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GS Paper: GS2

  • Collectors empowered to grant citizenship under CAA

    Why in the News

    The Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) has transferred the processing of pending citizenship applications under the Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019 from centrally staffed Empowered Committees to District Collectors in eight States and Union Territories. The transfer reverses a centralising arrangement built two years earlier specifically to keep State machinery out of the process. It arrives after the political composition of the State that had resisted the law most strongly changed.

    What is the Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019?

    1. What it does: It amends the Citizenship Act, 1955 to create a route to Indian citizenship for members of six communities from three neighbouring countries who entered India before a fixed cut off date.
    2. Who it covers: It applies to Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist, Jain, Parsi and Christian migrants from Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bangladesh who entered India on or before 31 December 2014 without documents or illegally.
    3. How it operates: It inserts Section 6B into the Citizenship Act, 1955, under which such persons may be granted citizenship by registration or naturalisation, and it exempts them from being treated as illegal migrants.
    4. When it became operational: The Act was passed in December 2019, and the Citizenship (Amendment) Rules that made it operational came into effect on 11 March 2024, days before the 2024 General Election.

    What is Section 6B of the Citizenship Act, 1955?

    1. The provision: Section 6B is the enabling clause inserted by the 2019 amendment, under which the Central Government or an authority specified by it may grant a certificate of registration or naturalisation to a person covered by the Act.
    2. What it removes: It provides that proceedings pending against such a person in respect of illegal migration or citizenship stand abated on grant of citizenship, and that the person is deemed a citizen from the date of entry into India.

    What were the Empowered Committees?

    1. Composition: Each Empowered Committee was made up of Central Government officials, drawn from bodies including the Census organisation, the Intelligence Bureau (IB) and the postal department.
    2. Purpose: They were created to receive and clear citizenship applications without routing them through State government machinery, with at least four constituted, two of them at the district level.

    What does the 19 August order change in the processing chain?

    1. The transfer of pending cases: All applications pending before the Empowered Committees and the District Level Committees in the eight jurisdictions stand transferred to the concerned Collector.
    2. The jurisdictions covered: Gujarat, Rajasthan, Punjab, West Bengal, Assam except tribal areas, Tripura except tribal areas, Jammu and Kashmir, and Ladakh.
    3. The instrument used: The Citizenship (Third Amendment) Rules, 2026, notified on 19 August 2026, empower Collectors in these jurisdictions to receive, scrutinise and dispose of applications for registration or naturalisation under Section 6B.
    4. What the Collector must now do: The Collector is required to verify the documents submitted by an applicant and determine whether the applicant meets the eligibility requirements.
    5. The earlier notification is displaced: The order makes the MHA notification of 11 March 2024 implementing the Citizenship Amendment Rules inapplicable to these jurisdictions.
    6. The committee route is spent: The order renders the earlier multi agency committee arrangement redundant in the eight jurisdictions.

    Why was the power centralised in the first place?

    1. State opposition to the law: The Citizenship Amendment Act was strongly opposed by the then Trinamool Congress government in West Bengal.
    2. The design was built to bypass the State: Empowered Committees headed by Central Government officials were constituted specifically to keep the State government out of the processing of applications.
    3. The timing tracked the electoral calendar: The committees were created days before the Assembly polls in West Bengal in April 2026, and the amendment now decentralising the process was notified after the Bharatiya Janata Party came to power in that State.
    4. The first grants preceded the committees: The Home Ministry handed the first set of citizenship certificates to 14 applicants in May 2024.

    Why does a Union List subject still need the States?

    1. The subject is central: Citizenship, naturalisation and aliens fall under the Union List of the Seventh Schedule, so legislative and executive competence rests with the Centre.
    2. The delivery is district level: Receiving applications, verifying documents and issuing certificates are field functions that need offices, staff and records located in the district.
    3. Police verification sits with the State: Police is a State List subject, so verification of an applicant’s antecedents runs through the State police machinery whatever the processing authority.
    4. The State’s role was reduced to logistics: Under the centralised arrangement the State’s contribution was limited to providing office space and police verification of applicants.
    5. The Collector belongs to both systems: A District Collector is an officer of the State administration and simultaneously the Centre’s principal field functionary in the district, which is why the transfer restores State machinery without transferring the subject.

    What are the other major changes the Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019 made?

    1. Shortened naturalisation period: For the covered communities the residence requirement in the qualifying period for naturalisation was reduced from eleven years to five years, a change made to the Third Schedule of the Citizenship Act, 1955.
    2. Exemption from illegal migrant status: Covered persons were exempted from the operation of the Passport (Entry into India) Act, 1920 and the Foreigners Act, 1946, so their entry without documents no longer bars citizenship.
    3. Abatement of pending proceedings: Proceedings pending against a covered person in respect of illegal migration or citizenship abate on grant of citizenship.
    4. Geographic carve outs: The Act does not apply to the tribal areas of Assam, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Tripura covered by the Sixth Schedule, nor to areas under the Inner Line Permit regime in Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Mizoram and Manipur.
    5. Effect on Overseas Citizen of India registration: The Act added a ground for cancellation of Overseas Citizen of India registration where the holder violates any law notified by the Central Government, with an opportunity of being heard.

    Major debates surrounding the Citizenship Amendment Act

    1. Religion as a statutory classification: The Act identifies its beneficiaries by naming six religious communities, which is contested as a classification that fails the reasonable classification test under Article 14.
    2. The defence of the classification: The stated basis is that the three named countries have a State religion and that the six communities are religious minorities there facing persecution, which is offered as an intelligible differentia with a rational nexus.
    3. The excluded groups: Persecuted groups outside the classification, including Ahmadis and Shias in Pakistan, Rohingya from Myanmar and Tamils from Sri Lanka, fall outside the Act’s coverage.
    4. The cut off date and the Assam Accord: The 31 December 2014 cut off for the covered communities sits against the 24 March 1971 cut off fixed for Assam by Section 6A of the Citizenship Act, 1955, inserted after the Assam Accord of 1985 to regularise migrants in that State. The gap between the two dates is the source of the objection in Assam.
    5. Section 6A itself has been upheld: A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court upheld the validity of Section 6A in 2024, confirming the 1971 cut off for Assam as constitutionally valid.
    6. The link with a national register: The objection that the Act operates as a filter alongside a nationwide citizens register turns on whether the two exercises are read together, since the Act creates a route to citizenship but no obligation to prove it.
    7. The federal objection: Several State legislatures passed resolutions seeking repeal of the Act, and Kerala filed an original suit in the Supreme Court under Article 131, raising the question whether a State can sue over a Union List subject.

    Challenges to implementing the CAA framework

    1. Documentary proof of origin is the binding constraint: An applicant who entered without documents has to establish nationality of the country of origin and the date of entry, which is precisely what the flight left behind. Eg. The Home Ministry issued its first set of certificates to only 14 applicants in May 2024, years after the Act was passed.
    2. Eligibility determination sits with a generalist officer: The Collector must now assess questions of foreign nationality, religious identity and date of entry alongside a full district administration workload. Eg. The function was earlier assigned to committees staffed by Census, Intelligence Bureau and postal officials specifically for that expertise.
    3. Verification depends on a machinery the Centre does not control: Police verification of applicants runs through the State police, a State List subject, so the pace of processing depends on State cooperation. Eg. The centralised committee design was itself adopted because the West Bengal government opposed the law.
    4. Applicants risk exposure by applying: Filing an application is an admission of having entered India without valid documents, which deters applicants where the outcome is uncertain. Eg. The Act exempts covered persons from the Foreigners Act, 1946 only on grant of citizenship, not on filing.
    5. Uniformity across eight jurisdictions is hard to hold: Decentralising to district officers across eight States and Union Territories creates as many decision practices as there are districts. Eg. The 19 August order applies to Gujarat, Rajasthan, Punjab, West Bengal, Assam, Tripura, Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh, each with a different administrative history on migration.
    6. The carve outs cut through the areas of highest migrant density: Excluding Sixth Schedule areas and Inner Line Permit States removes from coverage several districts where the affected population actually lives. Eg. Tribal areas of Assam and Tripura are expressly excluded from the 19 August transfer as well.
    7. The constitutional challenge remains live: A framework operating while its parent Act is under challenge risks decisions being unsettled later. Eg. More than 200 petitions challenging the Act were filed before the Supreme Court after its enactment.

    Conclusion

    The Citizenship (Third Amendment) Rules, 2026 stand notified with effect from 19 August 2026, and pending applications in the eight named jurisdictions have been transferred to District Collectors, who will now verify documents and determine eligibility. The 11 March 2024 notification no longer applies in those jurisdictions and the Empowered Committee route is spent there. The source names no further date or milestone for the disposal of the transferred applications. The change is administrative in form, and it records that the reason for centralising the process, namely State government opposition, is no longer present in the State it was designed for.

    “[2021] With reference to India, consider the following statements:

    1. There is only one citizenship and one domicile.

    2. A citizen by birth only can become the Head of State.

    3. A foreigner, once granted citizenship, cannot be deprived of it under any circumstances.

    Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

    (a) 1 only

    (b) 2 only

    (c) 1 and 3

    (d) 2 and 3

  • Ganga treaty not in Bihar’s interests, says JD(U) leader

    Why in the News

    The national working president of the Janata Dal (United), who was Bihar’s Minister for Water Resources between 2021 and 2024, has advocated against renewal of the 1996 India Bangladesh Ganga Water Treaty on the ground that renewal would hurt Bihar’s interests. The treaty expires on 31 December and the two sides are yet to hold the last round of talks on its renewal. A federal objection has therefore entered a bilateral negotiation that the Union alone has the power to conclude.

    What is the India Bangladesh Ganga Water Treaty, 1996?

    1. What it is: A bilateral treaty signed on 12 December 1996 for a term of 30 years, governing the sharing of Ganga waters between India and Bangladesh at the Farakka Barrage.
    2. What it covers: It applies only to the dry season, from 1 January to 31 May, when flow at Farakka is lowest and competition between the two uses is sharpest.
    3. How sharing is measured: Availability is measured in ten day periods at Farakka, and shares are calculated separately for each period rather than as an annual total.
    4. How disputes are handled: A Joint Committee observes and records flows at Farakka and at the Hardinge Bridge in Bangladesh, and the treaty provides for review of the arrangement at five yearly intervals or earlier by mutual agreement.

    What is a cusec?

    1. What it means: A cusec is one cubic foot of water flowing per second, the standard unit in which river discharge and canal capacity are stated in South Asia. All the sharing thresholds in the Ganga treaty are expressed in this unit.

    What does the sharing formula actually do at Farakka?

    1. When availability is 70,000 cusecs or less: The flow is divided equally, with India and Bangladesh receiving 50 percent each.
    2. When availability is between 70,000 and 75,000 cusecs: Bangladesh receives 35,000 cusecs and the balance of the flow goes to India.
    3. When availability is 75,000 cusecs or more: India receives 40,000 cusecs and the balance of the flow goes to Bangladesh.
    4. The guarantee clause: Between 1 March and 10 May, India and Bangladesh each receive a guaranteed 35,000 cusecs in alternate blocks of three ten day periods.
    5. The fallback provision: Where the two sides cannot agree at review, India is to release not less than 90 percent of Bangladesh’s share until an understanding is reached.

    Why does Bihar say the treaty has hurt its interests?

