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GS Paper: GS2

  • J&K Census enumerators raise tech concerns

    Why in the News

    A readiness review for the Population Enumeration phase in Doda district recorded that Census enumerators and supervisors in the snow bound areas of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) hold mobile devices below the configuration the Census application requires. Census 2027 is India’s first digital headcount, and it runs on personal phones owned by school teachers and government employees rather than on equipment the state issues.

    What is the Digital Census 2027?

    1. First digital enumeration: Census 2027 is the first Census in India to be conducted digitally, with field data captured through a mobile application instead of printed schedules.
    2. Field workforce: Enumerators and supervisors are drawn mostly from school teachers and government employees, who record entries on their own handsets.
    3. Device specification: The application requires a minimum of 8 GB of RAM and Android 13 or above on the device used for Population Enumeration.
    4. Phased design: A self enumeration portal opens before field work, after which enumerators conduct door to door visits within a fixed window.

    What is self enumeration?

    1. Self enumeration: Self enumeration lets a household fill its own Census entries on an online portal instead of waiting for an enumerator to visit. The entry is verified later by the field functionary during the enumeration window.

    Why has device configuration become an enumeration problem?

    1. Hardware shifted to the enumerator: The Census application runs on the enumerator’s personal phone, so the capacity to count depends on assets the state neither owns nor issues.
    2. Specification threshold breached: Functionaries in the snow bound areas of Jammu and Kashmir were found holding phones below the 8 GB RAM and Android 13 requirement.
    3. Cost borne privately: The field workforce is composed of school teachers and government employees, so meeting the specification is a private expense rather than a budgeted input.
    4. Terrain compounds the gap: The affected districts are enumerated ahead of the rest of the country, which leaves the least time to replace or upgrade equipment.
    5. Resolution left open: The review recorded the shortfall for appropriate resolution without naming a procurement or substitution route.

    Why are Ladakh and the snow bound areas enumerated ahead of the rest of the country?

    1. Second phase advanced: The second phase of the Census in Ladakh and the snow bound areas of Jammu and Kashmir, Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh is being conducted ahead of the rest of the country.
    2. Weather window: Snowfall closes road access to these habitations, so the field round has to be completed before winter sets in.
    3. Self enumeration first: The self enumeration portal for these regions remains available from 17 August to 31 August.
    4. Field window: Door to door enumeration starts on 1 September and concludes by 30 September 2026.
    5. District level review: Doda district’s readiness for that window was reviewed at the Deputy Commissioner’s Office Complex under the Chief Principal Census Officer.

    How is the exercise being prepared for hard to count populations?

    1. Migratory populations: Special attention was directed to the enumeration of migratory populations, whose movement across the enumeration window produces both omission and double counting.
    2. Tribal communities: Tribal communities were named as a category requiring focused enumeration effort.
    3. Remote forest residents: Residents of remote forest areas were named alongside them, since habitations there fall outside routine administrative contact.
    4. Verification discipline: Enumerators and supervisors were directed to ensure that all entries are properly recorded, verified and cross checked.
    5. Field inspection: Charge officers and supervisors were instructed to conduct regular field inspections and quality checks.
    6. Awareness campaigns: District authorities were asked to intensify awareness campaigns through newspapers, pamphlets, social media and local outreach programmes ahead of enumeration.

    Why is the postponement of the Census in Manipur being demanded?

    1. Deferral sought: The principal Opposition party has sought postponement of the Census exercise in Manipur, citing continuing violence and the displacement of thousands of people.
    2. Displacement scale: Nearly 60,000 people have remained homeless since violence in the State began on 3 May 2023, with many still living in relief camps.
    3. Housing stock destroyed: Over 10,000 houses have been destroyed in the State.
    4. House listing defeated: Accurate house listing of thousands of homeless people living in relief camps is not practicable, so the record would capture a household structure that no longer exists.
    5. Postponement, not cancellation: The demand is for deferral until conditions become conducive, and not for cancellation of the exercise in the State.
    6. Raised in Parliament: The Inner Manipur Lok Sabha member said he had raised the matter in Parliament.

    Does a digital Census widen or narrow the count?

    1. Speed against reach: Digital capture shortens the gap between field entry and tabulation, and it makes the count conditional on device capability in the districts hardest to reach.
    2. Uniform standard on an uneven base: A single minimum specification treats a school teacher in Doda and one in a metropolitan district as equally equipped.
    3. Self enumeration favours the connected: An online portal transfers effort to the household, which advantages literate and connected households and leaves the rest dependent on a field visit.
    4. Displacement defeats the frame: A Census counts people at a usual place of residence, and conflict displacement breaks that anchor before any technology is applied.
    5. Errors travel further: A digital schedule locks an entry into a database at the point of capture, so an unverified record propagates instead of being caught at manual tabulation.

    “[2009] Consider the following statements:

    1. Between Census 1951 and Census 2001, the density of the population of India has increased more than three times.

    2. Between Census 1951 and Census 2001, the annual growth rate (exponential) of the population of India has doubled.

    Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

    (a) 1 only

    (b) 2 only

    (c) Both 1 and 2

    (d) Neither 1 nor 2

  • BNP’s Alamgir elected new President of Bangladesh

    Why in the News

    Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir, long time secretary general of the ruling Bangladesh Nationalist Party, was elected President of Bangladesh on 20 August 2026 in the first contested poll for the office in 35 years. He secured 255 of the 343 votes cast in Parliament against 88 for the nominee of the Jamaat-e-Islami led opposition alliance. The contest itself is the significant fact, since the office has been filled by consensus and uncontested polls for decades.

    How is the President of Bangladesh elected?

    1. Who votes: The President is elected indirectly by the members of Parliament, so the outcome reflects the composition of the House rather than a popular vote.
    2. Who conducts it: The Chief Election Commissioner acts as the Election Returning Officer and declares the result after counting.
    3. The vacancy rule: Under the Constitution, a new President is required to be elected within 90 days of the office falling vacant.
    4. What the office holds: The presidency is largely ceremonial, with executive authority resting with the Prime Minister and the Cabinet.

    What is the Jatiya Sangsad?

    1. What it is: The Jatiya Sangsad is Bangladesh’s unicameral Parliament, which both elects the President and provides the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Its composition therefore determines the presidential outcome in advance of the vote.

    What is Bangabhaban?

    1. What it is: Bangabhaban in Dhaka is the official residence and workplace of the President of Bangladesh. Its Darbar Hall is the venue at which the President takes the oath of office.

    What did the vote actually show about the balance in Parliament?

    1. The electorate: Of the total 349 registered voters, 343 voted in the election, and six lawmakers did not vote.
    2. The result: Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir secured 255 votes and Oli Ahmed secured 88 votes.
    3. The losing candidate: Oli Ahmed, aged 84, is a retired Colonel and chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party, and was the nominee of the Jamaat-e-Islami led eleven party opposition alliance.
    4. The winning candidate’s standing: Alamgir, aged 78, is a long time secretary general of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and a close ally of former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia.
    5. What the margin reflects: The ruling party and its allies hold a two thirds majority in Parliament following the general election that returned them to power.
    6. The break with recent practice: It was the first contested presidential election in Bangladesh since 1991, the office having largely been filled through consensus and uncontested polls in recent decades.

    Why did the presidency fall vacant?

    1. The resignation: Mohammed Shahabuddin resigned last month on health grounds before completing his five year tenure.
    2. His political association: He was a close aide of the deposed Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, whose government fell in 2024.
    3. The constitutional consequence: The vacancy triggered the 90 day requirement for electing a successor.
    4. Why it became contested: With a changed parliamentary composition following the transition, the consensus mechanism that had filled the office in recent decades no longer held.

    What does a ceremonial presidency mean in Bangladesh’s system?

    1. Head of state, not head of government: The President is the head of state, while executive authority is exercised by the Prime Minister and the Cabinet.
    2. The formal military role: The President is designated supreme commander of the defence services, a title exercised on the advice of the government.
    3. Where discretion survives: The President’s independent discretion is confined to the appointment of the Prime Minister and the Chief Justice, and otherwise the office acts on advice.
    4. The order of succession: The Speaker of Parliament acts as President when the office falls vacant, until a successor is elected.
    5. The oath: The President elect will take the oath as Bangladesh’s 23rd President on Friday evening at the Darbar Hall of Bangabhaban.

    Why does the return of contested presidential politics matter?

    1. What consensus polls concealed: Uncontested elections meant the office was allocated by the ruling party rather than won, which removed any parliamentary test of the nominee.
    2. What a contest introduces: A recorded vote of 255 to 88 registers the size and composition of the opposition bloc inside Parliament.
    3. The opposition’s new configuration: The Jamaat-e-Islami led eleven party alliance fielded a joint candidate, which formalises an opposition grouping that had previously been fragmented.
    4. The signal of the abstentions: Six lawmakers declined to vote, which records dissent that a consensus procedure would have absorbed silently.
    5. The continuity of the office: The presidency remains ceremonial, so the contest changes the politics of the office without changing its powers.

    What does the change in Dhaka alter for India’s neighbourhood policy?

    1. A new majority to work with: The Bangladesh Nationalist Party and its allies hold a two thirds majority, which gives India a single interlocutor with the parliamentary strength to conclude agreements.
    2. A pending water file: The India Bangladesh Ganga Water Treaty of 1996 expires on 31 December, and its renewal must be negotiated with the new dispensation.
    3. The unresolved Teesta question: The Teesta water sharing agreement drafted in 2011 remains unsigned and has been Dhaka’s standing demand across governments.
    4. Connectivity projects in progress: Rail, road and port links built over the previous decade, including the Akhaura Agartala rail link and the Maitri Setu bridge, require continuity of commitment on both sides.
    5. The security file: Border management, insurgent sanctuaries in the northeast and the safety of minority communities are the standing items on which India seeks assurances from any government in Dhaka.

    Challenges to Bangladesh’s political transition

    1. A ceremonial head of state elected on party lines: A partisan presidency strains the office’s role as a neutral arbiter in disputes over government formation. Eg. The outgoing President was a close aide of the deposed Prime Minister and resigned before completing his tenure.
    2. Consolidation of power under a two thirds majority: A supermajority removes the parliamentary check on constitutional amendment. Eg. The ruling party and its allies hold a two thirds majority in the Jatiya Sangsad after the general election.
    3. An opposition organised around a religious party alliance: The main opposition bloc is led by a party with a contested constitutional history. Eg. The eleven party opposition alliance that fielded the losing presidential candidate is led by Jamaat-e-Islami.
    4. Institutional damage from the previous transition: Administrative and judicial appointments made under the earlier government remain politically contested. Eg. The presidency itself fell vacant through the resignation of an appointee of the deposed government.
    5. Economic pressure on a garment dependent economy: External demand shocks translate directly into employment and foreign exchange stress. Eg. Bangladesh’s export earnings are concentrated in ready made garments, which leaves the current account exposed to a single sector.
    6. Security of minority communities: Political transitions in Bangladesh have historically been followed by attacks on minorities. Eg. The period following the fall of the previous government in 2024 saw reported attacks on Hindu households and temples.
    7. Restoring routine electoral practice: A single contested election does not by itself re-establish competitive norms. Eg. It took 35 years for a contested presidential poll to recur after 1991.

