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GS Paper: GS2

  • Tribunals Reforms Bill, 2026 creates National Tribunals Commission after a decade-long tussle with the Supreme Court

    Why in the News

    Parliament passed the Tribunals Reforms Bill, 2026, which creates a National Tribunals Commission, fixes member tenure at five years and repeals the Tribunals Reforms Act of August 2021. The measure ends a decade in which the Centre re-enacted provisions the Supreme Court had struck down, most recently in November 2025 when a Bench called the 2021 re-enactment an impermissible legislative override. It concedes the institution the Court had demanded while retaining the appointment, funding and rule making levers that produced the dispute.

    What is the National Tribunals Commission?

    1. An independent oversight body for tribunals: The National Tribunals Commission is created to sever the dependence of tribunals on their parent government ministries for administrative and financial needs.
    2. Composition: It will be headed by a former Supreme Court judge or a former Chief Justice of a High Court, with two judicial members and two technical members.
    3. Qualification for technical members: Technical members must have at least 25 years of experience in fields such as public administration, finance or law.
    4. Core functions: The Commission will conduct the selection process for vacancies, review the performance of tribunals and oversee inquiries into complaints against members.
    5. Data function: It will maintain a National Tribunals Data Grid.
    6. Executive appointment retained: The Centre appoints the chairperson and members, with the chairperson and judicial members appointed after consulting the Chief Justice of India.

    What is the National Tribunals Data Grid?

    1. A central case data repository: The National Tribunals Data Grid is the consolidated database of tribunal case and disposal data to be maintained by the Commission.
    2. Purpose: It supplies the performance data on which the Commission’s review of tribunal functioning will rest, mirroring the role the National Judicial Data Grid performs for courts.

    What is an impermissible legislative override?

    1. Re-enacting a struck down provision: A legislative override is impermissible when a legislature re-enacts the same provision a court has declared unconstitutional, without removing the defect the court identified.
    2. The settled distinction: A legislature may cure the basis of a judgment by changing the underlying law, but it cannot simply nullify the judgment by restoring the identical text.

    Why did the Centre and the Supreme Court end up in a decade long confrontation?

    1. Finance Act, 2017: The statute empowered the Centre to frame rules for tribunals, transferring service conditions and qualifications to executive rule making.
    2. Constitution Bench ruling, 2019: A Constitution Bench struck down those rules for undermining judicial independence.
    3. New rules and a judicial recommendation, 2020: The Centre notified fresh rules, and the Court recommended several modifications, including a five year tenure for members.
    4. Ordinance, April 2021: Instead of incorporating those suggestions, the Centre promulgated an Ordinance fixing tenure at four years, setting a minimum appointment age of 50, and requiring selection committees to recommend a panel of two names.
    5. Provisions struck down as arbitrary: The Court struck down those provisions.
    6. Tribunals Reforms Act, August 2021: Parliament then passed an Act re-enacting the exact provisions the Court had just declared unconstitutional.

    What did the Supreme Court hold in November 2025?

    1. Re-enactment condemned: A two judge Bench struck down provisions of the 2021 Act, calling the re-enactment an impermissible legislative override of earlier judgments.
    2. Criticism of persistent non compliance: The Court criticised the government for its persistent refusal to adhere to its pronouncements.
    3. Four year tenure held anti merit: The Court ruled that a short four year tenure is anti-merit and increases interference by the executive, jeopardising the independence of the judiciary.
    4. Panel of two names rejected: It held that the government could not demand a panel of two names, since this gave the executive undue discretion in appointments.
    5. Direction to create the Commission: It reiterated the need for a National Tribunals Commission and directed the Centre to establish one within four months.
    6. Transitional protection: It protected certain existing appointments and selections while the new framework was being put in place.

    What are the other major changes proposed?

    1. Repeal of the 2021 Act (change to an existing provision): The 2026 Bill repeals the Tribunals Reforms Act of August 2021 in its entirety.
    2. Tenure fixed at five years (change to an existing provision): Chairpersons and members will hold office for a term of five years, replacing the contested four year tenure.
    3. Age ceilings specified (change to an existing provision): The maximum age limit is set at 70 years for chairpersons and 67 years for members.
    4. Reappointment permitted (new provision): Chairpersons and members can be considered for reappointment.
    5. Search cum selection committee restructured (new provision): The committee for members will be headed by a judicial member of the Commission and will include a retired High Court judge, a government secretary, a technical member and experts.
    6. One name per vacancy (change to an existing provision): The committee will recommend one suitable candidate for each vacancy, with one additional name kept on a waiting list, replacing the panel of two.
    7. Appointment deadline imposed (new provision): The government must make the appointment within three months of receiving the recommendation.
    8. Stated legislative intent: The Statement of Objects and Reasons says the Bill is introduced in consonance with the directions of the Supreme Court, to improve efficiency and ensure independence, transparency and uniformity in the functioning of tribunals.

    Why does the Bill not fully sever executive control?

    1. Appointment power retained: The Centre appoints the chairperson and members of the Commission itself, so the body meant to insulate tribunals is constituted by the executive.
    2. Consultation is not concurrence: The chairperson and judicial members are appointed after consulting the Chief Justice of India, a formulation that does not bind the government to the advice.
    3. Secretariat under the Centre: The Centre appoints the Commission’s secretary, which places the administrative machinery of the oversight body within executive reach.
    4. Financial dependence continues: The Centre provides grants to the Commission, reproducing at one remove the funding dependence the Court objected to.
    5. Rule making powers preserved: The Centre retains rule making powers over several aspects of tribunal members’ qualifications and service conditions.
    6. Reappointment as a pressure point: Permitting reappointment gives the appointing authority a continuing hold over a serving member’s prospects.

    Challenges to the National Tribunals Commission

    1. Vacancies outlast reform statutes: Tribunal benches sit without presiding officers for long periods, e.g. the National Green Tribunal has functioned with single member or non functional zonal benches for extended stretches.
    2. Parent ministry conflict of interest persists in adjudication: A tribunal often decides cases against the very ministry that shapes its service rules, e.g. the Armed Forces Tribunal adjudicates disputes against the Ministry of Defence.
    3. Appeal architecture keeps burdening the Supreme Court: Several statutes provide a direct appeal from a tribunal to the Supreme Court, e.g. appeals from the Telecom Disputes Settlement and Appellate Tribunal go straight to the Supreme Court, bypassing the High Courts.
    4. Technical member dominance dilutes judicial character: Benches weighted toward administrative expertise weaken the adjudicatory function, e.g. the Court in the Madras Bar Association line of cases repeatedly objected to bench composition tilted against judicial members.
    5. Uneven infrastructure and geographic access: Litigants travel long distances because benches are concentrated in a few cities, e.g. the abolition of appellate bodies in the 2021 rationalisation pushed those appeals to High Courts already carrying large backlogs.
    6. Rationalisation without capacity transfer: Abolishing a tribunal shifts its docket to courts without a matching increase in judicial strength, e.g. the 2021 rationalisation abolished nine appellate tribunals including the Intellectual Property Appellate Board and moved their work to High Courts.
    7. Non compliance with judicial directions: The record of the last decade shows directions being met with re-enactment rather than implementation, e.g. the 2021 Act reproduced the very four year tenure the Court had struck down months earlier.

    Conclusion

    A decade of contest between the legislature and the Court has ended with the Centre conceding the institution, since the Bill creates the National Tribunals Commission the Court had demanded and restores the five year tenure the Court recommended in 2020. The concession stops short of independence, because the Centre still appoints the Commission’s chairperson, members and secretary, funds it through grants and retains rule making powers over qualifications and service conditions. The measure has reached the stage of passage by both Houses of Parliament as the Tribunals Reforms Bill, 2026, and awaits Presidential assent and notification before it can take effect. The next milestone named in the record is the constitution of the National Tribunals Commission, which the Supreme Court’s November 2025 judgment directed the Centre to complete within four months.

  • Census 2027 questionnaire notified with 40 questions and India’s first caste enumeration since Independence

    Why in the News

    The Registrar General and Census Commissioner of India notified a schedule of 40 questions for the population enumeration phase of Census 2027 on 14 August, and the schedule went live on 17 August in Ladakh and the snow bound areas of Jammu and Kashmir, Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh through a self enumeration portal. The design of a single field decides the value of the whole exercise, since Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe respondents select from a fixed drop down while every other respondent types a caste name into an open field, the same method that produced over 46 lakh caste names in the 2011 Socio-Economic and Caste Census.

    What is the population enumeration phase of Census 2027?

    1. The second of two phases: The Census runs in two stages, a houselisting and housing phase followed by the population enumeration phase that records individual level characteristics.
    2. Scope of the notified schedule: The Registrar General notified 40 questions to be asked during this phase, against 29 questions in the Census 2011 questionnaire.
    3. Thirteen new data fields: The schedule adds 13 new questions or data fields that were not part of the 2011 questionnaire.
    4. Self enumeration route: The schedule was made available through a self enumeration portal, allowing a household to fill its own record rather than wait for an enumerator.
    5. Fields marked mandatory: The data fields in the caste section are marked mandatory, with declining to declare recorded as an option rather than left blank.
    6. Wider than the gazette text: The schedule made available to respondents further expands the data fields notified in the Gazette of India.

    What was the Socio-Economic and Caste Census (SECC) of 2011?

    1. A separate survey, not the Census: The Socio-Economic and Caste Census (SECC) of 2011 was a household survey of deprivation indicators conducted alongside but separately from the decennial Census.
    2. The caste data outcome: Its open field method of recording caste returned over 46 lakh different caste names, and the government has maintained over the last decade that the data were unreliable because of errors in data collection.

    What is the National Population Register (NPR)?

    1. A register of usual residents: The National Population Register (NPR) is a register of persons usually resident in a locality, distinct from a citizens’ register.
    2. Status of the update: The NPR was initially proposed to be updated along with the first phase of the Census, and has been put on the back burner amid opposition over concerns that the data could be used to build a country wide National Register of Citizens (NRC).

    What are the new data fields added to the 2027 schedule?

    1. Parents’ religion, date and place of birth: Under the head Family Particulars, the schedule seeks the religion, date of birth and place of birth up to the village level of both the father and the mother.
    2. Birth outside India recorded: A separate option records the place of birth of the father and mother if either was born outside India.
    3. Religion categories fixed with an escape field: Six religious categories are listed, Hindu, Christian, Sikh, Buddhist, Muslim and Jain, with other religion recordable in a separate column.
    4. Identity document details: The schedule seeks Aadhaar, mobile, voter identity card and driving licence details.
    5. Place of COVID-19 vaccination: A question on the place of COVID-19 vaccination offers two options, within India or outside India.
    6. Overlap with the NPR rehearsal form: The additional questions on parents’ particulars, Aadhaar, mobile, voter identity card and driving licence mirror those asked in the 2019 rehearsal form for the National Population Register.

    How will caste be recorded, and why does the method matter?

    1. A drop down for SC and ST respondents: Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe respondents select their caste from a predetermined drop down menu, which fixes the universe of permissible answers.
    2. An open field for everyone else: Question 10(C) reads, if not SC or ST in this State or Union Territory, enter caste name, leaving the entry entirely to the respondent.
    3. Two additional recorded choices: Besides the caste field, the schedule carries Does not want to declare Caste and No Caste as recordable options.
    4. The first count since Independence: This is independent India’s first caste enumeration, since the last full caste count was conducted in 1931.
    5. Why the asymmetry matters: A closed list produces categories that can be aggregated and compared, while free text produces spelling variants, sub caste names, surnames and gotra entries that cannot.
    6. The objection raised: The principal Opposition party has questioned the open field methodology and alleged that the government has abandoned the caste census it announced on 30 April 2025.

    Why does the open field method invite the 2011 failure?

    1. The precedent is documented: The same open field method in the 2011 SECC returned over 46 lakh caste names for a country whose recognised caste categories number in the thousands.
    2. The government’s own verdict on that data: The administration has maintained consistently over the last decade that the SECC caste data were unreliable because of errors in data collection.
    3. Asymmetric quality by design: SC and ST returns will be clean because they are drawn from a list, while Other Backward Classes and general category returns will carry the full noise of free text.
    4. Post enumeration classification burden: Reconciling millions of free text strings into usable categories becomes a discretionary exercise conducted after the count, not during it.
    5. Policy consequence: The categories that most need reliable numbers for reservation and welfare targeting are precisely the ones the open field leaves unstructured.
    6. Trust consequence: Recording caste as mandatory while leaving its classification unstructured invites the charge that the exercise is being conducted without an intention to use the result.

    Challenges to Census 2027

    1. Migrant and homeless undercount: Circular migrants and street dwelling populations are systematically missed, e.g. the absence of updated migration data after 2011 left ration portability planning during the 2020 lockdown without a reliable base.
    2. Digital self enumeration excludes the least connected: A portal based first phase presumes smartphone access and digital literacy, e.g. only 57 percent of women in India have independent internet access against 72 percent of men.
    3. Enumerator capacity and training: The count relies on schoolteachers deputed for the task with short training, e.g. Booth Level Officers in the Telangana Special Intensive Revision of 2026 were found skipping door to door verification under workload pressure.
    4. Data privacy exposure: Collecting Aadhaar, mobile, voter identity and driving licence details in one record creates a linkable profile, e.g. the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 carries wide exemptions for State instrumentalities processing such data.
    5. Political contestation over the instrument: State level demands can stall the exercise itself, e.g. a 48 hour shutdown in Imphal in August 2026 demanded a National Register of Citizens before the Census in Manipur.
    6. Delimitation and reservation stakes raise the incentive to misreport: Census figures feed seat readjustment and reservation shares, e.g. Article 82 makes the census the basis for readjusting Lok Sabha seat allocation.
    7. Snow bound and conflict affected areas run on a different clock: A staggered reference date fragments comparability, e.g. Ladakh and the snow bound belts began enumeration in August 2026 while the rest of the country follows later.