    1. The claim made: Thirty years of data under the treaty show that the interests of Bihar have been negatively impacted.
    2. The separation of interests asserted: Diplomatic issues between the two countries must be sorted out, but Bihar’s interests too must be kept in mind while doing so.
    3. The trade off named: The treaty may have checked a few boxes in terms of international messaging, but it has hurt the State’s interests.
    4. The physical mechanism behind the grievance: Maintaining pond level at Farakka raises the water surface upstream, which slows the river and deposits silt in the Ganga bed across Bihar, reducing channel capacity.
    5. The flood consequence: Reduced channel capacity aggravates flooding and drainage congestion in the Bihar districts along the Ganga, including Bhagalpur, Katihar and Munger.
    6. The State’s standing demand: Bihar has for years sought large scale desilting of the Ganga, a national silt management policy, and at one point the decommissioning of the Farakka Barrage.

    Why does the renewal decision sit with the Union alone?

    1. Treaty making power: Article 253 empowers Parliament to make any law for implementing an international treaty or agreement, and the executive power to conclude treaties rests with the Union.
    2. Water as a State subject: Water, including water supplies, irrigation and canals, drainage and embankments, is Entry 17 of the State List, which is why States claim a stake in any water sharing arrangement.
    3. The Union’s own entry: Entry 56 of the Union List gives Parliament power over the regulation and development of inter State rivers and river valleys where declared expedient in the public interest.
    4. Consultation is practice, not obligation: Riparian States are consulted as a matter of convention in transboundary water negotiations, but the Constitution does not require their concurrence.
    5. The precedent of exclusion: West Bengal objected in 2024 to being left out of the committee constituted for the Ganga treaty renewal and the Teesta discussions, which shows the grievance is not confined to Bihar.

    Why is the renewal a test of the wider India Bangladesh relationship?

    1. The deadline: The treaty expires on 31 December, which fixes the outer limit of the negotiation.
    2. The pending step: The two sides are yet to hold the last round of talks on renewal.
    3. The linked file: The Teesta water sharing arrangement has remained unconcluded since 2011, and the Ganga renewal is the only functioning template the two sides have.
    4. The upstream downstream asymmetry: India is the upper riparian on the Ganga, so the treaty is the principal instrument through which Bangladesh secures a predictable dry season flow.
    5. The domestic politics on both sides: A renewal that satisfies Dhaka must also survive objections from Bihar and West Bengal, which makes the negotiation a two level one.

    Challenges to the renewal of the Ganga Water Treaty

    1. No mechanism to compensate an affected upstream State: The treaty allocates water between countries and is silent on internal distribution of costs. Eg. Bihar’s siltation and flood costs from Farakka pondage have no route to redress inside the treaty text.
    2. Declining lean season flow: The volume the formula divides has itself been shrinking, which sharpens the distributional fight. Eg. The guaranteed 35,000 cusecs blocks between 1 March and 10 May become harder to honour when total availability falls below 70,000 cusecs.
    3. Absence of a State role in the negotiating machinery: Riparian States have no formal seat, which produces objection after the fact rather than input before it. Eg. West Bengal objected in 2024 to exclusion from the renewal committee.
    4. Silt management remains unfunded and unassigned: No agency has both the mandate and the budget for basin scale desilting. Eg. Bihar’s demand for a national silt management policy has been pending across successive Union budgets.
    5. Political transition in Dhaka: A renewal negotiated with one government may be reopened by its successor. Eg. Bangladesh has undergone a change of government since the fall of the Awami League administration in 2024, with the Bangladesh Nationalist Party returning to power in February 2026.
    6. Linkage risk with other rivers: Dhaka has consistently sought to tie the Ganga arrangement to progress on the Teesta. Eg. The Teesta sharing draft agreed in 2011 was not signed because of West Bengal’s objection, and remains unresolved.
    7. No basin wide framework with upper riparians: The Ganga basin extends beyond the two signatories, so a bilateral treaty cannot govern total flow. Eg. Nepal controls the headwaters of the Kosi, Gandak and Ghaghara, which contribute a large share of the Ganga’s dry season flow.

    Conclusion

    The India Bangladesh Ganga Water Treaty, 1996 expires on 31 December, the last round of renewal talks has not yet been held, and a party in Bihar’s ruling coalition has now publicly opposed renewal on the ground that thirty years of the arrangement have damaged the State’s interests. The dispute is not about the sharing ratio alone but about whether an upstream State’s siltation and flood costs can be recognised inside an instrument the Union alone concludes. The next milestone is the final round of renewal talks between the two sides before the treaty lapses.

  • NTA’s Big Reset: Air-Gapped & Tamper-Resistant

    Why in the News

    A day after the Education Ministry announced an overhaul of the examination system at the National Testing Agency (NTA), a senior agency official set out its operating design: shorter engagement periods for subject experts, information withheld even inside official circles, and question paper work confined to air gapped systems. The design treats paper leakage as an insider access problem rather than a detection problem.

    What does the four tier examination security system involve?

    1. Two distinct levels: The four tier system is operationalised at two levels, the first at the stage of setting question papers and the second at the stage of physical security during the process.
    2. Level one, separation of paper setting functions: Separate sets of people are involved with each key function, namely item writers and those moderating, translating and vetting the items, so no single group sees the paper end to end.
    3. Level two, layered physical screening: Persons coming to the centres are physically frisked, their credentials are established, their electronic devices are verified, and they work only on air gapped systems.
    4. Already field tested: The new system was tested in the recent Council of Scientific and Industrial Research examination and the National Eligibility cum Entrance Test (NEET) re examination, and is being institutionalised now.

    What is an air gapped system?

    1. Definition: An air gapped system is a computer or system completely isolated from unsecured external networks, including the public internet, so data cannot move in or out over a network connection. Isolation means any transfer requires physical access, which is what the frisking and device verification layers are designed to control.

    Why is the National Testing Agency shortening the engagement of subject experts?

    1. The stated reason: A senior agency official said engagement time is being curtailed because the mafia tries to make these people compromised if they are there for a longer duration.
    2. The threat characterised: The official described what the agency faces as a big mafia, framing leakage as organised rather than opportunistic.
    3. Scale of the churn: The Director General had announced the removal of 600 experts and the onboarding of new ones.
    4. The logic of rotation: A shorter tenure limits the window in which an expert can be identified, approached and cultivated by an organised network.

    Why is information being staggered even inside official circles?

    1. Partial disclosure by design: The agency and the Education Ministry are leaning towards a system where full information is not divulged even within official circles.
    2. The operating rule: Plans are confidential and divulged to people only in parts, on a need to know basis, so that no individual holds the complete process map.
    3. The stated intent: The official said the agency is not disclosing everything and is not opening all its cards, including to people within the system.

    How is physical security being tightened around the examination process?

    1. Frisking at entry: Persons coming to the centres are physically frisked before entry.
    2. Credential verification: Credentials of those entering are established rather than assumed from a pass or list.
    3. Device control: Electronic devices carried by such persons are verified.
    4. Isolated computing: Work is confined to air gapped systems, cutting the network route out of the secure area.
    5. Dedicated security force: Premises are being secured by the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), which specialises in frisking.

    What did the Parliamentary Standing Committee find about the agency’s record?

    1. The report: The Parliamentary Standing Committee on Education, Women, Children, Youth and Sports flagged the agency’s problems in its 371st Report, 2025, submitted to Parliament.
    2. The 2024 record: Of the 14 competitive examinations conducted by the NTA in 2024, at least five faced major issues.
    3. Postponements: Three examinations, namely the University Grants Commission National Eligibility Test (UGC-NET), the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research National Eligibility Test (CSIR-NET) and the National Eligibility cum Entrance Test Postgraduate (NEET-PG), had to be postponed.
    4. Leak and result failure: One examination, the National Eligibility cum Entrance Test Undergraduate (NEET-UG), saw instances of paper leaks, and one, the Common University Entrance Test for undergraduate and postgraduate admission, saw its results postponed.
    5. Question setting errors: In the Joint Entrance Examination (JEE) Main held in January 2025, at least 12 questions had to be withdrawn due to errors noted in the final answer key.
    6. The Committee’s conclusion: Such instances do not inspire the confidence of examinees in the system, and the NTA needs to quickly get its act together so that they do not recur.

    Challenges to the four tier security overhaul

    1. Expert churn trades security for quality: Replacing subject experts frequently reduces the accumulated experience of the item writing pool, which is itself a source of error. e.g. 12 questions withdrawn from JEE Main January 2025 over answer key errors, a failure of question quality rather than of security.
    2. Air gapping does not cover the human carrier: Network isolation stops remote exfiltration but not a person who memorises or physically removes content. e.g. the government’s own submission before the Supreme Court that the system is foolproof but that at some point there is human intervention.
    3. Need to know secrecy weakens internal audit: Compartmentalised plans that even officials do not see in full make independent internal verification of the process harder. e.g. no single officer being able to certify end to end compliance when each holds only a fragment of the plan.
    4. Outsourced links remain the weak node: Printing, transport and centre operations run through contractors outside the agency’s direct control. e.g. arrests following the NEET-UG leak extended beyond the agency’s own staff.
    5. Frisking capacity does not scale to all centres: Deploying a specialised central force is feasible at paper setting and storage nodes but not at thousands of examination centres. e.g. NEET-UG is conducted for over 23 lakh candidates across the country on a single day.
    6. Tested at small scale, deployed at large scale: The system was validated on the CSIR examination and a re examination, both far smaller than a full national cycle. e.g. a re examination involves a fraction of the centres, invigilators and logistics of a first attempt NEET-UG.

    Conclusion

    The overhaul reorganises examination security around compartmentalisation: shorter expert tenures, split paper setting functions, partial information even internally, and isolated computing behind physical screening. It has been tested on the CSIR examination and the NEET re examination and is now being institutionalised across the agency’s calendar. The Parliamentary Standing Committee’s finding that five of 14 examinations in 2024 failed sets the benchmark this design has to beat. The unresolved element is the human intervention the government itself concedes remains in the chain.

    About the National Testing Agency

    1. Mandate: The NTA is an autonomous testing organisation set up in 2017 under the Ministry of Education to conduct entrance examinations for higher education institutions, and it became operational in 2018.
    2. Legal form: It is registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 and is headed by a Director General.
    3. Examination portfolio: It conducts NEET-UG, JEE Main, UGC-NET, CSIR-NET, the Common University Entrance Test, the Common Management Admission Test and the Graduate Pharmacy Aptitude Test, among others.
    4. Delivery mode: Its examinations run in both pen and paper and computer based modes, across thousands of centres and multiple sessions.
    5. Scale: Its examinations together cover crores of candidates a year, with NEET-UG alone drawing over 23 lakh candidates in 2026.

    Laws and Rules Governing Examination Security

    1. Public Examinations (Prevention of Unfair Means) Act, 2024: Criminalises leakage of question papers and answer keys, unauthorised access, tampering with computer networks and the conduct of fake examinations, with imprisonment of three to five years and a fine up to ten lakh rupees for individuals.
    2. Service provider liability: A fine up to one crore rupees and debarment from conducting public examinations for four years.
    3. Organised crime: Imprisonment of five to ten years and a fine of not less than one crore rupees, with all offences cognizable, non bailable and non compoundable.
    4. Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023: Supplies the general offences of cheating, criminal conspiracy and forgery used alongside the special law.
    5. Central Industrial Security Force Act, 1968: The statute under which the force securing examination premises is constituted and deployed.
    6. State anti cheating laws: State statutes such as the Rajasthan Public Examination (Prevention of Unfair Means) Act, 2022 govern state recruitment and board examinations, which the central Act does not automatically cover.