    Conclusion

    Bangladesh has elected a new head of state through its first contested presidential poll in 35 years, with the ruling party’s nominee securing 255 votes against 88 for the opposition alliance’s candidate, from 343 of 349 registered voters. The office remains ceremonial, so the outcome registers the parliamentary balance after the political transition rather than shifting executive power. The next milestone is the oath of office as Bangladesh’s 23rd President on Friday evening at the Darbar Hall of Bangabhaban.

    About India Bangladesh Relations

    1. The border: India and Bangladesh share a land boundary of 4,096.7 km, India’s longest with any neighbour, running along West Bengal, Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram.
    2. The rivers: The two countries share 54 common rivers, and water sharing is the most persistent item on the bilateral agenda.
    3. Trade: Bangladesh is India’s largest trade partner in South Asia, and India is among the largest sources of Bangladesh’s imports.
    4. Connectivity: Rail links, inland waterway protocol routes, bus services and port access arrangements have been progressively restored since 2015 after decades of disuse.
    5. Energy: India supplies electricity to Bangladesh across the interconnection at Bheramara and through cross border transmission links, and the two countries operate a diesel pipeline between them.
    6. Development partnership: India has extended three Lines of Credit to Bangladesh totalling about $7.862 billion, its largest such commitment to any single country.

    Constitutional Framework Governing the Presidency in Bangladesh

    1. Article 48: Provides for a President elected by the members of Parliament, and requires the President to act on the advice of the Prime Minister except in appointing the Prime Minister and the Chief Justice.
    2. Article 50: Fixes the President’s term at five years from the date of entering office, and bars any person from holding the office for more than two terms.
    3. Article 54: Provides that the Speaker of Parliament shall act as President when the office is vacant or the President is unable to discharge functions.
    4. Article 55: Vests the executive power of the Republic in the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, which is the provision that makes the presidency ceremonial.
    5. Article 123: Governs the timing of elections to the office, including the requirement that a vacancy be filled within a fixed period of its occurrence.
    6. Presidential Election Act, 1991: Provides the procedure for nomination, polling and declaration of the result, with the Chief Election Commissioner acting as Returning Officer.

    India Bangladesh Cooperation Initiatives

    1. Maitri Setu: A bridge over the Feni river connecting Sabroom in Tripura with Ramgarh in Bangladesh, inaugurated in March 2021, giving the northeast access to Chattogram port.
    2. Akhaura Agartala rail link: A cross border rail connection commissioned in November 2023 that shortens the route between Agartala and Kolkata through Bangladeshi territory.
    3. Port access agreement: An arrangement permitting the use of Chattogram and Mongla ports for the movement of Indian goods to and from the northeastern States.
    4. India Bangladesh Friendship Pipeline: A cross border diesel pipeline from Siliguri to Parbatipur, inaugurated in March 2023, supplying high speed diesel to northern Bangladesh.
    5. Maitree Super Thermal Power Project: A joint venture coal fired power project at Rampal in Bangladesh, developed by an Indian and Bangladeshi partnership.
    6. Border Haats: Designated markets along the boundary allowing residents of nearby villages on both sides to trade specified local goods without formal customs procedures.

    Key Facts about Bangladesh and its Relations with India

    1. Independence: Bangladesh became independent in 1971, and India was among the first countries to recognise it.
    2. Land Boundary Agreement: The 1974 agreement was operationalised through the 100th Constitutional Amendment Act, 2015, under which India transferred 111 enclaves to Bangladesh and received 51.
    3. Maritime boundary: A Permanent Court of Arbitration tribunal delivered its award on the maritime boundary between the two countries in July 2014, which both accepted.
    4. Kushiyara agreement: The withdrawal of water from the Kushiyara river was agreed in September 2022, the second water sharing instrument after the Ganga treaty.
    5. Population: Bangladesh has a population of about 173 million people.
    6. Presidential history: The office being filled on 21 August 2026 is that of Bangladesh’s 23rd President.
    7. Joint river institution: The Joint Rivers Commission has functioned since 1972 as the standing bilateral mechanism on shared rivers.

    Back2Basics: Bangladesh Nationalist Party

    1. Founded: The party was founded in 1978 by Ziaur Rahman, then the country’s military ruler and later President.
    2. Ideology: It is built around Bangladeshi nationalism, which defines national identity by territory and religion rather than by the language based Bengali nationalism of its principal rival.
    3. Leadership: It has been led since 1984 by Khaleda Zia, widow of the founder, who served as Prime Minister on three occasions.
    4. Principal rival: Its long standing opponent is the Awami League, and the two parties have alternated in power for most of the country’s competitive electoral history.
    5. Electoral boycotts: The party boycotted the general elections of 2014 and 2024, which kept it out of Parliament for extended periods.
    6. Current position: It returned to power in the general election held in February 2026, and holds a two thirds majority in Parliament with its allies.

    Challenges in India Bangladesh Relations

    1. The unresolved Teesta agreement: The most contested river sharing file has remained unsigned for over a decade. Eg. The Teesta draft agreed in 2011 was not signed after West Bengal withheld support.
    2. Border killings: Fatalities along the boundary remain the most publicly damaging irritant in the relationship. Eg. Incidents involving the Border Security Force and Bangladeshi nationals along the fenced boundary recur and draw formal protests from Dhaka.
    3. Illegal migration and its domestic politics: Migration questions feed into Indian State level politics and produce friction with Dhaka. Eg. The National Register of Citizens exercise in Assam produced sustained diplomatic concern in Bangladesh.
    4. Trade imbalance: Bangladesh runs a large deficit with India, which sustains a domestic constituency against closer economic integration. Eg. Indian exports to Bangladesh far exceed Bangladeshi exports to India despite duty free access under the South Asian Free Trade Area.
    5. Competition from external partners: Infrastructure and defence offers from other powers reduce India’s relative weight. Eg. Chinese financing has funded major Bangladeshi infrastructure including bridges, power plants and port projects.
    6. The Rohingya caseload: More than a million refugees in Cox’s Bazar constrain Bangladesh’s policy space and create a shared security concern. Eg. Repatriation attempts to Myanmar have repeatedly failed since the influx of 2017.
    7. Security of minority communities: Attacks on minorities during political transitions generate pressure on Indian policy. Eg. The 2024 transition was followed by reported attacks on Hindu households and places of worship.
    8. Insurgent sanctuaries and connectivity security: Northeast Indian connectivity through Bangladesh depends on continued cooperation against insurgent groups. Eg. Transit corridors through Bangladeshi territory to the northeast require sustained security cooperation to remain viable.

    Way Forward

    1. Open the Ganga treaty renewal early: Begin the final round of renewal talks well before the 31 December expiry so that the instrument does not lapse during a political transition.
    2. Separate the Teesta from the Ganga negotiation: Handle the two rivers on independent tracks so that a stalled file does not hold a functioning one hostage.
    3. Institutionalise engagement beyond the ruling party: Maintain contact across the political spectrum in Dhaka so that the relationship does not have to be rebuilt at each change of government.
    4. Correct the trade asymmetry: Expand duty free access, remove non tariff barriers and complete the proposed comprehensive economic partnership so that the deficit ceases to be a political argument.
    5. Complete connectivity projects on schedule: Deliver the remaining rail, road and inland waterway links so that the economic case for cooperation is visible to the Bangladeshi public.
    6. Reduce border fatalities to zero: Shift to non lethal means and joint patrolling protocols along the boundary, since this single issue does the most reputational damage.
    7. Coordinate on the Rohingya question: Support repatriation diplomacy with Myanmar and continue humanitarian assistance to Cox’s Bazar, which addresses a Bangladeshi priority at limited cost.

  • EOI for data centre project on islands withdrawn

    Why in the News

    The Andaman and Nicobar Islands administration has withdrawn an Expression of Interest seeking feasibility proposals for a private sector-led green artificial intelligence data centre on the islands, days after publishing it. The withdrawal follows reports that the Nicobarese population on Great Nicobar Island had not been informed of any plan to set up a data centre in the sea areas around the island.

    What is an Expression of Interest in a public project?

    1. About: An Expression of Interest is a pre-tender notice through which a government body invites interested parties to indicate willingness and capability to undertake a project, before a formal tender is issued.
    2. Purpose: It is used to test market interest and technical feasibility for a project whose scope, cost or technology is not yet fixed, so the responses shape the later tender document.
    3. Legal effect: It creates no contractual obligation and can be withdrawn or modified by the issuing authority at any stage before award.

    What is a green artificial intelligence data centre?

    1. About: A data centre is a facility housing servers and networking equipment, and an artificial intelligence data centre is optimised for the high power and cooling demands of large model training and inference.
    2. Why green: The green label refers to powering the facility with renewable energy and using low-water or seawater-based cooling, since artificial intelligence workloads consume far more electricity and cooling water than conventional server hosting.

    Who are the Nicobarese?

    1. About: The Nicobarese are the largest indigenous community of the Nicobar group of islands, a Scheduled Tribe living in village-based settlements across the Nicobar archipelago including Great Nicobar.
    2. Why they matter here: Their traditional lands and coastal commons fall within the footprint of island infrastructure projects, so their prior information and consent is the legal and administrative test for any such proposal.

    Why has the withdrawal drawn attention to consultation?

    1. The sequence: The Expression of Interest was published on 10 August, and a notice issued days later withdrew it with immediate effect due to administrative reasons.
    2. Location of the proposal: The data centre was proposed for the sea areas around Great Nicobar Island, which places it directly in the coastal zone the resident community depends on.
    3. The information gap: The local Nicobarese population on Great Nicobar Island had not been informed of any plan to set up a data centre in those waters.
    4. The wider protest: Local people are already protesting against the government’s proposed Rs 91,000-crore mega-infrastructure project on the same island.
    5. What the reason given does not settle: The notice cites administrative reasons without specifying whether the withdrawal responds to the consultation failure, the technical feasibility or the wider protest.

    What is at stake in the Great Nicobar mega project?

    1. Scale: The proposed mega-infrastructure project on Great Nicobar Island carries an estimated cost of Rs 91,000 crore.
    2. Components: The Great Nicobar Island Project comprises a transhipment port at Galathea Bay, an international airport, a power plant and a greenfield township.
    3. Strategic rationale: The transhipment port is intended to rival Colombo and Singapore for container transhipment, capturing traffic that currently bypasses Indian ports.
    4. Ecological setting: Great Nicobar hosts the Great Nicobar Biosphere Reserve, along with the Galathea Bay leatherback turtle nesting site and the Campbell Bay and Galathea National Parks.
    5. Community setting: The island is home to the Nicobarese and to the Shompen, a Particularly Vulnerable Tribal Group living in the interior forests.
    6. The consultation question: The data centre withdrawal repeats the question already raised about the mega project, which is whether affected communities are informed before proposals enter the public domain.

