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GS Paper: GS2

  • Delhi High Court’s ANI v OpenAI ruling offers a better path on copyright and AI than a training licensing regime

    Why in the News?

    The Delhi High Court’s ruling in ANI v OpenAI, addressing technological neutrality and the research exemption, offers a framework for copyright and AI. At the same time, there is a growing criticism about the Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade (DPIIT) committee’s proposed AI training licensing regime as potentially harmful to innovation.

    What did the Delhi High Court’s ANI v OpenAI ruling establish?

    1. Technological neutrality: The ruling applies existing copyright principles to AI training without creating a separate, more restrictive legal category just because the technology involved is new.
    2. Research exemption: The ruling recognises a research exemption relevant to how AI systems process copyrighted content during training, rather than treating every instance of AI training on copyrighted material as infringement by default.

    How is the DPIIT new hybrid licensing system (One Nation – One License – One Payment) different from the Delhi High Court (ANI v OpenAI) judgment?

    1. DPIIT Proposal: AI seeks to bring in a statutory licensing mechanism that requires companies to pay compensation (royalties) to content creators through a centralized government system.
    2. Delhi High Court verdict: The court in its latest order refused to impose any strict or prior licensing norms, stating that AI training can be considered ‘fair dealing’ (under research purposes).

    Why does the proposed licensing regime as a step backward?

    1. Compliance burden: A mandatory AI training licensing regime would require AI developers to negotiate and pay for licenses before training on copyrighted content, raising the cost of building AI systems in India.
    2. Innovation chilling effect: Smaller AI developers and startups, unable to absorb licensing costs at the scale large technology companies can, would face a higher barrier to entry than the court’s technological neutrality approach imposes.
    3. Inconsistency with the ruling: A DPIIT-driven licensing regime would move policy in a more restrictive direction than the judiciary’s own reading of technological neutrality and the research exemption, creating a mismatch between executive rule making and judicial precedent.

    Conclusion

    The Delhi High Court’s ANI v OpenAI ruling offers a workable copyright and AI framework built on existing legal principles rather than new restrictions. DPIIT’s proposed licensing regime would discard that workable framework in favour of a compliance heavy structure that risks innovation without a clear corresponding gain for rights holders.

    Back2Basics

    The Proposed Licensing system by DPIIT:

    The Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade (DPIIT) proposed a new hybrid licensing systemin December 2025 called “One Nation – One License – One Payment”. Its main purpose is to strike a balance between creators’ rights and technological innovation on the use of copyrighted content for artificial intelligence (AI) training.

    The important aspects and provisions of this proposed policy are as follows:

    Mandatory Blanket License

    1. Data usage rights: AI developers can use any copyrighted content that is legally accessible (for example, freely available online) to train their models without seeking separate permission. [1, 2]
    2. No Opt-Out: Content creators or organizations do not have the right to opt-out of having their content used for AI training.

    Royalty Structure

    1. Payment after commercialization: AI developers do not have to pay any fees upfront. Royalties apply only after the AI ​​tool or product starts generating revenue commercially.
    2. Centralized Body: The government will set up a non-profit centralized nodal agency called “Copyright Royalties Collective for AI Training” (CRCAT) to collect royalties and distribute them to copyright holders .
    3. Pricing: Royalty rates are determined independently by a special expert committee appointed by the government

    Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade (DPIIT)

    1. It is a Union government department under the Ministry of Commerce and Industry.
    2. It is responsible for industrial policy, including the committee that proposed the AI training licensing regime referenced here.

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2024] What is the present world scenario of intellectual property rights with respect to life materials? Although India is second in the world to file patents, still only a few have been commercialized. Explain the reasons behind this less commercialization.

    Linkage: The PYQ examines India’s intellectual property rights framework and the balance between protection of intellectual property and innovation. The article discusses whether India’s copyright framework should promote AI innovation through existing legal principles or impose a mandatory licensing regime. It highlights the broader challenge of designing an IPR regime that protects creators without discouraging technological innovation.

