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GS Paper: GS2

  • India, Japan sign maritime security pact to deepen defence cooperation

    Why in the News

    India and Japan signed a Memorandum of Arrangement on Maritime Security Cooperation on 20 August 2026, after bilateral talks between the two Defence Ministers in New Delhi. The arrangement converts a relationship built on periodic exercises into a standing operational framework covering maritime domain awareness, logistics access and ship repair. It also opens naval shipbuilding and design to joint development, moving the partnership from equipment transfer towards co-production.

    What is the Memorandum of Arrangement on Maritime Security Cooperation?

    1. Nature of the instrument: A Memorandum of Arrangement is a signed framework document recording the agreed areas of cooperation between two defence establishments. It creates a standing basis for activity without the binding force of a treaty.
    2. Parties it links: The arrangement connects the Indian Navy with the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force.

    What is Maritime Domain Awareness?

    1. Definition: Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) is the effective understanding of everything in the maritime space that affects security, safety, economy or the environment. It rests on tracking, identifying and sharing information on vessel movements.
    2. Why it is built with partners: No single navy can watch an entire ocean, so MDA depends on pooling radar, satellite and automatic identification system feeds across countries.

    What are Sea Lines of Communication?

    1. Definition: Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) are the primary maritime routes along which trade, energy and naval forces move between ports. Disruption of a SLOC affects supply rather than territory.
    2. Why they are defended jointly: A SLOC crosses several jurisdictions and the high seas, so its protection depends on coordinated patrolling and port access rather than any one state’s territorial control.

    What is the UNICORN antenna system?

    1. What it is: UNICORN is a Japanese shipborne integrated communications antenna system that houses multiple antennas inside a single composite mast. It lowers a warship’s radar cross section by removing external antenna clutter.

    What is ATLA?

    1. Full form and role: The Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency (ATLA) is Japan’s defence procurement and technology development body under its Ministry of Defense. It is the counterpart to India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) for joint technology work.

    What is the Japan India Special Strategic and Global Partnership?

    1. The label: It is the highest tier of India’s bilateral relationships, adopted in 2014, under which defence, economic and technology cooperation between the two countries is organised.

    What does the arrangement operationally commit the two navies to?

    1. Information sharing: The two sides agreed to deepen operational cooperation through information sharing, naval exercises, ship repair and logistics support.
    2. Maritime domain awareness and rescue: The framework covers maritime domain awareness, search and rescue, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief between the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force and the Indian Navy.
    3. Protection of sea lanes: The Ministers agreed to strengthen coordination for the protection of Sea Lines of Communications through reciprocal naval visits, joint exercises, and personnel and subject matter expert exchanges.
    4. Logistics and port access: Logistical support was extended to include access to ports and maintenance and repair facilities.
    5. Mine countermeasures: The two countries will move towards greater cooperation in mine countermeasures.

    How does the partnership move beyond equipment transfer into co-development?

    1. Naval shipbuilding and design: The two sides will explore joint development in naval shipbuilding and design, leveraging Japan’s technological expertise and India’s production capabilities.
    2. Make in India framework: They will discuss greater use of India’s shipbuilding capabilities under the Make in India framework.
    3. Reciprocal ship repair: Both countries will work towards reciprocal provision of ship repair facilities.
    4. First equipment marker: The shipborne UNICORN integrated communications antenna system was identified as the symbol of the growing defence equipment partnership, with a commitment to its early realisation.
    5. Research and industry channels: DRDO and ATLA will deepen cooperation in advanced defence technologies, and a Defence Industry Forum will be convened.

    What does the expansion of joint exercises signal about interoperability?

    1. Existing exercise set: The Ministers welcomed the expansion of bilateral military exercises, including Dharma Guardian and the Japan India Maritime Exercise (JIMEX), the two navies’ bilateral maritime exercise.
    2. Veer Guardian 26: The planned Veer Guardian 26 air exercise will see Japanese fighter aircraft participate in an exercise in India for the first time.
    3. Greater complexity: The two sides agreed to enhance the complexity of bilateral exercises rather than repeat existing formats.
    4. Unmanned systems and short notice drills: They agreed to integrate unmanned systems and to explore short notice joint exercises, which test readiness rather than choreography.
    5. Special forces and theatre commands: The two countries will promote exchanges between their Special Operations Forces and pursue cooperation with India’s integrated theatre commands after their establishment.

    What institutional machinery will carry the cooperation forward?

    1. A standing Working Group: The two sides agreed to establish a Working Group headed at the Director General and Joint Secretary level.
    2. Domains it coordinates: The Working Group spans operational, intelligence, equipment, technology and industrial domains.
    3. Industry channel: A Defence Industry Forum will be convened alongside the research level cooperation.
    4. Ministerial channel: The two sides agreed to accelerate discussions for the fourth India Japan 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministerial Dialogue, to be held in Tokyo this year.
    5. Political framing: Both reaffirmed their commitment to deepen defence cooperation under the Japan India Special Strategic and Global Partnership and to work towards a free and open Indo Pacific amid heightened global tensions.

    Challenges to the India Japan maritime security arrangement

    1. Japan’s own legal constraints on transfers: Article 9 of Japan’s 1947 Constitution and the Three Principles on Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology limit what Tokyo can sell or co-develop abroad. Eg. The US 2 amphibious aircraft deal, negotiated with India for over a decade, lapsed without an order.
    2. Cost and schedule risk in Japanese technology tie ups: High specification Japanese systems carry costs that Indian procurement budgets absorb poorly. Eg. The Mumbai Ahmedabad High Speed Rail Project, built on Japanese technology and a Japanese loan, slipped from its 2022 target to 2027 or later.
    3. Thin use of the existing logistics pact: Reciprocal access agreements deliver value only when used outside exercise windows. Eg. The Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement signed in September 2020 has been used largely around scheduled exercises rather than for continuous deployments.
    4. Naval balance shifting faster than the partnership: The regional force ratio is moving against both partners while the arrangement is still being institutionalised. Eg. The People’s Liberation Army Navy crossed 340 battle force ships by 2021, overtaking the United States fleet in numbers.
    5. Indian yard capacity limits co-production: Joint naval shipbuilding assumes yard capacity India has not yet built. Eg. India’s share of global shipbuilding is under 1 percent, in a sector dominated by China, South Korea and Japan.
    6. Incomplete theatre command reform: Cooperation with India’s integrated theatre commands is conditional on those commands existing. Eg. The Inter Services Organisation (Command, Control and Discipline) Act, 2023 created the legal basis for joint commands, but no theatre command had been stood up when the arrangement was signed.
    7. Chokepoint risks a bilateral pact cannot fix: Sea lane disruption often originates from non state actors outside either navy’s operating area. Eg. Houthi attacks in the Red Sea forced shipping to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope, adding weeks to voyages.

    Conclusion

    India and Japan have moved from periodic exercises to a signed operational framework covering maritime domain awareness, logistics access and ship repair, with naval shipbuilding and design opened to joint development. The arrangement’s institutional carrier is a Working Group at Director General and Joint Secretary level spanning operational, intelligence, equipment, technology and industrial domains. The next milestone is the fourth India Japan 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministerial Dialogue, to be held in Tokyo this year, with the Veer Guardian 26 air exercise bringing Japanese fighter aircraft to India for the first time.

    “[2019, GS2, 10] ‘The time has come for India and Japan to build a strong contemporary relationship, one involving global and strategic partnership that will have a great significance for Asia and the world as a whole.’ Comment.”

  • English indigenous or foreign language? Supreme Court for examining constitution

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court on 20 August 2026 said the constitutionality of treating English as a non indigenous language under the three language policy will have to be examined, given the extent of its roots in Indian society. That classification decides which languages compete for a student’s single foreign language slot, so a descriptive label is operating as a rationing rule.

    What is the Three-Language Formula?

    1. What it requires: The three language formula requires a school student to learn three languages, of which at least two must be native Indian languages, described in the policy as Bhartiya Bhashas.
    2. Source and timing: The Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSE) is introducing it under the National Education Policy, 2020 from the academic year 2026-27.
    3. Sequence prescribed: The policy begins a child with the mother tongue, moves to another indigenous language, and leaves the third open to being either indigenous or foreign.

    What is the National Council for Teacher Education (NCTE)?

    1. National Council for Teacher Education: The National Council for Teacher Education (NCTE) is the statutory body that lays down norms for teacher education programmes and recognises the institutions running them. Its rules decide whether a school’s language teacher holds the Bachelor of Education qualification that recognition requires.

    Why is the classification of English as non-indigenous a constitutional question?

    1. The label under scrutiny: The bench said it will have to see whether English can be classified as a non indigenous language or an indigenous one, given the historical perspective of English and the extent of its roots into Indian society.
    2. Objection to the word native: A judge on the bench recorded a serious reservation about the expression native, holding that it carries a very colonial import and that indigenous is the correct term.
    3. Source of the expression: The Additional Solicitor General told the Court that non native is an expression coming from the new education policy, and the bench replied that the framers of the policy ought to have been conscious of the words they chose.
    4. The Board’s position: English is an official language under the Constitution and that status cannot be taken away, it is not treated like a foreign language, and it cannot be treated like a native language either.
    5. The presiding judge’s view: The Chief Justice of India said English could hardly be considered a foreign language.
    6. Why the label is reviewable: A classification that determines which language a student may take up is State action affecting a class of students, which brings it within constitutional review rather than leaving it to policy discretion alone.

    How does the classification restrict the study of other foreign languages?

    1. Two slots pre committed: Mandating at least two native Indian languages leaves a student only one slot for a foreign language.
    2. English absorbs that slot: Nearly all students choose English for the single slot, so French, Japanese and Spanish are effectively pushed out of the main curriculum.
    3. Enrolled students displaced: A large number of students already studying French and Japanese have to switch to a native language.
    4. Employment argument: Counsel for the petitioners argued that a second foreign language increases employment opportunities, and that the students affected come from middle and lower income homes.
    5. Textbook design problem: Textbooks placed online under the scheme begin with compound sentences rather than with the first letter, which makes learning an unfamiliar script from them impractical.

    Why is the Class 6 batch at the centre of the dispute?

    1. Cohort singled out: Classes 7 to 9 were exempted under Board guidelines, and the present Class 6 batch was slated to face full implementation.
    2. Terminal assessment: That batch faces a mandatory third language paper in the Class 10 Board examination by 2031.
    3. Reprieve proposed: The bench asked why the Class 6 students could not be given a reprieve from writing the third language paper in the Class 10 examination.
    4. Infrastructure not in place: The Court tied the reprieve to the fact that school infrastructure is still not adequately in place across the various education Boards.
    5. Start earlier instead: The bench held that the scheme should begin in a lower class, which would give students, families and school administrations elbow space to adapt.

    What capacity gaps does the Court identify in implementation?

    1. Choice on paper only: The option is 23 languages in theory, and in practice the range a school can actually offer is far narrower.
    2. Board asymmetry: Only around 4 per cent of schools are under the Central Board of Secondary Education and 96 per cent are under State Boards, so a Board level rule reaches a small share of the school system.
    3. Teacher education compliance: There are asymmetries in compliance with National Council for Teacher Education rules across schools and Boards.
    4. Qualified teacher shortage: There are inadequate numbers of Bachelor of Education qualified teachers for the languages the scheme would add.
    5. Sanskrit as the illustration: The bench asked how many Sanskrit teachers hold a Bachelor of Education qualification, noting that deep subject learning does not substitute for the prescribed teaching qualification.
    6. Compliance regime required: Schools will need an administrative compliance regime for the additional language, which they can absorb only if the change is phased in.

    What has the Court asked the Board to return with?

    1. One time reprieve: Whether a one time reprieve can be given to the current batch of Class 6 students from the third language Board examination.
    2. Human resources: How human resources are to be built to meet the demands of the three language scheme.
    3. Starting class: Whether the scheme should ideally be started in earlier classes rather than at Class 6.
    4. Response undertaken: The Additional Solicitor General said she would place these questions before the experts and appraise the Court.

    Does a mother tongue first policy expand or narrow a student’s choices?

    1. Cognitive case accepted: Early instruction in the mother tongue improves comprehension and retention, which the bench acknowledged as a good policy foundation.
    2. The count is not the constraint: The dispute is not over learning three languages but over the rule that two of them must be indigenous, which fixes the composition rather than the number.
    3. Choice shrinks at the top: Fixing two slots turns the third into the only site of choice, so every additional foreign language competes against English instead of sitting alongside it.
    4. Distributional effect: Students from middle and lower income homes depend on institutional provision for a second foreign language, and better resourced students can purchase it outside the school.
    5. Supply decides the outcome: A student in a school with two language teachers has a choice of two, whatever the 23 language menu states, so teacher supply and not the rule is the binding constraint.