    Challenges to Island Infrastructure Development

    1. Prior informed consent: Project proposals reach the public domain before the resident community is told, which converts consultation into a post-facto formality. Eg. The Nicobarese on Great Nicobar were not informed of the data centre proposal in the waters around their island.
    2. Ecological irreversibility: Island ecosystems are small, endemic and cannot absorb clearance at the scale mainland projects assume. Eg. The Great Nicobar project involves diversion of a large tract of tropical forest and construction at the Galathea Bay leatherback turtle nesting beach.
    3. Seismic and tsunami exposure: The islands sit on an active subduction zone, so heavy coastal infrastructure carries a hazard the mainland does not face. Eg. The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami devastated the Nicobar group and permanently submerged parts of the coastline near Indira Point.
    4. Water and power for data infrastructure: Artificial intelligence data centres demand continuous power and cooling that island grids cannot supply without new generation. Eg. The Andaman and Nicobar Islands depend substantially on diesel generation and an undersea optical fibre link commissioned in 2020.
    5. Rehabilitation of tribal populations: Displacement from customary land cannot be compensated in cash terms for communities whose livelihood is tied to a specific coastal ecology. Eg. Nicobarese families displaced by the 2004 tsunami were resettled in intermediate shelters, and return to original villages remained incomplete for years.
    6. Regulatory clearance layering: Island projects require forest, coastal zone, wildlife and tribal clearances from separate authorities, which invites piecemeal appraisal of a single project. Eg. The Great Nicobar project’s clearances have been challenged before the National Green Tribunal and reviewed by a high-powered committee.
    7. Strategic and civilian conflict: The islands host India’s only tri-service command, so security requirements limit civilian access and complicate transparent public consultation. Eg. Access to several Nicobar islands remains restricted under tribal reserve and defence notifications.

    “[2019] Consider the following statements about Particularly Vulnerable Tribal Groups (PVTGs) in India:

    1. PVTGs reside in 18 States and one Union Territory.

    2. A stagnant or declining population is one of the criteria for determining PVTG status.

    3. There are 95 PVTGs officially notified in the country so far.

    4. Irular and Konda Reddi tribes are included in the list of PVTGs.

    Which of the statements given above are correct?

    (a) 1, 2 and 3

    (b) 2, 3 and 4

    (c) 1, 2 and 4

    (d) 1, 3 and 4

  • Former SC judge-led panel to probe ‘police excesses’ against protesters

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court has constituted a five member High-Powered Enquiry Committee headed by a former Supreme Court judge to examine alleged excesses and disproportionate use of force by police and security personnel at Jantar Mantar and other locations during last month’s protests over the National Eligibility cum Entrance Test (Undergraduate) paper leak. The Court framed twelve issues for the inquiry, covering both police conduct and violence by protesters. The order therefore turns a policing controversy into an examination of the constitutional limits on how the State may respond to assembly.

    What is the High-Powered Enquiry Committee?

    1. What it is: The High-Powered Enquiry Committee (HPEC) is a fact finding body constituted by the Supreme Court to examine allegations of excessive force by police and security personnel during the protests, and to report back to the Court.
    2. Who heads it and who sits on it: It is headed by former Supreme Court judge R Subhash Reddy. Its members are former Punjab and Haryana High Court Chief Justice Ravi Shankar Jha, former Delhi High Court judge Justice Shalinder Kaur, former Central Bureau of Investigation Director Rishi Kumar Shukla, and retired Director General of Police of Meghalaya L R Bishnoi.
    3. How it must function: The inquiry is not to be a one time exercise. The Committee is to undertake a continuous and periodic assessment of the enumerated issues and submit interim findings periodically, so the Court can issue directions as warranted.
    4. What it does not displace: The Court clarified that the constitution of the Committee shall in no way deter or debar police authorities or security forces from taking administrative or disciplinary action against officers found in contravention of the rules governing their conduct.

    What is the current status of the right to protest in India?

    1. The right itself: The right to protest is drawn from Article 19(1)(a), the freedom of speech and expression, and Article 19(1)(b), the right to assemble peaceably and without arms, read together.
    2. The condition built into the text: The assembly must be peaceable and without arms, so the protection falls away for an assembly that turns violent or armed.
    3. The limits on the right: Restrictions may be imposed under Article 19(2) on speech and Article 19(3) on assembly, and the restriction must be reasonable and imposed by law rather than by executive discretion alone.
    4. No right to occupy a public space indefinitely: The Supreme Court in Amit Sahni v Commissioner of Police (2020) held that public ways and public spaces cannot be occupied indefinitely, and that demonstrations must take place in designated areas.
    5. A blanket ban on a protest site is not permissible: In Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan v Union of India (2018) the Court set aside an absolute prohibition on demonstrations at Jantar Mantar and directed that guidelines be framed regulating rather than eliminating protest there.
    6. Force must be proportionate and compensable: In Anita Thakur v State of Jammu and Kashmir (2016) the Court held that use of excessive force by police against demonstrators violates Article 21 and awarded compensation to the injured.
    7. The operative statutory levers: Prohibitory orders are issued under Section 163 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, and speech and assembly prosecutions have been brought under Section 152 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.

    Constitutional Provisions Related to the Right to Protest and Police Accountability

    1. Article 19(1)(a): Guarantees to all citizens the freedom of speech and expression, from which the right to voice dissent is drawn.
    2. Article 19(1)(b): Guarantees the right to assemble peaceably and without arms.
    3. Article 19(1)(c): Guarantees the right to form associations or unions, under which protest organisations operate.
    4. Article 19(2): Permits the State to impose reasonable restrictions on the freedom of speech and expression on enumerated grounds.
    5. Article 19(3): Permits reasonable restrictions on the right of assembly in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India or public order.
    6. Article 21: Guarantees that no person shall be deprived of life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law, the provision under which bodily harm caused by disproportionate force is examined.
    7. Article 22: Provides safeguards on arrest and detention, including the right to be informed of the grounds of arrest and to consult a legal practitioner.
    8. Article 20(3): Protects a person accused of an offence against being compelled to be a witness against himself.
    9. Article 32 and Article 226: Provide the remedies before the Supreme Court and the High Courts through which protest related grievances and monitored inquiries are brought.
    10. Seventh Schedule, State List Entry 1 and Entry 2: Place public order and police within the legislative and executive competence of the States, which is why a national inquiry into police conduct proceeds through the Court rather than through a central department.

    What is Section 163 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023?

    1. What it does: Section 163 empowers a District Magistrate, a Sub-divisional Magistrate or an Executive Magistrate to issue a written order directing a person or the public generally to abstain from a specified act, where there is an apprehension of obstruction, annoyance, danger to human life or a disturbance of public tranquillity.
    2. Its limits: An order under the section is temporary and cannot ordinarily remain in force beyond two months, and it corresponds to the power earlier exercised under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

    What is Section 152 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023?

    1. What it criminalises: Section 152 punishes acts that excite secession, armed rebellion, subversive activities or separatist feelings, or that endanger the sovereignty, unity and integrity of India, with punishment extending to life imprisonment or seven years with fine.
    2. What it replaced: It came into force on 1 July 2024 in place of Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, the sedition provision inserted in 1870, and its constitutional validity is under challenge on grounds of vagueness and overbreadth.

    What are metallic kinetic projectiles?

    1. What they are: Metallic kinetic projectiles, commonly called pellets, are small metal shot fired in a scattering pattern from pump-action rifles or projectile-action guns, used as a crowd control weapon.
    2. Why they are contested: The scatter pattern makes the point of impact uncontrollable, so injuries to the eyes and upper body are common and the resulting harm is often irreversible.

    What are the twelve issues the Committee will examine?

    1. Issue 1, excessive force: Alleged use of excessive force and violence against protesters by police authorities and other agencies, including deployment of pellet guns, electric batons, lathi charges and tear gas without adequate warning or proportionality, resulting in severe bodily harm and injuries, some alleged to be of a grievous and lasting nature.
    2. Issue 2, proportionality of response: Ensuring a proportionate and measured police response during protests, public gatherings and peaceful assemblies, so as to strike an appropriate balance between maintaining public order and exercising the constitutional right to peaceful dissent.
    3. Issue 3, banning pellets: The desirability of banning the use of metallic kinetic projectiles or pellets fired from pump-action rifles or projectile-action guns, having regard to the grave and at times irreversible bodily harm they cause.
    4. Issue 4, identification of officers: The necessity of ensuring that police and security personnel wear proper uniforms and visible nameplates while effecting arrests or using force during crowd control operations, to secure accountability and enable identification of individual officers.
    5. Issue 5, surveillance: Allegations of monitoring and surveillance of protesters by police personnel, and the extent to which such measures were consistent with the protesters’ constitutional rights to privacy and free assembly.
    6. Issue 6, female protesters: Alleged incidents of targeted violence, harassment, molestation and secondary victimisation directed against female protesters, which warrant a focused and expeditious enquiry.
    7. Issue 7, medical support and compensation: The provision of medical and other requisite support, including award of compensation, to victims of alleged police abuse, and the manner and adequacy of the support extended so far.
    8. Issue 8, prohibitory orders: Regulation of the issuance of blanket prohibitory orders under Section 163 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, to prevent their use as a routine or pre-emptive measure that forecloses peaceful assembly rather than as a proportionate response to a real and imminent threat to public order.
    9. Issue 9, thresholds for Section 152: The establishment of strict constitutional thresholds and safeguards to prevent Section 152 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 from being invoked to stifle political dissent and peaceful protest, so that it is not permitted to operate as a chilling restraint on constitutionally protected speech and assembly.
    10. Issue 10, violence by protesters: Alleged use of force and violence by protesters against police officers and other security personnel.
    11. Issue 11, damage to property: Damage to public property caused by the actions of protesters, including destruction of and injury to government installations, vehicles and other assets belonging to the State and to private citizens alike.
    12. Issue 12, injuries to police: The injuries sustained by police forces in the course of discharging their duties, and the consequent mental and emotional trauma borne by their families.

    Which issues has the Court told the Committee to take up first?

    1. The two priority issues: The Committee is to address Issue 1 on excessive force and Issue 6 on targeted violence against female protesters on a priority basis, bearing in mind the sensitivity attendant on them.
    2. The first deliverable: The Committee has been asked to complete its inquiry and deliberations on those two issues and submit its First Interim Report at the earliest.
    3. The additional head opened: The Committee may also examine the grant of interim compensation to those injured on either side, whether police personnel or protesters.
    4. The reporting design: Interim findings are to be submitted periodically rather than a single report at the end, so the Court can issue directions while the inquiry continues.
    5. When the order was made: The order is dated 19 August 2026 and was released on 20 August 2026.

    Why does the Court’s framing place police conduct and protester conduct on the same list?

    1. The list is symmetrical by design: Nine issues concern police and State conduct and three concern protester conduct, so the inquiry is not framed solely as an investigation of the police.
    2. The compensation head runs both ways: Interim compensation is opened for those injured on either side, which places an injured constable and an injured student within the same remedial frame.
    3. Trauma is recognised on the police side: Issue 12 extends to the mental and emotional trauma borne by the families of injured police personnel, a head rarely written into an inquiry mandate.
    4. Symmetry is not equivalence: The two issues marked for priority treatment are both allegations against the police, so the sequencing signals which set of allegations the Court treats as most urgent.
    5. The disciplinary channel stays open in parallel: The Court expressly preserved the power of police authorities to take administrative or disciplinary action against their own officers, so the inquiry does not become a reason to suspend departmental accountability.
    6. The tension the design carries: A committee asked simultaneously to judge police excess and protester violence must apply one standard of proportionality to an armed disciplined force and another to an unorganised crowd, without a settled test for either.