  • Political executive control over Delhi Police under Article 239AA comes under fresh scrutiny

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court is hearing petitions on the police crackdown during the NEET protest. The case has brought attention to the political control over the Delhi Police under Article 239AA and renewed debate on police independence in light of the Ramlila Maidan and Prakash Singh judgments.

    What does Article 239AA provide for policing in Delhi?

    1. Definition: Article 239AA, inserted by the 69th Amendment Act, 1991, gives Delhi a Legislative Assembly and Council of Ministers but excludes police, public order and land from the elected government’s jurisdiction, keeping them with the Union government.
    2. Effect: Delhi Police answers to the Union Ministry of Home Affairs rather than the elected Delhi government, unlike police forces in full states.
    3. Ramlila Maidan precedent: The Supreme Court’s Ramlila Maidan ruling addressed the limits of police force against a peaceful assembly, a precedent invoked whenever Delhi Police’s crowd control conduct is questioned.
    4. Prakash Singh precedent: The Prakash Singh v Union of India ruling laid down police reform directions aimed at insulating police from political direction, directions Delhi Police’s Union government control tests differently than in the states.

    Why does this arrangement resurface during the NEET protest crackdown hearing?

    1. Command versus accountability: Delhi Police’s actions during the NEET protest crackdown are being scrutinised even though the elected Delhi government has no command authority over the force to answer for its conduct.
    2. Union political exposure: Because Delhi Police reports to the Union Home Ministry, its conduct during politically sensitive protests places the central government, not the local elected government, in direct line of accountability.

    Conclusion

    Article 239AA’s exclusion of police from Delhi’s elected government means every controversial policing decision in the capital, including the NEET protest crackdown, becomes a Union government accountability question by constitutional design. The Supreme Court’s hearing will test whether the Ramlila Maidan and Prakash Singh standards can be enforced within this centralised command structure

    Back2Basics

    Article 239AA:

    1. It was inserted by the 69th Constitutional Amendment Act, 1991.
    2. It grants Delhi a special Union Territory status with an elected Assembly, while reserving police, public order and land for the Union Government.

    Prakash Singh v. Union of India:

    It is a landmark 2006 Supreme Court of India public interest litigation judgment that issued seven binding directives to reform police forces, ensure fixed tenures for top officials, and insulate law enforcement from political control.

    Key Directives of the Judgment

    1. State Security Commission: Set up a body to check that state governments do not exercise unwarranted influence over the police.
    2. Fixed Tenure for DGP: Give the Director General of Police a minimum stable tenure of two years regardless of their retirement date.
    3. Fixed Tenure for Officers: Ensure field-level police officers (like SPs and SHOs) have a minimum two-year tenure on their postings.
    4. Separation of Functions: Separate the investigation of crime from day-to-day law and order duties.
    5. Police Establishment Board: Create a board to handle transfers, postings, and promotions for junior officers.
    6. Police Complaints Authority: Establish independent state and district bodies to handle public complaints against police misconduct.
    7. National Security Commission: Form a federal panel to pick and manage top-tier police standards at the national level.

  • The urban nightmare: a fire with no escape 

    Why in the News?

    Repeated urban fire tragedies, in Lucknow and Delhi, are rooted in illegal construction, weak enforcement, and fragmented urban local governance. There is a growing need of empowering local bodies as the structural fix.

    Why do fire tragedies keep recurring despite each one prompting an inquiry?

    1. Illegal construction persists: Buildings that violate fire safety norms continue to be built and occupied because enforcement action rarely follows a violation before a tragedy occurs.
    2. Fragmented authority: Fire safety clearance, building plan approval, and municipal enforcement are split across different agencies, none of which holds end to end accountability for a building’s safety compliance.
    3. Post-tragedy pattern: Each fire triggers an inquiry and short term crackdown, but enforcement lapses again once public attention moves on, indicating the response is reactive rather than preventive.
    4. Weak local body capacity: Urban local bodies, the level of government closest to individual buildings, lack the staffing and financial autonomy to conduct sustained enforcement.

    How does fragmented urban governance weaken accountability?