    Challenges to implementing the Three-Language Formula

    1. Teacher cadre does not exist: A third language cannot be staffed from an establishment that was never recruited for it. Eg. Tamil Nadu has not maintained a Hindi teaching cadre in its government schools, so the posts a third language would require have no incumbents to draw on.
    2. State resistance on federal grounds: School education sits on the Concurrent List and States have rejected the formula as imposition. Eg. Tamil Nadu has followed a two language policy since 1968 and has declined central school scheme agreements that carry the three language requirement.
    3. Persistent non implementation: The formula has been official policy for six decades without uniform adoption. Eg. It was recommended by the Kothari Commission and adopted in the National Policy on Education, 1968, and no decade since has seen it implemented across all States.
    4. Migration breaks continuity: A child who moves between States loses the second indigenous language on transfer. Eg. A student learning Marathi in Maharashtra who relocates to West Bengal has to restart a new regional language at the same class level.
    5. Assessment weight against learning time: A Board paper in a language begun at Class 6 carries the same weight as papers in subjects taught from Class 1. Eg. The current Class 6 batch faces a third language paper in the 2031 Class 10 examination after five years of instruction.
    6. Material for less taught languages: Beginner grade teaching material is thin for classical and less taught languages. Eg. Textbooks placed online under the scheme open with compound sentences, which suits a scholarly reader rather than a Class 6 beginner.
    7. Private school offer disrupted: Schools that market a second foreign language lose that offer when the slot is taken. Eg. Private schools offering French, German and Japanese from Class 6 draw fee paying enrolment on that basis.

    Conclusion

    The dispute has moved from how many languages a school child must learn to who decides that English is not one of India’s own. The Court has said the constitutionality of classifying English as non indigenous will have to be examined, and has asked the Board to return on a one time reprieve for the Class 6 batch, on building teacher capacity, and on shifting the scheme to earlier classes. The Board has undertaken to place these questions before its experts, so the policy stands notified for 2026-27 with its core classification still under judicial scrutiny.

    “[2020, GS2, 15] National Education Policy 2020 is in conformity with the Sustainable Development Goal-4 (2030). It intends to restructure and reorient education system in India. Critically examine the statement.”

  • Centre set to expand mechanised sanitation scheme to rural India

    Why in the News

    The Social Justice Ministry has moved a proposal to extend the National Action for Mechanised Sanitation Ecosystem scheme from towns and cities to rural parts of the country. The scheme profiles sewer and septic tank workers as the route to its benefits, and coverage is being widened ahead of a delivery channel that approves capital subsidy for a small fraction of those profiled.

    Components of NAMASTE

    1. Profiling and identification: Sanitation workers are enumerated at camps run by urban local bodies, and that profile is the entry point to every other component of the scheme.
    2. Occupational safety: Profiled workers are given safety training and personal protective equipment for the work they already perform.
    3. Capital subsidy for self employment: A profiled worker or a Private Sanitation Service Organisation may apply for a capital subsidy to buy mechanised equipment and set up a sanitation enterprise.
    4. Emergency Response Sanitation Units: Urban local bodies are supported to set up standing units equipped with suction and jetting machines, so that a sewer or septic tank is cleaned by machine instead of by human entry.

    What is manual scavenging?

    1. Manual scavenging: Manual scavenging is the manual handling, carrying or disposing of human excreta from an insanitary latrine, an open drain, a pit or a railway track. The Prohibition of Employment as Manual Scavengers and their Rehabilitation Act, 2013 prohibits both the practice and the employment of any person for it.

    Who is a sewer and septic tank worker (SSW)?

    1. Sewer and septic tank worker: A sewer and septic tank worker (SSW) is a person engaged in cleaning sewer lines, manholes and septic tanks, whether employed directly or engaged through a contractor. The category is distinct from manual scavenging in law, since the work is lawful when performed with mechanised equipment and prescribed safety gear.

    What is a Private Sanitation Service Organisation (PSSO)?

    1. Private Sanitation Service Organisation: A Private Sanitation Service Organisation (PSSO) is a private entity providing mechanised sanitation services that can propose projects for capital subsidy under the scheme. It is one of two proposal routes, the other being an application by an individual worker.

    What is the Safai Udyami Yojana?

    1. Safai Udyami Yojana: The Safai Udyami Yojana is the self employment component under which sewer and septic tank workers receive capital subsidy to set up their own sanitation enterprise. It is one of the two self employment routes in which the National Commission for Scheduled Castes has flagged rejections.

    What does the proposed expansion change?

    1. Geographic extension: The proposal takes the scheme’s scope from towns and cities to rural parts of the country for the first time.
    2. New worker categories: Coverage will be widened to include drain cleaners, and workers in sewage treatment plants and faecal sludge treatment plants.
    3. Outlay and horizon: The Ministry has proposed around ₹498.73 crore for the expanded scheme, to be spent from this fiscal year to 2030-31.
    4. Second widening of scope: The scheme initially covered only sewer and septic tank workers and was first expanded to include waste pickers, so the rural extension is the second enlargement.
    5. Original aim retained: The scheme was started in 2023-24 with the aim of eradicating sewer and septic tank deaths, and the expansion does not alter that objective.

    Why has the scheme’s delivery record become the central concern?

    1. Profiling against approval: 90,915 sewer and septic tank workers have been profiled across the country, and only 810 have been approved for capital subsidies.
    2. Approval against disbursal: Of the 810 approved, 147 had actually received their funds as on 31 March 2026.
    3. Subsidy covers only part of the cost: The capital subsidy meets up to 50 per cent of total project cost, so an approved worker still has to raise the balance before the enterprise can start.
    4. Manual scavengers identified: Only 2,652 projects have been approved against the 58,000 manual scavengers identified under the scheme.
    5. Both routes inside the count: The 2,652 approvals include projects proposed by Private Sanitation Service Organisations as well as by individuals, so the figure is not a count of individual entrepreneurs alone.
    6. Waste picker coverage: 1.3 lakh waste pickers have been profiled alongside the sewer and septic tank workers, per the Ministry’s annual report for 2025-26.

    What has the National Commission for Scheduled Castes flagged?

    1. Repeated correspondence: The Commission has written repeatedly to the Social Justice Ministry since last year on the continued rejection of applications under the self employment and capital subsidy components.
    2. Rejections identified as the cause: It has held that one reason for the low number of approved projects is the high rate of rejections.
    3. Rejections across every part: It has noted rejections under each part of the capital subsidy component, and asked that these be examined.
    4. The August 2025 letter: That letter flagged rejections in the self employment components, both in the Safai Udyami Yojana and in the component for Private Sanitation Service Organisations.
    5. Source of the mandate: The Commission acts under Article 338, which empowers it to investigate and monitor safeguards for the Scheduled Castes and to inquire into specific complaints.

    Why do sewer and septic tank deaths persist under a statutory prohibition?

    1. Deaths on record: 498 people died across the country while engaged in the hazardous cleaning of sewers and septic tanks from 2019 to June 2026, per the Social Justice Ministry’s reply to Parliament in August 2026.
    2. Enforcement rests with the employer: The Prohibition of Employment as Manual Scavengers and their Rehabilitation Act, 2013 bars hazardous cleaning without protective gear, and the duty to enforce falls on local authorities who are frequently the employers themselves.
    3. Contracting layer: Sewer cleaning is routinely outsourced, which separates the municipal principal from the worker who enters the tank.
    4. Rehabilitation lag: A worker whose capital subsidy application is rejected returns to the same work, so profiling without disbursal leaves the occupational risk untouched.
    5. Rural gap unmeasured: Rural areas have been outside the scheme until this proposal, so deaths in village septic tanks have had no dedicated scheme response.

    Challenges to NAMASTE

    1. Rejection concentrated in the subsidy pipeline: The bottleneck sits between profiling and approval rather than between approval and identification. Eg. The National Commission for Scheduled Castes has recorded rejections under every part of the capital subsidy component and has asked the Ministry to explain them.
    2. Balance financing after subsidy: The worker must raise the uncovered share of project cost as a loan against negligible collateral. Eg. National Safai Karamcharis Finance and Development Corporation term loans routed through State channelising agencies have carried low utilisation and weak recovery.
    3. Urban local body capacity: Emergency Response Sanitation Units need trained crews and maintained machines, which small municipalities cannot sustain. Eg. The Safaimitra Suraksha Challenge launched in 2020 enrolled 246 cities to become sewer death free, and participation was concentrated in large municipal corporations rather than small towns.
    4. Contractor liability gap: Outsourcing lets the principal employer distance itself from a death inside a manhole. Eg. In Delhi Jal Board v National Campaign for Dignity and Rights of Sewerage and Allied Workers (2011), the Supreme Court held that the principal employer cannot escape liability by engaging contractors for sewer cleaning.
    5. No rural delivery cadre: Rural sanitation is administered by gram panchayats, which have no wing equivalent to an urban local body’s sanitation department. Eg. Faecal sludge emptying in villages is done by informal private operators outside any municipal register, which leaves no employer to profile a worker against.
    6. Monitoring by profiling count: Progress is reported as workers profiled rather than as workers rehabilitated, so the headline number rises without entitlement delivery following it. Eg. The Ministry’s annual report for 2025-26 leads with profiling totals for sewer and septic tank workers and waste pickers, and not with the count of workers placed in an alternative livelihood.

    Conclusion

    The Social Justice Ministry has proposed extending the National Action for Mechanised Sanitation Ecosystem scheme to rural India, to drain cleaners and to treatment plant workers. The proposal is at the stage of a Ministry submission and has not yet been notified, and the next milestone is approval of the expanded scheme and its outlay. The delivery record it inherits is a profiling count far ahead of the number of capital subsidy cases funded, alongside 498 sewer and septic tank deaths between 2019 and June 2026.

    “[2016] ‘Rashtriya Garima Abhiyaan’ is a national campaign to

    (a) rehabilitate the homeless and destitute persons and provide them with suitable sources of livelihood

    (b) release the sex workers from their practice and provide them with alternative sources of livelihood

    (c) eradicate the practice of manual scavenging and rehabilitate the manual scavengers

    (d) release the bonded labourers from their bondage and rehabilitate them

  • Climate resilience starts with the health workforce

    Why in the News

    Floods in Kerala and Assam have exposed the challenge of protecting lives during climate-related disasters, with attention going to rescue, relief camps and rebuilding. Analysis of climate-health governance across South and Southeast Asia shows that the workforce which prevents a disaster from becoming a prolonged public-health crisis is trained through fragmented, donor-supported projects rather than through the health system's own institutions.

    What is a climate-resilient health system?

    1. About: A climate-resilient health system is one able to anticipate, respond to, cope with and recover from climate-related shocks without interrupting routine health services.
    2. What it rests on: Its resilience ultimately depends on the workforce that delivers adaptation, since surveillance, emergency response and community outreach are performed by people rather than by plans.
    3. What changes under climate stress: Many of the foundational competencies required for climate adaptation already exist within health systems, and what changes is the context in which they must operate.
    4. The design principle: Climate change requires reorienting existing competencies through a climate lens and introducing new competencies where needed, rather than replacing what already exists.

    What is a heat action plan?

    1. About: A heat action plan is a city or region specific preparedness protocol that sets temperature thresholds, colour-coded warnings, and assigned responsibilities for health facilities, municipal bodies and emergency services during a heatwave.
    2. Why it is health-led: It converts a meteorological forecast into concrete health system action, covering hospital surge beds, oral rehydration supply, cooling spaces and outreach to outdoor workers and the elderly.

    What does the health workforce actually do during a climate disaster?

    1. Hospital preparedness: Hospitals prepare for medical emergencies, which is the visible clinical face of the response.
    2. Disease surveillance: Surveillance teams monitor disease outbreaks, since displacement and standing water raise the risk of communicable disease after a flood.
    3. Water quality testing: Laboratories test water quality, which determines whether relief camps and returning households face contamination risk.
    4. Community outreach: Community health workers reach vulnerable households, carrying care to those who cannot reach a facility.
    5. Cross-department coordination: Public health officials coordinate responses across departments, since the response involves disaster management, water supply, municipal services and health together.
    6. The net effect: It is the health workforce that prevents a natural disaster from becoming a prolonged public-health crisis, which is the least visible part of the response.