    “[2024, GS2, 15 marks] What are the aims and objects of the recently passed and enforced, The Public Examination (Prevention of Unfair Means) Act, 2024? Whether University/State Education Board examinations, too, are covered under the Act?”

  • Supreme Court asks Centre to institutionalise National Testing Agency reforms, cites the Union Public Service Commission as the model

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court has directed the Union government to file an affidavit within three weeks setting out what it has done to implement the recommendations of the expert committee headed by a former Chairperson of the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) on the National Testing Agency (NTA). The Bench held that reforms must be institutionalised and carried forward by successive officers rather than restarted with each new committee after each failure.

    What is the National Testing Agency (NTA)?

    1. Status: The National Testing Agency (NTA) is an autonomous testing organisation set up in 2017 under the Ministry of Education and registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, to conduct entrance examinations for higher education institutions.
    2. Examinations conducted: It conducts the National Eligibility cum Entrance Test Undergraduate (NEET-UG), the Joint Entrance Examination Main, the University Grants Commission National Eligibility Test, and the Common University Entrance Test, among others.
    3. Why it is before the Court: The agency has been under the Supreme Court’s scanner since the NEET-UG 2026 paper leaks, with petitioners describing the failure as recurring and systemic rather than isolated.

    What is a sovereign database?

    1. Meaning: A sovereign database is one whose servers, storage and control remain within the jurisdiction and ownership of the sovereign authority, rather than on infrastructure owned or operated by a third party or located abroad. The Bench asked whether the NTA has one and where question papers are stored.

    Why did the National Testing Agency come under the Supreme Court’s scrutiny?

    1. The trigger event: The 2026 NEET-UG question paper leaks led to cancellation of the examination and left over 23 lakh medical college aspirants stranded.
    2. Criminal process: A Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) probe was ordered into the leaks and arrests were made.
    3. Political consequence: The leaks led to nationwide protests and a police crackdown on students, and ultimately to the resignation of the then Union Education Minister.
    4. The petitioners’ framing: The Court was hearing petitions by the Federation of All India Medical Association and the United Doctors Front, which characterised the 2026 leak as part of a recurring, systemic and catastrophic failure of the NTA in conducting NEET-UG.

    Why does the Court treat committee hopping as the problem rather than the solution?

    1. The Bench’s central objection: The Court held that it should not be that a committee gives recommendations and a new committee is then formed which removes the old one lock, stock and barrel.
    2. The specific sequence at issue: A seven member committee formed in 2024 under a former ISRO Chairperson recommended structural reforms in the NEET system, and the Centre has since constituted a task force under an Infosys co founder for new technological reforms.
    3. The Court’s fix, not replacement but review: The new task force must review the earlier committee’s recommendations and improve on them where necessary, and the earlier committee’s chairperson could be made part of the new body.
    4. The pattern is older than these two: The Bench pointed out that there were two more committees before the 2024 committee, and that recommendations must not remain on paper but must translate into action.
    5. The Solicitor General’s position: The Union government agreed on the need for a permanent mechanism to introduce reforms and maintain their continuity, and stated that it had already accepted the 2024 committee’s recommendations.

    What does the Court mean by institutional memory in an examination body?

    1. The failure mode named: A set of reforms implemented for one examination is undone in the next when senior NTA officers are shifted out, so continuity depends on individuals rather than on the institution.
    2. The standard set: Reforms must be vibrant, institutionalised and carried on within the NTA by successive officers, and must flow down from one generation of officers to the next.
    3. The comparator used: The Court cited the Union Public Service Commission (UPSC), which has conducted examination after examination without a hitch because it holds institutional memory and institutional expertise.
    4. What the earlier committee already said: The 2024 committee had itself focused on ways to build institutional memory and had identified the problem as systemic rather than logistical.

    What specific institutional gaps did the Bench probe?

    1. Technology capability: The Bench asked how the agency was facing new technological challenges, and whether the necessary infrastructure and software systems were in place.
    2. Data security and storage: It asked about cybersecurity and storage, whether the NTA has a sovereign database, and where question papers are stored.
    3. Physical premises: It asked where the agency’s office is situated and pressed on the need to secure office premises and operational infrastructure.
    4. Manpower: It asked how many officers the body has, how much staff is available, whether the various director and joint director positions had been filled, and how many had taken charge.
    5. Candidate facing systems: It stressed training and preparing personnel for the long term, candidate friendly arrangements and a grievance mechanism, and the strengthening of physical and intellectual capacity.
    6. The government’s response on hiring: The Solicitor General said hiring for scaling up digital infrastructure was under way and that the chief technology officer and chief financial officer had already been selected.

    What has the Centre placed on record?

    1. Earlier affidavit: The Court referred to an affidavit of 4 August filed by the Union government listing several senior appointments to be made to the NTA.
    2. Fresh affidavit directed: The Secretary must file an affidavit within three weeks, containing all details and indicative timelines, on steps taken to implement the 2024 committee’s suggestions as reflected and nuanced by the new task force.
    3. Measures claimed: The Centre’s affidavit described the Public Examinations (Prevention of Unfair Means) Act, 2024 and the constitution of the new task force as landmark measures against future paper leaks.
    4. Mandate of the new task force: It has been constituted to recommend end to end reforms focused on leveraging advanced technology such as artificial intelligence and blockchain to strengthen examination security and integrity.
    5. Limits on redesigning NEET-UG: Any structural change in the design of NEET-UG would be undertaken only in consultation with and with the concurrence of the Union Health Ministry and the National Medical Commission.
    6. Assurance to candidates: The Union government committed to giving candidates adequate advance notice of any change in the mode or design of the examination.
    7. The residual admission: The Solicitor General submitted that the system in place is foolproof but that at some point there is human intervention.

    Challenges to institutionalising reform in the National Testing Agency

    1. Officer rotation defeats continuity: Reforms owned by a posting rather than a post are reversed on transfer, which is precisely the failure the Court described. e.g. reforms implemented for one examination cycle being undone in the next after senior NTA officers were shifted out.
    2. No statutory foundation: The NTA is a registered society rather than a body created by statute, so its powers, tenure protections and accountability are weaker than those of a constitutional or statutory examination body. e.g. the UPSC derives its independence from Article 315 of the Constitution, which the NTA has no equivalent of.
    3. Recommendations without an implementation tracker: Successive committees have produced reports with no published mechanism to show which recommendation was executed and when. e.g. the Court had to direct an affidavit with indicative timelines three weeks out simply to learn the status of the 2024 committee’s recommendations.
    4. The human link in an otherwise sealed chain: Security design can cover technology and logistics but not the conduct of every person with access. e.g. the Solicitor General’s own submission that the system is foolproof but that at some point there is human intervention.
    5. Vendor and outsourcing dependence: Question paper printing, transport and centre operations run through private contractors whose staff sit outside the agency’s disciplinary reach. e.g. arrests following the NEET-UG leak extended beyond the agency’s own personnel.
    6. State level examinations remain outside the frame: The Court’s directions bind the NTA, and state recruitment and board examinations run on separate legal and administrative regimes. e.g. the Jharkhand government’s cancellation of 22 recruitment examinations over alleged irregularities in the same week.

    Conclusion

    The Court has shifted the remedy from constituting committees to building an institution, holding that reforms must survive the officers who introduced them. The immediate stage is a directed affidavit from the Secretary within three weeks, setting out implementation of the 2024 committee’s recommendations as nuanced by the new task force, with indicative timelines. Whether the NTA acquires a sovereign database, filled senior posts, secured premises and a grievance mechanism is the test the Court has set. Committee count is not the measure of reform; institutional memory is.

    [2024, GS2, 15 marks] What are the aims and objects of the recently passed and enforced, The Public Examination (Prevention of Unfair Means) Act, 2024? Whether University/State Education Board examinations, too, are covered under the Act?”

  • Dignity in death: Supreme Court upholds hanging under Article 21

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court has dismissed a public interest litigation arguing that death by hanging is scientifically unreliable and violates the right to a dignified death under Article 21 of the Constitution. The ruling holds that a method of execution devised in colonial India still satisfies the constitutional promise of dignity, while leaving the question open to a future challenge built on fresh scientific material.

    What is the long drop method of hanging?

    1. The colonial inheritance: Hanging is the prescribed method of executing death sentences in India and derives from British Common Law.
    2. The older short drop method: Historically, hanging was carried out through a short drop, which causes death by asphyxiation.
    3. What the long drop is meant to do: A longer drop is calibrated to snap the second and third cervical vertebrae, the C2 and C3, and with them the spinal cord, rendering the person immediately unconscious.
    4. Why calibration decides the outcome: The drop must be matched to the individual’s weight and height, since a drop that is too short causes prolonged strangulation and one that is too long risks decapitation.
    5. The protocol afterwards: Standard prison protocols require the body to be left hanging for 30 minutes after the trap door opens.

    What is the current status of capital punishment and the right to die with dignity in India?

    1. Executions carried out: 971 executions have taken place in India between 1947 and 2025.
    2. Executions in this century: Only six executions have taken place since 2001, the most recent in 2020, of the four convicts in the Delhi gang rape and murder case.
    3. Sentences imposed: 1,281 convicts were sentenced to death between 2016 and 2025, which is far larger than the number of executions carried out.
    4. The sentencing threshold: The death penalty may be imposed only in the rarest of rare cases, the standard laid down in Bachan Singh v State of Punjab (1980).
    5. The statutory command: Section 393(5) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023 provides that where a person is sentenced to death, the sentence shall direct that he be hanged by the neck till he is dead.
    6. How old the clause is: The clause has barely changed since it was introduced in the Code of Criminal Procedure in 1861 and has survived multiple amendments.
    7. The recognised right: The Supreme Court in Gian Kaur v State of Punjab (1996) held that the right to life under Article 21 includes the right to live with dignity and consequently to die with dignity.
    8. The limits on that right: The right to die with dignity does not extend to a right to take one’s own life, and its recognised application is to end of life decisions rather than to the manner of a lawful execution.

    Constitutional Provisions Related to Capital Punishment

    1. Article 21: Guarantees that no person shall be deprived of life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law, and this procedure must be fair, just and reasonable.
    2. Article 14: Requires that the classification of offences and offenders attracting the death penalty be reasonable and non arbitrary.
    3. Article 20(1): Bars the imposition of a penalty greater than that prescribed by the law in force at the time the offence was committed.
    4. Article 22: Provides procedural protections on arrest and detention, including the right to consult and be defended by a legal practitioner.
    5. Article 72: Empowers the President to grant pardon, reprieve, respite or remission of punishment, and to suspend, remit or commute a sentence of death.
    6. Article 161: Empowers the Governor to grant pardon and to commute sentences, though the power to pardon a death sentence rests with the President.
    7. Article 134: Provides an appeal to the Supreme Court in a criminal proceeding where a High Court has reversed an acquittal and imposed a death sentence.
    8. Article 136: Provides for special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against any judgment or order in any cause or matter.
    9. Article 137: Provides the power of review, under which death row convicts are entitled to an open court hearing of a review petition.
    10. Concurrent List, Entry 1 and Entry 2: Place criminal law and criminal procedure in the Concurrent List, so both Parliament and State legislatures may legislate on them.