    1. Multiple agencies: Urban functions are divided among municipal corporations, development authorities, water boards, PWDs and transport agencies.
    2. No single authority: Responsibility is dispersed, making accountability difficult after disasters.
    3. Weak Urban Local Bodies: Municipal corporations have responsibilities but limited administrative and financial powers.
    4. State dominance: Major urban decisions remain under State governments rather than elected city governments.
    5. Governance vacuum: Citizens face one government, but responsibility is split among several agencies.

    Why is empowering Urban Local Bodies more important than launching new schemes?

    1. Constitutional basis: The 74th Constitutional Amendment, 1992 envisages democratic and empowered urban governance.
    2. Authority mismatch: Local bodies have functions but lack adequate powers and resources.
    3. Professional management: Cities require specialised urban planning and enforcement capacity.
    4. Clear accountability: One authority must be responsible for urban safety and regulation.
    5. Fearless enforcement: Building and fire safety laws must be insulated from political influence.

    Conclusion

    Illegal construction and weak enforcement are the proximate causes, but fragmented urban local governance is the structural one, since no single empowered local authority is accountable for preventing violations before they turn fatal. Empowering urban local bodies with real enforcement authority and resources is the fix the piece argues has been avoided.

    Back2Basics

    International fire safety and urban risk management rely on universally recognized frameworks and codes established by global organizations. These function as the benchmark for local building laws worldwide.

    Global Core Frameworks

    1. IFSS-CP (International Fire Safety Standards – Common Principles): Developed by a global coalition and published by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), this framework provides a benchmark for life safety. It sets 5 Universal Pillars for building design and management:
      1. Prevention: Minimizing ignition risks.
      2. Detection and Communication: Fast warning systems.
      3. Occupant Protection: Safe, unhindered evacuation routes.
      4. Containment: Sectioning buildings with fire-resistant barriers to stop spread.
      5. Extinguishment: Active suppression systems (sprinklers/suppression).
    2. ISO Fire Safety Standards: The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) sets global rules for equipment and risk management. This includes ISO 7240 (fire detection/alarm systems) and ISO 31000 (integrating systemic risk management directly into urban planning).

    Widely Adopted National/Model Codes

    Many countries explicitly adopt or adapt established model codes into their local municipal bylaws:

    1. NFPA Codes (USA): Developed by the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), these are the most globally replicated fire codes.
      • NFPA 1 (Fire Code): Total oversight rules governing building safety, hazardous materials, and structural fire protection.
      • NFPA 101 (Life Safety Code): The absolute blueprint for building design, specifying safe egress, travel distances to exits, and minimum corridor widths based on occupancy types.
    2. International Building Code (IBC): Published by the International Code Council (ICC), the IBC integrates strict structural engineering rules with active fire protection. It mandates specific automatic sprinkler thresholds (NFPA 13 standards) depending on building height and density.
    3. British Standards (UK): BS 9999 is an international code of practice for fire safety in building design and management. It uses a flexible, risk-based approach that balances architectural design with automated safety measures.

    PYQ RELEVANCE

    [UPSC 2020] The strength and sustenance of local institutions in India has shifted from their formative phase of ‘Functions, Functionaries and Funds’ to the contemporary stage of ‘Functionality’. Highlight the critical challenges faced by local institutions in terms of their functionality in recent times.

    Linkage: The PYQ examines whether Urban Local Bodies have the functional capacity and accountability to deliver effective urban governance. The article argues that repeated urban fire disasters stem from fragmented governance, weak Urban Local Bodies, poor inter-agency coordination, and lack of accountability, showing that the real challenge is the functionality of urban institutions rather than the absence of laws.

  • Protecting protest: on mass protests

    Why in the News?

    The Supreme Court is hearing petitions on alleged excessive police force during recent protests, while the CJI’s remarks on protests requiring due permission have sparked debate. The case has also revived the question of whether public inconvenience caused by peaceful protests should be conflated with violence, and the need for a national protocol on crowd-control measures.

    Why does conflating inconvenience with violence weaken the right to protest?

    1. Legal standard blurred: Treating traffic disruption or public inconvenience as equivalent to violence lowers the threshold at which force can be used against a peaceful gathering.
    2. Judicial remark’s weight: A “due permission” framing from the Chief Justice of India carries institutional weight that can shape how lower courts and police read the limits of Article 19(1)(b), the right to assemble peaceably.
    3. Precedent tension: Existing case law distinguishes disruptive but peaceful assembly from violent assembly, and collapsing that distinction narrows the constitutional space for protest.