    Conclusion

    The value of India’s first post Independence caste count now rests on a design choice rather than on the count itself, since a drop down for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and free text for everyone else guarantees two grades of data from a single schedule. The stage reached is definite, the 40 question schedule was notified by the Registrar General and Census Commissioner of India on 14 August 2026, and self enumeration went live on 17 August 2026 in Ladakh and the snow bound areas of Jammu and Kashmir, Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh, with the self enumeration window running to 31 August. The next milestone is the extension of population enumeration to the rest of the country, for which the source names no separate date. Unless the free text entries are reconciled against a recognised list, the exercise will reproduce the 46 lakh name problem the government itself called unreliable.

  • [19th August 2026] The Hindu OpED: Time to push back: On India and the continuing U.S. pressure

    Question (2025, GS2): “What are the challenges before the Indian economy when the world is moving away from free trade and multilateralism to protectionism and bilateralism? How can these challenges be met?
    Linkage: This is the most direct parallel. The US tariffs on China and the subsequent report accusing India of “enabling” evasion are prime examples of the move toward protectionism and the resulting challenges for India’s trade policy.

    Mentor Comment

    A recent White House report naming around 40 countries places India among the top enablers of China’s evasion of United States tariffs. The charge lands at the moment when the composition of India’s imports from China is shifting from finished products to intermediate goods, which points to genuine domestic assembly rather than cosmetic relabelling. India’s record of granting tariff concessions ahead of negotiations is what makes the accusation consequential.

    What is the tariff evasion India is accused of enabling?

    1. The alleged route: The accusation is that India and the other named countries import Chinese goods, make minor modifications to them, and re-export them to the United States.
    2. The gain being alleged: Goods routed this way enter the United States at lower tariffs than Chinese origin goods would have faced.
    3. Why origin matters: A minor modification does not change the country of origin of a good, so the practice is treated as circumvention rather than manufacturing.
    4. Status of the charge: The United States has not yet announced punitive action on the basis of this assessment.

    What are intermediate goods?

    1. Definition: Intermediate goods are inputs, parts and components bought by a producer and used up in making a finished good, rather than sold directly to the final consumer.
    2. What their share signals: A rising share of intermediate goods in imports indicates that the assembly and manufacturing stages are happening domestically, since the buyer is importing parts and not products.

    What is the e-commerce inventory model?

    1. Definition: Under the inventory model, an online retail platform owns the stock it sells and sells it directly to consumers, in contrast to the marketplace model where the platform only connects third party sellers to buyers.
    2. The Indian restriction: Foreign direct investment in the inventory based model of e-commerce was long barred in India, and that restriction was diluted recently.

    What does the White House report allege, and how wide is its net?

    1. Scale of the exercise: The report names around 40 countries in all, so the finding is a global mapping of tariff circumvention rather than a charge framed against India alone.
    2. India’s placement: India is placed among the top enablers of Chinese evasion of United States tariffs within that list.
    3. The economic stake: The accusation has the potential to be the most harmful to the Indian economy among the recent charges levelled, because it targets export access rather than a single product line.
    4. Escalation risk: Punitive action based on the assessment is a conceivable next step, and the absence of action so far is not an assurance.

    Why does the changing composition of India’s imports from China cut against the accusation?

    1. The dependence is not disputed: Chinese imports form a significant pillar of Indian manufacturing, and the government itself has admitted they are an important part of the Make in India story.
    2. The composition has shifted: India is moving away from importing finished products, making cosmetic changes and selling them.
    3. What is rising instead: The share of intermediate goods in Indian imports from China has been steadily rising.
    4. What that means in practice: India is doing much of its own assembly and manufacturing in several sectors, relying on China and other countries only for the parts required.
    5. Direction of travel: This shift is a step towards full scale manufacturing in India, which is the opposite of the relabelling the report describes.

    What does India’s record of tariff concessions to the United States show?

    1. High end motorcycles, first cut: After criticism of India’s tariffs during the first term of the United States President, India cut these tariffs to 50 percent in 2018 from the earlier band of 60 percent to 75 percent.
    2. High end motorcycles, second cut: India cut the same tariff further to 40 percent in February 2025, before trade deal talks had even started.
    3. Shrimp feed: Import duties on shrimp feed and its components were slashed in the February 2024 Budget, a key ask of the United States.
    4. Poultry: Tariffs on frozen duck and turkey were reduced in the same way.
    5. E-commerce: Allowing foreign direct investment in the inventory model of e-commerce met a demand that a large American platform had lobbied for over a decade, and diluted a long held Indian position.

    How did the punitive tariffs reshape India’s oil sourcing?

    1. The instrument: Punitive United States tariffs of 50 percent were imposed on India, and the pressure pushed India to diversify away from Russian oil.
    2. The measured shift: Russia’s share in India’s oil imports fell below 20 percent in January 2026, from nearly double that level when the tariffs were imposed six months earlier.
    3. What was set aside: The shift happened despite India’s strident claims of energy sovereignty and despite the discount it was receiving on Russian crude.
    4. A prior instance: The same pattern had played out with Venezuelan oil in 2019.
    5. The partial reversal: The West Asia crisis and a temporary United States reprieve are what turned India back towards Russian oil, not a change in the underlying pressure.

    Why does each concession make the next demand more likely?

    1. The concessions were rational in isolation: The United States can wield immense pressure, which makes each individual concession understandable on its own terms.
    2. The cumulative effect runs the other way: That record of accommodation has emboldened the United States to make increasing demands.
    3. Pre-emptive timing compounds it: Cutting motorcycle tariffs before trade talks had started surrendered a bargaining chip without obtaining anything in exchange.
    4. The present charge is the test: A charge aimed at India’s manufacturing imports would, if conceded, hit the input base of Indian industry rather than a single tariff line.
    5. The required break: India needs to start pushing back, since resisting on this issue is what stops the sequence of concessions from continuing.

    Challenges to India resisting United States trade pressure

    1. Export market concentration: The United States is India’s largest single export destination, so retaliation carries asymmetric cost. e.g. gems and jewellery and textile exporters in Surat and Tiruppur face immediate order cancellations when tariffs move.
    2. Input dependence on China: Resisting the transshipment charge while deepening reliance on Chinese parts is politically difficult. e.g. solar cell and module assembly in India still draws heavily on imported Chinese cells and wafers.
    3. Weak rules of origin enforcement: Establishing that value addition is genuine requires documentation Indian exporters often cannot produce. e.g. the Customs (Administration of Rules of Origin under Trade Agreements) Rules, 2020 were introduced precisely because origin claims under trade agreements were being made without supporting cost data.
    4. Energy exposure: Oil sourcing decisions can be reversed by sanctions pressure faster than supply contracts can be rewritten. e.g. Russia’s share of India’s oil imports fell below 20 percent by January 2026 within six months of the punitive tariffs.
    5. Limited retaliation capacity: India’s counter tariff options are small relative to the size of the American market. e.g. India’s retaliatory duties on American apples and almonds were eventually withdrawn as part of a dispute settlement.
    6. Multilateral fallback weakened: The dispute settlement route is unavailable while the appellate mechanism remains non functional. e.g. the World Trade Organization Appellate Body has been without a quorum since December 2019.
    7. Investment signalling: A public trade confrontation can deter the foreign investment India is simultaneously courting for manufacturing. e.g. electronics assembly investment decisions track tariff certainty as closely as they track incentive outlays.

    Conclusion

    The transshipment charge misreads a real change in India’s trade with China, since the rising share of intermediate goods shows domestic assembly rather than cosmetic modification of finished Chinese products. The deeper problem is India’s record of conceding on motorcycles, shrimp feed, poultry, e-commerce and oil sourcing ahead of or under pressure, which has invited larger demands each time. Conceding on manufacturing inputs would strike at the base of domestic production itself, and that is where the pattern has to stop.

    Foundational Context: India United States Trade

    1. Scale of the relationship: The United States is India’s largest trading partner in goods and its single largest export destination, and India has run a goods trade surplus with it for many years.
    2. Composition: India’s exports are concentrated in engineering goods, gems and jewellery, pharmaceuticals, textiles and petroleum products, while imports are led by crude oil, aircraft, machinery and defence equipment.
    3. Services and remittances: The relationship extends beyond goods into information technology services exports and the largest single source of inward remittances to India.
    4. Preference withdrawal: India was removed from the United States Generalised System of Preferences in 2019, ending duty free access for a set of Indian exports.
    5. Structural asymmetry: India’s dependence on the American market for demand is larger than the American economy’s dependence on Indian supply, which sets the bargaining balance.

    Laws and Rules Governing India’s Trade Policy and Origin Rules

    1. Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992: Empowers the Central government to make provisions for the development and regulation of foreign trade and to formulate the Foreign Trade Policy.
    2. Directorate General of Foreign Trade: Created under this Act as the authority that issues import and export authorisations and notifies policy changes.
    3. Customs Act, 1962: Provides the framework for levy and collection of customs duty, valuation, and confiscation for misdeclaration of goods.
    4. Customs Tariff Act, 1975: Carries the tariff schedules and the enabling provisions for anti dumping, countervailing and safeguard duties.
    5. Customs (Administration of Rules of Origin under Trade Agreements) Rules, 2020: Place the burden on the importer to hold and produce origin and value addition information when claiming preferential duty under a trade agreement.
    6. Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999: Governs the foreign direct investment regime, including the conditions applicable to e-commerce entities.

    Back2Basics: Make in India

    1. Launched: 25 September 2014, as a national programme to raise the share of manufacturing in output and employment.
    2. Nodal agency: The Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade (DPIIT) under the Ministry of Commerce and Industry.
    3. Original coverage: 25 sectors spanning automobiles, electronics, defence manufacturing, textiles, pharmaceuticals and renewable energy.
    4. Stated objective: Raising the manufacturing share of Gross Domestic Product to 25 percent and creating large scale industrial employment.
    5. Four pillars: New processes through ease of doing business, new infrastructure through industrial corridors, new sectors opened to foreign direct investment, and a new mindset treating government as a facilitator.
    6. Second phase: Make in India 2.0 extended the programme across 27 sectors, covering both manufacturing and services.

    Government Initiatives

    1. Production Linked Incentive schemes: Outlay linked incentives on incremental sales across sectors including electronics, pharmaceuticals, automobiles and solar modules, targeted at domestic and export oriented manufacturers.
    2. Remission of Duties and Taxes on Exported Products (RoDTEP): Refunds embedded central, State and local duties that are not otherwise rebated, available to exporters across most tariff lines.
    3. Districts as Export Hubs: Identifies a product with export potential in each district and builds an institutional mechanism to support producers there.
    4. Trade Infrastructure for Export Scheme (TIES): Funds export linked infrastructure such as testing laboratories, cold chains and border haats through State agencies.
    5. Interest Equalisation Scheme: Provides a subvention on pre and post shipment rupee export credit, targeted at labour intensive sectors and micro, small and medium enterprises.
    6. PM Gati Shakti National Master Plan: A multimodal connectivity plan intended to reduce logistics cost, which is a direct determinant of export competitiveness.

    Key Facts about India’s Trade Architecture

    1. Foreign Trade Policy 2023: Notified without a fixed end date, replacing the earlier five year policy cycle.
    2. World Trade Organization: India is a founding member from 1 January 1995 and was earlier a contracting party to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade from 1948.
    3. Appellate Body paralysis: The World Trade Organization’s Appellate Body has been unable to hear appeals since December 2019 for want of quorum.
    4. Generalised System of Preferences: India’s beneficiary status under the United States programme was withdrawn in 2019.
    5. Rules of origin: Preferential origin under India’s trade agreements is normally established through a combination of change in tariff heading and a minimum domestic value addition requirement.

    Challenges in India’s External Trade

    1. Narrow export basket: A few sectors carry a disproportionate share of export earnings. e.g. petroleum products, gems and jewellery and pharmaceuticals together account for a large share of merchandise exports.
    2. High logistics cost: Delivered cost erodes tariff advantages won at the negotiating table. e.g. turnaround time at Indian ports remains higher than at Singapore or Colombo transshipment hubs.
    3. Non tariff barriers abroad: Standards and certification requirements block market access even at zero duty. e.g. European Union restrictions on Indian shrimp and basmati consignments over residue limits.
    4. Trade deficit with China: Manufacturing growth deepens the input dependence that the deficit reflects. e.g. active pharmaceutical ingredient imports from China underpin India’s own formulation exports.
    5. Currency and commodity exposure: Import bills move with global oil and gold prices regardless of export performance. e.g. gold imports of $71.98 billion in 2025-26 widened the current account pressure.
    6. Weak participation in global value chains: India remains outside the large regional production networks that set input sourcing rules. e.g. India stayed out of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership in 2019.

    Way Forward

    1. Document value addition: Build a verifiable, firm level record of domestic value addition in export sectors so that transshipment allegations can be answered with data rather than assertion.
    2. Negotiate rather than pre-empt: Hold tariff concessions until a reciprocal commitment is on the table, since unilateral cuts before talks forfeit bargaining value.
    3. Deepen component manufacturing: Extend incentives from final assembly to components and sub assemblies so that the intermediate goods share shifts from imports to domestic supply.
    4. Diversify export destinations: Use the concluded trade agreements to shift a measurable share of exports away from a single dominant market.
    5. Strengthen origin administration: Equip customs with certification and audit capacity under the origin rules so that genuine Indian manufacturing is distinguishable from routing.
    6. Secure energy optionality: Maintain diversified term contracts for crude so that sourcing decisions are not dictated by tariff threats.

