💥Join UPSC 2027,2028 Mentorship (July Batch) + XFactor Notes & Microthemes PDF
Talk to Mentor

Civilsdaily

Login

GS Paper: GS2

  • [31st July 2026] The Hindu OpED: The Bay of Bengal as India’s SHANTI anchor

    PYQ Relevance
    [UPSC 2022]     What are the maritime security challenges in India? Discuss the organisational, technical and procedural initiatives taken to improve the maritime security.
    Linkage: It examines India’s maritime security challenges and initiatives to strengthen regional maritime governance.The article analyses SHANTI as India’s new framework to enhance maritime cooperation, security, and resilience in the Bay of Bengal through BIMSTEC.

    Mentor’s Comment

    The External Affairs Minister introduced Securing Holistic Advancement through Norms, Trust and Integrity (SHANTI) on 13 July while launching India’s candidature for the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 2028-29 term, naming the Bay of Bengal as the region to operationalise it first. The framework arrives in a region where growing naval and infrastructure capacity has outpaced any shared set of maritime norms among its littoral states.

    What is SHANTI?

    1. Full form and origin: SHANTI stands for Securing Holistic Advancement through Norms, Trust and Integrity, introduced on 13 July alongside India’s UNSC candidature announcement.
    2. Lineage: It builds on Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR), articulated in 2015 around the idea of equity in development, and Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions (MAHASAGAR), announced in 2025 to widen that vision to the interconnectedness of security across the Indo Pacific and the Global South.
    3. Function: SHANTI is presented as a normative framework, offering shared principles for maritime security, disaster response, the blue economy and environmental resilience, rather than a new institution or treaty.
    4. Rollout sequence: The Bay of Bengal is named as the first region where SHANTI is meant to move from principle to practice, before any wider application across the Indo Pacific.

    What is BIMSTEC?

    1. The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) is a regional grouping of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Thailand, connecting South and Southeast Asia around the Bay of Bengal.
    2. At its National Security Advisers’ meeting in New Delhi in July 2026, BIMSTEC members adopted common principles for maritime law enforcement and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. They also agreed to hold their first joint maritime security exercise in the Bay in November 2026.

    Why is the Bay of Bengal treated as SHANTI’s proving ground?

    1. Strategic centrality: The Bay links India’s Act East policy with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), gives access to the Malacca Strait, and connects the eastern Indian Ocean to major global trade and energy routes.
    2. Comparative advantage: The western Indian Ocean is marked by active conflict and fragile economies. The Bay’s littoral states instead face similar, non military challenges such as cyclones, coastal erosion, fisheries management and undersea cable protection, which makes cooperation more feasible than confrontation.
    3. Institutional gap: The region is not short of institutions but suffers from fragmentation among them, and SHANTI is framed as a common framework to align existing mechanisms rather than add another one.
    4. Geopolitical pressure: China’s reliance on the Malacca Strait, often called its Malacca dilemma, has driven an expanding Chinese presence through ports and infrastructure projects in the same littoral states SHANTI seeks to anchor.

    Can SHANTI move beyond being another acronym?

    1. Fragmentation risk: The region’s stated problem is institutional fragmentation, and a new framework risks adding to that fragmentation unless it visibly aligns existing mechanisms.
    2. Stewardship versus dominance: India’s convening role depends on being accepted as a preferred security partner and first responder, a position that rests on restraint rather than the naval and economic weight India commands in the region.
    3. Early stage outputs: Concrete outcomes so far are limited to a declaration of common principles, a first joint maritime exercise scheduled for November 2026, and a white shipping information sharing agreement still under discussion, none of which are yet operational.
    4. Norms without enforcement: SHANTI rests on shared principles rather than a binding treaty, leaving compliance dependent on the willingness of littoral states rather than an enforceable obligation.

    What are the challenges to SHANTI?

    1. Overlap with existing bodies: SHANTI must coordinate with, rather than duplicate, existing mechanisms such as BIMSTEC, the Indian Ocean Rim Association and the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, each with its own membership and mandate.
    2. Financing gap: Disaster response, undersea cable protection and blue economy cooperation require capital that several BIMSTEC members cannot supply on their own, raising the risk that shared projects become dependent on Indian or external financing.
    3. Limited replicability: The Bay of Bengal is easier ground precisely because it lacks the active conflict of the western Indian Ocean, so success there does not guarantee the same framework will work in more contested Indo Pacific waters.
    4. Competing infrastructure presence: Continued Chinese port and infrastructure investment in the same littoral states complicates India’s claim to a natural convening role.
    5. Dependence on voluntary compliance: Because SHANTI is a set of norms rather than a binding agreement, its durability depends on continued political will among BIMSTEC members rather than any enforcement mechanism.

