, industry and buildings convert their direct fossil-fuel use to electricity at a much faster pace.

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2022] Do you think India will meet 50 per cent of its energy needs from renewable energy by 2030? Justify your answer.

    Linkage: The question examines India’s renewable energy transition and the feasibility of achieving climate commitments. The article argues that renewable energy expansion alone is insufficient; achieving climate goals also requires rapid electrification of final energy consumption.

  • Right of way

    Why in the News?

    The Supreme Court has reaffirmed that the right to walk safely on demarcated footpaths is part of Article 21 and therefore a fundamental right. The judgment highlights the gap between constitutional recognition of pedestrian rights and the absence of adequate pedestrian infrastructure.

    What has the Supreme Court held on the right to walk?

    1. Article 21 Protection: The Court held that safe access to footpaths forms part of the right to life and personal liberty.
    2. Pedestrian Dignity: Walking is not merely a mode of transport. It is a constitutional entitlement linked to safety and dignity.
    3. State Responsibility: Governments must ensure safe pedestrian infrastructure and cannot treat pedestrians as secondary road users.
    4. Compensation Jurisprudence: The ruling emerged from a case involving the death of a five-year-old child who was hit by a tanker lorry in Karnataka.

    Why Does India Lack Functional Pedestrian Infrastructure?

    1. No central law: No national law governs pedestrian rights or safety.
    2. Vehicle-Centric Planning: Urban transport systems prioritise road expansion and vehicle movement.
    3. Fragmented responsibility: Responsibility for pedestrian safety is split across municipal laws, town-planning statutes, and street design guidelines, with no single accountable authority.
    4. Minimal safety standard: Current practice treats pedestrians as safe if they face no immediate physical harm, not if they have usable, continuous infrastructure.
    5. Physical encroachment: Existing footpaths are frequently encroached by parking, vendors, utilities, and construction debris.
    6. Competing infrastructure priorities: Road-widening projects compete with footpath space, with roads typically winning.

    Why is recognition of a right insufficient by itself?

    1. Rights Need Infrastructure: A right becomes ineffective when the supporting public infrastructure is absent.
    2. Implementation Deficit: India often struggles with execution rather than legal recognition.
    3. Administrative Neglect: Urban local bodies frequently delay or abandon pedestrian projects.
    4. Funding Priorities: Public expenditure remains concentrated on road widening and motorised transport.
    5. Behavioural Norms: Motorists often view pedestrians as obstacles rather than legitimate road users.

    What Tension Does the Ruling Expose Between Rights Recognition and State Capacity?

    1. Right without infrastructure is hollow: If the state does not build footpaths, the citizen’s right to walk on them carries no practical content.
    2. Compensation is not prevention: A right enforced only through post-tragedy compensation does not change the conditions that caused the harm.
    3. Conflict with the Street Vendors Act: The new judgment is likely to generate disputes with the 2014 Act, since reclaiming footpaths for pedestrians can mean removing vendors the 2014 Act protects.
    4. Risk of gentrification: A state acting on this ruling could use it to clear footpaths of informal commercial activity, criminalising the survival strategies of the urban poor under the cover of a pedestrian-rights judgment.

    Does India’s Experience with Rights-Based Legislation Suggest that Legal Recognition Alone Is Insufficient?

    1. Street Vendors Act, 2014: The Act protects vendors’ right to trade under Article 19(1)(g). Implementation has lagged because surveys, Town Vending Committees, and vending zones remain incomplete. Municipalities continue eviction drives despite legal protection.
    2. Cigarettes and Other Tobacco Products Act 2003: Public smoking declined through sustained enforcement, social messaging, and small immediate penalties. Behaviour changed because legal recognition was backed by continuous implementation.
    3. Swachh Bharat and Waste Segregation Laws: Citizens are required to segregate waste. Municipal systems often fail to collect segregated waste. The absence of supporting infrastructure weakens compliance.
    4. Implementation Gap: Rights and duties succeed only when governments create the institutions, incentives, and enforcement mechanisms needed to support them.
    5. Lesson for the Right to Walk: Pedestrian rights will remain symbolic unless cities build continuous, unobstructed footpaths and protect them from encroachment.

    What Precondition Determines Whether the Right Produces Real Change?