    What did the petition argue?

    1. The relief sought: A declaration that the provision prescribing hanging is unconstitutional, on the ground that Article 21 includes a right to die through a dignified procedure.
    2. The characterisation of the method: The method was described as accompanied by intense physical torture and pain, and as inherently unpredictable.
    3. The scientific material relied on: A 1992 study of the remains of 34 people hanged in England between 1882 and 1945.
    4. What the study found: Fractures at C2 and C3 were common, but the hangman’s fracture, assumed to cause near instant death, appeared in only three of the 34 cases, and six died of asphyxiation instead.
    5. The inference drawn: Hanging is therefore neither quick nor controllable in the way the law assumes it to be.
    6. The intervenor’s evidence: The Executive Director of a university death penalty clinic that intervened in the proceedings stated that researchers examining the remains of executed prisoners found that people had not died by an instant breaking of the neck, and that a range of painful and long drawn causes had produced their deaths.

    Why did the Court decline to revisit the 1983 precedent?

    1. The binding precedent: A three judge bench in Deena vs Union of India (1983) had upheld hanging as a constitutional mode of execution.
    2. What Deena examined: That bench considered medical evidence, expert opinion and comparative execution methods before ruling.
    3. What Deena held: Hanging, when properly administered, is a quick and certain method, causes no greater pain than any other known method, and avoids barbarity, torture and degradation.
    4. The legislative hurdle: Parliament chose to retain hanging while enacting the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, which is a recent legislative reaffirmation of the method.
    5. The evidentiary finding: The new scientific material did not displace the basis on which Deena was decided.
    6. The comparative finding: The material did not establish that lethal injection, electrocution, lethal gas or shooting offered any advantage over hanging.
    7. The constitutional conclusion: The existing method continues to satisfy the State’s obligation to carry out a death sentence with decency and decorum and without degradation or brutality.

    What is the Union government’s position?

    1. The claim made: Hanging remains the safest and quickest available method of execution.
    2. The domestic record cited: No botched execution has ever been recorded in India.
    3. The comparative argument: Lethal injection in the United States carries a well documented history of failures.
    4. What this position implies: The burden of demonstrating that an alternative is measurably less painful and more reliable rests on the challenger, not on the State.

    What did the Court leave open?

    1. No permanent closure: The bench stopped short of treating the question as settled forever.
    2. The ground for a future challenge: Constitutional law evolves, and a future challenge may succeed if new scientific, medical or empirical material fundamentally alters the assumptions on which Deena was decided.
    3. The executive route: The Court left it open to the Union government to examine alternative methods of execution should it choose to do so.
    4. What this means in practice: The method now depends on the state of the evidence rather than on the age of the precedent.

    What do other countries’ execution methods show about the search for a humane method?

    1. Hanging’s reach: A 2012 Cornell Law School database identified 60 countries that authorised hanging as a method of execution, concentrated in jurisdictions influenced by British Common Law, including India, Singapore and Japan.
    2. Lethal injection: The primary method in several United States states where the death penalty is allowed and heavily used in China, administering an anaesthetic, then a paralytic, then potassium chloride, and frequently botched where venous access is compromised.
    3. Shooting: Used in China, North Korea, Somalia and parts of West Asia, visually violent and traumatic for executioners, with proponents citing near instantaneous cardiac or neurological destruction.
    4. Beheading: Carried out with a sword in Saudi Arabia, and reliant entirely on the executioner’s precision.
    5. Nitrogen hypoxia: Recently introduced in the United States, using inhalation of pure nitrogen to cause asphyxiation without triggering the hypercapnic alarm response, the panicked sensation of suffocation, and criticised as insufficiently vetted and amounting to human experimentation.
    6. The abolition trend: More than two thirds of the world’s nations, around 113, have ended the death penalty in law or in practice, according to Amnesty International.
    7. The countervailing trend: A 2025 Amnesty International report recorded a 12 percent increase in executions over the previous year, so fewer states execute while those that do execute more.
    8. The 2025 concentration: The countries recording the most executions in 2025 were Iran at 2,159 or more, Saudi Arabia at 356 or more and Yemen at 51 or more, with China’s total running into the thousands and not published.
    9. What the comparison establishes: Every available method carries its own scientific and ethical controversy, which is why no alternative could be shown to be superior to hanging.

    Major debates surrounding capital punishment and the method of execution

    1. Retribution against reform: The claim that the gravest offences require the ultimate sanction stands against the claim that the state’s own conduct must not replicate the violence it punishes.
    2. Deterrence unproven: The deterrent effect of capital punishment has not been empirically established, which weakens the principal utilitarian justification offered for it.
    3. Two rulings in tension: Gian Kaur (1996) recognises a right to die with dignity within Article 21, while Deena (1983) holds that a method causing potential asphyxiation satisfies the same Article, and the present ruling resolves that tension in favour of the earlier precedent.
    4. Judge centric sentencing: The rarest of rare test is applied unevenly across benches, which makes the sentence depend in part on the composition of the court.
    5. Delay as cruelty: Prolonged delay in deciding mercy petitions has been held to be a ground for commutation, which converts the length of the process itself into a constitutional question.
    6. Socio economic profile of death row: A disproportionate share of death row prisoners come from poor and marginalised backgrounds with inadequate legal representation, which raises an equality question under Article 14.
    7. Irreversibility and wrongful conviction: The penalty cannot be corrected after execution, and acquittals in appeal after years on death row demonstrate that error occurs.
    8. The evidence gap the present dispute turns on: No systematic post mortem study of executions in India exists, so both the State’s claim of no botched execution and the petitioner’s claim of prolonged suffering rest on foreign data.
    9. Legislative expansion against judicial restriction: Parliament has extended the death penalty to more offences while the courts have narrowed the circumstances in which it may be imposed.

    Challenges to ensuring a constitutional mode of execution

    1. No Indian evidence base: India has no published forensic study of executions, so the constitutional question is argued on English data from 1882 to 1945. e.g. the 1992 study relied on by the petitioners examined 34 remains from England, not from any Indian prison.
    2. Calibration depends on execution skill: The drop length must be computed for each individual, so the outcome varies with the competence of prison staff. e.g. the official drop tables in use derive from colonial era manuals rather than from contemporary biomechanical evidence.
    3. Every alternative carries its own failure mode: No method has been shown to be reliably painless. e.g. lethal injection executions in the United States have taken over an hour where venous access failed.
    4. Absence of monitoring: No independent medical observation or record of the execution process is published. e.g. prison protocols require the body to hang for 30 minutes without any requirement to record the time or cause of death.
    5. Delay converts the sentence into a separate punishment: Prisoners spend years under sentence while appeals and mercy petitions are pending. e.g. the Supreme Court in Shatrughan Chauhan v Union of India (2014) commuted 15 death sentences on the ground of inordinate delay in deciding mercy petitions.
    6. Unequal access to competent defence: The quality of representation at the sentencing stage decides who receives the sentence. e.g. mitigating circumstances are often not placed on record at all in trial courts, which the Supreme Court addressed in Manoj v State of Madhya Pradesh (2022).
    7. Legislative expansion without sentencing guidance: New offences attract the death penalty without any accompanying sentencing framework. e.g. the death penalty was extended to the rape of a child below twelve years by the amendment to the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act in 2019.

    Conclusion

    The Court has held that hanging under Section 393(5) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 remains constitutional, on the twin grounds that Deena (1983) has not been displaced and that Parliament reaffirmed the method when it enacted the new Sanhita. The scientific material placed before it was found insufficient to dislodge the assumptions on which the 1983 ruling rests, and no alternative method was shown to be superior. The petition is dismissed, but the question is not closed, since a future challenge may succeed on fresh scientific, medical or empirical material. The Union government has also been left free to examine alternative methods of execution should it choose to do so.

    What is the rarest of rare doctrine?

    1. About: The rarest of rare doctrine is the sentencing standard under which the death penalty may be imposed only where the alternative of life imprisonment is unquestionably foreclosed.
    2. Rationale: It exists because the Constitution permits capital punishment while Article 21 requires that its imposition be exceptional, reasoned and non arbitrary, so life imprisonment is the rule and death the exception.
    3. Where it comes from: Laid down in Bachan Singh v State of Punjab (1980), which upheld the constitutionality of the death penalty by a majority while confining it to the rarest of rare cases.
    4. The named typology it rests on:
      • Aggravating circumstances: Factors relating to the crime, such as extreme brutality, premeditation and the vulnerability of the victim, which weigh in favour of the maximum sentence.
      • Mitigating circumstances: Factors relating to the offender, such as age, mental condition, socio economic background and the probability of reform, which weigh against it.
      • The five categories in Machhi Singh v State of Punjab (1983): Manner of commission, motive, anti social or socially abhorrent nature of the crime, magnitude of the crime, and personality of the victim.
      • The balancing requirement: The court must weigh aggravating against mitigating circumstances and record why life imprisonment is unquestionably foreclosed.

    Laws Governing Capital Punishment in India

    1. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023: The procedural code governing trial, sentencing, confirmation and execution of the death sentence, which replaced the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
    2. Section 393(5): Directs that a person sentenced to death be hanged by the neck till he is dead.
    3. Confirmation requirement: A death sentence passed by a Sessions Court has no effect until it is confirmed by the High Court.
    4. Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023: The substantive penal code listing the offences that carry the death penalty, including murder, waging war against the Government of India, and certain aggravated forms of rape.
    5. Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967: Provides the death penalty for a terrorist act resulting in death.
    6. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985: Provides the death penalty for repeat offences involving specified commercial quantities, made discretionary rather than mandatory after judicial challenge.
    7. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012: As amended in 2019, provides the death penalty for aggravated penetrative sexual assault on a child.
    8. Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 and Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2018: Extended the death penalty to repeat rape offences and to the rape of a child below twelve years respectively.
    9. Army Act, 1950, Navy Act, 1957 and Air Force Act, 1950: Provide the death penalty for specified offences under military law, where the alternative method of shooting is available.
    10. Prisons Act, 1894 and State prison manuals: Govern the conditions of confinement of death row prisoners and the procedure at the place of execution.

    “[2023, GS2, 15 marks] “The Constitution of India is a living instrument with capabilities of enormous dynamism. It is a constitution made for a progressive society”. Illustrate with special reference to the expanding horizons of the right to life and personal liberty.”

  • Palestine backs India’s bid for non-permanent Security Council seat

    Why in the News

    Palestine has backed India’s bid for a non-permanent UN Security Council seat for 2028-29. The support came during India’s renewed diplomatic engagement with Palestine, including plans for a new India-funded hospital in the West Bank and medical assistance for Gaza.

    Non-Permanent Seat of the UNSC

    • Composition: UNSC has 15 members: 5 permanent members with veto power and 10 non-permanent members.
    • Election: Elected by the UN General Assembly for a 2-year term with a two-thirds majority.
    • Distribution: Seats follow equitable geographical representation; India contests from the Asia-Pacific Group.
    • Rotation: 5 non-permanent seats are elected every year. A retiring member cannot be immediately re-elected.

    Significance of Palestine’s Support for India

    • Palestine supports India’s 2028-29 candidature and has also expressed support for India having a permanent UNSC seat.
    • It views India’s economic and political weight as important for advancing Palestinian interests.
    • Palestine expects India to use its relations with Israel to facilitate the peace process.
    • The endorsement strengthens India’s image as a country capable of engaging both sides of the Israel-Palestine conflict.