    Conclusion

    SHANTI’s substance will not be judged by its acronym but by whether the Bay of Bengal’s BIMSTEC linked initiatives, the first joint maritime exercise due in November 2026 and the pending white shipping information sharing agreement, convert shared principles into functioning practice. Until those steps are completed, SHANTI remains a stated framework rather than a demonstrated one.

    Back2Basics:

    BIMSTEC

    1. The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation was formed in 1997 and renamed after Bhutan and Nepal joined in 2004, expanding it from its original five members to seven.
    2. Its secretariat is based in Dhaka, Bangladesh, and its membership spans Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Thailand.
    3. The 6th BIMSTEC Summit, held in Bangkok in April 2025, adopted the Bangkok Vision 2030 and a Maritime Transport Agreement covering national treatment for vessels, crew and cargo among member states.
    4. BIMSTEC connects South Asia and Southeast Asia and has expanded its cooperation beyond trade into security, disaster management, energy and connectivity.

  • Activists raise alarm over PM CARES denial of access to audit statements

    Why in the News

    The Prime Minister’s Citizen Assistance and Relief in Emergency Situations (PM CARES) Fund has not published audited financial statements for the last three financial years. The government maintains that the trust is not a “public authority” under the Right to Information (RTI) Act, 2005 and is therefore not bound by its disclosure requirements. Activists argue that the fund has all the characteristics of a public body. They point out that the Prime Minister is its Chairperson, Union Ministers serve as ex officio trustees, and government employees have contributed from their salaries. Yet, the fund remains outside the RTI Act, parliamentary scrutiny, and audit by the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG).


    What is the PM CARES Fund?

    1. Establishment: Set up in March 2020 and registered as a public charitable trust under the Registration Act, 1908, with its trust deed registered in New Delhi on 27 March 2020, to support relief during public health emergencies and other disasters.
    2. Composition: The Prime Minister serves as ex officio Chairperson, and the Union Ministers of Defence, Home Affairs and Finance serve as ex officio trustees.
    3. Funding: Funded entirely through voluntary contributions from individuals and organisations, with the government stating it receives no budgetary support.
    4. Tax and foreign funding benefits: Donations qualify for a 100% deduction under Section 80G of the Income Tax Act, 1961, count as Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) expenditure under the Companies Act, 2013, and the fund holds an exemption under the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act (FCRA) to receive donations from overseas.

    What financial disclosure has the fund made?

    1. Last published statement: The last publicly available audited statement, for financial year 2022 23, showed an opening balance of Rs 5,415.65 crore, voluntary contributions of Rs 909.64 crore, total receipts of Rs 6,723.07 crore, total payments of Rs 439.38 crore, and a closing balance of Rs 6,283.68 crore as of 31 March 2023.
    2. Disclosure gap: Only the audited statements for 2019 20, 2020 21, 2021 22 and 2022 23 are available on the fund’s website, leaving the last three financial years without any published audit.
    3. Primary use: The fund has primarily financed India’s COVID 19 response and emergency health infrastructure.

    Why does the government’s “not a public authority” position sit uneasily with the fund’s structure?

    1. Government’s legal position: The government maintains the trust is not a public authority under the RTI Act, and the Ministry of Corporate Affairs retrospectively amended the relevant Companies Act rules to support this position.
    2. Activists’ counter: Activists argue the fund was presented as set up by the Union government, carries the sanctity of the Prime Minister’s office as chairperson, and drew contributions from government employees’ salaries, features that make it appear to be a public authority in substance.
    3. The accountability gap: The fund remains outside the RTI Act’s disclosure obligations, outside parliamentary scrutiny, and outside audit by the CAG, the three principal mechanisms that apply to ordinary government spending.

    What are the challenges to ensuring transparency in the PM CARES Fund?

    1. A named precedent: Activists cite the electoral bonds case, where sustained anonymity in political funding enabled quid pro quo arrangements between donors and the government, before the Supreme Court struck the scheme down in February 2024 for violating the right to information.
    2. No independent constitutional audit: Without CAG audit, no independent constitutional auditor verifies how contributions, including those from government employees’ salaries, are spent.
    3. Retrospective rule change: The Ministry of Corporate Affairs’ retrospective amendment to Companies Act rules narrows the scope for legal challenge based on the fund’s original design.
    4. CSR channel scrutiny: Because CSR contributions to PM CARES count toward companies’ mandatory CSR spending obligations, opacity in fund utilisation also affects corporate accountability for those obligations.
    5. No periodic review clause: Unlike time bound government schemes, PM CARES has no periodic legislative or parliamentary review clause forcing disclosure at fixed intervals.