    Major debates surrounding the right to protest and the use of force

    1. Regulation against prohibition: One position holds that designated protest sites and prior permission are reasonable regulation of a public space, and the other holds that permission requirements convert a right into a licence.
    2. Two rulings pulling in opposite directions: Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (2018) struck down a blanket prohibition at a protest site, and Amit Sahni (2020) held that public ways cannot be occupied indefinitely, so the boundary between the two remains contested.
    3. The proportionality standard for lethal and less lethal weapons: There is no settled judicial test fixing when tear gas, water cannon, batons or pellets may be used, so proportionality is assessed after the event rather than fixed in advance.
    4. Whether pellet weapons can be regulated or must be banned: One position accepts them as a less lethal alternative to firearms, and the other holds that an uncontrollable scatter pattern makes proportionate use impossible in principle.
    5. Prohibitory orders as prevention against pre-emption: Section 163 is defended as a preventive power against imminent threats and contested as a routine instrument that forecloses assembly before any threat materialises.
    6. Whether the narrowing of sedition survives its replacement: The Kedar Nath Singh (1962) requirement of incitement to violence narrowed the old sedition provision, and whether that narrowing automatically transfers to Section 152 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 is unsettled.
    7. Command responsibility against individual liability: Accountability for crowd control failures is contested between the individual officer who used force and the supervising officer who ordered the deployment.
    8. The evidentiary gap the dispute turns on: Without uniforms carrying visible identification, body worn cameras and a contemporaneous record of orders, allegations on both sides rest on competing testimony rather than on documented fact.

    Challenges to the inquiry delivering accountability

    1. A fact finding committee is not a prosecuting authority: The Committee reports to the Court and cannot itself frame charges or convict, so accountability depends on what follows the report. Eg. The Court has separately preserved the departmental power to take disciplinary action, which sits outside the Committee’s control.
    2. Evidence degrades with time in crowd control cases: Injury records, video footage, control room logs and deployment orders have to be secured early or they cease to be reliable. Eg. Issue 4 arises precisely because officers using force were allegedly not identifiable by uniform or nameplate.
    3. Prosecution of police officers requires sanction: Proceeding against a public servant for acts done in the discharge of official duty depends on prior sanction from the government that employs him. Eg. The requirement of prior sanction has historically been the reason many custodial and encounter cases do not reach trial.
    4. Police is a State subject and the incidents spanned States: The Committee’s findings must be implemented by multiple State governments, each of which controls its own force. Eg. The mandate covers Jantar Mantar and other locations across the country during the same protest wave.
    5. Compensation without a fixed scale invites disparity: Interim compensation awarded case by case, on both sides, has no published scale to anchor it. Eg. In Anita Thakur (2016) compensation was fixed by the Court itself in the absence of any statutory schedule for excessive force.
    6. Monitored inquiries lose momentum once attention moves: A periodic assessment mandate depends on the Court continuing to list and act on interim reports over years. Eg. The Prakash Singh directions on police reform were issued in 2006 and remain incompletely implemented across States two decades later.
    7. The unresolved statutory questions sit outside the Committee’s power: Issues 8 and 9 ask for constitutional thresholds on Section 163 and Section 152, which only the Court or Parliament can settle. Eg. The constitutional challenge to Section 152 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 is pending separately before the Supreme Court.

    Conclusion

    The Committee stands constituted with five members under an order dated 19 August 2026, and its immediate task is a First Interim Report on excessive force and on targeted violence against female protesters. The mandate is unusually wide, covering not only what the police did but also the statutory instruments through which protest was restricted, namely prohibitory orders under Section 163 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 and prosecutions under Section 152 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. The constitutional question the order raises is whether the State can be held to a proportionality standard in crowd control when no such standard exists in written form. Until that standard is fixed in advance, each episode will continue to be judged after the fact by a fresh committee.

    “[2013, GS2, 10] Discuss Section 66A of IT Act, with reference to its alleged violation of Article 19 of the Constitution.”

  • Why Sergio Gor’s words in Srinagar are noteworthy

    Why in the News

    The United States Ambassador to India visited Srinagar on 19 August 2026 and described Jammu and Kashmir as an important part of India, on his first visit to the Valley and immediately after meeting the elected Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir. Seventy three years earlier American emissaries had come to the same Valley to raise the possibility of independence with Sheikh Abdullah, whose grandson now stood beside the ambassador. The distance between those two moments is the measure of how far the American position on Jammu and Kashmir has travelled since 1947.

    What is the Instrument of Accession?

    1. What it was: The legal document by which the ruler of a princely state acceded to either India or Pakistan at the end of British paramountcy in 1947, ceding defence, external affairs and communications to the acceding dominion.
    2. Its statutory basis: It was executed under the Government of India Act, 1935 as adapted by the Indian Independence Act, 1947, which gave rulers the choice of accession.
    3. In the case of Jammu and Kashmir: The Maharaja signed it on 26 October 1947 following the tribal invasion, which brought Indian forces into the state.
    4. Why it is contested in this story: American assessments questioned whether the Instrument by itself finally settled the state’s future, which is the legal proposition the ambassador’s statement now cuts against.

    What is Sadr-i-Riyasat?

    1. What it was: The title of the constitutional head of Jammu and Kashmir between 1952 and 1965, elected by the state legislature in place of a hereditary ruler. The office was replaced by a Governor appointed by the President through the Constitution (Sixth Amendment) to the Jammu and Kashmir Constitution in 1965.

    What is a demarche?

    1. What it is: A formal diplomatic representation made by one government to another, delivered in writing or in a scheduled meeting, recording a position or a protest. It ranks above an ordinary statement of protest because it is placed on the record between foreign ministries.

    What was the Kashmir Conspiracy Case?

    1. What it was: The prosecution launched against Sheikh Abdullah and his associates after his dismissal in 1953, alleging a conspiracy against the state and dealings aimed at detaching Jammu and Kashmir from India. It ran for years before being withdrawn, and it framed the political atmosphere around his contacts with foreign interlocutors.

    What exactly did the United States envoy say, and why does the venue matter?

    1. The statement: Visiting Srinagar, the ambassador declared that this is an important part of India.
    2. The setting: It was his first visit to the Valley, and he had just finished meeting the Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir, who is Sheikh Abdullah’s grandson.
    3. The follow up: He suggested that the United States travel advisory could be reviewed by Washington because of improvements in the security situation.
    4. The date: The statement was made on 19 August 2026.
    5. Why the location carries weight: The venue mattered as much as the words, since the same Valley was where American interlocutors had once raised the prospect of independence.
    6. The reaction: Pakistan did not merely protest, but lodged a formal demarche.

    Why is an ambassador’s sentence not the same as a change in policy?

    1. What it is not: A statement by an ambassador is not a treaty, a presidential proclamation, or a formal repudiation by the State Department of every position Washington has espoused since 1947.
    2. Why it still counts: Diplomacy operates through vocabulary, and a shift in the words a mission uses in public registers a shift in position even without a formal instrument.
    3. The measure applied: No objective student of Kashmir can fail to notice how far America has come between the language of the early 1950s and the language used in Srinagar.
    4. What remains open: Nothing in the statement withdraws or replaces the underlying documentary record of American legal assessments.

    How did American diplomacy engage the idea of an independent Kashmir in the early 1950s?

    1. The 1950 meetings: Loy Henderson, the American ambassador to India, secretly met Sheikh Abdullah in Kashmir twice in 1950.
    2. What the record shows: Henderson’s secret telegram records the Sheikh making a strong case for Kashmiri independence from both India and Pakistan.
    3. The condition Abdullah attached: He told Henderson that an independent Kashmir could survive only if it had the friendship of both India and Pakistan and economic assistance from the United States, directly or through the United Nations.
    4. How it entered Indian politics: American interest in Kashmir took on such political overtones that even Henderson’s wife entered Indian political mythology, and Indian leaders suspected that Americans were holding out the prospect of independence to Abdullah.
    5. The Stevenson visit: Adlai Stevenson, twice the Democratic Party’s candidate for the presidency and one of the most influential American internationalists of his era, visited Kashmir in May 1953 and talked to Abdullah.
    6. The effect in New Delhi: Those meetings sent shockwaves of suspicion through New Delhi, and American diplomatic records show that the then Prime Minister believed Stevenson’s conversations had encouraged Abdullah’s growing intransigence.
    7. What the episode establishes: An independent Kashmir was then conceivable enough in American diplomatic parlance for the Indian Prime Minister to worry that Washington might act to encourage it.

    What did those contacts cost Sheikh Abdullah inside Jammu and Kashmir?

    1. The dismissal: On 9 August 1953, Sheikh Abdullah was dismissed as prime minister of Jammu and Kashmir by the Sadr-i-Riyasat.
    2. The stated grounds: The dismissal came amid mounting suspicions in New Delhi about his commitment to the accession and his growing interest in an independent Kashmir.
    3. The role of the American contacts: His contacts with prominent Americans fed those suspicions directly.
    4. The legal aftermath: Those contacts later became part of the political atmosphere surrounding what came to be known as the Kashmir Conspiracy Case.
    5. The symmetry with 2026: Almost exactly seventy three years separate that dismissal from the ambassador’s statement in Srinagar.

    How did United Nations Security Council Resolution 47 shape the international framing of the dispute?

    1. American support: The United States supported Resolution 47 in 1948, which was adopted on 21 April that year.
    2. What it did: It placed the dispute in an international context and anticipated a plebiscite after a process of demilitarisation.
    3. The prescribed sequence: The sequence required Pakistan first to secure the withdrawal of the tribal invaders from the territory under its occupation.
    4. What happened to it: That prescribed sequence was never implemented.
    5. What it gave Pakistan: For years afterwards the resolution provided Pakistan with the diplomatic scaffolding it wanted, namely that Jammu and Kashmir was not an Indian question alone but an international dispute to be settled.
    6. America’s place in it: America was at the centre of that scaffolding.

    How far did the American legal position on the accession go?

    1. The document: A State Department memorandum of February 1950 set out the American legal assessment of the accession.
    2. Its characterisation: The memorandum described Jammu and Kashmir’s accession to India as contested.
    3. Its conclusion: It concluded that in the American legal assessment at the time, the Maharaja’s Instrument of Accession could not by itself have finally settled the state’s future.
    4. Why this matters: The position was not confined to the plebiscite procedure but went to the legal sufficiency of the accession instrument itself.

    Why did the position persist after the Cold War?

    1. The 1993 statement: In October 1993, Robin Raphel, freshly appointed assistant secretary of state for South Asian affairs in the Clinton administration, called Kashmir a disputed territory.
    2. The legal claim made: She said Washington did not recognise the legal validity of the Instrument of Accession as meaning that Kashmir was forever part of India.
    3. India’s reaction: India was aghast, and the then Prime Minister described such efforts at diplomatic suasion as pinpricks and minor mischief.
    4. The larger fact it revealed: Nearly five decades after 1947, the United States remained unwilling to couch its discussion of Jammu and Kashmir in terms that accepted India’s political description of the state without qualification.
    5. Why 2026 stands out against it: Measured against that record, the ambassador’s description in Srinagar marks the closing of an ambiguity that had survived the end of the Cold War.

    Why should a favourable American statement not produce triumphalism in New Delhi?