    India’s Development Assistance to Palestine

    • West Bank: India is finalising an India-funded hospital.
    • Vocational training: Support for a vocational training centre.
    • Gaza: Discussions on artificial limbs for amputees.
    • Medical equipment: Talks on supplying dialysis machines and other equipment, potentially through Jordan.

    India’s Position on Palestine

    • India has consistently supported:
      • A negotiated two-state solution.
      • An independent Palestine coexisting peacefully with Israel.
      • Development and humanitarian assistance to the Palestinian people.
    • The recent visit to Ramallah marked India’s first high-level visit to the affected region since the October 2023 conflict.

    India’s De-hyphenated Israel-Palestine Policy

    India follows a de-hyphenated approach, treating relations with Israel and Palestine independently.

    • Full diplomatic relations with Israel were established in 1992.
    • India has deepened strategic cooperation with Israel while continuing to support Palestinian statehood.
    • India has continued supporting Palestinian-related resolutions at the UN.
    • This balancing gives India diplomatic credibility and leverage with both sides.

    “[2009] The Security Council of UN consists of 5 permanent members, and the remaining 10 members are elected by the General Assembly for a term of

    (a) 1 year

    (b) 2 years

    (c) 3 years

    (d) 5 years

  • From scientific research to geopolitics: Why India needs a clear ‘Arctic narrative’

    Why in the News

    A report of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on External Affairs, titled “India’s Role and Presence in the Arctic and Antarctic Regions”, asks what India’s narrative on the Arctic actually is. The tension it exposes is that India holds a 1920 treaty entitlement, a permanent research station and a national Arctic Policy, yet funds Arctic activity at a level that contradicts every one of those claims.

    What is the Svalbard Treaty of 1920 and what does it give India?

    1. The instrument: The Svalbard Treaty of 1920 recognises Norwegian sovereignty over the Svalbard archipelago while granting all signatory states equal rights of access and economic activity there.
    2. India’s standing: India, then part of the British Dominion, was among the original 14 signatories of the Treaty.
    3. The practical entitlement: The Treaty entitles an Indian to visit Svalbard, an archipelago located between mainland Norway and the North Pole, without a visa and to engage in commercial ventures.
    4. What India built on it: India remains one of only two developing countries with a permanent scientific presence in the region, through the Himadri research station at Ny-Alesund in Svalbard.

    What is India’s Arctic Policy of 2022?

    1. The framework: India notified an Arctic Policy in 2022, setting out its objectives across science, climate and environmental protection, economic and human development, transportation and connectivity, governance and international cooperation, and capacity building.
    2. The gap it left: The Policy provided the framework but India still lacks a dedicated senior official responsible for Arctic affairs.

    What is the Arctic and Indian monsoon teleconnection?

    1. The mechanism: Rapid Arctic warming and declining sea ice alter atmospheric circulation patterns, and those altered patterns influence monsoon behaviour across South Asia.
    2. What it affects: The chain runs from Arctic ice loss to rainfall patterns, agricultural productivity, food security and economic growth in India.

    Why does the Arctic matter to India’s climate security?

    1. Monsoon dependence is structural: India’s dependence on the monsoon remains profound, with nearly 70 percent of India’s annual rainfall coming from the southwest monsoon.
    2. The economic base at risk: Agriculture still accounts for roughly 18 percent of India’s gross domestic product and supports more than half of its population.
    3. The scientific link is now established: Scientific studies increasingly point to an Arctic and Indian monsoon teleconnection, so Arctic ice loss is a direct input into Indian rainfall variability.
    4. Sea-level rise is the second pillar: The Arctic is a major contributor to global sea-level rise, and on current trends entire low-lying island states such as the Maldives face existential threats.
    5. The regional exposure: Large parts of Bangladesh and significant stretches of India’s coastline could experience recurrent flooding and displacement, with more than 250 million people in vulnerable coastal regions of South Asia affected by mid-century.
    6. The security consequence: Large-scale climate-induced migration from neighbouring regions would create humanitarian, social and security challenges of an unprecedented order, which moves the Arctic out of the environmental file and into the security file.

    Why has the Arctic become a geopolitical arena rather than only a scientific one?

    1. India’s partners are Arctic states: Two of India’s closest strategic partners, the United States and Russia, are Arctic nations, so Arctic policy is inseparable from India’s core bilateral relationships.
    2. The adversary is already inside: China, described as India’s principal long-term adversary, has invested heavily in Arctic infrastructure, research and shipping despite being an extra-regional state.
    3. The convergence of stakes: The Arctic is emerging as a battleground for major powers, with maritime access, energy security and critical mineral supply chains intersecting in the same space.
    4. India’s existing goodwill: India maintains friendly relations with other Arctic nations, evident in the recent India-Nordic Summit.
    5. The unanswered question: The open issue is whether India is prepared to engage at a scale commensurate with the interests it has declared.

    What does China’s polar build-up show about the scale India is not matching?

    1. China, acquisition then indigenisation: China acquired a second-hand icebreaker from Ukraine and then developed indigenous icebreaker building capability from it.
    2. China, current fleet: China today operates several polar-capable vessels, giving it access to the wider Arctic Ocean that India lacks.
    3. China, the next tier: China is the second country after Russia to be building a nuclear icebreaker, which is the class of asset that permits sustained independent high-latitude operations.
    4. China, non-vessel presence: China has invested heavily in Arctic infrastructure, research and shipping despite having no Arctic coastline of its own.
    5. Russia and the United States, incumbency: Both are Arctic littoral states and therefore hold rights in the region by geography rather than by treaty accession, which is the position India can never occupy.

    What structural gaps does the Committee identify in India’s Arctic engagement?

    1. Fragmented ownership: Responsibility for Arctic affairs is fragmented across multiple divisions of the Ministry of External Affairs, with Arctic states and Arctic Council matters handled by four different territorial and functional divisions.
    2. No single point of accountability: The fragmentation makes a coherent whole-of-government Arctic engagement difficult, and India still lacks a dedicated senior official responsible for Arctic affairs despite having had an Arctic Policy since 2022.
    3. No ice-class vessel: Without an ice-class research vessel, India’s scientific footprint in the Arctic remains largely confined to Svalbard.
    4. Dependence on others for access: Access to the wider Arctic Ocean depends on collaboration with foreign partners and on the availability of chartered vessels.
    5. The vessel that never arrived: An indigenous Polar Research Vessel (PRV), a dedicated ice-capable ship required for meaningful pan-Arctic research, was sanctioned in 2014 and is expected to be delivered only towards the end of this decade.

    Why does the funding figure undercut the stated policy?

    1. The headline number: India spent just Rs 17.53 crore on Arctic activities in 2024-25.
    2. The internal comparison: That is less than one-tenth of India’s expenditure on Antarctica, despite the Arctic carrying the monsoon and sea-level linkages.
    3. The external comparison: It is less than the cost of building a single kilometre of a flyover.
    4. The exposure it is set against: The same region affects sea-level rise along India’s 11,098 km coastline and is simultaneously a climate and a geopolitical hotspot.
    5. The contradiction stated: If the Arctic warrants a national policy, a dedicated parliamentary study and repeated diplomatic engagement with Arctic states, the budgetary commitment suggests the opposite conclusion.

    Conclusion

    India’s Arctic problem is not an absence of standing but an absence of capability matched to that standing. A 1920 treaty entitlement, a permanent station at Ny-Alesund and a 2022 Arctic Policy establish the claim, while four scattered ministry divisions, no dedicated official, no ice-class vessel and Rs 17.53 crore a year establish the limit. The Parliamentary panel has identified the gaps, and the outstanding task is the conversion of policy into capability.

    “[2018, GS1, 10 marks] Why is India taking keen interest in resources of Arctic Region?”

  • An institution in freefall: Parliament is all dressed up with nowhere to go

    Why in the News

    The recently concluded session of Parliament ended in sustained disruption rather than debate, with sitting time, public money and scrutiny all lost. The deadlock has exposed a single conflict: disruption is now the Opposition’s only means of being heard, and it is also what is emptying the institution of purpose.

    Which parliamentary instruments does disruption trade away, and what replaces them?

    1. Question Hour: The first hour of a sitting is set aside for members to question ministers on the working of their departments. Supplementary questions asked on the floor are the point of pressure, since the minister cannot prepare for them in advance.
    2. Zero Hour: The period immediately after Question Hour allows a member to raise a constituency or local matter without prior notice. It is an Indian innovation and finds no mention in the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha.
    3. Rule 377: Rule 377 lets a member place on record a matter of public importance that no other procedural device covers. The member reads a short submission, no discussion follows, and the concerned ministry responds separately.
    4. Debate on a bill: Members place their views on a bill on record before the House votes on it. A bill passed amid noise goes through without that record ever being created.
    5. Calling attention motion: Under Rule 197 a member draws a minister’s attention to a matter of urgent public importance, and the minister must make a statement in reply. It is a one member device and needs no supporting members.
    6. Adjournment motion: Under Rule 56 a member seeks to set aside the entire day’s listed business to discuss a definite matter of urgent public importance. Fifty members must rise when the Chair reads the notice, and the motion ends in a vote.
    7. Short duration discussion: Under Rule 193 a member with two supporters seeks a discussion on an urgent matter of public importance, running to no more than two and a half hours. It concludes without a vote.
    8. No confidence motion: Under Rule 198 a member of the Lok Sabha moves against the entire Council of Ministers, and fifty members must rise for leave to be granted. It states no reasons and is decided by a simple majority of members present and voting.
    9. Rule 373 and Rule 374: Under Rule 373 the Speaker directs a grossly disorderly member to withdraw for the remainder of the day’s sitting. Under Rule 374 the Speaker names a member who persistently obstructs business, and the House then votes on suspension.
    10. Rule 374A: Inserted in 2001, it suspends a member automatically for five consecutive sittings or the remainder of the session, whichever is less, for entering the well or persisting in disorder after a warning. No motion is moved and no vote is taken.

    Why has the working relationship between government and Opposition broken down?

    1. Courtesy across the benches: Atal Bihari Vajpayee recounted the courtesy shown to him by the first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, when he sat as a young Opposition backbencher. That civility operated independently of political disagreement.
    2. Care extended to a political rival: Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi arranged for the same Opposition member to receive medical treatment in the United States.
    3. An Opposition member sent to represent India: Prime Minister P V Narasimha Rao despatched that Opposition member to Geneva to represent India at a critical United Nations (UN) summit on Kashmir.
    4. Mutual demonisation: Each side now claims sole possession of virtue and writes the other off as beyond redemption. Dissent is branded anti national by the ruling side.
    5. The Opposition’s self image: The Opposition presents itself as an outnumbered force fighting a ruthless and better resourced establishment, using the Mahabharata’s image of the Pandavas ranged against the Kauravas.
    6. The presumption of good faith: Democratic functioning rests on the belief that a rival cares about national welfare even where it disagrees profoundly on method. Treating adversaries as existential enemies removes the common ground that governance requires.

    Is disruption the Opposition’s last instrument of accountability or the thing destroying Parliament?