    What have states already put in place?

    1. Surveillance: States have begun to strengthen surveillance systems, which is the first line of detection for post-disaster outbreaks.
    2. Heat action plans: States have developed region-specific and city-specific heat action plans.
    3. Emergency preparedness: States have improved emergency preparedness arrangements within the health system.
    4. Programme integration: States have begun integrating climate considerations into several public-health programmes rather than treating climate as a separate vertical.
    5. The illustrative case: Kerala's response to the floods illustrates how health departments are increasingly incorporating public-health measures into disaster response.

    What does the South and Southeast Asia evidence show?

    1. The regional scope: The analysis covers climate-health governance across South and Southeast Asia, so the finding is regional rather than confined to one country.
    2. The central finding: Workforce development across the region remains fragmented, with no common architecture linking training to the health system's own institutions.
    3. The funding pattern: Climate-health training is largely confined to donor-supported or project-supported initiatives.
    4. What that implies: Capability rises and falls with the funding cycle of individual projects rather than accumulating within the system.
    5. Why the region matters for India: India's own state-level heat action plans and surveillance strengthening sit inside this regional pattern, so the fragmentation finding applies directly to Indian districts.

    Why does workforce capacity remain a surge response rather than a standing capability?

    1. The three questions the record raises: Whether these capacities can be sustained across all states, districts and levels of the health system; how surge capacities can be developed given the severe shortage of health workers across India; and whether capacities are being embedded across the workforce or continue to depend on individual relief-specific programmes and emergency mobilisation.
    2. The competency position: The competencies needed are largely present already, so the deficit is not one of knowledge.
    3. The institutional position: Those competencies sit in isolated training programmes rather than in the systems that produce, supervise and evaluate health workers.
    4. The consequence: Capacity is activated only during emergencies rather than translated into routine practice.
    5. The shortage constraint: The severe shortage of health workers across India limits how much surge capacity can be raised from an already stretched base.

    What would institutionalising climate-health competencies require?

    1. Beyond isolated training: Building climate-resilient health systems requires moving beyond isolated training programmes towards institutionalising climate-health competencies.
    2. The five integration points: These competencies should be integrated into pre-service education, professional development, supportive supervision, planning, and performance management.
    3. Pre-service education first: Placing climate-health content in pre-service education means every entrant carries the competency, rather than only those a project reaches.
    4. Supervision and performance: Embedding competencies in supportive supervision and performance management is what converts a completed training into observed practice.
    5. The three enablers: The integration must be supported by sustained governance, financing and institutional mechanisms.

    Challenges to Building a Climate-Resilient Health Workforce

    1. Absolute workforce shortage: Surge capacity cannot be drawn from a base that is already below norm, since redeploying staff for a flood response leaves routine services uncovered. Eg. Rural health facilities across India carry large shortfalls of specialists against Indian Public Health Standards, and community health centres report specialist vacancies in the range of two-thirds of sanctioned posts.
    2. Donor-cycle training: Competencies built through project funding disappear when the project closes, so the same district is trained repeatedly. Eg. Climate-health training across South and Southeast Asia remains largely confined to donor-supported or project-supported initiatives.
    3. Absence from pre-service curricula: Medical, nursing and allied health curricula do not carry climate-health competencies, so every entrant needs retrofitting. Eg. Heat illness protocols and post-flood outbreak management reach practitioners through workshops rather than through undergraduate training.
    4. Frontline worker load: Community health workers already carry multiple programme responsibilities, so a climate role is added without relief elsewhere. Eg. Accredited Social Health Activists deliver maternal health, immunisation, non-communicable disease screening and survey duties on an incentive-based payment structure.
    5. Data and early warning gaps: Health surveillance and meteorological forecasting run on separate systems, so an alert does not automatically reach a health facility. Eg. Heat action plans depend on India Meteorological Department warnings reaching district health officers in time for hospital preparation.
    6. Financing for adaptation: Adaptation finance for health competes with mitigation and infrastructure, so recurring workforce costs go unfunded. Eg. Global adaptation finance fell from 28 billion dollars to 26 billion dollars between 2022 and 2023, against a commitment to double it to 40 billion dollars by 2025.
    7. Attrition and contractual staffing: Much of the trained emergency workforce is on contract, so trained staff leave and the competency leaves with them. Eg. National Health Mission staff are engaged on contract across most States, with recurring demands for regularisation.

    Conclusion

    The health workforce is what prevents a climate disaster from becoming a prolonged public-health crisis, and its competencies are already largely present within health systems. The deficit is institutional, since climate-health training across South and Southeast Asia sits in donor-funded and project-funded initiatives rather than in pre-service education, professional development, supportive supervision, planning and performance management. Embedding those five points, supported by sustained governance, financing and institutional mechanisms, is what converts emergency mobilisation into routine practice. Until that happens, every flood and heatwave will draw on a surge capacity that has to be assembled afresh.

    Climate Change and Health in India

    1. The exposure: India faces heatwaves, floods, cyclones, droughts and air pollution simultaneously, so climate acts on health through multiple pathways rather than one.
    2. Heat: Rising heat exposure raises heat stroke, cardiovascular and renal illness, and reduces outdoor labour productivity, with outdoor workers, the elderly and pregnant women most exposed.
    3. Vector-borne disease: Warming and altered rainfall shift the range and season of malaria, dengue, chikungunya and Japanese encephalitis, moving transmission into districts and altitudes previously unaffected.
    4. Water-borne disease: Floods and cyclones contaminate drinking water and trigger diarrhoeal disease, cholera and leptospirosis outbreaks in the weeks after the event.
    5. Air quality: Ambient and household air pollution contribute to a very large share of India's non-communicable disease burden, with respiratory and cardiac mortality concentrated in the Indo-Gangetic Plain during winter.
    6. Nutrition: Crop yield loss and price shocks from extreme weather transmit into dietary quality, which shows up as child undernutrition rather than as a disaster statistic.
    7. The institutional response: The National Programme on Climate Change and Human Health, launched in 2019 under the National Health Mission, is the nodal programme, with State and district climate-health cells and nodal officers.
    8. The global frame: The Global Goal on Adaptation under the Paris Agreement now carries the 59 Belem Adaptation Indicators, the first global indicators for adaptation, spanning water, food, health, ecosystems, infrastructure and livelihoods.

    Government Initiatives

    1. National Action Plan on Climate Change: The 2008 framework of national missions, whose State Action Plans on Climate Change carry the health adaptation components at State level.
    2. National Action Plan for Heat Related Illnesses: Issued by the health ministry, it prescribes surveillance of heat-related illness and death, hospital preparedness, and health advisories during the heat season.
    3. National Disaster Management Authority heat guidelines: Guidelines for preparation of heat action plans, first issued in 2016 and revised subsequently, which States and cities use to build local plans.
    4. Ayushman Arogya Mandirs: Health and wellness centres delivering comprehensive primary health care, which are the delivery point for climate-sensitive surveillance and outreach at the community level.
    5. Integrated Disease Surveillance Programme and Integrated Health Information Platform: The national outbreak detection system, which is the mechanism through which post-flood and post-cyclone outbreaks are identified.
    6. Mission LiFE: A behavioural initiative on sustainable consumption, positioned as the demand-side counterpart to institutional climate action.

    Key Facts about Climate and Health Governance

    1. World Health Day: Observed on 7 April, marking the founding of the World Health Organization in 1948.
    2. National Doctors' Day: Observed on 1 July in India.
    3. Declaration on Climate and Health: COP28 at Dubai in 2023 was the first Conference of the Parties to formally address the health impacts of climate change, with a Declaration on Climate and Health endorsed by more than 140 nations, calling for climate-resilient health systems, extreme heat protocols and health co-benefits of mitigation. India did not sign it.
    4. Health Day at COP: COP28 also hosted the first dedicated Health Day on the official Conference of the Parties agenda, convened by the Presidency and the World Health Organization.
    5. Belem Adaptation Indicators: The 59 Belem Adaptation Indicators adopted at COP30 are the first global indicators for the Global Goal on Adaptation, and health is one of the domains they cover.
    6. Baku Adaptation Road Map: A two-year structured agenda running from 2026 to 2028 under the global goal on adaptation work programme, guiding progress on the Belem indicators and adaptation finance tracking.
    7. Adaptation finance goal: COP30 signalled a tripling of adaptation funding to 120 billion dollars a year by 2035 within the wider 1.3 trillion dollar pact, as a political signal rather than a binding commitment.

    Challenges in Climate and Health Governance

    1. Split institutional mandates: Climate policy sits with the environment ministry, disaster response with disaster management authorities and delivery with health departments, so no single authority owns climate-health outcomes. Eg. Heat action plans are issued under disaster management guidelines, and heat illness surveillance runs through the health ministry.
    2. Plans without financing: State and city plans are prepared without a dedicated budget line, so implementation depends on reallocating funds from other heads. Eg. Reviews of Indian heat action plans have found most lack identified funding sources and legal backing.
    3. Weak local vulnerability data: Plans use uniform thresholds rather than locally derived ones, so warnings misfire in humid or high-altitude districts. Eg. Heat thresholds calibrated for dry inland cities do not capture the combined temperature and humidity stress in coastal districts.
    4. Under-recording of climate-attributable deaths: Heat and flood-related mortality is recorded under proximate clinical causes, which understates the burden used to justify funding. Eg. Heat stroke deaths are frequently certified as cardiac or renal failure without the heat exposure being recorded.
    5. Primary care infrastructure gaps: Facilities lack cooling, uninterrupted power and water security, which are prerequisites for functioning during a heatwave or a flood. Eg. Many primary health centres operate without assured power backup for cold chain and emergency care.
    6. Fragmented surveillance integration: Meteorological, water quality and disease surveillance systems do not exchange data automatically, so early warning does not translate into facility-level preparation. Eg. Outbreak detection after floods relies on manual reporting through the Integrated Disease Surveillance Programme.
    7. International finance shortfall: Adaptation finance for the health sector remains a small fraction of climate finance, which pushes workforce costs back onto domestic budgets. Eg. Adaptation finance globally fell from 28 billion dollars to 26 billion dollars between 2022 and 2023.

    Way Forward

    1. Put climate-health in pre-service curricula: Introduce climate-health competencies into medical, nursing, allied health and public health curricula, so every new entrant carries them without retrofitting.
    2. Embed competencies in supervision and appraisal: Add climate-health tasks to supportive supervision checklists and to the annual performance appraisal of district health officers and facility staff.
    3. Fund workforce costs from domestic budgets: Provide a recurring National Health Mission budget line for climate-health cells, district nodal officers and refresher training, so capability does not lapse with donor projects.
    4. Localise heat and flood thresholds: Derive district-specific temperature, humidity and rainfall thresholds from local mortality and morbidity data, rather than applying uniform national cut-offs.
    5. Integrate the data systems: Link India Meteorological Department warnings, water quality testing and the Integrated Disease Surveillance Programme, so an alert automatically triggers facility-level preparation.
    6. Improve cause-of-death recording: Add climate exposure fields to death certification for heat, flood and cyclone events, so the burden is measured and can be budgeted against.
    7. Climate-proof health facilities: Provide assured power backup, cooling, water security and structural resilience at primary health centres and community health centres in high-exposure districts.
    8. Regularise the emergency workforce: Convert contract emergency and surveillance staff into regular cadres, so trained capacity remains in the system rather than leaving with the contract.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2024, GS2, 15] In a crucial domain like the public healthcare system, the Indian State should play a vital role to contain the adverse impact of marketisation of the system. Suggest some measures through which the State can enhance the reach of public healthcare at the grassroots level.”

  • UGC equity rules being reconsidered: Centre to SC

    Why in the News

    The Centre told the Supreme Court on 20 August 2026 that it is reconsidering the University Grants Commission regulations framed to prevent caste discrimination in higher education institutions. The regulations name the Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribes and the Other Backward Classes as the protected groups, and that naming is what general category petitioners have challenged as exclusion.

    What are the UGC (Promotion of Equity in Higher Education Institutions) Regulations, 2026?

    1. What they do: The University Grants Commission (UGC) (Promotion of Equity in Higher Education Institutions) Regulations, 2026 impose a compliance framework on higher education institutions to prevent and redress discrimination against students and faculty.
    2. Notification and stay: They were notified on 13 January 2026 and stayed by the Supreme Court on 29 January 2026, which revived the 2012 framework until further orders.
    3. Two definitions inside them: Regulation 3(1)(c) defines caste based discrimination as discrimination on the basis of caste or tribe against members of the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes. Clause 3(e) defines discrimination more broadly, covering unfair or differential treatment on the ground of caste against any stakeholder.
    4. Present position: The Centre has told the Court that the regulations are being reconsidered, so they stand stayed and unenforced.