    What does the absence of a national crowd control protocol expose?

    1. No uniform threshold: Without a national protocol, the force threshold used against protestors varies by state and by individual police commander’s judgment.
    2. Accountability gap: No standard mechanism currently holds police accountable for disproportionate force used to disperse a protest deemed merely inconvenient.
    3. Comparative absence: Other democracies operationalise proportionality standards for crowd control through documented use of force continuums, a structure India’s policing framework lacks in codified form.

    Conclusion

    Peaceful protests that cause public inconvenience should not be treated the same as violent acts. A national crowd-control protocol with clear rules on the use of force and strong accountability can help protect both the right to protest and public order.

    Back2Basics

    The right to protest in India is an implied fundamental right derived from Article 19(1)(a) (freedom of speech and expression) and Article 19(1)(b) (freedom to assemble peaceably and without arms) of the Constitution of India.

    Constitutional Basis and Rules

    1. No Absolute Right: Protests must remain completely peaceful and unarmed.
    2. Reasonable Restrictions: Under Articles 19(2) and 19(3), the state can limit protests to protect the sovereignty and integrity of India, security of the state, and public order.
    3. No Blocking Roads: The Supreme Court has ruled that public ways and spaces cannot be permanently blocked or occupied, balancing protester rights with public movement.

    Legal Obligations and Permissions

    1. Prior Permission: Organizers must generally seek local police or municipal permissions to hold public gatherings or marches.
    2. Designated Spaces: Authorities often restrict demonstrations to specific assigned areas (like designated grounds or parks) to prevent traffic and safety hazards.
    3. Police Action Limits: Courts maintain that mere assembly or peaceful agitation does not justify excessive police force or lathi-charges.

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2022] Right of movement and residence throughout the territory of India are freely available to the Indian citizens, but these rights are not absolute. Comment.

    Linkage: The PYQ tests the scope of Fundamental Rights under Article 19 and reasonable restrictions. The editorial examines the limits of the right to peaceful protest under Article 19, and whether restrictions on protests satisfy the test of proportionality.

  • Cauvery Water Regulation Committee directs Karnataka to release 3,500 cusecs a day to Tamil Nadu

    Why in the news?

    The Cauvery Water Regulation Committee (CWRC) has directed Karnataka to release 3,500 cusecs of water per day for 15 days to Tamil Nadu amid drought conditions. Meanwhile, the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister has urged the Prime Minister to review the Centre’s stand on the proposed Mekedatu Dam project, further intensifying the inter-state water dispute.

    Key Highlights

    • CWRC directive: Karnataka has been directed to release 3,500 cusecs per day for 15 days to Tamil Nadu.
    • Reason: The order was issued due to drought conditions and the need to ensure downstream water availability.
    • Parallel dispute: Tamil Nadu has sought a review of the Centre’s position on the Mekedatu Dam project proposed by Karnataka.
    • Possible appeal: Karnataka may challenge the CWRC’s direction before the Cauvery Water Management Authority (CWMA).

    About the Cauvery River

    • Originates at Talakaveri in the Brahmagiri Hills, Karnataka.
    • Flows through Karnataka, Tamil Nadu and Puducherry, with a small catchment in Kerala.
    • Empties into the Bay of Bengal.
    • Total length is about 805 km.
    • Left-bank: Harangi, Hemavathi, Shimsha, Arkavathi.
    • Right-bank: Kabini, Bhavani, Noyyal and Amaravathi.

    Cauvery Water Management Mechanism

    Cauvery Water Management Authority (CWMA)

    • Constituted in 2018 under the Ministry of Jal Shakti.
    • Implements the Supreme Court’s 2018 judgment on Cauvery water sharing.
    • Supervises reservoir operations and ensures implementation of water-sharing arrangements.

    Cauvery Water Regulation Committee (CWRC)

    • Functions under the CWMA.
    • Monitors reservoir levels, rainfall and inflows.
    • Recommends monthly water releases among basin States.