    “[2025, GS3, 10 marks] What are the challenges before the Indian economy when the world is moving away from free trade and multilateralism to protectionism and bilateralism? How can these challenges be met?”

  • Supreme Court invokes Article 142 to quash FIRs against student protesters, sets up panel on use of force

    Why in the News

    A three judge Bench of the Supreme Court agreed to use its Article 142 power to quash first information reports (FIRs) naming students who joined the nationwide protests against the NEET-UG paper leak. The move separates two categories the State had merged, peaceful student protesters and 2,873 persons with serious criminal antecedents, and forces a question the criminal process itself had avoided, who decides where lawful dissent ends. The Court simultaneously moved from case specific relief toward standing rules, proposing a high powered committee to lay down guidelines and protocol for the police use of force.

    What is Article 142 of the Constitution?

    1. Plenary power to do complete justice: Article 142(1) empowers the Supreme Court to pass any decree or order necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it.
    2. Enforceable across India: Such a decree or order is enforceable throughout the territory of India in the manner prescribed by or under any law made by Parliament.
    3. Ancillary powers under Article 142(2): The Court may secure the attendance of any person, the discovery or production of documents, and the investigation or punishment of contempt of itself.
    4. Not bound by ordinary statutory limits: Prohibitions in ordinary law do not operate as limitations on the Article 142 power, which is why the Court can quash an FIR that a statutory route would not permit it to touch.
    5. Discretionary and case specific: The power is exercised on the facts of the particular case and does not by itself create a general rule for later cases.

    What is a Facial Recognition System (FRS)?

    1. Biometric matching technology: A Facial Recognition System (FRS) captures a facial image and compares its measurable features against a stored database to return a probable identity match.
    2. Deployment at the protest site: The police affidavit stated that FRS is not deployed for indiscriminate surveillance and does not automatically capture, create or maintain profiles of every individual present.
    3. Database composition claimed: The police stated that the record covers faces of persons accused in serious offences, not those in petty matters such as traffic challans.

    What is the proportionality test?

    1. A four part judicial standard: The proportionality test asks whether a State measure pursues a legitimate aim, is rationally connected to that aim, is the least restrictive alternative, and strikes a fair balance between the aim and the rights burdened.
    2. Distinct from a privacy claim: The Bench stated it will examine the FRS deployment on proportionality and not on Article 21, which narrows the enquiry to whether the means matched the stated policing purpose.

    What is the current status of the right to protest in India?

    1. Derived from two Fundamental Rights: The right to protest flows from Article 19(1)(a), freedom of speech and expression, read with Article 19(1)(b), the right to assemble peaceably and without arms.
    2. Available only to peaceful assembly: The protection attaches to assembly that is peaceable and unarmed, and falls away where an assembly turns violent.
    3. Subject to reasonable restrictions: Restrictions are permitted under Article 19(2) on grounds including public order, and under Article 19(3) in the interests of sovereignty, integrity and public order.
    4. No right to an indefinite occupation of public space: The settled position is that a designated protest site may be used, but a public road or thoroughfare cannot be occupied indefinitely.
    5. The Court’s operative position in this case: The Bench stated it would protect students so long as they intended to hold a peaceful and lawful protest and raise demands they expected the authorities to hear.

    Which constitutional provisions govern protest, policing and this jurisdiction?

    1. Article 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b): Guarantee freedom of speech and expression and the right to assemble peaceably and without arms.
    2. Article 19(2) and 19(3): Permit reasonable restrictions on those two rights, including on the ground of public order.
    3. Article 21: Guarantees life and personal liberty, the route through which privacy and bodily integrity claims against surveillance and force are usually raised.
    4. Article 32: Gives the Supreme Court original jurisdiction to enforce Fundamental Rights, the gateway through which these petitions reached it.
    5. Article 142: Confers the plenary power to pass any order necessary for complete justice, the power the Bench invoked to quash the FIRs.
    6. Article 144: Requires all civil and judicial authorities in India to act in aid of the Supreme Court.
    7. Seventh Schedule, State List Entries 1 and 2: Place public order and police with the States, which is why the Delhi Police answered through the Union in the national capital.

    What exactly did the Court direct on the FIRs?

    1. Quashing confined to student only FIRs: The Bench sought a list of FIRs in which only students were named, and stated it would quash those by invoking Article 142.
    2. Serious antecedents carved out: FIRs involving elements with serious criminal antecedents were left to be decided subject to discussion in court.
    3. Investigation narrowed to a named number: The Solicitor General stated the police would confine investigation to 2,873 persons identified at the protest site with serious criminal backgrounds.
    4. Charges specified for that set: The affidavit named murder, attempt to murder, dacoity, rape and POCSO offences among the charges against those 2,873 persons.
    5. Non disclosure of FIR details flagged: Counsel for the students stated the police had not shared even the FIR numbers despite promising no action against peaceful protesters.
    6. Generic labels rejected: The Bench held that the State cannot refer to undesirable elements in generic terms and must at least identify them.

    Why is the Court routing the inquiry through a high powered committee?

    1. Proposed composition: The committee would comprise a former Supreme Court judge, a former High Court Chief Justice and a retired police officer of Director General of Police rank.
    2. Consent already secured: The Bench stated it had obtained the consent of a former Director of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and a retired Director General of Police of an unconnected State.
    3. Two names kept open deliberately: Both options were retained so that no allegation could later be raised against the presence of the CBI officer on the panel.
    4. Mandate beyond this protest: The Bench identified laying down guidelines and protocol for the use of force as a task for the committee, alongside issues needing immediate attention.
    5. Urgent items identified: Allegations of police personnel sexually molesting women protesters, and online harassment and victimisation of vulnerable persons, were listed for urgent examination.
    6. Evidence to be transferred: The Court stated it would direct the authorities to hand over all digital and other materials to the committee.

    What does the police affidavit claim about the use of force at Jantar Mantar?

    1. Force described as graded: The affidavit stated the force employed was proportionate, reasonable, graded and in accordance with law, and used only after protesters resorted to violence.
    2. Tear smoke shells as last resort: The police stated that tear smoke shells were used only as a last resort and that the lathi charge was limited and controlled.
    3. Specific denials recorded: The affidavit denied the use of nail lathis and denied that officers manhandled women protesters.
    4. Plainclothes personnel admitted: The police admitted deploying plainclothes personnel as spotters, describing this as a globally followed crowd control arrangement at large gatherings.
    5. Hindsight objection raised: The police argued that instantaneous operational decisions cannot be misjudged later by selectively relying on isolated video clips or media reports.
    6. Counter on accountability: Counsel for the petitioners pointed out that the affidavit records no internal or administrative action against the personnel concerned.

    Why has the Court framed the surveillance question as proportionality rather than privacy?

    1. A narrower and faster enquiry: Testing proportionality asks whether FRS deployment matched its stated purpose, which the Bench can decide on the record without reopening the settled privacy jurisprudence.
    2. Sequencing stated by the Bench: The primary question was identified as whether excessive force was used, with the FRS aspect to be examined after that.
    3. The petitioners’ wider claim left untested: Counsel argued that FRS cannot be used at all and that data on persons other than the accused are also retained.
    4. The storage objection: Counsel for a Rajya Sabha member submitted that the data were stored with private entities, a custody question a proportionality enquiry does not automatically reach.
    5. The data the police disclosed: FRS returned 2,873 persons with serious criminal antecedents, of whom 92 were involved in over 10 cases each and 47 of those 92 were history sheeters.
    6. The unresolved consequence: A proportionality finding settles whether this deployment was excessive, not whether a permanent facial database of protest sites is constitutionally permissible.

    What are the major debates surrounding Article 142 and the policing of protest?

    1. Complete justice against statutory command: One position treats Article 142 as a residual equity power to fill gaps, the other holds that it cannot be used to supplant express statutory provisions.
    2. Precedent versus one off relief: Counsel opposing the quashing asked whether this would be a one off order or a precedent, since a mass quashing of FIRs invites replication in every future agitation.
    3. Remorse as a condition for relief: The objection that the students had not expressed a shred of remorse or regret raises whether contrition is a legitimate precondition for constitutional relief.
    4. Lawfulness of the march itself: It was submitted that the 20 July march towards Parliament was unlawful, which reframes the dispute from excessive force to the legality of the assembly.
    5. Individual accountability against institutional inquiry: Petitioners pressed for immediate action against identified officers, while the Bench held that giving directions now would curtail the committee’s own role.
    6. Surveillance as ordinary policing: The police characterised FRS as a legitimate, bona fide and proportionate policing measure, which if accepted normalises biometric identification at every large gathering.

    Challenges to the use of Article 142

    1. Absence of a stated limiting principle: No settled test governs when the power may be used, so its exercise turns on the composition of the Bench, e.g. the 2016 direction banning liquor vends within 500 metres of national and State highways was substantially diluted by the Court itself in 2017.
    2. Encroachment on the legislative domain: Orders made under Article 142 can create obligations Parliament never enacted, e.g. the 2016 direction making the National Anthem compulsory in cinema halls, which the Court made optional again in 2018.
    3. No appeal against the order: A direction issued by the Supreme Court under Article 142 is not appealable, so an error of fact in the underlying record survives uncorrected, e.g. sealed cover material relied on in several public interest matters was never tested by the affected parties.
    4. Selective relief risk: Quashing an entire class of FIRs without a public list invites the charge that relief tracked the political salience of the protest, e.g. FIRs arising from other agitations of the same period, including the Siwan firing incident of 25 July, remain live.
    5. Executive resistance to enforcement: An Article 142 order still depends on the executive for compliance, e.g. the April 2025 order deeming Tamil Nadu bills assented led to a Presidential Reference rather than settled implementation.
    6. Displacement of ordinary remedies: Routine use encourages litigants to bypass High Court remedies under Article 226, e.g. FIR quashing petitions ordinarily lie under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 before the High Court.

    Conclusion

    The Bench used an extraordinary constitutional power not to settle guilt but to draw a line the police investigation had not drawn, between a protest and the criminal record of individuals inside it. The unresolved question is institutional rather than factual, since a committee of retired judges and a retired police officer will now write the protocol for the use of force that no statute currently supplies. The proportionality enquiry into facial recognition, framed expressly outside Article 21, will decide whether biometric identification at a protest site is treated as a policing tool or as a rights question. The order framing the committee’s terms of reference was stated to be forthcoming the next day.

  • Parliament curbs States’ power to tax mineral rights through MMDR Amendment Bill, 2026

    Why in the News

    Parliament has passed the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Bill, 2026, which restricts the power of States to impose levies on mineral rights and mineral bearing lands. The change follows a Supreme Court ruling that had upheld exactly that State taxing power and permitted recovery of arrears going back to 1 April 2005. A legislative measure aimed at investor certainty now sits directly against a judicially affirmed source of State revenue.

    What is the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957?

    1. Governing statute: The Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (MMDR Act) is the central law regulating the grant of mineral concessions and the development of mines in India. It is administered by the Ministry of Mines.
    2. Union declaration: Section 2 of the Act declares it expedient in the public interest that the Union take control of the regulation of mines and mineral development, which activates Parliament’s competence over the field.
    3. Concession regime: No person may undertake reconnaissance, prospecting or mining except under a licence or lease granted under the Act and the rules made under it.
    4. Auction based allocation: The 2015 amendment made auction the sole method for granting mineral concessions for major minerals, replacing discretionary allotment.
    5. Minor minerals carve out: Section 15 empowers State governments to frame rules for granting concessions in respect of minor minerals, while the power to notify a mineral as minor rests with the Central government.

    What is royalty in mining?

    1. Definition: Royalty is the payment a lessee makes to the State for the privilege of extracting and removing a mineral from the land, calculated per tonne or as a percentage of sale value.
    2. Statutory rates: Royalty rates for major minerals are fixed in the Second Schedule of the MMDR Act by the Central government, so a State cannot revise them on its own.

    What is a tax on mineral bearing land?

    1. Definition: A tax on mineral bearing land is a State levy imposed on the land itself, with the mineral yield of that land used as the measure of the tax.
    2. Distinct head: It is levied separately from royalty and from the auction premium a bidder pays to win a mine, and it is the head of levy the current amendment restricts.

    Current status of States’ power to tax mineral rights in India

    1. Judicially affirmed right: The Supreme Court upheld the right of States to impose taxes on mineral rights and mineral bearing lands, and separately permitted recovery of arrears going back to 1 April 2005.
    2. State levies already in force: Jharkhand imposed a mineral bearing land tax on iron ore at Rs 100 per tonne, subsequently hiked, and Tamil Nadu set a tax on limestone at Rs 160 per tonne.
    3. Scale of the levy structure: States impose 14 types of taxes, charges, fees and levies, including royalty and auction premium, and the rates of royalty and taxes vary across States.
    4. Statutory deductions already fixed centrally: Lessees additionally pay into the District Mineral Foundation (DMF) and the National Mineral Exploration Trust (NMET) at rates pegged to royalty, which the Centre sets.
    5. Position after the amendment: The new law restricts the State levies on mineral rights and mineral bearing lands, and a government fact sheet states that States will continue to receive the overwhelming share of mining revenue.

    Constitutional provisions related to the taxation of mineral rights

    1. Article 246 with the Seventh Schedule: Distributes legislative competence between Parliament and the State legislatures across the Union, State and Concurrent Lists.
    2. Entry 54, List I: Gives Parliament power over the regulation of mines and mineral development to the extent declared by law to be expedient in the public interest.
    3. Entry 23, List II: Gives States power over the regulation of mines and mineral development, expressly subject to Entry 54 of List I.
    4. Entry 50, List II: Gives States the power to levy taxes on mineral rights, expressly subject to any limitations imposed by Parliament by law relating to mineral development.
    5. Entry 49, List II: Gives States the power to levy taxes on lands and buildings, the head under which mineral bearing land taxes are framed.
    6. Article 265: Bars the levy or collection of any tax except by authority of law.