    Conclusion

    The PM CARES Fund’s structure gives it the outward markers of a public authority, a Prime Minister led chairpersonship, ministerial trustees and salary contributions from government employees, while its legal classification as a private trust keeps it outside the RTI Act, parliamentary scrutiny and CAG audit. Three consecutive years without a published audited statement leave activists’ comparison to the electoral bonds case as the operative risk to track. Whether the fund publishes its pending audits or its RTI exempt status changes remains the open question.

    Back2Basics:

    Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of India

    1. Constitutional basis: The CAG is a constitutional authority under Articles 148 to 151 of the Constitution, appointed by the President.
    2. Governing law: Its powers and duties are laid out in the Comptroller and Auditor General’s (Duties, Powers and Conditions of Service) Act, 1971.
    3. Mandate: Audits all receipts and expenditure of the Union and state governments, including bodies substantially financed by government grants, and reports findings for placement before the legislature.
    4. Tenure and independence: Holds office for six years or until age 65, whichever is earlier, and can be removed only through a process similar to a Supreme Court judge’s removal.
    5. Relevance here: PM CARES Fund’s exclusion from CAG audit means its accounts face no scrutiny from this constitutional auditor, unlike most bodies with government backed establishment.

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2020] “Recent amendments to the Right to Information Act will have profound impact on the autonomy and independence of the Information Commission”. Discuss.

    Linkage: This PYQ tests the role of the RTI Act in promoting transparency and accountability in public institutions.The article examines the PM CARES Fund’s exemption from the RTI Act and the resulting concerns over public accountability.

  • CWMA upholds CWRC’s order to Karnataka to release water to Tamil Nadu

    Why in the News

    The Cauvery Water Management Authority (CWMA) on 30 July upheld an order of the Cauvery Water Regulation Committee (CWRC) directing Karnataka to release 3,500 cusecs of water a day to Tamil Nadu for 15 days despite Karnataka’s own appeal citing drought. The ruling exposes that Karnataka and Tamil Nadu still have no agreed formula for sharing shortfalls in the Cauvery basin, years after the Supreme Court’s final verdict on the dispute.

    How does the Cauvery water sharing mechanism work?

    1. Two tier structure: The CWRC functions within the CWMA, which implements the 2007 award of the Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal as modified by the Supreme Court in 2018.
    2. Composition: The CWRC is headed by the Member (Water Resources) of the CWMA and includes Chief Engineers of all basin states along with representatives of the India Meteorological Department (IMD), Central Water Commission and the Union Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers Welfare.
    3. Monitoring role: It tracks daily water levels, inflows and storage at eight reservoirs, four in Karnataka, three in Tamil Nadu and one in Kerala. It also issues seasonal water release directions for each basin state.
    4. Appeal route: A state aggrieved by a CWRC order can appeal to the CWMA. The CWMA, as the apex body monitoring compliance with the Supreme Court’s verdict, can uphold, modify or set aside the CWRC’s order.
    5. Unit of measure: Releases are set in cusecs, a rate of flow measured in cubic feet per second, while cumulative volume is tracked in thousand million cubic feet, referred to as tmc ft.

    Why did the CWRC order the release now?

    1. Deficient inflows: Karnataka’s four reservoirs recorded a combined inflow shortfall of about 60% against the 30 year average, and the deficit at the Biligundulu gauge, where Karnataka’s flow to Tamil Nadu is measured, was 90%.
    2. Storage position: As on 30 July, Karnataka’s four reservoirs held 65.34 tmc ft against a total capacity of 114.57 tmc ft.
    3. Forecast: The IMD gave no optimistic outlook for the following weeks, which shaped the CWRC’s view that Karnataka could still spare water.
    4. Buffer assessment: The CWMA noted Karnataka’s reservoirs stood to gain a minimum of 15 tmc ft in the next 15 days and that releasing 4.5 tmc ft would not affect Karnataka’s drinking water needs.

    Why do both states reject the outcome as unfair?