    What is a "separate yet equal" classification?

    1. Separate yet equal: A "separate yet equal" classification permits separate facilities for different groups on the argument that the facilities provided are of equal quality. Constitutional courts treat the act of separation as the injury, since equality of facilities does not cure the stigma of being set apart.

    How far are students currently protected against caste discrimination on campus?

    1. Governing regulations restored: The UGC (Promotion of Equity in Higher Educational Institutions) Regulations, 2012 are back in force, requiring institutions to constitute an Equal Opportunity Cell and to publish an anti discrimination policy.
    2. Criminal protection: The Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 covers caste based insult, intimidation and social boycott, including inside educational institutions, and is tried by Special Courts. Its 2015 Amendment added new offences and mandated Exclusive Special Courts and time bound trial.
    3. Separate ragging machinery: The UGC (Curbing the Menace of Ragging in Higher Educational Institutions) Regulations, 2009 mandate an Anti Ragging Committee and an Anti Ragging Squad in every institution, alongside an anti ragging affidavit from every student and parent.
    4. Reservation in admission: The Central Educational Institutions (Reservation in Admission) Act, 2006 reserves 15 per cent of seats for the Scheduled Castes, 7.5 per cent for the Scheduled Tribes and 27 per cent for the Other Backward Classes, alongside 10 per cent for the Economically Weaker Sections.
    5. Reservation in teaching posts: The Central Educational Institutions (Reservation in Teachers' Cadre) Act, 2019 restored the institution rather than the department as the unit for computing reservation in faculty recruitment.
    6. No standalone statute: India has no dedicated anti discrimination Act for education, so protection is assembled from regulations, criminal law and reservation statutes.

    Constitutional Provisions Related to Equality and Non-Discrimination

    1. Preamble: Declares equality of status and of opportunity, and fraternity assuring the dignity of the individual.
    2. Article 14: Guarantees equality before the law and the equal protection of the laws to every person.
    3. Article 15(1): Prohibits the State from discriminating against any citizen on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth.
    4. Article 15(4): Enables special provisions for socially and educationally backward classes and for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.
    5. Article 15(5): Enables reservation in admission to educational institutions, including private unaided institutions, other than minority institutions.
    6. Article 15(6): Enables reservation of up to 10 per cent of seats for the Economically Weaker Sections.
    7. Article 16(4): Enables reservation in public employment for any backward class not adequately represented in State services.
    8. Article 17: Abolishes untouchability and forbids its practice in any form.
    9. Article 21: Guarantees the right to life and personal liberty, read to include the right to live with dignity.
    10. Article 29(2): Bars denial of admission to a State maintained or State aided educational institution on grounds of religion, race, caste or language.
    11. Article 46: Directs the State to promote the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections, particularly the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.
    12. Article 338 and Article 338A: Establish the National Commission for Scheduled Castes and the National Commission for Scheduled Tribes to investigate and monitor constitutional safeguards.

    Why were the 2026 Regulations framed?

    1. Origin in litigation: The regulations stem from a 2019 petition filed in the Supreme Court by the mothers of Payal Tadvi and Rohith Vemula.
    2. The two deaths: Payal Tadvi and Rohith Vemula died by suicide over alleged caste based discrimination in 2019 and 2016 respectively.
    3. Relief sought: The petition asked for enforcement of robust anti discrimination mechanisms across higher education institutions.
    4. Gap in the earlier framework: The 2012 regulations relied on Equal Opportunity Cells without naming caste based discrimination as a distinct wrong.
    5. Regulatory answer: The 2026 regulations responded by carving out caste based discrimination as a separate defined category rather than leaving it inside general discrimination.

    Why did the Supreme Court stay the regulations rather than let them operate?

    1. Sweeping consequences: The bench said the issue raised important questions that, if left unexamined, could have very sweeping consequences and could divide society.
    2. Prima facie ambiguity: The order recorded that on a prima facie consideration some provisions of the impugned regulations suffer from certain ambiguities, and that the possibility of their misuse cannot be ruled out.
    3. Status quo preserved: The Court directed that the 2012 Regulations will continue in force till further orders, so institutions were not left without an equity framework.
    4. Notices issued: Notices were issued to the Centre and to the University Grants Commission, so the challenge proceeds on merits rather than by administrative withdrawal.
    5. Narrow target of challenge: The petitions, filed by Mritunjay Tiwari, Vineet Jindal and Rahul Dewan, primarily challenge Regulation 3(1)(c) and not the regulations as a whole.

    Why has an anti-discrimination rule drawn objections from protected and general categories alike?

    1. General category objection: Naming the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes in Regulation 3(1)(c) is read as excluding general category students and faculty from specific protection against caste based discrimination.
    2. The broader clause cuts against the narrower: Clause 3(e) already covers unfair or differential treatment on the ground of caste against any stakeholder, so the narrower clause adds a group specific label without adding a group specific remedy.
    3. Dalit and Other Backward Class objection: Sections of Dalit and Other Backward Class opinion oppose the stay and any rollback, since deleting the named categories would dissolve the recognition the regulation created.
    4. Division within the protected groups: Some Dalit opinion opposes bringing the Other Backward Classes under the same protective umbrella, treating caste discrimination against the Scheduled Castes as a distinct harm.
    5. Absent machinery: The regulations create a named category of caste based discrimination without prescribing a distinct complaint, inquiry or penalty procedure for it.

    What questions has the Supreme Court framed for examination?

    1. Nexus of Regulation 3(1)(c): Whether Clause 3(1)(c) bears a reasonable and rational nexus to subserve the object and purpose of the 2026 Regulations, particularly since no distinct or special procedural mechanism has been prescribed to address caste based discrimination as against the exhaustive and inclusive definition of discrimination in Clause 3(e).
    2. Effect on sub classification: Whether introducing the term caste based discrimination has any bearing on the existing constitutional and statutory sub classification of the Most Backward Castes within the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes, and whether the new rules provide adequate and effective safeguards to such Extremely Backward Castes against discrimination and structural disadvantage.
    3. Segregation and the equality guarantees: Whether including the expression segregation in the context of allocation of hostels, classrooms, mentorship groups or similar academic or residential arrangements, albeit on transparent and non discriminatory criteria, would amount to a separate yet equal classification infringing the guarantees of equality and fraternity under Articles 14 and 15 and the Preamble.
    4. Omission of ragging: Whether omitting the term ragging as a specific form of discrimination is a regressive and exclusionary legislative omission, and whether that omission creates an asymmetry in access to justice for victims of discrimination and so falls foul of Articles 14 and 21.

    Why has the issue become an electoral question in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar?

    1. Upper caste protest: The rules triggered protests among sections of the upper castes, who argued that the explicit reference to the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes amounted to exclusion of general category students.
    2. Dalit disquiet over rollback: There is concern within the ruling party that the stay and any rollback may cause disquiet among Dalit communities.
    3. Election calendar: Uttar Pradesh Assembly elections are due next year, which places the dispute inside an active campaign in the largest State.
    4. Bypoll reading: One reason attributed within the ruling party for its defeat in the recent Bankipur Assembly bypoll in Bihar was upper caste dissatisfaction over the University Grants Commission issue.
    5. Cost in both directions: Retaining the clause loses general category support and withdrawing it loses Dalit and Other Backward Class support, which is why reconsideration rather than defence is the chosen route.

    Major debates surrounding caste discrimination in higher education

    1. Group specific against universal protection: Whether an anti discrimination rule should name the historically excluded groups, or state a caste neutral prohibition that any student can invoke, is the live legal fault line.
    2. Sub classification within the Scheduled Castes: The Supreme Court's 2024 ruling in State of Punjab v Davinder Singh permitted States to sub classify the Scheduled Castes for reservation, and the debate now extends to whether protection against discrimination can be similarly graded.
    3. Creamy layer for the Scheduled Castes: Judicial opinion is divided on extending the creamy layer exclusion, applied to the Other Backward Classes since Indra Sawhney (1992), to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.
    4. Merit against representation: The framing of open competition as merit and reservation as compensation is contested by the argument that access to coaching, language and schooling already prices the entry test.
    5. Institutional autonomy against central regulation: Whether a central regulator can prescribe internal grievance machinery binding on State and private universities is disputed by State governments.
    6. Empirical gap: Caste wise data on discrimination complaints and on student suicides in higher education institutions is not published in consolidated form, so the scale the dispute turns on is itself contested.

    Challenges to enforcing the UGC Equity Regulations

    1. Grievance machinery controlled by the respondent: Equal Opportunity Cells are constituted by the same administration that a complaint is frequently directed against. Eg. In the Rohith Vemula case, the suspension from the hostel that preceded his death in January 2016 came from the University of Hyderabad's own disciplinary machinery.
    2. Retaliation risk suppresses reporting: A complaint against senior faculty or residents is made inside a hierarchy that controls the complainant's evaluation. Eg. Payal Tadvi's complaint at BYL Nair Hospital in Mumbai in 2019 named senior residents in her own department.
    3. Regulatory reach ends at grant conditionality: University Grants Commission regulations bind institutions that seek its recognition and grants, and enforcement over State universities is weak. Eg. The 2012 regulations required every institution to publish an anti discrimination policy, and publication was never made a condition for release of grants.
    4. A stayed regulation does not operate: A judicial stay leaves the earlier and weaker framework in charge for the entire period of litigation. Eg. The 2026 regulations have been suspended since 29 January 2026, so the 2012 framework they were written to replace still governs every campus.
    5. Faculty representation shortfall: A grievance system staffed almost entirely by unreserved category faculty carries limited confidence among complainants. Eg. Central universities have reported persistent backlogs of unfilled reserved category professor and associate professor posts in successive parliamentary replies.
    6. Definitional contest displaces the remedy: Litigation on who is covered has consumed the entire period in which the compliance machinery was to be built. Eg. Seven months after notification the regulations have produced no Equal Opportunity Cell restructuring, no complaint procedure and no penalty.

    Conclusion

    A regulation written to give caste discrimination a name has become unworkable because targeted protection and formally neutral protection are being demanded of the same clause. The Centre has told the Supreme Court that the University Grants Commission (Promotion of Equity in Higher Education Institutions) Regulations, 2026 are being reconsidered, so the measure stands stayed and the 2012 framework continues in force until further orders. What remains unresolved is the defect the Court itself identified, that the regulations create a distinct category of caste based discrimination without prescribing any distinct procedure to act on it.

    What is Substantive Equality?

    1. About: Substantive equality treats equality as an outcome the law must produce, so it permits differential treatment where identical treatment would preserve entrenched disadvantage.
    2. Rationale: Formal equality applies the same rule to unequally placed persons, which reproduces the existing distribution of advantage; substantive equality asks what the rule does to those on whom the disadvantage already falls.
    3. Redressing disadvantage: The first dimension asks whether a measure removes the material and social disadvantage a group carries, rather than whether it treats everyone alike.
    4. Countering stigma, prejudice and violence: The second dimension asks whether a measure reduces the humiliation, stereotype and hostility attached to group membership.
    5. Enhancing voice and participation: The third dimension asks whether the affected group has a say in the institutions that decide for it, since exclusion from decision making sustains the disadvantage.
    6. Accommodating difference through structural change: The fourth dimension asks whether the institution itself is altered to fit the group, rather than requiring the group to conform to an existing design.

    Key Concerns Regarding Substantive Equality

    1. Ceiling on affirmative action: The 50 per cent limit set in Indra Sawhney (1992) restricts how far redistribution can go, and the 10 per cent Economically Weaker Sections quota upheld in Janhit Abhiyan (2022) breached it for a non caste category.
    2. Benefit capture within the beneficiary group: Reservation gains concentrate among the better placed sections of a reserved category, which is the argument behind creamy layer and sub classification demands.
    3. Absence of enumeration: Caste wise socio economic data has not been published since 1931 in a full Census, so the extent of disadvantage the doctrine seeks to redress is inferred rather than measured.
    4. Reach limited to the public sector: Reservation binds the State and State aided institutions, and the bulk of new employment and higher education capacity has grown in the private sector.
    5. Conflict with efficiency claims: Article 335 requires that claims of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes be considered consistently with the maintenance of efficiency of administration, which is repeatedly invoked against extending measures.
    6. Enforcement gap in horizontal relations: Constitutional equality guarantees bind the State, and discrimination between private individuals on a campus or in housing has no general statutory remedy.