    1. Disruption as the only remaining lever: An Opposition refused a hearing on the issues it names has no procedural route left, so it withholds the House’s ability to function at all. The tactic is defended as the enforcement of executive accountability.
    2. The same tactic as the injury: Every sitting lost to organised shouting removes the scrutiny the Opposition claims to be defending. The instrument and the damage are the same act.
    3. The case argued from the Opposition benches: The charge that disruption is hollowing out Parliament is pressed by a fourth term Opposition member of the Lok Sabha, not from the treasury benches. It places the Opposition’s own tactic under scrutiny by someone who depends on it.
    4. Reciprocal hypocrisy: Leaders who championed parliamentary obstruction as a vital accountability tool in Opposition treated it as an unpardonable sin once in office. The Opposition, having suffered those tactics for years, rejects the argument now made against them.
    5. The operating code: The reciprocity of the traditional golden rule has been replaced by a rule of retaliation, doing to the other side what was done to one’s own.
    6. A collective failure: The breakdown of democratic trust cannot be assigned to one side. Both have used the same instrument and both have condemned it from the opposite bench.

    Why does poor parliamentary performance carry no electoral cost?

    1. Re-election turns on other things: Members are elected and re-elected for reasons that have almost nothing to do with their performance in the House. Voters judge them on constituency services rendered and on raw local political strength.
    2. Debating skill has no electoral value: The ability to press a minister during Question Hour or to take apart a flawed bill does not convert into votes. That removes any incentive to acquire the skill.
    3. Talent has moved to the studio: The debating ability that would once have been displayed on the floor of the House is now displayed in television studios. The audience that rewards it is not in the chamber.
    4. Party whips direct the disruption: Members are corralled into the well of the House to disrupt proceedings through organised shouting rather than reasoned debate. The instruction comes from the party, not from the individual member.
    5. Parties reward aggression over excellence: By issuing that instruction, party leaderships signal that partisan aggression is valued far above parliamentary skill. The signal then shapes who rises within the party.

    What is lost when the politics of the street occupies the space of parliamentary politics?

    1. Two distinct political skills: Parties once valued mass mobilisation, the politics of the street, and debating prowess, the politics of Parliament, as separate competences. Leaders were assessed on both.
    2. One has displaced the other: The politics of the street has moved inside the chamber, leaving the politics of Parliament with no place to operate.
    3. Consequence for national consensus: Democratic discourse is impoverished and agreement across parties on any question of national progress becomes unattainable.
    4. Committees still function: Substantive work continues in parliamentary committees, which meet away from the media glare and without cameras. The absence of cameras removes the premium that disruptive grandstanding otherwise carries.
    5. What the public actually sees: The visible record is disruption, the absence of dialogue and a complete breakdown in communication. Disillusionment with the functioning of Parliament is rife across the country.

    How has the executive reduced Parliament’s place in the constitutional scheme?

    1. Contempt for the legislature: The government prefers to ride roughshod over the Opposition rather than engage it, and treats accommodation of even some of its demands as unnecessary.
    2. Attendance of the head of government: The first Prime Minister attended Parliament daily and treated it as the beating heart of Indian democracy. The current Prime Minister is rarely present in the House.
    3. From consultative chamber to noticeboard: Parliament’s function has shifted from deliberation to the announcement of decisions the executive has already taken.
    4. From scrutiny to legalisation: The House is used to give legal form to those decisions rather than to test them. That converts the vote into a formality.
    5. Custodians permitting the hollowing out: The institution is being emptied of purpose by the very people responsible for protecting it. The end point is a public that no longer misses it once it is rendered meaningless.

    Do other parliamentary democracies show that guaranteed Opposition time is workable?

    1. The comparative reference is general: The proposal of dedicated Opposition time is described only as successfully used elsewhere, with no country named and no design detail supplied. The comparative case therefore rests on the standing practice of other Westminster legislatures.
    2. United Kingdom, Opposition Days: Standing Order No. 14 of the House of Commons reserves twenty days in each session for Opposition business. Seventeen are at the disposal of the Leader of the Opposition and three at the disposal of the second largest Opposition party.
    3. Canada, allotted days: The House of Commons sets aside a fixed number of allotted days in each supply period on which an Opposition party chooses the subject of debate. A motion moved on such a day may be made votable.
    4. Australia, Matter of Public Importance: The House of Representatives sets aside time on sitting days for a Matter of Public Importance proposed in writing to the Speaker. The discussion is time limited and ends without a vote.
    5. The common design feature: In each case the time is fixed by standing order rather than negotiated session by session. The Opposition’s access does not depend on the government’s willingness in a given week.

    What would restore the balance between contestation and cooperation?

    1. Conviction during elections, cooperation after: Democratic functioning requires fierce ideological conviction at the time of an election and active cooperation once the ballots are cast.
    2. National interest above partisan rivalry: Where both sides concur that national interests outrank party rivalries, governance shifts from zero sum obstructionism to constructive collaboration.
    3. Not an abandonment of ideology: The approach requires no party to give up its ideology or its principles. Parties offer different routes to the same destination of national welfare, safety and prosperity.
    4. A fixed slot for the Opposition: Granting the Opposition one day a week, or two hours a day, to raise any issue it deems essential would let the rest of Parliament’s business proceed undisturbed.
    5. The missing ingredient is willingness: The compromise needs no constitutional amendment and no new institution. It needs a government prepared to imagine and concede the time.

    Conclusion

    Parliament’s decline is a failure of the presumption of good faith between government and Opposition, not a failure of procedure, and disruption has become both the Opposition’s only instrument and the agent of the institution’s hollowing out. The remedy identified is small and does not require a constitutional change. It requires guaranteed time in which the Opposition can be heard, and a government willing to concede it. Without that concession the House will continue to meet, pass bills and adjourn, and the deliberative function that gives it authority will not survive.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2017] The Parliament of India exercises control over the functions of the Council of Ministers through 1. Adjournment motion 2. Question hour 3. Supplementary questions Select the correct answer using the code given below: (a) 1 only (b) 2 and 3 only (c) 1 and 3 only (d) 1, 2 and 3 Answer: (d)”

    “[2020] Consider the following statements: 1. The President of India can summon a session of the Parliament at such place as he/she thinks fit. 2. The Constitution of India provides for three sessions of the Parliament in a year, but it is not mandatory to conduct all three sessions. 3. There is no minimum number of days of that the Parliament is required to meet in a year. Which of the statements given above is/are correct? (a) 1 only (b) 2 only (c) 1 and 3 only (d) 2 and 3 only Answer: (c)”

    “[2014] Consider the following statements regarding a No-Confidence Motion in India: 1. There is no mention of a No-Confidence Motion in the Constitution of India. 2. A motion of No-Confidence can be introduced in the Lok Sabha only. Which of the statements given above is/are correct? (a) 1 only (b) 2 only (c) Both 1 and 2 (d) Neither 1 nor 2 Answer: (c)”

    “[2021, GS2, 10 marks] To what extent, in your view, the Parliament is able to ensure accountability of the executive in India?”

    “[2019, GS2, 15 marks] Individual Parliamentarian’s role as the national lawmaker is on a decline, which in turn, has adversely impacted the quality of debates and their outcome. Discuss.”

    “[2024, GS2, 10 marks] “The growth of cabinet system has practically resulted in the marginalisation of the parliamentary supremacy.” Elucidate.”

    “[2013, GS2, 10 marks] The role of individual MPs (Members of Parliament) has diminished over the years and as a result healthy constructive debates on policy issues are not usually witnessed. How far can this be attributed to the anti-defection law, which was legislated but with a different intention?”

  • [20th August 2026] The Hindu OpED: A Palestinian state is the foundation for regional peace

    Question (2018, GS2): “India’s relations with Israel have, of late, acquired a depth and diversity, which cannot be rolled back. Discuss.”
    Linkage: This question directly evaluates India’s strategic partnership with Israel. Historically, India’s West Asia policy was heavily anchored in support for the Palestinian cause and the two-state solution. This question asks candidates to analyze how India’s relations with Israel have de-hyphenated from its stance on Palestine, expanding into robust defense, agricultural, and technological cooperation.

    Mentor Comment:

    United Nations Security Council Resolution 2803, adopted in November 2025, established a Board of Peace for Gaza, and its annex acknowledges a credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood once Gaza redevelopment advances and Palestinian Authority reform is carried out. The tension this exposes is that every subsidiary conflict in West Asia turns on a Palestinian state that the war since October 2023 has pushed further out of reach.

    What is the two-state solution, and what does it actually require?

    1. Core formula: The two-state solution proposes two sovereign states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side in defined borders with mutual recognition.
    2. The asymmetry inside the phrase: One of the two states already exists, so the operative task is not maintaining a balance but creating a second state that does not yet exist.
    3. The three qualifying tests: A Palestinian state must be sovereign, independent and viable, meaning it must control its own territory, conduct its own external relations and possess an economic base capable of sustaining a state.
    4. The claimed consequence: Peace and stability in the region are treated as unattainable until this second state comes into being.

    What is Resolution 2803 and the Board of Peace?

    1. Instrument: United Nations Security Council Resolution 2803, adopted in November 2025, set up a Board of Peace (BoP) as the transitional oversight mechanism for the Gaza Strip.
    2. The statehood clause: Its annex states that while Gaza redevelopment advances and the Palestinian Authority (PA) reform programme is faithfully carried out, conditions may finally be in place for a credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood.

    Why are the region’s separate conflicts treated as one unresolved question?

    1. Gaza: Israel’s war on Gaza is framed not as a discrete security operation but as the most violent expression of an unsettled sovereignty question.
    2. Hezbollah: Hezbollah began launching rockets and missiles at Israel immediately after Israel’s Gaza campaign opened following 7 October 2023, tying the northern front directly to the Palestinian question.
    3. Iran: The Iran war, Iranian arms supply to Hezbollah and Iranian hostility to Israel are held to rest on the denial of Palestinian self-determination rather than on theological difference.
    4. The Houthi factor: The Houthi phenomenon in the Red Sea is treated as a further derivative of the same unresolved dispute.
    5. Arab normalisation: Israel’s relations with its Arab neighbours will remain strained until it accepts the reality of a Palestinian state, in the same way Arab states have reconciled to the reality of Israel.
    6. The secondary issues: Once an irreversible road map to Palestinian statehood is accepted by all parties, disputes such as freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz become far easier to resolve.

    What are the historical roots of regional hostility towards Israel?

    1. The Balfour Declaration, 1917: British support for a Jewish homeland in Palestine expressly limited the indigenous Arab population to civil and religious rights, converting a holy land claim into a homeland project.
    2. The founding grievance: Hostility rests on the fact that Israel was created and imposed on the region at the expense of the indigenous Arab population.
    3. The 1947 partition offer: Palestinians were offered a state under the United Nations resolution of 1947 and on later occasions and rejected each offer, a record an Israeli Foreign Minister summarised as the Arabs never missing an opportunity to miss an opportunity.
    4. The counter-reading of that rejection: Rejection of a partial offer by a party that holds the underlying title is treated as a defensible refusal rather than as proof of intransigence, since the Zionist slogan itself described the territory as land without people for a people without land.
    5. The Holocaust and western guilt: Israel’s creation is attributed substantially to the Holocaust and to the sense of guilt felt by western countries, most of which, including the United States, had barred the entry of Jews fleeing Nazi Germany.
    6. No inherited religious enmity: Islam and Judaism carry no record of perpetual enmity, since the Koran names prophets and patriarchs from the Hebrew bible including Moses and Abraham, the Crusades were fought between Muslims and Christians with Jews not party to them, Jews were persecuted in countries professing Christianity, and the Arabs bore no responsibility for the Holocaust carried out by Nazi Germany and its collaborators.