    What is the Mekedatu Project?

    • Proposed by Karnataka on the Cauvery River near Mekedatu.
    • Intended to provide drinking water to Bengaluru and generate hydroelectric power.
    • Tamil Nadu opposes the project, arguing that it could affect downstream water availability and violate the Supreme Court’s allocation.

    Constitutional and Legal Provisions

    • Article 262: Empowers Parliament to legislate on inter-State river water disputes.
    • Inter-State River Water Disputes Act, 1956: Provides for adjudication of river water disputes through tribunals.
    • Supreme Court Judgment (2018): Modified the Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal award and directed the establishment of the CWMA.

    “[2013, GS2, 10 marks] Constitutional mechanisms to resolve the inter-state water disputes have failed to address and solve the problems. Is the failure due to structural or process inadequacy or both? Discuss.”

    [2020] Which of the following Protected Areas are located in Cauvery basin?

    1.Nagarhole National Park
    2.Papikonda National Park
    3.Sathyamangalam Tiger Reserve
    4.Wayanad Wildlife Sanctuary

    Select the correct answer using the code given below:
    a) 1 and 2 only
    b) 3 and 4 only
    c) 1, 3 and 4 only
    d) 1, 2, 3 and 4

  • India’s strategic thinking should shift from border “geography” to a “geometry of interests”

    Why in the News

    India’s strategic thinking should shift from a border centric “geography” view to a broader “geometry of interests” spanning the Gulf, Central Asia, the Indo-Pacific and maritime domains.

    Why is a border centric strategic view seen as inadequate?

    1. Narrow threat framing: A geography centric view concentrates strategic attention on land borders with Pakistan and China, underweighting maritime and extended neighbourhood interests.
    2. Expanding interest map: India’s energy security, diaspora, and trade interests in the Gulf, Central Asia and the Indo-Pacific now carry strategic weight comparable to border security concerns.
    3. Maritime domain gap: A geography first framing has historically under-prioritised India’s maritime domain, despite its growing dependence on sea lanes for energy and trade.

    Conclusion

    The central idea is that India’s strategic doctrine has not kept pace with the expansion of its actual interests beyond its land borders. A “geometry of interests” framing would reallocate strategic attention toward the Gulf, Central Asia, the Indo-Pacific and maritime domains in proportion to their real weight in India’s security and economic interests.

  • NCRB data shows chronic pendency under the National Honour Act, even as government moves to add Vande Mataram

    Why in the News?

    National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) data spanning 2014 to 2024 on the Prevention of Insults to National Honour Act, 1971 shows pendency above 90% and a conviction rate below 16%. The government is simultaneously pushing an amendment to criminalise insult to Vande Mataram on par with the national anthem, despite the existing law’s poor enforcement record.

    What is the Prevention of Insults to National Honour Act, 1971?

    1. The Prevention of Insults to National Honour Act, 1971 is an Indian law that bans the burning, mutilation, destruction, or disrespect of the national flag, the Constitution, and the national anthem.

    Key Rules and Penalties

    1. National Flag and Constitution: Section 2 prohibits burning, damaging, defacing, or showing disrespect to the flag or Constitution in any public place.
    2. National Anthem: Section 3 penalizes anyone who stops people from singing the national anthem or creates a disturbance during it.
    3. Punishment: Violations are punishable by up to three years in prison, a fine, or both. Repeat offenders face a minimum prison term of one year.
    4. Exceptions: Peaceful or lawful criticism aimed at changing or amending the Constitution or flag does not count as a crime

    Why does the enforcement record complicate the case for expanding the law?

    1. Pendency scale: Over 90% of cases registered under the Act between 2014 and 2024 remain pending, indicating a chronic backlog rather than an occasional delay.
    2. Low conviction: A conviction rate below 16% suggests weak evidentiary standards, prosecutorial capacity constraints, or both, in cases actually brought to trial.
    3. Expansion without fixing enforcement: Adding Vande Mataram to the Act’s protected symbols expands what the law covers without addressing why the existing provisions on the national anthem and flag are so poorly enforced.
    4. Symbolic versus functional legislation: A law with a sub-16% conviction rate functions more as a symbolic statement of state intent than as an operative deterrent.