    Why has Parliament moved to restrict State levies?

    1. Certainty and predictability: The stated rationale is to provide greater certainty and predictability in the mining sector for project developers.
    2. Investment flows: A stable levy structure is intended to facilitate investment flows into a sector the Union treats as vital to growth.
    3. Cost pass through: Higher State levies feed into the price of minerals and therefore into infrastructure costs downstream.
    4. Price uniformity: The change is also read as a bid to bring some degree of uniformity in the prices of major minerals, since royalty and tax rates currently differ from State to State.
    5. Critical minerals push: The Union government has launched a critical mineral mission, and a more predictable framework is meant to support that programme.

    Why do States read the amendment as an erosion of fiscal federalism?

    1. Loss of an affirmed revenue head: States moved to raise revenue from mining only after the Supreme Court affirmed that they could, and the amendment removes that opening.
    2. Concentration of dependence: For mineral rich States such as Odisha, Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh, revenue from this channel accounts for a significant share of non tax revenue.
    3. Narrow revenue base: State governments already have limited avenues to raise resources on their own, so each restriction on a taxing head weighs heavily.
    4. Arrears at stake: The right to recover arrears from 1 April 2005 represented a large one time accrual that the restriction places in doubt.
    5. Centre State friction: The apprehension is expressed as a concern about State revenues in particular and fiscal federalism in general, which needs to be addressed rather than assumed away.

    What does the tax burden on Indian mining actually look like?

    1. Effective tax rate: The effective tax rate in India is higher than 50 percent of revenues, according to a report on States’ Best Practices in Mining by FIMI-EY.
    2. Comparative burden: The same report places the effective rate in other countries at 35 to 40 percent of revenues.
    3. Cumulative structure: The Indian figure is the result of stacking royalty, auction premium, statutory contributions and State levies, and not of any single rate.
    4. Rationalisation as the fix: Rationalisation of taxes and royalties is presented as the step that would facilitate greater investor interest in the sector.

    What do cross country comparisons show, and how far does the evidence go?

    1. Limits of the source evidence: The comparison offered is a single aggregate figure of 35 to 40 percent, with no individual country named, so it establishes a gap rather than a model to copy.
    2. Australia: Mineral royalties are a State subject, and Western Australia levies ad valorem royalties on iron ore without a federal ceiling on State rates.
    3. Chile: The mining royalty law of 2023 combines an ad valorem component with a margin linked component on large copper producers, and caps the combined burden on a firm.
    4. South Africa: The Mineral and Petroleum Resources Royalty Act, 2008 sets a formula based royalty that moves with the producer’s profitability and with whether the mineral is refined.
    5. Canada: Mining taxes are levied by provinces such as Ontario and Quebec on mine profits, layered above federal corporate income tax.

    Why does the amendment set investor certainty against a judicially affirmed State right?

    1. Reversal of an outcome, not of a principle: The Court affirmed the competence of States under the Constitution, and Parliament has used its own competence to restrict the exercise of that power.
    2. Two legitimate claims: A predictable national mining framework is a genuine requirement for large, long gestation projects. A stable taxing head is a genuine requirement for a State with few own revenue sources.
    3. Uniformity has a price: Uniform mineral prices across States are achieved by removing the very differentiation that reflected each State’s own fiscal need.
    4. Arrears create the sharpest edge: The recovery window from 1 April 2005 was the largest single revenue expectation created by the ruling, and it is the first casualty of the restriction.
    5. Assurance without a mechanism: The assurance that States will keep the overwhelming share of mining revenue rests on royalty and statutory contributions whose rates the Centre alone fixes.

    Major debates surrounding the taxation of mineral rights

    1. Is royalty a tax: A seven judge Bench in India Cement Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu (1989) held royalty to be a tax, and a nine judge Bench in Mineral Area Development Authority v. Steel Authority of India (2024) held by an 8 to 1 majority that royalty is a contractual consideration and not a tax, restoring the States’ Entry 50 power.
    2. Legislative override: The dispute is whether a statute that removes a taxing power after a ruling is a permissible change in the legal basis or an impermissible override of a binding judgment under Article 141.
    3. Retrospective recovery: Recovery of arrears from 1 April 2005 raises the question of whether long settled project economics can be reopened, against the States’ claim to revenue already lawfully due.
    4. Uniformity versus autonomy: National price uniformity for major minerals is set against the constitutional design that lets a State calibrate levies to its own resource endowment.
    5. Compensation gap: There is no settled empirical answer on what mineral rich States lose in absolute terms, since the 14 State levies are not reported on a common basis across States.

    Challenges to the mineral concession framework after the amendment

    1. Revenue substitution for mineral States: States losing a taxing head have no equivalent replacement within their own competence. e.g. Odisha, which draws a large part of its non tax revenue from mining, has no comparable own source levy to fall back on.
    2. Litigation risk: A statute narrowing a power the Court affirmed invites a fresh constitutional challenge, prolonging exactly the uncertainty the amendment targets. e.g. the India Cement to Mineral Area Development Authority sequence ran for 35 years before a settled answer emerged.
    3. Auction premium distortion: Aggressive premium bidding in auctions inflates costs regardless of tax rationalisation. e.g. several iron ore blocks in Odisha were won at premiums exceeding 100 percent of sale value, squeezing operating margins.
    4. Exploration deficit: Rationalising levies does not fix the shortage of drilled and proved resources that investors actually need. e.g. India has explored only a small fraction of its obvious geological potential area despite the National Mineral Exploration Trust being funded since 2015.
    5. Clearance and land bottlenecks: Forest, environment and land acquisition delays, not levy rates, hold up most mine starts. e.g. blocks in the Hasdeo Arand coalfield in Chhattisgarh have stalled for years over forest clearance and Gram Sabha consent.
    6. District Mineral Foundation utilisation: Funds meant for mining affected communities remain unspent or diverted, weakening the social licence for expansion. e.g. DMF collections have exceeded Rs 1 lakh crore cumulatively, with large unspent balances reported in mineral rich districts.
    7. Critical mineral import dependence: Domestic levy reform does not address dependence on imported processed minerals. e.g. India imports the bulk of its lithium and cobalt requirements for battery manufacturing.

    Conclusion

    Parliament has restricted the States’ power to tax mineral rights and mineral bearing lands, undoing in law the revenue consequence of a ruling that had affirmed that power and allowed arrears from 1 April 2005. Investor certainty has been purchased with the tax autonomy of the States that hold the minerals, and the assurance that States keep the overwhelming share of mining revenue rests on rates the Centre alone sets. The measure has been passed by both Houses of Parliament; the source states no further date or next step beyond that stage. Resolving the resulting Centre State friction, not the levy structure alone, is what will determine whether the new framework actually attracts investment.

    Foundational Context: Mining in India

    1. Scale of the sector: India produces 95 minerals, covering fuel, metallic, non metallic, atomic and minor minerals, and mining contributes roughly 2.5 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) including the associated quarrying activity.
    2. Global standing: India is among the world’s largest producers of coal, iron ore, bauxite, chromite and mica, and is the second largest coal producer globally.
    3. Ownership principle: Minerals vest in the State government where they occur, except in offshore areas and for atomic minerals, where they vest in the Union.
    4. Classification: Minerals are divided into major minerals and minor minerals, with minor minerals such as sand, ordinary clay and building stone regulated by State rules under Section 15 of the MMDR Act.
    5. Institutional set up: The Geological Survey of India (GSI) carries out regional exploration, the Indian Bureau of Mines (IBM) oversees conservation and scientific mining, and the Directorate General of Mines Safety (DGMS) regulates safety.

    Constitutional Framework Governing Mineral Taxation and Federal Finance

    1. Article 245: Sets the territorial extent of laws made by Parliament and by State legislatures.
    2. Article 246: Distributes legislative power across the three Lists of the Seventh Schedule.
    3. Entry 54, List I: Union control over the regulation of mines and mineral development to the extent declared by Parliament.
    4. Entry 23, List II: State power over regulation of mines and mineral development, subject to Entry 54 of List I.
    5. Entry 50, List II: State power to tax mineral rights, subject to limitations imposed by Parliament by a law relating to mineral development.
    6. Entry 49, List II: State power to tax lands and buildings.
    7. Article 141: Makes the law declared by the Supreme Court binding on all courts within India.
    8. Article 265: Bars levy or collection of any tax except by authority of law.
    9. Article 280: Provides for the Finance Commission, which recommends the sharing of Union taxes with the States.

    Laws and Rules Governing Mining in India

    1. Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957: The parent statute for mineral concessions and mineral development.
    2. Second Schedule: Fixes royalty rates for major minerals centrally.
    3. Section 15: Empowers States to make rules for minor mineral concessions.
    4. MMDR Amendment Act, 2015: Introduced auction as the sole route for granting major mineral concessions.
    5. Section 9B and Section 9C: Created the District Mineral Foundation for mining affected communities and the National Mineral Exploration Trust for exploration funding.
    6. MMDR Amendment Act, 2021: Removed the distinction between captive and merchant mines and eased the transfer of mineral concessions.
    7. MMDR Amendment Act, 2023: Created the exploration licence for deep seated minerals and empowered the Centre to exclusively auction 24 critical and strategic minerals.
    8. MMDR Amendment Act, 2025: Widened support for critical mineral recovery, including recovery from mine waste and tailings.
    9. Mines Act, 1952: Governs the health, safety and working conditions of persons employed in mines.
    10. Offshore Areas Mineral (Development and Regulation) Act, 2002: Regulates mineral development in India’s territorial waters and exclusive economic zone.
    11. Mineral Conservation and Development Rules, 2017: Prescribe scientific mining, conservation and mine closure obligations.
    12. Minerals (Evidence of Mineral Contents) Rules, 2015 and Mineral (Auction) Rules, 2015: Govern the exploration thresholds and the auction procedure for major minerals.

    Back2Basics: National Critical Mineral Mission

    1. What it is: A central mission to build self reliance across the critical mineral value chain, from exploration and mining to processing, recycling and recovery from waste.
    2. Approved: By the Union Cabinet in January 2025.
    3. Administering ministry: The Ministry of Mines.
    4. Duration: Covers the period from 2024-25 to 2030-31.
    5. Outlay: An outlay of about Rs 16,300 crore, with a further expected investment of about Rs 18,000 crore by public sector undertakings and other agencies.
    6. Exploration target: A large programme of exploration projects by the Geological Survey of India within India, along with exploration in offshore areas.
    7. Overseas component: Acquisition of critical mineral assets abroad by Indian public and private entities, supported by trade and diplomatic engagement.
    8. Circularity component: Promotion of recycling of end of life products and recovery of critical minerals from mine tailings and overburden.
    9. Stockpiling: Creation of a stockpile of critical minerals to insulate domestic industry from supply disruption.
    10. Regulatory support: Fast tracking of regulatory approvals for critical mineral projects, alongside the exclusive Central auction of the notified critical and strategic minerals.

    Government Initiatives

    1. National Critical Mineral Mission: Secures the critical mineral supply chain through domestic exploration, overseas asset acquisition, recycling and stockpiling under the Ministry of Mines.
    2. National Mineral Policy, 2019: Sets the policy framework for sustainable mining, exploration incentives and a transparent auction regime.
    3. Star Rating of Mines: A self assessment and verification system run by the Indian Bureau of Mines rating mines on scientific mining and sustainability parameters.
    4. Pradhan Mantri Khanij Kshetra Kalyan Yojana (PMKKKY): Implemented through District Mineral Foundations to fund drinking water, health, education and livelihood works in mining affected districts.
    5. National Geoscience Data Repository and the exploration licence regime: Open access geoscience data and a dedicated licence to draw private explorers into deep seated mineral search.

    Key Facts about Indian Mining

    1. Ministry: The Ministry of Mines administers the MMDR Act, other than for coal, lignite, petroleum, natural gas and atomic minerals.
    2. Critical minerals list: India notified a list of 30 critical minerals in 2023, of which 24 are auctioned exclusively by the Centre.
    3. District Mineral Foundation contribution: Lessees contribute 10 percent of royalty for concessions granted after 12 January 2015 and 30 percent for earlier concessions.
    4. National Mineral Exploration Trust contribution: Set at 2 percent of royalty paid by the lessee.
    5. Geological Survey of India: Established in 1851, headquartered at Kolkata, and the principal agency for regional mineral exploration.

    Challenges in the Mining Sector

    1. Long clearance timelines: A block cleared at auction still waits years for forest, environment and consent approvals. e.g. bauxite mining in the Niyamgiri hills of Odisha was halted after Gram Sabhas exercised their veto under forest rights law.
    2. Illegal mining: Unregulated extraction of minor minerals erodes State revenue and damages river systems. e.g. sand mining in the Yamuna and Sone river beds has repeatedly drawn National Green Tribunal intervention.
    3. Rehabilitation deficit: Displacement from large mines is inadequately compensated and land losers rarely regain livelihoods. e.g. displacement in the Talcher and Ib Valley coalfields of Odisha has produced long running resettlement disputes.
    4. Mine safety: Accidents in underground and rat hole operations continue despite the Mines Act framework. e.g. the Ksan mine flooding in Meghalaya in December 2018 trapped and killed rat hole miners in an illegal coal pit.
    5. Low value addition: India exports raw and semi processed ore and imports finished products. e.g. iron ore fines are exported while high grade steel inputs are imported back.
    6. Exploration underinvestment: Private participation in greenfield exploration remains thin despite the exploration licence. e.g. only a small share of India’s obvious geological potential area has been explored in detail.
    7. Import dependence in critical minerals: Processing capacity, not deposits alone, is the binding constraint. e.g. India relies on imports for nearly all its rare earth magnet requirements.