    Why does a Shia axis support a Sunni movement?

    1. The alignment: Hezbollah, a Shia movement, and Iran, a Shia-majority country, both support Hamas, a Sunni movement.
    2. The explanation: The alignment rests on a shared commitment to the right of self-determination for the Palestinian people rather than on sectarian affinity.
    3. Where Israel sits in that logic: Israel attracts hostility as the only power standing in the way of an independent Palestine, not as a religious adversary.
    4. Iran was not always hostile: Under the Shah, Iran’s relations with Israel were cordial and a sizeable Jewish community lived in Iran.
    5. The residual community: About 15,000 Jews remain in Iran, and Iran’s Constitution reserves a seat for the Jewish community in Parliament.
    6. The conditional off-ramp: If Israel accepts a Palestinian state, Hezbollah loses its stated reason to disrupt life in northern Israel and Iran loses its reason to supply Hezbollah with weapons.

    Why has the war since October 2023 pushed statehood further away rather than closer?

    1. Collapse of domestic support: Whatever limited support existed within Israel for the concept of a Palestinian state has evaporated since the Hamas terrorist attack on Israeli civilians in October 2023.
    2. The cost of the response: Israel’s disproportionate and ruthless strikes on Gaza after 7 October have almost isolated Israel internationally.
    3. The physical precondition destroyed: The Gaza Strip has been devastated, and with it the territorial and administrative base on which a Palestinian state would have to be built.
    4. The time horizon pushed out: The possibility of Palestine emerging has receded by many years and possibly decades.
    5. The resulting deadlock: Peace and stability in the region have become an illusion precisely because the instrument that was to deliver security has removed the conditions for a settlement.
    6. The development cost: Without peace and stability, the region’s people cannot realise the development potential that new technologies offer.

    Why is external mediation, not bilateral negotiation, the only viable route?

    1. The bargaining asymmetry: The stronger side normally insists on a bilateral approach and the weaker side prefers an outside agency, which is why Israel has insisted on bilateral talks while simultaneously saying there is no one on the other side to negotiate with.
    2. The only power with leverage: The United States is the only external power with the required influence and residual goodwill with both sides.
    3. The honest broker objection answered: No broker is genuinely honest, but even a non-honest broker can sell a transaction to the satisfaction, or the equal dissatisfaction, of both parties.
    4. The single precedent that worked: The only period of real progress came with the Oslo Accord of 1993, negotiated through the mediation and good offices of Norway.
    5. What Oslo produced: Under Oslo the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) formally recognised Israel and the Palestinian Authority was created, and it is a reformed version of that Authority that is now proposed as a caretaker government of Palestine.
    6. Oslo’s downstream effects: The Accords paved the way for Jordan’s recognition of Israel and eventually for the Abraham Accords.
    7. The second broker: The United Nations remains the other viable mediator, and although Israel has declared the United Nations Secretary-General persona non grata, Israel owes its existence to the United Nations, and positions in international relations evolve with situations.
    8. The leadership obstacle: The current Israeli Prime Minister voted against the Oslo Accords and remains opposed to the idea of a Palestinian state.

    Conclusion

    The West Asian conflict system is not a set of separate wars but one unresolved sovereignty question, and every subsidiary conflict persists because a sovereign, independent and viable Palestinian state has not been created. Resolution 2803 has restored a conditional pathway to statehood in Security Council language, but the material base for that state in Gaza has been destroyed. What remains unaddressed is the absence of leadership on any side willing to accept mediation and convert a conditional pathway into an irreversible road map.

    What is the Right of Self-Determination in International Law?

    1. About: Self-determination is the right of a people to freely determine their political status and pursue their economic, social and cultural development.
    2. Rationale: It exists to convert the political fact of a distinct people under external or alien rule into a legal claim, so that statehood does not depend solely on the consent of the controlling power.
    3. Charter basis: It is recorded in Article 1(2) and Article 55 of the United Nations Charter and in Common Article 1 of the two 1966 International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
    4. External self-determination: The right of a people to determine its international status, including independence, association or integration with another state.
    5. Internal self-determination: The right of a people to choose its own government and to pursue development within an existing state, without a claim to secession.
    6. Uti possidetis juris: The principle that new states inherit the administrative boundaries existing at the moment of independence, which limits the redrawing of borders by force.

    Key Concerns Regarding the Right of Self-Determination

    1. Conflict with territorial integrity: The right runs directly against the principle of territorial integrity of existing states, and international law provides no settled test for which prevails.
    2. No agreed definition of a people: There is no accepted legal test for what constitutes a people entitled to the right, which allows both over-claiming and denial.
    3. Selective recognition: Recognition of statehood is a political act by individual states, so identical factual situations attract different outcomes depending on great power alignment.
    4. Enforcement gap: A recognised right of self-determination carries no enforcement mechanism where the controlling power is protected by a Security Council veto.
    5. Viability threshold: A territory may satisfy the legal criteria for statehood yet lack contiguous territory, revenue base or control over borders, leaving nominal sovereignty without effective sovereignty.

    Key Milestones in the Palestine Question

    1. 1917: The Balfour Declaration records British support for a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine.
    2. 1947: United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181 proposes partition of Mandate Palestine into an Arab and a Jewish state with Jerusalem under international administration.
    3. 1948: The State of Israel is declared, followed by the first Arab-Israeli war.
    4. 1967: The Six Day War brings the West Bank, Gaza, East Jerusalem, the Golan Heights and Sinai under Israeli control, and Security Council Resolution 242 sets out the land for peace principle.
    5. 1993: The Oslo Accord, mediated by Norway, brings mutual recognition between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization and creates the Palestinian Authority.
    6. 1994: Jordan recognises Israel, following Egypt’s earlier recognition under the 1979 peace treaty.
    7. 2012: The United Nations General Assembly upgrades Palestine to a non-member observer State.
    8. 2020: The Abraham Accords normalise Israel’s relations with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, later extended to further states.
    9. 2025: Security Council Resolution 2803 creates the Board of Peace for Gaza and records a conditional pathway to Palestinian statehood.

    India’s Position on Palestine and the Two-State Solution

    Source: Backgrounder, India-Israel Relations Backgrounder.docx

    1. Long-standing principled support: India maintains a long-standing principled support for the Palestinian cause and for a negotiated two-state solution.
    2. De-hyphenation: India separates its Israel policy from its Palestine policy, engaging each on its own terms rather than treating support for one as opposition to the other.
    3. Recognition timeline: India recognised the State of Israel in 1950 but withheld full diplomatic relations for four decades, shaped by its support for the Palestinian cause, its ties with Arab states and its energy dependence on West Asia.
    4. Normalisation in 1992: Full diplomatic relations were established in January 1992, in the post-Cold War context and alongside India’s economic liberalisation.
    5. The 2017 signal: The first visit by an Indian Prime Minister to Israel, in July 2017, elevated the relationship to a Strategic Partnership and notably did not include Ramallah, which signalled de-hyphenation.
    6. Voting record: India has continued to vote for Palestinian causes at the United Nations even while deepening its ties with Israel.
    7. The Gulf balance: India’s energy imports, remittance inflows and a large diaspora in Gulf states require its Israel ties to be balanced against Arab partners.
    8. Strategic autonomy: India frames the Israel relationship as issue-based cooperation and not as alignment against any third party.

    Back2Basics: The Palestinian Authority

    1. Origin: The Palestinian Authority was created under the 1993 Oslo Accord as an interim self-governing body for parts of the West Bank and Gaza.
    2. Parent body: It was established by the Palestine Liberation Organization, which formally recognised Israel under the same Accord.
    3. Mandate: It exercises civil and, in designated areas, security administration, with the Oslo framework dividing the West Bank into Areas A, B and C by degree of Palestinian and Israeli control.
    4. Interim design: It was designed as a transitional arrangement pending a final status agreement covering borders, Jerusalem, refugees and settlements, which was never concluded.
    5. Current relevance: A reformed Palestinian Authority is the body named in Resolution 2803 as the vehicle through which a pathway to statehood would run.
    6. Territorial split: Its writ has not extended to Gaza since the 2007 split with Hamas, which is itself a constraint on any single Palestinian government.

    Challenges to a Two-State Settlement

    1. Absence of contiguous territory: A viable Palestinian state requires territorial contiguity that settlement expansion has progressively removed, e.g. the West Bank’s division into Areas A, B and C leaves Palestinian-administered zones as separated enclaves.
    2. Physical destruction of the state base: Reconstruction must precede governance, since the administrative and economic base has been destroyed, e.g. the devastation of the Gaza Strip after the campaign that followed 7 October 2023.
    3. Divided Palestinian leadership: No single Palestinian authority commands both territories, e.g. the Palestinian Authority governs parts of the West Bank while Gaza has been under Hamas control since 2007.
    4. Collapse of political constituencies: Domestic support for a Palestinian state has evaporated inside Israel, e.g. the shift in Israeli opinion after the Hamas attack on Israeli civilians in October 2023.
    5. Leadership opposition at the top: The settlement requires assent from leaders personally committed against it, e.g. the current Israeli Prime Minister voted against the Oslo Accords and remains opposed to Palestinian statehood.
    6. Veto-protected deadlock: Security Council action is constrained by permanent member vetoes, e.g. repeated vetoes of ceasefire and membership resolutions have prevented enforceable outcomes.
    7. Spoiler incentives on both flanks: Armed actors gain standing from continued conflict and lose it from a settlement, e.g. Hezbollah’s rocket campaign against northern Israel began only after the Gaza war opened.
    8. Refugee and Jerusalem questions unresolved: Final status issues deferred at Oslo remain untouched, e.g. the right of return and the status of East Jerusalem were left to a final agreement that was never negotiated.

    Way Forward

    1. Convert the conditional clause into a road map: Translate the Resolution 2803 annex language on a credible pathway into a sequenced, dated and irreversible road map accepted by all parties.
    2. Restore a single Palestinian administration: Complete the Palestinian Authority reform programme so that one reformed administration can serve as a caretaker government across both territories.
    3. Anchor mediation in an external broker: Retain United States mediation, supplemented by United Nations involvement, rather than allowing a return to bilateral talks that the bargaining asymmetry makes unproductive.
    4. Sequence reconstruction with governance: Tie Gaza reconstruction financing to the standing up of civil administration, policing and revenue functions, so that physical rebuilding creates state capacity rather than only shelter.
    5. Use regional normalisation as leverage: Make further Arab normalisation with Israel conditional on measurable progress on the statehood pathway, so the Abraham Accords framework reinforces rather than bypasses the Palestinian question.
    6. Sustain India’s dual-track engagement: Maintain principled support for a negotiated two-state solution alongside development assistance to Palestine and cooperation with Israel, which protects India’s standing across West Asia.

    “[2018] The term “two-state solution” is sometimes mentioned in the news in the context of the affairs of (a) China (b) Israel (c) Iraq (d) Yemen Answer: (b)”

  • India to build hospital in West Bank, seeks to deploy field hospital in Gaza

    Why in the News

    India and Palestine broke ground on 19 August for a 200 seat super speciality hospital in Arrabeh city in the Jenin Governorate of the northern West Bank, during the first high level Indian visit to the affected region since the conflict broke out in October 2023. India simultaneously sought the deployment of an Indian field hospital in the Gaza Strip and reiterated its support for a negotiated two state solution. Palestine used the visit to back India's bid for a non permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council for 2028 to 2029.