    1. Where the case was actually made: India’s case in Kashmir has ultimately been made most strongly by the people of Jammu and Kashmir themselves, not by shifts in foreign vocabulary.
    2. The standing test: The test has always been India’s ability to deepen constitutionalism, expand democracy and political reconciliation, deliver development, and ensure civil liberties for all citizens.
    3. Why the elected government matters: Srinagar’s elected government is what gives the Indian position its domestic foundation, which is why the ambassador’s meeting with the Chief Minister carried weight.
    4. What remains outstanding: A return to normal democratic politics and the restoration of statehood is essential, and no external statement substitutes for it.
    5. What has genuinely changed: The historical arc reflects India’s own transformation and the gradual exhaustion of the idea that Jammu and Kashmir is best handled through international mechanisms conceived in the bloodshed of Partition.
    6. The precise nature of the shift: America has not overwritten history but has accepted reality, having for decades dealt with Kashmir as a problem in search of a permanent political resting place, and having now implicitly acknowledged that history had already made a choice.

    Challenges to India’s position on Jammu and Kashmir

    1. Statehood has not been restored: The state’s downgrade to Union Territory status remains unreversed, which weakens the constitutionalism argument India rests on. Eg. Jammu and Kashmir became a Union Territory on 31 October 2019 under the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019.
    2. Diplomatic language can reverse with an administration: Positions expressed by an envoy carry no continuity guarantee across governments. Eg. The assistant secretary of state’s 1993 characterisation of Kashmir as disputed territory came four decades after the 1950 State Department memorandum and repeated its underlying reasoning.
    3. The plebiscite framing survives in the record: Resolutions never formally rescinded remain available for citation. Eg. Resolution 47 of 1948 remains on the Security Council record even though its prescribed sequence was never implemented.
    4. Pakistan retains a formal diplomatic channel: Every Indian gain in framing is met with a counter representation. Eg. Pakistan lodged a formal demarche after the ambassador’s statement in Srinagar.
    5. Security perception governs external normalisation: Third country advisories track incidents rather than political statements. Eg. The ambassador tied any review of the United States travel advisory to improvements in the security situation, not to political developments.
    6. Political reconciliation remains incomplete: Electoral revival does not by itself settle questions of autonomy and representation. Eg. The elected Chief Minister heads a government whose legislative competence is that of a Union Territory rather than a State.
    7. Third country hyphenation persists in crises: External powers revert to treating India and Pakistan as a pair during military escalation. Eg. External calls for restraint are directed at both countries simultaneously during every India Pakistan military exchange.

    Conclusion

    The American position on Jammu and Kashmir has moved from a February 1950 State Department memorandum calling the accession contested, through the plebiscite framing of Resolution 47 and the 1993 refusal to accept the Instrument of Accession as final, to an ambassador standing in Srinagar in August 2026 and calling it an important part of India. That arc closes an ambiguity but settles nothing that India itself must settle, since the case in Kashmir has been carried by the people of the region and by the quality of Indian constitutional practice there. The unfinished work is the return to normal democratic politics and the restoration of statehood, which no shift in foreign vocabulary can supply.

    “[2019, GS2, 15] “What introduces friction into the ties between India and the United States is that Washington is still unable to find for India a position in its global strategy, which would satisfy India’s National self-esteem and ambitions” Explain with suitable examples.”

  • The ‘Vimal Elaichi’ promotion question

    Why in the News

    The Maharashtra Food and Drugs Administration (FDA) has issued notices to actors Shah Rukh Khan, Ajay Devgn and Tiger Shroff over their endorsement of Vimal Elaichi, alleging that the advertisements could amount to surrogate promotion of Vimal Pan Masala, a prohibited tobacco-related product in the State. The action moves enforcement from the manufacturer to the celebrity endorser, using food safety, consumer protection and tobacco-control law together.

    What is surrogate advertising?

    1. About: Surrogate advertising promotes a prohibited or restricted product indirectly, by advertising a legally permitted product that carries the same brand name, packaging identity and visual grammar.
    2. How it works: The permitted product acts as a carrier for brand recall, so consumer attraction built around the prohibited product is maintained without the prohibited product ever appearing in the advertisement.
    3. Why it exists: Direct advertising of tobacco products is prohibited by law, so a manufacturer extends the brand to a permitted category such as cardamom, mineral water or music to keep the name in circulation.
    4. The legal test applied: The question is whether the communication is an advertisement for an independent product or whether it is intended to maintain, reinforce or enhance the brand identity associated with the prohibited product.

    What is the Central Consumer Protection Authority?

    1. About: The Central Consumer Protection Authority is the regulator created under the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 to protect and enforce the rights of consumers as a class, with powers over false or misleading advertisements and unfair trade practices.

    Why does the FDA treat this advertisement as surrogate promotion?

    1. The eight elements weighed: The notice assesses the nature of the advertisement, the identity of the brand, its presentation, its visual elements, the dialogue, the product name, the market identity of the brand and the context in which the advertisement is presented.
    2. The brand identity test: The notice asks whether the use of the Vimal brand under the name of Elaichi or a similar product is intended to maintain, reinforce or enhance the brand identity and consumer attraction associated with pan masala and tobacco-related products.
    3. The consequence if the test is met: Such communication would not merely constitute an advertisement for an independent product, but would amount to indirect or surrogate promotion of a prohibited or restricted product.
    4. Status of the underlying product: Vimal Pan Masala is a prohibited tobacco-related product in the State, which is what makes the brand extension legally significant.
    5. Interim direction issued: The FDA has directed the removal of all content associated with the advertisement, alongside the notices to the endorsers.

    Where does the tension lie between a brand extension and a prohibited promotion?

    1. The manufacturer’s position in law: Cardamom is a lawful food product, and advertising a lawful product under a lawful trademark is ordinarily protected commercial activity.
    2. The regulator’s position: Legality of the advertised product does not settle the question, since the advertisement’s function may be to sustain recall for a different product that cannot be advertised at all.
    3. The shift in the enforcement target: The notices proceed against the endorsers rather than the manufacturer, which places liability on the person lending recognition to the brand.
    4. Pan masala’s regulatory position: Pan masala is a regulated food product under the Food Safety and Standards Authority of India framework, so compliance with all provisions relating to its manufacture, marketing, sale and advertisement is mandatory.
    5. What remains unsettled: The notice frames the surrogate question as a serious question that arises rather than as a finding, so the determination follows the actors’ response.

    Which laws does the notice say the advertisement violates?

    1. Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006: The notice invokes various sections of the Act and the rules and regulations framed thereafter, including Section 24, which restricts advertisements and prohibits unfair trade practices relating to food, including misleading advertisements.
    2. Food Safety and Standards (Advertising and Claims) Regulations, 2018: Food Business Operators and marketers must ensure that their advertisements are truthful, unambiguous and not misleading, and are prohibited from making claims that encourage excessive consumption of a particular food.
    3. Food Safety and Standards (Prohibition and Restrictions on Sales) Regulations, 2011: These pertain to substances that may be injurious to health, and are the route through which States prohibit tobacco-bearing pan masala.
    4. Central Consumer Protection Authority guidelines, 2022: The advertisement is said to violate the 2022 guidelines on the prevention of misleading advertisements and endorsements for misleading advertisements.
    5. Cigarettes and Other Tobacco Products Act, 2003: The Cigarettes and Other Tobacco Products (Prohibition of Advertisement and Regulation of Trade and Commerce, Production, Supply and Distribution) Act, 2003 is invoked for its provisions prohibiting tobacco advertisements.

    What penalty can follow a misleading endorsement?

    1. Statutory basis: Section 21 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 governs action against false or misleading advertisements and against the endorsers of such advertisements.
    2. Direction power: The Central Consumer Protection Authority can direct the discontinuation or modification of a false or misleading advertisement.
    3. First penalty: It can impose a penalty of up to Rs 10 lakh on the endorser.
    4. Repeat penalty: For subsequent contraventions, the penalty may extend to Rs 50 lakh.
    5. Endorsement ban: The authority can prohibit the endorser from endorsing any product for up to one year, and for subsequent contraventions the ban may extend to three years.

    What procedure must the endorsers now follow?

    1. Response window: The notices ask the actors to respond within 15 days.
    2. Mode of response: They need not appear in person and may submit a written explanation either in person or through a duly authorised representative, along with documentary evidence.
    3. Personal hearing: If they wish to be heard in person they may indicate it in the written explanation, and an opportunity of personal hearing, in person or through a duly authorised representative, is to be afforded in accordance with the principles of natural justice.
    4. Consequence of silence: Failure to respond within the stipulated period, or an unsatisfactory response, may attract action under the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 without any further reference or notice.
    5. The presumption: In the absence of a satisfactory explanation, it shall be presumed that the endorser has nothing to state in the matter.

    Challenges to Enforcement Against Surrogate Advertising

    1. Proving intent: Regulators must show that a lawful product’s advertisement was intended to promote a prohibited one, which turns on inference from brand identity rather than on a direct statement. Eg. Notices in this case rest on presentation, dialogue and market identity rather than on any reference to pan masala in the advertisement itself.
    2. Split jurisdiction: Food safety, tobacco control, consumer protection and broadcasting law sit with different regulators, so a single advertisement attracts overlapping and slow proceedings. Eg. The present notices invoke the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006, the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 and the Cigarettes and Other Tobacco Products Act, 2003 simultaneously.
    3. State variation in prohibition: A product prohibited in one State is lawfully sold in another, so a national advertisement cannot be uniformly assessed. Eg. Gutkha and tobacco-bearing pan masala have been banned by successive State notifications under the 2011 sales regulations, with renewal cycles differing across States.
    4. Penalty scale against advertising budgets: A ceiling of Rs 10 lakh on the endorser is small relative to the value of a national campaign, which weakens deterrence. Eg. Pan masala brands are among the largest advertisers during high-viewership sporting events.
    5. Digital and influencer channels: Enforcement designed for television and print struggles with content distributed through social platforms and regional influencers. Eg. The Central Consumer Protection Authority had to issue separate endorsement disclosure guidelines for social media influencers in 2023.
    6. Cross-border and streaming content: Advertisements and product placement travel through streaming services and platforms hosted outside the regulator’s reach. Eg. Anti-tobacco warning requirements had to be extended to over-the-top streaming content through separate rules notified in 2023.
    7. Health burden after prohibition: Prohibition of sale has not removed consumption, since smokeless tobacco moves through informal retail. Eg. Smokeless tobacco use remains widespread in States where gutkha has been banned for more than a decade.

    Conclusion

    The notices turn on a single legal question: whether an advertisement for a lawful cardamom product functions as indirect promotion of a prohibited tobacco-related product carrying the same brand identity. The FDA has invoked food safety, consumer protection and tobacco-control law together and directed the removal of the associated content. The actors have 15 days to file a written explanation with documentary evidence, and may seek a personal hearing.

    “[2018] Consider the following statements:

    1. The Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 replaced the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.

    2. The Food Safety and Standard Authority of India (FSSAI) is under the charge of Director General of Health Services in the Union Ministry of Health and Family Welfare.

    Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

    (a) 1 only

    (b) 2 only

    (c) Both 1 and 2

    (d) Neither 1 nor 2

  • Congress-ruled states to move court against new mines law

    Why in the News

    State governments where the Congress is in power are preparing to challenge the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2026 in the Supreme Court, on the ground that it undermines the rights of the States. The Act, passed by the House on 13 August 2026, seeks to curb the power of States to levy taxes on mineral rights and mineral bearing lands. That power was confirmed as belonging to the States by a nine judge Bench two years ago, so the dispute is over whether Parliament can legislate away a taxing entry the Court has read as independent.

    What is the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957?

    1. What it is: The Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957, referred to as the MMDR Act, is the parent law governing every mineral in India except petroleum and natural gas.
    2. The core split it creates: The State Government owns the mineral in its territory. The Central Government decides the rules, fixes the royalty rate for major minerals and, for some categories, conducts the auction.
    3. How a block reaches a miner: Someone auctions the block, the State signs the lease, and the company mines. The State signs the lease in every case, including where the Centre ran the auction.
    4. Where the money goes: Royalty, dead rent and the auction premium go to the State in every case, with offshore blocks the only exception.

    What is the current status of State taxing power over minerals in India?

    1. The settled position since 2024: A nine judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Mineral Area Development Authority v Steel Authority of India, decided eight to one in 2024, held that States hold an independent power under Entry 50 of the State List to levy taxes on mineral rights, and that the MMDR Act does not take that power away.
    2. The distinction the ruling rests on: Royalty is not a tax. It is consideration paid to the State as the owner of the mineral, which is why a State levy on mineral rights is a separate and additional exercise of power.
    3. What the ruling overturned: India Cement v State of Tamil Nadu (1990), which had held royalty to be a tax and State cesses on royalty to be beyond State competence, stands overruled.
    4. The recovery window: States may recover past dues from 1 April 2005, in instalments spread over twelve years beginning 1 April 2026, without interest or penalty on the earlier period.
    5. What the ruling did not give the States: It conferred a power to tax mineral rights, not a power to fix the royalty rate. Royalty rates for major minerals continue to be set centrally under the Second Schedule to the MMDR Act.
    6. What the 2026 amendment now does to that position: The Act passed on 13 August 2026 seeks to curb the power of States to levy taxes on mineral rights and mineral bearing lands, which is the power the 2024 ruling had recognised.

    Constitutional Provisions Related to Mineral Rights and Legislative Competence

    1. Entry 54, Union List: Regulation of mines and mineral development, to the extent that Parliament by law declares such Union control to be expedient in the public interest.
    2. Entry 23, State List: Regulation of mines and mineral development, expressly made subject to the provisions of Entry 54 of the Union List.
    3. Entry 50, State List: Taxes on mineral rights, subject to any limitations imposed by Parliament by law relating to mineral development.
    4. Entry 49, State List: Taxes on lands and buildings, the entry under which States tax mineral bearing land.
    5. Entry 55, Union List: Regulation of labour and safety in mines and oilfields.
    6. Article 297: Vests in the Union all lands, minerals and other things of value underlying the ocean within the territorial waters, the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone.
    7. Article 246: Distributes legislative power between Parliament and the State legislatures across the three Lists.
    8. Article 265: Provides that no tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law.
    9. Article 131: Confers original jurisdiction on the Supreme Court in a dispute between the Government of India and one or more States, the route through which a State sues over a central statute.

    What is royalty on minerals?

    1. What it is: Royalty is the payment a lessee makes to the owner of the mineral for the mineral removed or consumed, calculated mostly on an ad valorem basis on the average sale price published by the Indian Bureau of Mines.
    2. Who sets it and who receives it: The Centre fixes the rate for major minerals through the Second Schedule to the MMDR Act, and the State fixes it for minor minerals. The State Government receives it in both cases.

    What is a minor mineral?

    1. The statutory definition: Section 3(e) of the MMDR Act names building stones, gravel, ordinary clay and ordinary sand as minor minerals, and allows the Centre to notify any other mineral as minor. Everything not notified as minor is a major mineral, defined negatively with no positive list.
    2. Who controls them: Section 15 gives States exclusive power to frame minor mineral rules and to fix minor mineral royalty, so the Centre’s power over minor minerals is limited to deciding what enters the category.

    What does the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2026 change?

    1. The core change: The Act seeks to curb the power of States to levy taxes on mineral rights and on mineral bearing lands.
    2. The scope claimed for it: The Centre states that it is seeking to regulate only major minerals such as coal, limestone, iron ore, copper and manganese.
    3. What is stated to be left untouched: The States would continue to have powers over 49 minor minerals.
    4. The stated purpose: The Union Minister of Mines told the Rajya Sabha that the legislation does not seek to interfere with the autonomy or revenue rights of States, and that it aims only to ensure uniform mineral rates across the country.
    5. The stage it has reached: The Act was passed by the House on 13 August 2026.

    Which States are challenging the Act and on what ground?

    1. The States on board: Karnataka, Telangana and Himachal Pradesh are already committed to challenging the amendment Act in the Supreme Court.
    2. The State still being negotiated: The Congress is in talks with its ally the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha to get the Jharkhand government to join the challenge.
    3. The stated ground: The party alleges that the law undermines the rights of the States.
    4. The demand short of litigation: The Karnataka Deputy Chief Minister urged the Centre to withdraw the amendment Act, objecting to its restrictive provisions.
    5. The federal framing from Kerala: The Kerala Chief Minister stated that the amendments to the Act are against federal principles.

    How can a State challenge a central law?

    1. The original suit route: A State may institute an original suit against the Government of India in the Supreme Court under Article 131, which is the route available where the dispute involves a question on which a legal right of the State depends.
    2. The writ route is not open to a State in the same way: Article 32 is a remedy for enforcement of fundamental rights, and a State is not a person entitled to fundamental rights, so a State ordinarily proceeds under Article 131 rather than Article 32.
    3. Why the choice of route matters here: An Article 131 suit frames the matter as a Centre State dispute over legislative competence rather than as a grievance of an affected mining company.
    4. The competence question that will be argued: The dispute turns on whether the 2026 Act is a limitation of the kind Entry 50 permits Parliament to impose, or an extinguishing of the entry itself.
    5. The precedent that will be relied on: The 2024 nine judge ruling held that the MMDR Act as it then stood did not take away the Entry 50 power, which leaves open whether a later Act can impose limitations that empty it.

    Major debates surrounding State taxation of mineral rights

    1. Ownership against regulation: The State owns the mineral and receives the royalty, while the Centre fixes the rate and writes the rules, so the party bearing the social and environmental cost of mining does not set the price of it.
    2. Competing readings of one entry: Entry 50 is read either as a State power with a boundary Parliament may draw, or as a power Parliament may narrow until nothing is left of it.
    3. A tax entry against a regulatory entry: Entry 54 of the Union List is a regulatory entry over mineral development, and the question is whether a regulatory power carries with it the power to restrict a taxing entry in the State List.
    4. Two landmark rulings in tension: India Cement (1990) treated royalty as a tax and denied State competence, and Mineral Area Development Authority (2024) treated royalty as consideration and affirmed it, so the sector has operated under opposite rules within one generation.
    5. Uniform rates against fiscal autonomy: Uniform mineral rates across the country lower input cost volatility for steel, aluminium, cement and power, and remove a revenue instrument from the States where those minerals lie.
    6. The retrospective recovery question: Permitting recovery of dues from 1 April 2005 in instalments from 1 April 2026 exposes mineral users to a large accumulated liability, which is the practical trigger for legislative intervention.
    7. The empirical gap the dispute turns on: There is no agreed estimate of what the recovered dues and future State levies would add to the delivered cost of coal, iron ore and limestone, so both the revenue claim and the input cost claim rest on projections.

    Challenges to the new mineral taxation framework

    1. A single change alters two revenue streams at once: Curbing taxes on mineral rights and on mineral bearing lands touches Entry 50 and Entry 49 together, so States lose both an activity based and a property based levy. Eg. Several mineral States had begun framing levies immediately after the 2024 ruling recognised the Entry 50 power.
    2. Litigation freezes revenue planning on both sides: States cannot budget on a levy under challenge, and miners cannot provide for a liability that may be extinguished. Eg. Karnataka, Telangana and Himachal Pradesh have already committed to moving the Supreme Court against the Act.
    3. Uniform national rates ignore differences in deposit quality: A single rate across States taxes a high grade and a low grade deposit identically, which penalises the State with the harder ore body. Eg. Iron ore grades differ sharply between Odisha, Karnataka and Goa, with different beneficiation costs.
    4. The retrospective window collides with the amendment: Recovery of dues from 1 April 2005 was to start in instalments from 1 April 2026, the same period in which the curbing Act was passed. Eg. The twelve year instalment schedule the Court allowed begins precisely when the new restriction takes effect.
    5. The distinction between royalty and tax remains contestable in practice: A State levy structured on the royalty amount can be characterised as a tax on mineral rights or as a levy on land, which invites classification disputes at every notification. Eg. District Mineral Foundation contributions are already computed on the royalty amount rather than on sale value.
    6. Mining States bear the externalities regardless of the tax outcome: Land degradation, dust pollution, groundwater disruption and displacement fall on the district whether or not the State can levy. Eg. The mineral belt overlaps the Fifth Schedule tribal belt almost exactly.
    7. Investment decisions stall while competence is unsettled: Long gestation mining projects require certainty on the total payment stack over a fifty year lease. Eg. A mining lease under the MMDR Act runs for fifty years, far longer than the litigation cycle over the levy.

    Conclusion

    The Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2026 has been passed by the House on 13 August 2026 and seeks to curb State powers to tax mineral rights and mineral bearing lands. The next step is a challenge in the Supreme Court, with Karnataka, Telangana and Himachal Pradesh committed and Jharkhand still under negotiation, and the source states no date for filing. The dispute is not about who owns the mineral, which is settled, but about whether a taxing entry in the State List can be narrowed by a central law made under a regulatory entry in the Union List. Until that is answered, the sector operates with two revenue claims on the same rupee.

    “[2025] Consider the following statements:

    Statement I: In India, State Governments have no power for making rules for grant of concessions in respect of extraction of minor minerals even though such minerals are located in their territories.

    Statement II: In India, the Central Government has the power to notify minor minerals under the relevant law.

    Which one of the following is correct in respect of the above statements?

    (a) Both Statement I and Statement II are correct and Statement II explains Statement I

    (b) Both Statement I and Statement II are correct but Statement II does not explain Statement I

    (c) Statement I is correct but Statement II is not correct

    (d) Statement I is not correct but Statement II is correct |

  • This is not the end. They will be back

    Why in the News

    Students wound down a 36-day protest at Jantar Mantar a month after their attempted march on Parliament. The state conceded the movement’s central demand within days of a crackdown that left over 100 injured, which separates the state’s capacity to repress from its capacity to prevail.

    What is the Cockroach movement?

    1. About: A student movement that held a 36-day protest at Jantar Mantar in Delhi and attempted a march on Parliament, built around demands on examination integrity and employment.
    2. Origin of the name: The movement took its name from an insult directed at its participants, which landed because it confirmed a generational suspicion that the system discounts merit in favour of proximity to power and capital.
    3. Structure: It is a distributed structure of social-media accounts, campus unions and Left student federations moving in loose, non-hierarchical coordination.
    4. Founder and allies: Its founder is a young man skilled at communications rather than a moral authority, and its closest unifying figure, Sonam Wangchuk, was an ally who lent his hunger strike to a cause he did not create.