    1. Karnataka’s distress claim: Karnataka cited a super El Nino effect, said it had not begun irrigation releases this year, and argued Tamil Nadu would separately gain from the northeast monsoon later in the season.
    2. Karnataka’s carryover argument: Karnataka contended Tamil Nadu already held substantial carryover storage from earlier releases, reducing its immediate need.
    3. Tamil Nadu’s shortfall claim: Tamil Nadu sought 9.45 tmc ft over 15 days at 7,000 cusecs a day under the distress formula, arguing the ordered 3,500 cusecs was insufficient given a 90% deficit at Biligundulu.
    4. Tamil Nadu’s cultivation needs: Tamil Nadu’s ongoing kuruvai season needs at least 30 tmc ft against a Mettur storage of about 36 tmc ft, of which 10 tmc ft is reserved for drinking water. The following samba thaladi season needs a minimum of 180 tmc ft.
    5. Political fallout: Karnataka’s Chief Minister called an all party meeting in Bengaluru on 2 August to consider legal options, and farmer protests have already begun in the Cauvery basin against the release order.

    What are the challenges to the Cauvery dispute resolution mechanism?

    1. No distress sharing formula: Both the CWRC chief and Tamil Nadu’s position point to the absence of an agreed formula for splitting shortfalls in a deficient year, forcing an ad hoc order each time rainfall fails.
    2. Recurring litigation: Karnataka has approached the CWMA and is weighing further legal options, repeating a cycle of appeals seen in nearly every distress year since the tribunal’s award.
    3. Compliance risk: The CWMA can direct a release, but implementation still depends on Karnataka’s cooperation, a dependence that has previously produced Supreme Court contempt proceedings against Karnataka.
    4. Climate variability: A pattern of super El Nino effects and deficient monsoons increases the frequency of distress years, straining a formula built around long term averages rather than year on year swings.
    5. Political cost: A release ordered during an acknowledged drought risks becoming a flashpoint for farmer unrest and inter state friction, regardless of the technical merits of the CWRC’s assessment.

    Conclusion

    The CWMA’s ruling shows the institutional mechanism functioning as designed, yet satisfying neither riparian state. Karnataka calls the release unfair given its own distress, and Tamil Nadu calls the quantum inadequate for its cultivation needs. What remains unresolved is not whether the tribunal award should be enforced, but whether Karnataka and Tamil Nadu will ever agree on a distress sharing formula that removes the need for fresh litigation every deficient season. The CWRC is scheduled to meet again on 11 August to review compliance.

    Back2Basics:

    Cauvery Water Management Authority (CWMA)

    1. Established in June 2018 by the Union Jal Shakti Ministry to implement the final award of the Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal (2007) as modified by the Supreme Court’s verdict of the same year.
    2. Constituted under Section 6A of the Inter State River Water Disputes Act, 1956, following the Supreme Court’s directions.
    3. Composition includes a Chairman, a Secretary and Members, including a full time Member (Water Resources) who also heads the Cauvery Water Regulation Committee.
    4. Jurisdiction covers water release, storage and supply regulation across the Cauvery basin states of Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Kerala and Puducherry.
    5. Functions as the apex body for compliance with the Supreme Court’s verdict, with the CWRC as its technical monitoring arm.

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2013] Constitutional mechanisms to resolve the inter-state water disputes have failed to address and solve the problems. Is the failure due to structural or process inadequacy or both? Discuss.

    Linkage: It examines the effectiveness of constitutional and institutional mechanisms for resolving inter-state river water disputes. The article highlights recurring Cauvery disputes, the absence of a distress-sharing formula, and continuing litigation despite the CWMA framework.

  • Centre defends CEC panel without CJI

    Why in the News?

    The Supreme Court is examining the constitutional validity of the Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023, which gives the executive a majority in the CEC selection committee. The Court has reserved its decision on whether to refer the matter to a Constitution Bench.

    What is the CEC Selection Committee under the 2023 Act?

    The Act provides for a three-member selection committee comprising:

    • Prime Minister (Chairperson)
    • Union Cabinet Minister nominated by the Prime Minister
    • Leader of the Opposition (LoP) in the Lok Sabha

    What changed?

    • The Act replaced the Chief Justice of India (CJI) with a Cabinet Minister.
    • This gives the executive two out of three votes, with the Opposition holding one.

    What is the Anoop Baranwal Judgment (2023)?

    • Delivered by a five-judge Constitution Bench.
    • Held that until Parliament enacted a law, the CEC and Election Commissioners should be appointed by a committee comprising:
      • Prime Minister
      • Leader of the Opposition
      • Chief Justice of India
    • The Court stressed that the Election Commission must be independent, neutral, and free from executive control.