    Way Forward

    1. Institutionalise Centre State consultation on levies: Route mineral levy changes through a standing Centre State forum so that revenue impacts are quantified before a restriction is legislated.
    2. Publish a common levy dashboard: Report the 14 State levies on a uniform basis so that the effective tax rate claim of over 50 percent of revenues can be verified block by block.
    3. Compensate the transition: Provide a time bound, formula based transfer to mineral rich States for the revenue head withdrawn, on the model used for other tax transitions.
    4. Rationalise auction premium: Cap or stagger premium payments so that the auction price, rather than the tax rate, stops inflating the delivered cost of minerals.
    5. Front load exploration: Expand National Mineral Exploration Trust funded drilling and release geoscience data before auction so that bids reflect proved resources.
    6. Ring fence District Mineral Foundation spending: Enforce end use audit of DMF funds on drinking water, health and education in mining affected districts to rebuild the social licence for expansion.

    “[2025] Consider the following statements:
    Statement I: In India, State Governments have no power for making rules for grant of concessions in respect of extraction of minor minerals even though such minerals are located in their territories.
    Statement II: In India, the Central Government has the power to notify minor minerals under the relevant law.
    Which one of the following is correct in respect of the above statements?
    (a) Both Statement I and Statement II are correct and Statement II explains Statement I
    (b) Both Statement I and Statement II are correct but Statement II does not explain Statement I
    (c) Statement I is correct but Statement II is not correct
    (d) Statement I is not correct but Statement II is correct

  • 60 days on, a disturbing US-Iran stalemate

    Why in the News

    The 60 day window for the United States and Iran to agree a long term peace framework expired on 17 August 2026 with no agreement. Both sides had already shut that window through late June and July while trading strikes, and the Strait of Hormuz remains blockaded by Iran and counterblockaded by the United States. A deadlock that neither side can end now holds global oil and gas movement hostage.

    What is the US Iran Memorandum of Understanding of 17 June?

    1. What it was: An interim understanding signed on 17 June 2026 that declared the immediate and permanent termination of military operations on all fronts.
    2. The clock: It set a 60 day timeframe, extendable by mutual consent, within which a broader agreement was to be reached.
    3. What the broader deal covered: Limits on Iran’s nuclear programme on one side and the lifting of United States sanctions on the other.
    4. The disputed clause: Point 5 was read by Tehran as giving it the right to manage the Strait of Hormuz, which it shares with Oman. Washington rejected that reading.
    5. How it collapsed: Hostilities resumed once Iran began firing on vessels it said were using an unapproved route through the waterway.
    6. Status on expiry: No long term framework exists. The interim text is the only agreed document and it is no longer being observed.

    What is the Strait of Hormuz?

    1. Location: A narrow sea passage connecting the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea, bordered by Iran to the north and Oman and the United Arab Emirates to the south.
    2. Why it matters: About a fifth of global oil and liquefied natural gas moved through it before the war, with no overland route able to absorb that volume.

    What is a naval blockade?

    1. Definition: A blockade is the use of warships to stop shipping from entering or leaving a coast or a waterway.
    2. The two sided version here: Iran has closed the strait to traffic it has not approved. The United States has answered with a counterblockade of Iranian ports that it says it can sustain indefinitely by rotating ships.

    What is the Bab el Mandeb Strait?

    1. Location: The passage between Yemen and Djibouti that links the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, and so links Suez traffic to the Indian Ocean.
    2. Current state: The Yemen based Houthi group enforces a partial blockade there, which puts a second chokepoint on the same route at risk.

    What are strategic petroleum reserves?

    1. Definition: Underground crude oil stocks held by the State to cover consumption when imports are cut off by war, sanctions or a supply shock.
    2. How they work: The reserve is filled when prices are low and released into refineries when supply stops, so the shock reaches the economy slowly rather than at once.

    Why did the 60 day framework fail to hold?

    1. Interpretation, not intent: The understanding began to unravel largely over disagreement on how its own terms should be read, not over a refusal to talk.
    2. The strait stayed shut: The framework never reopened the Strait of Hormuz, which Iran has effectively blockaded since the Israel and United States attack of 28 February 2026.
    3. The war widened instead: The 60 day period saw the Houthis and Saudi Arabia begin attacking each other, extending the conflict to a second waterway.
    4. Escalation on the ground: Iranian drones struck the office of the Kurdistan Regional Government’s prime minister in northern Iraq on 17 August.
    5. Policy shift in Tehran: A senior Iranian official stated that Iran has moved from a defensive to a fully offensive posture and would strike to break the American naval blockade if diplomacy failed.
    6. Parallel track: Iran and Oman have separately negotiated the coordinates of a jointly managed route through the strait, and progress there has been slow.

    Which figures define the scale of the disruption?

    1. Transit collapse: Traffic through the strait fell to two vessels in a day against more than 130 daily before the conflict.
    2. Share of world energy: About one fifth of global oil and liquefied natural gas flowed through the strait before the war.
    3. Timeline: The war was launched on 28 February 2026. The Memorandum of Understanding was signed on 17 June and its window closed on 17 August.
    4. Second chokepoint: Seven missiles were fired at the Bab el Mandeb Strait and the Mokha coastline in a single day, alongside Houthi claims of striking a Saudi landing ship and four patrol boats.
    5. Spillover count: The Kurdistan region of Iraq has been targeted more than 1,000 times by Iran and pro Iran armed groups since the war began.
    6. Environmental cost: A 160 km oil slick from a bulk carrier struck by a projectile spread off Qeshm island and threatened the Hara mangrove forests, a UNESCO biosphere reserve.
    7. India’s gas shift: Indian liquefied natural gas imports rose 15.4 percent to 7.08 million tonnes over May to July as Qatari supply collapsed.

    Why are both sides doubling down on economic warfare?

    1. Lesson learned in Washington: Bombing alone has not dislodged the government in Tehran, and the United States is running low on munitions.
    2. Lesson learned in Tehran: The United States has come to stay in the region, and ballistic missiles fired at American bases or at Israel will not change that.
    3. American instruments: Washington has rescinded sanction waivers on Iranian oil in the international market and threatens to hold its naval blockade of Iranian ports indefinitely.
    4. Iranian instrument: Tehran’s single point of leverage is the strait itself, which it can keep closed at low cost to its own military.
    5. Iran’s political bet: Tehran calculates that it can squeeze the American administration until the midterm elections and treats the stalemate as the new balance of power.
    6. The American constraint: With a midterm election approaching, the United States President must show that the pressure campaign is producing results without trapping the country in another foreign war.

    What do the positions of other States in the conflict demonstrate?

    1. Oman: It shares the strait with Iran and is negotiating a jointly managed route with Tehran, which makes a small mediating State the only working channel. The United States President has threatened to bomb Oman if it gets in the way of a deal.
    2. Gulf States and the Malacca model: Oman, backed by Gulf States, offered Iran a scheme of voluntary transit fees for using the strait, modelled on the arrangement used in the Strait of Malacca.
    3. Israel: It launched the war jointly with the United States on 28 February, which is why the closure of the strait is treated in Tehran as a response to an attack rather than an independent act.
    4. Saudi Arabia: It is now in direct exchange of fire with the Houthis, which shows how a bilateral war spreads to a second chokepoint through proxies.
    5. Yemen and the Houthis: A non State armed group enforces a partial blockade of the Bab el Mandeb using ballistic missiles and drones against naval and commercial shipping.
    6. Iraq and the Kurdistan region: Iranian drones and pro Iran armed groups have struck the autonomous region’s leadership more than 1,000 times, showing that the conflict travels through weak neighbouring States.
    7. Qatar: Its liquefied natural gas exports must cross the strait, which is why the shutdown forced buyers such as India to switch to United States, Nigerian, Omani and Angolan cargoes.

    Where does the stalemate turn against both sides?

    1. Each side believes time favours it: Tehran is waiting out the American electoral calendar. Washington is waiting for economic pain to force a concession.
    2. Neither can convert leverage: Neither party has gained decisive leverage to force a settlement, and neither can end the conflict on its own terms.
    3. Rhetoric against interest: The American position swings between threatening to bomb a mediating State and insisting that a negotiated settlement is possible.
    4. Cost falls on third parties: The deadlock means the rest of the world remains hostage to a conflict that neither side is capable of ending.
    5. Stalemate as an outcome: The likeliest result is not victory for either side but the deadlock itself becoming the new normal.
    6. Diplomacy is not a hedge: For States dependent on the strait, waiting for a settlement is a bet on two governments that have both chosen to wait.

    What does the stalemate demand of India?

    1. Managed so far: India has absorbed the consequences of the closure to date without a visible supply failure.
    2. Three interests exposed: A persisting stalemate puts India’s economic, energy and strategic interests at risk together, not one at a time.
    3. Diplomacy alone is insufficient: Negotiating access with either party does not remove the underlying dependence on a single waterway.
    4. Cut import dependence: India must reduce its overwhelming dependence on imported oil rather than manage each disruption as it arrives.
    5. Build larger reserves: Strategic petroleum reserve capacity has to be expanded well beyond present levels. Oil and Natural Gas Corporation is to reserve half of its 1.75 million tonne Mangaluru facility for strategic storage.
    6. Diversify and substitute: Gas sourcing has already shifted to the United States, Nigeria, Oman and Angola, and investment in alternative energy is the only durable substitute.

    Challenges to India’s energy security in a Hormuz disruption

    1. Single route concentration: A large share of Indian crude and gas passes one 21 nautical mile wide passage with no overland alternative. e.g. Qatari liquefied natural gas supply to India collapsed once the strait shut.
    2. Reserve cover is thin: Indian strategic reserves cover only a few days of national consumption against the 90 day standard used by International Energy Agency members. e.g. phase one caverns at Visakhapatnam, Mangaluru and Padur hold 5.33 million tonnes in total.
    3. Freight and insurance shock: War risk premiums and rerouting raise the landed cost of every cargo even when volumes are secured. e.g. Red Sea diversions around the Cape of Good Hope from 2024 added roughly two weeks to voyages from Europe.
    4. Currency and fiscal transmission: An oil price spike widens the current account deficit and pushes up subsidy and inflation pressure together. e.g. every $10 rise in the crude price is estimated to add close to 0.4 percent of gross domestic product to India’s import bill.
    5. Refinery configuration: Indian refineries are tuned to specific crude grades, so substitution is not simply a question of finding any seller. e.g. sour heavy Gulf grades cannot be replaced one for one by lighter Nigerian or United States crude.
    6. Diaspora and remittance exposure: About nine million Indians work in the Gulf, and a wider war puts both their safety and their transfers at risk. e.g. evacuation operations of the scale of Operation Ajay in 2023.
    7. Shipping and seafarer risk: Indian crews form a large share of global merchant manning and are directly exposed to attacks on commercial vessels. e.g. the drone strike on a merchant vessel in the Arabian Sea in December 2023.

    Conclusion

    The lapse of the 60 day window confirms that the closure of the Strait of Hormuz is no longer a temporary interruption but the working balance of power between two governments that both expect the other to break first. For India the practical consequence is that the exposure is structural and cannot be negotiated away one shipment at a time. Reduced dependence on imported crude, a materially larger strategic reserve and a faster shift to alternative energy are the only responses that survive whichever way the deadlock ends.

    About Global Maritime Chokepoints

    1. Definition: A chokepoint is a narrow shipping channel through which a large share of world trade must pass, so a closure at that point reroutes or halts global flows.
    2. Strait of Hormuz: The single largest oil chokepoint, carrying roughly 20 million barrels a day of petroleum liquids before the war, about a fifth of world consumption.
    3. Strait of Malacca: The busiest passage between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, carrying most of the crude bound for China, Japan and South Korea.
    4. Bab el Mandeb: The Red Sea entrance that connects Suez traffic to the Indian Ocean, about 18 nautical miles wide at its narrowest.
    5. Suez Canal and Panama Canal: Artificial chokepoints whose closure adds thousands of nautical miles to a voyage. e.g. the Ever Given grounding blocked Suez for six days in March 2021.
    6. Turkish Straits and Danish Straits: The Bosphorus and Dardanelles carry Black Sea grain and Russian crude. The Danish Straits carry Baltic exports.
    7. India’s position: India lies alongside the Indian Ocean sea lanes that connect Hormuz and Malacca, which makes it both exposed to and capable of policing these routes.

    Treaty Framework Governing Passage Through International Straits

    1. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982: The framework treaty governing maritime zones, navigation rights and the settlement of maritime disputes.
    2. Article 3: Allows a coastal State a territorial sea of up to 12 nautical miles, which is why the Strait of Hormuz falls within Iranian and Omani waters.
    3. Article 37: Applies the transit passage regime to straits used for international navigation between one part of the high seas and another.
    4. Article 38: Guarantees all ships and aircraft the right of transit passage, which cannot be suspended by the bordering States.
    5. Article 44: Bars States bordering a strait from hampering or suspending transit passage and requires them to publicise navigational hazards.
    6. Article 88 and Article 301: Reserve the high seas for peaceful purposes and bar the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of any State.
    7. Iran’s position: Iran signed but has not ratified the Convention, and argues that the transit passage regime does not bind a non party.