    Conclusion

    The government’s push to expand the Prevention of Insults to National Honour Act, 1971 proceeds without addressing why the existing law convicts fewer than one in six prosecuted cases. Enforcement capacity, not statutory scope, is the constraint the amendment leaves unaddressed.

      Back2Basics

      The Prevention of Insults to National Honour (Amendment) Bill, 2026:

      1. It is a legislative proposal introduced in the Rajya Sabha on July 24, 2026. It amends the Prevention of Insults to National Honour Act, 1971, to extend statutory protection to India’s national song, Vande Mataram.

      Key Provisions

      1. Inclusion of the National Song: Amends Section 3 of the 1971 Act to place Vande Mataram under the same legal umbrella as the national anthem, Jana Gana Mana.
      2. Offenses Covered: Criminalizes intentionally preventing the singing of the national song or causing a disturbance at an assembly engaged in its rendition.
      3. Penalties: Proposes imprisonment for up to three years, a monetary fine, or both for first-time offenders, and a mandatory minimum of one year in prison for subsequent convictions

    1. West Bengal strips panchayat pradhans of registration and cheque signing powers, reopening the devolution debate

      Why in the News

      West Bengal Government has stripped elected panchayat pradhans of birth and death registration powers and cheque signing authority, transferring them to bureaucrats. The state cites the need to curb corruption after the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) exercise, but the move raises questions about devolution of powers to elected local bodies.

      Why does shifting these powers to bureaucrats raise a devolution question?

      1. Constitutional mandate: The 73rd Amendment Act, 1992 envisages panchayats as institutions of local self-government with functional autonomy, not merely implementing agencies for state bureaucrats.
      2. Elected versus appointed authority: Registration and cheque signing powers are everyday functions through which an elected pradhan exercises visible authority over local administration, and removing them shifts real power to an appointed official.
      3. Corruption justification: The stated reason, curbing corruption, does not explain why oversight rather than outright transfer of power was not chosen as the remedy.
      4. Precedent risk: A state government’s ability to strip elected local body powers by executive order, without a corresponding law reform process, sets a precedent other states could follow.

      Conclusion

      The central idea is that a corruption justification is being used to recentralise powers that the 73rd Amendment Act, 1992 assigned to elected local government. Whether West Bengal reverses this transfer, or other states adopt the same approach, will determine if devolution in India remains a one way commitment or a reversible administrative choice.

      Back2Basics

      Devolution of powers under the 73rd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1992: Functional Devolution (The 3 Fs [Functions, Funds, and Functionaries] and Eleventh Schedule)

      1. 29 Subjects: Article 243-G empowers state legislatures to devolve responsibilities to Panchayats for economic development and social justice across 29 areas listed in the Eleventh Schedule (such as agriculture, drinking water, health and sanitation, and primary education).
      2. The “3 Fs” Challenge: Real devolution relies on transferring Functions (the tasks), Funds (the money), and Functionaries (the administrative staff).
      3. State Discretion: Because local government is a state subject, actual transfer of these powers depends entirely on individual state laws rather than automatic constitutional enforcement.

      Institutional and Financial Framework

      1. Three-Tier System: Established a uniform structure of Panchayats at the village (Gram Panchayat), intermediate (Block/Taluk Panchayat), and district (Zilla Panchayat) levels.
      2. Gram Sabha: Positioned as the foundational base comprising all registered voters in a village area to ensure direct local oversight and social audit.
      3. State Finance Commission (SFC): Mandated the creation of an SFC every five years to recommend tax assignments, tolls, fees, and grants-in-aid to improve local fiscal autonomy.

      PYQ Relevance

      [UPSC 2023] ‘The states in India seem reluctant to empower urban local bodies both functionally as well as financially.’ Comment.”

      Linkage: The PYQ tests the extent of functional and financial devolution to local bodies. The article highlights the rollback of Panchayat powers, reflecting weak implementation of the 73rd Amendment.