    Centre’s Arguments

    • Parliament is competent to decide the appointment process.
    • The Prime Minister’s office carries constitutional trust.
    • Courts should not presume bad faith by constitutional authorities.
    • Replacing the CJI with a Cabinet Minister is within Parliament’s legislative powers.

    Supreme Court’s Concerns

    • The committee lacks a neutral member.
    • A 2:1 executive majority may affect the perception of independence.
    • Appointments should not only be fair but also appear to be fair.

    [2017] Consider the following statements regarding the Election Commission of India:
    1.The ECI is currently a five-member body consisting of the Chief Election Commissioner and four Election Commissioners.
    2.The Union Ministry of Home Affairs is the final authority that decides the election schedule for general elections.
    3.The ECI is the designated authority to resolve disputes relating to splits or mergers of recognized political parties.
    Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

    [A] 1 and 2 only

    [B] 3 only

    [C] 2 and 3 only

    [D] 1, 2 and 3

  • A medical education more inclusive

    Why in the News

    The National Medical Commission (NMC) issued revised guidelines on 27 July 2026 for admitting persons with disabilities to MBBS courses, replacing certificate-based disqualification with a functional assessment of whether a candidate can acquire the competencies needed to practise medicine. The change follows repeated legal challenges, including before the Supreme Court, to the earlier guidelines’ blanket exclusions.

    Key Highlights

    • Shift to Functional Assessment
      • MBBS eligibility will now be based on an applicant’s functional ability rather than the disability certificate alone.
      • Assessment will determine whether the candidate can acquire the competencies required to practise medicine.
      • Designated medical boards will conduct individual functional assessments.
    • Recognition of Reasonable Accommodation
      • Disability itself is not a ground for disqualification.
      • The guidelines recognise that: Assistive technology. Institutional support. Accessible infrastructure can enable candidates to successfully complete medical education.

    Why Were the Earlier Guidelines Challenged?

    • Earlier guidelines relied on fixed disability categories and thresholds.
    • Candidates could be declared ineligible solely because of the nature or extent of disability.
    • Petitioners argued that such blanket exclusions violated the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (RPwD) Act, 2016.
    • The Supreme Court observed that systemic discrimination against persons with benchmark disabilities should be eliminated.

    Significance

    • Promotes inclusive medical education.
    • Aligns with the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (RPwD) Act, 2016.
    • Shifts from a disability-based to a competency-based admission framework.

    Rights of Persons with Disabilities (RPwD) Act, 2016

    • Replaced the Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995.
    • Expanded recognised disabilities from 7 to 21.
    • Provides 4% reservation in government jobs and 5% reservation in higher educational institutions for persons with benchmark disabilities.
    • Administered by the Department of Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities, Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment.

    National Medical Commission (NMC)

    • Established under the National Medical Commission Act, 2019.
    • Replaced the Medical Council of India (MCI).
    • Regulates medical education and medical professionals in India.

    [2026] Which of the following statements with regard to the persons with disabilities in India is/are correct?
    1. The Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, an Act passed by the Parliament of India in 2018, mandates reservation in education and employment, places a legal duty on Governments to ensure accessibility and non-discrimination.
    2. The Sugamya Bharat Abhiyan focuses on achieving universal accessibility for Persons with Disabilities across three key domains – built infrastructure, transport systems and information and communication technology.
    3. The National Divyangjan Finance and Development Corporation (NDFDC) is a public sector organization set up by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs as a not-for-profit company to promote entrepreneurship among Persons with Disabilities (PwDs).
    Select the answer using the code given below:

    [A] 1 and 2

    [B] 2 only

    [C] 1 and 3

    [D] 1 only

  • RS passes Bill to criminalise disrespect to Vande Mataram

    Why in the News

    The Rajya Sabha passed the Prevention of Insults to National Honour (Amendment) Bill, 2026 on 29 July 2026, in the absence of most Opposition members who staged a walkout. The Bill extends criminal punishment for disrespecting national symbols to the National Song, Vande Mataram, placing it on the same legal footing as the National Anthem for the first time since the original 1971 law.

    What does the Prevention of Insults to National Honour (Amendment) Bill, 2026 change?

    1. Original law: The Bill amends the Prevention of Insults to National Honour Act, 1971, which criminalises insults to the National Flag, the Constitution and the National Anthem.
    2. New provision: The amendment extends criminal punishment to acts of obstruction or disturbance during the singing of the National Song, Vande Mataram.
    3. Penalty: Intentionally preventing the singing of the National Song, or causing disturbance to an assembly singing it, will be punishable with imprisonment up to three years, or a fine, or both.
    4. Legislative path: The Bill was introduced in the Rajya Sabha on 24 July by Minister of State for Home Affairs Nityanand Rai and will now go to the Lok Sabha for consideration and passage.