    1. Pedestrian Infrastructure as the Missing Link: Constitutional recognition cannot improve pedestrian safety unless cities build continuous and unobstructed footpaths.
    2. Funding Redirection as the Binding Constraint: The ruling’s success depends on shifting public expenditure towards pedestrian infrastructure rather than treating the judgment as a compensation mechanism.
    3. Risk of Legal Tokenism: If the right remains usable only for post-tragedy compensation claims, it produces no change in pedestrian mobility or safety.
    4. Cultural Internalisation of Right of Way: Pavements must be socially recognised as pedestrian space. Judicial declaration alone cannot alter road-use behaviour.

    What must change for the right to walk to become meaningful?

    1. Dedicated Pedestrian Infrastructure: Cities must invest in continuous and obstruction-free footpaths.
    2. Pedestrian-First Urban Design: Walking must become the foundation of street planning.
    3. Clear Space Allocation: Urban authorities must balance pedestrian access and vendor livelihoods.
    4. Municipal Accountability: Local bodies must be assessed on pedestrian safety outcomes.
    5. Stable Funding: Budget allocations must shift towards non-motorised transport infrastructure.

    Conclusion

    The Supreme Court has expanded constitutional protection for pedestrians, but rights alone cannot create safe streets. India’s challenge is not recognising the right to walk but building the footpaths, governance mechanisms and urban priorities that make that right real. The success of the judgment depends on shifting public investment and administrative attention towards pedestrian infrastructure rather than merely providing legal remedies after accidents.

  • Abhigyan App and NAFIS

    Why in the news?

    The Union Home Minister, Amit Shah, launched Abhigyan, a mobile application developed by the National Crime Records Bureau that enables police personnel to identify suspects through portable fingerprint scanning linked to the national fingerprint database.

    Abhigyan App

    • Enables police officers to capture fingerprints using portable scanners and smartphones.
    • Connected to the National Automated Fingerprint Identification System (NAFIS).
    • Can match fingerprints with national records in about 35 seconds.
    • Features:
      • Real-time identification
      • Mobile access to criminal records
      • Two-factor authentication
      • Field-level policing support

    National Automated Fingerprint Identification System (NAFIS)

    • Launched in 2022 by NCRB.
    • A centralized biometric database of Criminal suspects, Arrested persons, Convicts, and Prison inmates
    • Contains over 1.3 crore fingerprint records.
    • Facilitates nationwide sharing and matching of fingerprint data.

    Legal Basis

    • Based on the Criminal Procedure (Identification) Act, 2022.
    • Authorizes collection of biometric measurements including Fingerprints, Palm prints, Iris and retina scans, Photographs, and Biological samples

    Significance

    • Faster identification of repeat offenders and absconders.
    • Strengthens inter-state criminal tracking.
    • Supports crime investigation and law enforcement.
    • Raises concerns regarding Privacy, Data protection, and Scope of biometric collection from individuals not formally accused.

    Criminal Procedure (Identification) Act, 2022

    • Replaced the Identification of Prisoners Act, 1920.
    • Expands the categories of persons whose biometric data can be collected.
    • NCRB is designated as the central repository of records.
    • Data may generally be retained for 75 years, subject to prescribed conditions.

    [2018] In addition to fingerprint scanning, which of the following can be used in the biometric identification of a person?
    1. Iris scanning
    2. Retinal scanning
    3. Voice recognition
    Select the correct answer using the code given below.

    [A] 1 only

    [B] 2 and 3 only

    [C] 1 and 3 only

    [D] 1, 2 and 3

  • Right to Walk on Footpaths Declared a Fundamental Right

    Why in the news?

    The Supreme Court, in a landmark judgment authored by Justice P. S. Narasimha, held that the right to walk safely on demarcated and well-maintained footpaths is a Fundamental Right, which takes precedence over the privilege of motorized vehicles.

    Right to Walk as a Fundamental Right

    • Derived from Article 19(1)(d): Right to move freely throughout the territory of India.
    • Also linked with:
      • Article 21: Right to life and personal liberty.
      • Article 19(1)(a): Freedom of expression.
      • Article 19(1)(b): Right to assemble peacefully.
      • Article 19(1)(c): Right to form associations.

    Court’s Observations

    • Walking is the most basic form of human movement and is intrinsically connected to life and dignity.
    • Public spaces cannot become monopolies of motorized vehicles.
    • If a road exists, authorities have an enforceable duty to provide and maintain footpaths.
    • Pedestrian rights must override the convenience of motorized traffic.