    2. India’s “almost great power” status collides with domestic polarisation and stalled reform

      Why in the News

      India’s “almost great power” status is assessed against domestic political polarisation and stalled economic reforms. The piece argues these widen the gap between India’s geopolitical ambition and its material capability.

      Why does the gap between ambition and capability persist?

      1. Reform stall: Structural economic reforms needed to sustain great power level growth rates have slowed, limiting the material base India’s geopolitical ambitions depend on.
      2. Domestic polarisation: Political polarisation at home diverts governance bandwidth and consensus building capacity away from the sustained reform effort great power status requires.
      3. Capability versus signalling: India’s diplomatic signalling of great power ambition has outpaced the material capability, in economic scale and military modernisation, needed to back that signalling consistently.

      Conclusion

      The central idea is that India’s great power ambition is a signalling exercise running ahead of the material capability domestic reform stagnation and polarisation have failed to build. Closing the gap requires resuming the reform effort at home, not further diplomatic signalling abroad.

    3. CBSE On Screen Marking crisis exposes gaps in evaluation transparency

      Why in the News

      The Central Board of Secondary Education’s On Screen Marking system left roughly 18 lakh Class XII students unable to access their evaluated answer scripts, with only about 4 lakh managing to view them. The Supreme Court has flagged this as a source of frustration of young minds, exposing a gap between the Board’s digital evaluation push and its duty to let students verify their own results.

      What is On Screen Marking (OSM)?

      1. Definition: On Screen Marking is a digital evaluation method where scanned answer scripts are marked by examiners on a screen instead of on paper.
      2. Objective: The Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSE) adopted it to standardise evaluation and speed up result processing.
      3. Access problem: Students are meant to view their own scanned, marked scripts after results, but the current system does not guarantee this access at scale.
      4. CIC role: The Central Information Commission (CIC) had already advised CBSE to frame a standard operating procedure (SOP) for script access before this crisis became public.

      Why has script access broken down for most students?

      1. Capacity gap: The Board built a system that could evaluate scripts digitally but did not build matching capacity to let all students retrieve their own scripts afterward.
      2. Verification denied: Without script access, students cannot check whether their marks were recorded and totalled correctly.
      3. Court intervention: The Supreme Court’s intervention signals that the current process fails a basic due process test for an examination body.
      4. Trust deficit: The gap between the promise of a transparent digital system and the reality of restricted access has deepened student distrust in board evaluation.

      What are the challenges to CBSE’s On Screen Marking system?

      1. Server capacity: Providing 18 lakh students simultaneous access to scanned scripts requires infrastructure the Board has not demonstrated it has built.
      2. Re-evaluation load: A universal access policy will likely increase re-evaluation requests, straining CBSE’s examination machinery further.
      3. Accountability gap: No fixed timeline currently binds CBSE to release scripts or resolve discrepancies once a student flags one.
      4. Precedent for other boards: State boards using similar digital evaluation systems face the same access question, but have no shared standard to follow.
      5. Data security: Wider script access at scale raises the risk of manipulation or leakage of evaluation data if access controls are weak.

      What are the Core Safeguards Used Globally?

      1. Item-Level Marking: Slicing whole papers into isolated questions, sending each question to a different subject specialist to minimize bias or fatigue.
      2. Seed Scripts: Silently injecting pre-marked test scripts into an evaluator’s queue; failing to match the benchmark locks the user out for recalibration.
      3. Centralized Tracking: Real-time dashboards tracking marker progress, turnaround times, and statistical consistency across distributed pools.

      Conclusion

      The central issue is not the shift to digital evaluation itself but the absence of a guaranteed, time bound right for students to view their own scripts. A proposed seven day transparency framework standard operating procedure would fix the access gap, but only if CBSE is bound to a deadline rather than treating disclosure as discretionary.

      PYQ Relevance

      [UPSC 2020] National Education Policy 2020 is in conformity with the Sustainable Development Goal-4 (2030). It intends to restructure and reorient education system in India. Critically examine the statement.

      Linkage: The PYQ evaluates reforms aimed at improving quality, equity and governance in education. The OSM controversy underscores that digital reforms in education must be accompanied by transparency, accountability and robust grievance redressal to achieve quality education.