    What is the historical background to Vande Mataram’s status?

    1. Origin: Vande Mataram was composed by Bankim Chandra Chatterjee in 1875, but only two stanzas were adopted as the National Song.
    2. Adoption decision: Congress leader Jawaharlal Nehru limited the National Song to two stanzas in 1937, years before he became independent India’s first Prime Minister.
    3. Constituent Assembly reference: On 24 January 1950, Rajendra Prasad told the Constituent Assembly that Vande Mataram should be honoured on par with Jana Gana Mana, the National Anthem.

    What was the political dispute around the Bill’s passage?

    1. Government framing: Minister of State for Home Affairs Nityanand Rai said the Bill represents “India’s soul, national awareness, and cultural heritage” and accused the Congress of engaging in appeasement politics by opposing it.
    2. Opposition’s walkout reason: Nearly all Opposition members walked out demanding Union Home Minister Amit Shah’s statement on the police action against students protesting paper leaks at Jantar Mantar, rather than opposing the Bill’s substance.
    3. Cross-party support noted: The Aam Aadmi Party’s Sanjay Singh said his party supports the Bill while also demanding a law against insulting the National Anthem and the Tricolour.

    Conclusion

    The Rajya Sabha has passed the Bill giving Vande Mataram the same criminal protection as the National Anthem, with the Lok Sabha’s consideration as the next legislative step. The Opposition’s walkout centred on demanding accountability for the police action against student protesters rather than opposing the Bill on its merits.

    Back2Basics:

    Prevention of Insults to National Honour Act, 1971

    1. Enactment: The original Act was passed in 1971 to penalise insults to the National Flag, the Constitution of India, and the National Anthem.
    2. Scope: It covers acts such as burning, mutilating or defacing the National Flag, and preventing or disturbing the singing of the National Anthem.
    3. Amendment history: The Act has been amended before, including through the Prevention of Insults to National Honour (Amendment) Act, 2005, to add flag code violations.

  • IRDAI Reforms to Revamp the Insurance Sector

    Why in News?

    The Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority of India (IRDAI) approved a series of reforms to modernise the insurance sector and implement the Sabka Bima Sabki Raksha (Amendment of Insurance Laws) Act, 2025.

    Key Highlights

    • Reforms aim to:
      • Improve ease of doing business.
      • Enhance insurance penetration.
      • Strengthen governance and policyholder protection.
      • Provide greater operational and financial flexibility to insurers.
    • Liberalised norms for Investments. Capital infusion. Corporate restructuring. Transfer of shares and amalgamation of insurers.
    • Policyholders’ Education and Protection Fund (PEPF) operationalised under Section 16A of the IRDA Act, 1999 to Promote insurance awareness. Improve grievance redressal. Trace unclaimed insurance amounts. Enhance policyholder services.
    • Insurance intermediaries reforms:
      • Mandatory tagging of the authorised salesperson with every insurance proposal and policy.
      • Perpetual registration for intermediaries through an annual fee system, replacing periodic renewals.

    About IRDAI

    • Statutory regulator established under the IRDA Act, 1999.
    • Regulates, promotes, and ensures orderly growth of the insurance sector.
    • Headquarters: Hyderabad.

    Prelims Facts

    • IRDA Act, 1999 established IRDAI.
    • PEPF aims to strengthen insurance literacy and policyholder protection.
    • The reforms implement the Sabka Bima Sabki Raksha (Amendment of Insurance Laws) Act, 2025.

    [2019] In India, which of the following bodies/mechanisms review the functioning of independent regulators like PFRDA, IBBI, AERA, and PNGRB?
    1.Ad Hoc Committees appointed by the Parliament.
    2.Parliamentary Standing Committees.
    3.NITI Aayog.
    4.Financial Sector Legislative Reforms Commission (FSLRC).
    5.Finance Commission.
    Select the correct answer using the code given below:

    [A] 1 and 2 only

    [B] 1, 3, and 4

    [C] 2, 4, and 5

    [D] 2 only

  • Prevention of Insults to National Honour (Amendment) Bill, 2026

    Why in News?

    The Rajya Sabha passed the Prevention of Insults to National Honour (Amendment) Bill, 2026, extending legal protection to Vande Mataram by making its intentional disruption or prevention a punishable offence.