    Laws and Rules Governing Anti-Discrimination in Higher Education

    1. University Grants Commission Act, 1956: Establishes the Commission and empowers it to coordinate and determine standards in universities.
    2. Section 26 gives the Commission power to make regulations, which is the source of both the 2012 and the 2026 equity regulations.
    3. Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955: Penalises the enforcement of any disability arising out of untouchability, including in educational institutions.
    4. Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016: Section 16 requires educational institutions to provide inclusive education and reasonable accommodation.

    Government Initiatives for Equity in Higher Education

    1. Post Matric Scholarship for Scheduled Caste students: Meets tuition and maintenance costs of Scheduled Caste students pursuing post matriculation courses, targeted at students below a stated family income ceiling.
    2. National Fellowship for Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe students: Funds Master of Philosophy and Doctor of Philosophy research by students of these categories in recognised universities.
    3. PM Young Achievers Scholarship Award Scheme for Vibrant India (PM YASASVI): Supports school and higher secondary education of Other Backward Class, Economically Backward Class and De notified Tribe students, feeding the higher education pipeline.
    4. National Overseas Scholarship: Funds postgraduate and doctoral study abroad for Scheduled Caste, De notified Tribe, landless agricultural labourer and traditional artisan category students.
    5. Dr Ambedkar Centres of Excellence: Provide free civil services examination coaching to Scheduled Caste students in selected universities.
    6. Remedial Coaching and Equal Opportunity Cells: University Grants Commission supported cells run bridge and remedial courses for students from reserved categories in colleges and universities.

    Challenges in Ensuring Equity in Higher Education

    1. Enrolment gap by category: Gross Enrolment Ratio in higher education remains below the national average for the Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes. Eg. The All India Survey on Higher Education for 2021-22 recorded an overall Gross Enrolment Ratio of 28.4 per cent, against 25.9 per cent for the Scheduled Castes and 21.2 per cent for the Scheduled Tribes.
    2. Language of instruction: Professional and postgraduate programmes are taught almost entirely in English, which disadvantages students from State board schooling in regional languages. Eg. Engineering and medical curricula translated into Indian languages under the National Education Policy, 2020 cover a small share of programmes and enrolment.
    3. Financial barriers and delayed disbursal: Scholarship money arrives after fees fall due, forcing students into private borrowing. Eg. Post Matric Scholarship disbursal depends on release of the State share, and delays in that release have stalled payments across academic years.
    4. Residential segregation on campus: Hostel allotment and mess arrangements reproduce caste separation informally even where no rule prescribes it. Eg. The Supreme Court has framed the allocation of hostels, classrooms and mentorship groups as a separate yet equal question in the present case.
    5. Mental health and support systems: Counselling capacity in most institutions is not staffed to the size of the student body, and first generation learners carry the heaviest adjustment burden. Eg. Successive parliamentary replies have recorded student suicides in central institutions, with a disproportionate share from reserved categories.
    6. Growth outside the reservation perimeter: Capacity expansion has been largest in private unaided institutions, where implementation of Article 15(5) reservation is uneven. Eg. The provision was upheld for private unaided institutions in Ashoka Kumar Thakur (2008) and again in Pramati Educational Trust (2014), and compliance is not centrally monitored.

    Back2Basics: University Grants Commission (UGC)

    1. Formation: Set up in 1953 and given statutory status by the University Grants Commission Act, 1956, which came into force on 3 November 1956.
    2. Parent ministry: Functions under the Ministry of Education, with its headquarters in New Delhi and six regional offices.
    3. Constitutional basis: Draws from Article 246 read with Entry 66 of the Union List, which covers coordination and determination of standards in institutions for higher education.
    4. Composition: Consists of a Chairman, a Vice Chairman and ten members appointed by the Central Government.
    5. Mandate: Coordinates and determines standards in universities, disburses grants, frames regulations and advises the Union and State governments on higher education.
    6. Recognition function: Recognises institutions under Sections 2(f) and 12(B) of the Act, which determines their eligibility for central grants.
    7. Proposed replacement: A Higher Education Commission of India has been proposed to subsume its regulatory functions, with grant disbursal moved to a separate body.

    Way Forward

    1. Prescribe a distinct procedure: Attach a dedicated complaint, inquiry and penalty procedure to caste based discrimination, since the absence of one is the core defect the Court has framed.
    2. Independent grievance forum: Place the inquiry authority outside the institution's own administration, with an external member drawn from a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe commission panel.
    3. Keep the broad clause as the residual protection: Retain the wide definition in Clause 3(e) as the universal guarantee, so no category of student is left without a remedy. The group specific recognition created by Regulation 3(1)(c) is retained alongside it.
    4. Make compliance a grant condition: Tie release of central grants and continuation of Section 12(B) status to the constitution and reporting of a functioning equity mechanism.
    5. Publish disaggregated data: Require every institution to report complaints, outcomes, dropouts and student deaths by category in an annual public return.
    6. Fill reserved faculty posts in mission mode: Run a time bound special recruitment drive for the backlog of reserved category teaching posts, since representation among decision makers is what makes a grievance forum credible.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2018, GS2, 10] Whether National Commission for Scheduled Castes (NCSC) can enforce the implementation of constitutional reservation for the Scheduled Castes in the religious minority institutions? Examine.”

  • Union Cabinet clears HC bench for Ladakh

    Why in the News

    The Union Cabinet has decided to establish a bench of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court in Ladakh, aimed at improving access to justice in the Union Territory. The decision answers a long-standing demand on judicial access at a point when the agitation in Ladakh is pressing a different set of demands on statehood, Sixth Schedule protection and an empowered legislature.

    What is a High Court bench?

    1. About: A High Court bench is a permanent sitting of a High Court at a place other than its principal seat, where judges hear cases arising from a defined territory.
    2. Purpose: A bench reduces the distance and cost of approaching the higher judiciary for litigants living far from the principal seat, without creating a separate High Court.
    3. How it is established: The place of the principal seat and of any other place of sitting is fixed by the President by notification, and the establishment of a bench ordinarily follows a proposal from the State or Union Territory government with the concurrence of the High Court’s Chief Justice and the Union Law Ministry.
    4. The court concerned: The Jammu and Kashmir High Court, renamed the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh, is the common High Court for the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir and the Union Territory of Ladakh under the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019.

    What is the Leh Apex Body?

    1. About: The Leh Apex Body is the umbrella platform of political, religious and social organisations from Leh district, formed to press Ladakh’s demands for constitutional safeguards.
    2. Role: It leads the Ladakh agitation jointly with the Kargil Democratic Alliance and negotiates with the Ministry of Home Affairs.

    What is the Kargil Democratic Alliance?

    1. About: The Kargil Democratic Alliance is the corresponding umbrella platform of political, religious and social organisations from Kargil district.
    2. Role: It negotiates alongside the Leh Apex Body, so the two districts present a single set of demands to the Centre.

    What does the decision do?

    1. The decision: The Union Cabinet decided to establish a bench of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court in Ladakh, announced by the Union Home Minister on 20 August 2026.
    2. Stated effect: The bench will enhance access to justice for citizens living in remote areas of Ladakh by reducing the time required to avail the legal services they are entitled to.
    3. Framing by the Centre: The announcement reaffirmed the Centre’s commitment to ensuring constitutional safeguards and the all-round development of the region.
    4. Response from the Union Territory: The Lieutenant Governor of Ladakh welcomed it as a historic decision and said it would ensure speedy justice and reaffirm commitment to the region’s development.
    5. The demand it answers: Officials said the bench is expected to address a long-standing demand for easier and faster access to the higher judiciary for people in Ladakh.

    Does a High Court bench answer what the Ladakh agitation is asking for?

    1. What the agitation seeks: Local stakeholders are seeking stronger safeguards in four areas: land, employment, culture and political representation.
    2. The non-negotiable demands: The Leh Apex Body and the Kargil Democratic Alliance submitted a memorandum listing three non-negotiable demands: financial powers for the proposed elected Ladakh Legislative Assembly, a separate Public Service Commission for jobs in the Union Territory, and unconditional withdrawal of all cases against those affected by the violence of 24 September last year.
    3. The gap: A judicial bench addresses the distance to the higher judiciary and does not touch legislative powers, recruitment autonomy or constitutional protection of land and culture.
    4. Why the timing matters: The announcement comes against the backdrop of continuing discussions over the political, administrative and constitutional future of Ladakh.
    5. What the Centre is offering instead: The Centre is exploring a Union Territory level legislative body under certain provisions of Article 371, rather than the Sixth Schedule extension the agitation has demanded.

    What happened in Leh on 24 September last year and what has followed?

    1. The incident: Four persons were killed and at least 50 injured in Leh when a protest demanding statehood and extension of Sixth Schedule protections turned violent and police opened fire on protesters.
    2. Cases registered: About 87 people were booked following the violence, of whom about nine were chargesheeted.
    3. Withdrawal of cases: The Ladakh administration announced that cases against 25 people will be withdrawn, with closure reports to be filed in court in due course.
    4. Further review: The Chief Secretary said the Director General of Police has been directed to review the cases of the remaining persons still under investigation, to identify others who did not have an active role.
    5. Official characterisation: The Chief Secretary termed the incident a blot on the pages of India’s history.
    6. Detention of the activist: Climate activist Sonam Wangchuk, who was on a hunger strike for nearly 35 days in support of Ladakh’s demands, called off his fast, and was booked under the National Security Act, 1980 and lodged in Jodhpur jail for six months.

    What is the Article 371 route being explored?

    1. The proposal: A Union Territory level legislative body is being envisaged for Ladakh under certain provisions of Article 371.
    2. Work in progress: The Ministry of Home Affairs is working with the Law Ministry to prepare a framework for the arrangement.
    3. Questions the framework must settle: The framework has to decide how the body will be elected, what powers it will hold and the shape of the executive.
    4. Next step: The discussions will be taken further in a formal structured meeting of the sub-committee, expected in the first week of September.
    5. The stated horizon: The Chief Secretary said these things will not happen overnight and that a new model will be established for Ladakh.

    Challenges to Ladakh’s Demand for Constitutional Safeguards

    1. Sixth Schedule applicability: The Sixth Schedule as it stands applies to tribal areas in Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram, so extending it to a Union Territory requires a constitutional amendment. Eg. The National Commission for Scheduled Tribes recommended Sixth Schedule inclusion for Ladakh in 2019, and the recommendation has not been acted upon.
    2. Union Territory without a legislature: Ladakh was constituted as a Union Territory without a legislature on 31 October 2019, so all law-making for it rests with Parliament and the administrator. Eg. The Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019 gave a legislature to the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir and none to Ladakh.
    3. Employment and recruitment: Without a separate Public Service Commission, recruitment for Ladakh runs through arrangements that local stakeholders say do not reserve posts for residents. Eg. The demand for a dedicated Ladakh Public Service Commission is one of the three non-negotiable demands submitted to the Chief Secretary.
    4. Land and demographic protection: Absence of domicile-linked land restrictions is the core anxiety behind the safeguards demand. Eg. Leh and Kargil bodies have sought protection of land and culture alongside political representation in every round of talks.
    5. Trust deficit after the firing: Criminal proceedings against protesters continue during the talks, which constrains negotiation. Eg. Of about 87 people booked after the 24 September violence, cases against 25 are being withdrawn and the rest remain under review.
    6. Ecological limits on development: Ladakh is a cold desert with acute water stress, so development promises collide with carrying capacity. Eg. Leh town’s groundwater and spring-fed supply has come under strain from tourism growth and construction.
    7. Continuity of dialogue: Negotiations depend on periodic meetings without a statutory framework or timeline. Eg. The next round of talks with the Ministry of Home Affairs team is scheduled for the following month, with a sub-committee meeting expected in the first week of September.

    Conclusion

    The Union Cabinet has cleared a bench of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court for Ladakh, and the Lieutenant Governor has welcomed it as answering a long-standing demand on judicial access. The demands driving the agitation, statehood, Sixth Schedule protection, financial powers for an elected assembly and a separate Public Service Commission, remain unresolved. The Centre is preparing a framework for a Union Territory level legislative body under provisions of Article 371, with the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Law Ministry deciding its election method, powers and executive structure. The next milestone is a formal structured sub-committee meeting expected in the first week of September, ahead of the next round of talks with the Ministry of Home Affairs team.

    “[2025, GS2, 10] Discuss the nature of Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly after the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganization Act, 2019. Briefly describe the powers and functions of the Assembly of the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir.”