    How does its structure differ from earlier Indian mass movements?

    1. The older template: Every major mass movement in India over the last century organised itself around a moral authority, with Gandhi, Jayaprakash Narayan and Anna Hazare as the reference points.
    2. The inversion: The Cockroach movement inverted that template, since its organisational logic makes a singular leader almost unnecessary for mobilisation.
    3. Where a leader may still be needed: A single figure may eventually become necessary for consolidation, which is a different task from mobilisation.
    4. Resilience without a leader: The movement functions less as a single episode than as a recurring condition that has found a name and a shared vocabulary, which gives it a resilience no single leader could provide.

    What does a leaderless structure gain and what does it cost?

    1. The gain: A leaderless structure is hard for the state to decapitate, since there is no single node whose removal stops the movement.
    2. The three costs: Coalitions without a centre struggle to negotiate coherently, to discipline internal tactical disagreement, and to convert a moment of mobilisation into an institution.
    3. The precedent: India Against Corruption never built that institutional layer, unlike the Aam Aadmi Party it produced. The movement dissolved and the party it created persisted.
    4. The open question: Whether anyone is building an equivalent institutional layer beneath the surface of the Cockroach movement is the most important unresolved question about it.
    5. The untested capacity: Sustaining coherence and pressure over years is a capacity the movement has not yet had occasion to demonstrate.

    Why did coercive dominance not deliver the outcome it promised?

    1. The asymmetry of resources: The state fields cadre strength, a police and paramilitary apparatus, and financial resources that no youth movement funded by small donations can match.
    2. The crackdown: When protestors tried to march on Parliament, the police response left over 100 injured and dozens arrested, with the record showing violence running in one direction only.
    3. The concession: Within days of the crackdown, the government conceded the central demand.
    4. The distinction that follows: The episode separates the state’s capacity to repress from its capacity to prevail, and disproves any account in which coercive machinery automatically wins.
    5. The exposure of the machinery: The students left behind a dazed government, a confused leadership and a police machinery exposed as brutal and lacking the sensitivity the moment required.

    Why was the medical entrance examination leak a trigger rather than a cause?

    1. The distinction: The leak of the National Eligibility cum Entrance Test (NEET), the single national entrance examination for undergraduate medical admission, is a scandal rather than a structural condition. Only a movement fuelled by a structural condition survives the resolution of the immediate grievance.
    2. The labour market: Underneath the leak sits a labour market that cannot absorb the graduates it produces.
    3. The examination system: The examination and recruitment system is widely perceived as corruptible, which is a standing condition rather than a single episode.
    4. The rural crisis: A rural unemployment crisis draws less media attention than its urban counterpart and is arguably deeper and more intractable.
    5. What the insult confirmed: The name given to the movement stuck because it matched what a generation already believed about how selection actually works.

    What separates a low-cost concession from a structural demand?

    1. The cheap concession: A single resignation is a low-cost concession, which is why the government conceded it quickly.
    2. The expensive demands: Systemic examination reform, large-scale job creation and accountability for the crackdown are much harder fiscally and politically.
    3. The durability test: Extracting one concession through a low-cost demand is a different task from sustaining pressure on a structural condition with no single remediable trigger.
    4. What the movement has proved: The movement has already outperformed what its lack of centralised leadership would predict.
    5. What remains unproved: Whether a leaderless coalition can maintain coherence and pressure over years is the test the movement has not yet faced.

    Challenges to Sustaining the Movement

    1. Negotiating without a centre: A distributed coalition cannot make binding commitments across the table, since no faction can deliver the others. Eg. India Against Corruption fragmented once talks moved from street demands to draft legislation, with its constituent groups splitting over the text of the Lokpal Bill.
    2. Conversion into an institution: Movements that do not build an organisational layer dissolve when the immediate demand is met. Eg. The Aam Aadmi Party survived the collapse of India Against Corruption because it built an electoral machine, and the parent movement did not.
    3. State response confined to force: The government has shown no evident plan beyond force, and a ham-handed approach paired with the hope that pressure deters the youth is likely to misfire. Eg. Appointing a committee whose composition is unpalatable to the protestors solves nothing and hardens positions.
    4. Funding asymmetry: A movement funded by small donations cannot sustain legal defence, medical costs and logistics against a prolonged state response. Eg. Dozens arrested after the Parliament march face criminal proceedings that will run for years.
    5. Attention decay: A structural condition without a fresh scandal loses media attention, and rural distress attracts less coverage than its urban counterpart. Eg. Rural unemployment runs deeper than urban graduate unemployment and receives far less national coverage.
    6. Substituting identity for mobility: Where the economic route to status narrows, religion, nationalism, caste and online tribes supply the standing a salary does not, which fractures a common economic demand. Eg. Youth mobilisation in India has repeatedly shifted from employment demands to identity assertion within the same cohort.

    Conclusion

    The movement’s durability rests not on its leaderlessness but on whether a distributed coalition can convert a structural grievance into sustained institutional pressure. The state conceded a single resignation quickly and left the labour market, the examination system and rural unemployment untouched. What is needed on the government’s side is a return to the drawing board rather than force paired with a committee the protestors reject. The alternative is a long confrontation with a generation the state has not learned how to answer.

    “[2024, GS2, 15] What are the aims and objects of the recently passed and enforced, The Public Examination (Prevention of Unfair Means) Act, 2024? Whether University/State Education Board examinations, too, are covered under the Act?”

  • Five years after Taliban takeover, life in Afghanistan marred by many struggles

    Why in the News

    Five years have passed since the Taliban entered Kabul on 15 August 2021, ending the United States led military presence and the Islamic Republic that had governed Afghanistan for two decades. The Taliban have converted military victory into durable control of institutions, borders and revenue, without converting it into recognition, economic recovery or rights for women. That gap defines the position every state now has to work around, including India.

    What is a de facto government?

    1. Definition: A de facto government is an authority that exercises effective control over a territory and its population without being formally recognised as its lawful government by other states. Control is a question of fact, recognition a question of law.
    2. What recognition does: Recognising a government endorses its authority to represent the state internationally, while withholding recognition does not deny that the state itself exists.
    3. Why states still transact: Border management, humanitarian delivery and consular work require dealing with whoever controls territory, which produces engagement without recognition.
    4. What non recognition costs the authority: It blocks the state’s seat at international organisations, access to central bank reserves held abroad and formal sovereign borrowing.

    What is the Islamic State-Khorasan Province?

    1. What it is: The Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP) is the regional branch of the Islamic State operating in Afghanistan, Pakistan and parts of Central Asia, formed in 2015.
    2. Its relationship with the Taliban: It rejects the Taliban’s authority as insufficiently doctrinaire and is an armed rival rather than an ally, which is why the Taliban conduct operations against it.

    What has actually changed in Afghanistan’s security situation since 2021?

    1. The war ended: The most immediate change was the end of the war between the Taliban and the then Afghan government.
    2. The withdrawal and the collapse: The United States and NATO completed their military withdrawal in August 2021, and Afghan security forces collapsed soon afterwards.
    3. Consolidation of control: The Taliban control Afghanistan’s major government institutions, security forces and borders, and armed opposition groups have not been able to mount a significant nationwide challenge.
    4. No comparable conflict: There is now no nationwide armed conflict comparable to the fighting that took place before 2021.
    5. What it means on the ground: Roads previously affected by battles and checkpoints are generally more accessible, and the risk of being caught in clashes between the Taliban and government forces has fallen.

    Why has the end of the war not meant the end of violence?

    1. A surviving armed rival: The Islamic State-Khorasan Province remains active and has carried out attacks against civilians, Taliban officials and foreign nationals.
    2. Counter operations: The Taliban have carried out operations against the group, which makes the conflict internal rather than against a foreign force.
    3. Deteriorating relations with Pakistan: The two countries have repeatedly accused each other of allowing militant groups to operate from their territory.
    4. Frequency of border clashes: Clashes along the border have become more frequent since 2021.
    5. A reversal of the earlier relationship: Pakistan had been an important supporter of the Taliban for years, but since 2021 Islamabad’s concerns over militant attacks and border security have increasingly complicated relations with Kabul.

    How far have restrictions on women gone, and what do they cost in the long run?

    1. The initial assurance: When the Taliban took control in 2021 they said they would respect women’s rights under their interpretation of Islamic law.
    2. What followed: Restrictions on women have steadily increased rather than stabilised at the level announced.
    3. Education: Girls remain barred from secondary education and higher education.
    4. Employment and movement: Women have been excluded from many areas of employment and face restrictions on movement and on access to public spaces, affecting almost every aspect of participation in public life.
    5. The pipeline effect: Girls unable to complete school cannot move on to university or professional training, which means fewer women will enter professions such as medicine, teaching, journalism and public administration.

    Why is economic stability not the same as economic recovery?

    1. The pre 2021 base: International aid accounted for a significant part of government spending and economic activity before the takeover.
    2. The shock: The withdrawal of foreign troops and the sudden reduction in aid created a major economic shock, and there were fears that the Afghan economy could collapse.
    3. What the Taliban did instead: The administration increased domestic revenue collection, tried to expand trade with neighbouring countries, invested in infrastructure and attempted to raise economic activity within the country.
    4. The result: Afghanistan has achieved a degree of economic stability since the severe crisis that followed the takeover, but stability is not recovery.
    5. What stability leaves untouched: Poverty remains widespread, unemployment remains a major problem, and humanitarian assistance continues to be important for millions of Afghans.
    6. A new pressure: The country is dealing with the return of large numbers of Afghans from Pakistan and Iran, whose arrival has created additional pressure on housing, employment and public services.

    What do other countries’ positions show about the limits of non-recognition?

    1. The general position: The Taliban regime has not received widespread international recognition, and most countries continue to avoid formally recognising it as Afghanistan’s legitimate government.
    2. The stated grounds: The main concerns are restrictions on women, the absence of an inclusive political system, and questions about terrorism and human rights.
    3. Russia: Russia has formally recognised the Taliban regime, making it the outlier among major powers.
    4. China and the United Arab Emirates: Both have accepted Taliban appointed ambassadors, which is operational acceptance short of formal recognition.
    5. Western governments: Several Western governments have maintained contact with Taliban officials without extending recognition.
    6. The common driver: Countries have increasingly had to deal with the Taliban because they control Afghanistan, which shows that control eventually compels engagement even where it does not compel recognition.

    What explains India’s shift from distance to pragmatic engagement?

    1. The posture: India has followed a cautious but increasingly pragmatic approach towards the Taliban since they returned to power in August 2021.
    2. The line held: New Delhi did not recognise the Taliban regime, and has expanded diplomatic engagement without altering that position.
    3. Return of presence: India reopened its diplomatic mission in Kabul in 2022.
    4. Continuing assistance: India continued providing humanitarian assistance, including food, medicines and other supplies.
    5. The turning point: The engagement became more significant in 2025 with the visit of the Taliban Foreign Minister.
    6. Why Afghanistan matters: Security is one of India’s biggest concerns in relation to Afghanistan, and Pakistan is the other factor shaping the calculation.