    Key Highlights

    • Amends the Prevention of Insults to National Honour Act, 1971.
    • Makes intentional disruption or prevention of the singing of Vande Mataram punishable.
    • Punishment: Imprisonment up to 3 years, or fine, or both.
    • Seeks to accord the National Song legal protection similar to the National Anthem (Jana Gana Mana).
    • Passed by the Rajya Sabha through a voice vote.

    About the Prevention of Insults to National Honour Act, 1971

    • The Act penalises insults to: National Flag, Constitution of India, and National Anthem
    • The 2026 amendment adds protection for the National Song (Vande Mataram).

    Vande Mataram

    • Written by Bankim Chandra Chattopadhyay.
    • Originally appeared in the novel Anandamath (1882).
    • Adopted as the National Song on 24 January 1950.
    • Only the first two stanzas are accorded official status.

    Prelims Facts

    • National Anthem: Jana Gana Mana by Rabindranath Tagore.
    • National Song: Vande Mataram by Bankim Chandra Chattopadhyay.
    • 24 January 1950: Constituent Assembly adopted Jana Gana Mana as the National Anthem while according Vande Mataram equal honour as the National Song.

    [2025] Consider the following pairs:
    Provision in the Constitution of India State under
    I. Separation of Judiciary from the Executive in the Public services of the StateThe Directive principles of the State policy
    II. Valuing and preserving of the rich Heritage of our composite cultureThe Fundamental Duties
    III. Prohibition of employment of children below the age of 14 years in factoriesThe Fundamental Rights
    How many of the above pairs are correctly matched?

    [A] Only one

    [B] Only two

    [C] All the three

    [D] None

  • CPGRAMS Report for States/UTs (June 2026)

    Why in News?

    The Department of Administrative Reforms and Public Grievances (DARPG) released the 47th monthly report on the Centralized Public Grievance Redress and Monitoring System (CPGRAMS) for States/UTs for June 2026.

    Key Highlights

    • Public Grievances Received: 96,190
    • Grievances Redressed: 93,170
    • Pending Cases (30 June 2026): 2,16,032
    • 23 States/UTs have over 1,000 pending grievances.
    • Uttar Pradesh recorded the highest disposals (31,460), followed by Maharashtra (7,619).

    CPGRAMS

    • CPGRAMS is an online grievance redress platform of the Government of India.
    • Developed and monitored by DARPG.
    • Enables citizens to submit and track grievances against government departments.
    • Integrated with over 5 lakh Common Service Centres (CSCs) through 2.5 lakh Village Level Entrepreneurs (VLEs).

    Sevottam Scheme

    • Capacity-building initiative to improve public service delivery and grievance redress.
    • FY 2022-23 to FY 2026-27 (till June): 1,196 training programmes conducted. Around 39,509 officers trained.

    Other Highlights

    • 83,544 new users registered on CPGRAMS in June 2026.
    • Feedback Call Centre collected 75,318 feedbacks, including 33,092 from States/UTs.
    • 6,262 grievances were registered through CSCs.
    • A dedicated Review Module for senior-level monitoring has been operational since 6 June 2025.

    Prelims Facts

    • DARPG: Department under the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions.
    • CPGRAMS: National online portal for public grievance redressal.
    • Sevottam Scheme: Focuses on improving service delivery and grievance redress mechanisms in government.

    [2021] With reference to the Union Government, consider the following statements:
    1. N. Gopalaswamy Iyengar Committee suggested that a minister and a secretary be designated solely for pursuing the subject of administrative reform and promoting it.
    2. In 1970, the Department of Personnel was constituted on the recommendation of the Administrative Reforms Commission, 1966, and this was placed under the Prime Minister’s charge.
    Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

    [A] 1 only

    [B] 2 only

    [C] Both 1 and 2

    [D] Neither 1 nor 2

  • [29th July 2026] The Hindu OpED: Iran’s Afghan balancing act amid regional upheaval

    PYQ Relevance
    [UPSC 2013]     The proposed withdrawal of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) from Afghanistan in 2014 is fraught with major security implications for the counters of the region. Examine in light of the fact that India is faced with a plethora of challenges and needs to safeguard its own strategic interests.
    Linkage: The PYQ examines the regional security fallout of a foreign military withdrawal from Afghanistan. The article traces how the 2021 US withdrawal reshaped Iran’s Afghan calculus, a parallel instance of a withdrawal reordering regional strategic behaviour.