    What does India's development package for Palestine cover?

    1. The hospital: A 200 seat super speciality hospital funded by India, to be built in Arrabeh city in the Jenin Governorate of the northern West Bank, with construction work launched jointly on 19 August.
    2. The field hospital: India has sought the deployment of an Indian field hospital in the Gaza Strip, discussed with Palestinian officials during the visit.
    3. Health sector support: Essential medicines and anti cancer drugs, an Artificial Limb Fitment Camp, and a consignment of medicines handed over to the Palestinian Ministry of Health during the visit.
    4. Beyond health: A vocational training centre, the provision of artificial limbs for amputees in Gaza, and talks on medical equipment including dialysis machines, some of which are expected to be moved into Palestine through Jordan.

    What is the two state solution?

    1. The proposition: It is the framework under which an independent State of Palestine would exist alongside the State of Israel, with agreed borders, security arrangements and a settlement on Jerusalem and refugees.
    2. India's position on it: India supports a negotiated two state solution, and has restated that position through every phase of the current conflict.

    What did the Ramallah visit deliver?

    1. The rank of the visit: The Secretary in charge of Consular, Passport, Visa and Overseas Indian Affairs in the Ministry of External Affairs is the highest ranking Indian diplomat to visit the West Bank since the attack of 7 October 2023.
    2. Where it took place: Ramallah, the administrative headquarters of the Palestinian Authority, with a meeting held there with the Palestinian Foreign Minister.
    3. The officials met: The Minister of Health and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the State of Palestine, and a call on the Prime Minister of Palestine on 19 August.
    4. The positions restated: India's consistent support for the Palestinian people, its support for a negotiated two state solution, and a pitch for addressing the humanitarian situation in Gaza.
    5. The deliverable launched: The groundbreaking ceremony for the super speciality hospital in Jenin, carried out jointly by the Indian and Palestinian teams.
    6. What Palestine asked for: The Palestinian Ambassador to India said Palestine welcomes New Delhi's help towards key infrastructure projects in the region.

    Why does Palestine's backing of India's UNSC bid matter?

    1. The specific endorsement: The Palestinian Ambassador to India said Palestine backs India's bid for a non permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council for the 2028 to 2029 term.
    2. The wider position stated: Palestine has appealed, as a country of the global South, for India to be among the countries holding a permanent seat on a reformed Council.
    3. The reasoning offered: The endorsement was tied to India's global standing as a major economy and a political power.
    4. What Palestine seeks in return: Palestinians hope India will use its influence, including its ties with Israel, to push forward the peace process.
    5. Why it counts in a Council election: A non permanent seat requires a two thirds majority in the General Assembly, so endorsements from within the Asia Pacific group and the wider global South build the coalition a candidacy needs.

    How does India balance its Palestine policy with its Israel ties?

    Source: Backgrounder, India-Israel Relations Backgrounder.docx, supplemented

    1. The stated policy: India maintains long standing principled support for the Palestinian cause and a two state solution, balanced against deepening ties with Israel, a policy described as the de hyphenation of Israel from Palestine.
    2. When de hyphenation was signalled: The first ever visit by an Indian Prime Minister to Israel in July 2017 elevated the relationship to a Strategic Partnership, and notably did not include Ramallah.
    3. What the Israel relationship carries: Israel is among India's top defence suppliers alongside Russia, France and the United States, with merchandise trade anchored in diamonds, chemicals, defence equipment, high technology and agriculture, and a Free Trade Agreement under negotiation.
    4. Where the friction sits: Reports of Indian military shipments to Israel during the Gaza conflict draw domestic and diaspora criticism, and India's energy imports, remittances and large diaspora in the Gulf require careful balancing of Israel ties with Arab partners.
    5. How India frames it: India describes the relationship as issue based cooperation rather than alignment against any third party, which is its strategic autonomy formulation.
    6. What the present visit adds, supplemented: Restoring a high level Indian presence in Ramallah after nearly three years, and pairing it with a physical asset in the West Bank, gives the Palestine half of the balance a visible deliverable rather than a stated position alone.

    Challenges to India's engagement in Palestine

    1. Physical access to Gaza: A field hospital cannot be deployed without a functioning crossing and security guarantees from the parties in control of it. e.g. medical equipment including dialysis machines is expected to reach Palestine only through Jordan.
    2. Construction in a contested territory: Building in the northern West Bank exposes a project to demolition orders, permit refusals and military operations. e.g. the Jenin Governorate, where the Arrabeh hospital is sited, has been the site of repeated large scale Israeli operations.
    3. Balancing against defence ties with Israel: Visible development assistance to Palestine sits beside a defence relationship with Israel that domestic critics read as inconsistent. e.g. reports of Indian military shipments to Israel during the Gaza conflict drawing domestic and diaspora criticism.
    4. Fiscal and delivery capacity of the Palestinian Authority: A completed hospital requires recurrent staffing and operating budgets from an authority under fiscal stress. e.g. the vocational training centre and artificial limb programmes also depend on Palestinian institutions for continuity after handover.
    5. Gulf balance: India's energy imports, remittances and a large diaspora in Gulf states constrain how far it can lean toward either party. e.g. India's calibrated positions at the United Nations through successive phases of the Gaza conflict.
    6. Dependence on a stalled peace process: Development assistance cannot substitute for a political settlement, so the same infrastructure is at risk in the next round of hostilities. e.g. the India Middle East Europe Economic Corridor, announced at the 2023 G20 New Delhi Summit, whose progress regional conflict has slowed.
    7. Competing donor crowding: Reconstruction finance in Gaza and the West Bank is dominated by much larger Gulf and Western donors, which limits the visibility of Indian contributions. e.g. India's assistance is delivered through discrete projects rather than through a large reconstruction fund.

    Conclusion

    India's Palestine policy has for two decades rested on a stated position on the two state solution, and this visit converts part of that position into physical assets in health and vocational training. Palestine's endorsement of India's non permanent Security Council candidature for 2028 to 2029, coupled with its request that India use its ties with Israel to advance the peace process, prices that assistance in diplomatic terms. The next milestones are the finalisation of modalities for the Gaza field hospital deployment and the completion of the Jenin hospital construction.

    India-Israel Relations

    Source: Backgrounder, India-Israel Relations Backgrounder.docx

    1. Recognition and normalisation: India recognised the State of Israel in 1950 but withheld full diplomatic relations for four decades, and full ties were established in January 1992, when India opened its embassy in Tel Aviv and Israel opened its mission in New Delhi.
    2. Elevation to Strategic Partnership: The relationship was elevated to a Strategic Partnership during the first ever visit by an Indian Prime Minister to Israel in July 2017, followed by a reciprocal visit by the Israeli Prime Minister in 2018.
    3. Defence as the anchor: Israel is among India's top defence suppliers, with cooperation covering the Barak-8 medium range surface to air missile jointly developed with the Defence Research and Development Organisation, Heron and Searcher unmanned aerial vehicles, Harop and Harpy loitering munitions, radars, electronic warfare systems and precision guided munitions.
    4. The Kargil precedent: Cooperation proved decisive during the 1999 Kargil conflict, when Israel supplied laser guided munitions and reconnaissance support at short notice.
    5. Trade profile: Bilateral trade grew from about 200 million United States dollars in 1992, largely diamonds, to several billion dollars diversified across refined petroleum, chemicals, textiles and machinery from India, and defence equipment, high technology, potash and fertilizers from Israel.
    6. Agriculture and water: The India Israel Agricultural Action Plan operates Centres of Excellence across Indian States transferring drip irrigation, precision farming and protected cultivation, alongside Israeli expertise in desalination and wastewater recycling.
    7. Minilateral and connectivity architecture: The I2U2 grouping of India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates and the United States, launched in 2021 to 2022 for food security and clean energy, and the India Middle East Europe Economic Corridor announced at the 2023 G20 New Delhi Summit, with Israel as a key transit node.
    8. The Abraham Accords effect: The normalisation of Israel's ties with several Gulf states in 2020 eased India's balancing act between Israel and the Arab world.

    Key Facts about India and Palestine

    1. Early recognition of the PLO: India was the first non Arab state to recognise the Palestine Liberation Organisation as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, in 1974.
    2. Recognition of the State of Palestine: India recognised the State of Palestine in 1988.
    3. Representative Office: India opened its Representative Office to Palestine in Gaza in 1996, and shifted it to Ramallah in 2003.
    4. First Prime Ministerial visit: The first visit by an Indian Prime Minister to Palestine took place in February 2018, to Ramallah.
    5. Institutional gifts: Indian assistance has built the Palestine India Techno Park and a centre of excellence in information and communications technology at Al Quds University, along with a school in Abu Dis and support to the Palestine Institute of Diplomacy.
    6. Multilateral contributions: India contributes annually to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, and extends training slots under the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation programme to Palestinian officials.
    7. Voting record: India has consistently supported resolutions on Palestinian self determination at the United Nations General Assembly while abstaining on several resolutions that name parties for condemnation.

    Back2Basics: Non Permanent Membership of the UN Security Council

    1. What it is: The United Nations Security Council has fifteen members, five permanent with the veto and ten non permanent without it.
    2. Term: Non permanent members serve a term of two years and are not eligible for immediate re election.
    3. Who elects them: The United Nations General Assembly, by a two thirds majority of members present and voting.
    4. Regional distribution: The ten seats are allocated across the African group, the Asia Pacific group, the Latin American and Caribbean group, the Western European and Others group, and the Eastern European group, with five seats filled each year.
    5. India's record: India has served eight terms as a non permanent member, the most recent being 2021 to 2022, and is contesting the 2028 to 2029 term.
    6. What the seat carries: A non permanent member may preside over the Council in rotation, chair subsidiary bodies and sanctions committees, and vote on all resolutions, but holds no veto.
    7. The reform demand: India, along with Brazil, Germany and Japan in the G4 grouping, seeks permanent membership with expanded representation for Africa, Asia and Latin America.

    Way Forward

    1. Secure access guarantees for the Gaza field hospital: Modalities settled with all parties controlling the crossings are the precondition for deployment, without which the offer stays on paper.
    2. Build operating capacity alongside infrastructure: Pairing the Jenin hospital with training for Palestinian medical staff and a recurrent equipment supply line prevents a completed building without the workforce to run it.
    3. Route assistance through predictable channels: Formalising the Jordan transit route for medical equipment reduces the dependence on ad hoc clearances for each consignment.
    4. Sustain principled support for a two state solution: A consistent public position protects India's standing across West Asia irrespective of how the Israel relationship develops.
    5. Convert the Palestinian endorsement into a Council coalition: Following the endorsement with sustained outreach to the Asia Pacific group and the wider global South is what turns a statement of support into the two thirds majority the 2028 to 2029 election requires.
    6. Insulate long term cooperation from conflict cycles: Multi year funding commitments for health and vocational training projects prevent each round of hostilities resetting the assistance programme.
    7. Broaden beyond health: Extending assistance into water, agriculture and information technology training, where India already has delivery experience in Palestine, diversifies the partnership beyond a single sector.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2018] The term "two-state solution" is sometimes mentioned in the news in the context of the affairs of (a) China (b) Israel (c) Iraq (d) Yemen Answer: (b)”

    # Compiled Articles, 20 August 2026 (Part 5, Items 25 to 30)