  • J&K Census enumerators raise tech concerns

    Why in the News

    A readiness review for the Population Enumeration phase in Doda district recorded that Census enumerators and supervisors in the snow bound areas of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) hold mobile devices below the configuration the Census application requires. Census 2027 is India’s first digital headcount, and it runs on personal phones owned by school teachers and government employees rather than on equipment the state issues.

    What is the Digital Census 2027?

    1. First digital enumeration: Census 2027 is the first Census in India to be conducted digitally, with field data captured through a mobile application instead of printed schedules.
    2. Field workforce: Enumerators and supervisors are drawn mostly from school teachers and government employees, who record entries on their own handsets.
    3. Device specification: The application requires a minimum of 8 GB of RAM and Android 13 or above on the device used for Population Enumeration.
    4. Phased design: A self enumeration portal opens before field work, after which enumerators conduct door to door visits within a fixed window.

    What is self enumeration?

    1. Self enumeration: Self enumeration lets a household fill its own Census entries on an online portal instead of waiting for an enumerator to visit. The entry is verified later by the field functionary during the enumeration window.

    Why has device configuration become an enumeration problem?

    1. Hardware shifted to the enumerator: The Census application runs on the enumerator’s personal phone, so the capacity to count depends on assets the state neither owns nor issues.
    2. Specification threshold breached: Functionaries in the snow bound areas of Jammu and Kashmir were found holding phones below the 8 GB RAM and Android 13 requirement.
    3. Cost borne privately: The field workforce is composed of school teachers and government employees, so meeting the specification is a private expense rather than a budgeted input.
    4. Terrain compounds the gap: The affected districts are enumerated ahead of the rest of the country, which leaves the least time to replace or upgrade equipment.
    5. Resolution left open: The review recorded the shortfall for appropriate resolution without naming a procurement or substitution route.

    Why are Ladakh and the snow bound areas enumerated ahead of the rest of the country?

    1. Second phase advanced: The second phase of the Census in Ladakh and the snow bound areas of Jammu and Kashmir, Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh is being conducted ahead of the rest of the country.
    2. Weather window: Snowfall closes road access to these habitations, so the field round has to be completed before winter sets in.
    3. Self enumeration first: The self enumeration portal for these regions remains available from 17 August to 31 August.
    4. Field window: Door to door enumeration starts on 1 September and concludes by 30 September 2026.
    5. District level review: Doda district’s readiness for that window was reviewed at the Deputy Commissioner’s Office Complex under the Chief Principal Census Officer.

    How is the exercise being prepared for hard to count populations?

    1. Migratory populations: Special attention was directed to the enumeration of migratory populations, whose movement across the enumeration window produces both omission and double counting.
    2. Tribal communities: Tribal communities were named as a category requiring focused enumeration effort.
    3. Remote forest residents: Residents of remote forest areas were named alongside them, since habitations there fall outside routine administrative contact.
    4. Verification discipline: Enumerators and supervisors were directed to ensure that all entries are properly recorded, verified and cross checked.
    5. Field inspection: Charge officers and supervisors were instructed to conduct regular field inspections and quality checks.
    6. Awareness campaigns: District authorities were asked to intensify awareness campaigns through newspapers, pamphlets, social media and local outreach programmes ahead of enumeration.

    Why is the postponement of the Census in Manipur being demanded?

    1. Deferral sought: The principal Opposition party has sought postponement of the Census exercise in Manipur, citing continuing violence and the displacement of thousands of people.
    2. Displacement scale: Nearly 60,000 people have remained homeless since violence in the State began on 3 May 2023, with many still living in relief camps.
    3. Housing stock destroyed: Over 10,000 houses have been destroyed in the State.
    4. House listing defeated: Accurate house listing of thousands of homeless people living in relief camps is not practicable, so the record would capture a household structure that no longer exists.
    5. Postponement, not cancellation: The demand is for deferral until conditions become conducive, and not for cancellation of the exercise in the State.
    6. Raised in Parliament: The Inner Manipur Lok Sabha member said he had raised the matter in Parliament.

    Does a digital Census widen or narrow the count?

    1. Speed against reach: Digital capture shortens the gap between field entry and tabulation, and it makes the count conditional on device capability in the districts hardest to reach.
    2. Uniform standard on an uneven base: A single minimum specification treats a school teacher in Doda and one in a metropolitan district as equally equipped.
    3. Self enumeration favours the connected: An online portal transfers effort to the household, which advantages literate and connected households and leaves the rest dependent on a field visit.
    4. Displacement defeats the frame: A Census counts people at a usual place of residence, and conflict displacement breaks that anchor before any technology is applied.
    5. Errors travel further: A digital schedule locks an entry into a database at the point of capture, so an unverified record propagates instead of being caught at manual tabulation.

    “[2009] Consider the following statements:

    1. Between Census 1951 and Census 2001, the density of the population of India has increased more than three times.

    2. Between Census 1951 and Census 2001, the annual growth rate (exponential) of the population of India has doubled.

    Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

    (a) 1 only

    (b) 2 only

    (c) Both 1 and 2

    (d) Neither 1 nor 2

  • BNP’s Alamgir elected new President of Bangladesh

    Why in the News

    Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir, long time secretary general of the ruling Bangladesh Nationalist Party, was elected President of Bangladesh on 20 August 2026 in the first contested poll for the office in 35 years. He secured 255 of the 343 votes cast in Parliament against 88 for the nominee of the Jamaat-e-Islami led opposition alliance. The contest itself is the significant fact, since the office has been filled by consensus and uncontested polls for decades.

    How is the President of Bangladesh elected?

    1. Who votes: The President is elected indirectly by the members of Parliament, so the outcome reflects the composition of the House rather than a popular vote.
    2. Who conducts it: The Chief Election Commissioner acts as the Election Returning Officer and declares the result after counting.
    3. The vacancy rule: Under the Constitution, a new President is required to be elected within 90 days of the office falling vacant.
    4. What the office holds: The presidency is largely ceremonial, with executive authority resting with the Prime Minister and the Cabinet.

    What is the Jatiya Sangsad?

    1. What it is: The Jatiya Sangsad is Bangladesh’s unicameral Parliament, which both elects the President and provides the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Its composition therefore determines the presidential outcome in advance of the vote.

    What is Bangabhaban?

    1. What it is: Bangabhaban in Dhaka is the official residence and workplace of the President of Bangladesh. Its Darbar Hall is the venue at which the President takes the oath of office.

    What did the vote actually show about the balance in Parliament?

    1. The electorate: Of the total 349 registered voters, 343 voted in the election, and six lawmakers did not vote.
    2. The result: Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir secured 255 votes and Oli Ahmed secured 88 votes.
    3. The losing candidate: Oli Ahmed, aged 84, is a retired Colonel and chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party, and was the nominee of the Jamaat-e-Islami led eleven party opposition alliance.
    4. The winning candidate’s standing: Alamgir, aged 78, is a long time secretary general of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and a close ally of former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia.
    5. What the margin reflects: The ruling party and its allies hold a two thirds majority in Parliament following the general election that returned them to power.
    6. The break with recent practice: It was the first contested presidential election in Bangladesh since 1991, the office having largely been filled through consensus and uncontested polls in recent decades.

    Why did the presidency fall vacant?

    1. The resignation: Mohammed Shahabuddin resigned last month on health grounds before completing his five year tenure.
    2. His political association: He was a close aide of the deposed Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, whose government fell in 2024.
    3. The constitutional consequence: The vacancy triggered the 90 day requirement for electing a successor.
    4. Why it became contested: With a changed parliamentary composition following the transition, the consensus mechanism that had filled the office in recent decades no longer held.

    What does a ceremonial presidency mean in Bangladesh’s system?

    1. Head of state, not head of government: The President is the head of state, while executive authority is exercised by the Prime Minister and the Cabinet.
    2. The formal military role: The President is designated supreme commander of the defence services, a title exercised on the advice of the government.
    3. Where discretion survives: The President’s independent discretion is confined to the appointment of the Prime Minister and the Chief Justice, and otherwise the office acts on advice.
    4. The order of succession: The Speaker of Parliament acts as President when the office falls vacant, until a successor is elected.
    5. The oath: The President elect will take the oath as Bangladesh’s 23rd President on Friday evening at the Darbar Hall of Bangabhaban.

    Why does the return of contested presidential politics matter?

    1. What consensus polls concealed: Uncontested elections meant the office was allocated by the ruling party rather than won, which removed any parliamentary test of the nominee.
    2. What a contest introduces: A recorded vote of 255 to 88 registers the size and composition of the opposition bloc inside Parliament.
    3. The opposition’s new configuration: The Jamaat-e-Islami led eleven party alliance fielded a joint candidate, which formalises an opposition grouping that had previously been fragmented.
    4. The signal of the abstentions: Six lawmakers declined to vote, which records dissent that a consensus procedure would have absorbed silently.
    5. The continuity of the office: The presidency remains ceremonial, so the contest changes the politics of the office without changing its powers.

    What does the change in Dhaka alter for India’s neighbourhood policy?

    1. A new majority to work with: The Bangladesh Nationalist Party and its allies hold a two thirds majority, which gives India a single interlocutor with the parliamentary strength to conclude agreements.
    2. A pending water file: The India Bangladesh Ganga Water Treaty of 1996 expires on 31 December, and its renewal must be negotiated with the new dispensation.
    3. The unresolved Teesta question: The Teesta water sharing agreement drafted in 2011 remains unsigned and has been Dhaka’s standing demand across governments.
    4. Connectivity projects in progress: Rail, road and port links built over the previous decade, including the Akhaura Agartala rail link and the Maitri Setu bridge, require continuity of commitment on both sides.
    5. The security file: Border management, insurgent sanctuaries in the northeast and the safety of minority communities are the standing items on which India seeks assurances from any government in Dhaka.

    Challenges to Bangladesh’s political transition

    1. A ceremonial head of state elected on party lines: A partisan presidency strains the office’s role as a neutral arbiter in disputes over government formation. Eg. The outgoing President was a close aide of the deposed Prime Minister and resigned before completing his tenure.
    2. Consolidation of power under a two thirds majority: A supermajority removes the parliamentary check on constitutional amendment. Eg. The ruling party and its allies hold a two thirds majority in the Jatiya Sangsad after the general election.
    3. An opposition organised around a religious party alliance: The main opposition bloc is led by a party with a contested constitutional history. Eg. The eleven party opposition alliance that fielded the losing presidential candidate is led by Jamaat-e-Islami.
    4. Institutional damage from the previous transition: Administrative and judicial appointments made under the earlier government remain politically contested. Eg. The presidency itself fell vacant through the resignation of an appointee of the deposed government.
    5. Economic pressure on a garment dependent economy: External demand shocks translate directly into employment and foreign exchange stress. Eg. Bangladesh’s export earnings are concentrated in ready made garments, which leaves the current account exposed to a single sector.
    6. Security of minority communities: Political transitions in Bangladesh have historically been followed by attacks on minorities. Eg. The period following the fall of the previous government in 2024 saw reported attacks on Hindu households and temples.
    7. Restoring routine electoral practice: A single contested election does not by itself re-establish competitive norms. Eg. It took 35 years for a contested presidential poll to recur after 1991.

    Conclusion

    Bangladesh has elected a new head of state through its first contested presidential poll in 35 years, with the ruling party’s nominee securing 255 votes against 88 for the opposition alliance’s candidate, from 343 of 349 registered voters. The office remains ceremonial, so the outcome registers the parliamentary balance after the political transition rather than shifting executive power. The next milestone is the oath of office as Bangladesh’s 23rd President on Friday evening at the Darbar Hall of Bangabhaban.

    About India Bangladesh Relations

    1. The border: India and Bangladesh share a land boundary of 4,096.7 km, India’s longest with any neighbour, running along West Bengal, Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram.
    2. The rivers: The two countries share 54 common rivers, and water sharing is the most persistent item on the bilateral agenda.
    3. Trade: Bangladesh is India’s largest trade partner in South Asia, and India is among the largest sources of Bangladesh’s imports.
    4. Connectivity: Rail links, inland waterway protocol routes, bus services and port access arrangements have been progressively restored since 2015 after decades of disuse.
    5. Energy: India supplies electricity to Bangladesh across the interconnection at Bheramara and through cross border transmission links, and the two countries operate a diesel pipeline between them.
    6. Development partnership: India has extended three Lines of Credit to Bangladesh totalling about $7.862 billion, its largest such commitment to any single country.