    Mentor’s Comment

    Delegations from both the Taliban and the rival Northern Alliance attended the funeral of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in Tehran. This dual presence exposed Iran’s continued refusal to fully commit to the Taliban government despite deep economic and diplomatic engagement with Kabul. The visit occurred while Iran was fighting a war in the west, raising the stakes of managing its eastern flank.

    Why does Iran’s history with the Northern Alliance still shape its Taliban policy today?

    1. Pre-2001 alignment: Iran backed the Northern Alliance against the Taliban through the 1990s, alongside India, Russia, and Tajikistan.
    2. Post-9/11 recalibration: Iran’s view of the Taliban shifted after the 9/11 attacks brought sustained Western military deployment to its borders.
    3. Non-recognition persists: Iran has built the strongest external influence in Kabul since 2021 but still withholds formal recognition of the Taliban government.
    4. Dual channel maintained: Iran hosted Taliban Deputy Prime Minister Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar and Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi alongside Northern Alliance leader Ahmed Massoud at the same funeral.

    How did the US withdrawal from Afghanistan reshape Iran’s regional calculus?

    1. Border threat removed: The August 2021 US withdrawal ended a two-decade military presence on Iran’s eastern border.
    2. Competing patronage exposed: Pakistan simultaneously backed the Taliban and the US-led war on terror, producing overlapping and contradictory interests.
    3. Contradiction on record: Osama bin Laden was found in Abbottabad in May 2011, in a house and not a cave, pointing to this dual role.
    4. A quieter front sought: Iran calculated that reducing conflict on its Afghan front would free up resources for other priorities.
    5. Limited patronage offered: Iran could offer the Taliban political legitimacy but only a limited amount of material patronage.

    Why does Iran keep hedging despite the Taliban’s declared wartime support?

    1. Support pledged: A Taliban spokesman close to emir Hibatullah Akhundzada said the group would support Iran if it came under attack. The extent of this support remains undefined.
    2. Access granted: The Taliban gave Iran access to Afghanistan’s civilian airports over the past year.
    3. Durability doubted: Iran treats an insurgency-turned-government as carrying a persistent question mark over its long-term stability.
    4. Internal fissures noted: Ideological and tribal divisions inside the Taliban require constant micromanagement.
    5. Power still consolidating: The Taliban is still solidifying control between Kabul, its political capital, and Kandahar, its ideological one.
    6. Institutional memory at play: Quds Force chief Esmail Qaani’s operational history traces back to the 1990s Taliban-Northern Alliance conflict. This history informs his current caution.

    Why does Iran engage both the Taliban and its opposition at once?

    1. Hedging strategy: Engaging both the recognised Taliban government and the Northern Alliance lets Iran preserve influence regardless of which side gains ground in Afghanistan’s internal balance of power.
    2. Border security concern: Iran shares a long border with Afghanistan, and instability on either side directly affects Iranian security, giving Tehran incentive to maintain channels with all major Afghan actors.
    3. Pakistan factor: Iran’s Afghanistan policy is shaped in part by its complex relationship with Pakistan, which has its own competing interests in Afghan internal politics.
    4. Regional war context: The West Asia war constrains Iran’s bandwidth and resources, making a flexible, multi track Afghan policy more practical than committing exclusively to one Afghan faction.

    What does the Iran-Pakistan wartime “brotherhood” reveal about the limits of regional alliances?

    1. Mediator role assumed: Pakistan positioned itself as a mediator between Tehran and Washington during the war.
    2. Divergent aims surfaced: Pakistan seeks favour with the US and Gulf partners, shown by its troop deployment in Saudi Arabia.
    3. Instrumental use by Iran: Iran uses the relationship as a channel to reach the US through a neighbour it knows, though does not fully trust.
    4. Bilateralism made incidental: The Iran-Pakistan relationship itself is secondary to each country’s separate external objectives.

    Conclusion

    Iran’s simultaneous engagement with the Taliban and the Northern Alliance is a hedging strategy shaped by the West Asia war’s demands on its resources and by its complicated relationship with Pakistan. The approach preserves Iranian influence in Afghanistan without requiring Tehran to bet its regional position on one Afghan faction’s success.

    Back2Basics

      Key Terms

      1. IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps): Iran’s ideological military force, separate from its regular armed forces.
      2. Quds Force: IRGC’s branch handling external operations and foreign militant networks.
      3. Northern Alliance: A coalition of anti-Taliban Afghan factions, historically backed by Iran, India, and Russia.