    Laws and Rules Governing India’s Oil and Gas Security

    1. Petroleum Act, 1934: Regulates the import, transport, storage, production and refining of petroleum and petroleum products.
    2. Oilfields (Regulation and Development) Act, 1948: Governs the grant of exploration and production rights over petroleum and natural gas.
    3. Territorial Waters, Continental Shelf, Exclusive Economic Zone and Other Maritime Zones Act, 1976: Defines India’s maritime zones and the rights India exercises in each of them.
    4. Merchant Shipping Act, 1958: Governs registration, safety and manning of Indian flag vessels and the protection of Indian seafarers.
    5. Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board Act, 2006: Creates the downstream regulator for refining, transport, distribution and marketing, other than production.
    6. Essential Commodities Act, 1955: Allows the Union government to control the production, supply and distribution of petroleum products in a scarcity.
    7. Energy Conservation Act, 2001: Provides the legal base for efficiency standards and, after the 2022 amendment, for a domestic carbon credit trading scheme.

    Back2Basics: Strait of Hormuz

    1. Designation: A maritime chokepoint, tracked in the Places in News list as a strategic waterway rather than a protected area.
    2. Location: Between Iran on the north and Oman’s Musandam peninsula and the United Arab Emirates on the south.
    3. Connects: The Persian Gulf on one side to the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea on the other.
    4. Dimensions: About 21 nautical miles wide at its narrowest, with inbound and outbound shipping lanes of about two miles each separated by a buffer.
    5. Littoral States: Iran, Oman and the United Arab Emirates. Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and Iraq have no route to the open ocean except through it.
    6. Islands: Qeshm, Hormuz, Larak, and the disputed Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs, held by Iran and claimed by the United Arab Emirates.
    7. Ecology: The Hara mangrove forests off Qeshm island, dominated by grey mangrove, form a UNESCO biosphere reserve.

    Government Initiatives

    1. Indian Strategic Petroleum Reserves Limited: Builds and operates India’s underground crude caverns. Phase one covers Visakhapatnam, Mangaluru and Padur with a combined 5.33 million tonnes.
    2. Strategic reserve phase two: Approved caverns at Chandikhol in Odisha and a second Padur facility, adding about 6.5 million tonnes of capacity.
    3. Hydrocarbon Exploration and Licensing Policy and Open Acreage Licensing Policy: Replace production sharing with a revenue sharing model and let bidders select blocks on their own initiative to raise domestic output.
    4. National Green Hydrogen Mission: Approved in 2023 to build five million tonnes of annual green hydrogen capacity by 2030 and cut fossil fuel imports.
    5. Ethanol Blended Petrol Programme: Substitutes imported crude with domestic ethanol. The 20 percent blending target was advanced to 2025 and met.
    6. PM Surya Ghar Muft Bijli Yojana: Supports rooftop solar in one crore households, shifting household demand away from fossil generation.
    7. Overseas equity oil: ONGC Videsh Limited holds producing assets abroad so that a share of India’s crude comes from equity rather than the spot market.

    Key Facts about India’s Oil and Gas Dependence

    1. Import dependence: India imports over 85 percent of the crude oil it consumes and about half of its natural gas.
    2. Consumption rank: India is the third largest consumer of crude oil in the world after the United States and China.
    3. Refining capacity: India is the fourth largest refiner globally, with Jamnagar in Gujarat the largest single refining complex in the world.
    4. Main suppliers: Russia, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and the United States are the largest sources of Indian crude imports.
    5. Gas sources: Qatar has been India’s largest supplier of liquefied natural gas, delivered under long term contracts through Hormuz.
    6. Reserve benchmark: International Energy Agency members hold 90 days of net import cover. India’s strategic reserves cover only a small fraction of that.
    7. Institutional link: India became an Association country of the International Energy Agency in 2017 and has sought full membership.

    Challenges in India’s Energy Security

    1. Import concentration by geography: A single region supplies a majority of Indian crude, so one regional conflict moves the whole import basket. e.g. West Asian suppliers accounted for the bulk of Indian crude before Russian barrels rose after 2022.
    2. Payment and sanctions exposure: Secondary sanctions can strand a supply relationship that is otherwise commercially sound. e.g. Indian refiners halted Iranian crude purchases in 2019 after the United States ended sanction waivers.
    3. Domestic production decline: Output from ageing fields keeps falling even as demand rises, widening the import gap. e.g. Mumbai High output has fallen steadily from its peak levels.
    4. Storage and pipeline gaps: Gas cannot reach demand centres without a completed grid, so imported cargoes are stranded at terminals. e.g. sections of the Urja Ganga pipeline in eastern India took over a decade to commission.
    5. Critical mineral dependence in the transition: A shift to electric mobility replaces oil dependence with lithium, cobalt and rare earth dependence. e.g. India imports nearly all of its lithium and cobalt requirement.
    6. Grid readiness for renewables: Variable solar and wind output needs storage and balancing capacity that does not yet exist at scale. e.g. curtailment of renewable generation in high output states during low demand hours.
    7. Price pass through politics: Retail fuel prices are politically managed, so a crude spike lands on oil marketing company balance sheets rather than consumers. e.g. under recoveries absorbed by public sector oil marketing companies during 2021 and 2022.

    Way Forward

    1. Expand strategic storage: Complete the phase two caverns and move Indian cover toward the 90 day benchmark used by International Energy Agency members.
    2. Commercialise reserve operation: Allow foreign and private participation in cavern filling so storage is built and rotated without full budgetary funding.
    3. Diversify supply geography: Hold standing contracts across West Asia, West Africa, the Americas and Russia so no single waterway carries a majority of volumes.
    4. Accelerate substitution: Scale ethanol blending, compressed biogas, green hydrogen and electric mobility so demand growth is not met by imported crude.
    5. Secure the sea lanes: Sustain Indian naval deployments for merchant escort in the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea, and expand maritime domain awareness sharing.
    6. Build the gas grid: Complete the national gas grid and city gas networks so imported and domestic gas reaches demand centres.
    7. Deepen mineral supply chains: Secure lithium, cobalt and rare earth supply through overseas assets and domestic processing so the energy transition does not create a fresh chokepoint.

    “[2026] Ships from which of the following countries have to cross the Strait of Hormuz to reach out to the Indian Ocean?
    1. Bahrain
    2. Syria
    3. Qatar
    4. Egypt
    (a) 1 and 2
    (b) 1 and 3
    (c) 2 and 3
    (d) 3 and 4

  • At Afghan embassy, Taliban diplomats mark 5th anniversary of victory day

    Why in the News

    The Afghanistan Embassy in New Delhi held a reception on 17 August 2026, marking five years of Taliban rule. Indian officials attended despite India continuing to withhold formal recognition of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.

    The event highlights India’s growing working relationship with the Taliban without formal diplomatic recognition.

    What is a Chargé d’Affaires-led Mission?

    • Chargé d’Affaires: Diplomat heading a mission when no ambassador is accredited.
    • Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961, it ranks below an ambassador.
    • An ambassador presents credentials to the Head of State, while a chargé d’affaires is accredited to the Foreign Ministry.
    • It allows diplomatic engagement without necessarily signalling formal recognition.
    • The Afghan mission in Delhi has operated under this arrangement since November 2025.

    What is the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan?

    • Formal name used by the Taliban administration since August 2021.
    • India engages with the Taliban as a de facto authority but has not formally recognised it as Afghanistan’s government.

    How Has India-Taliban Engagement Evolved?

    • 2021: India closed its Kabul embassy and evacuated personnel.
    • 2022: India established a technical mission in Kabul.
    • 2025: Afghan Foreign Minister visited India.
    • India subsequently upgraded its Kabul mission to full embassy status.
    • November 2025: Taliban-appointed diplomats took charge of the Afghan Embassy in Delhi under a chargé d’affaires.
    • 2026: Embassy hosted its first public victory anniversary reception in Delhi.

    Why is India Engaging the Taliban?

    • Security: Maintains visibility over terrorist groups and developments affecting India.
    • Connectivity: Chabahar Port provides access to Afghanistan bypassing Pakistan.
    • Development assets: India has invested heavily in projects such as the Salma Dam, Zaranj-Delaram Highway and Afghan Parliament.
    • Regional competition: China, Russia, Iran and Central Asian countries are expanding engagement with Kabul.
    • Trade: Bilateral trade remains around $1 billion.

    “[2013, GS2, 10 marks] The proposed withdrawal of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) from Afghanistan in 2014 is fraught with major security implications for the countries of the region. Examine in light of the fact that India is faced with a plethora of challenges and needs to safeguard its own strategic interests.”

  • ID cards issued to transgender persons remain valid: Centre

    Why in the News

    The Union government assured a three judge Bench of the Supreme Court that transgender identity cards issued before the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Amendment Act, 2026 came into force continue to remain valid. The assurance was given in a challenge arguing that the amendment, in force since 30 March, dismantles the right to self identification recognised in the National Legal Services Authority v Union of India (2014) line of cases. The dispute turns on whether gender identity is declared by the person or certified by the State.

    What is the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Amendment Act, 2026?

    1. About: It amends the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019, the statute that governs recognition of transgender identity and the certificate of identity issued to a transgender person.
    2. Commencement: It came into force on 30 March 2026.
    3. Core objection to it: Petitioners argue that it dismantles the right to self identification and gives the State unfettered authority to determine gender identity.
    4. Status of earlier cards: The Solicitor General assured the Court that identity cards issued before the amendment remain valid, and their validity is unaffected by the new law.
    5. Judicial position so far: The Court had already indicated in the previous hearing that the 2026 law should not operate retrospectively to invalidate cards issued under the earlier legislation.
    6. Forum: The challenge is before a three judge Bench headed by the Chief Justice of India.

    What is self identification of gender?

    1. About: Self identification is the principle that a person’s gender is determined by that person’s own declaration of identity, without any requirement of medical examination or third party certification.
    2. Legal origin in India: The Supreme Court recognised it in National Legal Services Authority v Union of India (2014), holding that the right to determine one’s gender is integral to dignity under Article 21.

    What is a transgender identity card?

    1. About: A certificate of identity issued to a transgender person that provides official recognition of the person’s self identified gender.
    2. Practical use: It is used to support changes to name and gender across official records, and the government’s transgender portal expressly enables such changes.

    What is the current status of gender identity recognition in India?

    1. Statutory basis: Recognition runs through the certificate of identity issued under the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019 and the rules made under it.
    2. Application route: An application is made to the District Magistrate, who issues a certificate of identity as a transgender person and a revised certificate after gender affirming surgery.
    3. Third gender status: Transgender persons are recognised as a third gender for the purposes of state welfare and identity documents.
    4. Prohibition of discrimination: The 2019 Act bars discrimination in education, employment, healthcare, access to public goods and the right to residence.
    5. Reservation position: No reservation in education or public employment has been extended to transgender persons as a class, despite the direction in the 2014 judgment to treat them as socially and educationally backward.
    6. Position after the amendment: The 2026 Amendment Act is in force from 30 March 2026, and its validity is under challenge before a three judge Bench.
    7. Position of existing card holders: Cards issued before the amendment continue to remain valid on the government’s own assurance to the Court.

    Constitutional Provisions Related to gender identity

    1. Article 14: Guarantees equality before the law and equal protection of the laws to every person, not only to men and women.
    2. Article 15: Prohibits discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth, with sex read to include gender identity.
    3. Article 16: Guarantees equality of opportunity in matters of public employment and permits reservation for backward classes.
    4. Article 19(1)(a): Protects freedom of expression, which includes expression of gender identity through dress, speech and behaviour.
    5. Article 21: Guarantees life and personal liberty, read to include dignity, personal autonomy and the right to determine one’s gender.
    6. Article 15(4) and Article 16(4): Permit special provisions and reservation for socially and educationally backward classes, the route directed in the 2014 judgment.
    7. Article 32: Provides the remedy through which the present challenge to the amendment has been brought.
    8. Article 23: Prohibits trafficking and forced labour, relevant to the exploitation the community faces in the absence of livelihood options.

    What did the National Legal Services Authority judgment establish?

    1. Recognition of a third gender: The Supreme Court held in April 2014 that transgender persons must be recognised as a third gender for the purposes of law.
    2. Right to self identification: It held that the gender to which a person belongs is to be determined by that person’s own identification and not by biological or medical criteria.
    3. Constitutional grounding: It located the right in Articles 14, 15, 16, 19(1)(a) and 21, treating gender identity as an aspect of dignity and personal autonomy.
    4. Backward class direction: It directed the Centre and the States to treat transgender persons as socially and educationally backward for the purposes of reservation.
    5. Positive obligations: It directed provision of separate public toilets, medical facilities, welfare schemes and measures to address social stigma.
    6. The wider line of cases: Puttaswamy v Union of India (2017) recognised privacy and decisional autonomy, Navtej Singh Johar v Union of India (2018) decriminalised consensual same sex relations, and Arunkumar v Inspector General of Registration (2019) upheld the marriage rights of a transgender person.

    What do the petitioners argue against the 2026 amendment?

    1. Loss of self determination: The amendment allows the State unfettered authority to determine gender identity, displacing the person’s own declaration.
    2. Conflict with binding precedent: Self identification was recognised as a constitutional right in 2014, and a statute cannot narrow a right located in Article 21.
    3. Value of existing documents: The importance of transgender identity cards already issued cannot be trifled away, since name and gender across official records depend on them.
    4. Retrospective effect: Any reading that invalidates earlier cards would strip recognition already granted under a previous legislation.
    5. Who is before the Court: The petitioners include community members and activists, so the challenge is brought by the group the law regulates.

    Can the State certify gender identity without displacing the right to determine it?