    Directions to Government

    • Create a statutory framework recognizing the right to walk.
    • Establish a dedicated regulatory body for:
      • Planning pedestrian infrastructure.
      • Enforcement and monitoring.
      • Providing remedies for violations.
    • Judgment sent to Ministries of:
      • Housing & Urban Affairs
      • Rural Development
      • Road Transport & Highways

    Case Background

    • The ruling arose from the death of a five-year-old child who was run over by a truck while walking to school with his father.
    • The Court awarded compensation exceeding ₹11 lakh.

    [2018] Right to Privacy is protected as an intrinsic part of Right to Life and Personal Liberty. Which of the following in the Constitution of India correctly and appropriately imply the above statement?

    (a) Article 14 and the provisions under the 42nd Amendment to the Constitution.

    (b) Article 17 and the Directive Principles of State Policy in Part IV.

    (c) Article 21 and the freedoms guaranteed in Part III.

    (d) Article 24 and the provisions under the 44th Amendment to the Constitution.

  • International Sickle Cell Day 2026

    Why in the news?

    The President of India, Droupadi Murmu, commemorated International Sickle Cell Day at Omkareshwar and highlighted the achievements of the National Sickle Cell Anaemia Elimination Mission (NSCAEM).

    National Sickle Cell Anaemia Elimination Mission (2023)

    • Launched to eliminate Sickle Cell Disease (SCD) as a public health problem by 2047.
    • Targets screening of 7 crore people (0-40 years age group) in affected tribal and high-prevalence areas.
    • One of the world’s largest genetic disease screening programmes.
    • So far: Around 2.5 lakh patients identified. Over 20 lakh carriers detected.

    Sickle Cell Disease (SCD)

    • A hereditary genetic blood disorder caused by mutation in the haemoglobin gene.
    • Red blood cells become sickle-shaped, reducing oxygen supply.
    • Leads to anaemia, pain episodes, infections, organ damage, and reduced life expectancy.
    • Inherited in an autosomal recessive pattern.

    High-Risk Areas in India

    • Predominantly affects tribal populations across Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Chhattisgarh, Odisha, Gujarat, Jharkhand, and Rajasthan

    Madhya Pradesh Initiatives

    • Sickle Mitra Initiative: Trains volunteers, NCC cadets, and civil society members for awareness and patient support.
    • Swasth Nari, Sashakt Parivar Abhiyan (2025): Screened over 4 lakh women for SCD.

    [2023] Consider the following statements in the context of interventions being undertaken under Anaemia Mukt Bharat Strategy:
    1. It provides prophylactic calcium supplementation for pre-school children, adolescents and pregnant women.
    2. It runs a campaign for delayed cord clamping at the time of child- birth.
    3. It provides for periodic deworming to children and adolescents.
    4. It addresses non-nutritional causes of anaemia in endemic pockets with special focus on malaria, hemoglobinopathies and fluorosis.
    How many of the statements given above are correct?

    [A] Only one

    [B] Only two

    [C] Only three

    [D] All four

  • [19th June 2026] The Hindu OpED: NFHS-6 reveals progress amid nutrition challenge

    PYQ Relevance[UPSC 2018] Appropriate local community-level healthcare intervention is a prerequisite to achieve ‘Health for All’ in India. Explain.
    Linkage: The NFHS-6 findings highlight that achieving better nutrition outcomes requires community-level interventions through ASHAs, AWWs, crèches, behaviour-change communication, local governance participation and preventive counselling, rather than relying solely on institutional healthcare services.

    Mentor’s Comment

    NFHS-6 indicates that India has achieved substantial progress in public health delivery. The central challenge has shifted from expanding access to services toward improving caregiving, feeding behaviour, maternal support, and diet quality.

    What change does NFHS-6 reveal in India’s nutrition landscape?

    1. Decline in Stunting: Stunting among children under five declined from 35.5% to 29.3%.
    2. Better Maternal Care: Around 95% of mothers received antenatal care.
    3. Rise in Institutional Deliveries: Institutional births reached about 90%.
    4. Higher Immunisation Coverage: About 87% of children aged 12–23 months are fully vaccinated.
    5. Improved Public Health Access: Better housing, sanitation, education, and health services have strengthened child health outcomes.