    Challenges to India’s Afghanistan policy

    1. Engagement without recognition has no legal footing: Agreements reached with an unrecognised authority cannot be enforced or registered internationally. Eg. India’s diplomatic mission in Kabul, reopened in 2022, operates as a technical mission rather than a full embassy.
    2. Overland access runs through a hostile neighbour: India has no land route to Afghanistan that does not cross Pakistan. Eg. India’s wheat consignments to Afghanistan required specific Pakistani transit permission in 2022 for movement through the Wagah crossing.
    3. Dependence on a sanctioned transit route: The alternative sea and land corridor runs through Iran, which carries its own sanctions exposure. Eg. India’s ten year contract of May 2024 to operate the Shahid Beheshti terminal at Chabahar depends on a project specific sanctions exemption.
    4. Stranded development assets: India built infrastructure whose upkeep now depends on an authority it does not recognise. Eg. The Afghan Parliament building inaugurated in 2015 and the Afghan India Friendship Dam at Salma completed in 2016 both sit under Taliban administration.
    5. Reputational cost of engaging a rights violating authority: Expanded contact runs against India’s own stated positions on women’s rights. Eg. Girls in Afghanistan remain barred from secondary and higher education while diplomatic engagement expands.
    6. Competition from states willing to recognise: Recognition buys influence that engagement alone does not. Eg. Russia formally recognised the Taliban regime, and China and the United Arab Emirates accepted Taliban appointed ambassadors.
    7. Terrorism risk that engagement cannot eliminate: Groups hostile to India retain sanctuary regardless of the state of India Kabul relations. Eg. The Islamic State-Khorasan Province has attacked foreign nationals in Afghanistan, including a Sikh gurdwara in Kabul in June 2022.

    Conclusion

    Five years after the takeover, the Taliban hold Afghanistan’s institutions, borders and security forces, have arrested the economic collapse that was predicted, and face no nationwide armed challenge. They have not obtained recognition, have not converted stability into recovery, and have deepened rather than relaxed the restrictions that keep recognition out of reach. The unresolved question is whether states that must deal with a de facto authority can extract any change in its conduct through engagement alone, since Russia’s recognition and India’s non recognition have so far produced the same behaviour from Kabul.

    “[2013, GS2, 10] The proposed withdrawal of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) from Afghanistan in 2014 is fraught with major security implications for the countries of the region. Examine in light of the fact that India is faced with a plethora of challenges and needs to safeguard its own strategic interests.”

  • Can free public technology break the private coaching industry?

    Why in the News

    The Independence Day address of 15 August 2026 announced that the government will roll out free online coaching for competitive examinations using India’s digital public infrastructure. The announcement raises a question free access alone cannot settle, since the coaching industry sells structure, assessment and test strategy rather than lectures.

    What is the proposed free online coaching network?

    1. About: A publicly funded online coaching service for aspirants of competitive examinations, to be built on India’s existing digital public infrastructure, teachers and talent.
    2. Stated purpose: The stated objective is to save poor and middle-class families thousands of crores of rupees and to let students prepare without leaving their homes.
    3. Trigger for the announcement: The announcement was framed as an outreach to Gen-Z youth, following widespread student protests against the National Eligibility cum Entrance Test (NEET) paper leak.
    4. Design question left open: The current thinking within government is one course per examination, against a proposal for a single layered stack serving many examinations.

    What is SWAYAM?

    1. About: Study Webs of Active Learning for Young Aspiring Minds (SWAYAM) is the government’s massive open online course platform, offering courses from Class 9 to post-graduation free of cost to any learner.

    What is SAATHI?

    1. About: Self Assessment Test and Help for Entrance Exams (SAATHI) is a free preparation platform and application for national entrance examinations, carrying lectures and practice tests for aspirants.

    What is agentic artificial intelligence?

    1. About: Agentic artificial intelligence describes systems that pursue a goal across multiple steps on their own, choosing actions and tools rather than answering a single prompt at a time.
    2. Why it is invoked here: In a learning platform it allows the system to diagnose a student’s weak areas, set the next task and adapt the sequence without a teacher directing each step.

    What is a digital twin in education?

    1. About: A digital twin is a live digital replica of a real system, updated with data from that system so changes can be tested on the replica first.
    2. Why it is invoked here: A digital twin of a course or a classroom lets a student tweak the model and reshape the learning path to individual need.

    Why does coaching dependency persist when schools and colleges exist?

    1. Two different objectives: The school aims to conceptualise learning and focuses on board examinations. Competitive examinations ask whether a student can outperform millions of others under severe time pressure.
    2. A separate skill set: The two are different dimensions and require a separate skill set, which the school curriculum is not designed to build.
    3. Where dependency begins: Students in Classes 9 and 10 are less dependent on coaching. Dependency starts in Classes 11 and 12 as students begin preparing for the Joint Entrance Examination (JEE) and NEET and have to solve complex questions.
    4. The gap in objectives: The board curriculum is not designed to prepare a student for the examinations that follow it, so the objectives of the two systems diverge sharply.

    What does the private coaching industry sell that free lectures do not?

    1. Structure: Coaching classes are structured and deliver on what they promise, which free access to recorded lectures does not reproduce.
    2. Assessment and doubt resolution: The industry provides weekly assessments and doubt-solving forums as part of the same package.
    3. Examination technique: Coaching centres teach rapid problem solving and test strategies, including eliminating wrong options to arrive at the right answer, which directly improves rank.
    4. Price is not always the barrier: Not all coaching courses cost lakhs of rupees. Some tutors offer the same structure through an application for a minimum charge of around Rs 700 to Rs 800.
    5. The human element: Personalised feedback and a competitive peer environment come from teachers who mentor a student emotionally and academically, which an online module alone cannot supply.

    Does free access break coaching dependency or add another video library?

    1. The equity reading: The announcement is a major intervention in education equity and an opportunity to redesign the competitive examination preparation ecosystem, so the probability of success depends less on family income, geography and access to an elite coaching centre.
    2. The dependency reading: Accessibility and affordability are not the main issues. The deeper issue is the dependency of the Indian education system on coaching, and a platform that does not end that dependency becomes another free access platform where videos are uploaded daily.
    3. Why existing platforms fall short: The existing public platforms are traditional in nature and are not designed for a cohort that wants mobile-based delivery, quick content in different formats and room to experiment outside a classroom.
    4. The resource argument: The government has ample funds and the Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs) and the Indian Institutes of Management (IIMs) at its disposal, so it can make coaching free. The entire structure has to be incorporated, not only the lectures.
    5. The proposed middle path: A hybrid mechanism is needed, with skill hubs in schools that students attend physically for periodic mentoring alongside online classes, since the National Education Policy (NEP), 2020 already encourages skill hubs.

    Should the platform be one common stack or one platform per examination?

    1. The common stack case: India has over 100 major national-level examinations, including the Union Public Service Commission examinations, JEE and NEET, which attract millions of aspirants. About 70 to 80 per cent of these examinations have similar requirements for reasoning, language, general awareness and current affairs.
    2. The proposed grid: A national competitive learning and opportunity grid with a layered selection method would let a student adopt only the layers relevant to the examination being attempted.
    3. The dedicated platform case: The common stack model does not work in practice, since the same subject is taught differently for two examinations. Fundamental concepts in physics are the same for NEET and JEE, and the nature of the examination differs enough to require separate classes.
    4. The feasibility verdict: A common grid is a futuristic plan rather than a currently feasible one, so there should be one proper dedicated platform per examination.
    5. The dilution risk: Building coaching for all national examinations at one point risks diluting quality, which is why the scope of the plan has to be settled first.

    How can the last mile be reached?

    1. The double hurdle: Millions of students face two problems at once: the absence of reliable, high-speed Internet and electricity for online coaching, and examination centres located hundreds of kilometres away.
    2. Current coverage: Third generation and fourth generation mobile implementation has already reached tribal areas, so the residual problem is difficult terrain with low penetration and frequent disconnects.
    3. The satellite receiver: A small, compact ground antenna box is installed at a remote examination centre. The antenna connects directly to Low Earth Orbit (LEO) or Geostationary (GEO) satellites instead of relying on local broadband or mobile networks, in the manner of satellite television broadcasting.
    4. The offline base station: The base station receives the question paper from the satellite and stores it locally. It then acts as an offline server to display the paper or transmit it over short range to students.
    5. The digital answer pad: Students write answers with pen and paper placed over a small smart digital pad carrying short-range wireless capability such as near field communication or radio waves. The pad captures the answers as they are written, encrypts the data locally and saves it in real time, so no active Internet connection is needed during the test.
    6. The upload step: Once the examination ends and a satellite link connects, the local base station securely uploads all encrypted answer files back to the central examination authority.
    7. The low-technology alternative: Existing infrastructure can be improved instead, by installing smart boards, supplying all lectures, and having a mentor play the video and work through concepts and activities in front of the students.

    Challenges to the Free Online Coaching Network

    1. Content without structure: A platform that uploads lectures without weekly assessment and doubt resolution reproduces a library rather than a course. Eg. SWAYAM has run since 2017 with large enrolment and course completion rates that remain a small fraction of registrations.
    2. Device and bandwidth exclusion: Online delivery presumes a personal device and continuous data, which the poorest households do not have. Eg. The National Sample Survey round on education found that only about 8 per cent of rural households with members aged 5 to 24 had both a computer and an Internet connection.
    3. Teacher supply: A public platform needs subject teachers trained in examination technique, and the school system already runs short of teachers. Eg. Government schools carry lakhs of sanctioned teaching posts that lie vacant, with single-teacher schools still functioning in several States.
    4. Examination integrity: Moving preparation online does not address the leak risk in the examination itself, which is what triggered the protests. Eg. The NEET undergraduate paper leak of 2024 forced a re-examination and a Supreme Court-monitored review of the National Testing Agency’s processes.
    5. Coaching hubs and student distress: A free platform does not by itself dismantle the residential coaching economy or its pressures. Eg. Kota in Rajasthan recorded a series of student suicides, which led the district administration to mandate counselling and anti-suicide devices in hostels.
    6. Regional language coverage: Competitive examination content in Indian languages is thin, so a national platform in English replicates the existing advantage. Eg. NEET is conducted in 13 languages, and the supply of quality preparation material outside English and Hindi remains limited.
    7. Sustained financing: Platform costs are recurring, covering content refresh, mentors, assessment and bandwidth, and a one-time announcement does not fund them. Eg. Several State-run e-learning portals launched during the pandemic went dormant once the dedicated budget line lapsed.

    Conclusion

    Free public technology can lower the price of preparation, and price is not the mechanism that sustains coaching dependency. That dependency comes from the gap between what schools teach and what competitive examinations test, and from the structure, assessment and test strategy the coaching industry sells alongside its lectures. A public platform reduces dependency only if it reproduces that structure, adds physical mentoring through school skill hubs, and solves the connectivity and distance problem at the last mile. The scope question, one common stack against one platform per examination, remains unsettled and determines whether quality survives scale.

    “[2016] ‘SWAYAM’, an initiative of the Government of India, aims at

    (a) promoting the Self Help Groups in rural areas

    (b) providing financial and technical assistance to young start-up entrepreneurs

    (c) promoting the education and health of adolescent girls

    (d) providing affordable and quality education to the citizens for free