    1. Two claims in tension: The State has an interest in a verifiable identity document, and the individual has a constitutional right to declare gender without external validation.
    2. Where certification becomes control: A certificate that records a declaration is administrative, and a certificate that decides the declaration is determinative of the right itself.
    3. Documentary dependence: Name and gender in every other official record follow from the certificate, so control over the certificate is control over legal personality.
    4. Precedent against statute: The right was recognised through Article 21 in 2014, and the amendment operates on the same subject through ordinary legislation.
    5. The retrospectivity carve out: Protecting existing cards resolves the immediate hardship of current holders and leaves the question of future applicants untouched.
    6. The unresolved core: The assurance settles who keeps a card already issued, not who will be entitled to one under the amended procedure.

    Major debates surrounding gender self identification

    1. Declaration against certification: Whether recognition should follow a self declaration or require screening by a district authority.
    2. Medicalisation of identity: Whether any surgical or medical requirement for a revised certificate is consistent with autonomy under Article 21.
    3. Appeal and remedy: Whether refusal of a certificate by a District Magistrate should carry a statutory appeal, which the 2019 Act was criticised for omitting.
    4. Reservation for transgender persons: Whether the 2014 direction to treat the community as socially and educationally backward requires a horizontal reservation across categories.
    5. Penalty asymmetry: Whether the lower punishment for sexual violence against transgender persons under the 2019 Act compared with the general criminal law is constitutionally sustainable.
    6. Family and residence: Whether the requirement to reside with the natal family or in a rehabilitation centre respects the autonomy of adults who leave hostile homes.
    7. Data and enumeration: Whether recognition can be operationalised at all without accurate population data, since the last enumeration of the community was in Census 2011.

    Challenges to the transgender rights framework

    1. Certification bottleneck: Recognition depends on a single district officer with no statutory appeal against refusal. e.g. applicants under the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Rules, 2020 have reported long delays in issue of the certificate of identity.
    2. Absence of reservation: The 2014 direction on backward class status has not been operationalised at the national level. e.g. Karnataka became the first State to provide a one per cent reservation in public employment in 2021, and most States have not followed.
    3. Weak penalty structure: Offences against transgender persons carry lower punishment than equivalent offences in the general criminal law. e.g. the 2019 Act prescribes six months to two years for sexual abuse of a transgender person.
    4. Healthcare exclusion: Gender affirming care and mental health support are unevenly available and rarely insured. e.g. Ayushman Bharat TG Plus was created precisely because transgender persons were excluded from mainstream health coverage.
    5. Livelihood and employment: Discrimination pushes the community towards begging and sex work despite a statutory bar on discrimination. e.g. the SMILE scheme’s livelihood component was designed to move persons out of begging.
    6. Documentation mismatch: Records in education certificates, bank accounts and property documents do not update automatically after a change in gender. e.g. the government’s transgender portal exists specifically to enable name and gender changes across records.
    7. Data invisibility: Policy runs on a 2011 count with no subsequent enumeration. e.g. Census 2011 recorded 4.88 lakh transgender persons, a figure widely regarded as an undercount.

    Conclusion

    The assurance protects existing card holders and leaves the constitutional question untouched, since the dispute is about whether gender identity is declared or certified. The Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Amendment Act, 2026 remains in force from 30 March 2026, and its validity is pending before a three judge Bench of the Supreme Court on a challenge grounded in the 2014 line of cases. The Court has recorded that the law should not operate retrospectively and the government has accepted that position on the record. The source names no next date for the hearing, so the stage reached is the government’s undertaking and the pending challenge.

    [2024] Under which of the following Articles of the Constitution of India, has the Supreme Court of India placed the Right to Privacy?
    (a) Article 15
    (b) Article 16
    (c) Article 19
    (d) Article 21

  • Legal aid defence needs reform, not retreat

    Why in the News

    The National Legal Services Authority (NALSA) directed that contracts of Legal Aid Defence Counsel (LADC) engaged by legal services institutions across India not be renewed, following representations from Bar Associations in Punjab, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh and Chandigarh. The Bar’s claim is that a salaried public defence cadre is displacing private criminal practice, while the caseload data shows LADCs handling about 1.6 per cent of criminal cases instituted in a year. A scheme created by a statutory body is therefore being wound down without any national assessment of what it achieved.

    What is the Legal Aid Defence Counsel system?

    1. About: The LADC system is India’s experiment with a full time public defender office, staffed by salaried lawyers engaged by legal services institutions to defend accused persons who cannot afford a private lawyer.
    2. Purpose: It provides quality legal representation in criminal cases at every stage, from first production and remand through bail, trial and appeal.
    3. Structure: Each district office is headed by a Chief Legal Aid Defence Counsel supported by deputy and assistant counsel who work only on legal aid matters.
    4. Difference in accountability: Counsel work under institutional oversight with fixed remuneration, monitoring and case reporting rather than as empanelled private practitioners paid per case.
    5. Coverage in the last cycle: The NALSA dashboard records 4,86,354 cases assigned to LADCs in the 2025 to 2026 year, including 1,88,878 bail cases.

    What is the National Legal Services Authority?

    1. About: NALSA is the apex statutory body constituted under the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 to provide free legal services to eligible persons and to organise Lok Adalats.
    2. Structure: It works through State Legal Services Authorities, District Legal Services Authorities and Taluk Legal Services Committees, and it frames the schemes those bodies implement.

    What is the National Judicial Data Grid?

    1. About: The National Judicial Data Grid is the public database of pending and disposed cases across district and High Courts, updated from court software in near real time.
    2. Use here: It supplies the denominator of criminal cases instituted, against which the legal aid caseload is measured.

    What do the Bar Associations argue against the scheme?

    1. Parallel criminal bar: Bar Associations argue that a salaried defence cadre creates a parallel criminal bar inside the court system.
    2. Independence of the profession: They argue that lawyers paid and supervised by a state funded institution weaken the independence of the legal profession.
    3. Livelihood of practitioners: They argue that the scheme takes away work from advocates who depend on criminal briefs at the district level.
    4. Where the representations came from: The direction followed representations from Bar Associations in Punjab, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh and Chandigarh.
    5. The institutional response: NALSA acted on those representations by directing non renewal of LADC contracts across India, not only in the States from which the objection came.

    What do the caseload figures show about displacement?

    1. Cases assigned to LADCs: 4,86,354 cases were assigned in the 2025 to 2026 year as recorded on the NALSA dashboard.
    2. Bail work within that: 1,88,878 of those were bail cases, the stage at which delay translates directly into custody.
    3. Monthly institution of criminal cases: The National Judicial Data Grid records 24,68,339 criminal cases instituted in a single month.
    4. Annual criminal caseload: That translates to roughly 2.96 crore criminal cases instituted in a year.
    5. The resulting share: The 4.86 lakh cases assigned to LADCs represent approximately 1.6 per cent of criminal cases instituted.
    6. What the ratio establishes: A cadre handling one case in sixty cannot be the cause of a livelihood crisis in criminal practice.

    How does the LADC model differ from the assigned counsel system?

    1. Assigned counsel model: Private lawyers are empanelled and paid per case by the legal services institution to appear for indigent accused.
    2. Recorded weaknesses of that model: It has been criticised for missed hearings, delayed applications and complaints over the fees paid by the state.
    3. Why LADCs became popular: Many LADCs appear promptly at production and remand hearings, which is where an unrepresented accused is most exposed.
    4. Quality of filings: LADCs file appropriate and timely petitions challenging violations of procedural law and protecting the client’s rights.
    5. The reframing: Treating a more competent legal aid service as a threat to private practice converts an opportunity to raise professional standards into a demand to remove the comparison.
    6. What the Bar could take from it: The diligence that made LADCs effective is a benchmark for the assigned counsel system rather than a case against it.

    Why does the interim arrangement worry criminal justice practitioners?

    1. What replaces the cadre: Legal aid matters revert to young and relatively inexperienced lawyers assigned through the empanelment route.
    2. What criminal defence actually requires: Case preparation, cross examination, bail and remand advocacy, trial strategy and navigation of the criminal justice system.
    3. Where inexperience costs most: Bail and remand decisions are taken in minutes and determine months of custody, and 1,88,878 of the assigned cases were bail matters.
    4. Who bears the risk: Persons unable to afford private lawyers become the group on whom an untested arrangement is tried.
    5. Effect on pending matters: Ongoing cases change hands mid trial, breaking continuity of representation at the stage where evidence is being recorded.

    Whose interest should prevail when the livelihood of the Bar meets the fair trial right of the accused?

    1. Two genuine claims: Advocates have a legitimate interest in the volume and value of criminal briefs, and the accused has an enforceable constitutional right to competent representation.
    2. Asymmetry of voice: Bar Associations are organised and can make representations to a statutory authority, while indigent accused persons have no comparable channel.
    3. Asymmetry of consequence: A lawyer loses a share of a brief pool, an accused person loses liberty pending trial.
    4. The constitutional tilt: Article 39A and Article 21 place free and competent legal aid as a duty of the State, not as a welfare option to be balanced against professional interest.
    5. What the numbers settle: At 1.6 per cent of criminal institutions, the displacement claim is not supported by the caseload, so the two claims do not actually collide.
    6. What remains unresolved: Even a scheme that survives this objection needs a fair remuneration structure for the wider Bar, which the debate has not addressed.

    Why is the absence of any national assessment the central failure?

    1. No evaluation exists: There has been no national assessment of the LADC system since it was introduced.
    2. What an assessment would measure: Bail success rates, timeliness of appearance, conviction and acquittal patterns and client feedback against the assigned counsel baseline.
    3. The procedural objection: A scheme duly adopted and implemented by a statutory body is being stalled without an evaluation of its impact on ongoing cases.
    4. Evidence displaced by representation: The decision rests on submissions from professional associations rather than on outcome data from the scheme itself.
    5. The correct response to a working model: Where dedicated lawyers, institutional oversight and accountability improve defence quality, the response is to learn from the model rather than dismantle it.

    Challenges to the Legal Aid Defence Counsel system

    1. Contractual insecurity of counsel: Engagement on renewable contracts leaves the cadre vulnerable to a single administrative direction. e.g. the present non renewal order ends the engagement of counsel across India at once.
    2. Remuneration and parity: Salaries have to compete with private practice to retain experienced criminal lawyers. e.g. senior criminal advocates in metropolitan district courts earn multiples of the fixed LADC remuneration.
    3. Case overload per counsel: A small cadre carrying nearly five lakh cases limits time per client. e.g. 1,88,878 bail matters in a year across district offices leaves minutes of preparation for each.
    4. Resistance from the organised Bar: Institutional hostility can block access to court infrastructure and listings. e.g. Bar Associations in four northern States and Union Territories triggered the present direction.
    5. Uneven coverage across districts: The model has not been staffed uniformly, so quality of aid depends on the district. e.g. legal aid uptake remains far weaker in districts without a functioning prison legal aid clinic.
    6. Absence of outcome monitoring: Without published performance data the scheme cannot defend itself. e.g. no national assessment of the LADC system exists even after the scheme completed multiple years.
    7. Awareness deficit among the accused: Many undertrials do not know that free representation is available at remand. e.g. undertrials form about three quarters of India’s prison population, and a large share remain unrepresented at first production.

    Conclusion

    The case against the LADC system rests on a displacement claim that the caseload data does not support, since the cadre handled about 1.6 per cent of criminal cases instituted in a year. The decision to stop renewals was taken on professional representations without any national assessment of what the scheme delivered on bail, timeliness or trial quality. The immediate cost falls on indigent accused persons whose matters revert to inexperienced assigned counsel in the middle of ongoing trials. Reform of remuneration, cadre structure and Bar relations is the answer that the evidence supports, and withdrawal is not.

    What is Free Legal Aid?

    1. About: Free legal aid is the provision of legal services at state expense to persons who cannot afford them, so that access to justice does not depend on ability to pay.
    2. Rationale: An adversarial system delivers a fair result only where both sides are competently represented, and the criminal process places the individual against the resources of the State.
    3. Constitutional basis: Article 39A directs the State to secure equal justice and free legal aid, and the Supreme Court has read it into the fair procedure guarantee of Article 21.
    4. Who is eligible: Women, children, members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, victims of trafficking, persons with disabilities, industrial workmen, persons in custody and those below the prescribed income ceiling.
    5. Delivery structures: Legal aid is delivered through panel advocates, retainer lawyers, front office and legal aid clinics, Lok Adalats and the Legal Aid Defence Counsel system.

    Key Concerns Regarding Free Legal Aid

    1. Quality over availability: The system counts lawyers assigned rather than outcomes achieved, so representation can be nominal.
    2. Late entry into the case: Aid frequently begins after remand, when the most consequential decision on liberty has already been taken.
    3. Low remuneration for panel lawyers: Fees paid per case are modest and delayed, which affects the seniority of lawyers willing to take the work.
    4. Weak monitoring: Legal services institutions have limited capacity to audit the quality of representation their panels provide.
    5. Awareness gap: Eligible persons, especially undertrials and rural litigants, often do not know the entitlement exists.
    6. Fragmented data: Case level outcome data across States is not published in a comparable form, which prevents evaluation of any model.

    Constitutional Framework Governing Free Legal Aid

    1. Article 14: Guarantees equality before the law and equal protection of the laws, the basis for equal access to the courts.
    2. Article 21: Guarantees life and personal liberty through fair procedure, read to include the right to free legal aid for an indigent accused.
    3. Article 22(1): Guarantees the right of an arrested person to consult and to be defended by a legal practitioner of choice.
    4. Article 39A: Directs the State to secure equal justice and to provide free legal aid through suitable legislation or schemes.
    5. Article 32 and Article 226: Provide the remedies through which denial of competent representation is challenged.
    6. Article 38: Directs the State to promote a social order in which justice, social, economic and political, informs all institutions.