    Why has nutrition progress lagged behind improvements in health indicators?

    1. Poor Breastfeeding Practices: Only about half of newborns are breastfed within the first hour of birth.
    2. Delayed Complementary Feeding: Many children do not receive timely solid and semi-solid foods after six months. In many households, complementary feeding begins only after annaprasana. Delays during this period contribute to growth faltering.
    3. Inadequate Diet Diversity: Only around 15% of children aged 6-23 months receive an adequate diet.
    4. Persistent Wasting: Severe wasting indicators show limited improvement.
    5. Weak Feeding Awareness: Families often lack information regarding age-appropriate nutrition.

    Why is maternal time poverty emerging as a major nutrition challenge?

    1. Double Burden of Work: Women perform paid and unpaid work simultaneously.
    2. Informal Labour Participation: Large numbers of women work in agriculture and informal sectors.
    3. Childcare Deficit: Lack of crèches forces many mothers to leave infants with relatives or older siblings.
    4. Crèches as Nutrition Infrastructure: Community childcare centres improve feeding continuity, support breastfeeding and reduce women’s unpaid care burden.
    5. Disrupted Feeding Practices: Work responsibilities reduce breastfeeding and complementary feeding frequency.
    6. Limited Childcare Infrastructure: Rural areas lack adequate crèches and support systems.

    Why does greater food expenditure not guarantee better nutrition?

    1. Consumer Expenditure Shift: Recent Consumer Expenditure Survey findings show declining spending on cereals and rising expenditure on dairy, processed foods and beverages.
    2. Nutrition-Diversity Gap: Dietary diversity does not necessarily ensure nutritional adequacy.
    3. Affordability Constraints: Pulses, fruits, vegetables, nuts, and animal-source foods remain expensive.
    4. Convenience Advantage: Processed foods are easily available and ready to consume.
    5. Departure from NIN Guidelines: Many household diets diverge from recommended nutritional patterns.

    Why must India’s nutrition strategy move beyond treatment to prevention?

    1. Critical First 1,000 Days: Nutrition from pregnancy to age two determines lifelong outcomes.
    2. Early Growth Faltering: Stunting and growth failure begin well before severe malnutrition becomes visible. Growth faltering often begins before severe malnutrition becomes visible and peaks during the second year of life.
    3. Need for Early Detection: Regular anthropometric monitoring can identify risks sooner.
    4. Preventive Counselling: Timely guidance to mothers can prevent nutrition deficits.
    5. Focus on At-Risk Children: Current interventions remain heavily oriented toward severe cases.
    6. 0-2 Years Data Gap: Lack of disaggregated data for children aged 0-2 years limits targeted interventions during the most critical growth period.
    7. POSHAN Focus Gap: Current identification systems focus on severely malnourished children rather than children beginning to show growth decline

    What implementation gaps weaken frontline nutrition delivery?

    1. Data Quality Challenges: Large volumes of nutrition data remain underutilised.
    2. Limited Analytical Capacity: Local-level analysis and feedback mechanisms remain weak.
    3. Training Deficits: AWWs, ASHAs, and ANMs need stronger nutrition counselling skills.
    4. Human Resource Gaps: District-level nutritionists and data analysts are inadequate.
    5. Limited Digital Support: Technology tools remain underused for counselling and monitoring.

    Why is child malnutrition not merely a health-sector problem?

    1. Water and Sanitation Linkages: Safe drinking water and sanitation directly influence nutrition outcomes.
    2. Local Governance Role: Gram Sabhas and Panchayats can prioritise nutrition interventions.
    3. Need for Convergence: Health, ICDS, education, and local governments must coordinate.
    4. Gender Dimension: Women’s economic participation requires childcare support systems.
    5. Role of Men in Caregiving: Shared domestic responsibilities improve child feeding practices.

    What is the central tension in India’s nutrition transition?

    1. Access vs Outcomes: Health-care access has improved substantially, but nutrition outcomes lag behind.
    2. Health Care vs Nutrition Outcomes: India has largely solved access-related deficits in maternal and child health, but feeding practices, caregiving constraints and diet quality now drive malnutrition.
    3. Treatment vs Prevention: Policy focus remains stronger on rehabilitation than early prevention.
    4. Food Availability vs Nutrition Quality: More food spending does not ensure better diets.
    5. Women’s Work vs Childcare Needs: Economic participation often competes with caregiving responsibilities.
    6. Data Generation vs Data Utilisation: India collects extensive nutrition data but uses it inadequately for corrective action.