    Constitutional Framework Governing the Presidency in Bangladesh

    1. Article 48: Provides for a President elected by the members of Parliament, and requires the President to act on the advice of the Prime Minister except in appointing the Prime Minister and the Chief Justice.
    2. Article 50: Fixes the President’s term at five years from the date of entering office, and bars any person from holding the office for more than two terms.
    3. Article 54: Provides that the Speaker of Parliament shall act as President when the office is vacant or the President is unable to discharge functions.
    4. Article 55: Vests the executive power of the Republic in the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, which is the provision that makes the presidency ceremonial.
    5. Article 123: Governs the timing of elections to the office, including the requirement that a vacancy be filled within a fixed period of its occurrence.
    6. Presidential Election Act, 1991: Provides the procedure for nomination, polling and declaration of the result, with the Chief Election Commissioner acting as Returning Officer.

    India Bangladesh Cooperation Initiatives

    1. Maitri Setu: A bridge over the Feni river connecting Sabroom in Tripura with Ramgarh in Bangladesh, inaugurated in March 2021, giving the northeast access to Chattogram port.
    2. Akhaura Agartala rail link: A cross border rail connection commissioned in November 2023 that shortens the route between Agartala and Kolkata through Bangladeshi territory.
    3. Port access agreement: An arrangement permitting the use of Chattogram and Mongla ports for the movement of Indian goods to and from the northeastern States.
    4. India Bangladesh Friendship Pipeline: A cross border diesel pipeline from Siliguri to Parbatipur, inaugurated in March 2023, supplying high speed diesel to northern Bangladesh.
    5. Maitree Super Thermal Power Project: A joint venture coal fired power project at Rampal in Bangladesh, developed by an Indian and Bangladeshi partnership.
    6. Border Haats: Designated markets along the boundary allowing residents of nearby villages on both sides to trade specified local goods without formal customs procedures.

    Key Facts about Bangladesh and its Relations with India

    1. Independence: Bangladesh became independent in 1971, and India was among the first countries to recognise it.
    2. Land Boundary Agreement: The 1974 agreement was operationalised through the 100th Constitutional Amendment Act, 2015, under which India transferred 111 enclaves to Bangladesh and received 51.
    3. Maritime boundary: A Permanent Court of Arbitration tribunal delivered its award on the maritime boundary between the two countries in July 2014, which both accepted.
    4. Kushiyara agreement: The withdrawal of water from the Kushiyara river was agreed in September 2022, the second water sharing instrument after the Ganga treaty.
    5. Population: Bangladesh has a population of about 173 million people.
    6. Presidential history: The office being filled on 21 August 2026 is that of Bangladesh’s 23rd President.
    7. Joint river institution: The Joint Rivers Commission has functioned since 1972 as the standing bilateral mechanism on shared rivers.

    Back2Basics: Bangladesh Nationalist Party

    1. Founded: The party was founded in 1978 by Ziaur Rahman, then the country’s military ruler and later President.
    2. Ideology: It is built around Bangladeshi nationalism, which defines national identity by territory and religion rather than by the language based Bengali nationalism of its principal rival.
    3. Leadership: It has been led since 1984 by Khaleda Zia, widow of the founder, who served as Prime Minister on three occasions.
    4. Principal rival: Its long standing opponent is the Awami League, and the two parties have alternated in power for most of the country’s competitive electoral history.
    5. Electoral boycotts: The party boycotted the general elections of 2014 and 2024, which kept it out of Parliament for extended periods.
    6. Current position: It returned to power in the general election held in February 2026, and holds a two thirds majority in Parliament with its allies.

    Challenges in India Bangladesh Relations

    1. The unresolved Teesta agreement: The most contested river sharing file has remained unsigned for over a decade. Eg. The Teesta draft agreed in 2011 was not signed after West Bengal withheld support.
    2. Border killings: Fatalities along the boundary remain the most publicly damaging irritant in the relationship. Eg. Incidents involving the Border Security Force and Bangladeshi nationals along the fenced boundary recur and draw formal protests from Dhaka.
    3. Illegal migration and its domestic politics: Migration questions feed into Indian State level politics and produce friction with Dhaka. Eg. The National Register of Citizens exercise in Assam produced sustained diplomatic concern in Bangladesh.
    4. Trade imbalance: Bangladesh runs a large deficit with India, which sustains a domestic constituency against closer economic integration. Eg. Indian exports to Bangladesh far exceed Bangladeshi exports to India despite duty free access under the South Asian Free Trade Area.
    5. Competition from external partners: Infrastructure and defence offers from other powers reduce India’s relative weight. Eg. Chinese financing has funded major Bangladeshi infrastructure including bridges, power plants and port projects.
    6. The Rohingya caseload: More than a million refugees in Cox’s Bazar constrain Bangladesh’s policy space and create a shared security concern. Eg. Repatriation attempts to Myanmar have repeatedly failed since the influx of 2017.
    7. Security of minority communities: Attacks on minorities during political transitions generate pressure on Indian policy. Eg. The 2024 transition was followed by reported attacks on Hindu households and places of worship.
    8. Insurgent sanctuaries and connectivity security: Northeast Indian connectivity through Bangladesh depends on continued cooperation against insurgent groups. Eg. Transit corridors through Bangladeshi territory to the northeast require sustained security cooperation to remain viable.

    Way Forward

    1. Open the Ganga treaty renewal early: Begin the final round of renewal talks well before the 31 December expiry so that the instrument does not lapse during a political transition.
    2. Separate the Teesta from the Ganga negotiation: Handle the two rivers on independent tracks so that a stalled file does not hold a functioning one hostage.
    3. Institutionalise engagement beyond the ruling party: Maintain contact across the political spectrum in Dhaka so that the relationship does not have to be rebuilt at each change of government.
    4. Correct the trade asymmetry: Expand duty free access, remove non tariff barriers and complete the proposed comprehensive economic partnership so that the deficit ceases to be a political argument.
    5. Complete connectivity projects on schedule: Deliver the remaining rail, road and inland waterway links so that the economic case for cooperation is visible to the Bangladeshi public.
    6. Reduce border fatalities to zero: Shift to non lethal means and joint patrolling protocols along the boundary, since this single issue does the most reputational damage.
    7. Coordinate on the Rohingya question: Support repatriation diplomacy with Myanmar and continue humanitarian assistance to Cox’s Bazar, which addresses a Bangladeshi priority at limited cost.

  • EOI for data centre project on islands withdrawn

    Why in the News

    The Andaman and Nicobar Islands administration has withdrawn an Expression of Interest seeking feasibility proposals for a private sector-led green artificial intelligence data centre on the islands, days after publishing it. The withdrawal follows reports that the Nicobarese population on Great Nicobar Island had not been informed of any plan to set up a data centre in the sea areas around the island.

    What is an Expression of Interest in a public project?

    1. About: An Expression of Interest is a pre-tender notice through which a government body invites interested parties to indicate willingness and capability to undertake a project, before a formal tender is issued.
    2. Purpose: It is used to test market interest and technical feasibility for a project whose scope, cost or technology is not yet fixed, so the responses shape the later tender document.
    3. Legal effect: It creates no contractual obligation and can be withdrawn or modified by the issuing authority at any stage before award.

    What is a green artificial intelligence data centre?

    1. About: A data centre is a facility housing servers and networking equipment, and an artificial intelligence data centre is optimised for the high power and cooling demands of large model training and inference.
    2. Why green: The green label refers to powering the facility with renewable energy and using low-water or seawater-based cooling, since artificial intelligence workloads consume far more electricity and cooling water than conventional server hosting.

    Who are the Nicobarese?

    1. About: The Nicobarese are the largest indigenous community of the Nicobar group of islands, a Scheduled Tribe living in village-based settlements across the Nicobar archipelago including Great Nicobar.
    2. Why they matter here: Their traditional lands and coastal commons fall within the footprint of island infrastructure projects, so their prior information and consent is the legal and administrative test for any such proposal.

    Why has the withdrawal drawn attention to consultation?

    1. The sequence: The Expression of Interest was published on 10 August, and a notice issued days later withdrew it with immediate effect due to administrative reasons.
    2. Location of the proposal: The data centre was proposed for the sea areas around Great Nicobar Island, which places it directly in the coastal zone the resident community depends on.
    3. The information gap: The local Nicobarese population on Great Nicobar Island had not been informed of any plan to set up a data centre in those waters.
    4. The wider protest: Local people are already protesting against the government’s proposed Rs 91,000-crore mega-infrastructure project on the same island.
    5. What the reason given does not settle: The notice cites administrative reasons without specifying whether the withdrawal responds to the consultation failure, the technical feasibility or the wider protest.

    What is at stake in the Great Nicobar mega project?

    1. Scale: The proposed mega-infrastructure project on Great Nicobar Island carries an estimated cost of Rs 91,000 crore.
    2. Components: The Great Nicobar Island Project comprises a transhipment port at Galathea Bay, an international airport, a power plant and a greenfield township.
    3. Strategic rationale: The transhipment port is intended to rival Colombo and Singapore for container transhipment, capturing traffic that currently bypasses Indian ports.
    4. Ecological setting: Great Nicobar hosts the Great Nicobar Biosphere Reserve, along with the Galathea Bay leatherback turtle nesting site and the Campbell Bay and Galathea National Parks.
    5. Community setting: The island is home to the Nicobarese and to the Shompen, a Particularly Vulnerable Tribal Group living in the interior forests.
    6. The consultation question: The data centre withdrawal repeats the question already raised about the mega project, which is whether affected communities are informed before proposals enter the public domain.

    Challenges to Island Infrastructure Development

    1. Prior informed consent: Project proposals reach the public domain before the resident community is told, which converts consultation into a post-facto formality. Eg. The Nicobarese on Great Nicobar were not informed of the data centre proposal in the waters around their island.
    2. Ecological irreversibility: Island ecosystems are small, endemic and cannot absorb clearance at the scale mainland projects assume. Eg. The Great Nicobar project involves diversion of a large tract of tropical forest and construction at the Galathea Bay leatherback turtle nesting beach.
    3. Seismic and tsunami exposure: The islands sit on an active subduction zone, so heavy coastal infrastructure carries a hazard the mainland does not face. Eg. The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami devastated the Nicobar group and permanently submerged parts of the coastline near Indira Point.
    4. Water and power for data infrastructure: Artificial intelligence data centres demand continuous power and cooling that island grids cannot supply without new generation. Eg. The Andaman and Nicobar Islands depend substantially on diesel generation and an undersea optical fibre link commissioned in 2020.
    5. Rehabilitation of tribal populations: Displacement from customary land cannot be compensated in cash terms for communities whose livelihood is tied to a specific coastal ecology. Eg. Nicobarese families displaced by the 2004 tsunami were resettled in intermediate shelters, and return to original villages remained incomplete for years.
    6. Regulatory clearance layering: Island projects require forest, coastal zone, wildlife and tribal clearances from separate authorities, which invites piecemeal appraisal of a single project. Eg. The Great Nicobar project’s clearances have been challenged before the National Green Tribunal and reviewed by a high-powered committee.
    7. Strategic and civilian conflict: The islands host India’s only tri-service command, so security requirements limit civilian access and complicate transparent public consultation. Eg. Access to several Nicobar islands remains restricted under tribal reserve and defence notifications.

    “[2019] Consider the following statements about Particularly Vulnerable Tribal Groups (PVTGs) in India:

    1. PVTGs reside in 18 States and one Union Territory.

    2. A stagnant or declining population is one of the criteria for determining PVTG status.

    3. There are 95 PVTGs officially notified in the country so far.

    4. Irular and Konda Reddi tribes are included in the list of PVTGs.

    Which of the statements given above are correct?

    (a) 1, 2 and 3

    (b) 2, 3 and 4

    (c) 1, 2 and 4

    (d) 1, 3 and 4

  • Former SC judge-led panel to probe ‘police excesses’ against protesters

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court has constituted a five member High-Powered Enquiry Committee headed by a former Supreme Court judge to examine alleged excesses and disproportionate use of force by police and security personnel at Jantar Mantar and other locations during last month’s protests over the National Eligibility cum Entrance Test (Undergraduate) paper leak. The Court framed twelve issues for the inquiry, covering both police conduct and violence by protesters. The order therefore turns a policing controversy into an examination of the constitutional limits on how the State may respond to assembly.

    What is the High-Powered Enquiry Committee?