    Laws and Rules Governing Legal Aid in India

    1. Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987: Constitutes NALSA, State and District Legal Services Authorities and provides for free legal services and Lok Adalats.
    2. Landmark provision under the 1987 Act: Section 12 lists the categories entitled to legal services as of right, irrespective of income in specified cases.
    3. Legal Services Authorities (Amendment) Act, 2002: Created Permanent Lok Adalats for pre litigation conciliation in public utility services.
    4. NALSA (Free and Competent Legal Services) Regulations, 2010: Prescribe empanelment standards, monitoring committees and the duty to provide competent and not merely nominal representation.
    5. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023: Requires the court to assign a pleader at state expense where the accused has no means to engage one.
    6. Advocates Act, 1961: Governs enrolment, professional conduct and the disciplinary jurisdiction of Bar Councils over advocates.
    7. Mediation Act, 2023: Institutionalises pre litigation mediation and links it to the legal services framework.
    8. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996: Provides the wider alternative dispute resolution framework within which Lok Adalats operate.

    Back2Basics: Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987

    1. Enactment and commencement: Passed in 1987 and brought into force on 9 November 1995.
    2. Administering ministry: The Department of Justice under the Ministry of Law and Justice.
    3. Apex body: NALSA, with the Chief Justice of India as Patron in Chief and the second senior most judge of the Supreme Court as Executive Chairman.
    4. State level: State Legal Services Authorities are headed by the Chief Justice of the High Court as Patron in Chief, with a sitting High Court judge as Executive Chairman.
    5. District and taluk level: District Legal Services Authorities are headed by the District Judge, and Taluk Legal Services Committees by a senior civil judge.
    6. Lok Adalats: The Act gives a Lok Adalat award the status of a civil court decree, which is final and not appealable.
    7. Supreme Court level: The Supreme Court Legal Services Committee provides legal aid for matters before the Supreme Court.

    Government Initiatives

    1. Legal Aid Defence Counsel System: Introduced by NALSA in 2022 to create a salaried public defence office in district legal services authorities.
    2. Tele Law: Connects citizens at Common Service Centres to panel lawyers through video conferencing for pre litigation advice.
    3. Nyaya Bandhu: A pro bono legal services programme linking volunteer advocates to registered applicants through a mobile application.
    4. Legal aid clinics: Village and community level clinics, and clinics inside prisons, staffed by para legal volunteers and panel lawyers.
    5. Under Trial Review Committees: District committees that review the cases of undertrial prisoners eligible for release on bail or on completion of maximum custody.
    6. Designing Innovative Solutions for Holistic Access to Justice (DISHA): The Department of Justice scheme integrating tele law, pro bono services and legal awareness.
    7. Pan India Legal Awareness and Outreach Campaign: NALSA’s nationwide campaign to inform citizens of legal entitlements at the panchayat level.

    Key Facts about Legal Aid in India

    1. National Legal Services Day: Observed on 9 November, the day the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 came into force.
    2. Reach of eligibility: Roughly 80 per cent of India’s population is eligible for free legal aid under the income and category criteria of Section 12.
    3. Landmark ruling on state funded defence: Hussainara Khatoon v State of Bihar (1979) held free legal aid to be part of a fair procedure under Article 21.
    4. Landmark ruling on assignment of counsel: Khatri v State of Bihar (1981) held that the right arises at the first production before the magistrate.
    5. Lok Adalat scale: National Lok Adalats dispose of crores of cases in a single sitting day, mostly pre litigation and compoundable matters.
    6. Custody context: Undertrials form about three quarters of India’s prison population, which is the primary constituency of the LADC system.
    7. Caseload in 2025 to 2026: LADCs were assigned 4,86,354 cases, including 1,88,878 bail cases.

    Challenges in Delivering Free Legal Aid

    1. Representation at the first hearing: Many accused persons face remand without counsel. e.g. prison legal aid clinics do not exist in every district jail, so first production frequently proceeds unrepresented.
    2. Quality of panel advocates: Empanelment is often by seniority or availability rather than by demonstrated competence in criminal defence. e.g. the assigned counsel system has been criticised for missed hearings and delayed applications.
    3. Delayed and low remuneration: Panel fees are modest and payment is slow. e.g. complaints regarding fees paid by the state are a standing feature of the assigned counsel model.
    4. Institutional resistance from the Bar: Reform of the delivery model is contested by organised professional bodies. e.g. Bar Associations in Punjab, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh and Chandigarh triggered the non renewal of LADC contracts.
    5. Absence of outcome measurement: No comparative evaluation exists between delivery models. e.g. no national assessment of the LADC system has been conducted since it began.
    6. Awareness and access: Eligible litigants in rural and tribal areas do not know of the entitlement or how to claim it. e.g. Tele Law was created precisely because pre litigation advice was unavailable at the village level.
    7. Prison overcrowding as the downstream cost: Weak bail advocacy translates into custody. e.g. Indian prisons operate well above sanctioned capacity, driven mainly by undertrial numbers.

    Way Forward

    1. Assess before deciding: Commission a national assessment of the LADC system measuring bail outcomes, appearance timeliness and disposal rates against the assigned counsel model.
    2. Protect ongoing matters: Continue existing engagements until each pending case reaches a natural stage, so representation does not break mid trial.
    3. Give the cadre statutory footing: Convert the LADC office into a permanent public defender structure with secure tenure and a defined career path.
    4. Reform assigned counsel in parallel: Raise panel fees, pay them promptly and empanel on demonstrated criminal defence competence to address the Bar’s underlying grievance.
    5. Cap caseloads: Set a maximum active caseload per counsel so that preparation time per client is protected.
    6. Publish performance data: Release district level legal aid outcome data so that the effectiveness of each model is verifiable.
    7. Guarantee representation at first production: Station legal aid counsel at every remand court and prison so that no accused person is produced unrepresented.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2023, GS2, 10 marks] Who are entitled to receive free legal aid? Assess the role of the National Legal Services Authority(NALSA) in rendering free legal aid in India.”

  • Over 4,000 cases pending against MPs, MLAs: Amicus curiae to SC

    Why in the News

    The 22nd report of the amicus curiae to the Supreme Court records 4,192 criminal cases pending trial against sitting and former Members of Parliament and Members of Legislative Assemblies, with 519 pending for more than a decade. The figure has stayed above 4,000 every year since 2018, through three rounds of Supreme Court directions creating special courts, designated courts and suo motu monitoring. The report therefore shifts the question from what should be ordered to why nine years of orders have not moved the number.

    Who is an amicus curiae?

    1. About: An amicus curiae is a senior lawyer appointed by a court to assist it impartially in a matter, rather than to represent any party before it.
    2. Role here: The amicus in this public interest litigation collects pendency data from every High Court, audits compliance with earlier directions and files periodic reports with recommendations.

    What is a designated court for cases against legislators?

    1. About: A designated court is an existing Sessions or Magisterial court identified in each district to hear criminal cases against sitting and former legislators on priority.
    2. Difference from a special court: A special court is constituted exclusively for such cases, while a designated court continues to carry its ordinary docket alongside them.

    What does the 22nd amicus report record?

    1. Total pendency: 4,192 cases against sitting and former MPs and MLAs are pending trial across the country.
    2. The oldest bracket: 519 cases have been pending for more than a decade.
    3. Cases still under investigation: 700 cases are pending investigation, of which 360 have stayed at that stage for more than three years without a chargesheet.
    4. Source of the data: The figure is drawn from information received from High Courts and their websites, and the High Court websites together show 4,442 pending cases.
    5. A gap in reporting: The Allahabad High Court did not submit a report, so its figure of 1,171 cases is taken from its website as of February 2024.
    6. Reach into high office: Chief Ministers of 14 of 28 States have criminal cases pending trial against them.
    7. Where the case is listed: The matter was referred to a three judge Bench in February 2025 and was listed before that Bench on 18 August.

    What is the full pendency profile in the data?

    1. Cases pending for 5 to 10 years: 754.
    2. Cases pending for 3 to 5 years: 562.
    3. Cases pending for less than 3 years: 1,095.
    4. State wise concentration: Uttar Pradesh leads with 1,171 cases, followed by Kerala at 543, Bihar at 373, Maharashtra at 364 and Odisha at 330.
    5. Chief Ministers facing cases: The Telangana Chief Minister faces the highest number at 89, followed by the West Bengal Chief Minister at 29, the Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh Chief Ministers at 19 each and the Kerala Chief Minister at 18.
    6. The trend line: Pendency rose from 4,075 in December 2018 to 5,140 in November 2022 before settling at 4,192 in July 2026, remaining above 4,000 throughout.
    7. Scale in the sitting Houses: 251 of 543 members of the Lok Sabha and 75 of 233 members of the Rajya Sabha have criminal cases against them.
    8. Data caveat: The cut off dates for the State figures vary, so the totals are indicative rather than a single day snapshot.

    What has the Supreme Court already directed since 2017?

    1. Special courts in 2017: The Court ordered the setting up of 12 special courts in 10 States and Union Territories for speedy trial of criminal cases involving legislators.
    2. Designated courts in December 2018: It directed that one designated Sessions Court and one designated Magisterial Court be identified in every district to try such cases on priority.
    3. Suo motu monitoring in November 2023: It directed the Chief Justices of all High Courts to register suo motu cases to monitor early disposal and empowered special benches to issue directions for expeditious trial.
    4. Reference in February 2025: The matter went to a three judge Bench after an earlier amicus report flagged the absence of effective monitoring by most High Courts.
    5. The outcome so far: Pendency has remained at roughly the same level across all three rounds of directions.

    Why has pendency stayed above 4,000 since 2018?

    1. Designated courts carry ordinary work: Courts identified for legislators’ cases continue to handle their regular judicial docket, so priority exists on paper only.
    2. Repeated adjournments: Hearings are deferred at the instance of parties without effective cost or consequence.
    3. Non appearance of accused persons: Accused legislators fail to appear on listed dates, and the trial cannot proceed in their absence.
    4. Delays in securing witnesses: Witnesses are not produced on the dates fixed, breaking the continuity of evidence.
    5. Inadequate High Court monitoring: Most High Courts have not run the suo motu monitoring the Court ordered in November 2023.

    What does the amicus recommend?

    1. Exclusive trials: Designated courts should conduct trials involving lawmakers exclusively until their backlog is cleared.
    2. Day to day hearing: Cases pending for more than three years should be heard on a day to day basis.
    3. Non bailable warrants: Courts should issue non bailable warrants where an accused lawmaker fails to appear on two consecutive dates.
    4. Nodal prosecution officer: A nodal prosecution officer should be appointed to secure the attendance of witnesses.
    5. Real time data upload: Case data and order sheets should be uploaded in real time on High Court websites.
    6. Trial within one year: Trials should be completed within one year of the framing of charges.
    7. Monthly monitoring: High Courts should monitor cases pending for more than three years every month.
    8. Micro monitoring: Individual delayed cases should be tracked separately rather than only in aggregate.

    Does prioritising legislators’ cases sit comfortably with equal treatment of all undertrials?

    1. Two competing claims: Legislators exercise public power and merit faster scrutiny, while ordinary undertrials suffer longer custody and have a stronger claim under Article 21.
    2. Fixed judicial capacity: Exclusive trials for legislators redirect court time within an unchanged pool of judges, so another category of case slows down.
    3. The trigger for priority: A legislator’s continuation in office turns on conviction under Section 8 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, which no ordinary accused faces.
    4. Delay as a strategy: Prolonged trial protects the incumbent, so the beneficiary of delay is the accused who holds power.
    5. Why the equality objection is limited: The priority attaches to the office and its power over the criminal justice system, not to the person’s status as a citizen.
    6. The unresolved part: Neither the special courts of 2017 nor the designated courts of 2018 came with additional judges, so the priority was ordered without the capacity to deliver it.

    Challenges to expeditious trial of legislators

    1. No additional judicial capacity: Priority was mandated without creating new posts. e.g. the 2017 order created only 12 special courts across 10 States and Union Territories for a national caseload above 4,000.
    2. Investigation stalling before trial: A case never reaches the designated court if the chargesheet is not filed. e.g. 360 cases have stayed under investigation for more than three years without a chargesheet.
    3. Prosecutorial dependence on the executive: Public Prosecutors are appointed by State governments that the accused may lead. e.g. Chief Ministers of 14 of 28 States face pending criminal cases.
    4. Witness hostility and intimidation: Witnesses turn hostile where the accused holds local power. e.g. India still has no operational witness protection framework beyond the 2018 scheme approved in Mahender Chawla v Union of India.
    5. Withdrawal of prosecution: Section 360 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 permits withdrawal with the court’s consent. e.g. Uttar Pradesh moved to withdraw a large batch of political cases in 2020, prompting High Court scrutiny.
    6. Inconsistent High Court reporting: Monitoring cannot work without uniform data. e.g. the Allahabad High Court, holding the largest caseload at 1,171, did not submit a report at all.
    7. Conviction does not follow speed: Faster trials do not by themselves improve the quality of investigation. e.g. pendency fell from 5,140 in November 2022 to 4,192 in July 2026 without any recorded rise in convictions.

    Conclusion

    The report shows an institutional pattern rather than a backlog problem, since pendency has stayed above 4,000 through three separate rounds of Supreme Court directions since 2017. Priority listing without additional judges, an independent prosecution and enforceable attendance simply redistributes delay. The matter now stands listed before a three judge Bench of the Supreme Court on 18 August, where the amicus has sought exclusive trials, day to day hearing of cases older than three years and completion of trial within one year of charge framing. The number to watch after that hearing is the count of cases older than a decade, currently 519.

    “[2024, GS2, 15 marks] Explain the reasons for the growth of public interest litigation in India. As a result of it, has the Indian Supreme Court emerged as the world’s most powerful judiciary?”