    Conclusion

    NFHS-6 shows that India has largely succeeded in expanding health-care access and public service delivery. The next phase of nutrition improvement depends on correcting feeding practices, reducing maternal time poverty, improving diet quality, strengthening frontline counselling, and using nutrition data for preventive action. Better health care alone cannot overcome India’s nutrition challenge.

  • Iran gets ‘understanding’, world gets Hormuz, Trump gets his exit 

    Why in the News?

    The United States and Iran signed a 14-clause Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on June 17-18, 2026, opening a 60-day negotiating window for a final agreement. The MoU ends active hostilities, reopens the Strait of Hormuz, creates a pathway for sanctions relief, and revives nuclear diplomacy. It also departs significantly from the 2015 JCPOA by deferring key disputes over enrichment, ballistic missiles, and Iran’s regional network.

    What are the key clauses of the US-Iran MoU?

    1. Ends Hostilities: Clause 1 establishes a formal cessation of military operations involving Iran, Israel, and the United States.
    2. Establishes Non-Interference: Clause 2 commits both sides to refrain from actions aimed at destabilising the other, including regime-change efforts.
    3. Creates a 60-Day Negotiating Window: Clause 3 allows both sides to extend negotiations by mutual consent before a final settlement is reached.
    4. Reopens the Strait of Hormuz: Clauses 4 and 5 remove the US naval blockade and guarantee uninterrupted maritime transit through Hormuz.
    5. Creates an Economic Package: Clauses 6, 7, 10 and 11 provide for reconstruction assistance, sanctions relief, sanctions waivers, and release of more than $100 billion in frozen Iranian assets. At present sanctions waivers will act as interim arrangement before sanctions removal is operationalised
    6. Retains Nuclear Monitoring: Clauses 8 and 12 reaffirm Iran’s commitment not to pursue nuclear weapons and establish a monitoring mechanism.
    7. Seeks International Legitimacy: Clause 14 envisages a binding UN Security Council resolution endorsing the final arrangement.

    Why is the Strait of Hormuz central to the agreement?

    1. Global Energy Chokepoint: Nearly 20% of global oil trade and about 25% of global LNG shipments pass through Hormuz.
    2. Iran’s Principal Leverage: Control over Hormuz provides Iran with significant influence over global energy markets.
    3. Prevention of an Energy Shock: Reopening the Strait removes the immediate risk of disruption to nearly 20% of global oil trade and 25% of global LNG shipments.
    4. Shared Interest: The US, Iran, Gulf states and energy-importing economies all benefit from uninterrupted maritime traffic.
    5. Potential New Governance Framework: A future Iran-Oman arrangement inspired by the Montreux Convention governing the Turkish Straits.

    How does the MoU depart from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) framework?

    1. Broader Than a Nuclear Agreement: The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) focused on Iran’s nuclear programme. The MoU links nuclear issues, sanctions, reconstruction, maritime security and regional stability.
    2. Different Sequencing: The JCPOA imposed nuclear restrictions before sanctions relief. The MoU prioritises sanctions relief and economic normalisation before addressing several unresolved security questions.
    3. No Requirement to Transfer Enriched Uranium: Unlike the JCPOA framework, the MoU does not require Iran to transfer its enriched nuclear stockpile to a third country.
    4. Ballistic Missiles Excluded: Clause 9 of the MOU contains no commitment regarding Iran’s ballistic missile programme.
    5. Regional Networks Excluded: The agreement contains no provisions on Iran’s relationships with Hezbollah and other regional non-state actors.
    6. Response to the JCPOA Collapse: The framework emerges after the US withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018 and Iran’s subsequent departure from many of its commitments.

    Does the sanctions package constitute real relief or merely a promise of future relief?

    1. Relief Is Deferred: Clause 7 commits to sanctions relief but leaves implementation to the negotiation period.
    2. Multiple Sanctions Regimes Remain: Nuclear, counter-terrorism and designation-based sanctions remain interconnected and unresolved.
    3. Sanctions Waivers Act as a Bridge: Clause 10 creates temporary relief before full implementation.
    4. Asset Unfreezing Provides Immediate Benefits: More than $100 billion in frozen assets are scheduled to become available to Iran
    5. Large Economic Upside: According to estimates, sanctions easing could generate approximately $60 billion annually in Iranian oil and fuel revenues.