    1. What it is: The High-Powered Enquiry Committee (HPEC) is a fact finding body constituted by the Supreme Court to examine allegations of excessive force by police and security personnel during the protests, and to report back to the Court.
    2. Who heads it and who sits on it: It is headed by former Supreme Court judge R Subhash Reddy. Its members are former Punjab and Haryana High Court Chief Justice Ravi Shankar Jha, former Delhi High Court judge Justice Shalinder Kaur, former Central Bureau of Investigation Director Rishi Kumar Shukla, and retired Director General of Police of Meghalaya L R Bishnoi.
    3. How it must function: The inquiry is not to be a one time exercise. The Committee is to undertake a continuous and periodic assessment of the enumerated issues and submit interim findings periodically, so the Court can issue directions as warranted.
    4. What it does not displace: The Court clarified that the constitution of the Committee shall in no way deter or debar police authorities or security forces from taking administrative or disciplinary action against officers found in contravention of the rules governing their conduct.

    What is the current status of the right to protest in India?

    1. The right itself: The right to protest is drawn from Article 19(1)(a), the freedom of speech and expression, and Article 19(1)(b), the right to assemble peaceably and without arms, read together.
    2. The condition built into the text: The assembly must be peaceable and without arms, so the protection falls away for an assembly that turns violent or armed.
    3. The limits on the right: Restrictions may be imposed under Article 19(2) on speech and Article 19(3) on assembly, and the restriction must be reasonable and imposed by law rather than by executive discretion alone.
    4. No right to occupy a public space indefinitely: The Supreme Court in Amit Sahni v Commissioner of Police (2020) held that public ways and public spaces cannot be occupied indefinitely, and that demonstrations must take place in designated areas.
    5. A blanket ban on a protest site is not permissible: In Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan v Union of India (2018) the Court set aside an absolute prohibition on demonstrations at Jantar Mantar and directed that guidelines be framed regulating rather than eliminating protest there.
    6. Force must be proportionate and compensable: In Anita Thakur v State of Jammu and Kashmir (2016) the Court held that use of excessive force by police against demonstrators violates Article 21 and awarded compensation to the injured.
    7. The operative statutory levers: Prohibitory orders are issued under Section 163 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, and speech and assembly prosecutions have been brought under Section 152 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.

    Constitutional Provisions Related to the Right to Protest and Police Accountability

    1. Article 19(1)(a): Guarantees to all citizens the freedom of speech and expression, from which the right to voice dissent is drawn.
    2. Article 19(1)(b): Guarantees the right to assemble peaceably and without arms.
    3. Article 19(1)(c): Guarantees the right to form associations or unions, under which protest organisations operate.
    4. Article 19(2): Permits the State to impose reasonable restrictions on the freedom of speech and expression on enumerated grounds.
    5. Article 19(3): Permits reasonable restrictions on the right of assembly in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India or public order.
    6. Article 21: Guarantees that no person shall be deprived of life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law, the provision under which bodily harm caused by disproportionate force is examined.
    7. Article 22: Provides safeguards on arrest and detention, including the right to be informed of the grounds of arrest and to consult a legal practitioner.
    8. Article 20(3): Protects a person accused of an offence against being compelled to be a witness against himself.
    9. Article 32 and Article 226: Provide the remedies before the Supreme Court and the High Courts through which protest related grievances and monitored inquiries are brought.
    10. Seventh Schedule, State List Entry 1 and Entry 2: Place public order and police within the legislative and executive competence of the States, which is why a national inquiry into police conduct proceeds through the Court rather than through a central department.

    What is Section 163 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023?

    1. What it does: Section 163 empowers a District Magistrate, a Sub-divisional Magistrate or an Executive Magistrate to issue a written order directing a person or the public generally to abstain from a specified act, where there is an apprehension of obstruction, annoyance, danger to human life or a disturbance of public tranquillity.
    2. Its limits: An order under the section is temporary and cannot ordinarily remain in force beyond two months, and it corresponds to the power earlier exercised under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

    What is Section 152 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023?

    1. What it criminalises: Section 152 punishes acts that excite secession, armed rebellion, subversive activities or separatist feelings, or that endanger the sovereignty, unity and integrity of India, with punishment extending to life imprisonment or seven years with fine.
    2. What it replaced: It came into force on 1 July 2024 in place of Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, the sedition provision inserted in 1870, and its constitutional validity is under challenge on grounds of vagueness and overbreadth.

    What are metallic kinetic projectiles?

    1. What they are: Metallic kinetic projectiles, commonly called pellets, are small metal shot fired in a scattering pattern from pump-action rifles or projectile-action guns, used as a crowd control weapon.
    2. Why they are contested: The scatter pattern makes the point of impact uncontrollable, so injuries to the eyes and upper body are common and the resulting harm is often irreversible.

    What are the twelve issues the Committee will examine?

    1. Issue 1, excessive force: Alleged use of excessive force and violence against protesters by police authorities and other agencies, including deployment of pellet guns, electric batons, lathi charges and tear gas without adequate warning or proportionality, resulting in severe bodily harm and injuries, some alleged to be of a grievous and lasting nature.
    2. Issue 2, proportionality of response: Ensuring a proportionate and measured police response during protests, public gatherings and peaceful assemblies, so as to strike an appropriate balance between maintaining public order and exercising the constitutional right to peaceful dissent.
    3. Issue 3, banning pellets: The desirability of banning the use of metallic kinetic projectiles or pellets fired from pump-action rifles or projectile-action guns, having regard to the grave and at times irreversible bodily harm they cause.
    4. Issue 4, identification of officers: The necessity of ensuring that police and security personnel wear proper uniforms and visible nameplates while effecting arrests or using force during crowd control operations, to secure accountability and enable identification of individual officers.
    5. Issue 5, surveillance: Allegations of monitoring and surveillance of protesters by police personnel, and the extent to which such measures were consistent with the protesters’ constitutional rights to privacy and free assembly.
    6. Issue 6, female protesters: Alleged incidents of targeted violence, harassment, molestation and secondary victimisation directed against female protesters, which warrant a focused and expeditious enquiry.
    7. Issue 7, medical support and compensation: The provision of medical and other requisite support, including award of compensation, to victims of alleged police abuse, and the manner and adequacy of the support extended so far.
    8. Issue 8, prohibitory orders: Regulation of the issuance of blanket prohibitory orders under Section 163 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, to prevent their use as a routine or pre-emptive measure that forecloses peaceful assembly rather than as a proportionate response to a real and imminent threat to public order.
    9. Issue 9, thresholds for Section 152: The establishment of strict constitutional thresholds and safeguards to prevent Section 152 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 from being invoked to stifle political dissent and peaceful protest, so that it is not permitted to operate as a chilling restraint on constitutionally protected speech and assembly.
    10. Issue 10, violence by protesters: Alleged use of force and violence by protesters against police officers and other security personnel.
    11. Issue 11, damage to property: Damage to public property caused by the actions of protesters, including destruction of and injury to government installations, vehicles and other assets belonging to the State and to private citizens alike.
    12. Issue 12, injuries to police: The injuries sustained by police forces in the course of discharging their duties, and the consequent mental and emotional trauma borne by their families.

    Which issues has the Court told the Committee to take up first?

    1. The two priority issues: The Committee is to address Issue 1 on excessive force and Issue 6 on targeted violence against female protesters on a priority basis, bearing in mind the sensitivity attendant on them.
    2. The first deliverable: The Committee has been asked to complete its inquiry and deliberations on those two issues and submit its First Interim Report at the earliest.
    3. The additional head opened: The Committee may also examine the grant of interim compensation to those injured on either side, whether police personnel or protesters.
    4. The reporting design: Interim findings are to be submitted periodically rather than a single report at the end, so the Court can issue directions while the inquiry continues.
    5. When the order was made: The order is dated 19 August 2026 and was released on 20 August 2026.

    Why does the Court’s framing place police conduct and protester conduct on the same list?

    1. The list is symmetrical by design: Nine issues concern police and State conduct and three concern protester conduct, so the inquiry is not framed solely as an investigation of the police.
    2. The compensation head runs both ways: Interim compensation is opened for those injured on either side, which places an injured constable and an injured student within the same remedial frame.
    3. Trauma is recognised on the police side: Issue 12 extends to the mental and emotional trauma borne by the families of injured police personnel, a head rarely written into an inquiry mandate.
    4. Symmetry is not equivalence: The two issues marked for priority treatment are both allegations against the police, so the sequencing signals which set of allegations the Court treats as most urgent.
    5. The disciplinary channel stays open in parallel: The Court expressly preserved the power of police authorities to take administrative or disciplinary action against their own officers, so the inquiry does not become a reason to suspend departmental accountability.
    6. The tension the design carries: A committee asked simultaneously to judge police excess and protester violence must apply one standard of proportionality to an armed disciplined force and another to an unorganised crowd, without a settled test for either.

    Major debates surrounding the right to protest and the use of force

    1. Regulation against prohibition: One position holds that designated protest sites and prior permission are reasonable regulation of a public space, and the other holds that permission requirements convert a right into a licence.
    2. Two rulings pulling in opposite directions: Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (2018) struck down a blanket prohibition at a protest site, and Amit Sahni (2020) held that public ways cannot be occupied indefinitely, so the boundary between the two remains contested.
    3. The proportionality standard for lethal and less lethal weapons: There is no settled judicial test fixing when tear gas, water cannon, batons or pellets may be used, so proportionality is assessed after the event rather than fixed in advance.
    4. Whether pellet weapons can be regulated or must be banned: One position accepts them as a less lethal alternative to firearms, and the other holds that an uncontrollable scatter pattern makes proportionate use impossible in principle.
    5. Prohibitory orders as prevention against pre-emption: Section 163 is defended as a preventive power against imminent threats and contested as a routine instrument that forecloses assembly before any threat materialises.
    6. Whether the narrowing of sedition survives its replacement: The Kedar Nath Singh (1962) requirement of incitement to violence narrowed the old sedition provision, and whether that narrowing automatically transfers to Section 152 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 is unsettled.
    7. Command responsibility against individual liability: Accountability for crowd control failures is contested between the individual officer who used force and the supervising officer who ordered the deployment.
    8. The evidentiary gap the dispute turns on: Without uniforms carrying visible identification, body worn cameras and a contemporaneous record of orders, allegations on both sides rest on competing testimony rather than on documented fact.

    Challenges to the inquiry delivering accountability

    1. A fact finding committee is not a prosecuting authority: The Committee reports to the Court and cannot itself frame charges or convict, so accountability depends on what follows the report. Eg. The Court has separately preserved the departmental power to take disciplinary action, which sits outside the Committee’s control.
    2. Evidence degrades with time in crowd control cases: Injury records, video footage, control room logs and deployment orders have to be secured early or they cease to be reliable. Eg. Issue 4 arises precisely because officers using force were allegedly not identifiable by uniform or nameplate.
    3. Prosecution of police officers requires sanction: Proceeding against a public servant for acts done in the discharge of official duty depends on prior sanction from the government that employs him. Eg. The requirement of prior sanction has historically been the reason many custodial and encounter cases do not reach trial.
    4. Police is a State subject and the incidents spanned States: The Committee’s findings must be implemented by multiple State governments, each of which controls its own force. Eg. The mandate covers Jantar Mantar and other locations across the country during the same protest wave.
    5. Compensation without a fixed scale invites disparity: Interim compensation awarded case by case, on both sides, has no published scale to anchor it. Eg. In Anita Thakur (2016) compensation was fixed by the Court itself in the absence of any statutory schedule for excessive force.
    6. Monitored inquiries lose momentum once attention moves: A periodic assessment mandate depends on the Court continuing to list and act on interim reports over years. Eg. The Prakash Singh directions on police reform were issued in 2006 and remain incompletely implemented across States two decades later.
    7. The unresolved statutory questions sit outside the Committee’s power: Issues 8 and 9 ask for constitutional thresholds on Section 163 and Section 152, which only the Court or Parliament can settle. Eg. The constitutional challenge to Section 152 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 is pending separately before the Supreme Court.

    Conclusion

    The Committee stands constituted with five members under an order dated 19 August 2026, and its immediate task is a First Interim Report on excessive force and on targeted violence against female protesters. The mandate is unusually wide, covering not only what the police did but also the statutory instruments through which protest was restricted, namely prohibitory orders under Section 163 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 and prosecutions under Section 152 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. The constitutional question the order raises is whether the State can be held to a proportionality standard in crowd control when no such standard exists in written form. Until that standard is fixed in advance, each episode will continue to be judged after the fact by a fresh committee.

    “[2013, GS2, 10] Discuss Section 66A of IT Act, with reference to its alleged violation of Article 19 of the Constitution.”