    Has the MoU meaningfully constrained Iran’s nuclear capability?

    1. Clause 8- No Nuclear Weapons Commitment: Iran reiterates that it will not procure or develop nuclear weapons and reaffirms its stated position since 2003.
    2. Clause 12- Monitoring Mechanism: The MoU establishes a mechanism to monitor implementation of the agreement and future commitments.
    3. No Restriction on Enrichment Capacity: The agreement does not require Iran to dismantle or reduce its existing uranium enrichment capability. This is a significant divergence from the original US position and from the 2015 JCPOA, under which the negotiation timeline (roughly 2013-15) required limiting Iran’s 60%-enriched uranium stockpile.
    4. No Transfer of Enriched Uranium Stockpiles: Unlike the JCPOA framework, the MoU does not mandate transfer or reduction of Iran’s accumulated enriched uranium stockpile.
    5. Ballistic Missile Programme Remains Outside the Agreement: None of the 14 clauses contain any reference to negotiations over ballistic missiles or Iran’s relationships with regional non-state actors.
    6. Core Non-Proliferation Questions Remain Deferred: The agreement establishes monitoring and political commitments but postpones decisions on enrichment limits, stockpiles and missile capabilities to future negotiations.

    What gives the MoU more binding force than the JCPOA had, and what remains unresolved on enforcement?

    1. Clause 14- Binding UNSC resolution: This clause provides for a binding UN Security Council resolution endorsing the deal, notable because it proceeds despite the Trump administration’s general disdain for UN mechanisms.
    2. Anchored to existing resolution: The JCPOA was endorsed by UNSC Resolution 2231, whose binding nature was affirmed in the text through Article 25 of the UN Charter.
    3. New resolution’s terms uncertain: The new UNSC resolution will have to be similar to Resolution 2231, but Iran could potentially seek fail-safe arrangements that weaken its binding character.
    4. No enforcement detail in available clauses: Clause 12 provides a monitoring mechanism, but no clause specifies consequences for non-compliance, leaving enforcement design open for the 60-day negotiation.

    Why does the agreement create a strategic dilemma for Israel? 

    1. Iran Gains Before Major Concessions: Sanctions relief, asset access and diplomatic legitimacy arrive before resolution of missile and proxy issues.
    2. Maximum Pressure Weakens: The agreement shifts US policy from coercion to managed engagement.
    3. Military Options Narrow: The de-escalatory framework reduces immediate scope for escalation against Iran.
    4. Hezbollah and Regional Networks Remain: The agreement leaves Israel’s principal security concerns largely untouched.
    5. US and Israeli Priorities Diverge: Washington prioritises stability and conflict management. Israel prioritises long-term constraints on Iranian capabilities.

    Is this MoU a genuine resolution of the US-Iran conflict, or a deferral of its hardest elements?

    1. Visible De-escalation Achieved: Hostilities have paused. The Hormuz blockade has ended. A path to sanctions relief and reconstruction has opened.
    2. Core Disputes Remain Deferred: Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile, ballistic missile programme and regional proxies remain outside the agreement.
    3. Implementation Is the Real Challenge: The JCPOA provides a negotiating template. The challenge is securing compliance during the 60-day window.
    4. Strategic Questions Remain Open: The MoU does not restrict Iran’s existing enrichment stockpile. The core non-proliferation debate has been postponed to future negotiations.

    Conclusion

    The US-Iran MoU is not a non-proliferation settlement; it is a crisis-management framework. It secures Hormuz, pauses hostilities, unlocks a pathway to sanctions relief, and creates political space for further negotiations. The agreement’s success rests on postponing the issues that have historically prevented compromise, enrichment stockpiles, ballistic missiles, and Iran’s regional network. Whether those deferred questions can be resolved within the 60-day window will determine whether the MoU becomes a durable successor to the JCPOA or merely a temporary pause in a longer confrontation.

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2018] In what ways would the ongoing US-Iran Nuclear Pact Controversy affect the national interest of India? How should India respond to this situation?

    Linkage: The PYQ examines the strategic implications of US-Iran engagement for regional stability and national interests. The article analyses how the US-Iran MoU manages tensions through diplomacy while leaving key strategic issues unresolved.